Pressure Politics: The Changing World of

Pressure Groups
BY WYN GRANT

THE universe of pressure groups in Britain continues to experience

quite fundamental changes. Twenty-fve years ago in 1978 the author
developed a distinction between insider groups and outsider groups.
This typology has been absorbed into the literature on pressure groups
in Britain and has even been used in A-level questions. Although it has
been criticised, the typology survived the shift from neocorporatism to
Thatcherism and the arrival of New Labour. It offered a relatively
robust model giving insights into how pressure groups ft into the polity. However, the changes taking place in British politics, particularly in
relation to pressure groups, may mean that it is less useful than it was.
This article argues that it still has some utility but accepts that the rent
to be extracted from it is probably diminishing.
The insideroutsider typology was originally developed because the
older distinction between sectional and cause or promotional groups,
although certainly not without value, seemed insuffcient, particularly
in terms of understanding group strategies. The insideroutsider distinction cuts across it. Cause groups, in particular, may be either insider
groups or outsider groups. Sectional outsider groups also exist. For
example, it has always proved diffcult to organise older people in the
population effectively because their interests are so heterogeneous. This
has led to a pattern of organisation in which insider groups and outsider groups existing alongside one another, all acting as advocates for
the elderly.
The original typology identifed three key characteristics of insider
groups.1 First, they were recognised by government as legitimate
spokespersons for particular interests or causes. To gain this, they
needed to deploy certain political skills. In particular, they needed
to talk the language of the government and civil servants in particular,
the latter involving understatement and comments made in deep code.
Second, having gained recognition, they were allowed to engage in a
dialogue on issues of concern to them. For example, they would
normally be included in formal consultation processes, but more informal consultations were often more signifcant. Third, they implicitly
agreed to abide by certain rules of the game. Failure could ultimately
lead to political exclusion. The rules included always presenting an
accurate well-researched case, neither exaggerated nor untruthful. An
Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 57 No. 2, 408419 Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government 2004; all rights reserved
10.1093/pa/gsh033

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insider group needed to know how to bargain and this included a willingness to accept the outcomes of the bargaining process. There was an
expectation that group memberships would be told that the deal arrived
might not be all that was hoped for but was the best available. The
annual farm price review was a prototypical example of this.
Outsider groups by defnition formed a more disparate and heterogeneous category. They were not subject to the disciplines imposed by
acceptance of the informal rules of the game. For the purposes of the
typology, they were divided into outsider groups by necessity and outsider groups by choice. The former were groups that would like to
become insider groups, but lacked the necessary resources or skills to
gain recognition; the latter were ideological protest groups that did not
want to be drawn into the embrace of government. The distinction is
illustrated by gay rights groups in Britain. Stonewall relied on rational
persuasion, largely conducted behind the scenes, combined with the use
celebrities for access to decision-makers up to prime-ministerial level.
OutRage relied on tactics which were seen by their critics, literally in
some cases, as outrageous, including interrupting religious ceremonies
and outing individuals who, it claims, arent honest about their own
gayness and condemn homosexuality and advocate discriminatory
laws.2 Typically of insider groups, Stonewall came to rely on a small
but professional offce staff and developed a hierarchical internal structure, while OutRage, with its commitment to grass-roots democratic
organisation, came to rely on a core of committed individuals.3
An implication of the typology was that insider groups were more
likely to be successful in achieving their objectives, if only because they
had more access to decision-makers, although this had to be balanced
by the constraints imposed by working within existing political structures. This did not mean that all insider groups had at least some
success, nor that outsider groups would never be successful. However,
there was an assumption that biases in the political arrangements of
the UK tended to favour insider groups. A useful subdivision of the
insider category was introduced in the typology: core insider groups
dealing with a broad range of issues, specialist insider groups in policy
niches, and peripheral insiders with little inFuence. Although the division in terms of strategies might be between insider and outsider
groups, the dividing line in terms of inFuence could lie elsewhere or
indeed be less clear.
There have been some criticisms of the typology. A frst minor criticism
is that strategy choices are more constrained than the typology allows.
Strategy choices are constrained by the resources available to a group,
by how well its objectives ft in with those of decision-makers and by
the power it has. There may also be an element of path-dependency in
that decisions taken at crucial points in a groups history, especially at
its formation, shape its future course. In fact, the typology never stated
that strategy choices were unconstrained: it always accepted that there

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was a complex interactive relationship between the groups, the strategies

they pursue and government.
A second minor criticism argues that it is possible to pursue both strategies simultaneously. The usual example is Greenpeace which uses both
wet suit and business suit strategies. Greenpeace continues to use protest demonstrations of various kinds, if only as a means of drawing attention to and dramatising particular environmental problems. Thus,
genetically modifed (GM) crop trials were attacked and destroyed even
though these trials eventually produced results that GM crops could have
undesirable environmental effects. However, Greenpeace also engages in
dialogue with government, business and international organisations. It
may be that Greenpeace is an exception to the rule. More generally, it is
argued that pursuing both strategies simultaneously can set up serious
tensions within a group. While such tensions have surfaced in Greenpeace
from time to time, it has been possible to control them because of its hierarchical structure and the absence of members in the normal sense of the
term.

Transparency and the consultation code

Critics of the typology have argued that it exaggerates the barriers to
gaining insider status. One study estimated that insider groups outnumber pure insiders by nine to one.4 Indeed, given the advantages of being
an insider group, one would expect there to be far more of them than
outsider groups. Being placed on a consultation list and attaining the
status of a peripheral insider is not that diffcult; indeed, it has probably
become easier under the New Labour government. Then, driven by concerns about open government and transparency, it published a code of
practice on written consultation in 2000. The preface, by Tony Blair,
claimed that New Labour was consulting more than governments in the
past, although that is diffcult to measure accurately.
The stated intention of the code was to make written consultations
more effective, opening decision-making to as wide a range of people as
possible. In other words, if its objectives were achieved, the outsider
groups by necessity category should largely disappear, leaving only ideological outsider groups. The code emphasised the use of electronic
means to make documents widely available. The internet does make it
less costly to form a group and mobilise support, as this can be done on
line from someones home. Even for established associations, the internet has substantially reduced costs and increased effectiveness of communication with members. It also lowers the costs of involvement as
responses can be made on line. Nevertheless, some skills are still necessary to access the consultation process, so not all biases could be
expected to disappear. Internet consultation is ideal for the educated
and prosperous, but does it works as well for the socially excluded? The
internet can be used as an alibi, the right to place views on a website or
submit them electronically as a substitute for real dialogue. At least the

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411

consultation criteria required documents should be as simple and as

concise as possible.
The frst annual assessment of the code showed some limits to its
impact. There had been very little systematic evaluation of consultations, and central record-keeping within departments was not comprehensive. Departments in 2001 undertook 396 consultations covered by
the code. Of these, 19% were undertaken by the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions; 17% by the Department of
Education and Skills; 17% by the Department of Health, 13% by the
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Consultations by
the core executive were rare, only fve by the Cabinet Offce and none
by the Treasury, suggesting that formal consultations were more
important for peripheral than for core insider groups. Organisations
like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) have direct access to
the core executive. Note also that involvement in a consultation is not
the same thing as direct access to policy-makers. At the EU level, where
there has been some effort to develop citizens rights in policy-making,
many non-governmental organisations still feel that the process is
highly controlled and that there is little evidence of genuine dialogue. A
notional debate is often stiFed or artifcial and involves the usual suspects. In particular, it is felt that the right to be heard should be combined with the right to feedback about the views expressed, which
happens haphazardly rather than systematically.
In September 2003 a consultation was initiated on the code of practice on consultation. This involved a rather disparate list including all
the best-known core insiders, e.g. the CBI and the British Medical Association, but also some less high-profle organisations such as the Bioindustry Association and the National Governors Council; some think-tanks
were included, e.g. Demos and the Social Market Foundation, but other
well-known ones were left out e.g. the Institute for Public Policy
Research. In a company state like Britain, it was understandable that
fve companies were included, but less explicable that three were retailers, unless these are seen as proxies for consumers. The consultation
argued that the code of practice had been effective in embedding a
twelve-week consultation period into the policy making practice. However, users took the view that it was quite long and a mixture of guidance and principles.
The code is a move in the direction of greater transparency in the
consultation process. However, the authors experience of responding
to consultations is that the way in which they are structured follows the
governments agenda rather than what might be the different priorities
of relevant interest groups. Organisations are often asked to respond to
a highly-structured questionnaire or at least to a series of specifc
points. That makes it easier for government departments to analyse
responses systematically, but it also makes the process somewhat mechanistic. It can be diffcult for groups to emphasise the points that are

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important to them or at least to do that and ensure that they will be

heard.
The documents on consultations also contain strong hints that some
groups, largely traditional insiders, will be treated more seriously than
others. It is argued that to avoid placing extra burdens on groups with
limited resources, e.g. voluntary and community organisations, it may
be better to target consultation through umbrella bodies, including
trade associations and business organisations. But it is important to
speak to those bodies at an early stage.5 Similarly, it is said that analysing responses is not just a matter of counting votes, bearing in mind
what are seen as the risks of single-issue groups monopolising debate.
The proposed revised code of consultation singles out trade associations
as a category of organisations that should be engaged with in a proactive fashion. The broader political context is that New Labour appears
to be a government well disposed to big business. An implication that
could be drawn from this discussion is that in terms of inFuence the real
line should be drawn between the core and niche insider groups (CBI
and individual trade associations respectively) on the one hand and
peripheral insider groups (e.g. some small business organisations) on
the other.

Are outsider group strategies becoming more successful?

If outsider group strategies are becoming more successful, this undermines a key prediction of the typology, namely that insider groups are
more likely to be successful and that most groups will aspire to become
insider groups. Measuring the success of groups is diffcult. There is
nevertheless some evidence that there have been increases in direct
action.6 One can argue that the anti-poll tax protests at the end of the
1980s marked a resurgence of direct action techniques, continued
through to the marches organised by the Countryside Alliance and the
massive protests against the Iraq war. Direct action tactics have, of
course, been used at different points in British history (e.g. by the
suffragette movement), but their repertoire and, to some extent, their
effectiveness have increased: partly through learning from other countries, partly through modern technology, e.g. the mobile phone and
internet. The growth in direct action is driven also by growing dissatisfaction with more conventional forms of politics because of their failure
to bring quick results. In some ways, outsider movements are more
amenable to study through the social movements paradigm developed
by sociologists than through the interest or pressure group paradigm
favoured by political scientists. The insider group, in other words, is
more frmly located on the territory of conventional political science.
A literature on the petrol protests has developed, drawing on both
political science and sociological insights.7 The protests arose from the
coming together of concerns expressed by farmers and haulage contractors. The mobile phone, combined with informal social networks,

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413

facilitated effective mobilisation of a group to blockade refneries. The

petrol distribution network was particularly vulnerable to well-organised
protest action as it was run on just-in-time principles. The reluctance of
tanker drivers to cross picket lines made the protest a success, aided by
a relatively tolerant attitude towards the protesters from the police.
However, poor tactics and internal divisions meant that only limited
concessions were actually obtained, and these were in fact largely negotiated with established insider groups despite their increasing marginalisation.8 A widespread dissatisfaction with the perceived weakness of
insider groups was, however, one of the reasons why the protests took
the form that they did. The study referred to suggests that this is further
evidence of the emergence of a movement society in which direct
action becomes accepted as a normal feature of political participation
for a much wider range of social groups than in the past.
Successive articles in this Parliamentary Affairs series have paid particular attention to competition between insider groups and outsider
groups in farming, particularly the National Farmers Union (NFU) and
Farmers for Action (FFA). The NFU seemed to follow a strategy of
ignoring the FFA, presumably in the hope that it would eventually fragment and disappear. However, the FFA has been particularly successful
in drawing support from smaller scale dairy farmers, hard hit by reductions in the price for milk. It has continued its policy of blockading
dairy processing plants and the distribution depots of retailers and has
won some concessions from retailers on milk prices, although it encountered more resistance from the processors. The National Farmers Union
of Scotland has been more willing to engage in a dialogue with FFA and
to even to join in demonstrations, and this has led to some tensions
with their English counterpart. The FFA has claimed that NFU members are more willing to cooperate at local level. There has even been
some breaking of ranks within the NFU, with the chair of its dairy committee indicating his willingness to talk to the FFA, although this could
be a carefully designed cooption strategy rather than an indication of
internal dissent. Whatever the explanation, it suggests that the NFU is
taking the outsider approach followed by the FFA more seriously,
although it has so far ruled out any coalition with them. If the FFA continues to Fourish, it would mean that farmer representation in Britain
has been divided on the French model of more conventional and more
militant organisations. That would be an indication of a declining
attractiveness of an insider strategy.
The NFU has been seen as one of the best examples of an effective
insider group in Britain ever since the classic Self and Storing book on
the organisation.9 In the summer of 2003, the NFU announced that it
was planning to move its headquarters out of London, probably to
Warwickshire. It has always been assumed that major insider groups
would be located in London or at most an hours travelling time away
(like the defence manufacturers near Guildford) because face-to-face

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meetings remain important despite extensive use of the mobile phone

and the internet. Indeed, the NFU will probably retain a small offce in
London for its parliamentary staff. The move was partly motivated by
fnancial considerations: premises and support staff are cheaper outside
London. Together with some staff losses, the move is expected to yield
annual savings of 2.3 million.
The move also reFects how the NFUs relationships with government
have changed since the replacement of an agriculture ministry by a
Department of Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (Defra) with different priorities. Of course, the NFU retains close links with Defra and
has access to ministers, even the Prime Minister, and close consultation
with Defra continues on some issues, e.g. the new single farm payments
resulting from Common Agricultural Policy reform. It is also interesting
that when the NFU Scotland appointed a new chief executive they chose
the chief agricultural offcer of the Scottish Executives Environment
and Rural Affairs Department. Nevertheless, the relationship is different from that with the old ministry. The NFU appears to have taken a
strategic decision to move closer to its members and the market-place
and to downplay close links with government, although they will still
be important. The case of the NFU has, of course, special features arising from changes in agricultural policy towards a greater emphasis on
public goods, e.g. attractive landscapes produced by agriculture. A
major shift is bound to affect interest organisations and to lead to the
emergence of protest groups reFecting the concerns prompted by such
change.

The Huntingdon Life Sciences protest

The continuing protest at Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) raises issues
about the proper limits of direct action and about how far government
or courts should intervene to set them. In many respects, the campaign
against HLS remains a stalemate. HLS continues to operate, but under
conditions of considerable diffculty created by the protesters. The companys headquarters were moved to Maryland and two key board members felt unable to continue and were replaced by individuals with no
apparent relevant experience. Even its refuse-collector contractor withdrew its services, while HLS had to spend 750,000 on a piped gas supply to its site after the refusal of local fuel companies to deliver oil by
tanker. The government had to step in to provide special banking
arrangements and emergency insurance cover. All this is thought to
have been achieved by no more by twenty core activists, backed up by a
network of over one thousand supporters in the UK and overseas.
There is no sign of the campaign abating, but there is an apparent
sense in government and big business that it is important to draw a line
in the sand in relation to the HLS protest. It is feared that if the campaign is successful, the protesters will use the same tactics against frms
that are more important to the British economy, such as pharmaceutical

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companies. Government is therefore concerned to ensure that sciencebased industries in Britain are not placed in greater jeopardy, the biotechnology industry already having taken a battering over GM crops; plant
scientists have also been the subject of demonstrations and abusive
emails from environmental groups. If the direct action techniques used
against HLS appear to be successful, and cannot be restrained by state
action, they are likely to be replicated elsewhere, increasing the credibility of strong forms of direct action as a means of protest.
The biotechnology industry has put pressure on the government for
legislation that would criminalise intimidation and threats by animal
rights activists. According to the BioIndustry Association, in the last
quarter of 2002 there were 62 visits by activists to the homes of directors
or employees of companies linked to animal testing, and 20,000 emails,
phone calls or text messages were received. In the summer of 2003 the
Home Offce tabled two amendments to the anti-social behaviour bill at
its report stage in the House of Commons. Lord Sainsbury, the Science
Minister, said that they reFected the governments determination to
beat extremists who had focused on HLS. The frst amendment reduced
from 20 to just two the number of people who constitute a public
assembly within the meaning of the Public Order Act. Police can direct
the behaviour of a public assembly in a way that is not possible for
some smaller groups, and some demonstrations were deliberately kept
below 20 to make police action more diffcult. The second amendment
extended aggravated trespass to people obstructing activities within
buildings, rather than confning such trespass to the open air.
The BioIndustry Association welcomed the amendments, but said
that changing small pieces of legislation did not go far enough. It
wanted comprehensive legislation to address animal rights extremism,
including measures making it illegal to demonstrate within sight or
sound of peoples homes. Such legislation would have to be drafted very
carefully, however, if it was not to place wide restrictions on the right
to protest. Moreover, many would see it as improper to target legislation specifcally at a group of people advocating a particular cause.
Civil liberties groups would argue that there are suffcient controls
under existing public order legislation to deal with demonstrations.
The HLS protesters have also being pursued with some success
through the courts under the 1997 Protection Against Harassment Act,
although the judgements have been qualifed and not all the associated
issues have necessarily been resolved. The 1997 Act, passed by the
Major government, was prompted in part by media publicity regarding
individual victims of stalkers. It is questionable whether the law was
designed to deal with mass protests and large groups of victims,
although up to the time of writing the courts have largely sided with
claimants rather than protesters. Part of the attraction of the 1997 Act
is that it offers the party being harassed a civil damages remedy. However, if the harassers breach a court injunction, they guilty of criminal

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conduct, punishable by up to fve years in jail. Law enforcement offcers

might fnd this an attractive way of dealing with the diffculties caused
by the HLS protests.
In April 2003 the High Court granted innovative ffty-yard exclusion
zones around the homes of HLS employees, as well as limiting demonstrations at HLS itself; protesters cannot go within one hundred yards
of its offces except for peaceful protests of no more than twelve activists once a week. These injunctions were subsequently renewed and
extended to employees at fve Japanese multinational companies that
are clients of HLS, whose UK branches had been targeted after the
injunctions secured by HLS. It was claimed that the companies had
received threatening letters, phone calls and offensive material and had
been the subject of criminal damage, frebombing and hoax calls.
Though the judge ruled that the reference to a person in the 1997 Act
did not cover a company or corporate entity, claims could be brought
by a named individual in each company on his own behalf and on
behalf of its employees. Lawyers for the protesters have argued that the
restrictions sought are disproportionate; that they breach the rights to
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly under human rights legislation; and that, in any event, the police have all the powers they need
to deal with the dangers of any unlawful action.
Many might fnd reprehensible the tactics used by individual protesters, including some acting on their own initiative with no links to Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty. The protesters would argue that they have
been increasingly careful to stay within the law and that their tactics are
justifed by the moral imperative of ending cruel treatment of animals.
There are, however, two risks with this approach. One is that will
encourage the wider use of new forms of direct action that prevent individuals pursuing lawful activities and that may also disrupt the lives of
third parties who have no connection with the activity that is disapproved of. Second, it may lead to new legislation or court decisions that
erode important civil liberties.

Business Influence
The general conclusion in relation to the insider/outsider distinction is
that it is still valid but increasingly open to challenge. This is not so
much because of weaknesses in the categorisation itself but because the
nature of politics generally, and pressure politics in particular, are
undergoing some signifcant changes. Nevertheless, narratives of inclusion and exclusion remain important to the study of politics, particularly when one is looking to see where power is located. There are still
important and largely unchallenged concentrations of power in the system, and one of those is big business.
An argument increasingly heard at the EU level is that the inFuence of
business is declining as non-governmental organisations gain ground in a
new political climate which claims to be more citizen-oriented. Business

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417

is past its sell-by date as highly-targeted trade associations have diffculty in getting to grips with ideas of participatory democracy. The days
of the old, grey trade association are numbered. Arguments that hold
weight in the boardroom no longer have sway with decision-makers.
The associations with inFuence will be those which lobby with citizen
evidence and can demonstrate effective links with non-governmental
organisations. Although arguments of this kind are most commonly
heard from non-governmental organisations themselves, it is noticeable
that European business associations were slow off the mark in dealing
with the GM issue because it did not ft traditional structures. Companies had to take the initiative. There is a view among practitioners of
business politics that associations organised at the domestic level are
not dealing effectively with global challenges.
Nevertheless, the domestic level remains important. Business inFuence at the EU level has its own distinctive features and remains important, but the implementation of EU policy is mainly at the domestic
level. The recently published Commission paper on the control of
chemicals disappointed both business and environmentalists, but it was
considerably watered down from the original proposals as a result of
business lobbying. However, when it is eventually adopted, enforcement will occur principally at the national level.
Relations between the Confederation of British Industry and the
Labour government went through a diffcult period after the March
2002 budget raised business taxes without prior warning or consultation. The CBI was critical of the government at its November 2002 conference, publicising a survey which showed that 66% of respondents in
256 companies thought that the government was less business-friendly
than fve years earlier. A particularly acrimonious meeting between the
Prime Minister and the CBI in January 2003 was seen as a six-year low
point in the generally harmonious relationship between Labour and big
business. After that, however, relations started to improve. Ministers
went on a charm offensive and the April 2003 budget contained no
unpleasant surprises. In June 2003 Britain blocked an EU directive protecting the pay and employment rights of temporary staff, to the relief
of business leaders and the disappointment of trade unionists. Union
leaders were openly critical of the close relationship between the CBI
and the government, while the CBIs director general, Digby Jones,
claimed that union leaders were trying to proft from the governments
political vulnerability. The issues of business taxation and the burden
of regulation continued, however, to be a source of tension and the
Treasury was reported to be angered by an October 2003 CBI report
claiming that Labour had added an extra 54bn to company tax bills
since coming to offce.
A further complication is that the CBI is not the only organisation
that represents business as a whole. The British Chambers of Commerce
(BCC) has faced a diffcult period since its then director general was

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removed from offce in April 2002, just days before its annual conference. In September 2003 the Bristol chamber stopped paying its fees to
BCC and merged with some neighbouring chambers as Business West.
The BCC survived this split, but it would seem sensible to bring its
regional strengths together with the national strength of the CBI. However, the BCC is seen as more representative of smaller businesses than
the CBI and the last set of merger talks in 1999 ended in failure.
The Institute of Directors (IoD) represents individual business persons and has always been seen as being to the right of the other organisations. However, in October 2003 it sent its controversial and
outspoken policy director, Ruth Lea, on gardening leave. This was
interpreted as an attempt to build bridges between the IoD and the government. In addition to these relatively well known organisations, there
are more shadowy bodies such as the Multinational Chairmens Group
which organises major companies and enjoys an annual meeting with
the Prime Minister. It is evident that there are several channels open to
business to inFuence the government and the argument that business as
an organised interest enjoys a more favourable position than most other
interests remains valid. It will be interesting to see whether business
turns more to the Conservative Party to articulate its interests now that
the party is thought to have a more competent leader in Michael
Howard.

Conclusion
Old style insider politics has not disappeared. For example, the
National Trust, which has over three million members, has placed a
new emphasis on inFuencing government policy through traditional
networking strategies since a new director general was appointed in
2001. Established links with the Department for Food, Environment
and Rural Affairs and with the Department for Culture, Media and
Sport have been extended to embrace the Department of Trade and
Industry. A particular effort has been made to inFuence the governments policies on farming and the rural economy. However, alongside
the exercise of quiet persuasion in the corridors of power, one has seen
the emergence of movements composed of very disparate groups like
the Stop the War Coalition. In agriculture, the established insider
groups have continued to be challenged by movements relying on direct
action such as Farmers for Action. If legislation is passed effectively to
prohibit hunting with dogs, various forms of civil disobedience have
been forecast by those who want to go hunting. Many of the political
issues that Britain faces, not least those that relate to animal protection
issues, involve fundamental differences of principle that cannot be
resolved through negotiation and compromise. The continued importance of traditional forms of pressure politics should not be underrated
because they are less visible and, while newer forms of protest politics
are likely to continue to increase, they have yet to become the norm.

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