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In all cases we have filmed the best available copy. Un ieShins International 300 N. ZEEB AD., ANN ARBOR. Mi 48106512618 Hamblin, William James ‘THE FATIMID ARMY DURING THE EARLY CRUSADES The University of Michigan PHD. 1985 University Microfilms International sow. zeeb road, Ann arbor M4105 Copyright 1985 by Hamblin, William James All Rights Reserved‘THE FRTIMID ARMY DURING THE EARLY CRUSADES by William James Hamblin A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Pailosophy (History) in The University of Michigan 1985 Doctoral Committee: Professor Andrew Bhrenkreutz, Chairman Professor James Bellamy Associate Professor Rudi P. Lindner Professor X. Allin LutherRULES REGARDING THE USE OF MICROFILMED DISSERTATIONS Microfilmed or bound copies of doctoral dissertations submitted to The University of Michigan and made available through University Micre- films International or The University of Michigan are open for inspection, but they are to be used only with due regard for the rights of the author. Extensive copying of the dissertation or publication of material in excess of standard copyright limits, whether ot not the dissertation has been copy righted, must have been approved by the author as well as by the Dean of the Graduate School. Proper credit must be givea to the author if any material from the dissertation is used in subsequent written or published work,@ William James Hemblin 1985 Ali Rights ReservedFor Loree, Always iiTABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION. 2 ee ee te ee ee eee ee ee GE LIST OF APPENDICES». - eee ee eee ee ee ee iv CHAPTER I, INTRODUCTION. 2 eee ee ee ee ee ee eed II, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND... ee ee eee 6 III, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FATIMID ARME .... 13 IV, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY... 96 V, WEAPONS, TACTICS AND MILITARY THEORY . . . . 138 VI. FATIMID FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGY . . . . 199 VII, THE FAPIMID ARMY IN ACTION. ©... 1 + + + 235 VIII. CONCLUSIONS 26 ee ee ee eee ee 298 APPENDICES 6 oe ee ee ee ee ee ee es 802 BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 ee ee ee ee ee ee ee + 209 iiiLIST OF APPENDICES Appendix B Chronology 2... ee eee ee ee ee 302 3 ~i Khusrav's description of the Fatimid Army 2... 1... +e. . 304 ivCHAPTER T INTRODUCTION This study arose from an attempt to answer the question, "Why and how did the Fatimid army lose southern Palestine to the Crusaders?” Of course in reality this question has been asked many times before, and a number of different answers have been posed by some excellent scholars. However, past studies of the early Crusades in southern Palestine have been limited in a number of ways, First, and perhaps most significant, is the lack of a serious study of the wide range of Arabic sources. This is certainly true of most medievalists who deal with the Crusades, and although some Islamicists have made important contributions in this era, the later Fatimids have been woefully neglected The full use of Arabic sources can add significant etails to the study of this period. A second related problem is the nearly universal tendency on the part of past historians to present the history of the early Crusades with a strong Latin bias. 1, Although some study has been done on the early Fatimid period, there still is no adequate history of she entire dynasty.This tendency, although understandable, is no longer acceptable. Great strides have been made in recent years in dealing with the history of the Middle Fast from the Muslim point of view for the period after saladin’, but by comparison, the first half of the twelfth century has been untouched. The most damaging effect of a Latin bias is the tendency to establish a general outline based on Latin sources, using the Muslim sources mainly to fill in a few additional details. as I hope to show, serious consideration of the Muslim sources reveals a substantially different picture of the Crusader conquests. This study of the Fatimid loss of Palestine to the Franks consists of two major parts, The first discusses the nature of the Fatimid military establishment opposing the Franks (chapters 3-5). Past descriptions of the Fatimid army were woefully incomplete. Dr. R. C. smail, in his superb book Causading Wangane, regrets that he was only able to use translated Muslim sources, adding that, "Scholars better equipped for research into Byzantine and Arabic sources might well take this 2. Especially Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, Lyons and Jackson, SaLadin, Humphreys, From Saladin to the Nongols, and Ayalon's works cited in the Bibliography.subject further and it is to be hoped that one of them will do so'." Unfortunately, Dr. Smail's hope, at least for the study of the early period of the Crusades, has remained unfulfilled. It may seem gratuitous at first, but it is impossible to understand the events in Palestine until the nature of the Fatimid army and military response to the Crusaders has been accurately defined. Until now the Fatimids have often served historians as little more than straw men for the Crusaders to knock over one by one. The second facet of the problem is to examine the strategic and tactical actions and goals of the Fatimids in the region, What exactly were the Fatimids doing and why? This question is discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Althcugh the story of the early Crusades has often been told, Fatimid activities have never been studied in detail. The Latin bias, neglect of Arabic sources, and ignorance of Muslim technical military terminology ar? theory by nearly all past military historians has made it necessary to revise many battle accounts. A fresh examination of the story from the Fatimid perspective reveals a number of new dimensions to the course of 3, Smail p, vi.events. Centering only on the Fatimid field army, this study will not deal with two additional aspects of military history. Descriptions of Fatimid naval administration, technology and tactics must await further study. Likewise, it will not be possible to treat the technical aspects of siegecraft and fortifications. However, the Fatimid theory of siegecraft and the broader strategic importance of the Fatimid navy will be considered in chapters five and six. I hope that this study will serve three major purposes. First, it will shed some much needed illumination on late Fatimid history and administration, Second, it will present a more accurate and balanced nterpretation of the events of the first two decades of the Crusades. Finally, a more complete understanding of one portion of the military history of the Islamic world will emerge, thereby correcting some distortions in medieval military history. Many of the problems discussed here leave room for varied opinions. The inclusion of Arabic sources, often inaccessible or ignored in past studies of the military history of the Crusades, has added a number of significant pieces to the story, allowing us to fittogether what had formerly seemed scattered and unconnected blocks of evidence. However, many gaps still remain which will probably never be completely filled. My goal is not so much to provide a definitive account of the Fatimid army and military activities -- although I have attempted to present as complete a description as possible -- but to organize a consistent picture which can account for the known evidence and generate useful hypotheses about those areas for which direct ovidence is lacking.CHAPTER II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The political and military situation in the Middle Bast in 1095, when Al-Afdal assumed absolute rule in Egypt in all but name, was drastically different from that of only thirty-five years earlier. The Fatimid response to the Crusader invasions can best be understood with the preceding decades in sind’. tn 1060 the Middle East was divided between three more or less evenly matched and mutually antagonistic empires: the Saljtgid sultanate, centered (at least in its western portions) on Baghdad and maintaining control over northern Iraq; the Byzantine Empire ruling Anatolia from its capital at Constentinople; and the Fatimids of Cairo, who controlled most of Syria. As is well known, 1, For background from the Byzantine perspective see Jenkins, Byzantium; Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century* in Setton, Crusades; Hussey, "Later Macedonians" in Hussey, Byzantine Empine, and especially the related bibliography for this chapter. The Saljugids and Fatimids have received much less attention than the Byzantines, and a complete modern study is available for neither dynasty. Brief introductions can be found in: Cahen "Turkish Invasions" and Gibb "Caliphate" in Setton Crusades; O'Leary, History of the Fagimida; Zakkar, A£eppc. 6the developments of the four decades following 1060 completely changed the political map of the Middle East and greatly facilitate the Crusader invasions. The crucial decades were the 1060s and 1070s, during which both the Byzantines and Fatimids suffered major military defeats and civil wars. For the Byzantines, a decline in strength culminated in the unprecedented military disaster at Manzikert in 1071 followed by a decade of civil war and Turkish invaders. From the Ftimid military perspective, three significant changes derived from Manzikert and the Byzantine civil wars. First, the Byzantines, as a major military power, were driven from Syria and the Levant. They would not return in force until the 1130s when they were active only in northern Syria, far from any potential military conflict with the Fatimids, Second, the Turkish invasions of Anatolia undoubtedly saved Egypt from Saljigid conquest. In 1071 Alp Arsian was actually planning an invasion of Egypt when the advance of the Byzantine army under Romanus Diogenes distracted his attention from the south’. Although dealing with the "what ifs" of history is a risky undertaking at best, it seems likely that if 2. Cahen, "The Turkish Invasion" p. 149.Turkish access to Anatolia had been barred during the last quarter of the eleventh century much of the Turkish military strength that was actually expended against the Byzantines would have been turned against Egypt, which in its weakened condition after the great Civil War would probably have been overwhelmed. Finally, and perhaps most significant for this study, the Byzantine loss of Anatolia initiated a chain of events which culminated in the invasions of the Crusaders. The great catastrophe for the Fatimids vas a combination of famine, plague, and economic decline coupled with the transformation of the ever present factionalism between the various regiments of the arny into a full-fledged civil war. Beginning in 1062, Egypt suffered from economic depressior and anarchy as the rival Turkish, Berber and Sudari.corps vied for control of the government and plundered palaces and villages. This military and economic chaos lasted over ten years until 1074, when al-Mustan Muslim general Badr al-Jamali from Syria. As Wazir Badr al-Jam@li restored peace and stability to Egypt after a series of campaigns which lasted until 1077, when hedefeated the major Saljigqid invasion of Egypt . This period of anarchy had three major effects on the militery affairs of the Fatimids in the twelfth century. First, the Fatimids, who in 1060 had held control over most of Greater Syria, by 1077 held only some of the maritime cities and the southern region of Palestine. Second, Badr al-Janiéli initiated major military reforms, an important part of which was the decline of the Turks as the leading military corps and their replacenent by Christian Armenian mercenaries « Finally, real political power was taken from the Fatimid caliphs and invested in the hands of the Wazlr Badr al-Jamali and later his son al-Afdal, who took control of both the civil and military affairs of Egypt. In the process there occurred a major shift in Fatimid foreign policy from an expansionist religious ideology to an 5 Egyptocentric military dictatorship . Thus by 1080 the Saljigids had wrested most of Syria and much of Anatolia from the Fatimids and Byzantines. 3, Greenstone, "Turkoman Defeat at Cairo.” 4. For a discussion of these military matters see ch. 3.1.1 and 3.2.5, 5, The foreign policy goals of the Jamlian dynasty are discussed in ch. 6.10 But if the politics of the Midéle East had developed a new pattern, it was not stable, for although the Saljgids had seemingly emerged victorious. having crushed the Byzantine army at Manzikert and driven the disorganized Fatimids from Syria, their victories were ephemerai. The death of the great Sultan Malikshah in 1092 once again transformed the situation in the Middle East. The rulers of the Saljigids, who had once seemed destined not only to maintain control over most of the Middle East but perhaps even to conquer Egypt, became fragmented into feuding successor states. Both the Byzantine and the Fatimid Empires were transformed and revitalized, albeit on a more limited scale, by the establishment of "successor" dynasties, whose respective leaders, Alexius Comnenus and Badr al-Jamali, managed to stem the course of decline, reestablish internal security, initiate significant institutional reforms and begin attempts to reconguer lost territory from the successors to the SaljUgids. In the last decades of the eli enth century both the Byzantines and Fitimids began successful military operations aimed at ousting the Saljlgids from their recently conquered territories, while the Saljtigids and other Turkic principalities became progressively more fragmented, and Armenian lordsestablished a number of independent principalities in Cilicia. Thus in 1095, when Al-Afgal succeeded his father as Wazir and Supreme Military Commander (Amin al-Juyish), the political and military situation in the Middle East was again in a precarious balance, with the overall situation much more unstable than in 1060. To the east, Barkiyarug had succeeded to the Imperial title of his father Malikshah, but not to his Imperial authority. The fragmentation which had begun during his father's reign was greatly accelerated during the three short years of his brother Mahmid's rule (1092-5), leaving Barkiyarug without authority in Anatolia, and nearly so in Syria, Northern Iraq, and parts of Iran, To the west the Comneni had reestablished order and were even expanding Byzantine power to some degree, but Constantinople had lost effective control over most of Anatolia which remained in the hands of either Turkish or Armenian principalities, or had become a "no-man's land." The Patimids maintained control of Egypt but had lost all of their holdings in Syria except the strip of coast from Ascalon to Beirut. The area separating these three major powers, eastern Anatolia, northern Iraq, and Syria, was held by a series of independent and12 semi-independent principalities and clients. It was into this region at this time of maximum political and military confusion that the Crusaders attacked, bringing about @ complete reorganization of the political and military balance of the region, resulting in a drastic restructuring of Fatimid foreign policy. The nature of the Fatimid military response to this important new element in the political balance of the Middle Bast is the subject of this study.CHAPTER III THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY The activities of the Fatimid army had far reaching effects in Egypt and Palestine in the twelfth century. Fatimid government administration centered around the tasks of feeding, equipping, training and recrui soldiers for the army, and almost all government policies had as at least part of their purpose the preservation of the strength of the army. During the first half of the twelfth century the Fatimid army was responsible both for the security that Egypt enjoyed against outside invaders, as well as the devastating anarchy which engulfed Egypt during the periods when the army plunged the country into civil war. Despite the importance of the military establishne: in the history of the Fatimid dynasty little has been written about the details cf the organization of the d army in the tvelfth century, and what has been 1 written tends to be confused and uncritical . This chapter will examine how the army of the Fatimid dynasty was organized during the period of the early Crusades. 1, Beshir "Fatimid Military"; Smail pp. 83-7.3.1 Geographical and Ethnic Divisions In its broadest sense the Fatimid army vas divided into three categories, the mashiiga (easterners), soldiers o inating east of Egyp' the maghaniba (westerners), whose homelands were to the west of Egypt, and the Sudani or Blacks , whose geographical origins were to the south of Egypt. Each of these three divisions could potentially contain a number of different cultural, linguistic, and religious groups’. The actual numbers, sources, and relative proportions of the soldiers in each of these ee groups varied greatly throughout the history of the Fatimid dynasty. Attempting to understand the nature of these groups is complicated by the fact that depending on the historical source and period in question, the sub-groups included under these broad designations could vary. 1, In this study i have followed the medieval Arabic sources by adopting the Arabic word sudani to refer to Black African troops serving in the Fatimid army, either as mamlUks or mercenaries. 2. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves" p. 481 discusses this topic briefly,Egyptian-born sons of soldiers originally recruited elsewhere would often still be considered as part of the groups of their respective fathers’. On the other hand, any regiment of the Fatimid army could also be called "Egyptian" to distinguish it from regiments of other dynasties. Initially these terms seem to have been used to differentiate between the large body of Fatimid soldiers who had migrated from North Africa at the time of the Fatimid conquest of Egypt from those defeated Ikhshidid soldiers who were recruited by the Fatimids and enlisted in their army’, and should be thought of as being general descriptions rather than technical designations. By the twelfth century, however, the terms were used in a fairly limited sense. The MaghAriba referred primarily to Berber tribes, whether aries or soldiers serving in the regular regiments, although it seems that Arabs from North Africa and Barga could have been included as part of the 3. Na most of the Mashariga were actually Egyptian born sons of Turks or Persians. r i Khusrav tr. p. 217, states that in the 1060s 4, Bacharach, "African Military Slaves” p. 480 discusses the fate of Ikhshidid troops after the Fatimid conquest.Maghdriba. The Mashariga encompassed a broad range of peoples, including Turks, Syrians, Arabs, and Armenians, although at different times different groups tended to dominate the Mashriga coalition. Sudanis were drawn mainly from black slaves (abid af-shina'), although it is not impossible that non-slave Sudanis from Nubia, Ethiopia, and the black bedouin tribes of upper Egypt and the Sudan could have enlisted as free mercenaries as well. The actual organization of specific regiments did not always reflect these broad geographical divisions. Although some regiments were apparently always composed of soldiers drawn from a single geographical oe a and the Ustadhs, could be 6 composed of recruits from any of the regions , while the others, such as the Huja geographical origins of some regiments seem to have 7 changed over time . These geographical terms are used 5, The Daylami regiment was apparently composed solely of Daylami mercenaries, while the Rayhaniya regiment (see 3.2.5 below) seems to have been composed Sudani namliks. 6, See 3.2.1 and 3.2-3 respectively. 7. If my interpretation of the development of the_ JuyBshiya regiment from mainly Mash@riga to Sudani is correct, see 3.2.5 below.17 most often in the sources during times of factionalism and civil wars, which often took the form of pitting the various regional groups against one another, although alliances between any two cf the three groups against the third also occurred on occasion. Variations und shifts in the policies of recruiting troops from the three regions were based primarily on three considerations: the military needs of the dynasty and perceived or actual military effectiveness of the soldiers in the respective groups; the current political situation and relative alignment or factionalism of the different groups; and the direct accessibility and availability of men from a given region for recruitment. Specific details of shifts in the recruiting pattern are difficult to determine, although general trends are fairly clear. During the reign of al-‘aziz and al-Mustansir the dynasty recruited large numpers of Turks, Daylamis and other Mashariga. This was due to three major factors: the excellence of these troops in combat, the desire to establish a counterweight to the political power of the Maghdribe, and the recent severing of many ties with North Africa18 8 which rendered recruitment from that region difficult . An attempt was made to counter the subsequent rise of Turkish influence in Egypt by recruiting increasingly large numbers of Sudanis, culminating in the major civil wars of the 1060s between the Mashdriga and sudinis . The temporary victory of the Mashariga regiments was countered by al-Mustangir through the introduction of Badr al-Jamali from Syria with his army composed largely of Armenians. Subsequent wars with the Saljigids of Syria not only rendered the recruitment of Turks difficult but also foolish, since it would establish a large Turkish regiment which could potentially defect to Syrian Saljigid princes, Nonetheless, tie recruitment of troops from eastern regions continued at varying WW levels throughout the history of the dynasty . It should be emphasized in this regard that during the entire latter history of the Fatimids no group was 8. See Lev, "Fatimid Army,” for a discussion of al-‘aziz's nilitary reforms. 9, Bacharach, "African Military Slaves" pp. 482££ discusses this development. 10, Oa the importance and role of Armenians in the Jamalian army see 3.1.1. 11, See below 3.1.3 and 3.3.2.13 ever completely eliminated as a source of recruits. Even during the wars with the Saljtigid Turks, the Fatimid continued to hire Turkish mercenaries and samliks By al-Afgal's time, however, the numbers and influence of the Turks and Berbers in the army had been greatly curtailed. Although they continued to appear as individual mercenaries, there is no indication that either group was able to play as significant a political role as earlier, Thus, although Turkish and Maghariba troops were never totally eliminated from the Fatimid ranks, the reign of al-Afdel was dominated by Armenians and Sudnis. Each of these major groups will be discussed below. 3.1.1 Armenians Historians have long recognized the important role of the Armenians in the political and military history 13 of the Patimid dynasty . However, the exact nature and 12. Such as a group of Turks serving under Suqmin after his loss of Jerusalem to al-afdal in 1098, on which see 3.1.3 and 3.3.2. 13. See Canard, "Vizier" and "Armeniens,” for the fullest discussion,20 full extent of their activities has never been fully understood. Although some Armenians found their way to Egypt in the Ninth-and Tenth centuries, the major migration to Egypt formed a part of a general dispersal from Anatolia beginning in the eleventh century". The period of significant Armenian power and influence in Egypt began in 1073 when the Armenian Muslim Badr al-Jam&ll was installed as Wazir and usurped authority from the Caliph al-Mustangir. By 1087 there were at least 19,000 Armenian families, numbering around 30,000 people, resident in Egypt, and many, if not most, of the family heads served in the oa They first appeared in an independent political role when they demanded that Badr al-camali's eldest son succeed nin’. Perhaps the most important factor that has not been recognized is that most of the Armenians who joined the army remained Christian. In 1087 Gregory, Patriarch of the Armenians, made a state visit to Egypt and was 14, See Canard, "Armeniens," 143f£. 15. Lige of St. Neases, translated in Canard, "Armeniens,” p. 148 for the 10,000 families; Matthew of Edessa quoted by Canard p. 149 for the 30,000 total. 16. Mag. 3:62.21 17 received with honor by Badr al-Jamali . While in Egypt Gregory consecrated his nephev to be Patriarch over the Armenians in ae In 1090 Badr al-Jamali granted the Armenian soldiers (af-anman al-Gskaniya) the suburb of al-Hasaniya to the northwest of Cairo, and gave sem an unused Jacobite church for worship, clearly indicating the presence of a large Armenian Christian element among the soldiers. Later other churches were endowed and built for the Armenians by Badr ai-sansi?. In 1110 Shams al-Khiladfa attempted an abortive coup in Ascalon in which he was supported by 300 Armenian Christian oe erie Bahram, an Armenian Christian governor and general, became Wazir of Egypt in 1134 and was supported by a strong Armenian Christian army. This Christian dominance so infuriated the Muslims elements of the army that they united under Rigwan ibn Walkhashi and revolted against Bahram 17, Mug. 42145 18. Lige of St. Nexses translation in Canard, "armeniens," p. 148. 19, Mug. 2.3:225/355-6. 20. Abu Salih, fol. 47b-48a. 21, For a discussion of this incident see ch. 6.1.1.declaring their campaign to be a jihdd, using as their war-cry "Ya mijahidin = 0 fighters of jihad," and attaching pages of the Qur'an to their lances when they went into battle in an attempt to lure the Muslin supporters of Bahram away from his Christian cay The importance of Christians among the Armenian soldiers continued until the end of the dynasty, for the Armenian patriarch fled Egypt after the defeat of the Armenian troops by Saladin in 1171, implying that he somehow felt threatened by the elimination of the Armenian soldiers which would be less likely had they not been Christian arnenians’. These Armenians dominated the Fatimid military during this period. According the Ibn al-Mugaffa‘, the majority of Badr al-Jamali's soldiers (askax) were 24 = Armenians , a statement confirmed by Magrizi, who wrote that Badr al-Jamali "established for himself a jund and “askan of Armenians, and trom that time most of the jaysh 22. IMug. 3.1:30/48-9, It is interesting to note that there is no similar instance of Fatimid troops using Jihad peopaganda against the Frankish Christians during the first decades of their wars. 23. Abi Salih, fol. 2b p. 5. 24. IMug. 2.3:219/344-523 25 became Armenians and the Kutamas (Berbers) declined .” The exact significance of these statements requires some attention, When Badr al-Jamali was called by al-Mustansir to Egypt he brought with hima large army composed of a number of different elements, including a significant number of Armenians; many others migrated to Egypt in subsequent years, In his reconstruction of the Egyptian army the Armenians played an increasingly important role. Due to the disruptions in Anatolia caused by the Turkish invasions large numbers of Armenians, who were often considered excellent soldiers”, vere willing to immigrate and take military service in Egypt. More important, from Badr al-Janali's point of view, a body of Armenian Christian soldiers, far from their homeland and co-religionists, would provide a loyal power base for his personal authority in Egypt. Whereas the allegiance of Turks, Berbers and Sudanis might shift to different leaders or power gtoups, the Armenians would be bound to the Armenian Jani dynasty upon whose success their own power and position rested. 25. Magkh, 2:12b 26, Smail, p. 47.24 As will be discussed below, the size of the regular Fatimid army stationed at Cairo amounted to between ten and fifteen thousand men’. what portion of this vas Armenian? We have three basically independent sources on the size of the Armenian force in Cairo: the Life of St. Nerses claims there were 10,000 Armenian families in cairo’’; Michael of Edessa says there vere 30,000 Armenians in ore and Magrizi tells us that "The largest of the suburbs (of Cairo) was the Hasaniya ... the Armenian cavalry and infantry lived there, numbering 7000 or sore’"* these three sources can be easily reconciled: ten thousand families could number around 30,000 people total, of which 7000 would be actual soldiers, the rest being women, children, or men engaged in non-military occupations. Accepting the figure of of 7000 Armenian soldiers garrisoned at Cairo, it becomes clear that they would indeed represent most of the 27, See 3.4.2. 28. Quoted by Canard, "Armeniens," p. 148. 29. Ibid. 149. 30. MagKh. 2:21, quoting Ibn ‘Abd ai-Zahir." regular troops there as claimed by Ibn al-Mugeffa® and magtiei It seems that this numerical dominance by Armenians in the army did not last long after the death of al-Afdal, and was perhaps eroded even before. In 1134 when Bahram was summoned by al-Hafiz to restore order in Cairo, he mobilized the Armenian soldiers from the countryside in the western Delta where he was eae In all the factional fighting between the various regiments of Cairo in the preceding years there is no mention of direct political involvement by any regiment of Araenians’. At some point between the death of Badr al-JamAli and the rise of Bahram the 31, However, beyond the fact that all of these numbers may simply be inaccurate, another possible interpretation is that Matthew's 30,000 people and the Narses 10,000 families represents the total of Armenians in all_of Egypt rather than just those Cairo, and Magrizi's 7000 figure should be seen as the total number of Armenians in living in Cairo of which perhaps only 2-3000 might have actually been soldiers. 32, Mag. 32155 33. Despite the fact that Bahram's Armenians were located in the Delta, it appears that there were still some Armenians in Cairo, for Ibn Walkhashi burned their quarter, sacked their Churches and killed the Armenian patriarch. IMug. 3.1:32/50. Furthermore, Armenians were probably members of certain regiments such as the Hujariya, which as a whole would not have been calleé Armenian, see ch. 3.2.3.26 Armenians lost their position of dominance in the army at Cairo, Bahrdm's coup thus represents the return of Armenian influence and power to the capital. All details of the tactical military role of the Armenians are not clear, but some general outlines emerge from the sources. First, it should be emphasized that Armenians fought both as infantry and oe They vere also known as excellent archers, and occasionally are simply called "gaws," or ee A significant portion, if not all of the Armenian cavalry Sereatespeentad(erenersi Armenians also served in garrisons for the defense 34, Magkh. 2:21d mentions that both Armenian cavalry and infantry lived in the Hasaniya suburb, The Life of St. Nexses also mentions that Armenian knights greeted the Gregory the Patriarch when he visited Cairo, tr. Canard "armeniens" p. 148. Bahram was assisted by 2000 Armenian cavalry, Mag. 3:161. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves," p. 486, wrongly implies that the Armenians of Badr al-Jamali were chiefly infantry, although he notes later on the same page that Bahram had both Armenian infantry and cavalry. 35. Hak. 43/58, 44/59 says that the Fatimids sent 400 qaws aaman” and 700 Sudanis to zaman. IMug. 86 3.1231/49 talks of 1000 Armenian qaws supporting Bahram. 36. Mag. 3:161 states that when Bahram fled to upper Egypt in 1136 he was accompanied by about 2000 "mounted archers (axis numat)". See Ch. 5.1.2 and 5.2 for a full discussion,37 of the maritime of Palestine against the Crusaders , 38 and also occasionally appear as mamltks . 3.1.2 Sudanis Sud&ni is a generic Arabic term meaning “black” and was used in medieval Arabic to denote Blacks of any linguistic group or from any geographical region. Sudan's began to be recruited for Egyptian armies as early as the ninth century during the rule of Ahmad ibn 39 Tulin , who is said to have imported at least 12,000 5 40 Sudani slaves . They played important military, political, and administrative roles in Egyptian governments until the rise of Saladin, when the Sudan 37. Ikhal, 4:145 says that Tyre was defended by an Armenian ‘askan under ‘Izz al-Mulk al-Afazz. Shams al-Khilsta also enlisted Armenians in the defense of Ascalon, Mag. 3:47; Dhah. 2:23; Ikhal. 4:145 38, Usama 21/47, 39. Bacharach "African Military Slaves" gives an excellent survey of the role of the Sudgnis in the Egyptian army from the ninth century until the rise of the ayyubids. 40. Bacharach, p. 478, gives a number of estimates from the sources, some ranging as high as 45,000.28 41 regiments were suppressed . Despite the fact that the Sudanis appear on numerous occasions in the sources, it is difficult to get an exact idea of their organization and role. Still, a number of characteristics are clear. Although their Proportion of the entire army varied under different rulers, Sudanis are found serving in the army under each administration until the fall of the Fatimid dynasty. They were divided into a number of different regiments rather than a single large sudanT ree Furthermore, as Bacharach points out, "there is no real sense of development or change during these years (from Badr al-Jamali to Saladin) in the role of African military slaves. Africans continued to be used as infantry by caliphs and wazirs ... They fought on different sides at difterent times (of civil var). Although Albert of Aix once described a group of 41, Bacharach, pp. 487-9, 42. See Ch. 3.1.2 and-3.2.5 for a discussion of Sudanis in various regiments. 43, Bacharach, "African Military Slaves" p. 487. 44. AA 12,18 "midites ex genene Azopant = knights of the Azopart people," Azopart being Albert's name for Sudanis, see below.44 mounted Sudanis , it appears that they were not extensively recruited as cavalry during the twelfth century, although there were important Sudani cavalry regiments in earlier periods. During al-Afdal's reign the Sudinls most often appear as infantry, while cavalry seem to be drawn from Armenians, Turks, Arabs and Berbers". on the other hand there is mention of the Qaraghuldmiya, a mounted regiment mentioned under Saladin’ . If their name Qaraghulamiya, probably meaning "black slaves," is to be understood literally, it could indicate either that in Saladin's day there was a mounted Sudani regiment, or that during the Fatimid period the Qaraghulamiya were mounted Sudanis whom Saladin eventually replaced with Turks, Kurds, Arabs and other mercenaries while retaining the earlier Fatimid name of the regiment. Although there are only a few descriptions of the armament of the Sudinis, and it is dangerous to 45. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves,” pp. 484-6, discusses come of the evidence for this. 46, There are numerous clear references to the Sudanis fighting on foot. FC 2.32.1,11, 3.17.2, AA 6:41 where they are said to kneel down to fight. 47, Magkh, 1:86d.30 generalize from these, there is some indication that the Suddnis formed some of the lighter armed infantry elements of the Fatimid army. In a description of a military parade, al-Qalqashandi mentions that "there were 600 javelins (haxba) with polished heads... and three hundred daxaga shields with bosses of silver, borne by 300 black slaves, each carrying two javelins and a shield." this general picture of Sudani armament is confirmed William of Tyre who described "a countless host of infantry trained to throw the javelin’ * who almost certainly should be equated with the troops described by al-Qalgashandi. Fulcher describes the "Ethiopians" as defending themselves with shields, while a Sudani throwing a javelin wounded king Baldwin’. On the other hand, Nasir-i Khusrav, describing the army in the 1060s, says that the zanj (= Sudanis) fought with oe Sud&nis also held important offices and positions in 48. Qal. 3:474. 49, WT 12.6. 50. FC 3.17.3. St, FC 2.24.1. 52, Nasir-i Khusrav tr.the Fatimid military, including membership in the elite 53 4 Sibyan al-Khas and the Ustadhs . Sud&ni troops in the Fatimid army may not all have been slaves. Nasir-i Khusrav draws a distinction between the mamlUk SudanI troops, known as the AoZd a£-shind, and another group which he calls the ones Although zanj often referred to Blacks from East Africa, it is also simply Persian for black and semantically is the equivalent of Sudani. This distinction may imply a difference between those Sudani troops were slaves, and those who were freemen. Egypt's close contacts with Nubia and Ethiopia, as well as with Black nomadic tribes of the Sudan, would offer a logical avenue for free Blacks to enter Fatimid military service. Thus, although there is no concrete proof of free Sudani troops in Fatimid service, such a possibility should not be totally discounted. A final interesting problem relating to the Sudanis is Albert of Aix's use of the word Azopart apparently 53. Usama p. 9/33 mentions that the Sibyan al-Khass vere assigned by the Caliph to murder Ibn al-Sallar, and one of the murderers was said to be a SudanT. 4. Nagir-i Khusrav tr. p. 217. 55, Ibid.32 either as a term to describe Sudanis in general, or referring to a specific regiment of Sudanis. Albert describes them as a “black people from the land of Bthicpia * and "horrible and black’ .* They are described as "marshalled in the middle of the thousands of pagans armed with maces like hammers composed uf iron and lead, (who) attacked the king and his men striking not only the knights, but also their horses, on their 58 heads and other limbs with blows ." 3.1.3 Turks, Berbers and Others The role of the Turks in the Fatimid dynasty began during the Caliphate of al-‘aziz (r. 975-996) when a number of Turkish mamlUks were purchased and enlisted in the ee Their numbers and influence progressively increased during the succeeding decades until in the early reign of al-Mustansir they were reported to number 56. AA 6.41, 57. AA 6.46, 58. AA 9.4, See 5.1.3 for a further discussion of the armament of the Sudanis. 59. Lev, "Fatimid Army," pp. 169 ££.60 some 6000 men . After Badr al-Jama, overcame them, their influence and numbers decreased drastically, especially in view of the frequent conflicts between Egypt and Turkish princes in Syria. However, throughout the entire reign of al-afdal the Turks never ceased to play a military role. During the early twelfth century they appear most frequently in the sources as officers, Sadr al-Jamali had recruited a number of Turks during his governorship of Syria who came with him to Egypt where some of them eventually received important military and administrative commands under al-atgel When al-Atgal conquered Jerusalem in 1098 he enlisted part of the Turkish garrison into the Fatimid ie Some were probably the Turks mentioned as being part of the Fatimid garrison of Jerusalem during the 60. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves," pp. 482-6, discusses these developments. 61, A number of important Fatimid officers had Turkish names such ac Nasir al-Dawla Aftikin al-Turki, and “zz al-Mulk Anushtakin. 62. Ibn Sallar was the son of a Turk recruited from the Jerusalem garrison after the siege of 1098, IKhall. 12370-1,34 63 Crusader siege in 1099 . Others returned to Cairo where they continued in the military, often followed by their sons, such as Ibn Sallar who eventually became Wazir. A number of sources also mention Turkish participation at the battle of Ascalon’. Other Turkish troops vere engaged by the Fatimids as nerzenaries’. ‘Throughout al-Afdal's reign, however, their influence was numerically and politically minor. In the second quarter of the twelfth century the military role of the Turks in the army of Egypt began to increase, and substantial numbers of Turks again appear in the army. By 1134 there vas a regiment of unknown size in the Fatimid army known as a£-Ghuzz al-ghunaba, the "foreign turks." tn 1183 300 Turkish cavatry are mentioned as participating in the factional warfare in 67 Cairo . In the 1140s there was a regiment of 800 Turks 63. FC 1.30.3. 64, FC 1.31.1; Gesta 88; ME 2.125/311-2 mentions troops from Scythia, which I take to be Turks. 65. As at Ramla in 1105, Mag. 3:35; the campaign of 1118, Maq. 3:53; the garrison at Tyre included Turkish mercenaries from Damascus, WT 13.7. 66. Mag. 3:155. 67. IQal. 320.68 who garrisoned the fortress at Bab al-Futth in Cairo . Nonetheless, the Turks never again managed to regain the dominant political and military position in the Fatimid army they had held in the days of ai-mustangir Berbers played an even less significant role than the Turks. Most of the soldiers who conquered Egypt for the Fatimids were Berbers, and large numbers of Berbers continued serving in the Fatimid army in Egypt and syria. By the Great Civil war and the JuyishT reforms in the third quarter of the eleventh century, their importance had already begun to decline”. During the early twelfth century they only appear as irregular bedouins, mostly of the Lawita tribe from the Libyan desert, who were suppressed by the government on a number of occasions’. Although individuals probably continued to enlist in the army, independent regular units of Berbers are not mentioned in the chronicles for 68. Usama 25/51. 69. The question of the tactical implications of Turks and horse archery in the Fatimid army will be dealt with in Ch, 5.1.2, 5.2 and 5.3. 70. On these developments see Lev, "Fatimid Army” and Beshir, "Fatimid Military," pp. 38-9. 71, See IAth, 10:616; Maq. the Lawata tribe in 1122. 7 on the major uprising ofthis period. The role of Arabs in the Fatimid be discussed in Chapter 3.3. 3.2 quiar Fatimid Army In terms of expense, military effectiveness, political power and frequency of mobilization, the regular regiments of the Fatimid army were certainly its most important constituents These can be divided into two classes, the Caliphal or Royal Regiments (Khawass al-Khalifa) which for the most part were stationed in Cairo in special barracks either in the Palace or near it, and the regular army regiments (tawa'ig al-aj: 4) who were stationed in the suburbs of Cairo or throughout Egypt. The Caliphal Regiments were divided into three groups, the Ust@dhs who served as the Palace guard, military administrators, and from whom the officers of other regiments were frequently drawn; the Sibyan 1, For this study "regular" is defined as those soldiers who were enrolled in permanent regiments and whose names were listed on the registers of the Diwan al-Jaysh (see 4.2 and 4.3). Irregular troops are those whose service was temporary and who were not individually listed on the registers.al-kha § who formed the Caliph's personal bodyguard, attendants and companions; and the Siby&n al-hujar or the Hujariya who themselves were divided into a number of regiments apparently garrisoned around the Pelace rather than in it, 3.2.1 The Ustadhs ‘The Ust&dhs and the Sibyan al-Khass who will be discussed below, were the attendants, servants, officers, and bodyguard of the Caliph. They are most frequently met in the sources either as participating in royal ceremonies, or as engaged in palace coups or civil disturbances. According to al-Qaigashand?’: "the Ustdhs are known today (1350s) as the khudd@m and the tawashiya. In the (Fatimid) dynasty they held an important position. Among them were found the officers or the personal attendants of the Caliph. The most important were the Mukannaks who wound their turbans on their heads as do the Arabs and the magh@niba today. They were the closest and nearest to the Caliph, numbering over 1000 men." M, Canard, in his discussion of the ceremonial functions of the Ustadhs, maintains that they were a 2. Qal. 3:481,38 corps of eunuchs and consistently calls them such throughout his article’. He bases his interpretation on a passage in al-Qalgashandi, where the Ust&dhs are equated with the khudddm and gawishiya of MamlUk times, and as David Ayalon has shown, both of these words, as well as the word ust@dh, were used in the Mamlik period to refer to eunuchs'. However, the fact that certain terms referred to eunuchs during the Mamluk period should not be seen as evidence that they were always so understood. For example, most of the cavalry under Saladin were called taashZs, a term which, according to Ayalon, also eventually came to mean eunuch. Yet it seems incredible that Saladin could have had the resources or desire to recruit thousands of eunuchs for his cavalry. The Ustadh. regiment probably contained some eunuchs as guards or servants for the haren quarters in the palace, but others could well have been mamliks or free. For example, Nasr al-Dawla Aftikin was at first a mamlGk of Badr al-Jamali, and later was 3. Canard, "Ceremonial" 367 and n. 4, although he admits that it is possible that there were non-eunuchs in the regiment. 4, David Ayalon, "Eunuchs", passim. 5. MagKh. 1:86c-d.39 6 enrolled in the Ustadhs under al-Mustansir . The Ust@dhs included both blacks and whites among their ranks.» The Muhannaks ("expert, experienced") where the most powerful and important segment of the Ustadhs, holding major offices both in the administration and the army, including the Caliph's personal attendant and dresser (shadd a£-22j), the master of the royal council (sahib al-majlis), the Caliph's personal secretary (sahib al-risdla), Master of the Palace (zimam a£-qusiin), the Treasurer (sihib bayt al-m@£), the Master of Administration (sahéb al-dagtan), and eee Nasir al-Dawla Aftikin al-Turki, a member of the Ustadh regiment, served as governor of Alexandria and commanded 9 Nizar's armies during his revolt in 1095 . Control over such important administrative posts could give a 1. measure of political and economic power to the Ustadhs. 6. Ifagh. 7, Nagir-i Khusrav tr. p. 147. 8. Qal. 3:484-5 gives a full list with some details of their respective functions, See also MagKh. 1:386d, 41ib, and Canard, "Ceremonial," p. 368, for a brief discussion. 9. MagKh. 2240 ‘There are a number of examples of Ustadhs serving as officers for other regiments. Bach barrack of the 10 far was under the command of an Ust@dh . Others could be sent in command of armies on campaigns. Although it is clear that the Ust@dhs participated in combat as officers of other regiments, it is not possible to determine if they ever served in battle as an independent regiment. 3.2.2 The Sibyan al-Klass According to al-Qalgashandi, "the Sibyan al-Khass were a group of about 500 men who were the special companions of the Caliph. They included amirs and others, and are the equivalent of what are known today 12 as at-khZssakiya « They appear often in the sources, usually associated with the Palace establishment. It is difficult to detail any unique military functions beyond that of guards and officers, or to distinguish their 10. Qal. 3:481. It is possible that the word is here used in a general sense as "master" rather than in the technical sense of a member of the Ustadh regiment 11, Such as Waffi al-Dawla in 1133, Mag. 3:150. 12. Qal, 32481.activities from the Ust@dhs. They often participated in palace coups, and when a new Wazir or Caliph gained Power he might massacre or replace them with supporters of the new ruler. The Sibyan al-Khags were also used es secret agents by the Caliphs when plotting against Wazirs or other nenbers of the government". on another occasion al-Héfiz ordered a band of the Sibyan al-Khass to assassinate Abu Ali ibn al-atgat’, They also fought in military campaigns”, although most often appearing during civil wars, and as in the case of the Ust@dhs, it is unclear if they ever saw action as an independent military unit outside Egypt. 13, IMug. 3,1:28/44 reports that the wazir Yanis massacred the "Sibyan al-Khass who had been the army (jund) of the Imam al-Amir" because they had participated in the assassination of his predecessor. 14, In 1138 al-Hafiz sent one of the Siby3n al-Khass with money and letters to rally the support of “Ali ibn al-Sallar against Ridwan, Maq. 3:159. 13. Mag. 3:141, they were "min al-ajndd min Khass at-Khabifa.” ° 16. Maq. 3:173, in 1139 in a battle between al-Hafiz and Ridwan.3.2.3 The Sibyan al-Hujar The Sibyan al-Hujar ("Young Men of the Barracks or Chambers") were also commonly called the Hujariya. The buildings called the hujan were built in the days of MuSizz li-Din aan”, apparently to serve as barracks. Al-Afdal either renovated these buildings or constructed new ones on their site between Bab al-Nasr and the Palace as barracks for his newly organized regiments. The establishment of the Hujariya regiments occurred during the early reign of a)-Afdal as a direct reaction to the Frankish threat. Ibn Tuwayr gives the following 18 account of the establishment of this corps : "Al-Afdal ibn Amir al-Juylsh received a letter from Ascalon informing him that the Franks were gathering and the (garrison of Ascalon) was concerned that they might march against them. However, (al-Afdal) had insufficient wealth, weapons, horses and men. He therefore assigned his brother al-Muzaffar AbU Muhammad Ja‘far ibn Amir al-JuyUsh Badr in the presence of the Caliph to take his place and set out to rescue the coast (of Syria) from the Franks, He arrived at Ascalon and marched towards it with the army, but he was abandoned by his army which was a terrible catastrophe, and the fault for this lay with 17, Ibn Abi Tayy, quoted in MagKh, 1:443. 18. Quoted in Magkh, 1:443c-d.his army. After his defeat all of his equipment was burned. There was a poet in the service of the Franks who composed this poem in honor of the Frankish King Raymond St. Giles (Sanjil): ‘The Christian religion was made victorious by your sword / God achieved this by Sanjil / Mankind has never heard tell a tale / as shameful as the defeat of al-Afdal.' Al-Afdal dispatched an agent to murder this poet. After this catastrophe none of the army (ajnad) were of any use to al-Afdal... He then constructed seven barracks (hujar) and selected 3000 men from the sons of the army, and divided them in each barrack, giving each 100 men a zimim and nagib. Over the entire corps he assigned as zimam an amir called the muwagfiq. He distributed to each man whatever horses, arms and other equipment he needed, and took a great interest in these soldiers. If there was a sudden attack he ordered that they be mobilized with their zinams to meet it.” There are a number of problems with this passage which render interpretation difficult. First, there is no record other than this statement that al-Muzaffar ever led an army against the Franks in the defense of Ascalon, although there are a number of expeditions for which the commander is not known, Second, it is not possible from other sources to find an exact date for the founding of the Hujariya regiment. It is certain that they were founded before 1119/513 since in that year twenty of the Hujariya were sent as a bodyguardwith the Fatimid agent Ibn Najib al-Dawla to Yaman by ai-atgat”, ic is unclear how much earlier the regiment was in existence. According to the above statement by Ibn Tuwayr, al-Afdal received news from Ascaion that the Franks were mustering an army which could potentially threaten Ascalon, and the garrison asked for assistance. However, al-Afdal's army was in no condition to fight, lacking money, troops, mounts and equipment. This situation can best be explained as occurring after the disastrous Fatimid defeats by the Crusaders in the first few years of the wars. Thus the creation of the Hujariya corps was probably one of the major military and financial reforms of al-Afdal in 1106-7/501. 19. Hak. 42/57; another company of 100 were sent there six years later, ibid. 46/62. 20. Quoted in Magkh. 1:444a. C£. Qal. 3:481, "The gibyan a£-hujan are a corps of young men numbering about 5006 who live in barracks (hujax) each of which is designated by a special name. ..." The Hujariya are described by riya and the Qal, 3:508 as consisting of the Greater Lesser Hujariya (hujariya af-kibar wa al-hujarcya al-gightx), The exact significance of this phrase is unknown, but perhaps refers either to the relative size of the barracks -- the troops from the larger barracks (hu jan) being known as the Greater Hujariya, while those from the smaller barracks known as the Lesser ~~ or alternatively one of the barracks might have been known as a£-kéban and another al-sighan.Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir provides some additional 20 information : "A group of young men numbering about 5000 were enlisted from a number of sources. They were called the Sibyan al-Hujar and were trained in barracks, each of which had a special name such as al-Mansira (Victorious), al-Fath (Conquest), al-Jadida (New) and so forth. The (soldiers) had their arms with them and when they were mobilized they all set out immediately, for there was nothing to hinder them, In this they were like wolves and guardians. If one of them became known for his intelligence and courage, such as ‘All. ibn Sallar and others, he would be promoted to be an amir or officer. They would always sleep in their barracks with their horses and equipment and clothes. Each barrack had Ustadhs commanding them who lived with them, as well as servants,” The fact that the Hujariya were recruited from the sons of soldiers of a number regiments of the army may reflect an attempt to disrupt some of the factionalisn between the regiments. For example, Ibn Salar, who eventually became Wazir under al-1 tiz, was the son of a soldier who had served in the army of the Saljlg Sugmn who defended Jerusalem against al-Afdal in 1098. Part of Sugnan's force was recruited by the Fatimids, and Ibn Sallar, the son of one of these, was eventually enrolled by al-Afdal in the Hujariya, from which he was promotedby al-Hafiz to be governor of Alexandria and eventually eer The establishment of the Hujariya also represents a move by al-Afdal's to limit the power of the Ustadhs, who, as part of the Palace establishment, would tend to be supporters of the Caliph and thus potentially opponents of al-Afdal. With the formation of this new regiment from which al-Afdal could draw officers the control of the Ust@dhs -- and through then the Caliph -- over civilian and military offices could be further limited. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir's statement also implies that Hujariya were also given special military training by the Ustadhs. Unlike most Fatimid troops, who were not continually under arms”, the Hujariya were permanently stationed in Cairo and always available for immediate service. Part of the purpose behind a!-Afgal's military reforms was to improve the training of his troops and establish a body of men who could circumvent the long 21. IKhall. 1:370-1, Mag. 3:199 also mentions he was once one of the Hujariya. 22, See ch. 3.2.3, 4.2 and 4.3, Mag. 3:102 mentions that in the summer of 1123 "the army spent the entire summer in readiness and armed,” implying that this was usually not the case.a7 delays which often faced the Papimid army when it mobilized”, Finally, it seems that although al-Afgal's original regiment numbered only 3000 men, it was eventually increased to sooo. In sum, the Hujariya were an elite corps, established by al-Afdal sometime before 1119, and quite probably related to his reforms of 1107. They were recruited from the sons of soldiers of other regiments, given special training and equipment, and kept as an elite standing army ready for immediate service. 3.2.4 The Rikabiya The Fatimid army included an additional regiment, part of the Palace establishment, known as the Rikabiya According to Qalqashandi they were also known as "the Sibyan al-Rikab al-Khass They are the same as those known today (1359s) as the Silahdariya and the Tabardariya. They numbered over 2000 men and had 23. See cu. 6.2 on the delays of mobilization. 24, Magkh. 1:443 gives the original size as 3000, while Magkh. 1:444 and Qal. 3:481 state that they numbered 5000. 25. Literally, "Those of the stirrup." The word con aiso be read Rukkabiya or Rakkabiya meaning horsemen.twelve officers (mugaddam), They vere the masters of the stirrups (xék@b) of the Caliph... The most important of these Rikabiya were commissioned with government Ren gee Magrizi states that there were four groups of the Rikabiya, who were paid twenty, fifteen, ten or five dinars per month ae It is impossible to determine specific military or administrative functions for these troops other than participation at Caliphal ceremonies and parades. tt is also not possible to say if they were cavalry or 29 infantry or both . 3.2.5 Regular Army Regiments (Tawa'i{ al-ajnad) Most of the regular soldiers of the army were formed into regiments which were given names according to the 26. Qal. 3:484. 27. Maq. 3:341-2. Qal. 3:527 only mentions salaries of 15, 10 and 5. 28. Maq. 3:432 states that they carried the Caliphal equipment or possessions (a£-mukhalfajat). They are mentioned in processions in Qal. 3:508; Magkh. 1:389c. 29. MagKh. 1:289¢ states that they received the name Rikabiya from walking at the 2ikab or stirrup of the Caliph, implying that at least some of them were on foot in Caliphal processions.49 founder or the "ethnic" composition of the troops. 30 According to al-Qalgashandi : "There were numerous regiments of the army, each being named in different ways. Some regiments were named after Caliphs, such as the Hafiziya from al-Hafiz, and the Amiriya from al-Amir, Others were named after past Wazirs such as the Juylishiya, from amir al-cuyiish Badr al-Jamali, and the afdalfya, from al-Afdal his son. Still others were named according to various categories, such as the Waziriya and other tribes and peoples, such as the Turks and the Kurds and the Ghuzz and the Daylam! and the Masamida, or according to their nationality, such as Rim, Franks and Slavs, or the Sudani from the ‘Abid al-Shiaz’, or the ‘Utaga' (emancipated slaves) and other regiments. Each regiment had its own q@’id and mugaddam to command it.” There are a large number of questions regarding the exact nature of recruitment and organization of these units. These regiments were only semi permanent in nature. AS a new Wazir or Caliph began his reign he would immediately set about organizing one or more regiments troops who would subsequently be named after him. It is pessible that many if not most of the new soldiers recruited into the army during a given regime would be enrolled in these new regiments, leaving the older units to slowly shrink in size and importance as 30. Qal. 3:482. Cf. Qal. 3:508 which lists nearly all the same regiments.50 their ranks were thinned through casualties in battle and retirement, During the early part of his reign a new leader consistently relied on the regiments of his predecessors for support, while in the later part of the reign the soldiers from the newly formed regiments played an increasingly prominent role. On occasion new rulers disbanded some of the old regiments and reorganized their soldiers into new regiments under a different name. A good example of this process comes from the year 1134 when “the Anir Hasan proclaimed - himself as Caliph and a group knovn as the Sibyan al-zarad ("Mailed Youths") swore allegiance to hin. They were from a mixture of the soldiers from each regiment (khift al-ajnad min jami* al-tawa'if). He was strengthened by them and they supported him; he granted them benefits and made them commanders and granted then iq¢a%s and made them governors of the provinces and amirs in his government and his army (ajnad) Although a number of regiments are known by name, 31, Ibn Yanis "disbanded" the Sibyan al-Khass by massacting them, Al-Afdal possibly used soldiers from disbanded regiments in forming his Hujariya. 32. IMug, 3.1:28/45, see also Mag. 3:149. In Qal. 3:508 the Sibyan al-zarad are said to have numbered 500 men.51 for most few significant details can be found. The following is a discussion of some of the ore important regiments most frequently mentioned during the early twelfth century. The Rayhaniya regiment was composed of Sudani 33 troops who were garrisoned in the Rayhaniya district of Cairo just inside Bab al-puroh They came to prominence by supporting Haydara ibn al-Héfiz against his brother Hasen, who was supported by the Juyshiya when he refused to accept Haydara as Caliph in June 136°, They numbered no more than 5000 aa Usama states that 1000 of the Raypaniya vere killed ina battle with the JuyUshiya in 1149 , after which their 33. IMuy. 140. 34. MaqKh. 2:2c. They were named either because the regiment was founded by ‘Aziz al-Davla Rayhan, oF because their barracks were in the Rayhdniya quarter of Cairo, it being unclear if they were named after that quarter cf Cairo or if that part of the city get its name from them. 35, IMuy. 119, 36. After their battle with the Juytshiya in 1134 in which 5000 men were killed from both the Juylshiya and Rayhaniya regiments, the later were said to have numbered 2000 men, Mag. 3:149. (IMuy. 119 gives the casualties as 10,000). 37, Usdma. 31/7, Mag. 3:189.power was broken and they fled Cairo for Giza. This defeat did not result in tieir elimination, however, for they are still found as an independent regiment when Saladin became asi Badr al-Janali Amir al-JuyUsh established the duytshi regiment, giving them his name. They remained an important regiment in the Fatimid army until their suppression by Saladin in the civil war of wT. an 1134 they supported the usurper Hasan ibn Hafiz in his bid for the Caliphate, decimating the Rayhaniya regiment the subsequent aoe In 1149 they again defeated the ey : . This regiment contained both cavalry and infantry. 42 The "adji2 min al-juylshiya = Juyishiya Infantry ," were mentioned on one occasion, while on another a group of cavalry in a royal parade were said to have been from 38. Mag. 3:312. 39. Nag. 3:312 mentions them in 1168, 40. IMuy. 119. 41, IMuy. 140; Mag. 3:189; Usama 7. 42. Mag. 32153.. 43 the Juyshiya regiment . They are not explicitly called sudanis, but in describing the civil war of 1135 which brought Bahram to power, Magrizi states that "the Sudanis were victorious over the ajnad" and "the Sudanis supported Hasan against the agndd As the Juydshiya were the supporters of Hasan in this ee Magrizi's statement clearly implies they must have been Sudanis. In describing the battle at Cairo in 1171, Magrizi states that the Fatimid forces consisted of "the Rayhaniya, Juyishiya and Farahiya regiments, and other Sudani regiments (ghaynuhum min al-tawa'if 46 2£-sudanZya J" On the other hand, Magrizi twice mentions (in 1134) the JuyUshiya and "the foreign Ghuzz who supported them = wa-man yagiu bigawlihim min 47 af-ghuzz al-ghunaba' ." The a£-“skan af-ghunaba’ 43. Qal. 5:508. 44, Mag. 3:155, IDaw, 6:514-5 tells much the same story. 45, TMuy. 119; Mag. 32149. 46. Magkh. 2:2. The phrasing here can either imply that all the regiments named above were Sudani, or there were other regiments not mentioned which were Sudani. 47, Mag. 32155.# 48 in soldiers) also supported the Juyiishiya . Canard believes that since the Juytishi regiment was founded by Badr al-JanalI it was probably initially composed of arsenians’, which is not impossible. However, most, if not all, of the Armenians were clearly quartered in Hasaniya su! arb, while the Juyishiya were quartered within the walls of cairo, indicating that unless the residence of the troops changed over time, or there was more than one group of Armenian troops, the JuyishTya should not be considered as chiefly an Armenian corps, although there may have been Armenians included in their number. I would suggest as an hypothesis that Badr al-Janali recruited the best troops from a number of nationalities and sources into his Juylshiya corps, centered initially around the nucleus of his zersonal mamliks and Armenian retainers who had accompanied him from Acre. After the death of Badr al-Jama. the regiment continued its 48. Maq. 3:153. 49. Canard "Vizier" p. 96, he gives no evidence to support this assumption. 50. See 3.1.1. 51. Magkh.importance for a number of decades until those soldiers he recruited had either died or retired. In the ensuing years the regiment maintained its identity, but new elite soldiers began to be enrolled in other regiments such as the Hujariya, and the replacements for the Juytshiya came increasingly from Sudani infantry. By the 1130s and 1140s, although the regiment retained its original name, it had been transformed from the elite unit of the army in the days of Badr al-Jam@ll to a regiment largely composed of Sudani infantry. The Farajiya (also spelled Farahiya and Faranjiya) do not appear as frequently in the sources as the Raybaniya and Juyis! a, and their composition, numbers or functions cannot be accurately determined, although chey seem to have been infantry’. Although they never played a prominent role in the army they appear as early as the eysfatasia supported the Juyishiya in the civil wars in 1134 , and fought Saladin in 1168 . 52. Qal. 3:507 lists them as part cf the infantry regiments in a military parade. 53. Maq. 2:56, 166. 54, Mag. 32155. 55. Maq. 32312,56 Qalgashandi, in describing a royal parade, calis one of the units the Faranjiya, or "Frankish" regiment, and it is almost certain that he is referring to the Farajiya. Although his statement is probably simply a varient spelling, it may be that the regiment originated as a small body of Frankish mercenaries or mamliks serving the Fatimids in the late 10th and early 11th centuries. The Patimids clearly used European mamlUks in their army, usually called the saqlaba or Slavs, and it is not impossible that a regiment was called the Faranjiya, the pronunciation of which eventually became corrupted to Farajiya. Some type of slave trade contacts continued between the Fatimids and Western Europe during the twelfth century, for there are references to the sagi£iba serving in the Palace in 1134 57 and i160. 56, See Beshir, "Fatimid Military” pp. 41; Bacharach, "african Military Slaves," p. 481 mentions that the Fatimids use European slave soldiers (fananjc) in North Africa but gives no source for this statement. 57, Mag, 3:154 and 239, where they are mentioned committing an assassination along with the Ustadhs.o 3.3 Irregular units of the Fatimid Army In addition to the regular units of the Fatimid army discusseé above, the Fatimids were often aided in their campaigns by a variety of irregular troops who were often quite numerous. These irregulars can be somewhat arbitrarily divided into three classes: the bedouins, by far the most importa cenaries, and citizen militias. 3.3.1 Bedouins Arab bedouins were the dominant source of irregular troops for the Fatimids during the early twelfth century, They participated in many campaigns, and there was almost alvays an Arab bedouin contingent with each Fatimid army mobilized for battle in Palestine. In the twelfth century Arab bedouins were drawn from two distinct sources, those living in Egypt and those of 1. In Jerusalem a Jew who as an army agent known as the "Manager of the Bedouin levy." Goitein "Jerusalem" 165, Doc. 1, 11. 25-6.58 1 southern Palestine and perhaps Arabia , although earlier bedouins were also available from northern Syrian tribes. Many bedouin tribes served in the Fatimid armies, and a discussion of the exact relationships and geographical locations of these tribes is beyond the scope of this study’. At least some of the bedouin tribes received yearly stipends from the government by means of igta“at iteidaer in return for military service and loyalty, although they were paid at levels much lower than the regular soldiers. MakhzUmi describes a number of services the bedouins were expected to perform in return for these stipends. The first was that the bedouins were to obey the Fatimid rulers. In a sense this could be seen as "Danegeld", money paid the nomads to forestall raids on Fatimid villages and cities. They were also to guard the roads and offer assistance in 2, Usdma 24/80 mentions the Darma, Turayg, Judhan, Sinbis, Talha and Jafar tribes. ‘There is a useful but incomplete study by A. H. Salih, “Le role des bedouins.” 3. On which see ch. 4.3. 4, Ibn Mammati reports that the dind@a jayshZ for the bedouins was 1/8th the regular dinar, tr. by Cahen “administration,” p. 178-3, 5. MakhzUmi tr. pp. 166-7.times of invasion or trouble, as well as participating in offensive expeditions. The exact nature of this agreement, the number of men to be called, duration of service, regions in which the nomads were to serve, etc., probably varied according to tribe and regime. In addition to this standard annual payment, however, it was occasionally necessary to pay additional amounts to gain the active participation of bedouins in an offensive one It is impossible to arrive at a precise figure for the total number of Arabs available for military service, as opposed to those finally called up for actual military service. Nagir-i Khusrav gives the number of bedouins as 50,000, which is undoubtedly exaggerated . A gore accurate figure of those actually receiving stipends is available from the early reign of Saladin, when 7000 bedouins from the JudWam tribe 6. Al-Afdal managed to buy the support of a group of bedouins around Alexandria during Nizar's rebellion, IMuy. 68, Mag. 3:14. The Caliph al-Hafiz gave one of his officers some money to buy the support of the bedouin tribes of the Howl regions Usima” 24/50. 7. Tr. p. 217. See App. B for a complete discussion of Nasir-i Khusrav's account.received one million jayshZ dinars in return for their services’, Although it is likely that the Fatimids paid stipends to more bedouins than were enlisted under Saladin, this number probably reflects the potential bedouin manpower in Egypt. For actual campaigns, however, only a fraction of this total force would be mobilized, perhaps a few thousand. The Arabs exercised little real political power during the first half of the twelfth century. Although they often appear fighting for one side or the other during periods of anarchy or civil wer’, there {8 no evidence that there was any long range plan or well defined political goal behind their activities. They simply took advantage of opportunities for pay and plunder. Even in the later decades of the dynasty, with 8. MaqKh. 1:86d. If we accept Ibn Mammati's statement that the value of the bedouin jayshi dinar was on eighth the standard dinar then this figure should be reduced to about 125,000 dinars total which is about eighteen dinars a year per bedouiu, or one and a half dinars per month -- not an unreasonable figure for non-regular troops with other sources of income. See 4.2 and 4.3. 9. The numerous problems involved in trying to deal with the numbers of the Fatimid army will be dealt with in 3.4 below. 10. Salih, "Bedouins," reviews a number of Arab disturbances.61 the rise of the Arabs shawar and Dirgham as wazirs, the bedouins still fought on both sides in most disputes. Berber tribesmen had played the dominant role in the Fatimid army during the early years of the dynasty", but by the time of al-Afdal they seem to have been seldom enlisted as tribal groups, although there may have been a number of individual Berbers in various regiments. In the twelfth century their power centered on the Lawata confederation of the western delta and Libyan desert, plundering and taking advantage of 13 anarchy . 3.3.2 Turkish and Syrian Mercenaries 4 As has been discussed above , Turks continued to play an active though diminished role in the regular Fatimid army during the early twelfth century. They 11, Salih, "Bedouins” p, 62-5. 12. See Lev, "Fatimid Army,” and Beshir, "Fatimid Military." 13, They revolted after the death of al-Afdal requiring a major campaign to subdue them, IAth. 10:616; they are peoteea ia civil wars of the 1140s, Usama 24/50, 8/32. 14. Ch. 3.1.3,62 also appear on occasion as mercenaries hired in Syria, generally for one campaign. The nature of the role of Turks and Syrians in the Fatimid army is clouded by their appearance in Fatimid armies in Palestine as allied troops from the Princes of Damascus. Perhaps the most famous example was when Tughtakin sent 1300 cavalry to support the Fatimids at the battle of Ramla in 1105", but this is by no means the only case. When the Fatimids sent an army of 7000 men to Palestine in retaliation for Baldwin's sacking of Farama, Tughtakin met them, presumably with a strong force, and took over command of the army for that campaign’. when an alliance vas made between Danascus and Egypt for the defense of Tyre, the agreement was that the Fa¢imids would pay the Damascenes 1/3 of the revenues of Tyre in return for a garrison force of 700 cavalry from Bart Exact details concerning terms of service and how often such mercenaries were hired are lacking. The most illuminating example of Syrian mercenary 15, See ch. 7.5 for details and sources. 16. IAth, 10:543-4. 17, WE 13.7,63 service comes from Usama's activities in FStimid service in Palestine in 1150. He was given 6000 dinars and some fine robes and ordered to recruit a force of mercenaries from Syria. After receiving permission from Nir al-Din to enlist Syrian soldiers who were not currently enrolled in the regular Syrian army, Usama manayed to hire 860 mounted men . 3.3.3 Militia Although in the twelfth century the city militias (akd@th) were in general decline as important military units, they nonetheless played a significant role in defending Fatinid Palestinian cities”. the Franks describe the efforts of the "citizens" of Muslim cities, vhom they often distinguish from the regular troops of the garrison. However, although such troops were important, especially during sieges, they tended to be unreliable in martial skill and morale, and were 18. Usama 9/33ff. 19. On the akdath in general see von Sievers, and Cahen, "ahdath."20 probably poorly equipped . Thus, although the militias could be relied on during a siege, a regular Fatimid garrison was also invariably found in each coastal city, both to insure loyalty and to bolster the defense in case of siege. Militia soldiers also occasionally fought in pitched battles outside their cities. In terms cf numbers, if not skill and equipment, the militias still played a major role in the Fatimid defense of Palestine. Non-Muslims also occasionally assisted the Fatimids by defending their homes and cities along with Muslim militias. According to Gilo of Paris, Jews also took an active part in defending Jerusalem‘against the Crusaders 20, WT 13.7 describes the Fatimid militia at Tyre as Tweak and effeuinate in character and not at all accustored to warfare," although his opinion should not be thought of as unprejudiced in this matter. 21, See ch. 4.4. 22. The most notable example was at the battle of Ascalon in 1099 where there was a large force of Palestinian militia. See ch. 7.1 for details and sources. The Ascalon Infantry skirmishing with the Franks described by Usama 16/40-1 may also have been city militia. 23. Quoted by Goitein, "Jerusalem" p. 163. There is no confirmation of this in the earlier sources and it may be late anti-semitic propaganda, although it is accepted as accurate by Goitein,65 23 in 1099, and the large Jewish population of Haifa played a major role in the defense of the city during 24 the siege of 1100 . 3.4 The Size of the Fatimid Army A significant problem that one continually faces with the nature of the Fatimid army is the question of size. Before any estimate of the military effectiveness of the Fatimid army can be made we must have a relatively accurate assessment of the potential size of the army, A battle in which 20,000 Fatimids are defeated by 5000 Crusaders is very different froma battle in which only 5000 Fatimids fought and lost. Figures given for the size of the army as a whole, or of specific contingents in battle, vary widely in the sources, and, when taken uncritically, have led to gross distortions of the numbers in the Fatimid army. There are three sorts of evidence which can be used to determine the size of the Fatimid army. First, we must determine the upper limit of the size of the army based 24, AA 7,22-5.66 on the economic limitations of the military administration. The army could have nc more men than the Fatimid government was able to recruit, equip, pay and supply. Second, statements made by medieval historians giving the total size of the Fatimid arny should be examined. Finally, numbers given for the size of Fatimid armies in specific battles should be collected and compared. The fundamental historiographical problem of the reliability of the sources, both Latin and Arabic, deserves sone initial attention . Anong historians the response to numbers in medieval chronicles has ranged from almost naive credence to such extreme skepticism that almost no figure is acceptable. Some medieval writers, while occasionally recording extravagant numbers, recognized the inherent problems of accuracy. 2 Fulcher of Chartes wrote that "The truth regarding the number of dead or wounded in this or any other battle cannot be determined since large numbers can only be estimated. Often when different sorts of writers speak falsely the cause of the falsity is really adulation. They try to heap up 1, For an excellent discussion of similar problems see Smail, pp. 165-8. 2. FC 3.43.1.67 praise of the victorious men of their country and to extol the power of their land for the benefit of the present and future generations. ence it is very plain that such is the shamelessness of lying that they will exaggerate the number of the enemy slain and minimize or omit entirely the losses of their friends.” Ibn Khaldtin saw things in much the same way. He believed that there were many ways in which inaccuracies . 3 could enter historical works : "This is especially the case with figures, either sums of money or of soldiers, whenever they occur in stories. They offer a good opportunity for false information and constitute a venicle for nonsensical statements. They must be controlled and checked with the help of known fundamental facts. .., Whenever contemporaries speak about the dynastic armies cf their own or recent times, and whenever they engage in discussions about Muslim or Christian soldiers, or when they get to figuring the tax revenues and the money spent by the government as. they are quite generally found to exaggerate, to go beyond the bound of the ordinary, and to succumb to the temptation of sensationalism.” Yet despite the very real dangers of exaggeration and outright falsification of numbers by medieval historians, if we are to attempt to estimate the size of the Fatimid army it becomes necessary to essume that, for the most part, the chroniclers recorded numbers 3. IKhal. Mugaddima tr. pp. 11, 13.68 which they had derived from personal estimates, were counted or estimated by others (in government records, for example), they heard verbally, or saw in some type of written records. Otherwise, research becomes a matter of simply accepting those numbers which support ones preconceptions which "seem zeasonable" -- while rejecting these which would tend to counter a given thesis. However, accepting that an historian accurately recorded numbers need not imply that the numbers given ina text are correct. There are a wide variety of ways in which numbers could be distorted, of which only a few will be briefly mentioned here. For propaganda purposes, Islamic governments occasionally published exaggerated figures. As will be shown below, this is quite prebably the case with some of the figures given for the Fatimid oe It was often difficult for an observer, even with the best of intentions, to estimate the size of a military force. An example cf this type of problem can be seen in the following hypothetical situation. A certain army marshals its soldiers in four ranks with 4, See ch. 3.4.2.69 one meter per man, thus being able to mobilize 4000 men ona front of 1000 meters’. A second arny marshals in three ranks with 1.25 meters per man. On the same frontage of 1000 meters the second army would marshal only 2400 men’. Now imagine an observer from the first army, standing 400 meters from the enemy, trying to estimate the size of the second. He guesses that their army covers 2000 meters, and based on the density of the troops in his own army he concludes that the enemy must number 8000 men. In reality, however, the front of army two is only 1800 meters long, meaning that there are only 4320 men in the second army, Thus our hypothetical observer, although sincerely trying to avoid exaggeration, still estimated the size of his enemy at nearly twice their actual number. The problems are naturally compounded when an observer consciously or unconsciously attempts to glorify the victory of his companions or excuse a defeat. Numbers recorded by historians who heard or read them some years or decades after they were transmitted 5. One man per meter x 1000 meters = 1000 men x 4 ranks = 4000 men, 6. One man per 1.25 meters = 800 men per rank x three ranks = 2400 men.70 could easily be distorted by inaccurate memory. A related form of this problem involves numbers which are reported and passed by word of mouth by a number of transmitters. What may have started out a fairly accurate guess of five to ten thousand (a statement still varying 100%) could be potentially enlarged in three or four tellings to "nearly ten thousand", "ten thousand or more," “over ten thousand,” and so forth. Finally, great care should be taken to determine exactly what the historian is counting. A good example of this occurs in accounts of the battle of Ramla in 1105. Ibn al-Athir states that the Fatimid army consisted of 500C oe while Magrizi and other later historians recoré 5000 cavalry’. A Fatinid army with 5000 men might have had 2500 cavalry and 2500 infantry, while an army with 5000 cavalry would have included several thousand additional infantry. A similar example is found in economic history, where Ibn Muyassar records that the annual revenue of Egypt during al-Afdal's reign was five million dinars. Magrizi records that the khan&@j alone was five million, to which must be added 7, TAth, 102394. 8. Mag. 3:35.other taxes. In this case the revenue of Egypt will be markedly different depending on whether one accepts thesZj as original or as an interpolation « Of course none of this should be taken to imply that medieval chroniclers were not above exaggerating the size of armies. Muslim chroniclers even went so far as to state that the Franks had one million men at the siege of Jerusalem in 1099, vhile Ekkehard gives the size FSpimid army at the battle of Ascalon in 1099 as 500,000". If these and other related problems are borne in mind a careful consideration of the numbers given can lead us, if not an exact understanding of the size of the Fatimid army, at least a general idea. 3.4.1 The Military Budget and Maximum Army Size The first variable which needs to be defined, and against which all other figures must be compared, is the potential size of the military budget of the Fatimids. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, the total annual 9. See ch. 4.1 for sources and a discussion of this problen. 11, Bkk. 17,5/176.military budget for the Fatimid dynasty probably amounted to a sum between 2.5 and 3.75 million dinars”. This figure gives us the potential range of total military spending for the dynasty, including expenses for equipment and pay for the army, navy and fortifications. According to ai-Qalgashandi the monthly pay of an officer ranged from thirty to seventy dinars a month, while soldiers received either five, ten, fifteen or twenty dindrs a month, which included allowances for food and fodder. In addition, however, there was a yearly clothing distribution and special combat pay called the nagaga, making the actual cost of maintaining 13 a soldier somewhat more than his monthly salary Further, a significant sum was spent in yearly stipends to Arab and perhaps Berber tribes in return for their occasional military service, which would have further decreased the resources available to the regular army. Assuming for the moment that the monthly pey vas all the expense required to maintain a soldier, and there were no other military expenses besides this (both of which iz, See 4,1 for details and sources. 13, See 4.3 for sources and discussion.13 are incorrect assumptions), the following table summarizes the potential number of soldiers which could be paid at each pay level with budgets of a number of different sizes within the ranges established in Chapter 4, sections 1 and 3. Table 4.1, Potential army Size Monthiy Pay/ Yearly Budget in Millions of Dinars Yearly Pay 2.4 3.0 3.6 3/60 40,000 50,000 60,000 10/120 20,000 25,000 30,000 15/180 15,000 17,500 20,000 20/240 10,000 12,500 15,000 If we assume that the army was 50% infantry and 50% cavalry and the average pay for infantry was 5 dinars a month and cavalry 15 dinars a ponth, we find that at a yearly military budget of 3.0 million dinars the total size of the Fatimid army would be 12,500 cavalry and 12,500 infantry, or 25,000 men in all . Since we lack 14, See 3.4.2 and 4.3 for a discussion of these assumptions. 15. That is, 5 dinars per month per infantryman and 15 dinars per cavalryman makes a total of 20 dinars for one of each. According to table 4.1 a budget of 3 Million dinars could support 12,500 men at 20 dinars a month, or 12,500 each of cavalry and infantry.the necessary sources the exact figures can not be ascertained. However, if the data presented above is relatively accurate it establishes the probable maximum size of the regular Fatimid army at somewhere around 25,000 men. At any rate, what can be known for certain is that given the financial limitations of the dynasty the aray certainly could not have been much larger than this figure. 3.4.2 The Total Size of the Fatimid army : A number of different sources give various figures said to represent, at different times, the total size of the Fatimid field army. Perhaps the most significant figures come from the descriptions of military reviews held in Cairo during the twelfth century. According to MagrizT: "The regiments of the, ‘askan advanced, preceded by their officers (zimim)... regiment by regiment, numbering more than 5000 cavalry, then the infantry archers with bows and crossbows numbering about 1000, and then the infantcy regiments ... numbering about 16 7000, each with its banner and standard ." This did 16. Magkh. 1:389c.75 not represent the entire army at Cairo for the Rikabiya, Ustdhs and the Siby3n al-Khéss appeared elsewhere in the procession. If all of these are included the total number of men reached 16,500". Qalgashandi describes another military review: "Then came marines on foot, carrying Arab bows called foot bows or stirrup bows”, nunbering over 00 men, then the regiments of infantry from the Mas@mida, then the Rayhaniya and the Juytshiya, then the Faranjiya, then the Waziriya, troop after troop in great numbers, exceeding 4000 men ... then the regiments of the skan, the Amiriya and the Hafjziya and the Greater Hujeriya and the Lesser Hujarlya (hujantya al-kiban wa al-hujariya al-sighdr) and the afdaliya and the vuylshiya, then the commissioned Turks (af-ataak al-mustana‘in), then the Daylam, the Kurds, the commissioned Ghuzz and others exceeding 3000 17. The Ust@dhs numbered about 1000, the Rikabiya 2000 and the Sibyan 500; see ch. 3.2 for details. 1B, "Al-qisc al-Canablya, wa tusamma qisé al-rijl wa al‘nihab,” both of which were types of crossbows, see ch. 5.1, 19. Qal. 3:508. The precise date of this event is not certain, but mention of the Amiriya and Hafiziya make it certainly sometime after the 1130s.76 19 cavalry . To these troops should again be added the Ustadhs, Rikabiya and Sibyan, also mentioned as participating in the review, bringing the total number of men in the review to some 11,000. Although it is not certain, it would seem that both of these events represented an ‘and, one of the reguiar military reviews carried out by Islamic governments” , and if this is true, we can estimate that the regular army stationed at Cairo numbered between 10,000 and 15,000, depending on the date and whether or not some troops were absent on military expeditions. These figures are confirmed by a report from 1122 that 14,305 robes were distributed as the kiswa (clothing distribution) to the soldiers and civil servants at cairo’. an examination of the grain and fodder distributions of the Fatimid government are also consistent with an army of this size, The grain distribution was said to 20. Bosworth "Recruitment” pp. 70 ££. and "Isti discusses the “ard in Islamic armies. en 21, MagKh. 1:410, Although it is not clear from the text, I am assuming that this distribution includes robes given to both soldiers and civil secvants at Cairo, but excludes distributions which may have been made to troops stationed in the provinces and garrisons. See ch. 4.3 for further details.have been one million indabbs of grain a year, and if half of this can be thought of as supplying fodder for mounts it could supply enough fodder for avout 10,000 horses and mules”. Subtracting the several thousand mounts owned by the Caliph which were probably not used for military purposes’, this would leave only enough fodder supplies for perhaps 7-8000 mounts. Further deductions for pack animals and remounts would leave sufficient resources to maintain a regular cavalry force of 4-8000 at Cairo, which is consistent with the other figures éiscussed Although none of these interpretations is certain, they all consistently point to an army stationed in Cairo numbering about 10-15,600 men. Army sizes recorded in a number of others incidents supports a regular army at Cairo of about 10-15,000 22. The topic of fodder distribution is discussed in detail in ch. 4.3 with full references. 23. Qal. 3:478 mentions that there were two royal stables each containing over 1000 horses and mules specifically for the Caliph and royal processions. 24. It should be emphasized that this discussion is completely hypothetical, since it is not known what portion of the grain was used for fodder for animals, what portion of the fodder was for military horses, or even if the fodder distribution represented all the grain needs for a given mount, etc.78 men, A significant example is the rebellion of 1135, when the army at Cairo, excluding the Juydshiya regiment and 2 group of foreign mercenaries numbered 10,000 men including both cavalry and ere On another occasion each military and civilian officer in Cairo was given a robe of honoz, the total distribution amounting to 144 rebes. If all of these officers were military (which they probably weren't), and each commanded 100 nen (the usual unit size)”, the size of the army under the command of these officers would have numbered 14,400", In 1130 a force of 5000 cavalry and infantry at Cairo were sufficient to compel al-Hafiz to depose and execute his son Higit”. This vould tend to indicate that the size of the entire army at Cairo probably did not number much over 10,000 men or a force of 5000 men would not have been able to dominate the political situation there. To this army of about 10-15,000 stationed at Cairo should be added the Mugta‘s stationed in the provinces, 25. Mag. 3:153. 26. See ch. 3.5. 27, Mag. 1:390. 28, Mag. 3:137.79 and other troops on garrison duty in Palestine. It is impossible to estimate their number, but a figure of an additional 10-15,000 falls within the economic limits discussed in section 3.4.1. There are other descriptions of the Fatimid army, however, which would to contradict my reconstruction. According to Magrizi the army at the time of Ruzayk numbered 40,000 cavalry and 36.000 infantry”. An estimate of the total size of the army in 1163 is given as 10,000 cavalry and 40,000 slaves of the caliph”. In a letter to Roger of Sicily the Caliph al-Hafiz claimed that Bahram had 20,000 troops under his command’. The Armenians and Sudanese at Cairo were said to have 32 numbered 50,0U0 . These figures point to an army substantially larger than the one discussed above . 29. MagKh. 1:94d. Magrizi here states that he read this ina document written by Ibn Mammatt. 30. Mag. 3:266 31, Qal. 62461. 32. Mag. 2.1, One of the largest estimates of the size of the mid army, a total of 215,000 men, is given by Nagir-i Khusrav. His description will be discussed in detail in Appendix 3, where it will be shown to be significantly exaggerated in many respects.80 However, each of these statistics is subject to various historiographical problems. First, it was often a standard government practice among Islamic dynasties to exaggerate the numbers in their armed forces for security or propaganda purposes. By publishing inflated numbers of troops, their enemies, who would certainly not accept the figures as accurate, would nevertheless be confused about the actual military power of a dynasty. The inflating of published figures would thus serve to deter possible invasions because a leader could never be absolutely certain of the size of his eneny's army. According to the Fakhr-i Mudabbir, a Perso-Indian government official of the thirteenth century, official army strengths should exaggerate their actual numbers’, Nigdm al-Mulk also advises that care be taken lest foreign ambassadors learn the size of the army’. the Malik Sultans also practiced this policy. David Ayalon has analyzed al-Zahiri's description of the MamlUk army and determined that it was a purposeful exaggeration to convince the Mongols that their army was 34. Discussed by Bosworth, "Recruitment," p. 76, where other techniques of confusing enemy spies are discussed. 35, Nizdm al-Mulk Siyasat Namah ch 21, tr. pp. 98-101.81 36 much stronger than it was . Although there is no explicit evidence that the Patimids practiced such official exaggeration, it would clearly be to their advantage to do so and easily explain some of the excessively large numbers given in some cases for the strength of the F timid armies. Furthermore, many of these large figures can be seen as obvious misinterpretations or exaggerations. For example, although it is usually assumed that the 40,000 slaves said to have been owned by the Caliph were all military slaves, this may not actually have been the case, Some nay have been pelece slaves”, others vere undoubtedty women for the harem’, or wives for other slaves and soldiers. Also, not all of the military slaves would have been ready for military service. In the MamlUk military system slaves were purchased as young teenagers, trained for a number of years, and sent into battle only when 36. Ayalon, “Structure” III pp. 70-73. 37. Such as the {inaashi and other Palace servants described by Gal. 3:526. 38. The mother of al-Mustansir was a black slave woman.82 39 they reacned their early twenties . With these factors in mind the following model can be constructed. If it is assumed that the slaves were purchased at age fourteen, entered the army at age eventy and served until age fourty it follows that every year five per cent of the current military slave corps would retire. However, during any given year others would have been killed, captured or crippled in battle, deserted, or died of natural causes. If these ¢ arbitrarily estimated to average another five per cent, then each year ten per cent of the total number of military slaves would need to be replaced. However, as the training begins at age fourteen, and lasts six years until age twenty, each year's age group of replacements must contain ten per cent of the total number of active military slaves in order to keep the regiments at full strength. If there were 10,000 military slaves in the 39. See Ayalon, "Military Slavery" for an excellent discussion. It is here assumed that the essential pattern of recruitment and training for Fatimid military slaves was basically similar to that of the later Mamluks. 40. Nigam al-Mulk, ch. 27.2, tr. pp. 106 describes a seven year training program for mamliks, although they apparently began some type of military service in the fourth year of training.83 army, an additional 6,000 young slaves, or nearly fourty per cent of the total force, would need to be in the training process preparing to fill the yearly gaps in the ranks. Thus, even if the figure given above that the Caliph owned 40,000 slaves is accepted (and it may be an exaggeration), a large portion of those slaves would have been non-military or in training. If it is assumed that 15,000 of those were non-military, according to the model described above the actual fighting force would be only 15,000 men, the rest being recruits and trainees. Although in practice the actual numbers and proportions undoubtedly varied, it is certain only a portion of the total slave manpower of the dynasty could have been actively engaged in military service. AL-HAfiz's description of the size of Bahram's army is also somewhat tenuous. Although al-Hafiz's letter is a primary source preserved in archives, copied by al-Qalgashand?, and as such should be given serious attention, other sources mention Bahram as being Supported by an army of 2000 rather than 20,000 Armenians , giving the impression that al-Hafiz'sae letter is propaganda aimed at impressing the King of Sicily with Fatimid power, Turning to the question of the number of Sudanis and Armenians at.Cairo during Saladin's coup, although some sources seem to imply that there were indeed 50,000 soldiers engeged in the revolt against Saladin, others describe the rebels differently, stating that although there were 50,000 people involved in the revolution, this number included not only the Sudani and Armenian soldiers but a large body of the citizens (‘ama) of 42 Cairo as well . Thus the 50,000 figure given should not be seen as representing the strength of the army alone, but of the city mob and the army combined. 3.4.3 Sizes of the Fatimid Field Army Up to this point only the maximum potential number of troops in the Fatimid army have been discussed. Barring civil war or a major national military crisis 42. Magkh. 43. In the last 100 years of Fatimid history the Delta was invaded five times: Atsiz's invasion in 1077, Baldwin's abortive raid in 1118 and-the three Syrian Invasions in the 1160s under Shirkuh, when the dynasty was disintegrating.: 43 such as an invasion of the Delta , the Fatimids would never have fielded all these troops at once. During expeditions to Syria a significant portion of the army would have remained in Egypt to defend the country and maintain the authority of the Wazir against rival factions. Most field armies numbered only a fraction of the total Fatimid army. Latin estimates of the size of Fatimid field armies range from two to three times the average sizes given by the Arabic sources. Leaving aside the wild exaggerations giving the Fatimids hundreds of thousands of soldiers, the Latins clained that there were 11,000 cavalry and 21,000 infantry at Ramla in 1101", 20,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry in 1102'", 15,000 total at 47 Ramla in 1105 , 15,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry in 44, Such as Bkk, 17.5/176 giving the Fatimids at Ascalon 100,000 cavairy and 400,000 infantry; the Gesta gives them 200,000 men at the same battle. 45, FC 2.11.2. 46. FC 2.15.1. 47, FC 2.32.3. 48. FC 3.2.1; WT 12.6.86 48 49 1118, and 16,000 total in 1123 . Thus the Latin estimates for the usual size of the Fatimid army in major pitched battles ranges from about 15 to 35,000. ‘The Muslim sources give an entirely different picture cf the usual size of Fatimid expeditionary forces. In the period before the rise of Badr al-Jamali Fatimid field armies tended, with few exceptions, to range roughly from 5000 to 10,000 men. In 970 an army in Syria numbered 4000"; in 973 another numbered 4000”" or 10,000"; in 976 one of the largest armies of the period numbered 20,000"; in 979 again 4000; in 992 a Fipinia acey in northern Syria numbered 13,000"; in 987 10,060 ; in 1025 there was a request for 1000 cavalry and 1000 infantry to reinforce the Fatimid army 49. FC 3.18.6, although his earlier redaction gives 30,000; WT 12.21. 50. Mag. 13126. 51, Mag. 1:202. 52. 10a. 3. 53. Mag. 1:239 54. Mag. 1:253, 55. IAdim. 1:185-8, but it was joined by allies froma bedouin confederation numbering about 20,000. 56. IQal. 51.57 at Ramla ; in 1067 during the great civil war involving the entire Fatimid army in Egypt the Turks of the Mashariga numbered 6000 while the Suddnis over 18,000. Although this is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the recorded arny sizes in pre-twelfth century sources, it does give the general impression that the usual field army of the Fagimids contained 5-10,000 men, reaching as high as 20,000 men in exceptional eee A major exception vas the army led by the Caliph al-‘aziz to Syria in 978, said to have numbered 70,000. If this number represents the muster of all regular Fatimid troops along with large numbers of irregulars it might be conceivable. However, when faced with the general trend it seems more reasonable to conclude that this number is an exaggeration. During the Crusades the sizes of the Fatimid armies 57. Mag. 2:152. 58. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves" pp. 484-5; Mag. 2:273 states first that the Sudanis numbered 50,000, fought a battle with the Turks, and numbered 15,000 in a later battle. Since these supposed 50,000 Sudanis were defeated by only 6000 Turks it is probable the 50,000 figure is an exaggeration. 59. A combination of Ley, "Fatimid Army," Lev, "Fatimid Policy," Beshir, "Fatimid Military” and Bacharach, ‘african Military Slaves" provides a spotty overview of the Fatimid army during this period.88 as depicted by the Muslim sources again fall within this same range. The largest Fatimid force ever mentioned by the Muslim chroniclers was about 20,000 men at Ascalon, 1099°", but this number included many thousands of nilitianen fron Palestine’. the FHtinids sent force of 4000 cavalry to Palestine in 1103" at Ramla in 1105 the Fatimid army numbered 5000 nen’; 7000 cavalry vere sent to Syria in response to Baldwin's invasion; 10,000 troops are mentioned in a faction dominating cairo in 1135; Bahr8m vas supported by 2000 Armenian horse archers in 1136 7 in 1138 Rigwan ibn WalkhashT is said to have defeated a force of 15,000 Fatimid troops at Cairo with only 300 cavalry”, which would tend to indicate that the 15,000 figure is an exaggeration; 60. Dhah. 2:15-6; ITagh, 5:149. 61, 1Qal. 137/48-9. 62. Maq. 3:33; this force probably included an additional body of infantry as well. 63. IAth, 10:394. 64. IAth. 10:543. 65. Mag. 3:153. 66. Maq. 3:161. 67. Mag. 3:173ag Usama claims that 17,000 Fatimid soldiers were killed in battle of the civil war in the 1140s, but this figure, if not an exaggeration, includes large numbers of Arab and Berber irregulars who had been hired; in 1149 500 cavalry were sent to relieve the garrison at fae abbas had 5000 men in nee in 1163 a Fatimid army numbered 6000 cavalry. Although the size of the army for each individual campaign should be considered independently, this broad range of references shows that most Fatimid expeditions generally included 5-10,000 men, which gives a good indication of the military potential of the dynast: These figures, on the average, range from about 1/2 to 1/3 of the Latin estimates. A final question which remains to be considered is that of the proportion of infantry to cavalry in Fatimid armies. It is unfortunately impossible to give any definitive answer, but some general patterns emerge. The first point is that the proportions of Fatimid 68. Usama 32/8. 69. Mag. 3: 190. 70. Mag. 3:216. 71, Mag 267armies could vary widely depending on the types of irregular troops which were enlisted. when large bodies of militia infantry were included, such as at the battle of Ascalon, the proportion of cavalry could be much lower than normal, while if mounted bedouin irregulars were enlisted in large numbers the proportion of cavalry could rise sharply. Fulcher described one Fatimid arny as consisting of one third cavalry’, another of two thieds”*, and a third of about 40x", Unfortunately the Muslim sources tend to be much less specific in these matters and often only mention the number of cavalry in a given field army. Na! Khusrav describes the total Fatimid army as consisting of about one half cavalry. Likewise the army at the time of Ruzayk is said to have consisted of epproxinately equal proportions of cavalry and infantry . The two best descriptions of Fatimid army 72, PC 2.11.2, 75, FC 2.15.1. 74, FC 3.2.1. 78. Nagir-i Khusrav, tr. pp. 217-8. 76. Magkh. 1:94d. However, the numbers given in both of these instances are exaggerated, and the proportions may also be inaccurate.91 reviews discussed above both list about ¢5-55% of the soldiers as ae Maqrizi lists 5000 cavalry and 8000 ineeee ria to which should be added at least an additional 1500 cavalry from the Ustadhs and Sibyan al-KWass, making the total 6500 cavalry to 8000 infantry, or about 45% cavalry. Qalqashandi has 4000 infantry and 3000 coe to which should be added 1500 from the Ustadhs and Sibyan, which comes to slightly over 50% cavalry. The tentative conclusion can be drawn that, although the actual proportion of cavalry and infantry undoubtedly varied from time to time, the Patimids were able to field armies which could range from one third to two thirds cavalry, depending on which regular troops vere mobilized and the types and numbers of irregular troops. In conclusion, the economic constraints of the dynasty, the size of the regular army garrisoned at 71, See 3.4.2. for details, 78. Magkh. 1:389c. 79, Qal. 3:508, . 80. The Rikabfya have been ignored in both of these cases since it is unclear whether they were cavalry or infantry.Cairo and the general pattern of numbers for Fatimid field armies are consistent with a total size for the regular army during the reign of al-Afdal of between 20 and 30,000, and field armies of from 5 to 10,000, with about half of the regular army being cavalry. 3.5 Officers and Unit Sizes Details of the exact structure of the officer corps and standard size of units are lacking for the Fatimid army, end only the general outline can be discerned. During the twelfth century the Wazir was the supreme commander of the army, but under his command there were a number of different officers. al-Qalgashand? describes the system as follows: "There are three ranks of Amirs: The first rank consists of the Amirs of the Necklace (a£-'Umand a£-Mutamwagin) who wear a golden necklace around their necks. They are the equivalent of the Amirs (of One Hundred end) Commanders of 1000 in our day (1350s). The second rank consists of the Lords of Maces (Anbab af-Qudib), who ride in the procession (of the Caliph) with maces of silver, which the Caliph gives to them from the Khizina al-tajammul. They are the93 equivalent of the TabLakhina in our day. The third rank consists of the rest of the Amirs who are not allowed to carry maces. They are the equivalent of the Anirs of ten of Pive in our dey’. The officers in the Fatimid army were apparently officially known as aintn rather than Amins. In addition to the ranks mentioned above there was the Tagaksal@a or Isfahsalan at-Chakar who is described by Ibn Tuwayr as "the zimdm of all zinims who is in charge of the affairs of the roe The Tsfahsalan was more a government position in the administration than strictly military, and according to Maqrizi the Is{ahsa£ia was an officer in the Diwan ati. Exact details as to how many men were commanded by each of the three ranks are not known, It seems fairly 1, Qal. 3:480; on the equivalent ranks under the Mamliks of Qalgashandi’s day see Ayalon, “Structure.” 2. Literally "reins" but perhaps best rendered, "a holder of the reins of power." The terms zindm and amin seem to be used as equivalents in the sources. 3. See Bosworth "Ispahsalar” on the origin and use of this term in the Islamic world. 4. Qal. 483 5. Mag. 32335.certain that the smallest tactical unit of the Fatimid army was a company of 100 men, probably under the command of an Amir of the third rank. The Hujariya regiment was divided into companies of 100 men each under a zindm’, and it vas the standard practice that armies sent to relieve the garrison at Ascalon were in units of 100 men’. the "Lords of Maces" can probably be seen as commanding several of these companies of 100 men, while the "Amirs of the Necklace" would command entire regiments. The impression from the sources, which cannot be confirmed, is that the companies of 100 men were of fixed size and composition, while the larger regiments such as the JuyUshiya and the Hujariya could fluctuate in nusbers". Tt appears that only portions of each regiment would be sent to battle at a given time, ard were apparently organized into temporary battalions and 6. Magkh. 1:4434 7. Mag. 3190. 8. The Hujariya increased from 3000 (Magkh. 1:443d) to 5000 (Magkh. 1:444a, Qal. 3:481). 9. Thus, although the Hujariya numbered 3 to 5000 men, a small independent band’ of 100 was sent to Yaman in 1124, Hak. 46/62.95 8 assigned officers at the beginning of a campaign .CHAPTER IV THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FATIMID ARMY Dealing accurately with the administration of the Fatimid army is difficult. Few administrative records have survived from Fatimid times and the references in the historians are scattered, often unclear, and sometimes contradictory. Another major difficulty is that modern scholars have yet to give the administration of the Fatimid dynasty the careful study it deserves. A significant amount of research and analysis remains to be done, and the following description must remain general and tentative. Nonetheless, an attempt should be made to make some sense of the scattered and incomplete records which have survived and which can give us some idea of the administrative and economic constraints within which the Fétimid army operated. ancial Resource: Although there is a lamentable dearth of surviving documents for the Fatimid dynasty we are fortunate in possessing a summary of the Rawk (land and tax survey) 9697 of Badr al-Jamali in 478/1085-6 as recorded by Abt 1 $81ih » The sum for the khardj of Eoypt is given as 3,121,000 @indrs. This amount is generally consistent with the khand@j income for Egypt from a number of different periods which for the most part ranges from 2 ‘ndrs per year . However, this 2.8 to 3.4 million figure only represents the khaxZj, and there were other important sources of revenue available to the Fatimid Co . The taxes on the textile and other industries in the 1, AbU Salih, fol. 7b-8b, pp. 15-19. Rabie, p. 51 nistakenly states that AbU Salih's figures are from the Afdali nawk. Abu Salih, p. 19 states that this was the revenue in the dayS of al-Mustansir, and MagKh. 1:100 gives 3,100,000 dinars as the revenue based on the Jamali nawk 2. Toussoun, pp. 23ff (summarized pp. 31-2) gives a list of khanaj income from Egypt from a wide variety of sources and over a number of centuries. This data is also partially summarized in part by Ashtor, Economic Histoay, pp. 207-8. 3, For much of the following discussion I rely mainly on the analysis and figures given by Rabie, Financial Syste Although his work for the most part treats the AyyBbid and Mamluk periods, he gives a great deal of information about the Fatimid financial administration as background to the Ayyubids. 4. Rabie, p. 80-1 where he gives figures for c. 1060 dealing Only with the taxes on industries in parts of the delta and Cairo. The total industrial tax from all of Egypt ¥as certainly higher.96 . 4 Egyptian delta produced over 370,000 dinars annually . Another important form of revenue derived from such state owned monopolies as alum and natron mining, which could produce tens of thousands of dinars yeerly Tariffs on trade in Ibn Mammati's time (1190s) in Alexandria alone amounted to almost 30,000 dinars a year, while the zakdt on Muslim merchants produced over 50,000 dinars’. A wide range of hilali (non-canonical) taxes which were abolished by Saladin produced 100,000 ends from cairo alone’, vhile other cites in Egypt - also had higa2i taxes under the Fatimids. Such taxes produced nearly 1000 dinars from Fayyum ee Thus the total revenue from ,i£@lZ taxes from all Egyptian cities could have been significant. The jawalZ (or jazya, the poll-tax on non-Muslims) produced 130,000 dinars a year-under Ibn Mammati's aéninistration , and taxes on the minting of new coins, although varying 5. Rabie pp. 82-8. 6. Rabie p. 92 for figure from Alexandria, p. 98 for the zukat. 7, Magkh. 1:104, 8. Rabie, p. 105-6, 9. Rabie p. 109.greatly from year to year, could produce as much as 36,000 dinars cee eee Added to these may heve been a number of public service and other taxes and confiscations of private property which, although irregular, could produce significant sums. Although these figures are incomplete and possibly inaccurate, and in our present state of knowledge should not be used to attempt any detailed reconstruction of the Fatimid government resources, they do present us with a broad view. The approximate yearly total from the non-khaxa@j taxes mentioned above was between 800,000 and 900,000 dinars, and it should be emphasized that some of the figures given above (tariffs and hilaZzZ taxes especially) represent only a portion of the actual government income from those sources. Thus when these figures are added to the khax@j income of 3,121,000 dinars, we find that the total government income for the P&timids was probably well over 4,000,000 dinars annually. This sum is partially confirmed by Ibn 10, Rabie, p. 116, 11, Rabie, pp. 113-7, Public service taxes may have originated with Saladin's economic reforms and therefore might not have been available as sources for Fatimid revenue, see Rabie, p. 114.100 Muyassar who states that during al-Afdal's reign the yearly income of the Fatimid government was 5,000,000 dinars”, with an additional 1,000,600 indabbs in grain. There are a number of ways in which Ibn Muyassar's figure can be interpreted. Abi S@lih wrote that the khandj of Egypt amounted to 3,121,000 dinars during the reign of al-mustensir and this is confirmed by a report from al-Magrizi that when Badr al-Jamali was established as Wazir of Egypt he initiated a rawk in 478/1085-6 which gave the revenues as 3,100,000, whereas in 463/1070-1 the khaxaj had only amounted to 2,800,000 afnBrs ". aw nentioned above, Ibn Muyassar, reports that during al-Afdal's reign the "intifa® diya@nx misn = revenue of Egypt" amounted to 5,000,000 dinars and an additional one million indabbs of grain’. The five million dinar figure can be interpreted in a number of different ways: as an inaccurate exaggeration with 12, IMuy. 84, see next paragraph for analysis. 13. ABU SAlik, p. 17. 14, MagKh. 1:100. 15. IMuy. 84, and Magkh. 1:100, However, Mag. 3:72b states that it is the revenue from the khanaj of Egypt rather than the entire government revenue.103 16 little value; a figure given in jayshZ dindrs ; a figure representing @ real increase in the khaxj based on al-Afdal's new xawk in 1107, the purpose of which was to eliminate corruption and increase government revenue; or the total government revenue including both khanaj and other sources of government income mentioned above. A final resolution of this problem will require additional research. At this point it appears that the simplest solution is to assume that Abu Salib's and Maar Tz’ s figures of 3,100,000 represent the total revenue from the khanZj alone, vhile Ibn Muyassar's 5,000,000 dinars should be seen as the combination of the 3.1 million dinars in khan@j along with all other sources of government revenue, To the figures discussed above must be added the revenues from the territory controlled by the Fatimids in Palestine. The scarcity of sources makes it impossible to arrive at even a partial estimate for these numbers, but it would not have represented a major portion of the total. The nearest chronological figure 16. Following Ashtor, Economic Histoay, p. 208, who points out that this figure is substantially above the other khaxaj estimates for Egypt at this time, and concludes that it actually represents jayshi rather than standard dinars.102 was given by al-MugaddasT for the year 985, who states that the revenues from Palestine were 259,000 dinars, and from all of Greater Syria as 1,189,000 einars’ Before the Crusader attacks the F&timids controlled the equivalent of most of the old province of Palestine and some additional cities on the coast. An initial total for khandj of somewhere around three hundred thousand dinars from Palestinian revenues would probably be fairly accurate, with additional revenues from tariffs, "industrial" taxes, and the various hilaeZ taxes discussed above. This revenue would have been substantially diminished during al-Afgal's reign as the Crusaders captured cities, gardens, and farm lane, while their raids devastated crops and choked off trade. In summary, it must again be emphasized that it is impossible to arrive at any conclusive totals for the financial resources of the Fatimid dynasty. However, based on the figures briefly reviewed above, it can perhaps be estimated that the annual available resources 17. Al-MugaddasT, quoted in Le Strange, Pafestine, PP. 44-8 who gives a summary of reports on the revenues of Palestine from a number of sources all preceding the twelfth century which generally range from two to three hundred thousand dinars. These figures are also summarized by Ashtor, Economic Histony, p. 174.of the Fatimid dynasty lay somewhere between four and five million dinars. However, by no means all of the state revenue was devoted to the military, and some attempt must be made to establish the proportion devoted to the military budget. Unfortunately, there is even less data regarding this question than the for preceding one. One way to deal with this question is to examine some known non-military expenditures of the Dynasty. The maintenance of the Fatimid court was enormously expensive. The salaries of the Ustadhs, Rikabiya and other palace guards and servants would have amounted to 18 several hundred thousand dinars annually . Al-Afdal was said to have had over 6 million dinars in his personal treasury when he died the accumulation of which 19 would have represented a major drain on the treasury , 18, Qal. 3:525-7. The Ustadhs numbered about 1000 men and received from ten to 100 dinars per month, the Rikgbiya, numbering 2000, from five to twenty. If we take twenty dinars as the average pay for an Ustadh and ten dinars for a Rikabiya, the pay for the Ustadhs and Rikabiya each would be 240,000 dinars a year, or 480,000 dinars total. To this should be added the costs of the Firrash, the Rashshash and other servants. 19, Mag. 3:70; IZaf. 91,104 20 and to have freed 10,000 slaves when he died Building costs totaled ten million dinars during al-Afgal's reign |, which, if divided into the number of years he served as Wazir, amounts to almost 400,000 dinars per year. The expense of the “Td al-{itn for one year was 100,000 Sfnars’", and the Khézin at-khiwwa ves 23 said to have had a budget of 600,000 dinars annually To these figures should be added other civil and religious expenditures. Although no exact budget can be reconstructed, it is clear that a substantial portion of the state budget was spent on non-mi. ary matters. Another way to approach this question is to draw an analogy from the more detailed data available for Saladin's reign, Al-Q&di al-Fadil has left us an account of the revenues and military expenditures of Boypt for 85/1189". AL-Fadil lists the revenues from Egypt as totalling 4,653,019 dinars, of which 3,462,096 20, Mag. 3:71. 21, Maq. 3:72-3. 22. Maq. 3:83, although this figure included the nilitary expenditure of supplying new uniforms to some of the soldiers. 23. Magkh. 1:409; Maq. 3:343. 2. Reported by Magkh. 1:87.were apparently utilized directly for military matters, he equivalent of nearly 75% of the total puaget” Although there is no way of determining if the Fatimid military budget of some ninety years earlier utilized precisely the same proportions of the state funds es in the days of saladin’, this figure presents some idea of the potential cost of maintaining an army. For subsequent analysis in an attempt to gain a feeling for the economic limitations placed on the Fatimid army, it will be cautiously assumed that potential Fatimid military expenditures could have ranged from 50-75% of the total government revenues, or from 2.5 million to 3.75 million dinars. 25. Gibb "Armies" p. 77; Elbeheiry pp. 330£f, However, there are a large number of unanswered questions and difficulties concerning these figures, and Saladin's military budget as a whole. 26. Indeed, it seems likely that the Fatimid military budget vas proportionally lower, both because of the vast cost of maintaining the Fatimid court had been eliminated, and because Saladin was involved much more extensively in Syrian conquests and in battles with the Crusaders than were the Fatimids.106 The military administration of the Fatimid government was quite sophisticated, especially when compared with the administration of the Crusaders at the same period. The major administrative body for the army was the Diwan al-jaysh (Ministry of the Army) which employed a large number of ministers and secretaries. According to al-Qalgashandi this diwan was divided into three offices, the Diwan al-jaysh proper, the Diwan al-nqwatib (Ministry of salaries) and the Diwan al-igtz®© (Ministry of aati)’. The major duty of the minister of the Diwan al-jaysh was maintaining a complete register of all regular 1. This office was also associated at times with the Diwan af-Majlis which controlled non-military affairs. 2. Qal. 3:525. Al-Qalqashand? quotes extensively from Ibn Tuwayr in his description of the dawins, and it is likely that much of his unattributed material is from this source. The fullest description of the financial aspects of Fatimid military administration is Cahen, "Administration," which includes a French translation of a portion of al-Makhzimi's Minhaj. All references to al-Makh2Uni below are from this translation as the origina! ma:escript was unavailable to me.107 soldiers. The names of the officers of each regiment were listed, followed by the names of each soldier under his command, the district from which the revenues for his salary were drawn, the quality and type of his equipment, his physiognomy and his martial sein’, These registers were kept current through regular military reviews (ard) where each soldier was required to report for inspection with full equipment and pass tests of military expertise. The quality of the mounts and beasts of burden of each soldier was also inspected at these reviews, All changes in numbers of men in a regiment, salaries or iq¢Z%s, and quality of equipment and mounts were updated in the registries based on these inspections To insure against such fraud as padding the ranks with non-military personnel to increase the pay of a regiment, detailed descriptions of each regular soldier and his mount were kept in the registers. MakhzUmi tr. p. 164-5, mentions all of these subjects as being listed in the registers except the martial skill of each soldier, However, other detailed descriptions of Islamic military reviews (and) generally mention the practice of grading the troops according to skili, and it seems likely that the Fatimids followed this as well. See Bosworth, "Recruitment" and "Isti rad.” 4. Qal. 3:492,108 The Diwan al-nawatib kept registers of the names of all government employees, both civil and military, who received stipends in cash from the treasury’. These employees were divided groups according to departments of the government, and their rank within their department. These groups included the wazir, his family and staff, the personal attendants of the Caliph such as the ustZdhs and personal physicians, the administrators of the palace, officers of the army, major religious officials, ministers of the various administrative offices, and various other palace enployees . Al-Makhzimi states that there were two types of regular pay distributed by this diwan. The first, known as the infaq, was paid to the Hujariya regiments, and probably the other Royal regiments and officials stationed at Cairo as well; the second, the ijab or monthly stipend, vas paid to "those troops employed in the provincial gertisons .* The troops and officials stationed at Cairo received as part of the in{@q both a 5. Qal. 93. 6. Qal, 3:525£, for a discussion of the salaries of those associated with the military see 4.3. 7, Makh2im, tr. pp. 165-6, Cahen, "Administration," pp. 171-2109 cash stipend and allocations of food and fodder for mounts ané clothing . The troops in the provinces of Zoypt or in garrisons in Palestine were paid under 2 somewhat different system than those stationed in Cairo. A representative of the Diwan at-jaysh was assigned to each garrison in the provinces. s official held regular military reviews for his regiment and maintained a registry like the main registries of the Diwan. Copies of these provincial records would be sent to Cairo where they would be Processed and the necessary monthly stipends ordered to be paid to the troops of that region . It is unclear whether the money for provincial soldiers would be sent from the treasury at Cairo, taken from local resources, or some combination of both, or if all or part of the revenue to pay these troops might have come from iqta%s in the region where they were garrisoned. The third office of military administration vas the Diwan af-iggi© which kept registries of the lands allocated to the army, Rabie rightly maintains that 8. Makhziimi, tr. p. 165, Cahen, "Administration," pp. 171-2. For a discussion of these payments in kind see 4.3. S. Makhzimi, tr. p, 116."the main features of the Fatimid iqta©in Egypt are still ambiguous and need serious research ”,* and no solution to these difficulties can be offered here. According to Cahen, government officials and officers would receive grants of certain agricultural regions as iqfi%. Part of the revenue would be owed to the government, while part would be retained by the muqta%. The mugta would usually owe civil or military services, for which he might occasionally receive an additional salary. The government's portion of an igta%, the size of the ig¢a, and its holder could all be changed at the discretion of the government. The iqt@% of the Fatimid system were divided into two main types, the iq¢@© jayshi and the igta© i%idadt The first was allocated to regular soldiers and civil officials and included both cash and produce from the lands". the collection of revenue and produce fron some of these iqfa® jayshZ was on an annual basis. 10. Rabie, p. 26. 11, Cahen, “Administration,” pp. 173ff; Cahen. vEvolution," pp. 37-8; Cahen, "igta*,” p. 1089b; Rabie, Financial System, pp. 26-8, 51. 12, Makh2tmi tr. p. 166, Cahen, "Administration," pp. 173EE.According to al-MakhzUmi there was another type of ig#@© in which the revenue from a certain tract of land was assigned to a soldier, but collected by the government, and paid to the soldier as an ijab, or monthly stipend mentioned above’, In addition to the regular troops permanently stationed at Cairo some of the army was garrisoned throughout Egypt where they had been given tracts of land as igfa®s. Magrizi mentions that troops were mobilized from "those regiments present (at Cairo) and those visiting their ignts Bahram is said to have mobilized "a group of the jund and the “askan along with the army of the countryside (jund at-anyis)." Magrizi, in describing the same situation says that Bahram gained the support of "a group of mugta%s of the Gharbiya province *,* In al-Afdal's military and financial reforms of 1107-8/501 he made a 13. Makhzimi, tr. p. 166. 14. Mag. 3:190, "min a£-fawa'if h@dinan wa man kana musdfinan 2 igtSihi.” “The term musaginan, which I have translated "visiting" may imply that the troops were not permanently based near their igt#%s but only visited them occasionally, perhaps curing harvest or planting times. 15. IDaw, 6:514, 16. Maq. 3:155distinction between the "men of the army and the mugge’s In 1118 the mugta% of the governor of the eastern delta were mobilized to oppose Baldwin's invasion, implying that they were stationed in the eastern delta where the land of their iq¢@%s ves fone The exact significance of such sketchy evidence is not certain, but as a tentative hypothesis, it seems likely that the troops paid by the infaq were for the most part stationed in Cairo, while the mugta% resided as garrisons in towns near the lands of their ig¢a“s. This would make both economic and military sense in that the mugta%s would be near their lands and at the same time would also be available as a army for regional military needs and as garrisons of the major towns. These troops were paid from the revenue produced from the land in the region in which they were stationed which had been assigned to them as ig¢i%. Thus the officers and soldiers of a regiment stationed at Alexandria, for example, would be assigned a certain tract of land in that area as their iqta©. This land 17, Mag. 3:40, “al-nijal a-CaskanZya wa at-mugta “in.” 18. Mag. 3:53.would be administered by government officials, and a portion of the revenues from it would be sent to Cairo. The rest would be kept in Alexandria and distributed on a monthly basis to the troops stationed in Alexandria. If this hypothesis is correct, troops stationed in the provinces would have been mugéa%s receiving the ijab or monthly stipends, while those stationed in Cairo would have been paid by infdq direct from the state treasuries and granaries and would not, for the most part, have held igta%. The ita” i%tidadiwas based on a set of registers kept by the Diwan al-igta© concerning the bedouin tribes of the region around Alexandria, the Kindni berbers, and bedouins of other regions, as well as the fleet. The registers for the irregular bedouins were less complete than those of the regular soidiers kept by the Dian al-jaysh, listing only the required number of men from each tribe, and the stipends for the tribe as a whole in jayshT dinars'”, rather than a detailed listing of each individual. According to al-Qalgashané? the iqt@% of 19. Makhatimi, tr. pp. 164-5, 166-7; Qal. 3:493.20 the bedouins were lecated on the fringes of Egypt and were of less value than those of the regular soldiers. However the system actually functioned in practice, there were two major ramifications for the structure of the army, The first was that the bedouins of Egypt were provided with revenues from their igti® i¢tidadz in return Zor which they were obligated to undertake the protection of Egyptian territory and send troops to join Fatimid expeditionary forces outside soypt although in practice the bedouins tended to receive additional cash supplements, perhaps a type of nagaga, when called up for military service’. the seconé result vas that 2 portion of the Fatimid army vas more or less permanently stationed in the provinces, while the elite regiments 23 were based at Cairo . 20. Qal. 3:495, “atni{ af-bilad.” 21, Makhzumi, tr. p. 167. 22. See ch. 3.3.1. 23. Ayalon, "Structure" 1, 204ff., discusses the fact that in much the same way the Royal Mamluks were stationed at Cairo, vere better paid and considered superior troops, while other mamlUks and the hafga lived the provinces, apparently at or near their iqza%s.ae 4.3 The System of Payment only 2 brief summary of the Fatimid system of payment can be attempted here. The subject can not be fully examined until the economic and administrative history of the period has been studied in detait Furthermore, the Fatimid period lacks the economic detials which have allowed Dr. Ayalon to make his excellent studies of the Mamlik system of payment all thet can be done here is to give a general outline of the system for paying and supplying the armed forces, with a few details of that system in action. As has been discussed in the previous section, for purposes of payment Fatimid troops was divided into three classes: those who received the inj@g, those receiving the ijab which seems to have been usually supplied from igt%, and those holding iq¢a% of one of the various types discussed above. Unfortunately it is impossible to determine for certain the monthly pay of 1, Ayalon, "Payment," pp. 38-41 discusses the plentiful sources for his study.these various groups of Fatimid soldiers, although the general ranges and types of pay can be established. Qalgashand? provides some figures for pay rates for many government employees and soldiers serving in Cairo. The most important government officials received monthly salaries in the hundreds of dindrs’, vhile “the officers (zimdm) of the soldiers and the Sudanis were paid fifty, fo rty or thirty dinars per month." Guards of government buildings other than the Palace in Cairo were paid five, ten, fifteen or tventy dinars each, while non-military servants in the Palace each received five or ten ainars The pay of the Rikabiya fits the same pattern, with the officers receiving fifty dinars a month and the normal soldiers five, ten, fifteen or twenty dinars’. ‘The general pattern that emerges from these few known examples is a pay scale of five, ten, fifteen or twenty dinars a month for the norwal soldier and thirty, 2. Qal. 3:525-6. 3. Qal. 3:526. 4, Qal._3:526. Officers of the city guard were paid titty dinars a month, the leaders of the Palace servants thirty. 5. Mag. 3:341-2.fowrty or fifty dinars a month for the officers. It is difficult to make any distinctions beyond this, although a few observations ere pertinent. These differences in pay probably are based on three major criteria, the first whether the soldier was mounted or on foot, second, the skill and experience of the soldier, and, finally, the quality and cost of his arms. Cavalry would naturally receive a higher rate of pay than infantry to cover the cost of their horse, saddle gear, groom for the mount, etc.; the heavily armoured man would likewise receive higher pay than the lightly armoured due to the increased cost of his equipment and perhaps the need for a servant to care for it anda mule or camel to carry it to battle. Finally, in many Islamic dynasties there was a pay scale and grading according to military proves’, and it is likely the Fatimids followed this policy as well. With these factors in mind the following is a hypothetical reconstruction of the basis for the pay structure outlined above. The major division in pay was between cavalry and infantry. In each group there were two classes of troops: for infantry, the standard pay 6. Bosworth, "Recruitment," passin. esp. pp. 73-4.18 was five dinars, while elite or heavily armed infantry were paid ten dinars. For calvary, the standard pay was fifteen dinars, while the elite or extra heavy cavalry received twenty. Infantry officers received thirty or foyrty dinars, while cavalry officers received fourty or fifty. Although such a reconstruction is completely conjectural it parallels some known pay rates of other troops in the “iddle East during this time. In Iraq in the late Tenth century a cavalryman received twelve to fourteen dinars per month, an infantryman three and a halt’, ana during the Crusades the Armenian cavalry were paid twelve dindrs a month, while the infantry received three’. another parallel presents itself from the 9 nagaga paid to troops mobilizing for combat . The nagaga of a cavalry officer was 100 atnars, or twice 10 their monthly salary of fifty dinars . The nafaga of the cavalryman was thirty dTnars, and if this also represented double his monthly salary, the salary would 7. Ashtor, Economic History, pp. 132-3, 154, 8. ME p, 246. On the nagaga see the following paragraph. 30, Mag. 3: 190.be fifteen dingrs a month, which fits the general pattern described above Monthly salaries were not the only type of payment received by Fatimid soldiers. Another important, and for the government costly, form of pay was the nafaga, 2 special grant of money on the eve of a campaign or at the ascension of a nev Caliph’. If the troops vere being mobilized for combat its purpose was to provide soldiers with money to refurbish their equipment, buy camels or mules, and cover all extra expenses involved in a major campaign, as well as boosting morale. At the accession of a new ruler it was meant to solidify support of the army and thereby ease the transfer of power. Very few details are known about the actual procedure and level of the nasaga in FStimid times. The most illuminating example is recorded by Magrizi, who 11. This hypothesis does not conform to the situation when Usima managed to recruit 860 mercenary cavalry for 6000 dinars at a rate of about seven dinars each (Usama 9/33). However, these troops were unemployed Syrian soldiers and their actual pay rate was undoubtedly negotiated on the spot and should not be seen as some type of standard Fatimid practice. 12. Ayalon, "Payment," pp. 56-65, has an excellent discussion of this practice during Mamluk times.126 states that whenever the garrison at Ascalon was relieved the new troops were given a nagaga. "The nafaga of the amirs was 100 éindrs, and for the (cavalry) soldiers thirty dTnirs each." tt is impossible to tell if this was the standard rate paid to soldiers whenever they vent to combat or vas a special nafaga for garrison duty. However, at an earlier period a nagaga of forty dinars per cavalryman was mentioned’. During the Manlik period the nafaga was theoretically 100 aTndrs\, but in practice it usually varied from twenty to fifty dines’. rt sens Likely that in practice the Fatimid nagaga also varied according to the current reserves of the treasury and the type of military activity to be undertaken, with 2 higher nafaga being paid for a more lengthy and arduous campaign. ‘This practice could represent a significant expense for a campaign. If an army of 5000 cavalry was 13. Mag. 3:190. 14. Mag. 22152; Lev, "Fatimid army," p. 189 mistakenly takes this figure as an increase in pay rather than the nagaga paid on the eve of a campaign. 15. Ayalon, "Payment," p. 57. 16. Ibid., pp. 58, 64.121 mobilized, each receiving a thirty dindr nafaga, the cost of the nagaga alcne would amount to 150,000 dinars, to which would be added the regular pay of the troops, n of the cost of supplies, equipment, and the mobilizati the fleet to transport troops and supplies. Although no exact costs can be determined each expeditionary force undoubtedly cost the Fatimid government at least several hundred thousand dinars. The Kiswa was an annual or semi-annual distribution of either a robe or its cost to soldiers and government enployees’ The government's’ supplies of clothing and cloth were kept in the Khizdna af-kiswa in Cairo, and according to Ibn Abi Tayy, the early Fatimid administration spent approximately 600,000 dinars a year on the maintenance of this storehouse. However, this Khiz@ina included the costly jewel and gold covered robes of the Caliph and his high officials, as well as the robes for the slaves and servants of Palace establishment, and the figure of 600,000 dinars, if not an exaggeration, should not be thought of mainly as a 17. Although some could receive clothing more frequently, for example, al-Afdal's librarian received 3 bes per year, aq. 3:51.18 military expense . In 1119 the kiswa was said to have amounted to 8775 robes, while in 1122 it was 14,308. ‘The money spent on the kiswa was said to have been greatly decreased during the regime of al-Ma'min al-aatagl. It thus appears that in practice there was no set standard as to who received the kiswa or how many times a year, or even the quality or value of the robes distributed. It is clear that the robes for the high officers and administrators were much finer and more expensive than those of the lower ranks, Ibn AbT Tayy stating that the gold embroidered tindz (decorative band) on the robes of the amirs alone cost 500 dinars each’. During Ramadan in 1122 the cost of the distribution of gifts, sweets and robes given on the “id a£-{itn amounted to 100,000 18. Quoted by Magkh. 1:409. (Note that Mag. 3:343 abridges and distorts this same passage.) Magkh, 3:415 mentions roval robes costing 30,000 and 80,000 dinars made of gold fabric and covered with jewels and pearls. . MagKh 1:410. Mag. 3:82 gives the second number as 4308, undoubtedly erroneously omitting the 10,000. 20. Ibid. 21, Quoted by Maqkh. 1:409. The subsequent pages of Magkh, give additional descriptions of costly robes. 22, Mag. 3:83.123 pore dinars. Although again all the details are not known, it is clear that the Fatimids had some type of fodder distribution for the army. According to Ibn Muyassar the Fatimid government's yearly revenues included one million indabbs of grain for the state granaries (aaa), Qalqashand! states that there were a number of store houses for grain in which taxes in kind were stored for distribution to many different government employees and charities, including the daily food rations (jardy@t) for the army and navy. Two large storage facilities were established near Fustét for stray There was food distribution to some government employees. Al-Makhzumi's discussion implies that part of the payment to Fatimid troops was in kind Quigashandi's statement above shows that at least some of the grain in the storehouses was distributed to civil servants and the military. There are also cases of 23, IMuy. 84 followed by Mag. 3:72. 24, Qal, 3:479. 25. Makhzlmi tr. p. 166, Cahen, "Administration," p.26 salaries including flour and meat . There was thus clearly some kind of food distribution to the soldiers stationed in Cairo. According to ayalon the daily fodder allotment per soldier under the MamlUk dynasty ranged from three to five “alZqas per oe As an “alZqa was 1/25th of a indabb, this rate of distribution would amount to about one indabb of barley per week per cavalryman, or around 50 indabbs per a If we arbitrarily assume that half of the government grain vas barley for cavalry mounts, this would include enough grain to supply 10,000 oe which corresponds to the needs of the estimated size of the army stationed in cairo. of course this is a much simplified and completely hypothetical model. It is clear that not all of the government's grain was intended to serve as fodder for 26. Mag. 3:79. 27. Ayalon, “Payment” pp. 261-2. 28. For the “aliga see Ayalon, "Payment," p. 261. At 3 “gigas per day the rate is one indabb per 8 days, at 5 “atiqas it is one per 5 days. For the purposes of general calculations I am using one indabb per week. 29. One half of a million indabbs divided by fifty dndabbs per mount equals 10,000. 30. See 3.4.2.animals, since some was given to the Navy, government employees and charitable institutions. Further, not all fodder was used for distribution to the mounts of cavalrymen as the Fatimid government maintained the 32 33 34 mounts of the royal stables , mules , and livestock which probably received some type of fodder distribution from these storehouses as well. Furthermore, it may be that the F&timid barley distribution for nilitary mounts was less than that of the MamlUk period with the Fatimid soldiers being expected to supply part of their mount's needs from their monthly pay. It should be noted that the costs of the food and fodder, and perhaps the kiswa as well, were apparently not paid in addition to the monthly salary. according to al-Makhzimi, the salaries of soldiers were recorded on paper in jayshi dinars, but were distributed in both 35 cash and payments in kind . As an hypothetical 31, Qal. 3:479. 32. Qal. 3:478, numbering well over 2000. 33. Qal. 3:479. 34. Mag. 3:70 mentions that al-Afdal spent 40,000 dinars a year feeding his cattle, sheep and camels. 35. MakhzUmi tr. pp. 165, 167.example, if cavalryman's salary was fifteen dinars per month, he would receive daily rations of wheat or flour, and perhaps meat, oil and vegetables or other products, and a measure of barley and/or straw as fodder for his mount, ‘The value of all of these products would then be deducted from his monthly pay, so that although he was officially listed in the registers as having been paid fifteen dindrs a month, in practice he was paid perhaps seven dinars in cash, the rest having been paid in kind throughout the month. It is not clear how many of these types of payment applied to those troops holding ig¢a*s in the provinces. Clearly they received the nafaga when they were mustered for military expeditions. However, as their income from an igta® almost certainly included produce, it seems possible that they were not given special fodder or food rations as were the troops based in Cairo receiving the infaq. 4.4 Garrisons The important role played by the garrisons of the id maritime cities merits some attention.127 Garrisons of regular Fatimid troops were found in most FEtimid coastal cities. They were numbered for the most part only in the hundreds, only in the most important cities or in times of crisis reaching over 1000 men. When the walls of Jerusalem were breached in 1099 it was said that 500 men took refuge in the citadel, perhaps reflecting the general size of the regular garrison there’, Reinforcenents to the city of Arsuf in 1100 numbered 100 cavalry and 200 infantry , a strong enough force to encourage the initiation of counter-raids from the city. A Turkish mercenary force from Damascus garrisoning Tyre numbered some 700 ene but as at that time the revenues of the city were divided between Damascus and Cairo, and there were probably additional 4 Fatimid contingents as well Shams al-Khilafa 1, FC 1.30.3. 2, AA 7:10. 3. WE 13.7, 4. WT 13.5 says that 1/3 of the revenues of Tyre went to Damascus, 2/3 to Egypt. If this represents the Proportion of defense obligations taken we can perhaps assume that the totai garrison was about 2100 men, 1/3, or 700 from Damascus, and 2/3 or 1400 from Egypt.128 garrisoned Ascalon with 300 Armenian mercenaries in 1110". All of these figures indicate the relatively small size of the regular garrison forces of the cities. Garrisons vere paid from some combination of a portion of the revenues of each city’ and direct payments from the treasury of Zgypt, which could include Barents fericsnce rr (crcieeresnts | ccortieset and sometimes even stipends to the citizens to encourage their support . As the Crusaders captured the agricultural hinterland and interdicted trading through competition and piracy, the difficulties and expense in supplying the city and paying and feeding the garrisons continually mounted. More information is available concerning the garrison at Ascalon than any other, and although there were possibly significant differences in the 5. See 6.1.1 for details. 6. As at Tripoli Nasir-i Khusrav, tr. in LeStrange, Patestine, p. 349. 7, See ch. 4.3. 8. Maq. 3:96 mentions shipping 15,000 indabbs of grain to Tyre. 9, WE 17.22,128 administration of the garrison of each city, Ascalon can serve as a pacadigm of the coastal defense. Fulcher makes the general statement that the garrison of Ascalon was "few in number ”,* and this is supported by other sources. According to Ibn Taghribardi, the Fatimids maintained a garrison of from 300 to 609 cavalry at oe which is confirmed by Magzizi, who mentions that in 1149 a force of 500 cavalry wagsent to relieve the Ascalon ee Fulcher mentions a raid from the garrison of Ascalon carried out by 500 cavalry and 1000 infantry, the infantry in this case possibly representing, at least in part, the militia of Ascalon William of Tyre gives an interesting description of how he viewed the Fatimid policy toward the garrisoning 14 of Ascalon : 10. FC 2.49.12. 11, ITagh. 5:244 12. Mag. 32190, 13. FC 2.37.3 claims this entire force was defeated by a mere sixty five knights from Jaffa, indicating Fulcher's figures are perhaps exaggerated. 14, WE 14:22, 17:22."Now because of their continued success (in raids against the Crusaders), the people of Ascalon were becoming increasingly bold and insolent and were overrunning the entire region without restraint. Ascalon itself was subject to a very powerful Egyptian potentate. If this city should be taken, the prince foresaw with alarm that the Christian army might invade Egypt and disturb the peaceful conditions which existed there. Accordingly, at a great outlay of money and effort, he was endeavoring to make the land of Ascalon a barrier, as it were, between Egypt and our territory, Fearing that the strength of its people might give way under the constant hardships and perils of warfare, he took great care to send to their assistance every three months new people and fresh legions, together with provisions and supplies of arms, The new arrivals sturally wished to try their strength and to give proofs of their courage. Hence, against the wishes of the veterans, they often made experimental sallies and expeditions... There vas a large population in that city, even the least of whom -- and, indeed, according to the general report, even the youngest babes -- received pay from the treasury of the caliph of Egypt." The garrison was relieved on a regular basis by fresh troops from Egypt. According to Magrizi this relief occurred every six months’, while Willian of Tyre maintains it was every three nonths ". On the other hand, Uséma only stayed there four months, but he 15. Mag 90, 204, and ITagh. 16. WE 14:22,7 was apparently called back earlier than usual . It is possible that during times of relative quiet the garrison was relieved every six.months as stated by Magrizl, while when under siege or Zacing the danger of siege, the relief may have been increased to every three months, cr perhaps at one time the standard service period vas six months which eventually changed to three months. In addition to their regular pay, each time a man was sent from Egypt for his tour of duty at Ascalon he received a special na{aga, a type of active duty pay, of 100 dinars per officer and thirty dinars per cavelzysan With 500 cavalry paid fifteen dinars a month, five officers at fifty a month, plus the nafaga, the cost of supplies and transportation, and stipends to the citizens, the total yearly cost of maintaining the garrison at Ascalon would have been well over 100,000 ars. If William of Tyre's statement is correct, the citizens vere also paid a special stipend, presumably both to encourage them to stay while facing imminent 17, Usama 17/42. He received a letter summoning him back to Cairo, while his brother, who had come vith him to Ascalon, stayed on in the city. 18, Mag. 3:190, ITagh. 5:244, see ch. 4.3 above.danger from the Franks, assist them in meeting the possibly increased prices due to the need to transport all goods there by sea from Egypt, and enable the city militia to provide themselves with better equipment. The soldiers of the regular garrison were divided into units of 100 men, each commanded by an amir, while the commander of the entire force was called the ania at-mugaddente’ The amin al-mugaddamZn was not the governor of Ascalon, as he was to present his credentials to the governor when his force arrived. This commander was sent a purse with 100 dinars (his nagaqa) as a sign he was to be nobilized, and was given written orders from the Army Office and additional money to be distributed for the na{aga to the troops. He then dispatched officers to mobilize "the regiments who were present (in Cairo) and those who were visiting 21 their igfa%s .” 19, Mag. 190. 20, ITagh. 5:244.12 21. Mag. 3:190. Although both ITagh. 5:244 and Maq. 3:190 appear to be either quoting or paraphrasing Ibn Tuwayr (specifically mentioned only by ITagh. 5:240.9), both versions should be consulted since, though giving generally the same description, each gives specific information not found in the other,133 Finally, after the invasion of the Crusaders had effectively cut off the maritime cities from most of the agricultural hinterland, the maritime garrisons had to be supported by a constant flow of supplies from Egypt by sea. There are numerous references to seaborne supplies being sent from Egypt, but one case merits special attention. During the final siege of Tyre in act ae indabbs of grain were sent there from Egypt + In addition to the garrisons stationed in the maritime cities of Syria the Fatimids maintained troops in Egyptian towns outside Cairo, although little 23 information has survived regarding these units . 4.5 Al-Afdal's Administrative Reforms By 1107 the invasions of the Crusaders and the subsequent loss of Palestine brought to a head a number of military, administrative and economic problems faced by the Fatimid dynasty in the early twelfth century. 22. Mag. 3:96. An indabb = c. 110 kg. 23. See 3.4.2 and 4.3 on provincial troops.The defeats at the hands of the Crusaders had resulted in the loss of a great deal of equipment, money and men, leaving al-Afdal with "insufficient wealth, weapons, horses and men " to mount an effective expedition into Palestine. This military problem was compounded due to extensive corruption in the iq¢@© system. The soldiers were complaining that the revenues from their igté%s had declined and the officers and government agents were increasing the size eekenets own iqt@% at the expense of the common soldiers . It was said that the revenues of the i &%s were too small to meet the military requirements of the soldiers, the government took too much of the revenue, the estates vere in disrepair because of lack of funds for upkeep, and the number of inhabitants vere too few to vork the land In response to these difficulties al-Afdal initiated two major series of reforms, one administrative, the other military. 1, Ubn Tuwayr quoted in Magkh, 1:443c. For a full discussion of this passage see Ch. 3.2.3. 2. MagKh. 1:832, see also French translation by Cahen, "Administration," p. 174. Mag. 3:38-9 also mentions th> dismissal of corrupt officials. 3. Ibid.135 Although the details of his reforms have not been preserved, the general outline is clear, With the assistance of al-Ma'min al-Bataq!, al-Afdal synchronized the solar and lunar calendars which had reached a disparity of about four years , and apparently upset the tax schedule. A complete cadastral survey of lands in Egypt vas ordered, and the values of each igtt© was fixed in registers and guaranteed for the next thirty a The size and values of the igta%s of the amizs and other powerful lords were decreased to a prescribed level, and the resultant excess in revenue vas reassigned to the weak soldiers (du“a{@ at-jund)’, who could thereby upgrade the quality of their equipment and mounts. Al-Afdal's major military reform was the establishment of the Hujariya te In response to the Fatimid defeats in Palestine al-Afdal "constructed seven barracks (bujar) and selected 3000 men from the 4, Mag. 3:40. 5. MagKh. 1:83a. 6, MagKh. 1:83a, Mag. 3:40 gives an abridgement of the of this text which clarifies some of the meaning. 7, For a full discussion of this regiment see Ch. 3:2.3.136 sons of the army, and divided them in each barrack, giving each 100 men a zimam and naqZb. Over the entire corp he assigned as zimim an amir called the muwag{iq. He distributed to each man whatever horses, arms and other equipment he needed, and took a great interest in these soldiers. If there was a sudden attack he ordered that they be mobilized with with their zimams to meet it'.” Al-afgal thus hoped that his security and military power would be increased with this specially trained and equipped body of cavalry stationed at Cairo, It is impossible to determine the ultimate effectiveness of al-Afdal's reforms, but it seems that they did not ultimately resolve the problem. The Fitimids continued to suffer setbacks in Palestine, and al-Ma'min vas forced to again reorganize the iqt@% system, This is the only recorded attempt at a major military or administrative reform during the early eleventh century. Although the chronologies and records for this period are by no means complete, it appears that the Fatimids made no significant 8. Ibn Tuwayr quoted by MagKh. 1:443c.137 effort to adopt new organizational or tactical theories in response to the Crusader invasions.CHAPTER V WEAPONS, TACTICS AND MILITARY THEORY There are a large number of physical, psychological and theoretical factors which influenced the effectiveness of medieval armies in combat such as the relative superiority in numbers, quality of armour and weapons, the types of weapons and techniques of their use, the appropriateness of tactics employed on the battlefield, motivation, morale and courage. This chapter will analyze the quality of Fatimid arms and armour and their tactics and military theory on the battlefield and in siegecraft, ending with a discussion of some of the weaknesses of the Fatimid army which contributed to their loss of southern Palestine to the Crusaders. 5.1 Arms and Armour The types and quality of weapons can be an important factor in the relative effectiveness of an army. Ina general sense the Fatimid army vas equipped with the standard weapons of any pre-technical army: spears, 138139 swords, bows, and various types of armour, shields, helmets, etc. There were not substantial differences between the military technology of the Fatimids and the Crusaders, and if anything, the Fatimid technology may have been superior. However, the relative proportions of heavily as opposed to 1i ed men in the tvo armies could nely 2: have a significant impact on the results of campaigns. In attempting to explain the reasons for the Fatimid defeat at. the hands of the Crusaders, some modern historians have made the assumption that the Fatimid troops were in general more lightly armed than the ereeniersi Precise data on the types and quality of arms and armour for the Fatimids is not readily available. Few actual archaeological examples of their equipment have survived and Fatimid art with military themes was not 2 extensive . Nonetheless, a careful examination of the available evidence, even if it will not as yet produce complete picture of Fatimid armament, will at least 1, Runciman 2:74 "the huge army of the Egyptians ... was lightly armed and untrained." See also 2:77 2. For a survey of some of the significant artistic remains see Gorelik and Nicolle.140 allow us to dismiss the theory that the Fatimids were poorly and lightly equipped. 5.1.1 Arsenals Based on a survey of artistic Gorelik has recognized 3 that the armour of the Fatimid period included : "nail (dix or zandZya), lamellar jawshan, a type similar to scale with a rounded scale edge directed upwards beyond the mail and finally the scale (quilted or lined) qazakand. Like the contemporary short Syrian mail coat the long mail shirt had full length sleeves and often served as an undershirt. Lamellar armour, being knee-length, probably had a hemmed slit in the front. Atmour similar to scale was waist long and poncho-shaped,... This general description is confirmed by literary sources describing the arms and armour contained in the Fatimid arsenals. The Fatimid government maintained a number of important arsenals and storehouses in which all types of military equipment and material was stored’. There vere three main storehouses devoted to military equipment which also served as factories for 3. Gorel 7D. 33. 4, See Magkh, 1:397, i:417, 2:423-4 and Qal. 3:477-8.141 5 making arms and armour . To maintain this highly organized system of procurement, storage and distribution of military equipment, the government spent 70-80,000 dinars a year on keeping the stocks of weapons adequate in the khéz@na al-silth alone’. The first and most significant of these is the Khizina af-sil@h, the "Treasury of arms," or Arsenal. A detailed descriptions of this arsenal was given by Ibn Soe describing a large number of different types of arns and armour including “kazaghand armour” teinforced’ by mail covered in finely wrought silk brocade, and jawshan armour reinforced (Madgina) by chain mail and gold... Helmets and most of the many types cf mail s s and swords were decorated with 5, Magkh. 2:423 describes 3000 craftsmen as being employed in the Treasury of Banners. 6. According to Qa} MuhT al-Din al-2ahir quoted in Qal. 32477, 7, Preserved in Maqkh. 1:417. 8. Kazaghand (kkizaghand, g@zakand) and jawchan were types of laminar, scale or splint armour which included a large number of different specific styles. See Tarstsi p. 116/138; Mayer pp. 36-41; Gorelik p, 32-3 and passim.; Nicolle 66ff. 9. MadgGna, literally "buried."silver. These included Arab style and gajanzya swords", lances, painted and gold washed cera and lance heads (asinna) from Busra. There were bows for shooting by hand according to the respective skill {of the archer), for example the khagiit bow which is appropriate for skilled archers, (The Caliph) had arrows brought to him from the arsenal which he examined, including triangular arrowheads of various types’. There were also crossbows (qisf a£-nije) and stirrup crossbows (qisZ at-nitdb)'” and ballistas” with arrowheads weighing 5 xagls. ... One type of arrow was called the jandd with the length of a span (c. 10. A long slightly curved Persian saber, the qalachun. Nicolle pp. 123-4 11, A very long cavalry lance, Tarsist 113/135. 12, Cf. Latham pp. 25-6 "The most reiiable and effective arrowheads are those which are either triangular or square. these are for use in battle and for piercing iron and all kinds of armour." See also p. 28 where they are called yaghtiq or hanbZ arrowheads, and illustrations 15.1 and 2 on page 25. 13. On both of these crossbows see Latham and Huuri p. 94, 14, qisZ af-Lawlab, literally “spring or pivotal bow". Huuri pp. 120, 126.143 7-8 inches), which is shot froma bow with an arrow 15 guide . Neither cavalry nor infantry are aware of it 16 until it has struck them . The treasury vas.also said to have included "helmets, suits of armour (duai®), horse barding (t0j§Z$), swords embellished with gold and silver, steel swords, boxes of arrow heads and heathwocd arrow shafts, boxes of bows, bundles of strong long lances, and mail and helmets numbering 200,000, each type divided into tens of thousands. * Although the intent is not clear, the last phrase in this passage probably means that there were a total of 200,009 items in the arsenal, divided according to types in groups of 10,000, which is to say, 10,000 helmets, 10,000 swords, 10,000 lances, and so on. Other descriptions give further evidence of the variety, quality and quantity of weapons found in the 15. See Latham pp, 145-50, 184, 191 16. Qal. 3:477 gives an abbreviated and somewhat Gifferent version of the same: "There were mail coats covered with finely wrought silk brocade decorated with silver, gold decorated jawshan armour, helmets decorated with gold and silver, Arab and qaljaxcya swords, and long qantariya lances polished and engraven with gold with huge lance (heads).” 17, Magkh, 2:417.various arsenals, In 1066 the Arsenal was plundered of a large number of weapons including “Azizi lances with lance heads finely inlaid with gold and silver, jeweled swords, arrows made of heath wood (khafnajZ), Lamti shields oe we. suits of armour (dusi® washed with silver, horse barding (taj§ig), and jawshan and 19 k@zaghand armour with silk brocade and stars of 20 silver ." Twenty thousand decorated swords were said 21 to have been taken during the same period . This Arsenal also functioned as a type of military museum in which could be found preserved large quantities of arms and arsour of fanous Islamic rulers and warriors’. Another important arsenal was known as the Khizana al-buntd, or the "Treasury of Banners" in which 3000 skilled craftsmen were employed in the days of al-7ahir. During an inspection in the year 1068 it was 18. Danaga referred to shields made of leather (Qal. 22136), LamtZ shields were a type of North African hide shield. See also Tarsiisi p. 114/136 19. The text reads kand“idat, which I have amended to kh@zaghandat. 20. MagKh. 1:397. 21, Qal. 3:478. 22. MaqKh. 1:417.145 found to contain 1900 daraga shields and a similar number of weapons, as well as banners, gold brocade robes and other ceremonial itene’”, and at various times from 10-15,000 swords. This arsenal was apparently mainly devoted to ceremonial equipment of the guards: and officers. Finally, both military and ceremonial equipment for horses and other mounts was kept in the khizdna a£-4ualj (Seddie Treasury)”. ‘The bhizina al-tajammuk (Treasury of Adornment) contained ceremonial weapons for the nobles to carry in royal processions ané could also perhaps be considered an independent treasury, although accor: ng to Ibn al-Tuwayr it was actually a part of the 25 khizdna al-sitah . 5.1.2 Cavalry Although the Berber tribesmen who initially served as caval in the Fatimid army during their conquest of 23. Magkh, 2:423-4, 24, Qal. 3:477. 25. Quoted by Qal. 3:477,146 26 Egypt may have been for the most part lightly armed , a significant portion of Fatimid cavalry adopted heavy armour in later periods. About 1000 AD a Fatimid cavalry regiment is described as "400 military slave cavalry wearing Kazaghand ae and helmets, carrying swords and war maces (£u¢i¢), with 2aj§2§ arnour for their horses." Nasir-i Khusrav's description of the Fatimid army in 1060s confirms this when he describes 10,000 cavalry, "with expensive equipment. Each horse is covered with armour and a helmet is placed on the pommel of the saddle along vith the other arms’.* Uslma noted that in a battle in 1144 the Fatimid army had "donned armour (mudanre®) for combat." In 1163 6000 F mid cavalry are described as 30 having “costly armour and excellent weapons ." Some Fatimid armour is described as being double strength, 26. According to Beshir "Fatimid Military" 38, 48. 27. I have emended the text from k@dhaghand to k@zaghand. 28. IQal. 36. 29. Nagir-i Khusrav text p. 46. On Nagir's exaggeration of numbers see App. B. 320. Mag. 3:267.147 at consisting of a k@zaghand covered by mail . With such double strength armour and barding for horses, which was uncommon among Frankish knights of this period, it not impossible that some Fatimid cavalry units were actually more heavily armoured than their Frankish opponents. This is not to say that all Fatimid cavalry were as heavily armoured as those described above. Certainly many of the irregular troops, lacking regular pay and equipment distributions from the state would have have been more lightly armed, some even altogether unarmoured. Unfortunately it is not possible to determine what proportion of the Fatimid cavalry were lightly or heavily armed. Smail asserts that "Mounted archers did not form part of the Fatimid armies," and that they therefore did not make use of traditional Turkish mounted archer tactics. Although the Fatimid use of Central Asian 33 dispersal tactics is somewhat problematic , there is strong evidence that a significant number of Fatimid cavalry served as mounted archers. Magrizi states that 31, Magkh. 2:417. 32, Smail p. 86. 33, See ch. 5.2.148 when Bahram fled to upper Eoypt in 1136 he was accompanied by about 2000 "fanis rumBt = mounted atchers’.° Albert of Aix confirms the use cf bows by mounted Fatimid troops, when he states that the garrison of Ascelon "sent forth men on horses, extraodinarily 35 skilled in the use of lance and bow ." Another possible example of armeni Fatimid expeditionary force which consisted of 400 Armenian archers and 700 sueanis ©. It seems unlikely that the Fatimid expeditionary force would have consisted of only infantry, implying that perhaps some of the Armenian archers were mounted. Furthermore, the army was defeated in a battle in which all of the Sudinis were killed and only 50 of the Armenians escaped, which could best be explained if Sudanis vere on foot while the Armenians were mounted allowing them 34, Maq. 3:161. The reading is somewhat tenuous. Technically it should read alfey fatisin xzmin, with namin in the genitive singular as opposed to tunadin, the genitive plural. However, as noted by Wright, A Gramnan of the Arabic Language 2:239a, #103 rem., it is not impossible for af to be modified by a genitive plural. 35, AA 10.10 "paaemiserunt vinos in equis, Lancea et sagittis penitissinos.” 36. Hak 43/58.149 37 to flee more easily to safety . Archery was also an important part of the training of Fatimid cavalrymen. Maqrizi mentions that in the days of al-2ahir the 38 Hujariya cavalry regiments were trained in archery . 5.1.3 Infantry Arabic sources make it clear that there were a number of important types of infantry in the Fatimid army. One group was armed with a type of war mace know as the lugi¢ which had an "elongated head and an iron shafts two cubits long (c. 3 feet), square in form’ .* The fugit was used by ae as well as by Sudini infantrymen. Albert describes the "Azoparts," or Sudanis as fighting "marshalled in the middle of the thousands of pagans armed with maces like hammers 37. Hak. 44/59, 38. MaqgKh, 1:423. On the Hujariya as cavalry see ch. 3.2.3, The tactical role of these horse archers will be discussed in section 5.2. 39. Qal. 3:473; He is here only describing the soldiers on parade with the Caliph who would undoubtedly have been armed, if not with better weapons, at least with more expensive and beautiful one. However, a general picture of the types of infantry in the Fatimid soldiers can be obtained from his description. 40. 1Qal. 36, describes cavalrymen armed with the ugi¢.150 composed of iron and lead, (they) attacked the king and his men striking not only the knights, but also their horses, on their heads and other limbs with blows’ ." On another occasion these Sudan Azoperts were armed with "a terrible iron mace penetrating both mail and helmets, striking horses on their heads, and causing a great clamor in the ranks of the faitntul’ these "maces composed of iron and lead shaped like hammers’ *, correspond perfectly with al-Qalqashandi's description of the 2uga¢ as heavy iron war-maces with shafts a yard long and square elongated heads", which would have appeared much like the "hammers" by which Albert describes the Azoparts' maces. An important group of Sudani infantrymen are described as armed with "600 javelins with polished heads ... and 300 danaga shields with silver bosses. 41, AA 9.4, "fustibus, in modum matfeonum genre et plumbo compositis." 42. AA 6.46, Albert actually uses the word {lagella here, meaning whip, but as it is apparently the same weapon and tactic described above, and since a whip could hardly be expected to penetrate armour as here described, I take it to be a mace. 43, AA 9.4. 44. Qal. 32473.151 ‘These were carried in the procession by 300 black slaves each slave with two javelins and a shiela’ "the existence of javelin armed Sudani infantrymen in battle is confirmed by the Latin sources. William of Tyre mentions a “countless host of infantry trained to throw the javetin. = and Baldwin was wounded by a Sudan? javelin thrower. Archers and crossbowmen also formed an important element among the Fatimid infantry. Of 8000 infantry present during a military review, only i000 were archers, armed with both bows and crossbows. tn another review of 5000 infantry 500 were creer The role of the Sudanis as archers of the Fatimids has occasionally been exaggerated by modern scholars. Sud3ni troops are found serving in all types of infantry 45. Qal. 32473. 46. WT 12.6. 47. FC 2.24.1, 48. MagKh. 1:389b,_"1000 infantry archers with hand bows and cot bows (qisz af-anjul = crossbows"; see Huuri pp. 94, 208 49. Qal. 3:508. These crossbowmen were specifically mentioned as being marines from the fleet, and it may have been that some of the other 5000 infantry were also archers.regiments, most often appearing in the sources bearing javelins or maces, In fact, it was not the Sudanis, but the Armenians who were well known among the Fatimids as excellent archers, and are occasionally simply called "qaws = bow." The Armenians ho supported Bahram claimed that they were "A thousand archers (qaws) capable of conquering the world to the gates of Constantinople” .* Magrizi states that all Armenian soldiers were archers’, and it may vell be that during the period of al-Afdal it was the Armenians rather than the Sud&nIs who monopolized archery in the Fatimid army. The exact nature of the weaponry of another regiment is somewhat ambiguous, in that it could be considered either infantry or cavalry. They are only said to be armed with “pikes seven cubits (c. 11-12 feet) iong, on the top of which was lance head with a neck of iron, 50. Hak. 43/58, 44/59 says that the Fatimids sent 400 qaws anman” and 700 Sudanis to Yaman. 51. IMued. 3.1:31/49. dent refers to the riots of $2. Mag. 3:313, The in 1168-9,153 These were carried by a group known as the sa Other infantry were armed with "small daxaga shields and 54 swords. ." The Fal timids also apparently had slingers among there troops, as described by Albert of A, and there are numerous references to stones being cast at the Franks during sieges, some of which may also have come from slings. This discussion should not be thought of as a necessarily complete description of all types of Fatimid infantry. However, it is sufficient to show that the infantry were not simply a mass of archers waiting to be ridden down by the Franks’. ‘They included a large range of infantry types organized for specific tactical purposes, including archers, slingers, crossbowmen and javelin throwers as missile troops, pikemen, and men armed with swords and heavy maces for defensive lines 53. Qal. 3:73, There is perhaps some relationship between these infantry and the Sanayi described by Nagir-i Khusrav tr. p. 217. However, the later are said to be drawn from many countries, each fighting with their own weapons as opposed to being solely pikemen here described. 54. Qal. 3:473, Ekkehard 17.8/178 mention "Moorish" swords among the Frankish booty. 55. AA 6.46. 56. As described by Smail p. 86-7.154 and close combat. Additional discussion of the tactical functions of these troops will be presented in section 5.2. although there is no detailed information concerning uniforms, al-Qalgashandi also includes some interesting descriptions of the banners and standards of the arny, from which some idea of the pomp and color of a Fatimid 57 army on the march can be seen : "The two most important banners are known as the ‘Two Standards of Praise (to God).' They are on two tall lances inlaid with joints of gold up to their lance heads. Their flags are of white silk striped with gold ... (carried) by two amirs assigned to bear them. In addition there are two lances with a crescent moon of gold on the top of each with seven silk pennants of red and yellow . They were carried by two horsemen from the Sibyan al-khass. Behind them was a narrow many colored banner of stripped silk upon which was written, ‘Victory is from God’ and "Conquest in Near!'. The length of each of these banners was two cubits and the width was a cubit and a half." The Latin sources also mention the trumpets and 53 drums which accompanied the Fatimid battle array 57. Qal. 3:473. 58. WT_11.13; AA 6.41, Examples could be further multiplied.5.2 Tactics The study of Fatimid tactics against the Crusaders has been virtually ignored There are two basic sources of information which can be utilized to help clarify this subject. The first is an examination of how the Latin and Arabic chronicles describe Fatimid actions in battle. This type of analysis is complicated by the fact that there are only a few detailed references to Fatimid tactical militery actions in battle and these are usually ambiguous. A second source of information comes from the Arabic military manuals. However, the study of these crucial documents is fraught with difficulties. Although there have been some attempts to identify the surviving manuscripts of the various Arabic and Persian military manuals, these efforts are incomplete and sometimes 1, Smail pp. 86-7 devotes three paragraphs to the subject, Beshir another three, pp. 51-3. 2. Mercier pp, 431££; Ritter; Scanlon pp, 1-21 reviews the work of these two scholars and adds a number of other manuscripts as well.156 contradictory’. only a handful of these manuals have been published, and, excepting the field of archery’, there has been only preliminary study of the technical vocabulary and military techniques they describe’. thus it must be emphasized that the discussion of these manuals which follows should be considered as a tentative attempt to shed some much needed light on Muslim military tactics during the Crusades . Although most of the military manuals which have survived date, at least in their current form, to after the thirteenth century, it is clear from the Fikaist of Ibn Nadim, that by the ninth century military science of the Muslims was already highly fie and dependent in part on even earlier Sassanian, Greek and Indian 3. See Latham Saracen Ancheny and Faris Anab Aacheay. It is somewhat remarkable that so much scholarly attention has been paid to archery while the other branches of Muslim military science have been totally ignored. 4. Tantum, "Muslim Warfare," Wustenfeld, "Das Heerwesen der Muhammedaner" poth deal with the Nikdyat af-Su'l. See also Rabie, “Training” and Ayalon, "Furusiya. 5. The author is currently preparing a more detailed study and translation of these documents. 6. Ibn Nadim tr. pp. 37-8.7 military theory . This military tradition was transferred and transformed throughout the Islamic world, until the thirteenth century when a significant disjunction occurred in Muslim military theory in the Middle East end Egypt, at which time the extensive use of professional infantry was essentially curtailed in favor of forces composed mainly of mounted Mamluk archers’. Due to this disjunction there are many problems in attempting to utilize post thirteenth century material for the study of pre-thirteenth century tactics and theory, when armies still utilized large bodies of professional sntantey Nonetheless, there are a number of important documents related to Fatimid military theory in the twelfth century which can provide 7. Ibn Nadim includes in his list works from Greek, Sassanian and Indian sources. Tantum and Wustenfeld discuss the relationship to Greek sources, specifically Aelian's Tactica. Neither recognizes the dependence on Sassanian military theory. For example, the passage in Nihdyat BM Add. 18866 fol. 208, translated by Tantum p. 199 is directly based on an Arabic translation of the Sassanian Kitab a£-Ayin found in Ibn Qutayba 1:113-4. 8, Ayalon's many articles best trace this phenomenon. 9, Of course much of the material in the later manuals represents quotations and paraphrases from earlier documents. However, until the exact relationships between the dozens of texts can be established, it is dangerous to attempt to trace lines of thought and development from earlier periods.158 important new informa: An important document is the Mukhtagan Siyasat al-Hurlb by al-Harthami, an abridgement of an earlier text written for the Caliph al-Ma'mln in the early ninth century". This manual, although very terse and sometimes confusing, gives numerous details of military tactics and theory which can be seen clearly reflected in Fatimid military activities. The great Fatimid scholar al-Q&di al-Nuw> wrote a text on the propagation of IsmSilism, the Da%a'im a£-Isfam, which contains a chapter on jihdd detailing some of the battle tactics of the Fatimids of the late tenth cen“ury. Two important military documents of the late twelfth century, written under the patronage of Saladin, also contain many items of interest for the study of a tary theory. The first is a manual of military theory written by All ibn AbI Bakr al-Harawi and the second a discussion of arms and armour by al-JarsisT. Unfortunately none of these documents is precisely contemporary with early twelfth century Fatimid Egypt. 10, According to abd al-Ru'lf Sawn, the editor of al-Harthant, ‘the Siyasat is an abridgement of the Kitt 62 ad-Fuatscya wa kame al-silah listed in Ibn al-Nadin 23737,189 However, although there may have been significant changes and differences in military organization and practice between different decades and places, a comparison of the outlines of the military theory described in the manuals with the few available descriptions of Fatimid tactics on the battlefield can reveal at least the general pattern of the Fatimid military theory and tactics employed against the Crusaders. Although the details are unknown, it is clear that the Fatimids had a sophisticated system of training, at least for the elite regiments of the regular troops. The only detailed description of the training method is recorded by Magrizi concerning the days of al-Zahir. “Barracks (hujaa) were established for mamlUks in which they were taught in different branches of (military) knowledge, and (the use) of different types of instruments of war, and types of military theory, including archery, lance play, racing, and others .* Similar barracks for training and housing soldiers had been established as early as the days of al-Mu“izz and 11, Magkh. 12423.12 later reorganized by al-Afdal . Beshir believes that these Fatimid training centers were based on earlier ‘abbasid and aghlabid sodels'”. ‘The actual training methods and exercises probably differed in detail, but a general idea of the wide range of military training can be seen from later Mamlik military manuals, including horsemanship, dozens of different techniques of fighting with lances both mounted and on foot, group training for military maneuvers, various mounted and foot archery and crossbew techniques, fencing, wrestling and the use of maces, axes and shields. Military strategy and tactics were formalized and highly developed, and probably systematically taught to Fatimid officers”. the inportance of proper reconnaissance and scouting is emphasized in Muslim 12, Magkh. 1:443, 13. Beshir "Fatimid Military" pp. 46-8. 14, The contents of many of these manuals, most of which are still unpublished, are summarized by Rabie, "Training," and Ayalon, "Furlsiya." 18, According to Magkh. 1:423 training included "different branches of (military) knowledge” (anwa® al-“uliim) as well as the use of weapons.161 16 military theory . Al~ hédal's failure to follow this principle is probably the major reason for his disastrous defeat at Ascalon in 1099. The building of camps fortified with trenches is advised whenever the army is marching within five days of the oo There is no evidence that the Ftimids practiced this policy in their campaigns in Palestine, but this may be because they were never much more than a day's march from Ascalon which could have served the same strategic and tactical function as a fortified atte Complex methods of organizing the army are described in the militery manuals, The army is divided into three major corps, known as the Right, Left and Center, each of which in turn is divided into three divisions, again called the right, center and left”. when describing, for instance, the Right division, the texts refer to the "right of the Right" or the right division of the Right Numan p. 369; Harawi ch. 12, 23-5. 79; Harthaml ch. 9, 17, Harthami ch. 10, p. 25; NuSman p. 369. 18. Fatimid practice on the march probably resembled more the description in Harawi ch. 14, p. 87, which does not mention fortifying campsites with a ditch. 19. Harthaml ch. 11, p. 26; NuSm&n p. 372.162 corps, the "center of the Right" and so on. The same general organizational pattern was followed by the later vaniiks’. To these were added the Vanguard and the Rearguard, each of which could have additional subdivision; the Vanguard including scouts, flying 21 columns, and skirmishers , while the Rearguard 22 including army reserves, and baggage . Thirty different tactical functions of regiments are outlined 23 by al-Harthan? + The best troops were to be placed in the front ranks, the Right corps, on the far flanks, and in a reserve division to exploit weaknesses in the eneny 24 formation . the least experienced were assigned to 20. Described by Ayalon, "Harb," pp. 186-7. In my discussion I will attempt to distinguish between the major divisions of an army in corps from the smaller divisions by capitalizing the words Right, Left and Center when referring to the major divisions. 21. Harthami ch. 11.2, p. 26. 22. HarthamT ch. 19.3, p. 36, ch. 22.2, p. 39. 23, Harthami ch. 11.2, pp. 26-7, including a number of types of scouts, flying columns, rear and flank guards, heavy and elite cavalry, ambushers, infantry in close marshalled ranks, etc. Unfortunately there is no elaboration as to the specific responsibilities of each group. 24. Harthami ch. 20.1, p. 36-7.163 25 guard the baggage , while the "unreliable cavalry should be placed in the rear of the Left Corps so that if God grants victory over the enemy they can advaace to capture his army - there 1# no other use fer then '.* Specific duties and commands vere assigned to various officers, ranging froma highly formalized system as described by al-Harthas?” to the practice of assigning leaders and positions for regiments only on the day of 28 al-Nu%™n . Although it battle as described by ai-0& is clear from Muslim chronicles that the Fatimids divided their armies into three major corps as described above, it is impossible to specifically confirm any of the other organizational details. It is possible to gain an accurate idea of the method of marshalling infantry from the manuals. Al-Hartham? only mentions that the infantry should precede the cavalry in battle "in ranks and types 28. Harthami ch. 20.1, p. 37, ch. 21.6, p. 38. 26. Harthami ch. 22.6, p. 39. 27. Harthami 21.5, pp. 27-8. 28. Numan p. 372 "CalT, when he advanced into battle, marshalled the regiments (kata'ib) and divided the tribes placing 2 man in command of each tribe to order the ranks and organize the cavalry regiments (kanxadis), after which he advanced into battle.”164 29 according to their practice ," without giving any of the additional details which the unabridged version 30 = probably contained . Al-Harawi adds that "the infantry, archers, bowmen, naphta throwers and javelin 31 throwers should precede the cavalry ." - 32 Al-Qdi al-NuSwan gives the fullest description , saying that heavy infantry wearing jawshan armour or mail, armed with shields and pikes should be placed in the front ranks of the infantry, behind whom were placed archers. If attacked the armoured infantry in the front ranks were ordered to "kneel on your knees and hide behind your shields in tight solid ranks (sa{4 muhkam) without any gaps." Then they were to "raise up their pikes, and stand firm and patient; the archers are to shower the enemy with arrows, They should wave their 21,1 p. 37, 30. He does later add that "the infantry archers (ad-naj jaa al-nshiba) should precede (the cavalry) loosing their arrows." Harthami 24.3 p. 41. 31, Harawi ch. 20 p. 99, "Layataqaddam “ald al-khayyala al-najjata wa al-rumat wa al-nabbala wa al-zannaqin wa at-haxnaba.” 32. All of the following material in this paragraph is paraphrased from Numan p. 373.133 banners and beat their shields ." The ranks of the infantry were to hold their positions until the enemy was in full retreat, after which they were to engage the enemy in melee. This infantry tactic is closely paralleled by an eleventh century account of Andalusian Muslim infantry in battle by al-TurtishI, which coincides with all the specifics of al-Qadi al-NuSman's description, but is worth quoting in full for its additional details and 34 clarity "The infantry, armed with large shields, long pikes and sharp tipped javelins, form the first ranks, taking their positions with their pikes thrust into the ground behind them and the points aimed at the enemy, each man kneeling on the ground on his left knee with his shield in front of him, Behind them are marshalled the elite archers whose arrows can pierce armour; behind them are the cavalry. When the Christians (a£-xtm) attack the Muslims the infantry do not move from their place and no man advances in front of another, When the enemy draws near the archers loose their arrows and the infantry throw their javelins and take up their pikes. They then go to the right and the left and the Muslim cavalry charges between the archers and the infantry.” 33. Numan 373, The details of this tactic occur in two sections separated by admonitions to hold firm in the ranks, making the entire procedure somewhat unclear. 34, Turtlsh? pp. 309-10.166 That this was a standard Fatimid infantry tactic is confirmed by a passage from Albert of Aix where he describes the Egyptian tactics. "The SudanIs, whose custom in war is to kneel on the ground, advanced forward to battle, violently attacking the Franks with a nail of arrows." This has usually been interpreted as meaning that the Sud@nf infantry knelt down to loose their bors". In view of the above description of infantry tactics known to the Fatimids, it seems certain that the Albert's informant saw the front ranks of the Fatimid infantry kneeling, while the archers behind the heavy infantry were loosing volleys of arrows, slingstones and jav ns as described in the military manuals. mail maintains that "With a mass of bowmen on foot s+ the Fatimid armies provided, as the Turks never did, a solid target for the most powerful tactical weapon of the Franks: the charge of the mailed and 35, AA 6.46, "Nam Azopant, qui {Lexis genibus suo mone beLgum soLent committene, paaemissi, in fnonte belli Graviter sagittanum gnandine Gallos impugnaverunt.” 36. Oman 1:290.167 37 mounted knights ," implying that the Fatimid infantry were generally easily broken and defeated by the 38 knights . In reality, the Fatimid infantry, when properly marshalled and supperted by cavalry, formed a formidable barrier to the Frankish knights. It is most unfortunate that the battle of Ascalon is used by Smail, and many other historians as the major example of the 39 40 Fatimid army in actions . As will be discussed , the Fatimid army was completely surprised at Ascalen and their defeat there, the most grievous of the entire war with the Crusaders, should not be taken as the norm for the Fatimid army in battle, any more than the Frankish defeats at the battles of Mersivan 1101, Ramla 1102, Harran 1104, or Ager Sanguinus 1119, should be seen as the norm for Frankish aru'es in battle. At Ramla in 1101 the Fatimid army was able to sustain four charges of the supposedly invincible Frankish knights in a battle which ended in a tactical draw, At Ramla in 1102 the Fatimid army repeiled a 37, Smail pp. 86-7. 38. Smail pp. 87, 174-7 38. Smail pp. 87, 74-3. 40. See 7.1,166 massive charge by the knights, culminating in the complete defeat of the Frankish army, while at Ramla in 1105 the F&timid infantry were defeated only after they had been deserted by their Damascene cavalry allies. Albert of Aix makes mention on two occasions of the great skill and deadly effectiveness of the Sudani heavy infantry armed with the lugo¢ mace against the Frankish memes ‘Thus although in certain circumstances the Fatimid infantry could be defeated and overrun by Frankish knights, (just as the Frankish knights and infantry, or any other army could be defeated), in different circumstances they managed to thwart the knight's attack, and there seems little justification to conclude with Smail that "the charge alone secured a Latin vietory «" Despite the general excellence of Smail's work, the fact that many of the Arabic sources were not available to him on occasion distorts his usually illuminating analysis. For example, when the 41, See chs. 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5 for discussions of each of these battles. 42. AA 6.46 mentions them "penetrating mail and helm and attacking the heads of the horses." AA 9.4, and ch. 5.1.3. 43, Smail p. 175,169 PEtimid infantry at Ramla in 1102 defeated the charge of the knights he writes, "the (Egyptian) enemy mass 44 absorbed the charge of the leading squadrons “ seeming to imply that there were just too many Fatimids for the Franks to kill thenall, while when the Frankish infantry performed well at Jaffa in 1192 it was “by virtue of that defensive ability to be displayed throughout the century by bodies of armed, dismounted Franks in close erie: There were a number of different formations and methods for attacking discussed in the military manuals. Three general formations are mentioned: the straight ranks (mustawa) in which all of the troops formed up parallel to the enemy; the crescent (hifaez), with the two flanks were extended closer to the enemy than the center; and the recurved (ma‘fi{), with the Right and Left corps withdrawn and the Center closest to the enemy, which was considered the weakest formation . Fulcher witnessed the Fatimid use of the crescent formation at Ascalon in 1099, when the 44, Smail p. 176. 45. smail p. 177. 46. Harthami ch. 17, pp. 34-6.Egyptians "approached our army like a stag thrusting forvard the branches of his antlers”. Scouts and ambushers were to advance in front of the main army and take the high ground, groves of trees and sources of water, prevent enemy ambushes, prepare ambushes against the enemy and cut off the eneny from Se Strong cavalry regiments were posted on the extreme wings of the Right and Left corps to prevent the enemy fron accomplishing flanking maneuvers and attacking the baggage. Reserve cavalry regiments were marshalled behind the main battle line to fill gaps in the ranks, reinforce weak areas, and to attack gaps or weaknesses in the enemy's army. The unreliable cavalry were held in reserve on the left flank and used to pursue the enemy's army after it has been routed. Offensive actions were preceded by volleys of archery and apnea with flanking attacks by the light cavalry. The main attack began with the troops of the right flank and center, If this attack failed and the 47, FC 1.31.6. 48. This entire paragraph is a summary of Harthami ch. 22, p. 39. 49. This paragraph summarizes Harthami ch. 24, pp. 41-4.Wh army was forced to retreat each regiment vas to remain in its relative position to the other regiments and retreat to its former position in the main battle line. Latin sources clearly reveal that some variation of this general procedure was generally followed by the Fatimids, Missile volleys are mentioned as preceding the general engagenent and attempts by Fatimid cavalry units to outflank the Frankish army and strike fen heer coca Dr. Smail, in his discussion of Fatimid tactics, makes the important point that the Egyptians “did not vse dispersal as a tactical device, and therefore offered a solid target for the Latin charge” .* However, this was not, as Smail claims, because the Fatimids “were not an army of mounted archers’ .* AS discussed above, the Fatimids indeed had regiments of 54 regular mounted archers and utilized Turkish 50. AA 6:46. 51, FC 1.31.6 at Ascalon 1099, FC 2.21.10 at Jaffa 1102, FC 2.32.6 at Ramla in 1105. 52, Smail p, 174. 53. Ibid. 54, See 3.1.1 and 5.1.2.55 + Thus mercenary mounted archers on occasion as well although Smail's point that the Fatimids did not fully utilize the fluid nomadic’ mounted archer tactics is well taken, the decisive factor underlying difference in tactics was not whether they did or did not include mounted archers, but that the Fatimid army contained a large body cf professional infantry who were unable to avoid the Frankish knights’ charge by dispersal. Fatimid mounted archers could utilize their mounted archery techniques in a number of ways, but if they dispersed when faced with a Frankish charge they would leave their infantry to be surrounded and overrun’. Another point of confusion needs to be clarified. Smail maintains that "the fact that on other occasions the Egyptian forces outflanked the Latins was a consequence not of mounted archery, but of numerical 57 superiority ." As discussed previously, question of 55. See 3.1.3 and 3.3.2. 96. As occurred at Ramla in 1105 when the allied Turks from Damascus dispersed when attacked by the Frankish knights leaving the main body of infantry to be defeated, FC 2.32.6-7, and at the battie of Ramla in 1123, FC 3.18.4, 57, Smail, p. 86.173 58 numerical superiority is somewhat problematic . But even if the Fatimids on occasion outnumbered the Franks, this alone would not insure that they would have cutflanked them, The area occupied by the front of an army is dependent not only on the number of men ina force, but the density of deployment, the number of ranks per unit, the proportions of cavalry to infantry, and the number of units held in reserve. ‘Thus even if the Fatimids outnumbered the Franks in a given battle it is not certain they would have outflanked them. Although the view of the Latin chroniclers may be that Fatimid flanking maneuvers were due solely to numerical superiority, the military theory described above clearly indicates that cavalry flanking attacks was a standard tactical practice of Muslim armies. 3 Siegecraft Until the development of effective gunpowder siege artillery the general pattern of siegecrait remained 58. See ch. 3.4 for a general discussion and chapter 7 for detailed analysis of five major battles.174 quite similar throughout the Middle East during the Islamic period, and this pattern generally holds true for the varfare of the Crusades’. However unlike the Latin West, Muslim military theorists formally described a number of principles of siegecraft, most of which are clearly reflected in the recorded activities of the Fatimid army during sieges. This general pattern of siegecraft will be outlined here and highlighted with examples from the military manuals and from actual imid activities during sieges. In offensive siegecraft the easiest way to capture a city is to avoid a siege altogether. This can be done best by unexpectedly striking a city with a force of cavalry, or by drawing out most of the garrison of the city into an anbush Opportunities should be taken to strike at cities when they can be surprised, the garrison is weak or they are known to be low on supplies 1, See Smail's excellent chapter on castles in warfare pp. 204-244, 2. Harthami, ch. 34.4, p. 57. This type of surprise attack was attempted by the Fatimids against Jaffa in 1115, FC 2.53.7. 3. Harthami, ch. 34.5, p. 57. This was probably the Fatimid intent when they withdrew from their initial blockade of Jaffa in the summer of 1102. See 7.4.