PART TWO

WORKER RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION

I. BASIS OF RIGHT
S.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, 559 SCRA 435 (08)
facts of the case
SS Ventures is a PEZA-registered export firm located in Mariveles, Bataan. SSVLU is a labor organization registered with DOLE. On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE a petition for
certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. 542 signatures were gathered, 82 of which belonged to terminated employees of Venture.
Ventures filed a petition to cancel the certificate of registration of the Union because:
1. The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures in its list of members who attended the organizational
meeting and in the adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws held on January 9, 2000 in Mariveles, Bataan; and the Union forged the signatures of these 82 former employees to
make it appear they took part in the organizational meeting and adoption and ratification of the constitution;
2. The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons namely: Mara Santos, Raymond Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;
3. No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and
4. The Union's application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures, or 418 of the total 2,197- employee complement. Since more or less
82 of the 500 signatures were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum (2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4)
required by the Labor Code.
Union answered the allegations in the following manner:
1. The organizational meeting actually took place on January 9, 2000 at the Shoe City basketball court in Mariveles;
2. The 82 employees adverted to in Ventures' petition were qualified Union members for, although they have been ordered dismissed, the one-year prescriptive period to question their
dismissal had not yet lapsed;
3. It had complied with the 20%-member registration requirement since it had 542 members; and
4. The "double" signatures were inadvertent human error.
The DOLE regional director found for Ventures, however in a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, the BLR reversed the DOLE decision. This was affirmed by the CA.
issue
WON Ventures may have the Union de-certified for violation of Art. 239 (a) of the Labor Code. NO.
ratio
The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and such right shall not be abridged. Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a
legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organization.
To decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in
connection with the application for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification
of the constitution or by-laws, among other documents.
The employees' withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to
be involuntary and does not affect the same.
After a labor organization has filed the necessary registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously
complied with. If the union's application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especial those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied
recognition as a legitimate labor organization. The issuance to the Union of Certificate of necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting documents thereof are prima facie
free from any vitiating irregularities.
The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and proceedings adverted to is not really fatal to the Union's cause for, as determined by the BLR, the allegations of falsification of
signatures or misrepresentation with respect to these individuals are without basis. The procedure for acquiring or losing union membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified
to be members are matters internal to the union and flow from its right to self-organization.

The relevancy of the 82 individuals active participation in the Unions organizational meeting and the signing ceremonies therefore comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the
Union, even without the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires to be submitted:
Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:
xxxx
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.
In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union submitted the names of [542] members x x x. This number easily complied with the 20% requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in
the establishment. Even subtracting the 82 employees from 542 leaves 460 union members, still within 440 or 20% of the maximum total of 2,202 rank-and-file employees.
The issue surrounding the involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration.
"[F]or fraud and misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of union registration under Article 239 [of the Labor Code], the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and
compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members."
The Union points out that for almost seven (7) years following the filing of its petition, no certification election has yet been conducted among the rank-and-file employees. If this be the case, the
delay has gone far enough and can no longer be allowed to continue. A certification election is exclusively the concern of employees and the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge it.
A. Constitution, 1987 Constitution Arts. III, Sec. 8, and XIII, Sec. 3
See also: 1935 Constitution Art. III, Sec. 6; and 1973 Constitution Art. IV, Sec. 7
1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to
investments, and to expansion and growth.
1935 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 6. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 7. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to the law shall not be abridged.
B. Statutory 243; 244; 245; 269; 212 (g); 212 (f)
Art. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational
institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)
Art. 244. Right of employees in the public service. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with
their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24,
1986)
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
(As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Art. 269. Prohibition against aliens; exceptions. All aliens, natural or juridical, as well as foreign organizations are strictly prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in all forms of trade union
activities without prejudice to normal contacts between Philippine labor unions and recognized international labor centers: Provided, however, That aliens working in the country with valid permits

issued by the Department of Labor and Employment, may exercise the right to self-organization and join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining:
Provided, further, That said aliens are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers. (As amended by Section 29, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Art. 212. Definitions.
(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially
equivalent and regular employment.
(g) "Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning
terms and conditions of employment.
UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio, 318 SCRA 186 (99)
FACTS:

Private respondents are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU). The union has a subsisting five-year CBA with UST.

The petitioners on the other hand, questioned before the Med-Arbiter, that the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance with USTFUs constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules
had been issued to govern the conduct of the October 5, 1996 election.

Med-Arbiter issued a TRO enjoining the conduct of elections. However, a general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. The general assembly was attended by members of the USTFU
and, as admitted by the appellants, also by non-USTFU members [who] are members in good standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit. On this occasion,
appellants were elected as USTFUs new set of officers by acclamation and clapping of hands.

On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001. Said CBA was ratified by a majority of the UST
faculty community.

ISSUE:
WON the election of the officers was valid.
HOLDING/RATIO:

NO. The importance of a unions constitution and bylaws cannot be overemphasized. They embody a covenant between a union and its members and constitute the fundamental law
governing the members rights and obligations. As such, the unions constitution and by-laws should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.

A union election is held pursuant to the unions constitution and by-laws, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election should be distinguished from a
certification election, which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of
collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and, in the
affirmative case, by which particular labor organization.

In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled
to vote in said election. However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot vote in the union
election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and by-laws of the union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union activity.

In both elections, there are procedures to be followed. Thus, the October 4, 1996 election cannot properly be called a union election, because the procedure laid down in the USTFUs CBL
for the election of officers was not followed. It could not have been a certification election either, because representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such election was
not followed. The participation of non-union members in the election aggravated its irregularity.

National Union of Bank Employees v. Minister of Labor 110 SCRA 274 (81)
FACTS: Petition for Mandamus to compel public respondents (Minister of Labor, Deputy Minister of Labor, Director of Bureau of Labor Relations) to conduct a certification election among the rank
and file employees of respondent employer Producers Bank of the Philippines.

Petitioner Union filed a petition to be directly certified as collective bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of respondent. When required to submit a payroll of employees, respondent agreed
that as soon as the registration certificate of the local union was issued by the Ministry of labor and that it was shown that the local union represents the majority of the rank and file, the Bank would
recognize said union and would negotiate accordingly.
The registration certificate was issued, which petitioner submitted together with the union membership application of 183 members out of 259 rank and file employees of respondent, authorizing the
NUBE to represent them as their sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent. Respondent, nonetheless, failed to submit the required payroll and the list of rank and file workers based on said
payroll.
Med Arbiter: Ordered the holding of a certification election.
Respondent: Motion to suspend further proceedings in view of a prejudicial issue consisting of a pending proceeding for cancellation of the registration of petitioner for allegedly engaging in
prohibited and unlawful activities.
Deputy Minister of Labor: Assumed jurisdiction over the certification election case and the application for clearance to terminate the services of 13 union officers by respondent. Issued an order
directing Chief of the Med-Arbiter Section, Atty. Piezas, to conduct summary investigations for the purpose of determining the definition of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented as
well as compliacnce with the 30% mandatory written consent.
Respondent: Pressed for the exclusion of the following personnel from the bargaining unit: Secretaries, Staff of Personnel Department, Drivers, Telephone Operators, Accounting Department, Credit
Investigators, Collectors, Messengers, Auditing Department Personnel, Signature Verifiers, Legal Department Personnel, Loan Security Custodians, and Trust Department Personnel.
Med Arbiter: Ordered the holding of a certification election but sustained the respondent as to the exclusion of certain employees. Petitioner has substantially complied with the mandatory and
jurisdictional requirement of 30% subscription of all the employees in the bargaining unit (submission of copies of the application and membership forms of its members wherein they have duly
authorized petitioner as their sole and exclusive bargaining agent), it appearing that out of the 264 total rank and file employees, 188 are union members who have authorized petitioner to represent.
Petitioner: Filed a partial appeal to the Director of Bureau of Labor Relations questioning the exclusions of those employees who are not among those expressly enumerated under the law to be
excluded and urged the holding of certification elections allowing all those excluded to vote but segregating their votes as challenged in the meantime.
Respondent: The Minister of Labor, and not the Med-Arbiter, has jurisdiction over the petition. The order directing the holding of certification election is premature in view of the fact that petitioners
union registration was subject of cancellation proceedings. The bargaining unit was not appropriately defined.
Director of Bureau of Labor Relations: Affirmed Med-Arbiters order. Respondent should not unduly press the jurisdictional issue, as it does not lead nor contribute to the resolution of the real
pressing issue of certification election. What is at stake is the right of the employees to organize and be represented for collective bargaining purposes by a union at respondent bank where none
existed up to the present time.
The matter of defining the bargaining unit usually presents for determination 3 questions, to wit:
1. the general type of bargaining unit whether it should be an industrial unit embracing all the employees in a broad class; or a craft unit that is confined to a small specialized group within a
broad class
2. the scope of the bargaining unit whether it would embrace all employees in a given class at only one plant or at several plants of the employer
3. the specific composition of the bargaining unit whether the unit should include employees of different occupational groups, like clerks, inspectors, technical employees, etc.
The petition for certification election, whether filed by a legitimate labor organization or by an employer in an appropriate case shall contain the description of the bargaining unit which shall be the
employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require. Thus, the policy under the Labor Code on the matter of fixing the bargaining unit is to favor larger units, which is sought to be implemented on a
2-tiered basis. On the lower tier, the law mandates the employer unit as the normal unit of organization at the company level, thus discouraging fragmentation into small craft or occupational units. But
the Code envisions further consolidation into larger bargaining units. Thus, on the higher tier, the law mandates the eventual restructuring of the labor movement along the one union, one industry
basis. Applying this rule, the appropriate bargaining unit should embrace all the regular rank and file employees at the head as well as branch offices of respondent. An exception is when
circumstances otherwise require, which circumstances respondent has not shown.
The definition of the appropriate unit refers to the grouping or the legal collectivity of eligible employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The presumption is that these employees are entitled to
rights to self-organization and collective bargaining, otherwise, they would not be, in the first place, considered at all in the determination of the appropriate bargaining unit. Therefore, the question of
excluding certain rank and file employees for being allegedly confidential, managerial or technical does not simply involve a definition of the bargaining unit, but rather raises the fundamental issue of
coverage under or eligibility for the exercise of the workers rights to self-organization and collective bargaining. The pertinent provisions on coverage and exclusion are Arts. 244 (all persons

employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions operating for profit shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining), 245 and 246 (security guards and managerial employees are not eligible to form, assist or join any labor organization) of
the Labor Code. A managerial employee is defined as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies, and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank and file employees for purposes of
self-organization and collective bargaining.
The Med-Arbiters order, insofar as it excludes all managerial and supervisory employees, etc. should be modified for being either superfluous, discriminatory or simply contrary to law. Exclusion as
managerial employee is not based on the personality of the occupant but rather on the nature and function of the position. There was no clear showing that they were managerial employees. The mere
fact of being a supervisor or confidential employee does not exclude him from coverage. He must strictly come within the category of a managerial employee as defined by the Code. The Constitution
assures to all workers such rights to self-organization and collective bargaining. Exclusions, being the exception and being in derogation of such constitutional mandate, should be construed in
strictissimi juris.
It is a policy that the exclusion of confidential employees from the bargaining unit is a matter for negotiation and agreement of the parties. Absent such agreement, coverage must be observed. In any
event, any negotiation and agreement can come after the representation issue is resolved.
Unless there is an order of cancellation which is final, the unions certification of registration remains and its legal personality intact. It is entitled to the rights and privileges accorded by law.
The rights of workers to self-organization is found in Sec. 7, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution (the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged) and Sec.
9, Art. II (the State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work). A healthy respect for the freedom of
association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself.
The definition of the appropriate bargaining unit does not call for an actual head count or identification of the particular employees belonging thereto. That is done in the pre-election conference. It is
sufficient that the bargaining unit is defined such that the employees who are part thereof may be readily ascertained for purposes of exclusions and inclusions during the pre-election conference when
the list of eligible voters are determined.
Since 188 of the 264 employees subscribed to the petition, which constitutes 70% of the total employees in the bargaining unit, the 30% consent requirement has been more than sufficiently complied
with.
Petitioner: Petition for Mandamus to hold the certification election, as the Director nor the Minister of Labor did not proceed with said process.
ISSUE: Whether a certification election should be held despite the pendency of the petition to cancel petitioners certificate of registration. YES.
RATIO: The pendency of such proceeding is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. The pendency of the petition should not suspend the holding of a certification election because there is
no order directing such cancellation. Such petition was also evidently intended to delay the early disposition of the case for certification election, considering that it was filed only after the Order
directing the holding of a certification election was issued. Furthermore, the Court observes the liberal approach as to matters of certification election. The whole democratic process is geared towards
the determination of representation, not only in government but in other sectors as well, by election. A certification election is crucial to the institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to
the principle of majority rule as one of the basic concepts of a democratic policy.
The institution of collective bargaining is a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The 2 parties to the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to terms.
That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice.
It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. The will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom
on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the 2 parties to a business enterprise establishing a regime of selfrule.
Cancellation of the registration certificate is not the only resultant penalty in case of any violation of the Labor Code. The penalty imposable should be commensurate to the nature or gravity of the
illegal activities conducted and to the number of members and leaders of the union staging the illegal strike. (The Court cited the decision of the Director of BLR see underlined paragraph).
DISPOSITIVE: Writ of mandamus granted.

C. Universal Declaration of Human Rights Preamble; Arts. 2; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Arts. 2 and 8 (a); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Art. 22
UDHR, Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and
women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end
that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of
territories under their jurisdiction.
UDHR, Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to
which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
ICESCR, Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to
non-nationals.
Article 8
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and
social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations;
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take
legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.
ICPPR, Article 22
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on
members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take
legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.
D. ILO Convention No. 87, Art. 2, 11 and 98

ILO 87, Art. 2. Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own
choosing without previous authorisation.
ILO 87, Art. 11. Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and
employers may exercise freely the right to organise.
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confessor, 432 SCRA 308 (04)
FACTS:

After several negotiations over their CBA terms and conditions, the parties couldnt agree on the economic provisions, except for signing bonus and uniforms.

The Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for ULP and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila.

The SOLE Nieves R. Confesor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Bank and consolidated the complaint for ULP filed by the Bank before the NLRC with the complaint over which
the SOLE assumed jurisdiction. After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the SOLE issued an Order directing the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions stated
in the Order. The SOLE dismissed the charges of ULP of both the Union and the Bank, explaining that both parties failed to substantiate their claims.

Dissatisfied, both Union and Bank filed a MR but SOLE issued a Resolution denying the motions. The Union filed a second MR, which was, likewise, denied.

The Bank and the Union signed the CBA and immediately thereafter, the wage increase was effected and the signing bonuses based on the increased wage were distributed to the employees
covered by the CBA.

Afterwards, the Union filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Procedure:
(1) The Union alleges that the SOLE acted with GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it found that the Bank did not commit unfair labor practice when it interfered with
the Unions choice of negotiator.
(2) The Union, likewise, pointed out that the public respondent failed to rule on the ULP charges arising from the Banks surface bargaining.
(3) The Union also accused the Bank of refusing to disclose material and necessary data, even after a request was made by the Union to validate its guestimates.
ISSUE (relevant):
WON the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged interference with its choice of negotiator; surface bargaining; making bad
faith non-economic proposals; and refusal to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data?
HELD:
No. Petition is bereft of merits. Dismissed.
DISCUSSION:
Interference under Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code (dito pinasok ung ILO)
Under the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 87 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE to which the Philippines is a signatory,
workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to job organizations of their own choosing
without previous authorization. Workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom to organize their
administration and activities and to formulate their programs.
Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98 pertaining to the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, provides:
1. Workers and employers organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts or interference by each other or each others agents or members in their establishment, functioning or
administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers organizations under the domination of employers or employers organizations or to support workers organizations
by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers organizations within the meaning of this Article.
The aforcited ILO Conventions are incorporated in our Labor Code, particularly in Article 243 and Articles 248 and 249 respecting ULP of employers and labor organizations.
Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form
association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining.
Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the
employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection
with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Unions negotiating panel.

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank
consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees. The records show that after the initiation of the
collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only after a deadlock was declared by the Union.
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought.
The Duty to Bargain Collectively
The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain when it engaged in surface bargaining.
Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface
bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged
partys conduct both at and away from the bargaining table. It involves the question of whether an employers conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard
bargaining.
The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle
the differences between it and the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. Hence, the parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.
In view of the finding of lack of ULP based on Article 248(g), the accusation that the Bank made bad faith provisions has no leg to stand on. The records show that the Banks counter-proposals on
the non-economic provisions or political provisions did not put up for grabs the entire work of the Union and its predecessors. As can be gleaned from the Banks counter-proposal, there were many
provisions which it proposed to be retained. The revisions on the other provisions were made after the parties had come to an agreement. Far from buttressing the Unions claim that the Bank made
bad-faith proposals on the non-economic provisions, all these, on the contrary, disprove such allegations.
The Union also failed to substantiate its claim that the Bank refused to furnish the information it needed.
While the refusal to furnish requested information is in itself an unfair labor practice, and also supports the inference of surface bargaining, in the case at bar, Umali, in a meeting dated May 18, 1993,
requested the Bank to validate its guestimates on the data of the rank and file. However, Umali failed to put his request in writing as provided for in Article 242(c) of the Labor Code.
The Union, did not, as the Labor Code requires, send a written request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Banks rank and file employees. Moreover, as alleged by the Union, the fact that
the Bank made use of the aforesaid guestimates, amounts to a validation of the data it had used in its presentation.
II. WORKER QUALIFICATION 277 (c) AND REQUIRED ACTION CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAW
Art. 277. Miscellaneous provisions.
(c) Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first day of service, be considered as an employee for purposes of membership in any labor union.
(As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715)
UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio, 318 SCRA 185 (99)
Facts:

Petitioner USTFU is the exclusive bargaining representative of the faculty of UST. In September 1996, the Union announced the convening of a general assembly on 05 October 1996. Among the
agenda in the general assembly is the election of USTFU. The proposed election was contested by some members of the Union alleging that the preparations for the said election as demanded by
the Unions constitution and by-laws (CBL) were not satisfied. The meeting was moved earlier to 04 October 1996.

On 04 October 1996, the general faculty assembly was held. It was attended by both members of USTFU and non-members thereof. In the said general assembly a new set of USTFUs officers
was elected by acclamation and clapping of hands.

Respondents filed a petition with the med-arbiter alleging the illegality of the election conducted on 04 October 1996 as it did not conform to the requirements of the CBL.

In the meantime a new CBA was declared to be ratified purportedly by a majority of USTs academic community.

The med-arbiter rendered a decision declaring the election done in 04 October 1996 as null and void for not having been executed conformably to the CBL of the Union. The said decision was
affirmed by public respondent Bitonio Jr., hence this petition.
Issue: WON the election conducted on 04 October 1996 is null and void
Held:

Yes the election is null and void. Petitioners argue that the anomalies allegedly comtted by the respondents impelled them to conduct the election on 04 October 1996 and that such exercise was
pursuant to their right to self-organization.

Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the workers by the Philippine Constitution and the Labor Code. Such right is better understood in the context of ILO Convention No. 87 to
which the Philippines is a signatory. It provides that the incident of the assertion of the right to self-organization is reflected in the promulgation of the unions CBL which governs the
relationship between the members of the union. It is where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and authority of the officers and as well as the members is defined. It determines
the validity of the acts done by any officer or member of the union.

Clearly the election conducted on 04 October 1996 was tainted with irregularities as:
o The assembly was not convened in accordance with the provision of the CBL

o There was no commission of elections to oversee the election as mandated by Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the CBL
o The purported election was not done thru secret balloting as provided by Section 6 Article IX of the CBL as well as Article 241 (c) of the Labor Code

The foregoing infirmities more than justifies the conclusion by the public respondents that the proceedings were rendered void due to lack of due process.
As to the contention that the 04 October 1996 assembly suspended the operation of the CBL, such argument is bereft of merit. Such is in fact, an implied admission that the election held on that date
could not be considered as valid under the existing USTFU constitution.
III. EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RIGHT 243, 246
Art. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational
institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)
Art. 246. Non-abridgment of right to self-organization. It shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere with employees and workers in their exercise
of the right to self-organization. Such right shall include the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and
to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection, subject to the provisions of Article 264 of this Code. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May
1, 1980)
Reyes v. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484 (92)
Facts:
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Cor. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees
Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be
qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK.
The ballots provided for three (3) choices: (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, for (c) a third choice: "NO UNION."
The final tally of the votes showed the following results: TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141.
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the preelection conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections."
The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect
the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest the results of the election,"
because "they are not members of either contending unit, but of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization."
The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees petition, and certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
The petitioners brought the matter up on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the appeal. He opined that the petitioners
are "bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as
sole and exclusive bargaining representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do
not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations."
Issue: W/N the INK employees votes of NO UNION should be excluded from the certification election. NO
Ratio:
Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining." Article 243 LC
provides as follows:
ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational
institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining.
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to "interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization." Similarly,
Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization."
The same legal proposition is set out in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, as might be expected Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V (Labor Relations) of
the Omnibus Rules provides:
Sec. 1. Who may join unions; exception. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government corporations established under the
Corporation Code as well as employees of religious, medical or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, except managerial employees, shall have the right to self-organization and
to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and without any definite employers people, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities
with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection.

Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to
maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right.
Section 8 (rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules) entitled "Marketing and canvassing of votes," provides that:
. . . (a) The voter must write a cross (X) or a check (/) in the square opposite the union of his choice. If only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating
"YES" or "NO."
Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is doubtful if the employee's
alternative right NOT to form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently coerced to vote for one or another of the
competing unions and be represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square
indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may outnumber the "YES" votes indicating that the majority of the employees in the
company do not wish to be represented by any union in which case, no union can represent the employees in collective bargaining. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by
considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point, and may not be inquired into at all.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor
organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any
union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit. The minority employees who wish to have a
union represent them in collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not
and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority who do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon the plea that
they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or
assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union.
That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when
they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect.
The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor
jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the
right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious
beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to
exercise the right in past certification elections.
Pan-American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan-American Employees Association, 27 SCRA 1202 (69)
FACTS: Respondent Union filed a strike with the Department of Labor against the petitioner company. On that same day, the union declared and maintained such strike. The strike, being an industrial
dispute affecting the national interest, was certified by the President to CIR. Several conferences were held to settle their dispute. The position of the Union was that they would not return to work
unless its officers were also included in the return-to-work order. However, petitioner company alleged that the strike that the union held was illegal. Hence, its officers should be liable for dismissal.
The CIR issued an order requiring petitioner company to accept the five union officers pending resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the strike. An MR was filed but was denied by the
same court. Hence, the union filed the instant petition, alleging a grave abuse of discretion of the said court.
ISSUES & HELD: 1. WON CIR has jurisdiction over the case.
Yes.The case comes under the operation of CA 103 which empowers the CIR to act on cases of labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national interest. Since the court was granted authority
by the president to find a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution consists in ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be said that the CIR does not have jurisdiction over such
case.
2. WON the five union officers should be included in the return-to-work order.
Yes. The record is bereft of the slightest indication that any danger is to be expected from their return to work. However, the Court said that the greater offense is to the labor movement itself, mores
specifically the right to self organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions which would take care of their interests vis-avis their
employers. Their freedom would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders who would represent them to the management.
Union of Supervisors (R.B.)-NATU v. Sec. of Labor, 109 SCRA 139 (81)
Facts:
In 1970, a Provident Fund was established pursuant to the CBA between the union and the bank for the benefit of the employees of Republic Bank. The sources of its fund include contributions from
members and of the bank. It is managed by a Board of Trustees composed of five (5) members, of which three (3), are supposed designated by the bank, and the other two are the presidents of the
Republic Bank Union of Supervisors and of the Republic Bank Employees' Union. Luna, president of the petitioner union, became the fund's administrator and secretary.
In 1974, the bank decided to establish a money market department. At the meeting of the BoT, de Vera (AVP of the bank & member of the BoT) proposed a reorganization of the fund to carry out the
instruction of the Board of Directors (of the bank), which wants to have control of the fund so as to tie it up with the Money Market Operations. Luna objected and a heated discussion followed. The
reorganization move was carried by a 3 to 2 vote. It was during the ensuing discussion that Luna allegedly uttered the libelous remarks as follows:

The present Board of Trustees decided against giving out a loan to Mr. de Vera who was considered a poor credit risk. Now how can we expect a person who cannot be given a loan and who will
now have a say in the PF I don't think the PF will allow that.
As I have said before the personal standing of a trustee is very important so that if a man has a very poor standing and crooked (sic) at that he will be very bad for the interest of the PF. I repeat that the
trustees had in the past denied a loan application of Mr. de Vera for the reason that his salary is under garnishment and for a man to be appointed as trustee when his records show that his salary was
under garnishment, definitely, the intention of the RB is to appoint unscrupulous people
After which, Luna walked out. Later, the bank asked Luna to turn over the all records of the fund to the new administrator. Luna refused claiming that the appointment of a new administrator was
invalid. Later, the banks BoD suspended Luna as branch manager pending investigation of Abads charges against him for making libelous remarks. The investigation was held ex-parte and resulted
in the dismissal of Luna for grave misconduct and insubordination.
Petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against the bank for ULP. The NLRC Arbitrator ruled in favor of the bank. This was affirmed by the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor.
Issues:
1. WON dismissal was for valid and just cause
2. WON dismissal constitutes ULP
Held / ratio:
Granted, reinstatement proper.
1. No.
ON GRAVE MISCONDUCT (uttering libelous remarks)
The evidence presented does not support the findings. Luna challenged the accuracy of the stenographic notes of the said meeting on the ground that Mrs. Unson was not a court stenographer and her
notes do not truly reflect all that transpired during the meeting. Since there is nothing in the records to indicate that Luna has been changed as secretary, the minutes should have been signed by him
before being officially released. Without such signature, neither probative value nor credibility could be accorded to such minutes; for the one who signed, Abad, is also the accuser of, and therefore
biased against Luna.
This leaves only the testimonial evidence. It appears, however, that of the seven witnesses presented only the three (3) positively testified as to the alleged derogatory statements. This is
understandable, considering that Abad is the accuser, Galicia is the successor, and de Vera was the prime mover of Luna's ouster. Thus, the weakness of the evidence for respondent bank is easily
discernible.
Even if it were not so, and had the alleged derogatory or libelous statements been substantially established, still the same will not justify Luna's dismissal. For one thing, his allegations were never
controverted. On the contrary, the said allegations were confirmed by the takeover by the Central Bank of the distressed respondent bank which was of public knowledge.
Moreover, Luna's remarks are privileged in nature as a valid exercise of his constitutional freedom of expression. Luna's remarks were intended to protect the interests of the members of the Provident
Fund. His protests could be treated as union activity by the Industrial Peace Act, which assures the employees' right "to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection ... ". This is so because Luna's membership in the BoT was by virtue of his
being president of the Union. Luna was therefore acting out his role as protector of his constituents.
The joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.
ON INSUBORDINATION (refusal to turn over records of the fund)
The "order" referred to was not an order but a letter-request. Luna answered in writing explaining why he feels justified to keep them. The BoT, upon receipt of such written explanation, should have
referred the matter to the grievance machinery under the CBA. But this was not done. Instead, management preferred as many charges as it could frame against Luna.
That the respondent bank tried to maneuver Luna's ouster is evident from the way the investigation was conducted. The testimonies of witnesses who were not even under oath were taken
without notice to Luna and without giving him a chance to cross-examine them. And corporate actions through, such as filing of charges, suspension and termination, were taken against Luna just as
soon as, and on the very same dates the reports are made.
2.

Yes

Luna had more than 21 years of service with respondent bank and for 11 years the president of the Union. The Union had caused the filing of several cases against the bank with the NLRC. Some of
these cases had been decided or were settled by the parties.
The respondent bank argues that Luna's union activities had nothing to do with his dismissal. If Luna's union activism indeed caused his separation, the bank contends, how come it never took action
against Canizares the president of the RB Employee's Union?
To this, WE may ask the following: Why was not Caizares cited for dereliction of duty when he also walked out of the meeting on February 1974? The answers are obvious: Canizares and the other
union officers were not as active and militant in their defense of union rights, much less did they pose any threat against the respondent bank's plan to control the Provident Fund. Only Luna posed
such threat.
These circumstances indubitably show that Luna's discharge was discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice under paragraph (5) Section 4 of the Industrial Peace Act
IV. WORKERS WITH RIGHT OF SELF-ORGANIZATION Art. III, Sec. 8; and Art. XIII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution
1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Sec. 3. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law.
A. All Employees 243, 212 (f)
Art. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational
institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)
Art. 212. Definitions.
(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially
equivalent and regular employment.
1. Non-Profit Organization
FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, Inc. v. Trajano, 152 SCRA 725 (87)
FACTS: Alliance Filipino Workers, members of which are employees of petitioner FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc., filed a petition for Consent/or Certification Election with the
Ministry of Labor. The petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition is pending resolution before the SC. AFW admitted that it filed a similar petition, but this petition was
denied by MED Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution. Pursuant to Art. 244 of the Labor Code, the employees
may not form, join, or organize a union.
The Med Arbiter declared that a certification election be conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the company's employees. This order was affirmed by the respondent
director.
ISSUE: WON respondent director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition for certification of election.
HELD: No. At the time the petition for certification election was filed, Article 244 was already amended by BP Blg 70, which added the phrase whether operating for profit or not. Under the Art. 244
LC, there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining.
Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law for calling a certification of election, it was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to
ascertain the bargaining representative of the employees.
Victoria v. Inciong, 157 SCRA 339 (88)
Petitioner Saturno Victoria was employed on March 17, 1956 by private respondent Far East Broadcasting Company, Incorporated as a radio transmitter operator. Sometime in July 1971, he and his
co-workers organized the Far East Broadcasting Company Employees Association. After registering their association with the then Department of Labor, they demanded recognition of said association
by the company but the latter refused on the ground that being a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and religious corporation, it is not covered by Republic Act 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at that time.
Several conciliation meetings were held at the Department of Labor
Director of Labor Rel: no right to bargain collectively
Association held strike
Company sued for damages and injunction which CFI granted, later company asked that strike be declared illegal

Case on strike transferred to NLRC created by PD 21

LA:employees to return to work without prejudice to the pending CFI case
LA affirmed by NLRC, SOLE and OP
CFI: strike illegal, FEBC is a non-profit/non-stock org which does not issue dividends, cannot compel to recognize labor org because not covered by RA 875
Because of CFI decision, FEBC dismissed Victoria as an officer in the illegal strike to which Victoria filed ID case with LA (another issue altogether)
SKIPPING TO THE ACTUAL RELATED ISSUE: Whether or not right to self-organization and collective bargaining exists vis. non-profit/non stock org
SC: The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to
court to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private respondent to show
specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal.
This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of
law.
Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed knowledge to the members of the union that employees and laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the
provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of
said non-profit organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers.
As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the law at that time, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of remedy peculiarly their own and
outside of the statute, and as such, the strikers must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice. If they succeed and the employer succumbs, the law will not stand in their way in the enjoyment of
the lawful fruits of their victory. But if they fail, they cannot thereafter invoke the protection of the law for the consequences of their conduct unless the right they wished vindicated is one which the
law will, by all means, protect and enforce.
(PLEASE NOTE THAT UNDER THE CURRENT LAW, even employees of non-profit orgs have a right to self-organization)
2. Members Religious Group
Victoriano v. Elizalde Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (74)
facts of the case
Victoriano, a member of Iglesia ni Cristo, had been in the employ of Elizalde Rope since 1958. As such, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union)
which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees."
On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
The INC, as a religious sect, prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, and as a member of the INC, Victoriano therefore presented his resignation to the Union in 1962, and
when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. In response, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Victoriano from service
in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless he could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Victoriano to file an action for injunction in the CFI Manila to enjoin the Company
and the Union from dismissing him.
CFI ruled in favor of Victoriano and enjoined the Company from dismissing him, as well as sentencing the Union to pay attorneys fees and costs. The Union appealed to the SC, stating that the CFI
erred in NOT ruling that RA 3350 was unconstitutional, as well as questioning the payment of attorneys fees.
issue
WON Victoriano should be dismissed from employment due to the termination of his membership in the Union. NO.
WON the assailed RA 3350 is unconstitutional. NO.
ratio

The SC, in affirming the CFI decision, states that the right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights such as the right to self-organization. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor
union and despite the fact that there is a closed shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein.
Furthermore, the right to join a union includes the right NOT to join a union. The law recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it
recognizes the workers right to join or not to join union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.
A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an
association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and
cancel his membership with said organization at any time.
The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. The Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor
organizations.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union.
It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects
from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division v. Calleja, 162 SCRA 367 (88)
From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division of the Universal Robina Corporation, with a 3-year
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which was to expire on November 15, 1987.
On October 8, 1987, the NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect, registered as a labor union.
On October 12, 1987, the TUPAS staged a strike. ROBINA obtained an injunction against the strike, resulting in an agreement to return to work and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA.
The next day, October 13, 1987, NEW ULO, claiming that it has "the majority of the daily wage rank and file employees numbering 191," filed a petition for a certification election at the Bureau of
Labor Relations.
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the members of the NEW ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which three (3) years previous refused to
affiliate with any labor union. It also accused the company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS' bargaining rights
On November 17, 1987, the Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election within 20 days
TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations BLR. In the meantime, it was able to negotiate a new 3-year CBA with ROBINA, which was signed on December 3, 1987 and to expire on
November 15, 1990.
MA, affirmed by BLR, ordered cert election
I: whether or not Iglesia members can form a labor org which can be a legitimate labor organization
Whether or not cert election barred by newly signed CBA between TUPAS and Robina Meat factory
SC: the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union.
As held in the case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, upholding the right of members of the INC sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the
members of that sect from forming their own union. At the same time, NEW ULO was able to file a timely petition for certification election within the 60 day freedom period and was able to ascertain
the majority of the workers who prefer their union.
The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge
TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a new CBA with
the company on December 3, 1987.

a "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret
ballot.
C. Government Corporation Employees 244
Art. 244. Right of employees in the public service. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with
their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24,
1986)
D. Supervisors 245; 212 (m)
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
(As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Art. 212. Definitions.
(m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this
Book.
1. Test
Paper Industries Corporation v. Laguesma, 330 SCRA 295 (00)
FACTS: Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), engaged in the manufacture of paper and timber products, has over 9000 employees, 944 of whom are supervisory and technical
staff employees, and more or less 487 of said 944 are signatory members of PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and Technical Staff Employees Union (respondent).
Respondent instituted a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP for CBA purposes. Federation
of Free Workers (FFW) and Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed their respective petitions for intervention.
Med-Arbiter: Granted petitions for intervention and set the holding of a certification election among PICOPs supervisory and technical staff employees with 4 choices, namely: (1) respondent, (2)
FFW, (3) ALU, and (4) no union.
Secretary of Labor: Upheld Med-Arbiters order.
PICOP: objected to the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters, whose positions were reclassified as managerial employees in light of the Revised Organizational
Structure effected by PICOP. The company was divided into 4 main business groups, namely: Paper Products Business, Timber Products Business, Forest Resource Business and Support Services
Business. A Vice-President or Assistant Vice-President heads each of these business groups. A Division Manager heads the divisions comprising each business group. A Department Manager heads the
departments comprising each division. Section Heads and Supervisors, now called Section Managers and Unit Managers, head the sections and independent units, respectively, comprising each
department. Considering the present authority of these section managers and unit managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial employees, and hence, ineligible to form/join any labor
organization.
Med-Arbiter: Supervisors and section heads of PICOP are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters for purposes of certification election.
Undersecretary of Labor: Reversed. Subject supervisors and section heads are supervisory employees eligible to vote in the certification election.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the subject section heads and supervisors are managerial employees ineligible to vote in the certification election. NO.
RATIO: Managerial Employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and
operational policies, while the task of the First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees. Under this distinction, managerial employees fall
in 2 categories, namely, the managers per se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the supervisors composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated as
manager does not ipso facto make him one, for it is the job description that determines the nature of employment.

In this case, the job description of the supervisory employees and section heads show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees, since they do not lay down company
policies. The contention that they exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading because such authority is not supreme but merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a final
determination of the company policies, inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is still subject to confirmation
and approval by their superior. Thus, where such power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation, review, and final action by the department heads and higher
executives of the company, the same is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.
There was no denial of due process when the Undersecretary did not allow PICOP to present additional evidence on the implementation of its program inasmuch as the appeal before the former,
PICOP even then had already submitted voluminous supporting documents. What the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard. PICOP only voiced out its objection to the holding of
certification election after the Undersecretary affirmed the holding thereof, which leads to the conclusion that PICOP raised the issue merely to prevent and thwart the concerned section heads and
supervisory employees from exercising a right granted them by law.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
Samson v. NLRC, 330 SCRA 460 (00)
FACTS: Petitioner Samson received a letter calling the attention of petitioners conduct during a Sales and Marketing Christmas gathering where Samson allegedly made utterances of obscene,
insulting and offensive words towards the SPSs Management Committee. Complainant was given two days to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him and he was thereafter
placed on preventive suspension. Samson replied stating that such utterances were only made in reference to a decision taken by the management committee on the Cua Lim Case and not to any
specific person. Petitioner was thereafter informed in a letter that his employment was terminated. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal. Both parties
appealed the decision; petitioner filed a partial appeal of the denial of his claim for holiday pay and the cash equivalent of the rice subsidy; respondent company sought the reversal of the labor
arbiters ruling of illegal dismissal. The NLRC found that dismissal was made for just cause.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was validly dismissed.
HELD: No.
Misconduct. Petitioners dismissal was brought about by utterances made during an informal Christmas gathering. For misconduct to warrant dismissal, it must be in connection with the employees
work. In this case, the alleged misconduct was neither in connection with the employees work, as such utterances of petitioner is expected in informal gatherings; also, such conduct was not even of
such serious and grave character. Furthermore, petitioners outburst was in reaction to the decision of the management in a certain case and was not intended to malign on the person of the respondent
companys president and general manager. Respondent company itself did not seem to consider the offense serious to warrant an immediate investigation. It is also provided in respondent companys
rules and regulations that for conduct such as that of the petitioner, a first offense would only warrant a verbal reminder and not dismissal. Petitioners position does not fall within the definition of a
managerial employee; and even assuming that he is, the ground for loss of confidence is without basis as it was not clearly established. Therefore, there was no just cause for petitioners dismissal and
thus was unlawful.
Loss of Confidence. Neither is his dismissal justified on ground of loss of confidence. As a ground for dismissal, the term "trust and confidence" is restricted to managerial employees.
Before one may be properly considered a managerial employee, all the following conditions must be met:
(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or sub-division thereof;
(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;
(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of
other employees are given particular weight.
Further, it is the nature of the employees functions, and not the nomenclature or title given to his job, which determines whether he has rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial status.
The job description of petitioner does not mention that petitioner possesses the power "to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees."
Absent this crucial element, petitioner cannot be considered a managerial employee despite his designation as District Sales Manager.
Tagaytay Highlands v. Tagaytay Highlands, 395 SCRA 699 (03)
FACTS: On Oct 1997, the TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO (THEU- PTGWO), a legitimate labor organization said to represent majority of the rank-and-file employees
of Tagaytay Highlands Gold Club (THIGCI) filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE Med-Arb unit. THIGCI opposed the petition on the ground that the list of union members
submitted was flawed as it includes supervisors, resigned employees, AWOL employees and non-employees of THIGCI. DOLE Med-Arbiter ordered holding of a certification election on the ground
that the union is a legitimate labor federation, and that the issues on the members should be properly raised in exclusion-inclusion proceedings in the pre-election conference, THIGCI appealed to the
DOLE Secretary which set aside the Med-Arbiter decision on the ground of clear absence of community of mutuality of interests as THEU sought to represent separate bargaining units (supervisory
emp and rank-and-file emp). Upon MR by THEU, DOLE Usec, by authority of the Secretary set aside the resolution dismissing the petition for certification election and held that rather than
disregarding the legitimate status of THEU, the names of alleged supervisory employees should be simply removed form the roster of membership. THUGCI filed an MR but was denied. CA likewise
denied.
Issue: WON the inclusion of supervisory employees in the rank-and-file union affects the legitimacy of the union

Held: No. While Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does not provide what would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory
employees as members. After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for
cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the "Rules to Implement the Labor Code" (Implementing Rules) which section reads:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers' association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such
legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239 of the Labor Code.
As for the lack of mutuality of interest, it does not lie, given the companys failure to present substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually occupying supervisory positions. While
petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their corresponding job titles and ranks, there is nothing mentioned about the supervisors respective duties, powers, and prerogatives that would show
that they can effectively recommend managerial actions with the required use of the independent judgment.
ISSUE: WON the conduct of cert election is proper, despite the allegations raised against THEU. Yes.
HELD/RATIO:
* After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent action for cancellation. (The grounds for
cancellation of union registration are provided in Art. 239, LC. It does NOT include the existence of disqualified members in the roster as a valid ground for cancellation, unless the same is attended
by misrepresntation, false statement or fraud. If these are attendant, the proper procedure to prove them is by a petition for cancellation of the cert of registration and not by intervening in a petition
for certification election.
* Further, there was lack of evidence to substantiate lack of mutuality of interest. Although THIGCI submitted a list of its EEs with corresponding ranks, there is no mention of the supervisors'
respective duties, powers, prerogatives as would indicate their managerial function. As held in Pepsi Cola v Sec of Labor, " The mere fact that an EE is designated manager does not necessarily make
him one. What is essential is the nature of the EEs function and not the nomenclature given to the job which determines whether the EE has R&F or managerial status or a supervisory EE.
2. Right
Filoil Refinery Corporation v. Filoil Supervisory and Confidential Employees Association, 46 SCRA 512 (72)
FACTS:

Respondent association is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor. It is composed exclusively of the supervisory and confidential employees of petitioner
corporation. There exists another entirely distinct labor association composed of the corporation's rank-and-file employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers Association (FEWA) with which
petitioner executed a collective bargaining agreement. This collective bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its coverage petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees, who in
turn organized their own labor association, respondent herein.

February 18, 1965 Filoil Supervisory & Confidential Employees Assoc filed its petition for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all of petitioner's supervisory
and confidential employees working at its refinery in Rosario, Cavite.

Corp filed a MTD on grounds of lack of cause of action claiming supervisors are not employees in the Industrial Peace Act since they are part of management, they do not have the right to
bargain collectively although they may organize an organization of their own.

CIR denied MTD. It ruled that under the express provisions of section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act, "(I)ndividuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations their own. CIR Ruled in favor of Filoil S&C Emp Assoc.
ISSUE: WON supervisors are part of management and not considered as employees entitled to bargain collectively NO
RATIO:
Petitioner's contentions are untenable, prescinding from the fact of its failure to appeal in due course respondent court's en banc resolution of September 7, 1965 upholding the right of the supervisors
and confidential employees to organize respondent association and to compel petitioner to negotiate and bargain collectively with it. Petitioner's argument that since supervisors form part of
management, to allow them to bargain collectively would be tantamount to management bargaining with itself may be a well-turned phrase but ignores the dual status of a supervisor as a
representative of management and as an employee.
As stated for the Court by the now Chief Justice in AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. C.I.R., 8 section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act "explicitly provides that "employees" and this term includes
supervisors "shall have the right to self-organization, and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representations of their
own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection" and that "individuals employed as supervisors ... may form separate
organizations of their own". Indeed, it is well settled that "in relation to his employer," a foreman or supervisor "is an employee within the meaning of the Act" ... For this reason, supervisors are
entitled to engage in union activities and any discrimination against them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair labor practice."
Petitioner's arguments go in reality to the wisdom and policy of the Industrial Peace Act which expressly grants supervisors the right to organize and bargain collectively, which are beyond the Court's
power of review.

So with petitioner's thesis that "(T)o then give supervisors the right to compel employers to bargain would in effect align labor and management together against stockholders and bondholders (capital)
and inexorably tilt the balance of power in favor of these hitherto confliction forces. This is contrary to the nature and philosophy of free enterprise." This further serves to point up the validity and
rationale of the Industrial Peace Act's provision, since the supervisors and confidential employees, even though they may exercise the prerogatives of management as regards the rank and file
employees are indeed employees in relation to their employer, the company which is owned by the "stockholders and bondholders (capital)" in petitioner's own words, and should therefore be entitled
under the law to bargain collectively with the top management with respect to their terms and conditions of employment.
Petitioner's argument that the express provisions of section 3 of our Industrial Peace Act must give way to the intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act which exempts employers from the legal
obligation to recognize and negotiate with supervisors is tenuous and groundless. The language of our own statute is plain and unambiguous and admits of no other interpretation.
The other principal ground of petitioner's appeal questioning the confidential employees' inclusion in the supevisors bargaining unit is equally untenable. Respondent court correctly held that since the
confidential employee are very few in number and are by practice and tradition identified with the supervisors in their role as representives of management vis-a-vis the rank and file employee such
identity of interest has allowed their inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for purposes of collective bargaining in turn as employees in relation to the company as their employer.
Judgement affirmed.
Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc, 312 SCRA 437 (07)
Facts:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning
employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed
the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union
officers and members also insisted that their wages be based
on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the
Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the reasons cited by the
Union were not valid grounds for a strike. The Union then filed an Amended Notice of Strike.
Meanwhile, the Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Companys premises. 106 Union members, officers and members of the BoD, and shop stewards,
individually filed applications for leave of absence for September 21, 1999. Certain that its operations in the plant would come to a complete stop since there were no sufficient trained contractual
employees who would take over, the Company disapproved all leave applications and notified the applicants accordingly. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore gears, red tag
cloths stating "YES KAMI SA STRIKE" as headgears and on the different parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.
The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it "to conduct a mass protest action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant on September 21, 1999 from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon."
Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. All of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for
work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with
cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal.
The NCMB recommended that the Notice of Strike of the Union be converted into a preventive mediation case. After conciliation proceedings failed, the parties were required to submit their
respective position papers. LA declared the strike illegal. NLRC affirmed LA. CA dismissed petition.
Issues:
1. W/N the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal. YES
2. W/N the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner Union should be dismissed from their employment. YES
Ratio:
1. Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the
Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute.
As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.
The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which
already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.
For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date
thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called
for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply
therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.

2.

The law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he
commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment.

Union officers are duty-bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their
dismissal from the service is just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers responsibility is greater than that of the members.
Here, the law required respondents to follow a set of mandatory procedures before they could go on with their strike. But obviously, rather than call on their members to comply therewith, respondents
were the first ones to violate the same.
Finally, the contention of petitioners who were appointed as shop stewards of the Union that they were mere members and not the officers of petitioner Union is barren of merit.
We agree with the observation of respondent that under Section 501(a) and (b) of the Landrum Griffin Act of 1959, shop stewards are officers of the Union:
Sec. 501 (a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore,
the duty of each such person, taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members
and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such
organization as an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interest of such organization, and to
account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general
exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.
(b) When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section and the labor organization or its
governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the
labor organization, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court of the United States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction to recover
damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization. 49
Under said Act, Section 3(q) thereof provides, as follows:
(q) "Officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative", when used with respect to a labor organization, includes elected officials and key administrative personnel, whether elected or appointed
(such as business agents, heads of departments or major units, and organizers who exercise substantial independent authority), but does not include salaried non-supervisory professional staff,
stenographic, and service personnel.
Admittedly, there is no similar provision in the Labor Code of the Philippines; nonetheless, petitioners who are shop stewards are considered union officers.
Officers normally mean those who hold defined offices. An officer is any person occupying a position identified as an office. An office may be provided in the constitution of a labor union or by the
union itself in its CBA with the employer. An office is a word of familiar usage and should be construed according to the sense of the thing.
Irrefragably, under its Constitution and By-Laws, petitioner Union has principal officers and subordinate officers, who are either elected by its members, or appointed by its president, including the
standing committees each to be headed by a member of the Board of Directors.
A shop steward is appointed by the Union in a shop, department, or plant serves as representative of the Union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the
supervisor of the employer. He is the representative of the Union members in a building or other workplace. Blacks Law Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official who represents members
in a particular department. His duties include the conduct of initial negotiations for settlement of grievances. He is to help other members when they have concerns with the employer or other workrelated issues. He is the first person that workers turn to for assistance or information. If someone has a problem at work, the steward will help them sort it out or, if necessary, help them file a
complaint. In the performance of his duties, he has to take cognizance of and resolve, in the first instance, the grievances of the members of the Union. He is empowered to decide for himself whether
the grievance or complaint of a member of the petitioner Union is valid, and if valid, to resolve the same with the supervisor failing which, the matter would be elevated to the Grievance Committee.
In this case, instead of playing the role of "peacemakers" and grievance solvers, the petitioners-shop stewards participated in the strike. Thus, like the officers and directors of petitioner Union who
joined the strike, petitioners-shop stewards also deserve the penalty of dismissal from their employment.

United Pepsi Cola v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15 (98)

Facts:
Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore,
ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to
form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Issues:
1) W/N the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees. YES
2) W/N Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. NO
Ratio:
1) The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating
employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them. They are not mere functionaries with simple oversight functions but business administrators in their own right.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment." Thus, their only power is to recommend. Certainly, the route managers in this case more than merely recommend effective management action. They
perform operational, human resource, financial and marketing functions for the company, all of which involve the laying down of operating policies for themselves and their teams
The term "manager" generally refers to "anyone who is responsible for subordinates and other organizational resources." Managers constitute three levels of a pyramid:
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS: The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers direct
operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers
MIDDLE MANAGERS: Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the
activities that implement their organizations' policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates
TOP MANAGERS: Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and
guides the organization's interactions with its environment
In the Case, entitled Worker's Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., decided on November 13, 1991, the Secretary of Labor found: we find that only those employees
occupying the position of route manager and accounting manager are managerial employees.
2) The real intent of Art. III, 8 is evident in Lerums proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards to
be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle
managers.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Sec. 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, Sec. 8 is subject to the condition that
its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations. In Bulletin
Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:
The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.
E. Alien 269
Art. 269. Prohibition against aliens; exceptions. All aliens, natural or juridical, as well as foreign organizations are strictly prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in all forms of trade union
activities without prejudice to normal contacts between Philippine labor unions and recognized international labor centers: Provided, however, That aliens working in the country with valid permits
issued by the Department of Labor and Employment, may exercise the right to self-organization and join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining:
Provided, further, That said aliens are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers. (As amended by Section 29, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
F. Security Guards
Manila Electric Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 197 SCRA 275 (91)
Facts:
On November 1988, the Staff and Technical Employees Association of MERALCO ("STEAM") a labor organization of staff and technical employees, filed a petition for certification election seeking
to represent regular employees of MERALCO who are:
(a) non-managerial employees with Pay Grades VII and above;
(b) non-managerial employees in the Patrol Division, Treasury Security Services Section, Secretaries who are automatically removed from the bargaining unit; and

(c) employees within the rank and file unit who are automatically disqualified from becoming union members of any organization within the same bargaining unit.
The petition was premised on the disqualification of certain MERALCO employees pursuant to Art. I, Secs. 2 and 3 of the existing MEWA CBA.
Before Med-Arbiter Parungo, MERALCO contended that employees from Pay Grades VII and above are classified as managerial employees who, under the law, are prohibited from forming, joining
or assisting a labor organization of the rank and file. As regards those in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service Section, MERALCO maintains that since these employees are tasked with
providing security to the company, they are not eligible to join the rank and file bargaining unit, pursuant to Sec. 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the then Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code (1988) which reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Who may file petition. The employer or any legitimate labor organization may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization, shall contain, among others:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require, and provided, further: that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank and file employees
shall not include security guards (As amended by Sec. 6, Implementing Rules of EO 111)
The Med-Arbiter ruled that having been excluded from the existing CBA for rank and file employees, these employees have the right to form a union of their own, except those employees performing
managerial functions. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the assailed order of the Med-Arbiter.
Issue:
WON security guards may join the union of rank-and-file employees
Held / ratio:
Dismissed, certification election ordered conducted.
Yes.
MERALCO has questioned the legality of allowing them to join either the rank and file or the supervisory union, claiming that this is a violation of par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V of the Implementing
Rules of RA 6715, which states as follows:
Sec 1. Who may join unions. . . .
Supervisory employees and security guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations
of their own; . . .
Paragraph 2, Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V, is similar to Sec. 2 (c), Rule V, also of Book V of the implementing rules of RA 6715:
Rule V.
REPRESENTATION CASES AND
INTERNAL-UNION CONFLICTS
Sec. 1. . . .
Sec. 2. Who may file.Any legitimate labor organization or the employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor-organization shall contain, among others:
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require; and provided further, that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file
employees shall not include supervisory employees and/or security guards;
Both rules, barring security guards from joining a rank and file organization, appear to have been carried over from the old rules which implemented then Art. 245 of the Labor Code:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of security personnel to join any labor organization.Security guards and other personnel employed for the protection and security of the person, properties and premises of
the employer shall not be eligible for membership in any labor organization.
In 1986, Pres. Aquino issued E.O. No. 111 which eliminated the above-cited provision on the disqualification of security guards. What was retained was the disqualification of managerial employees,
renumbered as Art. 245 (previously Art. 246), as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to joint any labor organization.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.

With the elimination, security guards were thus free to join a rank and file organization.
In 1989, the Congress passed RA 6715. Section 18 thereof amended Art. 245, to read as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization.Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their own.
The second sentence of Art. 245 embodies an amendment disqualifying supervisory employees from membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. It does not include security
guards in the disqualification.
The implementing rules of RA 6715, therefore, insofar as they disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file organization are null and void, for being not germane to the object and purposes
of EO 111 and RA 6715.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees, the Secretary
of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their
constitutional right to self-organization.
The law is apt to produce divided loyalties in the faithful performance of their duties. Economic reasons would present the employees concerned with the temptation to subordinate their duties to the
allegiance they owe the union of which they are members, aware as they are that it is usually union action that obtains for them increased pecuniary benefits.
Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security personnel may neglect or outrightly abandon their duties, such as protection of property of their employer and the persons of its officials
and employees, the control of access to the employer's premises, and the maintenance of order in the event of emergencies and untoward incidents.
It is hoped that the corresponding amendatory and/or suppletory laws be passed by Congress to avoid possible conflict of interest in security personnel.
V. WORKERS WITH NO RIGHT OF SELF-ORGANIZATION
A. Managerial and Confidential Employees 212 (m); 82
Art. 212. Definitions.
(m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this
Book.
Art. 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees,
field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as
determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof, and
to other officers or members of the managerial staff.
"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of
work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
1. Test
Standard Chartered, etc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 552 SCRA 284 (08)
Facts: The Union and the Bank began negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement in May 2000 due to the expiration of the 1998-2000 CBA. However, the negotiations went into
deadlock, prompting the Union to file a Notice of Strike, prompting the assumption of jurisdiction of the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary subsequently issued an order stating that the Bank and
Union are directed to execute the CBA agreement effective April 1, 2001 until March 2003, incorporating the agreements and dispositions reached over the course of negotiations. Motions to
reconsider from both parties were denied. The CA also dismissed their petition for certiorari.
[RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE] It was brought forth by the Court that the CBA provisions in dispute consisted of:

Exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate bargaining unit

Adjustment of remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity for one month.

The Union sought the exclusion of only the following employees from the appropriate bargaining unit all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire employees, confidential employees,
those with access to labor relations materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff.
In the previous 1998-2000 CBA, the excluded employees are as follows:
A. All covenanted and assistant officers (now called National Officers)
B. One confidential secretary of each of the:
1. Chief Executive, Philippine Branches
2. Deputy Chief Executive/Head, Corporate Banking Group
3. Head, Finance
4. Head, Human Resources
5. Manager, Cebu
6. Manager, Iloilo
7. Covenanted Officers provided said positions shall be filled by new recruits.
C. Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers in Manila, Cebu and Iloilo, and in any other branch that the BANK may establish in the country.
D. Personnel of the Telex Department
E. All Security Guards
F. Probationary employees, without prejudice to Article 277 (c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, casuals or emergency employees; and
G. One (1) HR Staff
The Secretary of Labor maintained the previous exclusions from the 1998-2000 CBA as the Union failed to show that the employee sought to be removed from the list qualify for exclusion.
Issue: WON managerial and confidential employees should be excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit. YES.
Held: The Court held that disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for rank and file employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. While
Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or
those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential
records.
The Court held that:
A. Bank Cashiers are considered as confidential employees, citing National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres. The Court stated that
such employees have control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic
transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable instruments. Therefore, they were held to be disqualified from joining or assisting a union, or any other labor organization.
B. Radio and Telegraph operators, citing Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, were also held to be confidential employees, who, having access to confidential information, may become the
source of undue advantage in that they may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
C. Personnel staff were also said to be confidential employees since, by the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters
of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations.
In general, the test of whether or not an employee should be considered as a confidential employee should be whether or not the employee, by the nature of his or her position, has control, custody or
access to confidential matters, such that they may become a source of undue advantage to either party in the negotiating table.
The Union was unable to buttress and substantiate its claims that bank cashiers, radio and telegraph operators, and personnel staff were not confidential employees. As stated by the CA:
petitioner failed to show that the employees sought to be removed from the list of exclusions are actually rank and file employees who are not managerial or confidential in status and
should, accordingly, be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Absent any proof that Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex department and one (1) HR Staff have mutuality of interest with the other rank and file employees,
then they are rightfully excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.

San Miguel Corporation Supervisors v. Laguesma, 277 SCRA 370 (97)

FACTS:

Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants
of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification election among the abovementioned employees of the different plants as one bargaining unit.

San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiters error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, into
one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.

The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent companys Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the true
classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Upon petitioner-unions motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the supervisors ranked as
supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE:
1.
WON the Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.
2.

WON the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit, if they are not confidential employees.

HOLDING/RATIO:
WON the Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.

NO. On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining a union.

They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the very same
provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.
The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought
to be accomplished by the confidential employee rule. The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests.
Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal
performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the companys position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.

The Court held that if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.

An important element of the confidential employee rule is the employees need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key
question frequently considered is the employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
WON the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.

YES. The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial.
Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.


An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest
of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.

Sugbuanon Rural Bank Inc, v. Laguesma, 325 SCRA 425 (00)

FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. (SRBI) is a duly registered banking institution while respondent SRBI-Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office and Technical Employees
Union is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).
DOLE Regional Office granted a Certificate of Registration to respondent. Then respondent filed a petition for a certification election of the supervisory employees of SRBI, alleging that SRBI
employed 5 or more supervisory employees, a majority of which supported the petition; there was no existing CBI between any union and SRBI; and no certification election had been held in SRBI
during the past 12 months prior to the petition.
Med-Arbiter: Gave due course to the petition.
SRBI: Motion to Dismiss. The members of respondent were in fact managerial or confidential employees disqualified from forming, joining or assisting any labor organization (attached job
descriptions). Moreover, the ALU-TUCP was representing the union. Since it also sought to represent the rand-and-file employees of SRBI, there was a violation of the principle of separation of
unions.
Respondent Union: Its members were not managerial employees but merely supervisory (attached affidavits describing the nature of their respective duties). Art. 245 of the Labor Code expressly
allowed supervisory employees to form, join or assist their own unions.
Med-Arbiter: Denied motion to dismiss.
Secretary of Labor and Employment: Denied SRBIs appeal.
Med-Arbiter: The following SRBI personnel are voting supervisory employees in the election: Cashier of the Main Office, Cashier of the Mandaue Branch, Accountant of the Mandaue Branch, and
the Acting Chief of the Loans Department.
SRBI: Motion to suspend proceedings.
Med-Arbiter: Denied.
SRBI: Motion for reconsideration.
Med-Arbiter: Denied.
SRBI: Appealed to DOLE Secretary. Then filed a petition with the DOLE Regional Office seeking the cancellation of respondent unions registration.
DOLE UNDERSECRETARY: Denied appeal. Respondent was a legitimate labor organization fully entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law, including the right to file a petition for
certification election. Until and unless a final order is issued cancelling the unions registration certificate, it had the legal right to represent its members for collective bargaining purposes.
ISSUE: Whether the union members should be considered as managerial or confidential employees. NO.
RATIO: Art. 212(m) of the Labor Code defined managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees; supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.
SRBI: The functions are responsibilities of the employees involved constitute the very core of the banks business lending of money to clients and borrowers, evaluating their capacity to pay,
approving the loan and its amount, scheduling the terms of repayment, and endorsing delinquent accounts to counsel for collection hence, they must be deemed managerial employees.
SC: In Tabacalera v. NLRC, the court classified a credit and collection supervisor by management as a managerial/supervisory personnel, because they had the power to recommend the hiring and
appointment of his subordinates, as well as the power to recommend any promotion and/or increase. SRBI failed to show that the employees concerned were vested with similar powers. At best, they
only had recommendatory powers subject to evaluation, review and final decision by the banks management. Their job descriptions show that they cannot transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees; nor do they formulate and execute management policies which are normally expected of management officers. In Panday v. NLRC, a branch accountant was considered

a managerial employee because said employee had managerial powers, including recommending the hiring and appointment of his subordinates and the power to recommend any promotion and/or
increase. Subject employees in this case do not possess managerial powers and duties. They are not managerial employees.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies (specially in the field of labor
relations). The 2 criteria are cumulative and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and
his superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Although Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of
managerial employees equally apply to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties, they become
aware of management policies relating to labor relations. However, when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations information, there isn o legal prohibition against
confidential employees from forming, assisting or joining a union.
SRBI: It has only 5 officers running its day-to-day affairs. They assist in confidential capacities and have complete access to the banks confidential data. They form the core of the banks
management team.
SC: SRBIs explanation does not state who among them has access to information specifically relating to its labor relations policies. Although the Board of Directors is responsible for corporate
policies, the exercise of corporate powers, and the general management of the business and affairs of the corporation, the secretary of the banks governing body could not be deemed to have access to
confidential information specifically relating to SRBIs labor relations policies.
ISSUE: Whether the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon the filing of a petition for certification election despite SRBIs appeal pending before the DOLE
Secretary against the issuance of the unions registration. YES.
RATIO: One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Art. 242(b) is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes
of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, respondent is a legitimate labor union. Art. 257 mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted by
the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization. Nothing prohibits such automatic conduct of certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the
validity of the unions registration.
A local union maintains its separate personality despite affiliation with a larger national federation.
The law frowns on a union where the membership is composed of both supervisors and rank-and-file employees, for fear that conflicts of interest may arise in the areas of discipline, collective
bargaining and strikes.
Samson v. NLRC, 330 SCRA 460 (00)
NATURE Special civil action of certiorari
FACTS - Rufino Norberto F. Samson was dismissed from the Company for uttering what was considered by the company as obscene, insulting, and offensive words and for making malicious and
lewd gestures directed at the President and General Manager of the company during an informal Sales and Marketing gathering in relation to the decision of the Management Committee on a dispute
with another employee. He was also accused of threatening to disrupt or create violence in a forthcoming National Sales Conference.
- The Labor Arbiter found that Samson was illegally dismissed but the decision was reversed by NLRC.
ISSUE/S WON the dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is valid
HELD No. As a ground for dismissal, the term trust and confidence is restricted to managerial employees. And before one may be properly considered a managerial employee, three conditions must
be met:
a. Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof:
b. They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;
c. They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to hiring an firing and as to the promotion or any other change of
status of other employees are given particular weight.
-In this case the job description of Samson does not mention that petitioner possesses the power to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall. discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Absent this crucial element, petitioner cannot be considered a managerial employee despite his designation as District Sales Manager.
Disposition Petition is granted. NLRC decision is reversed and set aside. Samson is reinstated to his position without loss of seniority rights and is awarded payment of his full backwages.
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Laguesma, 330 SCRA 295 (00)

Petitioner
Paper
Industries
Corporation
of
the
Philippines
(PICOP)
has
over
9,000
employees,
944 of whom are supervisory and technical staff employees. PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and
technical staff employees of PICOP for collective bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes. Meanwhile, private respondents Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed
their respective petitions for intervention.
Med Arbiter granted the petitions for interventions of the FFW and ALU. It held that the supervisors and section heads are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters for
purposes of certification election. DOLE Undersecretary Laguesma reversed Med Arbiter; hence this appeal by PICOP.
PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were reclassified as managerial employees in the light of the
reorganization effected by it. Under the Revised Organizational Structure of the PICOP, the company was divided into 4) main business groups, namely: Paper Products Business, Timber Products
Business, Forest Resource Business and Support Services Business. A vice- president or assistant vice-president heads each of these business groups. A division manager heads the divisions
comprising each business group. A department manager heads the departments comprising each division. Section heads and supervisors, now called section managers and unit managers, head the
sections and independent units, respectively, comprising each department. PICOP advanced the view that considering the alleged present authority of these section managers and unit managers to hire
and fire, they are classified as managerial employees, and hence, ineligible to form or join any labor organization.
Issue: WON section managers and unit managers are considered managerial employees; hence, ineligible to form or join any labor organization.
SC: No.
A thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section heads indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees since
they do not lay down company policies.
PICOP's contention that the subject section heads and unit managers exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not
supreme but merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer,
suspension and termination of employees is still subject to confirmation and approval by their respective superior. Thus, where such power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject
to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as
required by law.
The fact that PICOP voiced out its objection to the holding of certification election, despite numerous opportunities to ventilate the same, only after respondent Undersecretary of Labor affirmed the
holding thereof, simply bolstered the conclusion that PICOP raised the issue merely to prevent and thwart the concerned section heads and supervisory employees from exercising a right granted them
by law. Needless to stress, no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
Cainta v. Cainta, 489 SCRA 468 (06)
Facts: CBA between the school and the Union provided stipulation in a CBA that allows management to retire an employee in its employ for a predetermined lengthy period but who has not yet
reached the minimum compulsory retirement age
Union held an election of officers, with Mrs. Llagas, Dean, being elected as President; Ms. Javier, subject coordinator, as VP. The School retired Llagas and Javier, who had rendered more than 20
years of continuous service, pursuant to the CBA.
Union filed a notice of strike and picketed the Schools entrances. Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice before the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that the retirement of Llagas and Javier is legal
as the School was merely exercising an option given to it under the CBA. The NLRC dismissed the unfair labor practice charge against the School for insufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, it was
found that the strike declared by the Union is illegal, thereby declaring all union officers to have lost their employment status. CA annulled and set aside the resolutions of the NLRC; hence, this
appeal.
Issues: (1) WON the retirement of Llagas and Javier is legal; (2) WON the School is guilty of unfair labor practice; and (3) WON the strike is legal.
SC: ifo School. Affirmed CA.
(1) Retirement is legal, arising as it did from a management prerogative granted by the mutually-negotiated CBA between the School and the Union.
The retirement of Rosalinda Llagas has become inevitable because, being a managerial employee by reason of her position as Dean of Student Affairs, she accepted the Union presidency. She lost
the trust and confidence on her by the SCHOOL as she occupied a managerial position as Dean Being also the union president, she has allowed her loyalties to be divided between the administration
and the union.
As to Paz Javier, her retirement was decided upon after an evaluation shows that she was not performing well as her students were complaining about her brusque attitude and bad language,
aside from being habitually absent and late.
By their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had agreed to cede to management. The questioned retirement provisions
cannot be deemed as an imposition foisted on the Union, which very well had the right to have refused to agree to allowing management to retire employees with at least 20 years of service.
(2) The law and this Court frowns upon unfair labor practices by management, including so-called union-busting but the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire
an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice.
(3) The functions of the Dean of Student Affairs, as occupied by Llagas, are enumerated in the Faculty Manual, are managerial in nature, thereby classifying Llagas as a managerial employee.
Javier was occupying the position of Subject Area Coordinator. Her duties and responsibilities include various recommendations to the principals consideration the appointment of faculty members in
the department, their promotion, discipline and even termination. She was therefore a supervisory employee.

Both are therefore proscribed from joining a labor union, more so being elected as union officer. In the case of Javier, a supervisory employee, she may join a labor union composed only of
supervisory employees. Finding both union officers to be employees not belonging to the rank-and-file, their membership in the Union has become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to
represent their cause; hence, strike is considered illegal.
2. Prohibition and Rationale
Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confessor, 254 SCRA 182 (96)
Facts: Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers (Union) is a labor organization representing the rank and file employees of petitioner Metrolab Industries, Inc.
(Metro Drug, Inc.).
CBA expired. The negotiations for a new CBA, however, ended in a deadlock. Union filed a notice of strike against Metrolab and Metro Drug Inc. SOLE Torres issued an order resolving all the
disputed items in the CBA and ordered the parties involved to execute a new CBA.
On the basis of its management prerogative, Metrolab laid off 94 of its rank and file employees, including executive secretaries. Acting Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor issued a resolution declaring
the layoff of Metrolab's 94 rank and file workers illegal and ordered their reinstatement.
Contention of Metrolab: The executive secretaries of the President, Executive Vice-President, Vice-President, Vice-President for Sales, Personnel manager, and Director for Corporate Planning who
may have access to vital labor relations information or who may otherwise act in a confidential capacity to persons who determine or formulate management policies. This being the case, they could
not be made members of a labor organization.
Issue: Can the executive secretaries be given the benefit of whatever the Union avails by way of its petitions. Stated differently, can they be members of a labor organization?
SC: No, as they are considered confidential employees. Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees,
jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial
employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations.
As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them.
Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of the
employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound to protect.
Finally, confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file. The nature of employment of confidential employees is quite distinct from the rank and file, thus, warranting a separate category.
Excluding confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.
Pepsi Cola Products, v. Secretary of Labor, 312 SCRA 104 (99)
Facts: Consolidation of 2 cases.
1. The union Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF filed a petition for certification election. Med-Arbiter granted the petition, explicitly stating that it was an affiliate of the federation Union de
Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas, together with the rank and file unions of Pepsi employees. Pepsi filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to cancel and/or revoke the charter affiliation of
the union, saying that the union's members were managers and that a supervisors' union can not affiliate with a federation whose members include the rank and file union of the same company.
2. The Med-Arbiter issued an order to conduct a certification election to be participated by and among the supervisory workers of Pepsi. Pepsi appealed the order. The Labor Secretary modified by
referring the cases to the Regional Director, but the call for certification election was sustained. The Bureau of Labor Relations later issued a registration certificate in favor of the union.
Issues: 1. WON a supervisors' union can affiliate with the same federation of which two rank and file unions are also members,
2. WON the petition to cancel/revoke the union's registration is a prejudicial question to the petition for certification election,
3. WON confidential employees can join labor unions of rank and file employees.
Held: 1. In view of the supervisors' union's withdrawal from the federation, the issue has become moot and academic, and was dismissed. But to guide the parties and others similarly situated, the
Court resolved it.
Article 245 only states that managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, and that supervisory employees are not eligible to join rank and file unions but may
join, assist or form their own organizations. While the wording of the law does not cover federations of unions of rank and file employees, the intent of the law must be upheld, i.e. to avoid a situation
where supervisors would co-mingle with those employees whom they directly supervise and thus represent conflicting interests, especially if the federation takes active part in union activities in the
same company. In a battery of cases the Court has said that the prohibition extends to a supervisors' union applying for membership in a federation which has rank and file unions for its members.
2. No, it is not a prejudicial question. Certification proceedings are investigations which are non-adversarial and fact-finding in character. Thus, technical rules of evidence do not apply. A union still
has the legal personality to petition for certification election absent an order directing the cancellation.
3. No, they cannot. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, Article 245 disqualifies confidential employees from becoming members of rank and file unions, even though the provision singles out
managerial employees. The reasons for such disqualification of managerial employees are 1) the union will not be so sure of the managers' loyalty because managers are supposed to be on the side of
the employer, and 2) the union may become company-dominated, making collective bargaining a one-sided affair. The same reasons hold for confidential employees, especially in view of the fact that
they have access to the company's confidential matters.
B. Worker/Member of Cooperative

Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Calleja, 180 SCRA 740 (89)

Facts: BWLU-ADLO filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO). BELU opposed, saying that it was the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of BENECO's workers, and in fact had filed two cases against BENECO for bargaining deadlock and ULP. BENECO on the other hand filed a motion to
dismiss the petition claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative, and the employees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor unions because they
are members and joint owners of the cooperative. The Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition for certification election, but limiting it to 37 employees who are not members and without any
involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. BELU and BENECO appealed, but their appeals were dismissed. The election was held with BELU emerging as the winner (49 out of 83 votes
cast). BENECO through counsel protested, submitting a certification that only 4 employees were not BENECO members and were the only ones eligible to vote. The Med-arbiter dismissed the
protest. BLU director Ferrer-Calleja affirmed. BENECO filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Issue: WON the BLU director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying BELU as the bargaining representative of BENECO's rank and file employees.
Held: Yes. The right to collective bargaining and self-organization is not available to an employee who is also a member and co-owner of the same cooperative. The fact that the members-employees
do not participate in the actual management does not make them eligible to join, form or assist labor organizations. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative and not involvement in its management
which disqualifies them.
BELU contends that "there would be no hindrance for employers to grant on a scheme of generous profit sharing stock bonuses to their employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are
not stockholders, they are now also co-owners and thus disqualified to form unions". The SC said that membership in cooperatives is different from being a stockholder of a corporation. The owners
and members of a cooperative are the ones who run and operate the business. Thus, an employee who is also a member and co-owner of the same cooperative cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining because he cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.
Even if there were 37 employees who were originally non-members of the cooperative but were forced to join it, and therefore must be allowed to vote, the election is still void because those who
were already members of the cooperative at the time of the issuance of the Med-arbiter's order were allowed to vote.
The director thus committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the med-arbiter's order.
Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc, v. Secretary of DOLE, 201 SCRA 584 (91)
NATURE Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS - Petitioner Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CENECO) seeks to annul the order issued by then Acting Secretary of Labor Laguesma declaring the projected certification election
unnecessary and directing petitioner CENECO to continue recognizing private respondent CENECO Union of Rational Employees (CURE) as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
the rank-and-file employees of petitioner's electric cooperative.
- Previous events: Their CBA was valid for a term of 3 years; CURE then wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new agreement. CENECO denied CURE's request on the
ground that, under applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union.
- CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification election; CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of legal restraints.
- Some employees of CENECO then filed for withdrawal of membership in the cooperative but CENECO contended that this cannot be allowed.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the employees were allowed to withdraw membership from the cooperative so as to entitle them to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement
HELD 1. YES Ratio Membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis. Hence, withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an organization necessarily includes
the equivalent right not to join the same.
No Right of Self-Organization: WORKER/MEMBER OF COOPERATIVE
- It was held in Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. Romeo A. Young that "employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join unions
for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners."
- However, nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.
Disposition The questioned order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The med-arbiter is hereby ordered to conduct a certification election among the rank-and- file employees of CENECO with
CURE and No Union as the choices therein.
Republic etc. v. Asia Pro Cooperative, 538 SCRA 659 (07)
Facts:
Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members. Under its by-laws, owners-members are of two categories: (1) regular member, who is entitled to all the rights and privileges of
membership; and (2) associate member, who has no right to vote and be voted upon. Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other livelihood services for its
owners-members.
Respondent entered into Service Contracts with Stanfilco - a division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. The owners-members do not receive compensation or wages from the cooperative. Instead, they
receive a share in the service surplus which the cooperative earns from different areas of trade it engages in, such as the Service Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-members get their income from
the service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services they rendered, which is determined by the Board of Directors of the cooperative.

In order to enjoy the benefits under the Social Security Law of 1997, the owners-members of the cooperative who were assigned to Stanfilco requested the services of the latter to register them with
petitioner SSS as self-employed and to remit their contributions as such.
On September 2002, SSS informed the cooperative that based on the Service Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, the cooperative is actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco
and for that reason, it is an employer of its owners-members. Thus, the cooperative should register itself as an employer and make the corresponding remittance of premium contributions in
accordance with the Social Security Law. Respondent asserted that it is not an employer because its owners-members are the cooperative itself; hence, it cannot be its own employer.
SSS filed a Petition before SSC against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco praying that the respondent cooperative or, in the alternative, Stanfilco be directed to register as an employer and to
remit the necessary contributions. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that no employer-employee relationship exists between it and its owners-members, thus, petitioner SSC has no
jurisdiction.
SSC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition filed
by the respondent cooperative.
Issues:
1. WON SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint
2. WON EE-ER relationship exists
Held / ratio:
Granted, orders of the SSC reinstated.
1. Yes
SSCs jurisdiction is stated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 as well as in Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable
by the Commission, x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure states:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. Any dispute arising under the Social Security Act with respect to coverage, entitlement of benefits, collection and settlement of contributions and penalties thereon, or any
other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission after the SSS through its President, Manager or Officer-in-charge of the Department/Branch/Representative Office concerned had
first taken action thereon in writing. (Emphasis supplied.)
Any issue regarding the compulsory coverage of the SSS is well within the exclusive domain of the petitioner SSC. The mandatory coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship except in cases of compulsory coverage of the self-employed.
The allegations in the complaint, not the defenses set up in the Answer or in the Motion to Dismiss, determine which court has jurisdiction over an action; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely upon the defendant. Moreover, it is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full termination of the case. The said principle may be
applied even to quasi-judicial bodies.
Based on the allegations in the petition-complaint filed before the petitioner SSC, the case clearly falls within its jurisdiction. Although the Answer with Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent
cooperative challenged the jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC on the alleged lack of employer-employee relationship between itself and its owners-members, the same is not enough to deprive the
petitioner SSC of its jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it.
2.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by
whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the workers conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration.

All the aforesaid elements are present in this case.

First. It is provided in the Service Contracts that it is the cooperative which has the exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement of the owners-members as well as its team leaders who will be
assigned at Stanfilco.

Second. Wages are defined as "remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on a time, task, piece or commission basis,
or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for service rendered or
to be rendered." In this case, the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in the service surplus given by the cooperative to its owners-members were in reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an
amount not lower than that prescribed by existing labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area and industry; or the same shall not be lower than the prevailing rates
of wages. It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to the owners-members as compensation in rendering services to
respondent cooperatives client, Stanfilco.
Third. It is also stated in the Service Contracts that it is the cooperative which has the power to investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members and its team leaders who were rendering
services at Stanfilco.
Fourth, in the case at bar, it is the cooperative which has the sole control over the manner and means of performing the services under the Service Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and
methods of work. Also, the cooperative is solely and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other representatives at Stanfilco.
It is true that the Service Contracts provide that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. This Court cannot give the said
provision force and effect.
The existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and surrounding circumstances show otherwise. The employment
status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be.
*** DISCUSSION IN RE: SYLLABUS TOPIC STARTS HERE***
This Court is not unmindful of the pronouncement it made in Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja wherein it held that:
A cooperative, is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern, being run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the
business while the others are its employees x x x.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his coowners. Employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves coowners of the cooperative.
However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization,
collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country.
The situation in the aforesaid case is different from the present case. In the instant case, there is no issue regarding an owner-members right to bargain collectively with the cooperative. The question
involved here is whether an employer-employee relationship can exist between the cooperative and an owner-member.
A cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its registration with the Cooperative Development Authority. It has its Board of Directors, which directs and supervises its business. With that, a
cooperative can be likened to a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from its owners-members. Consequently, an owner-member of a cooperative can be an employee of the latter and an
employer-employee relationship can exist between them.
It is not disputed that the respondent cooperative had registered itself with the Cooperative Development Authority. In its by-laws, its Board of Directors directs, controls, and supervises the business
and manages the property of the respondent cooperative. Therefore, it is completely logical that the respondent cooperative, as a juridical person represented by its Board of Directors, can enter into an
employment with its owners-members.
C. Non-Employees 243
Art. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational
institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)

Republic Planters Bank v. Laguesma, 264 SCRA 637 (96)

NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS -on January 21, 1991, Republic Planters Bank General Services Employees Union-National Association of Trade Unions (petitioner) filed a petition for certification election to determine the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular employees outside the bargaining unit of Republic Planters Bank.
-The proposed bargaining unit is composed of clerks, messengers, janitors, plumbers, telex operators, mailing and printing personnel, drivers, mechanics and computer personnel. Allegedly, these
employees are regular employees but are considered as contractual employees by the bank and are excluded from the existing collective bargaining agreement.
-The bank filed moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the contentions that they are employed on contractual basis, that there was already an existing bargaining unit, and that the
petition failed to state the number of employees in the proposed bargaining unit.
- The petition was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter. On Dec 21, 1992, Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma reversed the Order of the Med-arbiter. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Usec
Laguesma modified the December 21, 1992 Resolution, finding 6 employees as regular and included in the existing rank and file unit.
- Both parties moved for reconsideration. Petitioner sought a ruling that the other workers in the proposed bargaining unit should also be considered regular employees. On Feb 24, 1995, Usec
Laguesma issued another Order reinstating the Resolution dated December 21, 1992.
ISSUE WON petitioners have the right to self-organization, and thus be allowed to file a petition for certification election.
HELD NO.
- In the case of Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. Drilon, et al., it was rules that if the union members are not employees, no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as
bargaining agent can be recognized. Since the persons involved are not employees of the company, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining.
Disposition Petition is dismissed
VI. PARTY PROTECTED
Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz, 45 SCRA 577 (72)
facts of the case
Cebu Shipyard was found to have been employing laborers and employees belonging to rival labor unions Mactan Workers Union or MWU (which has 72 of its members working for Cebu Shipyard)
and Associated Labor Union or ALU. On November 1964, ALU entered into a CBA, with one of the provisions being an agreement where the Company agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its
laborers and employees, to be taken from 10% of its net profits derived from its operations in Lapulapu City, to be delivered in two installments payable in March and in June. Also, it must be noted
that there was also a clause in the agreement, stating that if a laborer or employee of the Company does not want to accept the profit-sharing bonus which the said employee or laborer is entitled under
the agreement, it shall be the duty of the ALU to return the money received by it as profit-sharing bonus to the Company within 60 days from the receipt by the ALU from the Company of the said
profit-sharing bonus.'
In compliance to the agreement, the Company delivered the bonuses to the ALU for distribution to the employees and laborers on March 1965. However, on June 1965, the MWU members failed to
receive the second installment of their bonus as it was stated that they did not like to go to the office of the ALU to collect their shares. Therefore, according to the terms of the agreement, the
uncollected shares amounting to PHP 4,035.82 was returned to Cebu Shipyard. Further to this, the ALU advised Cebu Shipyard to not give MWU their uncollected share, otherwise the ALU will take
steps to protect the interests of its members. As such, the Company did not pay MWU but deposited the amount with the Labor Adminstrator.
A case was filed by MWU with the lower court, which decided in favor of MWUs receipt of the PHP 4,035.82, hence the appeal by ALU to the SC.
issue
WON MWU is entitled to the terms and conditions bargained for by ALU. YES.
ratio
The Court, in affirming the lower courts ruling, held that it is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement extend not just to the laborers and employees in the
collective bargaining unit, but also to those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. The labor union that gets the majority vote as the exclusive bargaining representative does
not act for its members alone. It represents all the employees in such a bargaining unit. It is not to be indulged in any attempt on its part to disregard the rights of non-members, which the Court found
was what ALU was doing to the members of MWU. With the rights of the MWU being clear, the enforcement of the same was all that was needed to be done.
The Court then discusses that, while it is understandable for labor unions to campaign for ascendancy in a shop, plant or industry, resulting in bitter feuds, it should not be forgotten that what is
entitled to constitutional protection is labor, or more specifically the working men and women, not labor organizations. Labor organizations, as the Court stated, are merely the instrumentalities
through which the welfare of employees may be promoted and fostered, and therefore are the raisons d'etre of labor unions. Utmost care should be taken to avoid having an intransigent attitude
towards rival labor unions which may result in injustices done to fellow employees.

VII. NON-ABRIDGMENT OF RIGHT 246; 248 (a); 249 (a)

ART. 246. Non-abridgment of right to self-organization. - It shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere with employees and workers in their
exercise of the right to self-organization. Such right shall include the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection, subject to the provisions of Article 264 of this Code. (As amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 70, May 1, 1980).
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code
or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of
another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be
assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized collective bargaining
agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair
labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981).
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to
be performed, including the demand for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorneys fees from employers as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or organizations who have
actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981).