Tan, Idony A.

People of the Philippines vs. Roluna

GR No. 101797, March 24, 1994, Justice Puno
Facts:
On June 26, 1990, eight people were charged with the crime of Kidnapping with
Murder before the RTC of Baybay, Leyte. The accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping one another, with the use of firearms and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, hogtied and kidnapped
Anatalio Moronia. They took Anatalio away to an unknown place where he was
subsequently killed.
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried, and convicted while his other
seven (7) cohorts remained at large.
During trial, Conrado Sombilon testified that while he was on his way to Sitio
Bungabungan, he saw his neighbor Anatalio Moronia taken captive by Roluna together
with seven other persons. All eight of them were armed. Buenaventura Noglada
corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon. From that time they saw Anatalio
Moronia, the victim was never seen or heard of again.
The trial court found Roluna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder.
In the accused-appellants brief, Roluna contends that the trial court erred in the
judgment citing the fact that corpus delicti was not duly proven by the prosecution. He
submits that considering the body of Moronia was never found, the alleged victims
questionable and unexplained absence should not be blamed on him as he may still in
fact be alive and well.
The prosecution, on the other hand, explained that Moronias death and the
culpability of the accused were sufficiently established by evidence and the presumption
provided under Sec. 5(3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. Under the said provision, a
person may be presumed dead for all purposes if he has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. Because
Moronia was last seen in captive by eight armed men, the prosecution argues that
clearly he was in danger of death and the presumption should apply.
Issue:
Whether or not the circumstances surrounding the case and the disputable
presumption of death under the Rules of Court is enough to establish corpus delicti to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

Held:
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. The corpus
delicti is a compound fact made up of two things: 1. The existence of a certain act or
result forming the basis of the criminal charge; and 2. The existence of a criminal
agency as the cause of this act or result.
In so far as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen on
May 27, 1984 with his hands tied and accompanied by eight armed men undoubtedly
shows that his life was then in danger. Coupled with the fact that he has been absent or
unheard of for a total of six years, the presumption of death was sufficiently raised.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough
to hold the accused-appellant responsible for the death of Moronia.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under the
Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the presumptive death of
Moronia. However the rules does not authorize that from the disputable presumption of
deah, it should be further presumed that the person with whom the absentee was last
seen shall be responsible for the subsequent unexplained absence or disappearance of
the latter. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with
murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague facts established by the prosecution.
In lieu of the foregoing, the Supreme Court modified the judgment and the
accused-appellant was found guilty of slight illegal detention, not kidnapping with
murder.

Tan, Idony A.
People of the Philippines vs. Dadles
GR No. 118620-621, September 1, 1997, Justice Francisco
Facts:
The case involves the alleged kidnapping of two farmers, Alipio Tehidor, Salvador
Alipan and their sons, Dionisio and Antonio from their homes.
On May 24, 1989, in Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, Narito Naring Dadles, in
company of five other co-accused whose true names are still unknown and are all still at
large, armed with assorted firearms of unknown calibers, conspiring confederating, and
mutually helping on another by means of force, violence, and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously took, kidnapped, detained and kept Alipio
Tehidor and Dionisio Tehidor under guard and brought them somewhere in the
hinterlands, under restraint and against their will, without proper authority, thereby
depriving said victims of their civil liberties since then up to present.
On the abduction of victims, prosecution witness Francisca and Danilo Tehidor
testified that on May 24, 1989 at around 11 in the evening, the appellant Dadles
together with 5 others arrived at the residence of one of the victims, Alipio Tehidor.
Alipio, his wife, and theur two sons Dionisio and Danilo were awakened from their sleep
when the appellant and his companions called Alipio from downstairs. The group which
was known to the Tehidor family because they used to visit the latters house to ask for
rice was allowed to enter by Francisca. Once inside, they told Francisca that they
wanted to talk to Alipio downstairs. Francisca asked them not to bring Alipio outside and
to just talk to him upstairs but her request went unheeded. Then Morito, assisted by the
appellant, tied the hands of Alipio and Dioniso. When Francisca protested, the
appellants group told her that they would free Alipio and Dioniso if they surrender the
firearms of their two other sons. Unable to surrender the said firearms which were not in
the possession of the spouses Tehidor, the appellants group forced Alipio and Dioniso
to walk with them to an unknown place. Since then and up to the present, Francisca has
not heard from either her husband or son.
On the other hand, prosecution witnesses Luzviminda Alipan and Vicente ALipan
narrated the alleged kidnapping of Salvador and Antonio Alipan. According to their
testimony, on May 24, 1989, at around 11:30pm while the Alipan family were in their
house, they heard somebody calling from outside. Luzviminda lighted a lamp and
opened the door. She saw the appellant and his nine companions who were all armed.
The appellant and Dindo went upstairs and told Salvador who was apparently
acquainted with the group acceded and followed the appellant and Dindo downstairs.
The appellant told Luzviminda that he will borrow her husband and son and that they
will be back the following day. Thereafter, Salvador and Antonio left with the group to an
unknown destination and Luzviminda never saw them again.

Appellant denied the charges against him and interposed an alibi. The defense
attempted to prove that on said date and time of the alleged kidnapping of the victims
the appellant was in the house of defense witness Rogelio Ariola sleeping soundly after
a round of beer with the latter and with other guests.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in holding the accused liable for 2 counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention considering the evidence and facts presented
Held:
According to the Supreme Court, the circumstances surrounding the taking of
Salvador and Antonio, particularly the appellant and his companions previous conduct
in kidnapping victims Alipio and Dionisio, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise
deprive Salvador and Antonio of their liberty. However, since none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 257 of the RPC was proven and only the fact of kidnapping was
established, the Supreme Court found that the crime that was committed was merely
slight illegal detention, and not kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

Tan, Idony A.
People of the Philippines vs. Pastrana
GR No. 143644, August 14, 2002, Justice Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
This is a case convicting accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana y Tefora of the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and imposing upon her the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The antecedent facts reveal that complainant Erma Postejo was then working as
a domestic helper in Canada. She has four children namely, Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola,
and 9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr., her son by a common-law-relationship.
Sometime in January 1997, while in Canada, Erma was introduced by her sister,
Elma Saludarez to spouses Leopoldo and Rebecca Frias who informed her that their
daughter, accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana of Tondo, Manila, can help process
Willys travel documents to Canada. Erma agreed to hand the processing of her sons
papers to accused-appellant and consequently sent her, on various occasions,
Canadian dollars equivalent to a total of P18,300.00.
During a telephone conversation with Erma, the accused informed the former
that her son was suffering a disease and was in need of medical attention. Erma
provided the necessary funds for the treatment but the accused admittedly used the
same to pay her own personal obligations. A few days thereafter, the accused asked
Erma for more money her son was finally brought to the hospital as well as an additional
P60,000 for the procurement of a water purifier. The accused also asked for more
money to help her facilitate her papers to work in Singapore. Erma protested and never
delivered the funds requested and instead asked the accused to bring her son back to
their residence in Caloocan. The accused never did.
A few days thereafter, the accused went to Caloocan and reported that Willy,
Ermas son, was missing and he was last seen playing in her apartment in the morning
the previous day. According to the accused, she tried her best to search for Willy with
the help of authorities and even informed Ermas relatives that Willy was missing.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be held criminally liable for kidnapping and
failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revise Penal Code even if the
disappearance of Willy was beyond her control

Held:
Yes. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the
custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said
minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping
of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the
latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply
something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly
daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, there is no question that accused-appellant was entrusted with
the custody of 9-year old Willy. Erma and her children trusted accused-appellant that
they sent her money for the processing of Willys travel documents, and more
importantly, they allowed Willy to stay in her apartment. Regardless of whether Willy
stayed in accused-appellants apartment permanently or temporarily, the first element of
the offense charged is satisfied because during said period Willy was entrusted to
accused-appellant who undertook the responsibility of seeing to it that he was welltaken care of.
As to the second element, accused-appellant contends that her failure to return
Willy was never deliberate inasmuch as her inability to return him to his mother and/or
guardian was due to his disappearance which was definitely beyond her control.
The contention is without merit. It was actually her failure to heed Ermas order
on March 19, 1997 to return Willy to their residence in Sampaguita St., Malaria, Tala,
Caloocan City, that consummated the offense. Clearly, the felony under Article 270 was
consummated and the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.