Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Introduction
Forensic linguistics for its application in real life and for its involvement in the field
that is capable of influencing the course of ones life has become a very interesting and
pragmatic discipline to study, however, one that is still not very widespread in the Czech
academic setting.
The consideration of how language can shape our society and how it affects the
interpretation of interpersonal behaviour has become topical in the quite recently evolved
disciplines, viz. pragmatics and sociolinguistics, which in their discussion of language are
inherently interdisciplinary, looking for links to the external world and to the internal world of
the individual.
In this thesis I want to endorse these views and thus add to the corpus of literature
focussed on forensic linguistics as studies of legal language are not easily accessible in the
Czech academic setting. I also want to explore this field, which is rather distant to the
majority of people while still significantly affecting their lives, and thus help understand the
operation of the judiciary.
1.2 Abstract
The M.A. major thesis deals with types of questioning used during the
cross-examination in the Shipman trial. From the point of view of pragmatics it studies the
persuasion devices inherent in each category. Among the features that affect the persuasive
illocutionary force are elicitative force and conduciveness. The differences in force with
regard to general context of conversation and the specific institutional context of the
courtroom are studied. Tag questions are discussed extensively as they are the most frequent
category and they demonstrate the greatest variety of meanings. Other forms of questions,
such as wh-questions, yes-no questions, declarative questions, questions with lexical tags and
alternative questions are discussed.
1.3 Abstrakt
Diplomov prce se zabv typy kladen otzek uvanch bhem kovho vslechu
v kauze dr. Shipman. Z pragmatickho hlediska zkoum pesvdovac prostedky, kter jsou
vlastn kad kategorii. Dleitmi pesvdovacmi aspekty jsou elicitativn sla a
konducivnost. Prce zkoum rozdl v interpretaci tchto prostedk pi uit v bn
konverzaci a specifick situaci soudnho len. Nejvznamnj kategori jsou otzky
pvsn (tag questions), kter jsou nejastj a vykazuj nejvt variantnost vznam. Prce
se dle zabv dalmi typy otzek jako jsou otzky typu wh-questions, otzky typu yes-no
questions, deklarativn otzky, otzky s lexiklnmi markery a alternativn otzky.
Klov slova: kov vslech, navozovac otzky, pvsn otzky, typy otzek, prokurtor,
konducivnost, elicitan sla, soudn diskurz.
1.6 Material
The material for analysis is provided in the official trial transcript made available on
the internet (The Shipman Inquiry). The duty of making verbatim transcriptions of legal
proceedings is defined by law; the profession of court reporters has been established for this
reason. The transcripts are used in the appellate court proceedings, where only the counsels
are present and the case is discussed on the basis of the transcript only. Consequently the
accuracy of these transcripts becomes an important issue, however, one that is impossible to
reach.
Walker (1990) in her paper maintains that court reporting is actually another act of
interpretation, which poses problems for the validity of inferences drawn from such data for
the sake of science research. The problems that occur are inherent already in the process of
reducing spoken language into writing. Another, more important aspect is a problem of bias,
which is an inherent, individual, and often unconscious force which is difficult to combat
and redress. [T]ranscription does not exist in a vacuum: the institution in which it occurs has
goals, needs, desires, and biases of its own (1990.239-240). Thus subconscious corrections
of ungrammaticality or smoothing of dialects can occur.
These are definitely valuable insights into the problematic of the fallacy of verbatim
recording and one needs to consider them in the perception of the methodology of this thesis.
However, videotape recordings (which are not without certain problems too) are not
accessible in the Czech academic setting; therefore I have to rely on this kind of data. Also the
5
subject of my research does not concern the specific features of spoken discourse to a large
extent (such as hesitation markers, non-verbal phenomena, etc.), but discusses grammatical
structures that are not significantly liable to distortion: from these structures, pragmatic
inferences are made. Also, though the study of intonation would be helpful, it does not in any
way distort my findings; it would only make them more accurate within the discussed
categories (see p.28).
(Maley 1994.12). Thus a language within a language evolves, one that is almost impossible to
be understood by laymen.
Legal writers, pushed into oddity by their attempts to be unambiguous, are pulled as it
were in the same direction by the knowledge that since their productions are for the
benefit of someone as familiar with the jargon as themselves, they have no need to
bother too much about the simpler needs of a general public. (Crystal 1969.194)
(Maley 1994.13). That is, the language of legal documents as examined by Crystal and Davy
has some common features with the courtroom discourse I want to explore in this thesis.
Nevertheless, one could argue that there are more differences than there are similarities. One
of the key features here is definitely the fact that the language of the courtroom is largely
spoken and interactive, exploiting some ritualised parts of legal discourse but on the whole
largely resembling everyday usage the structures that it exploits are taken from the
common language, but as will be shown they are used in different frequencies and for
different purposes. On the other hand, the language of legal documents significantly differs
from common language in both lexis and grammar.
Maley (drawing on Halliday) approaches legal language from semiotic and functional
points of view to describe its constituent discourses. The signs of a semiotic system in their
characteristic configurations communicate meanings.
Table 2.1 below is a summary of Maleys findings, in which he models the different
discourse types on the basis of different situation types that may arise sequentially in the legal
process. The groups that are formed are labelled as
1) sources of law
2) pre-trial processes
3) trial processes
4) recording and law-making.
The sequence is exemplified on a social conflict between two parties that must first be
recognised as coming under the heading of rule of law (sources of law may be interpreted that
doing of one participant was unlawful). If the parties decide to sue each other, they step in the
realm of pre-trial processes - consulting lawyers, lawyers consulting each other, police
investigation, etc. In the next step the parties appear in court and fight their cases. This step is
the one that my thesis subsumes and investigates from the point of view of persuasion
devices. Each trial has to end with some decision, which in turn can influence the first step,
i.e. the sources of law (under common law the rulings of judges may become precedents,
i.e. explanations or reformulations of the sources of law). (Maley 1994.15)
10
2.3.1 The Legal Situation and Its Consequences for Linguistic Research
As the courtroom situation is an institutional one, the notion of power comes to play
a significant part.
Cf. http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rules.htm. These are applied in the United States. In other countries,
similar rules are devised.
11
The essential difference between the two systems there are many incidental ones is
apparent from their names: the one is a trial of strength and the other is an inquiry. The
question of the first is: are the shoulders of the party on whom is laid the burden of
proof, the plaintiff or the prosecution as the case may be, strong enough to carry it and
discharge it? In the second the question is: what is the truth of the matter. In the first
the judge and jury are arbiters: they do not pose questions and seek answers; they
weigh such material as is put before them, but they have no responsibility for seeing
that it is complete. In the second the judge is in charge of the inquiry from the start; he
will of course permit the parties to make out their cases and may rely on them to do
so, but it is for him to say what he wants to know. (Maley 1994.33)
All the labels are based on the simple fact that there are two opposing parties which
present their version of the facts, of what, when and how happened, to the jury (which
comprises laymen) who then produce a verdict based on which version was the most
trustworthy, i.e. which was presented in the most persuasive manner. The way these facts are
presented is through the question-answer sequence, that is more generally through language.
I have shown earlier that the language of legal documents strives for unambiguity and
clarity of meaning. How then can two competing versions of facts emerge in legal language?
The decisive factor is that we are now talking about a spoken discourse within the courtroom
and, moreover, one that is directed towards a lay-, i.e. non-professional jury. In this context
one cannot separate what happened from the language that is used to describe or explain
what happened. When the meaning of an act is ambiguous, the words we choose to talk about
it become critical (Danet 1980.189).
What is there then to the battle, war, theatre? It is the battle of words, of grammatical
structures, of pragmatic phenomena, all directed towards one ultimate goal and that is the
jurys acceptance of your version of the facts. In Goldbergs (1982) words a trial is the
presentation of an idea (why your client should win), to an audience (the jury), through the
medium of performers (1982.4). The important observation here is the fact that the actual
presentation is much more important than the truth. Only a lawyer believing that real
events have more to do with a jury verdict than the theater of the trial will cross examine
a lying witness with the question: Tell the jury how you can explain that, Mr. Benton?
(Goldberg 1982.5-6). The keyword thus becomes persuasion, especially considering the fact
that your play stands against the play of your opponent how can you talk the jury into the
fact that yours is the true one?
Legal realism rejects the view dominant in analytical or positivist jurisprudence, that
logic and rules are the essence of the law (...). Facts are seen not as objectively
determinable entities, but as constructions, created by persons engaged in interaction
and negotiation. In Courts on Trial, Frank contrasted the truth theory of courts with
12
what he called the fight theory. (...) [T]he adversary system encourages the use of
trial tactics to prevent the judge or jury from correctly evaluating the trustworthiness
of witnesses and to shut out the evidence damaging to a case: The lawyer aims at
victory ... not at aiding the court to discover the facts. If facts are constructions
produced by participants in the legal process, and trials are wars of words, the need
to understand better the role of words as the tools for the construction of facts and
interpretation of action becomes clear. (Danet 1980.190)
To sum up, I have shown that the courtroom situation is essentially oral and oral
language becomes the medium through which reality is constructed and negotiated.
Although the question-answer sequence that is fundamental to this situation proceeds between
two interactants (counsel-witness), it is directed primarily to the jury as the receiver and the
decoder of the message. The interest for the linguist thus lies in focussing the attention on the
discoursal strategies of all participants, but particularly those of counsel and witness; the ways
in which both counsel and witness exploit the discoursal resources available, given the
discoursal constraints laid upon them, and the inequalities of power that these represent
(Maley 1994.35).
opening
statements,
direct
examination,
cross-examination,
possible
re-examination and closing arguments. In my thesis I have analysed data taken from
a cross-examination transcript, therefore this particular stage will be of major consideration.
I will, however, devote some space to comment on some general features of examination as
such and on direct examination as opposed to cross-examination. Although the opening and
closing speeches offer abounding examples of persuasive methods employed by lawyers, they
are simply beyond the spatial limits of my thesis.
Courtroom discourse is referred to by Maley (1994) as spoken and interactive.
Interactivity is definitely more topical in the question-answer sequence of the examinations,
as the opening and closing speeches are delivered to the jury as to the silent participant, i.e.
one that is not contributing and is not allowed to contribute to the communication by any
verbal means. The examination stages are usually perceived to be the core of the trial
process, an arena of opposition and drama (Maley 1994.36). In their description I will draw
on the lawyers manuals as they clearly define the goals of each stage and to some extent also
13
show how to achieve them. The handling of language is nevertheless treated only marginally
and it seems that it is effected by lawyers rather intuitively, or it springs from experience. In
the practical part of my thesis some of the features of persuasion that are actively exploited in
the question-answer sequence by an experienced prosecutor will be dealt with.
In the examination of witnesses stages most of the information vital for determining
the trial outcome will be presented. The information that is determining is the information that
the jury accepts. It is the role of the lawyer, one that wholly relies on his/her skill, to ensure
that the vital information gets through he/she has to first make sure that the jurors are aware
of the piece of information that is presented. Second, it has to be presented in a persuasive
manner so as to ensure that the jurors believe it. Examination in its two forms is directed first
at building the pile of evidence supporting the lawyers position which the jury will accept
usually a direct examination (or re-examination). Secondly, it is aimed at tearing down the
evidence presented by his/her opponent which the jury are willing to accept usually
a cross-examination. (Goldberg 1982.210-211)
The real reason for the rule that you should not lead on direct, but should lead on cross
is not an evidence rule, it is a rule of persuasion. The rule of persuasion is based upon
the understanding that how a witness says things is at least as important as what the
witness says when you are trying to build up the pile of evidence acceptable to the
jurors, and that what the witness acknowledges, not how it is acknowledged is
more important when you are tearing down the pile your opponent has built.
(Goldberg 1982.213)
Jurisprudence maintains that the jury will not accept information presented by the
lawyer but will take into account information supplied by the witness. However, studies by
Luchjenbroers (1997) or Hobbs (2002) have shown that witnesses are the lawyers puppets
even during the direct examination the questions asked are not leading, nevertheless they
exercise high control and do not in fact allow the witness to relate his/her story. This is true
even of friendly witnesses, who being laymen, usually for the first time before the court, are
14
dangerous for their barristers in the way that by talking too much they could supply
information that could be harmful to their case.
However, it is clear that as leading questions are allowed to be used at
cross-examination, they will be used abundantly and it will be proved in my analysis.
2.3.1.5 Cross-Examination
Let us now look more closely on the processes of cross-examination and how it should
be conducted. Cross-examination follows direct examination and the structure points at the
objectives of this stage: in cross-examining a witness the prosecutor scrutinizes the weak
points of his/her testimony (presented during direct examination) and tries to expose its
inaccuracies or improbabilities to persuade the jury not to take the witness testimony into
account. A cross-examination is very rarely a scene of a destructing logic turning the lying
witness completely to admit that he/she has made it all up as depicted in films and TV series.
It is the ultimate confrontational theater in which the prosecutor tries to show
a demonstration of bias, the admission of omissions, and the failure of detail on the part of
the witness testimony (Goldberg 1982.271-272). It is a play in which the prosecutor tries to
make the witness look untrustworthy and thus destroy his/her highly persuasive account of
events.
The objectives of a cross-examination as defined by Morrill (1973) will be one of the
following:
a) to establish that the witness is lying on one or more material points
b) to show that the witness is prejudiced
c) to show that his/her testimony is improbable
d) to force the witness to admit certain facts
e) to supplement testimony that the witness has already given
f) to weaken the testimony of the witness by showing it as questionable because of
his/her inability to observe, to hear a conversation, or to see because of poor
lighting conditions, or by showing other facts to reduce the value of his/her
opinion
g) to show incompetence of a witness (on expert matters)
h) to impeach a witness by showing that he/she has given a contrary statement at
another time
i) to cast doubt on the witness credibility (e.g. an ex-convict)
15
If the safest way to insure against losing a cross examination is to keep the witness
from saying anything at all, the next safest technique is to ask questions that allow the
witness to answer in one word. Not only is it the safest way to cross examine, it is also
the most effective. The less the witness talks, the more the lawyer controls. (Goldberg
1982.275)
The very reason that cross-examination is such an effective tool in the hands of a
lawyer is that he can choose the area of inquiry the ground rules are all in his favor.
If a series of questions can each be answered by a simple Yes or No, a witness can
be required to make such answers. (Morrill 1973.61)
In other words, to ensure that your version of facts is produced and presented for the
sake of persuasion of the jury, let the witness answer only yes or no to each question. I
would add and draw the jurys attention to the desired answer; this will be dealt with under
the heading of conduciveness (see p.26). As Morrill (1973) maintains one should never ask
why? at cross-examination. From the pre-trial proceedings the lawyers have all the relevant
information about their case. Thus the next rule to cross-examining questions is that
a question to which the lawyer does not know the answer should never be asked (Morrill
1973.59).
There are many more hard and fast rules about the lawyers conduct in the battle of
persuasion called the cross-examination. Let me just list some of them as they are not central
to understanding of the thesis the examiner must be fair to witness as the witness is someone
the lay-jury will identify with and thus any dishonesty on the part of the lawyer will reflect on
the acceptance of his/her case; similarly do not let the trapped witness be trapped too long so
as not to produce feelings of compassion in the jury; examine step by step and highlight
important information; etc. (Morrill 1973.57-60).
Let me now go back to the types of questions that should be employed while
cross-examining. The question that gets the yes or no response is a declaration, but in a
16
form that requires the witness to agree or disagree. (...) Although the lawyer is not privileged
to speak unless he is asking a question of the witness, the question is in form only (Goldberg
1982.276). Producing only polar answers seems to be rather unfair to the witness as nothing is
black and white. However, this is the purpose of the cross-examination and any explanations
can be provided on re-direct examination. Any other answer would allow the witness to tell
his/her story again and in a persuasive fashion; thus it would be unfair to the counsel as
his/her stage of persuasion would be infiltrated by the opponents witness relating to the jury
and maybe gaining their acceptance.
Goldberg (1982) states some more rules as to the nature of the declarations used in
the cross-examination. The declarations should be short and contain only one idea for them
not to be subject to misinterpretation. This is not directed primarily to the jury but to
preventing any evasive responses on the part of the witness: a long question is likely to be
requested for repetition and if the request is a fair one, you have lost a little not in
substance, but in theater (Goldberg 1982.281). Every topic has to be broken down to its
component parts, each of which contains just one idea. In the question-answer sequence this
may seem rather tedious, it is nonetheless the only way how to prevent misinterpretation and
more than one word answers.
17
a scrutiny of its weak points: the prosecutor strives to make the witness look untrustworthy so
that the jury does not take his/her testimony into account.
For the successful persuasion of the jury about the untrustworthiness of the witness,
leading questions are exploited. The prosecutor thus significantly controls the elaboration of
the witness answers (and consequently his/her chances for building credibility) and at the
same time uses these questions to construct his/her version of facts. The prosecutor will hence
use a lot of declarations to build the pile of evidence that supports his/her case and will
usually allow the witness to answer in one word only (or rather will be able to request the one
word answer).
18
It is clear that this definition is not exhaustive as for example a sentence: You like it,
dont you? is a question (though as we will see on the lower level of the scale of
questionness), which can be uttered with falling intonation (and very frequently is).3
Though Bolinger (1957) claims that a question cannot be defined by the utilization of
just one element, he adds that sometimes this ability is ascribed to question intonation.
However, elaborating on this subject he finds four criteria, any of which may serve to define
a given question and no question will lack all of them. They are:
1) interrogative distribution
2) interrogative syntax
3) interrogative intonation
4) interrogative gesture (Bolinger 1957.2-3).
The first criterion employs the fact that questions usually elicit answers and thus an
answer usually indicates that a question has preceded (Bolinger 1957.3). Those linguists that
take this criterion as the one element capable of exhaustive definition, however, usually go
round in circles looking for the definition of an answer. Moreover, not every question elicits
an answer, viz. rhetorical questions and similar.
It is surprising how much importance linguists devote to question intonation. The study by Stenstrm (1984)
shows that a large number (28%) of questions in face to face conversation are those that ask for confirmation
(this will be elaborated on later) and out of these as many as 72% have a falling tone (Stenstrm 1984.177-178).
19
Under the label of interrogative syntax Bolinger (1957) includes inversions, wh-words
plus inversions, interrogative tags etc. As regards syntax, there is the problem of a
considerable degree of syntactic and functional overlap; negative interrogatives and
imperatives can be realized by identical surface form, such as in Dont you drink any brandy,
which can either function as a command or as a Q (syntactic overlap), (...) whereas Will you
pass me the book bears a close functional similarity to imperatives (functional overlap)
(Stenstrm 1984.31-32).
Interrogative gestures are raised eyebrows, eyes focused on the interlocutor, hand
gestures etc.
Bolinger (1957) concludes that if we want to have some ultimate foundation for the
definition of question, it would have to be an attitude, some kind of behaviour. A question
appears to be a behavior pattern, and is as real but as hard to pin down as other behavior
patterns: aggressiveness, deference, anxiety, or embarrassment (1957.5). Considering all the
difficulties accompanying the attempts at formal definition of questions, many linguists (e.g.
Anthony, Lyons, Brazil, Coulthard) quoted in Stenstrm (1984) emphasize the irrelevance of
linguistic form in favour of the importance of the linguistic function in discourse, which, of
course, influences the form (Stenstrm 1984.32).
Although it is difficult to define questions from the linguistic point of view, the very
nature of courtroom discourse enables us to overcome this difficulty. The court dialogue is
essentially a linguists passion as it is wholly organized in institutionally enforced adjacency
pairs, one part of which is labelled a question and the other an answer or response. As
Stenstrm (1984) maintains, the characteristics which set examination apart from
conversation are:
1) the turn order is fixed
2) the type of the turn is fixed.
[T]alk is organized into series of Q/R [question/response] pairs and the minimal
demand on each speakers turn is that it should be designed either as Q or as R. The
distribution of speaker turns is predetermined insofar as the right to ask Qs is restricted
to the party who conducts the examination, whereas the examined partys utterance
always occurs post-question and is heard as an answer. Speaker-change is
consequently unidirectional and occurs in a fixed ABAB order, i.e. is restricted to two
parties. The pre-allocation of turns is built into the system and not locally managed.
In conversation, by contrast, features of turn order, turn size and what is done in a turn
are locally managed, i.e. occur in no pre-determined order. (Stenstrm 1984.257)
20
The first type lets the witness take floor and allows him/her a relatively unhindered
relation of facts. It thus permits the jury to evaluate the speaker and it permits the speaker to
fully employ his/her skills of persuasion.
Example 1:
Q. Would you now explain why on that Lloyd George card you have recorded the time of
death as 14.45?
21
The second category includes questions that define the subject of response and thus
give more control over the subject of the witness speech, at the same time they are open
enough to give the witness opportunity to relate to the jury and build credibility.
Example 2:
Q. What is there in 1991, page 847, that permits you to write on this Lloyd George summary
card "Ischaemic heart disease?"
More control is exercised in the specific response questions. The length of the answer
is regulated in order to regulate the display of the witness charisma (or lack of charisma for
that matter).
Example 3:
Q. What time did you admit the next patient to your room?
The last type, referred to in legal terminology as a leading question is a very
significant type, the occurrence of which is even regulated by rules concerning examination.
A question which suggests a response provides maximum control over witness response,
namely its length (usually can be answered by yes or no only), and as the heading suggests it
very importantly offers the right answer. The witness chances of a persuasive appeal to the
jury vanish as soon as this question is uttered.
Example 4:
Q. You had abandoned her as dead at 16.10, hadn't you?
alternatives (e.g. ok, alright, indeed, no way, etc.). Yes-no questions include tag questions and
declarative questions, both of which have a positive or negative orientation, or in other words
are conducive (Quirk et al. 1972.387-392). This will be dealt with in greater detail later on
(see p.26).
Bolinger (1957) does not subdivide yes-no questions in this way; instead he divides
them according to whether:
1) they contain inversions (Do you like it?, the auxiliary precedes subject) - these are
called auxiliary questions
2) they contain increments, i.e. question markers that make what looks like
a statement into a question
3) they manipulate towards affirmative or negative response these are called
conducive questions.
Wh-questions are formed with the aid of one of the following interrogative words who,
what, which, when, where, how, why. They call forth an elaboration of a questioned point.
Alternative questions are of lesser importance; they expect an answer, which is one of
the alternatives (usually two but can be more) presented in the question. Any positive yes-no
question can be converted into an alternative question by adding or not? or a matching
negative clause:
yes-no: Are you coming?
alternative: Are you coming or not?
Are you coming or arent you (coming)? (Quirk et al. 1972.399).
Bolinger (1957) adds to the low importance of this category by maintaining that
alternative questions could be subsumed under the heading of yes-no questions. He considers
or to be a coordinating conjunction of two yes-no questions. Will you have oranges? No.
Grapefruit? No. Tangerines then. (Bolinger 1957.114).
Quirk et al. (1972) also mention some minor types of questions, such as rhetorical
questions and exclamatory questions. I would claim that their role is rather connected with
their function in discourse, since on the level of syntax they resemble one of the above stated
categories and only through context can one draw further conclusions.
In my analysis I will employ the basic categorization as devised by Quirk et al.
(1972). Within the category of yes-no questions I will recognize the subcategories of tag
questions, questions with lexical tags (drawing on Bolingers question markers), declarative
questions and yes-no questions proper.
23
only predicts the occurrence of an answer (by means of its elicitative force) but also lays
constraints on the appropriateness or relatedness of this answer (cf. Grices Maxim of
Relation (Leech 1984)). Hence, it follows that some continuations become more socially
acceptable than others; it is definitely much more acceptable to give an answer rather than to
refuse to give it.
Franck (...) suggests that there exists a hierarchy of preference for continuation
options, consisting of three levels: 1) acceptance or positive confirmation, 2) refusal or
doubt, and 3) indeterminate, postponing reactions like check-ups. (...)
Sinclair and Coulthard suggest the following options for utterances ending in an open
elicitation: 1) a minimal, totally fitting response, 2) something which satisfies the
notional presuppositions of the elicitation but is structurally independent, 3) something
which implies an adequate answer but principally sets up further presuppositions, and
4) something which challenges the terms of the question. (Stenstrm 1984.35)
Typically, preferred responses are produced immediately and without qualification.
(...) Dispreferred responses may be 1) delayed by silence or other conduct, 2) prefaced
by appreciations or other items, 3) mitigated or qualified, and 4) explained or
accounted for. (Raymond 2003.943)
It will be seen that lawyers formulate their examination questions in such a way that
they elicit a minimal response moreover, an acceptance or negation (cf. conduciveness
below). Thus they exercise great amount of control over the response possibilities of the
witness, who, if dissatisfied with the terms of the question (e.g. considering them harmful for
him/her), chooses a different kind of response from the one expected or socially accepted and
thus loses some of his/her credibility (be it on the subconscious or conscious level). As has
been discussed above, he/she can moreover be forced to provide just the minimal response
that is called forth by the question and the jury may be instructed not to take the part that
does not satisfy the notional presuppositions of the question into consideration.
Let me conclude this part by listing three types of questions commented on by
Stenstrm (1984) according to their elicitative force. She distinguishes:
a) requests for information
b) requests for confirmation
c) requests for acknowledgement.
The first two are taken over and modified from Labov and Fanshel (1977), the last one
is devised by herself. The rule for requests for information states:
If A addresses to B an interrogative focussing on I, and B does not believe that A
believes that
a) A has I
b) B does not have I
then A is heard as making a valid request for information.
25
For my thesis requests for confirmation acquire a central role. The boundary between
requests for confirmations and requests for acknowledgement is rather vague, usually
disambiguated by intonation only or by occurrence of accentuating pragmatic markers. This is
beyond the scope of my thesis, I will therefore make use of requests for confirmation, adding
some comments if the function tends towards acknowledgement.
3.3.2 Conduciveness
As a characteristic aspect of yes-no questions (with the exception of declarative ones),
Quirk et al. (1972) recognise the use of non-assertive forms any, ever, etc. As opposed to
statements, questions have neutral polarity, meaning that they are open to positive or negative
answers. Hence questions like negatives belong to the class of non-assertions (Quirk et al.
1972.389). Nevertheless, various linguistic devices enable us to formulate these questions in
such a way that they are biased towards a positive or negative answer. This phenomenon is
described by Quirk et al. (1972) as positive versus negative orientation. Leech (1983) uses the
term loaded questions, Pope (1976) the term biased. Bolinger (1957) and Stenstrm (1984)
use the one that I am going to employ, i.e. conduciveness.
A conducive or leading (NB. the term leading, cf. with the legal terminology) question
is one that shows that a given answer is expected or desired (Bolinger 1957.96), one where
A is taken to show preference for one R [response] rather than another, as opposed to a
straight question where no preference is manifested (Stenstrm 1984.47). Paraphrasing
Hudson (1975) Stenstrm (1984) presents one important characteristic of conduciveness, i.e.
that the conducive aspect is read into [the question] by B, who hears a sentence of a certain
form and interprets what he hears on the basis of what he knows about A (1984.48).
It is important to realize that in the case of cross-examination the speaker has more
hearers - the witness and the members of the jury (also the judge). If a conducive question is
interpreted by the jury as calling for a specific answer, viz. agreement or disagreement, and
the answer provided by the witness does not conform to this expectation, a tension is created
and the credibility of either the speaker or the addressee is thus questioned. Along the same
26
lines, as the form of a question can employ a variety of conducive devices and can have a high
degree of elicitative force, as opposed to the addressees minimal response options, it
becomes clear against which side the scales of justice are likely to be tipped. This will be
shown later in the analysis of questions used in the Shipman trial.
which they are uttered cancel all other possible answers rhetorical questions and
suggestions-for-action. The former are more like forceful statements, What would I give to
see them again!, Who would applaud to such a mediocre performance?, which conduce but
do not compel an answer. The latter are usually those started by the expression why (...) not
Why not try a little harder?. The answer is self-evident, however, some expression of
affirmation is usually present. To the group of conducing wh-questions Bolinger also adds
some that are marked lexically. The lexis usually indicates undesirability Why bother?, Why
worry about such a trifle?, Where would I drive that old wreck?.
As one of the conducive devices Quirk et al. (1972) characterise an insertion of
assertive forms into questions. These expressions indicate that the speaker expresses belief in
his assumption and merely asks for confirmation. They are often used in offers. Would you
like some cake? Did someone call last night? Has the boat left already?. Two forms of
questions are discussed as inherently expecting positive or negative answers tag questions
and declarative questions. They will be discussed in detail (see pp.40-47). Let me now just
state that the former are conducive as they consist of a statement, where the assumption is
expressed, and a tag part, where the interlocutors confirmation is invited. The latter are
conducive along the same lines, however they are even more so as the tag element is missing
and what is an assertion is turned into a question only by intonation. The declarative question
is a type of question which is identical in form to a statement, except for the final rising
question intonation. (...) The speaker takes the answer yes (or no) as a foregone conclusion
(Quirk et al. 1972.392-393). Let me just note that in their terminology declarative questions
are somehow mixed up with questions with different tags like I suppose, I think (cf. Bolinger
(1957)).
A high value is usually ascribed to intonation. As my data does not contain intonation
markers I present here a justification that conduciveness can be studied without a detailed
investigation of intonation.
Assuming that falling tone correlates with assertiveness and finality and that rising
tone correlates with lack of assertiveness and non-finality (cf. Pope, 1976:79), these
relations do not affect the order already established for the syntactic forms involved; it
may be concluded that a Q of a certain syntactic form with rising tone reflects As
assumption to a lesser degree and is also less conducive than the same Q with falling
tone. Despite the effect of intonation, the interrogative form is still the least conducive
and the declarative form the most conducive. (Stenstrm 1984.50)
28
It is also notable that these presuppositions about intonation in tag questions and
questions overall are not completely fulfilled in reality, with the falling tone representing a
large amount of questions (cf. Stenstrm (1984)). Let me conclude this chapter with a simple
table taken over from Stenstrm (1984.49), which will be later elaborated on.
29
80
23,74%
Alternative questions
12
3,56%
Declarative questions
57
16,91%
Tag questions
117
34,72%
19
5,64%
Wh-questions
52
15,43%
Sum
337
100%
As can be seen, the most represented categories are tag questions, followed by yes-no
questions. However, as discussed above (see p.25), when we talk about the response they may
elicit, the categories of alternative questions, declarative questions, tag questions and
questions with lexical tag are, technically speaking, subcategories of the category of yes-no
questions. Let me therefore propose another table where this categorization is applied, with
the former category of Y/N questions now being renamed as Y/N questions proper.
Wh-questions
Alt Qs
Decl Qs
Tag Qs
Qs with LT
Y/N Qs proper
12
4,21%
57
20,00%
117
41,05%
19
6,67%
80
28,07%
52
15,43%
285
84,57%
Now the disparity between the frequencies of yes-no questions and wh-questions
becomes much more visible and proves what I have stated above (see p.17). The lawyer, in
order to achieve maximum control of the interrogation (along with maximal persuasive
advantage), needs to exploit questions that can be answered with a simple yes or no as often
as possible. This is also a finding of Luchjenbroers (1997), Raymond (2003), Danet (1980)
and many others.
30
Let me now focus on the diversification within the category of yes-no questions. I will
pay attention to how the subcategories differ in terms of their elicitative force and
conduciveness and how each of them adds to the persuasive discourse tactic of the lawyer.
opposing conversational rules pertaining to the RC and the tag. Simply speaking, telling and
asking the same thing is confusing to the interlocutor, who can only arrive at the one logical
conclusion that the speaker wants him to agree (Nsslin 1984.26). It is this fact that enables
him to claim that tag questions are always conducive at the semantic level. He summarizes his
findings into two sincerity conditions (SC), which, when appearing together, bring about the
conduciveness (be it positive or negative) of the tag question.
The sincerity condition for declarative or the corresponding semantic category, e.g.
statement seems to be this:
[SC1] The speaker believes that the proposition is true. (1975:24 (59)).
The SC of the question in the tag is always:
[SC2] The speaker believes that the hearer knows at least as well as he himself does
whether the proposition is true or false. (1975:12 (20)). (Nsslin 1984.27)
32
conclusion that the speaker is asking them to confirm his/her proposition about the truth value
of which he/she is sincerely convinced.
What I have discussed concerns only reversed polarity tag questions. Nsslin (1984)
proposes another sincerity condition for constant polarity tag questions, which removes from
the speaker any personal opinions as to the truth value of the proposition in the RC.
[SC3] The speaker does not express any personal opinion as to the truth of the
proposition, he merely reports what other people say. The speaker has only reasons to
believe that the hearer or other people believe the proposition is true. (Nsslin
1984.29)
According to Quirk et al. (1976), constant polarity tag questions indicate the
speakers arrival at a conclusion by inference, or by recalling what has already been said
(1976.392). The conduciveness of this type is of a different nature. The speaker in expressing
no opinion as to the truth value of the proposition and at the same time asking about it does
not provide any contradiction. The clue to conduciveness can be figured out only through
context. The interlocutor has already made the speaker believe that he thinks [a proposition
is true] (...) and, therefore, when asked, he will be expected to agree. If the interlocutor has
not expressed his opinion earlier but other people have said that they think [a proposition is
true] (...), the speaker wants to know if the hearer subscribes to this view too. Now the
sentence is not conducive, not even in the wider sense of conducive when used about cp
APTSs [constant polarity tag questions], i.e. when the speaker expects agreement as a
repetition of a view the interlocutor has already professed (Nsslin 1984.29).
I rather disagree with Nsslin on this point, since I believe that in the legal setting of
the cross-examination the constant polarity tag question is even more conducive than the
reversed polarity tag question. The prosecutor in presenting the witness with a question the
truth value of which has been established in the course of the preceding examination (i.e.
through the preceding context), is usually presenting it in a new context which may now
prove harmful to the witness and thus he/she needs to disagree. This becomes, however, very
difficult by means of the conducive constant polarity tag question which lays the
responsibility on the witness, who once accepted the truth value of the proposition and now
disagrees with him/herself. The jury will of course be aware of this and thus the witness by
rejecting the proposition of the question is corrupting his/her previous testimony which is
exactly the aim of the cross-examining prosecutor. Examples of this procedure will be
provided in the analysis that follows.
33
Nsslin (1984) continues examining the constant polarity tag question in terms of
elicitative force.
The comments on the difference between cp APTSs and rp APTSs are vague in
linguistic literature. A common statement is that cp APTSs are closer to direct
questions than rp APTSs. (...) A speaker who is neutral to the truth value of
proposition is experienced by the hearer to be more in need of an answer than a
speaker who has already said that he believes or even knows that his proposition is
true. (Nsslin 1984.31)
In this case I would once again be inclined to disagree. If the truth value of the
proposition has already been established in the preceding context, the speakers constant
polarity tag question does not really expect an answer (different from a nod or some gesture
encouraging the speaker to continue), the tag is here in my view a polite consideration of the
hearers presence and of the possibility of a different opinion (this possibility is, however,
very limited).
34
than this: to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which enable us
to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place. (Leech
1983.82)
When applying these to the analysis of tag questions we immediately find out why
Quirk et al. (1976) described tag questions and declarative questions as inherently conducive.
The RC of the tag question is in the form of declarative (semantically a statement) and
according to the Maxim of Quality, this statement expresses speakers view that what he/she
says is true (cf. SC1 above). However, such an assertion is rather infrequent in normal
conversation as it contradicts the PP, i.e. telling your interlocutor that what you say is truth
and nothing but the truth would definitely be considered by him/her impolite. Therefore the
grammatical tag is attached to the RC, which has a mitigating effect: it provides the hearer
with the possibility to disagree (as will be seen, in the declarative question this function is
supplied by intonation). The PP which reflects itself in the tag can thus be compared to SC2.
However, as Nsslin (1984.49) argues, in Hudsons theory the sincerity conditions are
balanced, whereas in the pragmatic interpretation, referring to Lakoff (1972), the sincerity
condition of the RC always dominates the sincerity condition of the tag. The domination of
the RC can be highlighted by employing accentuation, which is another frequent pragmatic
feature used to support the speakers standpoint. Accentuation is a feature modifying the
illocutionary force the meaning becomes reinforced, underlined, exaggerated, explicit
(Urbanov 2003.66). As accentuation cannot be studied here in detail, consider the imbalance
that is produced by looking at a few examples.
Example 5:
Q. She could not possibly have done so, could she?
Example 6:
Q. Now look, the plain truth of the matter is that you were telling Carol Chapman that your
ECG machine wasn't working, weren't you?
Example 7:
Q. Carol Chapman has every reason to remember vividly what occurred that afternoon, has
she not?
The proposition of the RC purports to be true due to the Maxim of Quality and this is
reinforced by the use of accentuation. Such a strong assertiveness is balanced (not equally as
was shown) by the polite tag, providing the possibility to disagree.
Coming back to the constraints of the institutional setting, my claim is that the polite
feature, i.e. the tag, is directed at the members of the jury (rather than at the witness) as the
prosecutors means of saving his/her face. Were it not for the jury, the prosecutor would, in
35
my view, exploit even more conducive devices, maintaining as high degree of interrogation
control as possible. However, not to be despised by the members of the jury for his/her
arrogant assertiveness and abusing his/her institutional power and for the jury not to feel
compassionate with the witness, he/she needs to mitigate the uttered propositions.
The tag question thus allows the prosecutor to employ a high degree of conduciveness
and at the same time be polite. This is then turned against the witness, who interprets the
question as one looking for a particular answer (along with the members of the jury) and by
uttering a response that does not conform to the expectation created by the question (because
the design of the question is harmful to him/her), he/she risks to create the tension: the jury
was looking for some kind of response and the witness produced a different one.
Example 8:
Q. Well, if this lady died at 10 minutes past 4 she must have been administered or
administered to herself diamorphine between certainly 4 o'clock and 10 past 4, mustn't she?
A. You can put the evidence that way and yes I would agree.
Q. You were with Ivy Lomas throughout all that time, weren't you?
A. I don't disagree with that statement.
Q. Continuously with her. We can see when you were first with her because that is shown on
the computer screen. If you pull out the A3 schedule, 15.57 and 16 seconds, "Seen in GP's
surgery. Dr. H. F. Shipman." That is not a backdated entry. And so that indicates that at 3.57
you were in the presence of Ivy Lomas?
A. I'm not disagreeing with that.
Q. And you say to us here and now, do you, that you were continuously in her presence up to
the moment that she collapsed and died?
A. Allowing for the time taken for resuscitation, yes.
Q. How then did Ivy Lomas get that diamorphine into her system?
A. I have no knowledge.
Q. Dr. Shipman, there is simply no sensible explanation, is there?
A. Was that a statement or was it a question?
Q. You know very well it was a question, formulated as a question requiring an answer. Dr.
Shipman, there is no sensible explanation, is there?
A. I know, do not know of any explanation.
This example is one of the crucial points of the whole cross-examination I came across
in my analysis. There are questions that precede the final accusation, all of them formulated as
closed questions and all of them conducive to agreement. Note well that there is an openended wh-question however in the context that is provided, this question cannot be
answered narratively as to win some credibility on the part of the witness; on the contrary, the
only explanation that could answer this question is Dr. Shipmans guilt. Through the context
thus created the final accusation is also strongly conducive and Dr. Shipman in providing the
non-conforming response loses the whole battle of words. It has been proven to him that by
36
the time that the fatal dose of diamorphine was administered to the victim, he must have been
there.
The example above also points to another pragmatic feature of conduciveness, which I
have already partly mentioned, and that is the context. I now want to discuss another
pragmatic device, which relates to the context and that is the emphasis on symmetrical
relations between the participants in conversation. Urbanov (2003.45) defines symmetrical
relations between participants in conversation as a state where an atmosphere of mutuality,
confirmation, agreement and commitment prevails, a state, when the participants share the
same ground. The CP and the PP underline these relations as those that are preferred in
everyday conversation. [D]eclarative questions with or without intonation or lexical
markers, as well as declarative questions accompanied by tags or prompters, reinforce the
effect of confirmation and agreement, including commitment (Urbanov 2003.45). Thus
another pragmatic aspect of tag questions that is derived from their conduciveness is that tag
questions are mostly confirmation-seeking. I claim that in the legal setting they always seek
for confirmation, thus creating an atmosphere of agreement.
Example 9:
Q. If an ambulance had been sent to your surgery Ivy Lomas would have been taken away to
hospital, wouldn't she?
A. Yes, she would have done.
Q. And when she was taken away to hospital she would have been the patient of the doctor at
the accident and emergency department of presumably Tameside General Hospital?
A. Yes.
Q. And when it came to whether or not a death certificate was to be signed and whether the
coroner was to be informed, it would be that person's decision and not yours, wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. That would take Ivy Lomas out of your control, wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. That was why no ambulance was ever summoned by you in these cases, isn't it?
A. No.
This example shows how a chain of confirmation-seeking questions builds up the
context and creates an atmosphere of confirmation, both of which in turn significantly
contribute to the conduciveness of the last question, which is an accusation harmful to the
witness. In fact it will be seen that all questions used by the prosecutor in the
cross-examination, with the exception of wh-questions and alternative questions, are to
a certain degree confirmation-seeking. If an analysis were performed as to how the witness
can oppose this tactic in his/her responses, it would very probably result in his/her trying to
37
which
a denial of a proposition becomes rather difficult, as it creates tension with regard to the
expectation of the witness response.
38
pos + neg
87
72.5%
neg + pos
24
20%
Constant polarity
pos + pos
4.17%
Imperative TQs
Constant polarity
pos + pos
1.67%
Exclamatory TQs
Reversed polarity
pos + neg
1.67%
Declarative TQs
4.1.5.1 Exceptions
Only two instances of imperative tag questions were found in the text. They were
polite instructions as the type pos+pos indicates: the tag provides opportunity to disagree and
thus is face-saving.
Example 10:
Let's go to the bundle of photographs shall we.
Example 11:
Look at page 918 A will you, the last document before the schedule.
Similarly, two instances of exclamatory tag questions were found, in fact both
instances in one sentence, which is useful to provide in the whole context.
Example 12:
Q. And what would you then say that in fact the cause of death was in Ivy Lomas's case?
A. At the time a coronary thrombosis. With the information that is available now we have to
say it is morphine toxicity.
Q. We have to say it, don't we, and then we have to ask don't we, how could Ivy Lomas have
taken a massive dose of morphine or diamorphine, how could that have occurred in her case?
A. I would agree with you that that is the question to ask.
The two exclamations are evidently used to ridicule the witness in order to challenge
his depersonalized answering as a pragmatic tactic which strives to produce the conforming
answer as regards agreement (NB. negative answer is not possible). However, at the same
time, it strives to shift the focus from any personal commitment as far as the contents of the
proposition are concerned.
40
41
However, using this construction, the prosecutor implies that there was no point in
summoning an ambulance due to the fact that Dr. Shipman actually murdered the patient.
Note how the grammatical construction of the tag question allows the prosecutor to form the
whole accusation, leaving no real options for response.
Example 14:
Q. And you say to us here and now, do you, that you were continuously in her
presence up to the moment that she collapsed and died?
A. Allowing for the time taken for resuscitation, yes.
Q. How then did Ivy Lomas get that diamorphine into her system?
A. I have no knowledge.
Q. Dr. Shipman, there is simply no sensible explanation, is there?
A. Was that a statement or was it a question?
Through the context it has been established that there is no other explanation than the
doctors guilt. However, the prosecutor makes sure that the jury understands this by wording
this out explicitly in the neg+pos form. If he employed the pos+neg form, Dr. Shipman, there
is surely some sensible explanation, isnt there?, he would imply that Dr. Shipman did not
do it and that is of course contrary to what he wants to achieve. Similarly employing a yes-no
question (e.g. Is there any other possible explanation?) would deprive the prosecutor of the
advantage of wording the statement which actually impeaches the witness and would give
more space to implicature, i.e. the prosecutor could not be sure if all the members of the jury
understood his point (e.g. they could expect an affirmative answer to the question).
The following examples function similarly:
Example 15:
Q. But it does not work, does it, in Ivy Lomas's case? Where could she have got the
diamorphine from?
Example 16:
Q. There was nothing, was there, of a confidential nature here requiring you to make an
entry on a Lloyd George card, was there?
Example 17:
Q. That is not what the record says, is it?
42
Example 18:
Q. Do you remember when you were holding forth about the death of Nora Nuttall there
were two ladies in your waiting area and you with your arms aloft told them how you knew
this would happen, "I've been saying for a long time that this would happen?"
A. Do I remember that?
Q. Yes. That is the evidence?
A. I remember it being said.
Q. You disagree with that evidence do you?
A. I do.
In this example it can be seen that in the exchanges preceding the cp tag question, the
form of dr. Shipmans answer enabled the prosecutor to infer that he disagrees with an
evidence given by a different witness. That is, the premise of the cp tag question has been
established in the preceding context and SC3 can thus be applied. The proposition is
self-evident and therefore strongly conducive if explicitly worded.
Let me here present all the instances of cp tag questions with their responses.
Example 19:
Q. I see. Now you contend do you that you used all your best efforts to revive Ivy Lomas?
A. Yes.
Example 20:
Q. And you say to us here and now, do you, that you were continuously in her presence up to
the moment that she collapsed and died?
A. Allowing for the time taken for resuscitation, yes.
Example 21:
Q. So you very much take issue, do you, with Carol Chapman's version of the facts there?
A. As presented to me at this moment, yes.
Example 22:
Q. Let me understand this, you are saying are you that 1978 is an indication that she had
ischaemic heart disease?
A. I'm saying her doctor thought it was worth while querying an ECG.
All these examples meet the expectations that were established in the above
discussion. All answers are affirmative, although two of them are agreed to with a slight
modification. The reason for this is that the prosecutor actually uses these tag questions (with
which one cannot really disagree) as a springboard for presenting a version of facts that in the
end proves harmful to the witness. The witness feels this threat and reacts accordingly.
The first example is followed by a context in which the prosecutor proves that
Dr. Shipman either did not use all his best efforts to revive the patient or that he is
incompetent both of which are harmful to him as establishing the former could imply that
he killed her and establishing the latter would mean that he would lose some of his credibility
in all exchanges where his medical performance would be put into question. The doctor,
unaware of what is to come, answers simply and not evasively yes.
43
The second example leads to what was discussed above in example 8: a direct
accusation of Dr. Shipman and of his guilt.
The third example is followed by showing disparity between the evidence of
Dr. Shipman and the evidence of his employee Carol Chapman, the aim of which is that the
jury rejects Dr. Shipmans version of the facts. The affirmative answer is qualified by
Dr. Shipman who is aware where this is leading the affirmation is thus mitigated. However,
the prosecutor immediately attacks this qualification:
Example 23:
Q. There is no question about me presenting it to you at this moment. That was the evidence
that Carol Chapman herself presented to the Court when she was giving evidence in relation
to Ivy Lomas's case. Do you understand?
A. I understand.
The evasive tactic is thus immediately challenged. Similar procedures follow the last
example.
44
The most frequent auxiliary used is be, which along with the two most frequent
pronouns you and it signifies that facts are very frequently discussed and that reference to the
witness is most frequent in the tags. The frequency of the pronoun she results from the fact
that evidence by women or reference to women (Carol Chapman and Ivy Lomas respectively)
is discussed.
45
pos + neg
neg + pos
Declarative TQs
Constant polarity pos + pos
Non-final tags
46
resembles that of tag questions with non-final tag and is one step closer to declarative
questions where the function of SC2 or PP is supplied by intonation only.
Example 30:
Q. I'm going to suggest to you that even before Ivy Lomas went down that corridor on your
version of the facts this was a case for an ambulance?
Example 31:
Q. But you went on, you say, to take the blood pressure?
Example 32:
Q. First of all, you told Carol Chapman a deliberate lie, is that right?
Example 33:
Q. You agree, I take it, that you had the opportunity of administering diamorphine to Ivy
Lomas?
The utilisation of personal lexical tags (such as Im going to suggest, you say) is more
frequent than the utilisation of impersonal tags, of which there are only two instances (both
are is that right). This follows the face-saving strategy in that personal tags show a higher
degree of subjectivity and thus they are more polite.
Table 4.7: Tag Questions, Questions with LT, Declarative Questions Summary
Elicitative force
Questionness
Tag questions - rp
Tag questions - cp
TQs with non-final tag
Questions with LT
Declarative questions
47
Conduciveness
Interrogation Control
48
courtroom. During the direct examination leading questions may not be used, thus other forms
of leading have to be employed.
In the last example, it is a question that was already asked before and in the following
exchanges, the prosecutor tried to prove (using e.g. tag questions) to the witness that his
answer is unreliable. After the context has been established, the question can be posed again,
now with a high degree of conduciveness towards the affirmative pole.
Many of the yes-no questions proper are truly polar and with a low degree of
conduciveness. Such are asked by the prosecutor for a certain sequence to be established and
for some facts to be revisited and repeated. The conduciveness of these is not that important
as it only introduces the facts that function as the background for later interrogation that
slowly closes up towards the main point at issue (an allegation or a rejection of the witness
previous testimonies), utilising more conducive forms that are less question-like, viz. tag
questions and declarative questions.
Example 38:
Q. Do you agree and stand by what you said last week?
Example 39:
Q. Is Carol Chapman wrong about that?
Example 40:
Q. Did you laugh in the presence of Sergeant Reade?
Example 41:
Q. Was she able to walk along the corridor to your examination room?
To sum up, yes-no questions proper are employed by the prosecutor rather frequently,
their function can be polar as the grammars would claim, however the majority of these
questions will be asked with a bias towards a given answer, their function thus being that of
confirmation-seeking. I have discussed above why this is important. Let me then conclude
that I consider yes-no questions proper as a category which is higher on the scale of elicitative
force and lower on the scale of conduciveness, as opposed to the above discussed categories.
These functions are nevertheless present and utilised by the prosecutor, which makes this
category another one that complies with the outlined discourse tactic.
49
Bolingers example Will you have oranges? No. Grapefruit? No. Tangerines then.
(1957.114) violates these rules already in the first sentence, which does not give the right
amount of information, therefore is not polite (if someone is offering me oranges only, he/she
does not want me to have his/her grapefruits) and not economical.
As regards their function in the legal discourse, alternative questions differ from
yes-no questions proper in that they are truly polar as regards their grammatical form. Their
conduciveness can be established only through the context and this may not be immediately
perceptible by the members of the jury. The allegations have to be then worded explicitly
using more conducive forms of questions. The advantage of alternative questions lies in their
polarity. The witness can answer the question only be choosing one of the options, evasive
answers are almost excluded the degree of interrogation control is very high. Thus
alternative questions serve as a springboard for a certain line of questioning or as a coercive
device if the witness is reluctant to answer the preceding questions without qualifying them.
The former is reflected in the first example, the latter in the second.
Example 42:
Q. When you admitted your next patient to your room was Ivy Lomas dead or alive?
Example 43:
Q. But which do you take first, pulse or blood pressure?
4.6 Wh-questions
The last category of wh-questions comprises 52 instances, which amounts to roughly
15.4%. This category is one of the dispreferred ones in the legal manuals. Wh-questions call
for an elaboration of the proposition, for providing information Stenstrm (1984) classifies
them as requests for information. As has been discussed above in relation to the discourse
tactic of a cross-examining lawyer, the utilisation of this category is dangerous in that it
provides the witness with the opportunity to win the favour of the members of the jury
he/she can answer rather freely, employing the vocabulary that prefers his/her case and
referring to his/her interpretation of the facts and consequently gaining points in terms of
his/her evaluation by the jury. That is why leading questions are advised to be used during
cross-examination as frequently as possible. However, the frequency of this type of questions
is small but still significant. Does it mean that the cross-examining lawyer in the case of
Dr. Shipmans trial is inefficient?
Bolinger (1957) recognized only three types of conducive wh-questions, i.e. rhetorical
questions, suggestions for action and questions that are conducive by means of the
50
undesirable lexis. However apart from example 10, which could be considered as a
rhetorical question, it would be difficult to find any of the mentioned types.
Example 44:
Q. What time did you admit the next patient to your room?
Example 45:
Q. Where is that recorded, her pulse and her blood pressure?
Example 46:
Q. Where could she have got the diamorphine from?
Example 47:
Q. What do you think would have happened if you had told an officer of the law that your
ECG machine wasn't working and she had died in your presence?
Example 48:
Q. What time is the computer switched off?
Looking at these examples it becomes clear that although wh-questions are generally
supposed to be open and non-restrictive as regards the answer they elicit, in the legal situation
they can be formed in a way that they expect a minimal response and lay constraints on the
type of response that is to follow. [T]he answers sought to wh-questions are (potentially) just
as restrictive as other interrogative types, in that there is only one legitimate answer and legal
professionals already know what it is. (...) [W]h-questions are often answered minimally (i.e.
are not open-ended, or are not treated as open-ended) (Luchjenbroers 1997.487-488).
Though wh-questions would not be used extensively in the climax of
cross-examination, they are very useful for establishing the context and for trying to put the
desired (that has been prepared through the context) conclusion into the mouth of the witness
if he/she worded it explicitly, he/she would actually accuse him/herself of the crime. That is,
the conduciveness of wh-questions lies in its establishment through the preceding context and
in not asking for a particular answer but rather in suggesting a conclusion that derives from
the context. Through the interpretation of context, the suggestion is formed in the minds of the
members of the jury and the witness. Again, tension is created as the suggested conclusion is
contrasted to the actual answer of the witness. Consider these examples:
Example 49:
Q. And the reason that you are disagreeing with Sergeant Reade's evidence is this, isn't it,
that you had to give to him the version of facts that would most certainly avoid a postmortem?
A. No.
Q. What do you think would have happened if you had told an officer of the law that your
ECG machine wasn't working and she had died in your presence?
A. I haven't any idea of what he would have thought.
Q. Do you think it is more likely, that that disclosure would make it more likely that the
coroner would be informed or less likely?
A. I don't know which one he would choose.
51
Q. If he knows or if he has been told there may been a mechanical breakdown in the ECG
machine, he is likely to inform the coroner isn't he?
A. I don't know what the procedure is.
Q. Does not that occur to you as a real possibility? "Here is an accident that has occurred,
ECG machine not working in a local doctor's surgery. I think the coroner should know
something about this." That is why you were giving different versions to Carol Chapman and
to Sergeant Reade, isn't it?
A. No.
All these questions are actually directed to one conclusion, i.e. that Dr. Shipman lied
to the investigating police officer about the circumstances of the patients death and the
reason was that he wanted to avoid that a postmortem had been performed, which would point
to the fact that the patient did not die of a heart attack but of diamorphine poisoning. The
wh-question is asking Dr. Shipman to provide that one possible conclusion that derives from
the context. Because he answers evasively (of course he does not want to corrupt himself),
more closed questions are used and finally a reversed polarity tag question is used to
pronounce the whole conclusion explicitly, with only a grammatical tag turning it into a
question.
Example 50:
Q. How then did Ivy Lomas get that diamorphine into her system?
A. I have no knowledge.
Example 51:
Q. If you say there was a point why didn't you?
A. It was one of the options I had.
Example 52:
Q. Well, why didn't she have one?
A. Because I didn't think of it on that day.
Example 53:
Q. Why didn't you say that last week?
A. I cannot give you a sensible explanation. If that's what I said last week that's what I said
last week.
These examples show the restrictiveness of wh-questions used in my corpus. It is not
possible to elaborate on these questions and thus attempt to win some credibility. Those
answers that are elaborate are usually used for the development of questioning or the line of
questioning is immediately stopped and the prosecutor changes the topic of discussion.
52
Interrogation Control
Wh-questions
Alternative questions
Classical Yes-no questions
Tag questions - rp
Tag questions - cp
TQs with non-final tag
Questions with LT
Declarative questions
It was shown that all the categories are able to comply through their functions with the
discourse tactic of the legal cross-examination (as opposed to the perception of normal
conversation). However, the ability is scalar, therefore there exist preferences for certain
categories. My claim is that the tag questions are the most useful category, resulting from
their frequency in this particular trial and from the fact that they are in the middle of the above
devised scales. Of course, variation of questions for the examination so that it is not dull and
stereotypical is an obligation for the cross-examining prosecutor. However, when it comes to
certain important points in the interrogation, it is the tag questions that will most likely be
used.
Tag questions are the category which allows for a high degree of interrogation control
by means of their preferences they set as to the type of the answer and for a high degree of
conduciveness by means of their preference of particular answer that is expected. They are on
the lower scale of questionness and consequently their elicitative force is lower which
53
contributes to the conducive aspect in that the desired answer is less expected to be worded
explicitly, i.e. it is taken for granted. However, as opposed to questions with lexical tag and
declarative questions, the imposition is not perceived as conspicuous because the grammatical
tag shows the right amount of consideration for the partner in communication (rather than
opponent in communication) and is complicit with the Politeness Principle.
The prosecutor exploiting this category of questions manages to be impositive enough
in order to direct the witness to the evidence he/she wants to be discussed (in order to reject
his/her testimony, accuse him/her of something, point to inconsistencies in the witness
testimonies). At the same time, the prosecutor is polite enough (i.e. showing no contempt for
the witness, behaving in accordance with the general rules of inter-human conduct) in order
for the jury not to feel compassionate with the witness. On the contrary, the jury will
appreciate this kind of conduct on the part of the prosecutor. In seeking confirmation, the
prosecutor exploits the tension which is created by the answer-expectation on the part of the
jury (through conduciveness the answer is consciously/unconsciously formed in their minds)
and by the answer-realization on the part of the witness.
54
5. Conclusion
In this thesis I have analysed different types of questioning in the cross-examination in
the Shipman trial.
My analysis springs from the views of legal realism maintaining that in a trial the
presentation of facts is much more important than what happened in reality. The outcome of
a trial in the adversarial system depends heavily on how the facts are presented through
language: in the courtroom, a certain kind of mediated reality is being constructed and
negotiated. Persuasion becomes the crucial factor that can determine the outcome of a trial
and thus significantly affect peoples lives. In studying how persuasion is manifested in the
various questions forms that are exploited by the prosecutor, I want to draw attention to one of
the many features of language that can affect the interpretation of reality in a murder trial.
Employing the pragmatic approach, I have focused mainly on how the hearer
interprets the message, i.e. on how the speakers persuasive linguistic devices influence the
mind of the hearer. In the courtroom situation, there are more hearers to whom the message is
directed. There is a communication under way between the prosecutor and the witness. The
illocutionary force of this communication is, however, directed completely to the members of
the jury who have no right to intervene into the flow of the communication. The way how
they interpret its illocutionary force is reflected in their final decision of the case. I have come
to the conclusion that the crucial factor determining the acceptance of a version of facts is the
tension created by the different interpretations of the hearers, or rather by the contrast between
the expectation and its accomplishment, namely the contrast between what answer the
members of the jury (as the silent interlocutors) expect and what answer is actually produced
by the witness. This contrast is created by the use of the various persuasive devices and
evaluated on the basis of trustworthiness and credibility of two main participants in
communication, i.e. the prosecutor and the witness.
The situational context of the cross-examination significantly influences the chances
of these two interactants at success. The distribution of power is imbalanced: the prosecutor as
the one who has the most right to speak (next to the judge) is in an advantageous position as
he/she is in control over the topics of discussion. The prosecutor is entitled to ask questions,
the witness is obliged to answer them. Therefore, absolute lawyer control over the
interrogation is enabled by the use of question forms that elicit a minimal answer in the form
of agreement or disagreement, ideally a yes or no. In the legal terminology, these are called
leading questions and they are allowed for use by the evidentiary rules; during the direct
examination they are forbidden. Moreover, the evidentiary rules say that if a question during a
55
cross-examination calls for a yes or no answer, this answer can be enforced and any
qualification of the terms of the question may be stricken from the record and the jury are not
allowed to take it into consideration. One can see that the prosecutor when asking questions
(which are not in any way limited as to their length) can exploit many more persuasive
devices than the witness, who is only allowed a polar answer. This imbalance of power is, of
course, compensated for in other stages of examination, viz. direct or re-direct.
In my analysis of a cross-examination transcript I have shown that the majority of
questions asked by the prosecutor are leading, as other scholars have shown before. It would
actually be surprising if the prosecutor did not exploit his/her favourable position in this way.
However, these questions are not leading as the legal term would have it (i.e. suggesting the
response) but they are leading due to two question functions that are crucial for the persuasive
effect of the questions, i.e. through elicitative force and conduciveness.
The prosecutor exploits these functions, in that he/she transfers them from the general
use in human communication into a specific institutional situation, i.e. cross-examination. I
have shown that both functions are exploited to create a cooperative, confirmation-seeking
atmosphere (which is a general feature of casual conversation) which, in the specific context
of the cross-examination, where opposing, i.e. asymmetrical relations reside, make it very
difficult for the witness to procure his/her version of facts or even oppose the allegations that
are raised against him/her.
I claim that the category of questions that is most effective with regard to the outlined
goal of communication is the category of tag questions. In the analysis of my data, tag
questions are most frequent and have the greatest variety of meanings. In the general context
of conversation, tag questions are used for the sake of seeking confirmation, for the sake of
establishing symmetrical relations between the interlocutors. Their degree of elicitative force
is rather low in comparison to yes-no questions proper or wh-questions, which suggests that
agreement is to a certain degree taken for granted. This is supported by the fact, that the
reference clause of the tag question is in a declarative form, in which the speaker procures
his/her point of view. Therefore the degree of conduciveness is also greater in comparison to
yes-no questions and wh-questions. These two impositive features are, however, compensated
for (though not evenly) by the tag. The tag shows a consideration of the hearer and leaves the
opportunity to disagree, though disagreement occurs only seldom. Thus the tag question is
considerably more polite than a question with a lexical tag or a declarative question, which is
a face-saving factor that sustains the trustworthiness of the prosecutor, in that he/she is not
perceived as over-confident, impositive and arrogant by the members of the jury.
56
The tag question therefore allows the prosecutor to maintain his/her control of the
discussion, enables him/her to persuade the jury about the unreliability of the witness
testimony given on direct examination or even about the witness guilt (in the reference
clause). At the same time, it permits him/her not to lose face in wording these allegations and
to behave in accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Principle (in the
tag).
57
6. Summary
This thesis investigates the use of questioning in the Shipman trial. It analyses
a cross-examination excerpt using a pragmatic approach and qualitative and quantitative
discourse analysis.
In the first chapter I introduce the subject of my thesis, my aims and objectives and the
material used.
In the second chapter theoretical insights into the nature of the legal language are
provided. I have looked into the history of the evolution of legalese as a distinct variety of the
English language. Recognizing four distinct discoursal situations within the legal discourse, I
particularly focus on the courtroom situation. I elaborate on the crucial stages of this
discourse, i.e. direct examination and cross-examination, and present their aims and objectives
and how the prosecutor can achieve them. These findings are summarized in the description
of the discourse tactic of the cross-examining prosecutor.
In the third chapter I investigate the theory of question definition and question
classification. Questions are classified from legal and linguistic perspectives and two question
functions that are crucial for the evaluation of the use of questions during
a cross-examination, i.e. elicitative force and conduciveness, are discussed.
In the fourth chapter the devised classification of questions is employed for my
analysis of the corpus. Looking into each category that is represented in the corpus I consider
the degree to which elicitative force and conduciveness are employed and how this reflects on
the interpretation of the illocutionary forces of each category. I devote most space to the
discussion of tag questions as they proved to be most frequent in my data, demonstrating great
variety of meanings.
In the concluding chapter my findings are summarized. I attach great significance to
the specific institutional context and how it influences the interpretation of messages when
employing structures that are common in everyday interpersonal interaction. I have come to
the conclusion that the transfer from the general to the specific context is exploited by the
lawyers to comply with their discourse tactic to the disadvantage of the witnesses. The
everyday structures used in the courtroom produce the same expectations as in the general
context of conversation, however, they produce completely distinct effects. In the general
context, symmetrical relations are striven to be established and this is used in the specific
context of courtroom, which is an arena of opposition, where asymmetrical relations persist.
This contrast is exploited by the prosecutor to persuade the jury about the version of facts that
is favourable to his/her case.
58
7. Shrnut
Tato diplomov prce zkoum typy kladen otzek pi soudnm len s
dr. Shipmanem. Analyzuje vatek z kovho vslechu, k emu vyuv kvantitativn a
kvalitativn analzy a pragmatickho pstupu.
V prvn kapitole uvdm pedmt vzkumu, cle, kter chci doshnout, a pedstavuji
pouit materil.
Ve druh kapitole se zabvm aspekty prvn anglitiny. Zkoumm historick vvoj
tohoto jazyka jako specifick od vvoje jazyka anglickho. V rmci tohoto diskurzu
rozeznvm tyi diskurzn situace a zamuji se zejmna na situaci soudn. Rozhodujc fze
tohoto kontextu jsou popsny hlavn vslech a vslech kov, spolu s jejich cly a
monostmi jejich uskutenn. Kapitolu uzavr popis diskurzn taktiky prokurtora
provdjcho kov vslech.
V kapitole tet se zabvm problmy definice tzn a klasifikac jednotlivch typ
otzek. Typy otzek jsou klasifikovny z pohledu prvnho a lingvistickho. Dle rozebrm
dv funkce tzn, kter jsou rozhodujc z hlediska posouzen uit rznch typ tzn pi
kovm vslechu. Tyto funkce jsou elicitativn sla a konducivnost.
Ve tvrt kapitole analyzuji zkouman korpus na zklad uveden klasifikace.
Zabvm se jednotliv kadm typem tzn, kter lze v korpusu vysledovat, zejmna mrou,
do jak se v nich projevuje elicitativn sla a konducivnost a jak ten se odr na interpretaci
ilokun sly kad kategorie. Vtina rozboru je vnovna pvsnm otzkm, protoe byly
nejastj a vykazovaly vznamnou variantnost vznam.
V zvren kapitole shrnuji sv zvry. Pikldm velk vznam specifickmu
institucionlnmu kontextu, kter vyuv struktury z bn mezilidsk komunikace a tak
ovlivuje jejich interpretaci. Pesun kontextu z obecn situace do specifick je vyuvn
prvnmi zstupci za elem dosaen jejich diskurznch cl. Struktury bn v konverzaci
produkuj v soudnm kontextu stejn oekvn, ale zrove dosahuj jinch vsledk. V
bn konverzaci lid usiluj o ustanoven symetrickch vztah, eho prvn zstupci
vyuvaj ve specifick soudn situaci, kde pevldaj protichdn, asymetrick vztahy.
elem je pesvdit porotu o verzi udlost, kter je pzniv pro uritho prvnho zstupce.
59
8. Bibliography:
Bolinger, Dwight L. Interrogative Structures of American English: The Direct Question.
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1957.
Budkov, Barbora. The dynamics of Courtroom Interaction in English: a Sociolinguistic
Study of the Transcripts of O.J. Simpson's Civil Case. Manuscript, 2004.
Crystal, David and Derek Davy. Investigating English Style. London: Longmans, 1969.
Crystal, David and Derek Davy. Advanced Conversational English. London: Longman, 1978.
Crystal, David. A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
Danet, Brenda. Baby or Fetus?: Language and the construction of reality in a
manslaughter trial. Semiotica, 32: 187-219, 1980.
Goldberg, Steven H. The First Trial: Where Do I Sit? What Do I Say?. St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1982.
Halliday, M.A.K. Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and
Meaning. London: Edward Arnold, 1979.
Hobbs, Pamela. Tipping the Scales of Justice: Deconstructing an Experts Testimony on
Cross-Examination. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 15: 411-424, 2002.
Charrow, Veda R., and Jo Ann Crandall, and Robert P. Charrow. Characteristics and
Functions of Legal Language. In Sublanguage: Studies of Language in Restricted Semantic
Domains. Eds, Richard Kittredge and John Lehrberger. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982. 175-190
Leech, Geoffrey Neil: Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman, 1983.
Leech, Geoffrey Neil: Semantics: The Study of Meaning. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1981.
Luchjenbroers, June. In Your Own Words ...: Questions and Answers in a Supreme Court
Trial. Journal of Pragmatics, 27: 477-503, 1997.
Maley, Yon. "The Language of the Law." In Language and the Law, edited by John Gibbons.
London and New York: Longman, 1994.
Morrill, Alan E. Trial Diplomacy. Chicago: CPF, 1973.
Nsslin, Siv. The English Tag Question: A Study of Sentences Containing Tags of the Type
Isn't it?, Is it?. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1984.
Quirk, Randolph, and Sidney Greenbaum, and Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik. A Grammar
of Contemporary English. London: Longman, 1972.
60
Raymond, Geoffrey. Grammar and Social Organization: Yes/No Interrogatives and the
Structure of Responding. American Sociological Review, 68: 939-967, 2003.
Stenstrm, Anna-Brita. Questions and Responses in English Conversation. Malm: CWK
Gleerup, 1984.
Urbanov, Ludmila. On Expressing Meaning in English Conversation: Semantic
Indeterminacy. MU Brno, 2003.
Walker, Anne Graffam. Language at Work in the Law: The Customs, Conventions, and
Appellate Consequences of Court Reporting. In Language in the Judicial Process. Eds.
Judith N. Levi and Anne Graffam Walker. New York: Plenum Press, 1990. 203-244
Internet Sources:
Transcript for Trial Day 35. The Shipman Inquiry. 10 July 04
<http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/trialday.asp?day=35>
Background to the Inquiry. The Shipman Inquiry. 26 June 06
<http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/backgroundinfo.asp>
Dr. Harold Shipman. Most Notorious Serial Killers. 26 June 06
<http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers/notorious/shipman/dead_1.html>
61
9. Appendix
9.1 Categorization of Questions in the Shipman Trial
Y/N questions proper
1. Did you see Ivy Lomas walk into your surgery on Market Street, Hyde, on the 29th May 1997?
2. Do you accept that when you gave your evidence you said that she was walking into the surgery, "I
recall seeing her that day. She was walking into the surgery?"
3. Did you see any difficulty in her getting up and going into your consulting room?
4. Would you explain please now the document which is at page 822 in our bundle, Mrs. Lomas divider?
5. is the next word "try?"
6. Is the next word "continuous?"
7. Do you say that the time of Ivy Lomas's death was 16.45?
8. Had you ever started it?
9. Do you accept any blame for the death of Ivy Lomas?
10. Do you disagree with Dr. Grenville when he says this was an emergency?
11. Do you remember when you were holding forth about the death of Nora Nuttall there were two ladies in
your waiting area and you with your arms aloft told them how you knew this would happen, "I've been
saying for a long time that this would happen?"
12. Do you remember her?
13. Is it ever right for a doctor to tell untruths to his employees within his surgery?
14. Is it ever right for a doctor to tell untruths to his employees within his surgery?
15. And could you not have simply drawn Carol Chapman a few feet away and whispered something
quietly to her or even taken her along to the examination room?
16. Can you see that?
17. Will you look immediately above that on the wall?
18. Were you at fault in not calling an ambulance at that stage?
19. Were you at fault in not calling assistance in the resuscitation process?
20. Do you agree?
21. Now that question about the airway you say you put in, do you remember Police Constable Reade
attending?
22. Was there an implication that I had unfairly demoted him in your tone there?
23. Do you remember?
24. And do you remember what Sergeant Reade's response to that was?
25. Do you need to know what an airway is to see whether or not a tube is going into the mouth?
26. Are you suggesting that there was a tube to be seen going into the mouth?
27. Are you saying it was not your case that there was a tube going into her mouth?
28. Did you contemplate at all an adrenaline injection?
29. Would it be a matter that you should have considered?
30. Was there anything to be lost by giving her an adrenaline injection?
31. Was she suffering when you first saw her in your consulting room any apparent effects of diamorphine
poisoning?
32. Was she able to walk along the corridor to your examination room?
33. Can you think of any other explanation other than your guilt?
34. Will you please now answer the question. Can you think of any other sensible explanation other than
your guilt?
35. Did anybody else have the opportunity of administering diamorphine to Ivy Lomas?
36. Did Ivy Lomas administer diamorphine to herself in your presence?
37. Do I take it you disagree with it?
38. Have you ever done it before, just leaving somebody for dead?
39. Do you remember that?
40. Do you remember what Professor McQuay said about the time it takes for somebody to die if they have
received an overdose of diamorphine?
41. He said 5 minutes. Isn't that why you went to attend to other patients, leaving Ivy Lomas in the rear
examination room?
42. Can you think of any other good reason for leaving her there, or bad reason for that matter?
43. Can you think of any other reason for leaving Ivy Lomas unattended, your staff uninformed, other than
that you were waiting to make sure she had actually died?
44. Do you agree and stand by what you said last week?
45. Is Carol Chapman wrong about that?
62
63
Wh-questions
1. Where is that recorded, her pulse and her blood pressure?
2. Why is it not in the records?
3. Why is there no entry on the computer?
4. Why are neither recorded?
5. Would you now explain why on that Lloyd George card you have recorded the time of death as 14.45?
6. I want to ask you what time Ivy Lomas in fact died?
7. That is not the question. I asked you at what time did Ivy Lomas die?
8. What time did you admit the next patient to your room?
9. What time did your next patient enter your room?
10. If that be so, why and how on page 822 can you write either 14.45 or 16.45 as the time of death?
11. Why didn't you write that you had certified her dead, if indeed you had certified her dead, at 16.45 but
she had died at 16.10?
12. What do you mean by you certified her dead?
13. Sorry, what is the magic in the word "certified?"
14. If Mrs. Lomas was grey and sweaty with irregular pulse, complaining of a chest pain, why walk her all
the way along the corridor?
15. What is the point of trying to find out whether or not there is some irregularity in the heart beat when
you know already that there is an irregular heart rate?
16. Well let me ask it again. Dr. Grenville's suggestion was that an ECG was not appropriate because you
already knew this lady had an irregular heart rate. Why then did you go ahead and have, and take or
purport to take an ECG reading?
17. Well?
18. Well, will you explain why you said to Carol Chapman that you were having trouble with the ECG, "I
spoke with Carol Chapman and indicated a problem with the ECG?"
19. Why does that mean it must be the consulting room?
20. Why should you lie to your staff?
21. What do you see there?
22. And since it would have been useful on that occasion can you explain why it is that you did not then
summons an ambulance which would have brought with it a defibrillator?
23. Can you explain why it was being put on your behalf to Police Constable Reade that Ivy Lomas had a
tube going into her mouth?
24. Well, why then was the question being put that she had a tube going into her mouth if not on your
instructions?
25. Well, why do you say you cannot remember whether you considered it?
26. Well, why didn't she have one?
27. And what would you then say that in fact the cause of death was in Ivy Lomas's case?
28. Where could she have got the diamorphine from?
29. How then did Ivy Lomas get that diamorphine into her system?
30. Why did you simply leave Ivy Lomas unattended whilst you went to attend to other patients?
31. How could you know they were only going to be quickies?
32. If you say there was a point why didn't you?
33. Why didn't you say that last week?
34. What do you think would have happened if you had told an officer of the law that your ECG machine
wasn't working and she had died in your presence?
35. What was the joke? What was funny about this?
36. If you were sad why were you joking with Sergeant Reade?
37. What is there in 1991, page 847, that permits you to write on this Lloyd George summary card
"Ischaemic heart disease?"
38. And if we look at the Lloyd George cards, and by all means do so if you wish, but there is absolutely no
entry on those Lloyd George cards in 1991 whatsoever. By all means look at them and explain how you
could come to write on the Lloyd George cards 1991, "Ischaemic heart disease?"
39. You say that. Why should it be ECG?
40. What about electro convulsive therapy?
41. Which entries are you now pointing to?
42. And can you tell us how from the 8th of the 3rd 96 you are able to divine in 1991 ischaemic heart
disease?
64
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
Declarative questions
1. You did not see her then enter the surgery, you saw her for the first time in your surgery entering your
consulting room?
2. You described her in your evidence as looking grey and sweaty and unwell?
3. You told us that you checked her pulse and her blood pressure?
4. You had your computer switched on?
5. You have no pattern as a general practitioner?
6. All the more reason to make an entry?
7. And the computer was the place where you would have made an entry if you had made one?
8. And so by 16.10 and 57 seconds Ivy Lomas had died?
9. You knew she was dead at 16.10?
10. If she was grey and sweaty with an irregular pulse and very low blood pressure, surely you should have
required her to lie down at the nearest possible place?
11. Prior to her taking her stockings off?
12. Prior to any lead from the ECG machine being attached to her?
13. So it is an obvious statement that no ECG lead had yet been applied?
14. From the relatives?
15. You never predicted that that would happen?
16. No you didn't, you told her a bare faced lie?
17. You have got photograph 20 in front of you?
18. That is the bed or couch on to which you say Mrs. Lomas collapsed?
19. And there is a chair to the right of it as we look at it?
20. And that phone would permit you to speak directly to the desk, to the reception desk?
21. But that was what was put to him, that she had a tube in the singular going into her mouth?
22. This is not a case where you decided that she would be better off dead?
23. Some 9 times the minimum amount found in Soren Phelby's report?
24. Or inaccurate?
25. Continuously with her. We can see when you were first with her because that is shown on the computer
screen. If you pull out the A3 schedule, 15.57 and 16 seconds, "Seen in GP's surgery. Dr. H. F.
Shipman." That is not a backdated entry. And so that indicates that at 3.57 you were in the presence of
Ivy Lomas?
26. Save and except for your guilt?
27. Other than your guilt?
28. And when she was taken away to hospital she would have been the patient of the doctor at the accident
and emergency department of presumably Tameside General Hospital?
29. The reason for no ambulance was perfectly simple, you would no longer be able to control what had
happened?
30. And you went on and treated 3 patients?
31. No, that you said this to Carol Chapman. You said to Carol Chapman, "I put Ivy Lomas on the ECG
machine but I thought it wasn't working. I couldn't get a reading and I thought she had died?"
32. Yes, that's untrue?
33. When you saw her after you had seen the 3 patients?
34. And then after seeing your 3 patients you said that she had, referring to Ivy Lomas, that she had flat
lined?
35. She it was who said in terms that you had told her that there was a flat line trace in relation to Ivy
Lomas?
65
36. Reading from our note, "He told me that he put Ivy Lomas on the ECG machine but he thought it wasn't
working. He couldn't get a reading and thought she had died. He was always calm, never got worked
up, to keep us calm I think. He thought the machine was broke and realised she had died. He said he
had put her on the ECG machine. He said she flat lined. He tried to resuscitate her with no response."
That was her evidence?
37. Because his evidence is that you treated Ivy Lomas for bronchial problems?
38. That you had treated Ivy Lomas for bronchial problems?
39. But let us just understand the difference between his version and your present version. His version of
what you told him is that you were absent for a considerable period of time treating those 3 patients and
you told him that on your return you found her dead?
40. Standing for ischaemic heart disease?
41. Well--42. . Dr. Shipman, there should be two loose sheets there. Before anything is distributed to the jury, you see
a page with the number 831 on it?
43. "On examination?"
44. Now again dated some 4 months prior to the query for EC that we have looked at?
45. All this 11 months, sorry, 11 years prior to your completion of the card which appears at page 824 in
our bundle?
46. Page in our bundle?
47. Page 852?
48. That is one. "Myalgia?"
49. And "Shoulders, movelat," is that?
50. So you have prescribed some cream for aching shoulders?
51. In March 1996, and you are using that to diagnosis ischaemic heart disease 5 years earlier?
52. She had pain in her shoulders in March 96 and neck pain due to stress in December 1996 and that
equals ischaemic heart disease in 1991?
53. Yes, got the Lloyd George cards here?
54. You remained in the surgery for sometime thereafter talking, for example, to Constable Reade as he
then was?
55. And so you made the entries and backdated them?
56. In your case no?
57. You said this before the break, "I didn't challenge the toxicology because I'm not skilled in that area?"
66
16.
17.
18.
19.
Dr. Grenville's evidence, you heard it, he explained that resuscitation depends to a considerable degree
on the staying capacity of the person attempting resuscitation.
You say the then PC Phillip Reade?
You agree, I take it, that you had the opportunity of administering diamorphine to Ivy Lomas?
You agree you could have picked the phone up?
Tag questions
1. Ivy Lomas was 63 years of age on the 29th May 1997 when she visited your surgery, was she not?
2. That is the true description of Ivy Lomas, is it not?
3. You are deliberately attributing to her greyness, sweatiness and being unwell to explain her death which
followed shortly afterwards, aren't you?
4. Having taken the pulse you would need some way of making a record of that pulse, wouldn't you?
5. The obvious place is the computer, isn't it?
6. There was nothing, was there, of a confidential nature here requiring you to make an entry on a Lloyd
George card, was there?
7. That is not what the record says, is it?
8. Look at page 918 A will you, the last document before the schedule.
9. But time and time and time again you have written down the time of death, haven't you?
10. You had abandoned her as dead at 16.10, hadn't you?
11. The document we have been looking at, page 822, is a completely false document made up to explain
away the fact you had made no proper entry on your computer, isn't it?
12. By asking whether that was a question you are simply buying time to respond, aren't you?
13. You were not dealing with it quickly, were you?
14. And so the question of whether or not the ECG machine was functioning or malfunctioning did not
arise, did it?
15. You disagree with that evidence do you?
16. Well, it could hardly have taken place with two females present, could it, in your consulting room?
17. If there were 2 females present it could not be the consulting room, could it?
18. That was all that was needed, wasn't it?
19. That was a bare faced lie, wasn't it, to a trusted employee?
20. But you had no problem with the ECG machine, did you?
21. And having said those words they were untrue because you had had no problem with the ECG, had
you?
22. But you were indicating to her that you had, weren't you?
23. And that was untrue, wasn't it?
24. Let's go to the bundle of photographs shall we.
25. That telephone there is an internal phone which permits you to speak to somebody on the reception
desk, doesn't it?
26. And that would permit you to call an ambulance, wouldn't it?
27. This was as obvious a case for summoning an ambulance, albeit later than you should have done, as
there could possibly be, is it not?
28. Your story as to what happened in that examination room is patently untrue, is it not?
29. If that lady had collapsed she would have gone directly to the ground and not onto the bed, wouldn't
she?
30. If she had collapsed her knees would have buckled and she would have gone to the ground, wouldn't
she?
31. You had a major problem, according to you and your version of the facts, didn't you, upon her collapse?
32. You had a major problem, didn't you?
33. If you were not going to call an ambulance the obvious thing was to call Mrs. Chapman to help you
with first aid, wasn't it?
34. Well, you could, if you wished to, do it properly, couldn't you?
35. Carol Chapman to the best of your knowledge and belief was capable of resuscitating, was she not?
36. But what is much better still is a defibrillator, is it not?
37. Now you contend do you that you used all your best efforts to revive Ivy Lomas?
38. I'm going to suggest there is a very good and plain reason why she didn't have one, because you had
administered to her a vast dose of diamorphine, hadn't you?
39. You recollect the evidence of the toxicologist, don't you, that she had 9 micrograms or .9 micrograms of
morphine per gram of thigh tissue?
67
40. The fact of the matter is that that lady did not die of a heart attack at all but she died of morphine
toxicity, didn't she?
41. But the toxicological findings of Mrs. Evans, the .9 micrograms of morphine, that is not the subject of
any challenge by you is it?
42. It wasn't suggested to Mrs. Evans that that reading in itself was unreliable, was it?
43. We have to say it, don't we, and then we have to ask don't we, how could Ivy Lomas have taken a
massive dose of morphine or diamorphine, how could that have occurred in her case?
44. But it does not work, does it, in Ivy Lomas's case? Where could she have got the diamorphine from?
45. You remember Professor McQuay's evidence, don't you, that the effects of a fatal dose of diamorphine
would be seen within a 5 minute window?
46. Well, if this lady died at 10 minutes past 4 she must have been administered or administered to herself
diamorphine between certainly 4 o'clock and 10 past 4, mustn't she?
47. You were with Ivy Lomas throughout all that time, weren't you?
48. And you say to us here and now, do you, that you were continuously in her presence up to the moment
that she collapsed and died?
49. Dr. Shipman, there is simply no sensible explanation, is there?
50. Dr. Shipman, there is no sensible explanation, is there?
51. She could not possibly have done so, could she?
52. That leaves only one possibility, doesn't it?
53. It is right isn't it?
54. It is worse than unprofessional, isn't it, just to leave somebody for dead in a back room?
55. You had had no time to read the Lloyd George cards, had you?
56. This was just bluster on your part, wasn't it, to try to explain away why you had not attended to Ivy
Lomas?
57. You had a major problem, hadn't you, with Ivy Lomas?
58. She died and her body had a substantial amount of morphine in it, that was the problem wasn't it?
59. If an ambulance had been sent to your surgery Ivy Lomas would have been taken away to hospital,
wouldn't she?
60. And when it came to whether or not a death certificate was to be signed and whether the coroner was to
be informed, it would be that person's decision and not yours, wouldn't it?
61. That would take Ivy Lomas out of your control, wouldn't it?
62. That was why no ambulance was ever summoned by you in these cases, isn't it?
63. Of course there was never any point in summoning an ambulance in Ivy Lomas's case, was there?
64. You left Ivy Lomas there in the back room, didn't you?
65. You told Mrs. Ward not to go to Irene Turner for 5 minutes, didn't you?
66. You were waiting for her to be sure that she had died, weren't you?
67. As you looked at the Royal Doulton in Lizzie Adams' case you were waiting for her to die, weren't you?
68. As Mrs. Hadfield heard that silence in Mrs. West's case, you were waiting for her to die, weren't you?
69. And here in Ivy Lomas's case as you attended these 3 quickies, as you put it, Ivy Lomas was for certain
sure dying, wasn't she?
70. You are again telling an untruth to Carol Chapman,, aren't you?
71. But that is untrue, isn't it?
72. You never put her on the ECG machine, did you?
73. And to say that you thought it wasn't working was a long way from the truth when you were talking to
Carol Chapman, wasn't it?
74. Now look, the plain truth of the matter is that you were telling Carol Chapman that your ECG machine
wasn't working, weren't you?
75. You have been caught out, haven't you, because you were continuing your lie to Carol Chapman weren't
you?
76. You made it plain, did you not, to Carol Chapman that the ECG machine was not in working condition?
77. Carol Chapman has every reason to remember vividly what occurred that afternoon, has she not?
78. Well, it is a dramatic event, seeing a lady walking into a surgery at 3 minutes before 4 o'clock and her
being dead in the examination room at 10 minutes past 4, isn't it?
79. And then you told her the ECG machine was not working, didn't you, before seeing your 3 patients?
80. So you very much take issue, do you, with Carol Chapman's version of the facts there?
81. Of course there was the nothing on any computer or on any Lloyd George record to contradict that at
that time, was there?
82. That is what you told Sergeant Reade that day, isn't it, that you had treated Ivy Lomas for bronchial
problems?
68
83. And you said to Sergeant Reid that you had showed her to the treatment room so that she could rest,
didn't you?
84. And you said to Sergeant Reade, didn't you, that you, "...continued to treat other patients and on his
return he found her dead?"
85. From your point of view it was an anxious matter having an officer of the law in your surgery so soon
after Ivy Lomas's death, wasn't it?
86. You completely disagree that as well, don't you?
87. And the reason that you are disagreeing with Sergeant Reade's evidence is this, isn't it, that you had to
give to him the version of facts that would most certainly avoid a postmortem?
88. If he knows or if he has been told there may been a mechanical breakdown in the ECG machine, he is
likely to inform the coroner isn't he?
89. That is why you were giving different versions to Carol Chapman and to Sergeant Reade, isn't it?
90. You also said this didn't you to Sergeant Reade, "This lady was beyond resuscitation, she was dead?"
91. You didn't put it that way to him, you put it that she was beyond resuscitation, she had been resting and
died in your absence and by the time you got to her she was dead? That's right isn't it?
92. Not just the resuscitation is it?
93. Carol Dalpiaz, Mrs. Lomas's daughter, you saw her that evening, didn't you, at about 10 o'clock?
94. You see quite independently you have told Police Constable Reade and Carol Dalpiaz that you found
Ivy Lomas dead, haven't you?
95. That is the truth, isn't it, you told Constable Reade that she was a nuisance?
96. That's right, isn't it?
97. You had seen a lot of Ivy Lomas hadn't you?
98. And Ivy Lomas had died very suddenly in your surgery, hadn't she?
99. Now this is another case, isn't it, as with the Pomfret family and the Mellor family, that Carol Dalpiaz
had no knowledge of any heart problems.
100. There is nothing, is there, on the Lloyd George cards relating to 1991?
101. Well, that is 1978, is it not?
102. Let me understand this, you are saying are you that 1978 is an indication that she had ischaemic heart
disease?
103. There is nothing there relevant to ECG either, is there?
104. You had absolutely no evidence at all other than this, had you, to justify IHD going on that card?
105. Come on. This is a fantastic proposition, isn't it, quite fantastic.
106. What you have done is to make a late entry on the Lloyd George card trying to show that Ivy Lomas
had a heart attack, that's what you have been doing isn't it?
107. Save for that in 1959 there is absolutely nothing to indicate at or about 1990 that this lady suffered from
depression, is there?
108. There is one here, 1971 depressive illness, but between 199 - you see somewhere you have got the
information or you should have got the information to put on the Lloyd George cards the word
"depression," shouldn't you?
109. And the fact of the matter is that those two were late entries put on together at the same time and they
are false misleading entries, aren't they?
110. Yes. You were anxious, weren't you, to explain away the death of Ivy Lomas?
111. You were in the surgery when Ivy Lomas died, were you not?
112. And you had an abundance of time on the 29th May to make the appropriate computer entry in relation
to Ivy Lomas's death, hadn't you?
113. And that would give you, wouldn't it, between 10 past 4 and 6 o'clock to make the appropriate entry in
Ivy Lomas's case?
114. "Chest pain. Lots of problems at home. Clinically coronary thrombosis." And then, "On examination
dead." Now you were continuously with Ivy Lomas, weren't you?
115. Done automatically, that's right isn't it?
116. Ivy Lomas, she died, didn't she, of diamorphine poisoning in your surgery?
117. You have had available to you the necessary skills and expertise of others, haven't you?
69
9.2 Transcript for Trial Day 35: The Cross-Examination of Dr. Shipman on the Death of
Ivy Lomas
Trial day 35
HAROLD
FREDERICK
SHIPMAN, recalled
Cross-examined by
MR. HENRIQUES
Tuesday, 7th
December, 1999
HAROLD
FREDERICK
SHIPMAN, recalled
Cross-examined by
MR. HENRIQUES
Q. Dr. Shipman, we
will proceed to Ivy
Lomas's case, still
jury bundle 1. Ivy
Lomas was 63 years
of age on the 29th
May 1997 when she
visited your surgery,
was she not?
A. Yes.
Q. Your evidence, "I
was working that
day. I recall seeing
her that day. She was
walking into the
surgery sometime
before 4 pm, about 5
to 4." Did you see
Ivy Lomas walk into
your surgery on
Market Street, Hyde,
on the 29th May
1997?
A. No, I saw her
walk into my
consulting room.
Q. Do you accept
that when you gave
your evidence you
said that she was
walking into the
surgery, "I recall
seeing her that day.
She was walking into
the surgery?"
A. I cannot
remember saying
that.
A. No, I don't
disagree with that.
Q. Where is that
recorded, her pulse
and her blood
pressure?
A. If it is not in the
records I don't know
where it is recorded.
Q. That I suggest is
not the truth. The
truth was spoken by
Carol Chapman,
"She was quiet and
pale but normal. She
was all right." That is
the true description
of Ivy Lomas, is it
not?
A. It is not.
Q. Take it from me it
is not in the records.
Why is it not in the
records?
A. Because I was too
busy getting her
down to the
treatment room to do
an ECG to record it.
Q. "Quiet, pale
normal. She was all
right." You are
deliberately
attributing to her
greyness, sweatiness
and being unwell to
explain her death
which followed
shortly afterwards,
aren't you?
A. I am not.
Q. You have no
pattern as a general
practitioner?
A. Not that I can
think of relating to
the area you are
70
talking of.
Q. Let's assume you
take the pulse first.
Having taken the
pulse you would
need some way of
making a record of
that pulse, wouldn't
you?
A. Yes.
Q. The obvious place
is the computer, isn't
it?
A. It is.
Q. Why is there no
entry on the
computer?
A. Because the pulse
was abnormally slow
for her.
Q. All the more
reason to make an
entry?
A. And she looked
unwell.
Q. But you went on,
you say, to take the
blood pressure?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are neither
recorded?
A. Because I was
busy with her
afterwards.
Q. There was
nothing, was there,
of a confidential
nature here requiring
you to make an entry
on a Lloyd George
card, was there?
A. Not that I can
think of it.
Q. And the computer
was the place where
you would have
made an entry if you
had made one?
A. Normally yes.
Q. Would you
explain please now
the document which
is at page 822 in our
bundle, Mrs. Lomas
divider?
A. Sorry, did you say
822?
Q. 822. Go right to
the back of Mrs.
Lomas's.
MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: It should
be 5 pages in from
the A3 schedule,
Doctor?
A. Found it. Thank
you.
MR. HENRIQUES:
We will just run
quickly through this.
"5 days, son
returned. Central
chest pain, arms on
and off and some," is
the next word "try?"
A. Next word is
"today".
smoking 4 years."
Would you now
explain why on that
Lloyd George card
you have recorded
the time of death as
14.45?
A. Because I was
using the 24 hour
clock and it should
be obviously 4.45
which is 16.45.
Q. When you
admitted your next
patient to your room
was Ivy Lomas dead
or alive?
A. She was dead.
Q. "Clinically, CT
(coronary
thrombosis). 14.45,
died. Family phoned.
Coronary thrombosis
4 hours, ischaemic
heart disease 5 years,
chronic obstructive
airways disease 10,
Q. Your explanation
is that Ivy Lomas
died at 16.45 and that
is one digit in error. I
want to ask you what
time Ivy Lomas in
fact died?
A. I certified her as
dead as 4.45.
71
A. I usually put
down the figure
when I certify death.
Q. But time and time
and time again you
have written down
the time of death,
haven't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Not the time you
certified but the time
of death. What do
you mean by you
certified her dead?
A. I saw her after a
period of death and
certified that she was
dead.
Q. Sorry, what is the
magic in the word
"certified?"
A. There is no magic
in it.
Q. You knew she
was dead at 16.10?
A. Yes.
Q. You had
abandoned her as
dead at 16.10, hadn't
you?
A. I had stopped
resuscitation, yes.
Q. Had you ever
started it?
A. Yes.
Q. The document we
have been looking at,
page 822, is a
completely false
document made up to
explain away the fact
you had made no
proper entry on your
computer, isn't it?
A. That is absolutely
wrong.
Q. If Mrs. Lomas
was grey and sweaty
with irregular pulse,
complaining of a
chest pain, why walk
her all the way along
the corridor?
A. I'm sorry, I was
waiting for you to
finish. I was going to
perform an ECG on
her.
ECG?
Q. That was a plain
question and you
heard it. By asking
whether that was a
question you are
simply buying time
to respond, aren't
you?
A. I'm not. I didn't
understand your
question.
Q. Do you accept
any blame for the
death of Ivy Lomas?
A. On the day no.
Q. Well?
A. And it is true. I
mean why attach the
leads before she has
actually got onto the
bed.
Q. Do you disagree
with Dr. Grenville
when he says this
was an emergency?
A. This needed to be
dealt with quickly.
Q. So it is an obvious
statement that no
ECG lead had yet
been applied?
A. That's correct.
Q. And so the
question of whether
or not the ECG
machine was
functioning or
malfunctioning did
not arise, did it?
A. No it didn't.
Q. I'm going to
suggest to you that
even before Ivy
72
Do you remember
her?
A. I remember her
giving evidence.
Q. Well, it could
hardly have taken
place with two
females present,
could it, in your
consulting room?
A. I believe she said
that she could see the
screen.
73
Q. I'm going to
suggest if there is
any truth at all in this
version that you have
given about Mrs.
Lomas's collapse,
that the obvious
simple and
straightforward thing
to have done would
have been to pick
that telephone up and
speak to them at
reception telling
them, "Call an
ambulance
immediately?"
A. That is an option
that I didn't take.
Q. You agree you
could have picked
the phone up?
A. It is possible that I
could have picked up
the phone, yes.
Q. And that phone
would permit you to
speak directly to the
desk, to the reception
desk?
A. Yes.
Q. And that would
permit you to call an
ambulance, wouldn't
it?
A. Yes.
Q. This was as
obvious a case for
summoning an
ambulance, albeit
later than you should
have done, as there
could possibly be, is
it not?
A. No, I said I, that
option I didn't take.
Q. Your story as to
what happened in
that examination
room is patently
untrue, is it not?
A. It is not.
Q. Dr. Grenville's
evidence, you heard
it, he explained that
resuscitation depends
to a considerable
degree on the staying
capacity of the
person attempting
resuscitation. Do you
agree?
A. If it is done
properly, yes.
Q. If she had
collapsed her knees
would have buckled
and she would have
gone to the ground,
wouldn't she?
A. Not in my opinion
no, and she didn't do
either.
Q. Dr. Grenville's
evidence, and tell me
whether you agree or
disagree, was that
two would obviously
74
Q. Did you
contemplate at all an
adrenaline injection?
A. I can't remember
that I did consider an
adrenaline injection.
Q. Would it be a
matter that you
should have
considered?
A. It is one of the
things that is
available and some
people find it useful.
75
A. I remember that.
Q. Some 9 times the
minimum amount
found in Soren
Phelby's report?
A. On the one
patient, yes.
Q. The fact of the
matter is that that
lady did not die of a
heart attack at all but
she died of morphine
toxicity, didn't she?
A. The pathologist
has put that forward
as the cause of death,
yes.
Q. But the
toxicological
findings of Mrs.
Evans, the .9
micrograms of
morphine, that is not
the subject of any
challenge by you is
it?
A. I'm not going to
challenge it because
I'm not skilled in that
area.
Q. But you know you
cannot. It wasn't
suggested to Mrs.
Evans that that
reading in itself was
unreliable, was it?
A. Not that I'm aware
of.
Q. Or inaccurate?
A. Not that I'm aware
of.
Q. And what would
you then say that in
fact the cause of
death was in Ivy
Lomas's case?
A. At the time a
coronary thrombosis.
With the information
that is available now
we have to say it is
morphine toxicity.
Q. We have to say it,
is there?
A. Was that a
statement or was it a
question?
Q. Continuously with
her. We can see
when you were first
with her because that
is shown on the
computer screen. If
you pull out the A3
schedule, 15.57 and
16 seconds, "Seen in
GP's surgery. Dr. H.
F. Shipman." That is
not a backdated
entry. And so that
indicates that at 3.57
you were in the
presence of Ivy
Lomas?
A. I'm not
disagreeing with that.
76
disgraceful way to
behave when you
could have done so
by a simple word of
mouth to Carol
Chapman?
A. That is your
opinion.
Q. It is right isn't it?
A. It is your opinion.
Q. It is worse than
unprofessional, isn't
it, just to leave
somebody for dead
in a back room?
A. That's your
opinion.
Q. Do I take it you
disagree with it?
A. I disagree with
your opinion, yes.
Q. Have you ever
done it before, just
leaving somebody
for dead?
A. Have I seen
people who have
died and then I have
gone off and done
something else prior
to contacting a
relative? Is that what
you are asking me?
Q. You know what
I'm asking you. I'm
asking you if in
circumstances such
as these you have
just left somebody
for dead?
A. I have left a
person dead and
gone on to do
something else, yes.
Q. You gave this as
your explanation,
"The 3 who were
waiting were only
going to be
quickies." Do you
remember that?
A. I remember that,
yes.
A. Yes.
Q. He said 5 minutes.
Isn't that why you
went to attend to
other patients,
leaving Ivy Lomas in
the rear examination
room?
A. No it wasn't.
Q. Of course there
was never any point
in summoning an
ambulance in Ivy
Lomas's case, was
there?
A. There was a point
in summoning an
ambulance. I did say
that was one of the
options I had.
Q. If an ambulance
had been sent to your
surgery Ivy Lomas
would have been
taken away to
hospital, wouldn't
she?
A. Yes, she would
have done.
77
Q. Do you remember
what Professor
McQuay said about
the time it takes for
somebody to die if
they have received
an overdose of
diamorphine?
A. Yes.
Q. As you looked at
the Royal Doulton in
Lizzie Adams' case
78
seeing your 3
patients you said that
she had, referring to
Ivy Lomas, that she
had flat lined?
A. I didn't say words
like that to Carol on
the second occasion.
Q. So you very much
take issue, do you,
with Carol
Chapman's version of
the facts there?
A. As presented to
me at this moment,
yes.
Q. Is she completely
wrong?
A. A lot of that is
wrong.
Q. There is no
question about me
presenting it to you
at this moment. That
was the evidence that
Carol Chapman
herself presented to
the Court when she
was giving evidence
in relation to Ivy
Lomas's case. Do
you understand?
A. I understand.
Q. Right. Police
Constable Phillip
Reade as he then
was, now Sergeant
Reade, 6.10 he
attended, almost 2
hours after the death.
He told us he went to
32 Thornley Street
and he returned at
6.30. He spoke to
you and according to
Sergeant Reade, "Dr.
Shipman said he
treated her for
bronchial problems
and showed her to
the treatment room
so that she could
rest." Do you agree
or disagree with
Sergeant Reade in
relation to that
statement?
A. I disagree with his
statement.
Q. Because his
evidence is that you
treated Ivy Lomas
for bronchial
problems?
A. Yes, he is not
remembering
correctly.
Q. Of course there
was the nothing on
any computer or on
any Lloyd George
79
record to contradict
that at that time, was
there?
A. What are we
contradicting please?
Q. That you had
treated Ivy Lomas
for bronchial
problems?
A. Prior to that
attendance I had
treated her a great
many times for
bronchial problems.
Q. That is what you
told Sergeant Reade
that day, isn't it, that
you had treated Ivy
Lomas for bronchial
problems?
A. Not on that day.
Q. And you said to
Sergeant Reid that
you had showed her
to the treatment room
so that she could rest,
didn't you?
A. No I didn't.
Q. And you said to
Sergeant Reade,
didn't you, that you,
"...continued to treat
other patients and on
his return he found
her dead?"
A. PC Reade is
mistaken.
Q. But let us just
understand the
difference between
his version and your
present version. His
version of what you
told him is that you
were absent for a
considerable period
of time treating those
3 patients and you
told him that on your
return you found her
dead?
A. He is mistaken
about what I said.
Q. From your point
of view it was an
anxious matter
having an officer of
the law in your
surgery so soon after
Ivy Lomas's death,
wasn't it?
A. I see no reason
why I should have
been anxious.
Q. Just in the same
way as you were
anxious and you
completely disagree
with the evidence of
Police Constable
Fitzpatrick who went
round to Mrs.
Grundy's house. Do
you remember his
evidence?
A. Yes.
Q. You completely
disagree that as well,
don't you?
A. A fair amount of
it, yes.
Q. And the reason
that you are
disagreeing with
Sergeant Reade's
evidence is this, isn't
it, that you had to
give to him the
version of facts that
would most certainly
avoid a postmortem?
A. No.
Q. What do you
think would have
happened if you had
told an officer of the
law that your ECG
machine wasn't
working and she had
died in your
presence?
A. I haven't any idea
of what he would
have thought.
Q. Do you think it is
more likely, that that
disclosure would
make it more likely
that the coroner
evidence. He was
asked this question:
"Did he speak as to
whether or not he
made any effort to
revive her or attempt
at resuscitation?"
Answer from
Sergeant Reade:
"Yes, I asked him,
`Has resuscitation
taken place,' and he
said, `No.'" On a
matter as important
as that do you take
issue with Sergeant
Reade?
A. Yes, I carried out
resuscitation.
would be informed
or less likely?
A. I don't know
which one he would
choose.
Q. If he knows or if
he has been told
there may been a
mechanical
breakdown in the
ECG machine, he is
likely to inform the
coroner isn't he?
A. I don't know what
the procedure is.
Q. Does not that
occur to you as a real
possibility? "Here is
an accident that has
occurred, ECG
machine not working
in a local doctor's
surgery. I think the
coroner should know
something about
this." That is why
you were giving
different versions to
Carol Chapman and
to Sergeant Reade,
isn't it?
A. No.
Q. Well, has
Sergeant Reade got it
entirely wrong?
A. About the
resuscitation, yes.
Q. Not just the
resuscitation is it?
Carol Dalpiaz, Mrs.
Lomas's daughter,
you saw her that
evening, didn't you,
at about 10 o'clock?
A. I did.
80
described.
Q. Did you say that
you took her mother
to the examination
room whilst you saw
her other patients?
A. I took her mother
to the examination
room and she
collapsed and needed
resuscitation.
Q. We have heard
that more than once.
Did you tell Mrs.
Dalpiaz that you took
Mrs. Lomas to the
examination room
whilst you saw other
patients?
A. I told her that I
had taken Mrs.
Lomas to the
examination room.
Q. Did you tell her
you saw other
patients whilst Ivy
Lomas was in the
examination room
alive?
A. No I did not.
Q. Did you say you
had gone back to Ivy
Lomas and she was
blue around the
mouth?
A. No.
Q. She was dead.
You see quite
independently you
have told Police
Constable Reade and
Carol Dalpiaz that
you found Ivy Lomas
dead, haven't you?
A. That's their
recollection of the
events.
Q. Now, you gave
evidence last week
that, "I did not tell
Police Constable
Reade she was a
nuisance, far from it.
I told him I had
thought of a plaque."
Do you still deny
telling Sergeant
Reade that Ivy
Lomas was a
nuisance?
A. I didn't say that
she was a nuisance.
Frequent attender,
but not a nuisance.
Q. Sergeant Reade's
evidence, "He said
she was a nuisance. I
did not infer it. He
said it once. And
then we went on to
talk about the plaque
and he was then still
inferring she was a
nuisance." That is the
truth, isn't it, you told
Constable Reade that
she was a nuisance?
A. I did not tell PC
Reade that she was a
nuisance.
Q. Another thing I
want to ask you
about Constable
Reade. I have just
put to you the
passage about asking
whether resuscitation
had taken place and
you saying no. You
have given us your
version on that. But
Sergeant Reade also
said this, that you
were, you told him
that she may have
just taken her last
breath as you walked
back into the room
and no resuscitation
had been attempted.
That's right, isn't it?
A. It was absolutely
wrong. I don't know
where he has got that
story from.
Q. And Sergeant
Reade also said this,
that, attributing these
words to you, "He
had considered her
Q. Are doctors
deprived of human
emotion?
A. And to show a lot
of human emotion at
every time that
emotion could be
shown, I'm sure Dr.
Grenville is writing
this down, he will
say that you can't
practise because you
get too tied up with
your patients.
Sadness that she
died, yes. It is always
a sad event when a
patient dies.
Q. Now this is
another case, isn't it,
as with the Pomfret
family and the
Mellor family, that
Carol Dalpiaz had no
knowledge of any
heart problems. Do
you remember her
saying that?
A. Yes.
81
Q. This is at the,
towards the rear of
the paper work.
MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: 4 pages in
from the A3.
MR. HENRIQUES:
Thank you, my Lord.
If Mr. O'Brian could
be kind enough, or
whoever has the
Lloyd George cards,
just to dig out the
original of that so we
can remind ourselves
of it. Page 847.
MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: 824.
MR. HENRIQUES:
824 I'm sorry. And
would you please
look at the last entry
on that, 1991, does
that say IHD?
A. It does.
Q. Standing for
ischaemic heart
disease?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you now
turn back in the
records, 1991. Look
at page 847. What is
there in 1991, page
847, that permits you
to write on this Lloyd
George summary
card "Ischaemic heart
disease?"
A. There doesn't
appear to be any
entries for 1991.
Q. No. Nor for 1992,
nor any time between
1986 and 1993. Is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And if we look at
the Lloyd George
cards, and by all
means do so if you
wish, but there is
absolutely no entry
on those Lloyd
George cards in 1991
whatsoever. By all
means look at them
and explain how you
could come to write
on the Lloyd George
cards 1991,
"Ischaemic heart
disease?" My Lord,
would that be a
suitable time for a
break so perhaps the
doctor if he so
wishes, but in
perhaps supervised
conditions, can look
at the - do you want
to look at them?
A. No. I thought you
wanted me to
answer.
Q. You have a break
then if you don't
want to look at them.
A. I've already
looked at them. Do
you want the answer
now or we can do it
after the break?
MR. HENRIQUES:
We will continue if
His Lordship thinks-MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: I think he
should be allowed to
answer the question
at this stage if he
wishes to do so.
MR. HENRIQUES:
There is nothing, is
there, on the Lloyd
George cards relating
to 1991?
A. If you turn to 831
you will see that
there is a written
comment by one of
me predecessors
which at the end of
his comment he has
written "Query
ECG."
MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: Very well.
Members of the jury,
we will break off
now for 15 minutes.
Would you like to go
with your usher.
Short adjournment
MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: Yes Mr.
Henriques.
MR. HENRIQUES:
Thank you my Lord.
Dr. Shipman, there
should be two loose
sheets there. Before
anything is
distributed to the
jury, you see a page
with the number 831
on it?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that a
photocopy of the
Lloyd George card
beginning September
78 going through to
the 14th December
1979?
A. It is.
Q. Let me understand
this, you are saying
are you that 1978 is
an indication that she
had ischaemic heart
disease?
A. I'm saying her
doctor thought it was
worth while querying
an ECG.
MR. HENRIQUES:
We will consider
that, if we may, after
the break in greater
detail.
MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: As far as I
know we have not
got a copy of that
particular part of the
Lloyd George
records.
Q. My Lord, may
copies of those two
documents go to the
jury for inclusion in
their bundle please?
May I suggest, we
have page 824 we
have been looking at,
the logical place for
these would be after
page 826. 824, 826,
MR. HENRIQUES:
My Lord, for that
very reason I
suggested this would
be an appropriate
time. Thank you.
82
Q. There is nothing
there relevant to
ECG either, is there?
A. You wouldn't
subject a patient to
electro convulsive
therapy on the basis
that you had a query.
Q. Would you have a
look at the document
I have handed to you
at the same time,
page 831 A. Do you
have that?
A. Yes.
Q. The physician's
report. Can you see
there 3 quarters of
the way down that
page her ECG is
satisfactory?
A. Yes.
Q. Now again dated
some 4 months prior
to the query for EC
that we have looked
at?
A. Yes.
Q. All this 11
months, sorry, 11
years prior to your
completion of the
card which appears
at page 824 in our
bundle?
A. These events
occurred in 1978,
that's correct.
Q. You had
absolutely no
evidence at all other
than this, had you, to
justify IHD going on
that card?
A. And the two
entries in my
computer on the
previous year?
Q. Which entries are
you now pointing to?
A. It is in March and
in December.
Q. Page in our
misdiagnosed an
angina pain for
purely and simply
muscular pain and in
December of that
year, 855, on the
18th of the 12th she
again complains of
pain in the neck and
we agree at that time
that it was due to
stress.
bundle?
A. I wouldn't know.
Q. Would you help
me by pointing to
them? Between 847
and 857 we can see
the patient history.
A. Page 852.
Q. Page 852?
A. An entry dated
8th of the 3rd 96.
Q. That is one.
"Myalgia?"
A. Myalgia, it just
means aching
muscles.
Q. And "Shoulders,
movelat," is that?
A. That's a cream.
Q. So you have
prescribed some
cream for aching
shoulders?
A. For pain in the
shoulders.
Q. In March 1996,
and you are using
that to diagnosis
ischaemic heart
disease 5 years
earlier?
A. No, I'm saying
that it was a
possibility that I had
83
Q. 1996 we see
"Depressive illness"
on a card of Ivy
Lomas, 1996. But
nothing at or about
1990.
MISS DAVIES: My
Lord, if one in fact
turns to page 850
there is an entry there
25.10.95. It is the 4th
entry from the end,
"Endogenous
depression recurrent."
Q. You remained in
the surgery for
sometime thereafter
talking, for example,
to Constable Reade
as he then was?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had an
abundance of time on
the 29th May to
make the appropriate
computer entry in
relation to Ivy
Lomas's death, hadn't
you?
A. No.
MR. JUSTICE
FORBES: Thank
you.
MR. HENRIQUES:
1995, yes. Anything
around 1990? Can
you see looking
through the records?
A. I have already
said to you, sir, that
there is a gap
between 86 and 93.
84
Q. I am going
suggest to you that as
a doctor it is
absolutely second
nature when you take
a blood pressure to
write it down? Done
automatically, that's
right isn't it?
A. No.
85