García Sebastiani - The Other Side of Peronist Argentina Radicals and Socialists in The Political Opposition To Perón (1946-1955)

The Other Side of Peronist Argentina: Radicals and Socialists in the Political Opposition to Pern
(1946-1955)
Author(s): Marcela Garca Sebastiani
Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May, 2003), pp. 311-339
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875952
Accessed: 09-04-2015 17:51 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Latin American
Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 200.5.224.104 on Thu, 09 Apr 2015 17:51:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
j Lat.Amer.Stud.35, 311-339 ? 2003 CambridgeUniversityPress

DOI: Io.soI7/Soo2zz26Xo3006734 Printedin the United Kingdom
311
The Other Side of Peronist Argentina:

Radicalsand Socialists in the Political
Opposition to Per6n (1946-195 5)
MARCELA
GARCIA
SEBASTIANI
Abstract. The political life of Argentina between 1946 and 195 5 cannot be defined
exclusively by the emergence and consolidation of Peronism, but was also shaped by
the actions, ideas and conflicts of opposition to it. The evolution of the Radical and
Socialist parties during those years was marked both by their respective internal
discrepancies and by the dynamics of confrontation with the government. In the
face of Per6n's emergence as a political figure, Radicals and Socialists revitalised
inter-party agreements that had been tried and tested in previous years. The Radicals, their internal disagreements notwithstanding, were to become the main representatives of anti-Peronism their oppositional roles changing as the institutional
spaces for conflict and engagement with Peronism developed. Meanwhile, the Socialists lost political and representational weight, despite their desperate attempts to
maintain themselves as an option within the political arena. When the rules of
political competition changed in Peronism's favour, Radicals and Socialists became
convinced of the legitimacy of challenging the constitutional order in an attempt to
increase the political representation of anti-Peronism.
From Per6n's 1946 election victory to the present the hostility between
supporters and opponents of Per6n has been a recurrent feature of recent
Argentine political history. Numerous attempts have been made to explain
Peronism, a phenomenon that appeared to change all the previously established rules of politics in the country, provoking many intellectual battles
regarding its origins and the characteristics which facilitated its subsequent
consolidation in power.1 In recent years new readings of Peronism have
given rise to an ongoing and lively historiographic debate.2 However, the
MarcelaGarciaSebastianiis a ResearchFellow in the Departmentof Historiadel Pensamiento y de los Movimientos Sociales y Politicos II, Facultadde CienciasPoliticas y
Sociologia,UniversidadComplutensede Madrid.
1 For a bibliographyof Peronism,see L. Horvath(ed.),A Half Century
ofPeronism,
1943-1993:
An International
(Stanford,I993). For the differentinterpretationsof Peronism
Bibliography
from its overthrowin 1955 until the end of i98os, see MarianoPlotkin, 'Per6n y el
peronismo:un ensayobibliogrifico,'EstudiosInterdisciplinarios
deAmricaLatinay el Caribe,
.
vol. 2, no. I (i99I), pp.
II3-3
2
Among the most interesting studies in the last decade are: J. C. Torre, La viejaeguardiasindical
y Perdn:sobrelos ortgenes
delperonismo(Buenos Aires, 1990); J. Horowitz, ArgentineUnions,The
31 2
MarcelaGarciaSebastiani
almost ten yearsduringwhich Per6n was in power cannot be definedwith

referenceonly to means of exercisingpower and new relationshipsbetween
the stateand certainsectorsof society,but must also be understoodin terms
of the ideas, actions and conflicts of those who opposed him. Peronism
generatedpoliticaloppositionandredefinedthe adversaryfor the partiesthat
had traditionally
competedon the Argentinepoliticalstage.We cannotspeak
of Peronismand anti-Peronismas theirreconcilablepoliticaldichotomyin
Argentinawithout knowing how and why anti-Peronismarose or understandingthe politicalstrategiesand behaviourthat identifiedit as an opposition.
This articlefocuses on whathappenedto Radicalsand socialistsduringthe
Peronist period, and presents a political history of opposition to the
government.The extremistaccusationslevelled by anti-Peronistsimmediatelyafterthe civilianand militarymovementthat overthrewPer6nin 1955
should be treatedwith caution.These accusations,which were designedto
discrediteach and everygovernmentaction and politicalleaderin the Peronist decade,became the foundationof manyhistoricalinterpretationssince
refuted.They also defined subsequentcriticalargumentswhich explained
the polarisationof Argentinepoliticallife exclusivelyin termsof Peronism
and anti-Peronism.FollowingPer6n's downfall,anti-Peronistintellectuals
pointedto the restrictionshe placedon dissidenceas evidencefor theregime's
supposed totalitarianaspirations.However, such an interpretationallows
little space for examinationof the politicaloppositionof the period.In fact,
the successive governmentsheaded by Per6n attempted to preserve,in
one way or another,certainlegitimisingfacets of politicalpluralism.The
country'srepublicaninstitutionsweremaintained:CongressandtheJudiciary
continuedto function,electionswereheld at national,provincialand(despite
an initialdelay)municipallevels. Per6n himself won two consecutivefree
electionsin which oppositionpartiesalso participated,despiterulesof representationwhich placedthem at a disadvantage.AlthoughPer6n'smargins
of victory in national elections graduallyincreased following his narrow
victoryin 1946,the oppositionvote never fell below 30 per cent duringthis
e integracidn.
El
StateandtheRiseof Peren, 93o-0-94y(Berkeley,i990); D. James, Resistencia
y la clasetrabajadoraargentina1946-1976 (Buenos Aires i990); M. Plotkin, Magana es
peronismo
SanPerin.Propaganda,
y educacinenel regimenperonista
(BuenosAires,
ritzualespoliticos
(1946-si9)
enlaArgentina
Estado
y la IglesiaCatdlica.
Religidn,
1993);L. Caimari,Perdn
y sociedad
(iq43-iy9)
en los origenes del peronismo,'
(Buenos Aires, 1995); S. Bianchi, 'La Iglesia Cat61lica
AnuarioIEHS, No. 5 (1990), PP. 71-89 and 'Catolicismoy peronismo:la educaci6ncomo
campo de conflicto (1946-195 5),' Anuario IEHS, No. 1i (1996), pp. 147-78; F. Neiburg,
Losintelectuales
(BuenosAires, 1998); R. Rein,Peronismo,
y
y la invencidn
populismo
delperonismo
politica.Argentina5943-s9y1(Buenos Aires, 1998); L. Zanatta, Perdny elmitode la nacidncatilica,
enlosorgenesdelperonismo,
J. C. Torre(dir),Los
Iglesiayejircito
943-1946(BuenosAires, I1999).
adosperonistas (5943-syj) (Buenos Aires, 2002zooz).
toPerdn 313
andSocialists
inthePolitical
Radicals
Opposition
period.This clearlyindicatesnot only that the oppositionrepresenteda real
alternative,but also that the politicaland social life of Argentinabetween
1946 and 1955 cannotbe reducedsimplyto the emergenceandconsolidation
of Peronism.Moreover,Peronism did not reduce its opponents' political
space in the same way as did those totalitarianregimeswith which it has
often been compared.Governmentand oppositionenjoyedsufficientlegitimacy to enablepoliticalcompetition.Moreover,while politicalopposition
maybe worthyof attentionin itself, examinationof the type of relationship
that exists betweengovernmentand oppositionis centralto analysisof any
politicalregime."Althoughit accounts for only a relativelyshort period of
Argentinepoliticalhistory,Peronismdid not remainunchangedthroughout
the decade.The opposition'srelationshipwith the governmentand the former'sroom for manoeuvreshiftedbetween 1946 and 1948 and 1949-1952,
and againbetween 1952 and 955. It is true thatlimitationswere placedon
dissidentopinion throughoutthis period,but this does not mean they were
alwaysof the same intensity,or that Peronismdid not attemptto observe
certaindemocraticruleswhich commandedincreasedinternationalsupport
afterthe fall of fascism.
The studyof politicaloppositionrequiresconsiderationof severalfactors.
First,the spacesof confrontationbetweenthe governmentand the political
opposition. The prevailinginstitutionalstructuredetermines,in part, the
possibilitiesof differentoppositionalactors to develop their strategies,althoughobviouslypoliticalconflictis not alwayscarriedout solelywithin an
The opposition'sopportunitiesandpossibilitiesfor
institutionalframework.4
action vary dependingon how politicalresourcesare allocatedwithin the
divisionof powers,on the electoralrulesthat regulatemechanismsfor representationand on the functioningof the partysystem.Too much stresshas
often been laidon the fact thatunderthe ArgentineConstitution,the executive can avail itself of greaterinstitutionalresourcesthan other branches
of state, tendingto weakenthe opposition'scapacityto control and design
strategiesfrom the legislature.In a systemsuch as this, parliament'shandis
weakenedwhile the presidentenjoysexclusivelegislativepowers of his own
throughexecutivedecree.This does not mean that congressis not a forum
for political confrontationand negotiation, or that its articulationwith
3
in Western
On opposition in democraticregimes, see, R. Dahl, (ed.), PoliticalOppositions
Democracies
(New Haven and
(New Haven and London, 1966); Regimesand Oppositions
London, 1973). For non-democratic regimes, see J. Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime: The
Case of Spain,'in R. Dahl, RWgimes
and Oppositions,
pp. I71-259 and G. Pasquino,'L'opAnnoIV, No. 2 (Aug. 1974), PP.421-39.
Politica,
posizionedifficile,'RivistaitalianadeScienza
(Madrid,1974)
oposicidn
4 With regardto this point see, R. Dahl, Lapoliarquzia.
Participacidny
de unaoposicidn
and G. Ionescu e and De Madariaga,La oposicidn.
Pasado
y presente
politica
(Madrid, I977).
3 4
MlarcelaGarciaSebastiani
centres of oppositional action beyond formal institutionalchannels is

impossible.5
In the second place, it is difficultto examinethe subjectof politicalopposition without analysingthe politicalpartiesinvolved. In the Argentine
case a numberof factorsmakethis task particularly
complex:the instability
of the partysystem due to the discontinuityof democraticalternation,the
questioningof the legitimacyof partypoliticalrepresentationand the tendency to focus on leaders as opposed to institutions.In the period under
considerationthe Uni6n CivicaRadical(UCR)was the largestof the oppositionparties.The PartidoSocialista(PS),meanwhile,lost the relativemargin
of representationand decisionin public life which it had enjoyedsince the
beginningof the century.In its searchfor an ideologicalplatformfromwhich
to compete in the politicalarena,the PS becamePeronism'ssharpestcritic.
This stance,however,did not save it from rapiddecline.Clearly,any reference to the opposition to Per6n'sgovernmentsrequiresan examinationof
the internaldynamicsandpowerstrugglesof theseorganisations.It is argued
here that the parties'organisationalcapacityand the resultsof theirinternal
power strugglesultimatelydeterminedtheir practiseand strategy.A final
point whichmeritsfurtherinvestigation(andwhichis merelysignalledin this
article)is the type of relationshipwhich oppositionpartiesestablishedwith
other actors,such as corporatebodies and anti-Peronistintellectualcircles.
relevantfor understandingthe way in which opposition
This is particularly
was articulatedduringPer6n'ssecond termof office and above all to explain
the participationof the armedforces and the CatholicChurchin his overthrowin September1955.
Radicals
in theUnionDemocritica:
andsocialists
a tradition
unity
ofinter-party
The Uni6n Democriticawas an alliance,formedby differentpartiesthathad
traditionallyparticipatedin the politicalarena,which establisheditself as an
alternativeto the militaryregimethat had takenpower in 1943. Althoughit
5
See,J. Linz,'Democraciapresidencialo parlamentaria.

iQue diferenciaimplica?,'inJ. Linz
and A. Valenzuela(comps.),La crisisdelpresidencialismo.
i. Perspectivas
(Madrid,
comparativas
andAssemblies:
Constitutional
1997),PP. 25-143; S. M. ShugartandJ. Carey,President
Design
andElectoral
Dynamics
(Cambridge,1992); S. Mainwaringand M. Shugart,'JuanLinz: Presidencialismoy democracia.Una revisi6ncritica,'Desarrollo
No. 135 (Oct.-Dec.
Economico,
andDemocragin Latin
1994),PP. 397-418; S. Mainwaringand M. Shugart,Presidentialism
America(Cambridge,1997).For the specific case of the relationshipin Argentinehistory,
C. Fenell, 'Congressin the ArgentinePoliticalSystem:An Appraisal,'W. H. Agor (ed.),
LatinAmerican
TheirRoleandInfluence.
Analyses
(New York, 1971)
Legislatures:
for theCountries
and G. Molinelli,Presidentes
enArgentina:
(BuenosAires,i991).
mitos
y Congresos
y realidades
For the democraticgovernmentsof RafilAlfonsin and the first of CarlosMenem,A. M.
Mustapic,'Oficialistasy diputados:las relacionesejecutivo-legislativoen la Argentina,'
vol. 39, No. I56 (Jan.-Mar.2000).
Desarrollo
Econdmico,
Radicals
inthePolitical
toPerdn 3y5
andSocialists
Opposition
calledelectionsfor April 1946 (eventuallybroughtforwardto February)the
militarygovernmentdid not appear,in the eyes of its contemporaries,to
offer any innovativechangein Argentinepolitics. Oppositionto Per6n was
not a decisive factorbehind the coalitionof traditionalpoliticalgroupings.
Therewere no indicationsbefore the electionsthatPer6nhad any chanceof
success or that he would become a new charismaticleader who would
changethe relationshipbetweenthe state,politicalpartiesand society.Postmortemexplanationsfor Per6n'svictoryand the changesto Argentinepolitical life wrought by his movement seldom emphasise the fact that the
alliancewas the result of inter-partyententes that had been part of the
Argentinepoliticalspectrumsince the 1930s. The majorityof the political
leaderswho decidedto unite as Uni6n Democritica two months before the
February1946electionshad priorexperienceof such undertakings,although
it is true that the influence of events in Europe on the nationalpolitical
debatewas a decisivefactorin the timingof the pact.
Examples of coalition buildingcan be seen, for example,in the presidentialelectionsheld on 8 November i931. These electionswere calledby
GeneralUriburuin an attemptto legitimisethe institutionalcrisiscausedby
the militarycoup of 1930. Althoughthe UCR decidedin favourof abstention, Dem6crataProgresistasand socialistshad decidedto form an electoral
coalition.Under the name of AlianzaCivilthey proclaimedLisandroDe La
Torre and NicolaisRepetto as their candidatesfor presidentand vice president.6The winningticketin these electionswas thatof AgustinP. Justo and
Julio A. Roca, also the resultof an electoralcoalitioninvolvingvariouspolitical groupings, including the Partido Socialista Independiente,led by
AntonioDe Tomaso,whichhadbrokenawayfromthe PS fouryearsbefore;
the conservatives(who had organisedthemselvesin the PartidoDem6crata
Nacional);some sectors of radicalismopposed to Hip6lito Irigoyen'sleadershipbut also the processof reorganisationset in motion by MarceloT. de
Alvear;and, finally,a collectionof independentassociations.7
In 1936, the experienceof the PopularFronts in Europe had led to the
formationof an oppositiongrouping.This includedthe UCR, the PS, the
PartidoDem6crataProgresistaand the PartidoComunista.The most representativeworkers' and students' organisations,such as Confederaci6n
Generalde Trabajadoresand the studentsof the Federaci6nUniversitaria
Argentina,had announcedtheir supportfor the coalition.This new Frente
6
See E. Dickmann, Recuerdos

de un militantesocialista(Buenos Aires, 1949), chap. XI. See also,
R. Larra,Lisandrodela Torre.VIday dramadelsolitario

dePinas(BuenosAires, 1942),p. 107
and P. Siegler,Lisandro
dela Torreylosproblemas
desu e'oca(BuenosAires, 1984),pp. 50-5.
7 L. De Privitellio, 'Sociedad urbana y actores politicos en Buenos Aires: el 'partido'
No. 9,
independiente en 193 i,' BoletindeHistoriaArgentinay AmericanaDr. Emilio Ravignani,
2
30
Series (1994: I), PP. 75-6 and R. Fraga, El GeneralJfusto (Buenos Aires,
1993),
PP. 2 5-42.
316
Popularhad arousedstrongcriticismfrom the conservativesin power,but,

despitewild declarationsfrom one side and carefulspeechesfromthe other,
the idea had not been translatedinto an alliancecandidaturefor the presidential elections of 1937. The Radicals had decided not to join the coalition
and opted to field theirown candidates.8This rejectionby the UCR directly
affectedthe socialists'politicalinterests:afterfouryears'supportingelectoral
abstention,in 193 5 the Radicalsjoinedthe scramblefor votes. Followingthe
defeat of Radicalism by conservative candidates in the 1937 elections, the
socialiststriedby all meanspossibleto exploitthe possibilitiesof an alliance

with the UCR in orderto reachan agreementfor the electionof deputiesin
March 1938. Yet, despite proposals made by the socialist leaderNicolas
Repetto to the opposition Radical leader, Marcelo T. de Alvear, and the
supportfor such a move at the highestlevel meetingsof the PS, the agreement came to nothing.9
Supportfor the differentcombatantsin the Second WorldWarhad split
Argentinesociety into two politicaland culturalpoles. Those who had favoured the Allies began an openly anti-fasciststrugglebased within those
sectorsopen to liberaland cosmopolitanthought,such as the universityand
the differentculturalinstitutions,and ended up assumingan overtlypolitical
Throughoutthe opposition spectrum,leadingpartyfiguresdecharacter.1o
cidedto join this wave of civilprotestagainstthe conservativegovernments'
dangerouslyauthoritarianand anti-democraticpractices.In June 1940 they
createda civil organisation,Acci6n Argentina,and calledon 'todoslospartidos
a la union
antelasgraves
solidaria
y coordinacion
paratenerunadeterminacidn
politicos
amenazasde la hora'." Acci6n Argentina became an element of political
8 On this
topic, see A. Rouquie,Podermilitarysociedad
politicaen la ArgentinaI-hasta1943
enlaArgentina
moderna
(BuenosAires, i981), pp. 27 1-73 ; A. Ciria,Partidosypoder
(93o-946)
(Buenos Aires, 1975), pp. 68-70; N. Repetto, Mi pasopor la politica.De Uriburua Peron
Alvear(Buenos
(BuenosAires, 1957), pp. 157passim;andA. Cataruzza,Losnombres
delpoder:
Aires, 1997),PP. 56-7.
masurgente
9 In an interviewwith the Radicalleader,Repettocommentedthat '... consideraba
de organizar
ungranmovimiento
de opiniondestinado
a darconel modomas
quenuncala necesidad
enelpaisel imperio
dela legalidad
deuna
y eficazdeIlegara restablecer
y crearlaposibilidad
prectico
convivenda
fecunda
y dignade lospartidos...'-'Comitn Ejecutivo Nacional del PS, i945,'
El PartidoSocialista
Resoludones
(BuenosAires, s/f) and
y la UnidnDemocritica.
y documentos
'Programade acci6n politica sancionadopor el XXIV Congreso Ordinariodel Partido
Socialista'(1938),AnuariodelPartidoSocialista
(BuenosAires, 1946), p. 25.
see R. Fitte and E. F. SanchezZinny, Ginesisdeunsentimiento
10 ConcerningAcdcinArgentina,
(BuenosAires, 1944),Tomo I, pp. 254-5. On the universityand other cultural
democraitico
la invencion
institutions,see F. Neiburg,Losintelectualesy
delperonismo,
chapter4; T. Halperin
deBuenos
Aires(BuenosAires, 1962) and R. Walter,Student
Donghi, Historiadela Universidad
anditsEffects,1918g-164(New York, 1968).
PoliticsinArgentina.
TheUniversity
Reform
n The leadershipof this grouping were comprised Nicolas Repetto, Mario Bravo and
Am&ico Ghioldion behalfof the PS,JulioA. Noble on behalfof the PartidoDem6crata
Progresista;M. T. De Alvear,Emilio Ravignani,EduardoLaurencenaand ErnestoBoatti
RadicalsandSocialists
in thePoliticalOpposition
toPerdn 317
socialisation, which sowed the seeds for an inter-party understanding on
liberal, and democratic values and which would later lead to the creation of
the Uni6n Democratica. Towards the end of 1941 the government, under the
control of the conservative Ram6n Castillo, took various decisions that
particularly affected the opposition parties: the Concejo Deliberante of
Buenos Aires, a political forum dominated by Radicals and socialists, was
closed down and a state of emergency proclaimed. Acci6n Argentina then
became the platform for the re-launching of proposals for a coalition between the different political forces.12As on previous occasions, the initiative
came from the PS and had the support of trade unions and students. Neither
the Partido Dem6crata Progresista nor the UCR took part in these preliminary talks on 'la coalici6n de unidad', which was supported initiallyby the PS
and Acci6n Argentina, who spread the idea through propaganda in the
Federal Capital, C6rdoba, Santa Fe and the various towns in the province of
Buenos Aires."l Integration in the proposed coalition became the best
alternative for the UCR, which was beset by a leadership crisis following the
death of Marcelo T. de Alvear in January I942. The UCR's difficulties had
been clearly reflected in its poor showing in the March I942 by-elections in
Buenos Aires. In January 1943 the National Convention of the UCR agreed
to participate, albeit with internal differences, in a pro-Uni6n Democritica
Argentina commission, in which the PS and Acci6n Argentina, and somewhat later the Partido Dem6crata Progresista, were already involved.14 An
electoral coalition was being defined to compete in the general elections
called for September 1943. When the military movement, in which Per6n
participated and from which he emerged as a political option, emerged on 4
June, the parties which comprised the then-Uni6n Democritica were at the
most delicate stage of the debate over the party or extra-partyprofile of the
presidential candidates.
Following the military uprising, many of the political leaders who had
taken part in the debate sought refuge in Montevideo for fear of persecution and from there continued their contacts in order to reach some kind
of agreement.15Demonstrations against the regime and in favour of the
on behalfof the UCR;andReynaldoPastor,VicenteSolanoLimaandAntonioSantawho refusedto supportthe governments
whicharose
marina,who wereconservatives
from the agreement.
See Fitteand SanchezZinny,Ginesisde un sentimiento
democritico,
pp. 254-5 andp. 275.
12 'Frente
desde
de
a lasituacidn
interna
... lanzamos
ya laidea,sineludir
y responsabilidades,
obligaciones
unacercamiento
exclusidn
detodas
y noproyectamos
alguna'.
'Primera
resoluci6n
lasfuerZaspoliticas,
del ConsejoNacionaldel PS, partefinaldel manifiestodel z8 de diciembrede 94i,'
la Unidn
ElPartido
andLa Vanguardia,
Socialistay
Democrdtica
29 Dec. I94
13
Fitte and SanchezZinny, Ginesisdeunsentimiento

democritico,
pp. 397-406.
14 F. Luna, Alvear (Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 331.
15 S. Nudelman, El radicalismo
al serviciode la libertad(Buenos Aires, I1947).
3 18
restorationof democraticinstitutions,called by extra-partyorganisations

includingstudent and professionalsectors from mid-i945 onwards,16led
partyleadersto believe that they did not need to redefinesignificantlythe
inter-partyentente towardswhich they had been working for years.They
believed that the defence of democraticvalues was sufficientto guarantee
theirelectoralvictory.
andRadicals
in conflict:
Peronists
thedebate
in theNationalCongress
Per6n's victory over the candidatesof the Uni6n Democraticain the
February1946electionwas not overwhelmingin termsof votes,17but caused
such surpriseand perplexityamongstthe politicalactorswho had defined
themselvesby theirunityagainstthe militaryregimethatit even conditioned
their analysisof the reasonsfor the defeat. Once the finalresultswere announced,the electoralcoalitioncollapsedand afterJune 1946eachpartyhad
to elaborateits own strategiesof oppositionto Per6n'sgovernment.The task
was not easy,given that some parties,such as the PS, had not even gained
politicalrepresentationin Congress.Othershad lost leadersand activiststo
the Peronist cause, as was the case of the conservativesand the Radicals
as well as the socialists.18In this situationthe questionof how to oppose
Peronismbecame a matterof politicalsurvivalfor the partieswhich had
dominatedelectoralpoliticssince the beginningof the century,althoughthe
UCR appearedto have emergedfrom the process the most unscathed.
The results of the 1946 elections left the UCR as the main opposition
force andmarkedthe constitutionalbattlegroundfor politicalconfrontation.
The oppositionhad 49 of the 158 seatsin the lower house, but had no representationin the Senate.The Chamberof Deputieswas thereforeto be one
of the centresof rivalrybetween the two partieswith most representatives
16 For an account
leading up to the Feb. 1946 elections, see F. Luna. El4y.
Crdnicade un ano
decisivo
(BuenosAires, 1971).
17 Out of a total of 2,839,507 registered votes (all male), Per6n gained 1,487,886 (52.40%) and
the Uni6n Democraitica1,207,080 (42.51%), D. Cant6n,Eleccionesy

politicosen la
partidos
balance(Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 272.
Argentina.Historia, interpretacidny
18
On the formationof the PartidoPeronistaand the conflictswithin the its rise,see M. M.

Mackinnon,'Sobre los origenesdel PartidoPeronista.Notas introductorias,'W. Ansaldi,
A. PucciareliandJ. C. Villarruel(eds.), Representaciones
inconclusas.
y los
Las clases,losactores
discursos
dela memoria,
912-1946 (BuenosAires, 1995), pp. 123-56. On the allianceof Per6n
with the conservativesectors,see IgnacioLlorente,'Alianzaspoliticasen el surgimientodel
peronismo: el caso de la provinciade Buenos Aires' and Luis Gonzalez Esteves, 'Las
elecciones de 1946 en la provinciade C6rdoba,'both in M. Mora and Araujoand I.
Llorente(comps.),El votoperonista.
electoral
Ensayosdesociologia
(BuenosAires,1980),
argentina
pp. 269-307
y pp. 318-364
respectively. Also, C. Tcach, Sabattinismoyperonismo.Partidos
enCerdoba,I94i-syy(BuenosAires, 1991),pp. 89-90. On socialistsconvertedto the

politicos
Peronistcause, see Rein,Peronismo,
populismoy
politica,pp. 1-83.
toPerdn 319
inthePolitical
Radicals
andSocialists
Opposition
and the main stage for the politicaland institutionalconfrontationbetween
governmentand opposition.The Radicaloppositionwas to concentrateits
effortsagainstgovernmentpolicy here.The Congresshad not met since the
end of 1942 and its reopeningwas awaitedwith greatpublicexpectation.
The opposition to Peronismin Congresscame from the Bloque de los
44 - a group of Radicaldeputies, who were respected even by deputies
within the Peronistgroup;19 anotherfive deputiescame from other oppositionforces.However,the Radicalsnot only had to definetheirstrategiesof
opposition to the governmentin Congress,but also had to organisetheir
partyinternally.Their defeat at the hands of Per6n had unleashedsuch a
majorcrisiswithin the nationalleadershipof the UCR. The internalpower
strugglecame to centre on the resistanceof certainleaderswho had supported inter-partyunity as the best solution for Radicalism(and were
thereforeknown as unionistas)
to the need to introduceorganisationalreforms which would democratisethe party'smain decisions. The internal
divergencesbetween differentstrandsof Radicalismwere intrinsicto the
historyof the partyorganisationand were not to be absentin the yearsof
These divergencesshouldnot be seen merelyas a
oppositionto Peronism.20
disputebetween two opposing factions,one more conservative(the unionistas)and the othermore popularand nationalist,espousingthe principlesof
whose memberswould come to be known as the intransigentes.
yrigovenismo,
The UCR's list of candidatesfor the 1946 elections had given seats to
severalyoung leaderswith new ideas who had fought for a shareof power
within the party. Amongst the most outstandingof these were Ricardo
Balbinand Arturo Frondizi.The formerwon his seat for the province of
Buenos Aires and was elected a leaderof the Radicalgroup in parliament;
the latterwon a seatin representationof the FederalCapitaland supported
The difficultiesfaced by those who
Balbin'swork in the lower chamber.21
defended their membershipof a modernisingand intransigente
faction of
Radicalismin consolidatingtheirinitiativesand politicalpracticewithintheir
partystructures,contrastedsharplywith theirwork as the largestopposition
19
'(Los radicales)
NerioRojas,Absal6nRojas,
ya ten/anunoshombres
hechos:
Sanmartino,
Santander,
delradicalismo
teniamos
Pomar,eraunbloque
Balbin,Frondii,el coronel
que... nosotros
queveniamos
escucharlos
unagranadmiracio'n
un granrespeto,
y hastaesperabamos
que los
por ellos,quer/amos
laposici'nnuestra
sobrela
sentimientos
radicales
y sobretodolaplataforma
irzgoenistas
comprendieran
cual actuariamos... se llamaronlos 44 defierro, era una representacidn
muy capa7 muy luchadora'.
Interviewwith OscarAlbrieu,ArchivodeHistoriaOral,InstitutoTorcuatoDi Tella.Colom,

for his part,commentedon the Radicaldeputies:'... fue unaoposicidn
la calidad
de
brillantepor
encalidad...' Interviewwith Eduardo
suscomponentes
eransuperiores
sistemiticos,
y eranopositores
Colom,Ibid.
20 See Tcach,Sabattinismoy
peronismo.
21 On the political trajectoryof Frondizi,see N. Babini,Frondiz:de la oposicidn
al gobierno
(BuenosAires, 1984). Also, A. Rouqui6,Radicalesydesarrollistas
(BuenosAires, 1975) and
C. Szusterman,Frondif,lapoliticadeldesconcierto
GardaSebastiani
320 Marcela
partyin Congress.For the Radicalsfrom this group,the work of opposition
in Congressthat began in 1946 meant rathermore than-oppositionto the
initiativesof the Peronistmajority.It also gave them the possibilityto consolidatetheirposition as those responsiblefor the ideologicaland strategic
directionof the party.
The confrontationbetween Peronists and Radicals in Congress was
of the time andreflected,to a
framedwithinthe constitutionalarrangements
or
the
of the Argentine
lesser
characteristics
extent,
greater
presidentialist
In
this
sense
conflicts
between
the
political system.
governmentand the
opposition were political and institutional,but they were not the same
Untilmid-1948
throughoutthe lifetimeof Per6n'ssuccessivegovernments.22
therewas, in general,freedomof expressionfor parliamentary
workand the
main discrepanciesbetween governmentand opposition were markedby
debate.The rights that Peronismenjoyedas the majoritypartyduringthe
first two yearsof governmentdid not appearvery differentfrom those enjoyed by other majoritypartiesduringpreviousperiods of democracy.The
Radicalopposition unveileda series of initiativesthat helped to shape the
programmeof the Movimientode Intransigenciay Renovaci6n.It was this
group which was finallyable to gain dominanceover the Radicals'national
decision-makingstructurein mid-1948.23 The proposals made by Radical
deputiescovereda wide rangeof topics,but those thatreferredto the role of
the State in the social and economic organisationof the countrydeserve
particularattention.The problemsposed in this areawere partof the ideologicalclimateof the periodand Radicalsand Peronistswere committedto
similar- ratherthan opposing- proposals.The lack of ideologicaldistance
of
betweenArgentina'stwo mainpartieswas one of the maincharacteristics
the two-partysystemwhich formedthe basisof Argentinepoliticallife.
The projectspresentedby Radicalrepresentativesin the NationalCongresscastdoubton the claimthatonly Peronismpursuedinitiativesdesigned
to improvethe welfareof largesectors of Argentinesociety and strengthen
the state as the guarantorof social and economic development.Radical
deputies promoted the freedom of professionalassociation,the right to
strike and workers'participationin the profits of industry.24The Radical
proposals also included the extension of the state's welfare role. For
example,therewere Radicalproposalsfor laws to createfree summercamps
22
Fora moredetailedanalysis
of theconflictbetweenRadicals
in theNational
and Peronists
'Peronismoy oposici6npoliticaen el Parlamento
Congress,see M. GarciaSebastiani,
argentino.La dimensi6ndel conflictocon la Uni6n CivicaRadical(1946-1951),'Revistade

IndiasNo. 22 (Jan.-Apr.2zoo1),pp. 27-66.
23 See Boletindela UnidnCivicaRadical,
No. I (14 Aug. 1948)and G. Del Mazo,El radicalismo.
El Movimiento
deIntransigencia
y Renovacidn
(If4y-Iy7) (BuenosAires, 1957), pp. I42-54.
24 Diario
deSesiones
dela Caimara
deDiputados
(fromhere on, DSCD),1946,X, pp. 486-9.
Radicals
andSocialists
inthePolitical
toPerdn 321
Opposition
for children;for protectionand assistancefor orphans,childrenand teenagers;the drawingup of a Children'sCode; the extensionof social services
andthe promotionof collectivelife insurancefor allworkers;annualholidays
and paidleave for employeesandworkers;retirementand compensationfor
work-relatedaccidents; free distributionof text books; the extension of
primaryeducationfor illiterateadultsand support for the constructionof
inexpensivehousing.25Nor were the Peroniststhe only partysupportingthe
nationalisationof publicgoods and services.Indeed,discussionson the best
means of implementingnationalistpolicies had formed part of Argentine
political debate since the 1930s. Radicaldeputies introducedprojects to
nationalisethe oil industry,the railways,the trams,and the telephone,gas,
but also pressuredthe government
electricityand refrigerationindustries,26
to commititself to parliamentary
debateon questionsof economicpolicy.27
PeronistsandRadicalsalso agreedon the wideningof the franchise.From
the beginningof the 1946 parliamentary
sessions both sides establishedthe
need to widen electoralrepresentationby grantingwomen the vote and to
of nationalterritoriesinto provinces.28
Governcompletethe transformation
ment and opposition deputiespresentedbills on the country'sinstitutional
designwhichwould have implicationsfor the distributionof politicalpower
and,in short,for the partysystem.In truth,both sides endeavouredto turn
their parliamentary
argumentsinto futurevotes. The opposition,however,
to
have
the
femalesuffragelaw passed at a particularsession and
managed
not at thatpreferredby the Peronists.This can thereforebe seen as a relative
opposition success in terms of parliamentarycontrol over the Peronist
Executive.The systematicpostponingof the debateover the transformation
of the nationalterritoriesof El Chaco and La Pampainto provincesfrom
the beginningof the 1946 parliamentary
term to its final approvalin i951,
reflectedan attemptby the governmentto capturethe votes of the new citizens in the electionsto be held in 1952.29
Even so, the natureof the conflictbetweengovernmentandoppositionin
Congresschanged after mid-1948.The apparentresolutionof the UCR's
had allowed
processof reorganisationunderthe directionof the intransigentes
25 Ibid.,
1946,IV, pp. 6io-iz; V, pp. 309, 314 and 317-18; VI, pp. 275-6; XI, pp. 599-600
and 780-781; 1947, I, pp. 484-8; 1948, I, pp. 109-23, 216-17 and 367-70.
26 Ibid.,
1946,I, pp. 94, 123 and 684.
27 Ibid., 1946, I, pp.
563-8, 743-4 and 666-98; III, pp. I35, 345-6; IV, pp. 630-2; V,
pp. 38-40, 62-9, o105-I and 610-735; X, pp. 671-3; 1947, I, PP. 193-4 and 287-327; II,
311 and 451; III, 324; 1948, I, p. 154, 468-9; II, pp. 1.117-1-.118; y II, P. 1.79328 pp. 229,
Ibid.,1946,I, pp. 98-9, 105-7; 1947,I, pp.77,73-98 and 43 5-6; III, pp. 203-58.
29 Ibid.,
1946, I, p. 112; 1951, II, pp. 1.140-1.201. Law 1.532 hadbeen approved
in 1884 to
organisethe national territories.Among its provisions, attention should drawn to the
articleby which any territorycould become a province if it had more than 6o,ooo inhabitantsaccordingto the NationalCensus.
322
the party to maintainthe same quotas of institutionalrepresentationin

Congress after the elections of March 1948. However, the new constitutional
arrangements changed the rules of parliamentarydynamics after 1949. Cer-
tain reforms introducedin the Constitutionaccentuatedthe presidential

nature of the political system. The division of powers continued to be
governedby the preceptsof the I853 Constitution,but the facultiesof the
Executive were increased. The most important change was the possibility of
presidential re-election; other articles widened the president's powers of
affairs.30
interferencein parliamentary
Thereafter,Congress ceased to be the UCR's preferredforum. In the
parliamentary
period that opened with the constitutionalreform,Congress
was slowlytransformedinto a rubberstampfor the government'slegislative
control were more rigid and
proposals;the mechanismsof parliamentary
certainhierarchicaltendencieswere heightened.3' The Chamberof Deputies
ceased to be a nationalforum for politicaldebate and becamethe stageon
which the opposition madeits accusationsagainstthe abusesof the executive, contained within the new constitutional arrangements.32Parliamentary
debate was pepperedwith protests by the opposition over procedures.33

From 1949 onwards, however, the accusations were heightened in an attempt
to conserveparliamentas an organof institutionalcontrolover the Peronist

executive. The Radicals launched a campaign to discredit the government
30 By means of a partialveto, the presidentcould rejectany legislativeproposaland return
only a revisedversion to Congress.A new institutionalfigurewas introduced:'el estadode

alarma'.In thisway,the Executivecoulddispensewith Congressto calla stateof
prevenciony
emergency.The sittingperiodsof the legislatorswere altered:deputiesand senatorswould
sit for six yearswith half the Chamberbeing elected every three years.In this way their
mandateswould coincide with the presidency.Other reformsalteredthe links between
wouldbe notified
ministersand Congressandwith the president.Ministerialarrangements
to the Presidentbefore the Chambers,untyingthe institutionalrelationshipthat the mincontrolover the Execuistershad maintainedwith Congressand reducingparliamentary
tive. M. Serrafero,'El presidencialismoen el sistemapolitico argentino,'PhD. diss., I. U.
Ortegay Gasset-UniversidadComplutensede Madrid,1992, pp. 85-115 and J. Slodky,
(BuenosAires, 1988),ChapterIII.
ElEstadojusticialista
31 A. Ciria, Politica cultura
y
popular:la Argentina
peronista946-i9;,r (Buenos Aires, 1986),
(BuenosAires, 1981),pp. 63-4 andF. Luna,
pp. Iz7-9; P. Waldman,Elperonismo
I94}-i95r
Perony su tiempo.La Argentinaera unafiesta
(Buenos Aires, 1984), I, p. 3 I2.
32 The Radical
representativesexpressedtheir disagreementwith the new Constitutionby
renouncingthe seats of those deputieswho would have sought re-electionin I95o, accordingto the establishedrulewhen they were electedin 1946.After 1950,therefore,they
were reducedin numberby 21 deputiesdue to this decision.
33 The Radicaldeputiescalled for reportsfrom the governmentover the attackson oppositionnewspapersthatoccurredthroughout1947and on the attitudeof the FederalPolice
in these events. They also denouncedvarious violations of the freedom of speech, of
reunionand of the press and the obstaclesthat the opposition facedin gainingaccess to
radio stationsthat steadilycame to belong to people connected to the Peronistgovernment. See, for example,DSCD, 1946, IX, pp. 833-4; 1947, I, p. 141; II, PP. 312-14,
and 1948,IV, p. 3.212.
892-904; III, pp. 128-30, 568-9 and p. 765; IV, p.
58;
in thePolitical
Radicals
andSocialists
toPern 323
Opposition
and callinto questionthe way the Peronistpartyused the state to favourits
own interests,obstructingits opponents'freedomof speech in the process.
committeeto investigatethe privatefinances
They calledfor a parliamentary
of Peronist deputiesand of the most importantpartymemberswho held
governmentposts. They also demandedreports on the way public funds
were grantedto politicalorganisations;the premisesused by committees,
centres and grassrootsorganisationsof the Peronist partyand the use of
materialsand public servicepersonnel for partyactivities.The opposition
also presentedseveralproposalsto ban the use of politicalbadges by civil
servantsor state employees and the display of party symbols in meeting
rooms and other publicbuildings.34
The most heated politicalconflict between governmentand opposition
duringthe final yearsof Per6n's first governmentwas, however, of an institutionalnatureandwas promptedby the suspension,expulsionor removal
of parliamentary
rights from Radicaldeputies in Congressaccused of insultinggovernmentfigures.The impassionedspeeches that resultedreveal
two differentvisions- Peronist and Radical- of the constitutionalityof
politicalaction.35For the Peroniststhe measuresadoptedin the Chamber
against a few Radicaldeputies- Ernesto Sanmartino,Agustin Rodriguez
Araya,RicardoBalbin,Atilio Cattineo and MauricioYadarola- were justifiedby a particularreadingof the Constitution.For the Radicals,on the other
hand,the oppositionin Congressthroughoutthe periodunderconsideration
was based on the defence of constitutionalvalues and the reprisalsagainst
the minoritydeputiesservedto prove to their supportersthat Peronismdid
not respectits politicalopponents.
Airescastthemselves
as thealternative
TheRadicalsoftheProvince
ofBuenos
toPeronism
The steady erosion of the National Congress as a politicalvenue for the
conflict between Peronism and its opponents also signalleda worsening
context more generallyfor the opposition.In its attemptto attractall civil
society to the Peronistcause after the passing of the new Constitutionthe
governmentimplementeda series of authoritarianmechanismswhich limited the areasof expressionavailableto its opponents."6Whileensuringsure
that the opposition parties'position as legal politicalcompetitorswas not
34 Ibid.,1949, III, p. 1954,2.oz2 and2.029-31; IV,p. 3.201, pp. 3o61-2 and 3.624;V, p. 3.830;
1950,I, pp. 227-8, p. 342 and pp. 678-681, II, p. 982; 1951,I, pp. 298-9.
'Peronismo
Sebastiani,
y oposici6npolitica,'pp. 57-64.
35 Formoredetails,seeM. Garcia
36 On the increasing authoritarianism of the Peronist government, see Waldman, Elperonismo,
p. 227 and passim;and W. Little, 'Party and State in Peronist Argentina,1945-1955,

HAHR, 3, No. 4 (Nov. 1973), PP. 645-62.
324
diminished,Peronismmade greateffortsto reducetheir possibilitiesof becominga viablepoliticalalternative.An officialcampaignof intimidationand

attacksbegan,which swiftlyled to the closureof all sectionsof the medianot
openly identifiedwith Peronistpolicies.37Even so, the Radicalsfelt more
committedthan any other partyto the politicalwork of opposition.
In this unfavourablesituation,designingan opposition strategyto confront Peronismrequiredadditionalactionsto those carriedout in Congress.
The unificationof all the internalforceswithinthe UCR would facilitatethis
hadgainedcontrolof the National
decision-making
process.The intransigentes
Committee the party's maximum decision-makingbody - in February
1948.However,the differencesbetweenRadicalstook on new characteristics
and could no longer be reduced to discrepanciesbetween unionistas
and
This
internal
was
transformed
a
into
between
intransigentes.
struggle
dispute
leadersof the keyelectoralregionsover the styleof the party'sleadership.The
fiercestconfrontationwas over controlof the organisational
structuresof the
UCR and establishedthe provincialrepresentativesof C6rdobaandBuenos
Airesas the maincompetingprotagonists.Caughtbetweenthe two, the sectors previouslyidentifiedas unionistas
(for theirsupportfor electoralalliances
with other parties)had, from 1950 onwards,reunitedtheir forces around
UnidadRadicaland, from their control over the committeeof the Federal
Capital,endeavouredto find a space in which to act and avoid being relegatedto the sidelinesof the internalpower struggle.38
Generalelectionswere held in 1952 and Per6n stood for re-electionfor
anothersix-yearterm. The UCR had to convince the electorate,by all the
meansat its disposal,thatit representeda distinctpoliticaloption and could
establishitself as the referencepoint for anti-Peronism.Not all the intransigente
groupswererepresentedin the NationalCommittee;those in control
were basicallyCordobanintransigentes
led by AmadeoSabattini.As theywere
in
interested
this
especially
maintaining position of internaldominance,in
the face of the increasingprominencewhich other intransigente
leaders,such
as Balbin,were gainingin nationalpolitics,they were unableto co-ordinate
oppositionalpolicies that would bringtogetherall sectors of anti-Peronism.
Insteadit was the intransigente
sectorsof Radicalismin the provinceof Buenos
to legitimisethe closureof
7 To this end, Parliamenthad formalisedthe ComisidnTisca-Decker
(27 May195o), p. 895,this commission
oppositionnewspapers.Accordingto TheEconomist
had closed more than 15o newspapersby the end of April 1950. Cf M. Plotkin,Maadana
es
SanPerdn,p. 126. On governmentcontrolover the mass media,see, P. Sirvmn,
los
Perodny
mediosde comunicacidn
(Ip43-I9y) (Buenos Aires, 1984); E. F. Sinchez Zinny, El cultode la
Historiadocumentada
dela Segunda
Tirania
I (BuenosAires, I 8), ChapterII,
infamia.
argentina,
and O. Confalonieri,Perdncontra
Peron(BuenosAires, I956), pp. I81-95.
38 On the reunificationof the unionistas,
see C. Tcach, Sabattinismoyperonismo,
pp. 147-5 3.
Radicals
andSocialists
toPeron 325
Aires that sought to transform themselves into the most credible political
reference point within the opposition to Per6n between 1949 and 195 I.39
The intransigentes
of Buenos Aires were not immune to internal differences,
on
the
centring
differing visions of their principal leaders, Balbin y Moises
to
as
what should be the political orientation of a party with
Lebensohn,
deep roots in national history. The former, with a more pragmatic approach
to politics and impressive public speaking abilities, moved within those
spaces of political confrontation which made him the opposition leader
with the greatest chance of challenging Per6n for the presidency. As deputy
for Buenos Aires province and president of the opposition group his main
platform was the National Congress. However, he neglected his work as
president of the Buenos Aires committee of the UCR, which he had won in
internal elections at the end of I947.40 Towards the end of 1949 he was
accused of contempt by the government and lost his parliamentaryimmunity, following his public declarations in the city of Rosario.41These events
consolidated his position as leader of the opposition and affected the political
tried to take advantage of in
opportunities that the Buenos Aires intransigentes
order to gain control over the party's national decision-making structures. In
order to lead the party, it was necessary to obtain the presidency of the
UCR's National Committee. This was the key position because it selected the
leaders
Radical candidates for the next presidential elections. Two intransigente
contested the position: Balbin and Santiago Del Castillo, the latter allied with
the followers of Sabattini. In February 195o Del Castillo was finally elected
president of the National Committee with the support of the unionistatendencies.42The tensions between the intransigentes
of Buenos Aires and C6rdoba
were resolved in favour of the latter, paradoxicallyas the result of a pact with
the sector which had been its most tenacious internal enemy. This election
anticipated a new correlation of forces at the heart of Radicalism. Barely
a month later, in March 195o, Balbin suffered another political defeat
when he lost the elections for the governorship of Buenos Aires province
to the Peronist candidates.43It was, however, his imprisonment after the
39 For more details, see M. Garcia Sebastiani, 'Radicales vs. peronistas en las elecciones
presidenciales de 1951 : Balbin, Lebensohn y el comit&de la UCR de la provincia de Buenos

Aires,' Ciclos en la Economia,Estadoy Sociedad,IX, vol. IX, No. 18 (2nd semester i999),
pp.91-142.
On the internal Radical elections in Buenos Aires, ProvinciasUnidas, No. 48 (19 Aug.
1947); on the reorganisation of the Buenos Aires committee, G. Del Mazo, El radicalismo,
pp. 76-92.
41 M. Monteverde, 'Balbin preso,' Todoes Historia, No. 74 (1981), pp. 8-29.
42 On the
development of the party meeting, see ElDia, 6 and 9 Feb. 195o0.
43 The Peronist ticket headed by Domingo Mercante obtained 486,549 votes and the UCR
283,454. According to the authorities of the Buenos Aires provincial committee of the
UCR the results had been encouraging because they implied a 32% rise for the Radicals
40
326
Buenos Aires elections that endowed him with a symbolicvalue that his
comradesin the provincewere able to capitaliseon to createan
intransigente
of
Radicalism
as the defender of civil libertiesin its politicalfight
image
with Peronism.The campaignthatthe BuenosAiresintransigentes
mountedin
favourof Balbin'sfreedombecamea catalysingelementin the Radicalstrategyin the contextof the comingelectoralconfrontationandthe limitsplaced
on oppositionactivity.Balbin'ssuccessin becomingthe most credibleoption
for anti-Peronismwas due,to a greatextent,to the activitiesthatLebensohn
carriedout as presidentof the UCR provincialcommitteein Buenos Aires.
Lebensohnwas one of the leaderswho workedhardestto endow Radicalism withan organisationwhichwouldensurethatthe party'spoliciesreflected
the concernsof the averagemember.44He thereforeworkedto organisethe
its youthsection.He was presidentof
grassrootsof the partyandparticularly
the BuenosAirescommitteeof the UCR fromDecember 1949onwardsand
from this positionpromotedthe party'spoliticalactivityin the province.He
managedto commit the Radicalactiviststo a campaignof civil mobilisation
and politicalproselytismin order to projectthe partyas a force in national
politics and increase the effect of the Balbin Case among the remaining
opposition partiesand the generalpublic.One outcome was the establishment of theJornadapor
deBalbin,to raisefundsandorganisevisitsto
la libertad
Olmos prison, as well as numerouspublic meetingsin favourof Balbin's
release.At the sametime,Lebensohnpromotedthe affiliationof new Radical
members,acceleratedthe creationof secretariatsandsub-committeesfor the
political, technical and legal briefing of the party's representatives,and
oversaw the creationof a permanentfund for propagandaand a printing
press for the diffusionof Radicalactivitiesin the province.45
The Buenos Aires provinceintransigentes
increasingrole as the focus for
to
Peronism
was
not
welcomed
opposition
by the sectors of intransigencia
which
still
maintained
their
control
over the nationalstructuresof
sabattinista,
the party.In November 1950o,Balbin had been sentencedto five yearsin
prison,which put his possibilitiesof becomingthe UCR'spresidentialcandidateon ice for the comingelections.It was an idealsituationfor advancing
the alignmentof the internaltendencies within Radicalism;the national
leadershipof Radicalismwas at stake.At the National Conventionof the
UCR debatesclearlydemonstratedthe differenceswithin the intransigencia
at
comparedto the previouscongressionalelection held in the province.Boletindela Union
CivicaRadical,No. 12 (8 July 1950), p. 6.
44 On the work of Lebensohn,see M. Lebensohn,Pensamientoy
accion(BuenosAires, 1956);
E. Pasalaqua,'Moises Lebensohn:apunteshist6ricos,'Entrelineas,
No. 8 (198o),pp. 4-7,
and A. G6mez, La signicacidnde Lebensohnen el radicalismo(Buenos Aires, 1993).
45 On the work of Lebensohn at the committee of the UCR of Buenos Aires province, see
Boletin de la Unidn Civica Radical, No. 12 (8 July I95o), p. 6.
toPerdn 327
inthePolitical
andSocialists
Radicals
Opposition
defended electoral abstention as the best
nationallevel. The sabattinistas
strategyof oppositionto Peronism,a position also eventuallysupportedby
the renovatedradicalismo
unionista.46
Defendingabstentionimpliedtwo things.
in which the opposition could still
areas
it
meant
the
few
First,
giving up
connect with public opinion. Second,it restrictedthe likelihoodof Radical
leadersopposed to sabattinismo
risingthroughthe internalmechanismsof the
their
in
leader
With
party.
prison and their rejection of their Cordoban
from Buenos Aires province
comrades'calls for abstention,the intransigentes
faceda difficultconjuncture.Whenthe governmentgrantedBalbina pardon
in earlyi 95 , the prospectsof the Buenos Aires provinceRadicalscompeting internallywith Sabattiniandfightingfor Balbin'scandidaturefor the next
presidentialelectionswere reawakened.However,the alreadyunfavourable
conditionsfor the oppositionworsenedat the beginningof 195i.
The Peronistswanted to make sure their leaderwas re-elected,and deployedall the institutionalmechanismsat theircommandto tilt the political
playingfield againstthe opposition parties.A trade union dispute in the
railwayswhichhad startedat the end of 1950oandlaterspreadto otherlabour
organisations,resultedin a series of arrestsof workers,union leadersand
politicians.It was a foretasteof the worseningof relationsbetweengovernment and opposition.47The closureof La Prensafollowedimmediately.This
nationalnewspaperhad been a stubbornopponent of Per6n'sbut, like La
Nacio'n,had managedto survivethe governmenttake-overof the press.48
This furtherlimitedthe potentialfor expressinganti-governmentopinions.
However,the finalblow for the oppositionpartiescamewith the new electoral arrangementsand the decision to bring the presidentialelections forwardto November 195 1. The principalnoveltyof the new electorallaw was
the substitutionof the incomplete list system- establishedby the Saenz
PefiaAct - with a first-past-the-postsystem,togetherwith a ban on the creaffectedthe Radicals
ation of electoralcoalitions.These reformsparticularly
in orderto
boundaries
becausethe governmentgerrymandered
constituency
reducethe opposition'selectoralrepresentationto a minimum.49
46 Tcach,
Sabattinismoyperonismo,
pp. I47-8.
47 For the originsof the railconflictin the relationshipbetweengovernmentand opposition,
Ecosee W. Little, 'La organizaci6nobreray el Estado peronista,1943-1955,' Desarrollo
nomico,No. 75 (Oct.-Dec. 1979), PP. 331-7z; L. Doyon, 'Conflictos obreros durante
Revistade CiendasSodales(Oct.-Dec. 1977),and
el regimenperonista,'Desarrollo
Econodmico.
su tiempo(BuenosAires, 1986),II, pp. 52-6o.
F. Luna,Perodny
48 For the conflictwith La Prensa,
see Luna,Peren
II, pp. 13-31 and Sirven,Perdny
y su tiempo,
losmedios
decomunicadcin,
pp. 94-I 15.
49 On the implicationsof the distributionof electoralgeographyon politicalalternation,see
P. Taylor,G. Gudgin and R. Johnston, 'The Geographyof Representation:A Review of
andTheirConsequences
RecentFindings,'in B. GrofmanandA. Lijphart,ElectoralLaws
(New
York, 1986),pp. i83-92.
32 8
The Buenos Aires provinceintransigentes

had to adaptto the new political
ruleswithoutrenouncingtheirreducedpossibilitiesof actingas politicalcompetitorsloyal to the constitution.The 1951electionswere to put the UCR's
possibilitiesof uniting anti-Peronismto the test. While the party'sother
internalmovements speculatedwhether electoralabstentionwas the best
committeditselfto
wayof opposingPeronism,the BuenosAiresintransigencia
its
of
as
authentic
Radicalismin the
projecting campaign politicalproselytism
anti-Peroniststruggle.It continuedthe line of politicalaction it had developed since 1949, but also promotedthree types of campaignactivities:the
holding of public assemblies,the disseminationof the partypress and the
organisationof sectorialcongresses.
Withthe aimof promotingBalbinas the best oppositioncandidatefor the
elections, the Buenos Aires Radicalsorganiseda series of public meetings
in differentareasof the province throughout1951 in favourof the 'esclarwith the participationof the principalleaders,
ecimiento
dela verdad
argentina',
nationaland provincialdeputiesof the intransigencia.50
The weeklyAdelante,
in
La
which
commanded
the
Plata,
published
supportof the intransigencia
to
Balbin, was able to successfullyoutwit governmentpergroup loyal
secutionof the oppositionpress and becamea platformfor the diffusionof
partydoctrineand criticismof the lack of freedomof speech for the opposition.51Finallythe sectorialcongressesheld by the Buenos Aires Radicals
between 195oand i 95I on the problemsof farmers,youngpeople,workers
andwomen, clearlydemonstratedthe openingup of the partyto new sectors
of society,generallyopposed to monopolistand corporatelymanagedeconomic policies.52The proposalsthe Radicalsunveiledat the National Congress had shown that the opposition was also in favourof improvingthe
living conditionsof certainsectors and had developedadvancedsocialand
economicprogrammesto achievethese ends. The debatespromotedby the
BuenosAiresintransigentes
at these sectorialmeetingsmadeit clearthatit was
not only Peronismwhich had a progressiveproject for the country.The
constructionsof modernRadicalismthatwere
ideologicalandprogrammatic
formed duringPer6n's first governmentlaid the foundationsfor the most
5o
0...
elpresidente
delBloque
suluchaen
parlamentario
Nacionaldela UCR,Ricardo
Balbin,hainiciado
las verdades
la callepara hacerconocer
queelgobiernonopermitequese hagaporlaprensaopor la radio,'
de la verdad
see also the
I. On the campaign'esclarecimiento
Adelante,4 Feb. 195
argentina';
51
52
editionsof 24 March 1951 and 5 Apr. 1951; and UCR, Informe

delcomitidela Provincia
de
Buenos
Aires(195 ), pp. I-2.
See, for example,Adelante,24 Feb. i951 and 4 Apr. 1951.
'
UCR,Comitede la provinciade BuenosAires,I Congreso
libertad
(Tandil,i i
AgrarioTierravy
19 5o); I CongresoAgrario 'Tierray Libertad' (Bahia Blanca 2 i and 22 July 1951);

I CongresoGremial(Avellaneda, and 12zAug. 195I) and I Congreso
Femenino(Lanlts, 16 y 17
i
y 12 Nov.
Aug.
I951).
Radicals
in thePolitical
andSocialists
toPerdn 329
Opposition
importantcharacteristicsof the Argentinetwo-partysystem. Once again,
the differencesbetweenPeronismand Radicalismwere not ideological.The
reasonswhy Argentineshave at differentpoints preferredone or other of
the two partiesare more a questionof politicalstyle.
of BuenosAiresprovincestillneededto takean
Even so, the intransigentes
importantstep withinthe partyin orderto ensurepoliticalleadershipof antiPeronismat a nationallevel. The UCR had yet to select its presidentialand
vice-presidentialcandidatesfor the 1951elections.The RadicalConvention,
held at the beginningof August 195I, backedthe Balbin-Frondiziticket,but
forces was also made clear.53The candidates
the divisionin the intransigente
were proclaimedin the absence of the Cordobaprovincialdelegateswho,
even though they controlledthe party structuresand enjoyedthe implicit
for their abstentionistpositions, were unable to
support of the unionistas
overcomethe consensuscreatedby the BuenosAiresRadicalsas the clearest
politicalalternativefor the oppositionto Peronism.
Thesocialists
Perdnandsearch
to recover
lostvoters
oppose
forformulas
Non-institutionalopposition to the Peronist government encompasseda
very broad spectrum.This separateuniverse comprisedcivil associations,
journalsand celebritieswith influentialideas,all of whose criticismsfound a
certainecho in public opinion. Some had close contactswith the political
partiesbut otherswere merelyorganisationswith clearanti-Peronistconvictions.The PartidoComunista,the Trotskyistsandthe PS completedthe lineup of the opposition front. The communistshad played an active role in
formingthe Uni6n Democritica,but historicallytheirrole in Argentinepoliticallife had been limited,focusinglargelyon the tradeunions.Supportfor
Per6namongthe workingclassrequireda reformulationof the communists'
positionsand the acceptanceof some governmentpolicies.Theiractionsdid
not bringthem into any majorconflictwith the government.54
The case of
the PS was, however,different.The resultsof the 1946electionshad left the
partywithoutinstitutionalrepresentationat Statelevel for the firsttime since
the instaurationof democracyin Argentina.Even in the FederalCapitaland
the Provinceof Buenos Aires- both traditionalareasof electoralsupportthe PS did not garnerenoughvotes to gain representationeitherat provincial level or in the National Congress.Moreover,throughoutthe Peronist
53 On the development of the meeting of the UCR, ElDia, 5-7 Aug. 195I.
54 For the evolution of the Partido Comunista during the decade of Peronism,see J. J. Real,
Treintaanos de historiaargentina(Buenos Aires, 1962).
330
decade,the Buenos Aires municipalgovernmentdispensedwith its Concejo

Deliberante,
traditionallyan influentialareafor the PS's politicalactivities.55
The 1946 electionswere thereforea complete disasterfor the partyand
markedthe beginningof the declineof what had been one of the most important political forces in Argentinepolitical life in the first half of the
twentiethcentury.The resultinglackof representationat national,provincial
and municipallevels deniedthe PS accessto the most essentialforafor political opposition. In addition, their unexpectedpolitical defeat had even
deeperimplications,questioningthe party'sveryformof politicalactivityand
social mediation.From his position as Secretariode Trabajoy Previsi6n,
Per6n had establishedcontactswith recognisedunion leadersaffiliatedto
the PS who would become key figuresfor the configurationof his support
base.56At the same time, socialisttradeunion leaderswere conspicuously
absentfrom the higherechelonsof PS, which was heraldedby middleclass
professionals.Nevertheless,the absence of the socialistsfrom parliament
did not mean theirwithdrawalfrom the politicalstruggle.The PS expressed
its oppositionto Peronismin differentwaysto Radicalism,whichhadgained
withinthe representative
institutionsof the statefromwhich
representatives
to oppose Peronism.
The socialistsnever forgavePer6n for achievingthe politicalmobilisation
of Argentineworkers,as this hadbeen the mainobjectiveof the PS sincethe
beginningof the twentiethcentury.Peronismhad taken up the socialists'
demandsin favourof the workingclass, provokingstaunchantagonismof
socialistleaderstowardsPer6nand his government.PS oppositionwas consistent in its attacks,criticismand argumentsand contributedto the consolidationwithin anti-Peronistopinion of the idea that Peronismwas the
Argentineversion of the Europeaninter-wartotalitarianmovements.This
notion was to form the basis of every anti-PeronistplatformafterPer6n's
overthrowin 1955.
Once the 1946electoralresultshad been assimilated,and in an attemptto
recover its credibilityamong voters who had defected to Per6n, socialist
leadersadvocateda generationalchangewithinthe party.They promised,as
on other occasions, 'nuevosmitodos(y la) colaboracidn
de un admirable
femrvorosa
to
calls
were not
de
but
these
contingentejdvenes'57 strengthenparty activity,
in Buenos
Aires,1911-1942(Cambridge,1993). Also,
55 See, R. Walter,PoliticsandUrbanGrowth
by the same author,'MunicipalPolitics and Governmentin Buenos Aires, 1918-i930,'
Studiesand WorldAffairs, XVI, No. (May 1974), PP. 173-97.
Journalof Interamerican
z
56 This was the case, for example, of Angel Borlenghi or Alitilo Bramuglia,former PS
members who later formed part of Per6n's cabinet, as Interior Ministerand Foreign
Minister respectively, Rein, Peronismo,populismoy politica, pp.
guardiasindicaly Perdn,pp. 50-89.
1-83 and Torre, La vieja
57 La Nacidn, 7 May 1946.
Radicals
andSocialists
to Perdn 33
accompanied by political opening within party ranks. Instead the fate of the
party was jealously guarded by a small group of historic leaders. Deprived of
an institutional forum for their anti-government stance, the socialists were
not particularlyinnovative in seeking alternatives. Instead they concentrated
their efforts on tried and tested methods, using long-established proselytising
practices such as public meetings and the party newspaper, La Vanguardia.
The socialist press became the fiercest critic Per6n had faced since taking
office. La Vanguardia
had been restructuredas a weekly in January 1945, after
decades as a daily newspaper. Despite this clear sign of the party's decline,
the newspaper's readership was not limited to the circle of party members
and followers; it was well received among certain professional groups,
students and, in general, all those who defended democratic and progressive
principles. The accusations levelled against Per6n, his wife and leading members of his governments became steadily more strident in the newspaper's
editorials, comments, news stories and cartoons. The government attempted
to have the paper closed down on repeated occasions. Eventually, in August
1947, the Direcci6n General de la Policia of Buenos Aires ordered the
closure of the Vanguardia'sprinting press.58Naturally, the effective banning
of the paper infuriated the party leaders.59It was to prove a turning point:
from that moment on, the PS redoubled its criticism of the government and
restrictions on freedom of speech and called for certain changes in the internal organisation of the party to be speeded up. The socialists felt that the
restrictions on the opposition's freedom of speech justified their comparison
of Peronist and totalitarian methods. This became the basis for the party's
arguments in the March 1948 parliamentaryand municipal elections. They
accused the government of having
a endiosar
a laparejapresidencial
destinada
enunamaquinadepropaganda,
convertido
(para)
las elecciones
de marZo... Para ello... tendremos
de nuevopromesas
preparar
aguicopiosas,
naldosdobles,
a la marchanta
....60
pan dulce,sidra,
juguetes,dinerodistribuido
The socialist share of the vote rose by ten per cent compared to 1946 and
Teodoro Bronzini won a seat for the party in the provincial assembly of
Buenos Aires. Although the PS did not receive enough votes to gain representation in the National Congress, the results were less catastrophic for
the party than the previous election. The party's electoral commission
stressed the need to build on this gain in future elections and proposed new
considered
the socialistnewspaper's
criticismof EvaPer6n'sexpenses
58 The government
La Prensa,
21 Aug.1947.
duringhertripto Italyas 'unaimposturaperiodistica'.
In the'Declaradcin
delComitiEjecutivo
in thefaceof theclosureof theofficesof La
Nacional'
thesocialists
denounced
theeventas'... unepisodio
encaminado
Vanguardia,
definitivo
delproceso
a destruir
losderechos
but alsousedthe opportunity
to attackthe
democraticosfundamentales,'
Peronistgovernment's
policiesof economicandsocialfavours,La Prensa,
29Aug.1947.
60JuanAntonioSolari,'El afiopolitico,'Anuario
(1948),pp. 20-22.
delPartido
Sodcialista
9
332
MarcelaGardaSebastiani
methods of politicalpropagandaand campaignorganisation.The cornerof some of the functionsof

stone of this approachwas the decentralisation
the party's Comite Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN) and greater contact with
the electoratethroughmore directpropaganda.61
These proposalsrequired
in
and
the
party'sorganisation
changes
politicalprogramme.In mid-1948,
the PS held its biannualNationalCongress,whichbecamethe scene of a debate that the leadershipknewwas crucialfor the party'spoliticalsurvival.If
the PS wanted to remainin the political ring as a serious contenderin
nationalpoliticswith an acceptableelectoralbase it had to instigatechanges
in its organisation,leadershipand programme.62Several aspects of the
were modified to enable greaterpolitical flexibility,
party's CartaOrganica
avoidsectarianismandmodernisethe organisation.For example,the number
of membersrequiredto open socialistcentreswas reduced;the membership
of the party'sCEN was increasedand access to the Executivebecameless
restricted,the minimumage for membershipwasloweredandvariousrestrictions were lifted (religiousmarriage,workingin gamblinghalls or having
fought in duels of honour) that had hinderedthe party'scontactwith civil
society.6' The need to modernisethe party'sprogrammewas not even disputed. Despite these reformsthe PS found it difficultto jettisonits former
identityand afterweighingup the difficultiesof clandestineactivity,decided
that La Vanguardia
still commandedgreat prestigeand loyaltyamong antiPeronistpublic opinion and should continue to be published.Other party
and subsequentlyNuevasBasespublicationsappeared- such as El Socialista
as part of socialist initiativesto circulatetheir ideas, principlesand programmes.
In its desperateattemptsto preservea foothold in the politicalarenaand
developoppositionalternativesthatcouldinfluencethe electorate'sdecision,
the PS took a number of decisions which were at odds with the party's
traditionalstance. At the election of representativesto the Constituent
Convention,it urgedvoters to cast blankballotpapersas a show of opposition to constitutionalreform;this caused open conflictswithin the party,
whichPeronismusedto capturesupporters.64
However,the differenceswithin
the leadershipdeepened at the party'sgeneralassemblyin 1950. Discrepanciesbetween socialistleaderswere not a new phenomenonin the party's
61
62
'Informe de la Comisi6nelectoralnacional,'in XXXVT Congreso

NacionaldelPartidoSodalista:28 ordinarioy9 extraordinario,
es sobre
Accordingto Bronzini,who presidedthe meeting,'Nuestro
masimportante
problema
de
delasideas.Hemossidosiempre
todounproblema
deorganizacion.
elpartido
elpartido
Siemprefuimos
asimilar
estasealaformadequeseamos
dotado
decapacidadpara
elpartido
grande,
losprincipios.
QuizaZ
El Socialista,
12-Aug. 1948.
hombres
al ladodelosviejosmilitantes,'
quetrabajen
nuevos
63 El Socialista, 24 Aug. I948.

64 The activists who did not share the party's decision even edited a paper with the title
UnidadSodcialista
which appeared to have government support, El Sodialista,14 Dec. 1948.
Radicals
andSocialists
inthePolitical
toPerdn 333
Opposition
history;indeed,some had given rise to splintergroupsand the formationof
Nevertheless,the agendathatseveralsocialseparatepoliticalorganisations.65
ist leadersproposed at the 1950 assemblyclearlystated, for the first time
since Per6n had emergedonto the politicalscene, that the partyneeded to
understandwhy a broadsector of Argentinecitizenshad supportedPeronism. The debaterevolvedaroundthe party'sprogrammefor the upcoming
generalelections.Therewere two ideologicallydivergentprojects:the minorityproposaldefendedbyJulio GonzAlez,one of the youngestmembersof
the CEN and distancedfromveteranpartyleaderslike Nicolis Repettoand
Enrique Dickmann; and the majority proposal defended by Americo
Ghioldi.For GonzAlez,the discussionmeant'tocarfondo'
and he accusedthe
otherside of lackingthe self-criticismneededto discoverthe reasonsunderlyingits politicaldeclineandits failureto reachout to the workingclass.He
proposeda generalreviewof the party'saimsand,above all,calledfor the reexaminationof the party'shistoric socialistprogramme.Gonzalez argued
that this could no longer be distinguishedas exclusiveto the PS, because
otherpoliticalgroupshad appropriatedthe ideas and put some of them into
practice.G6nzalez'sdid not win the day,however:the majorityof socialist
leaderssupportedGhioldi'smotion that the partywas followingthe correct
ideologicallines, but the open dissidencedisplayedat the assemblyforetold
a futureof irreversiblediscrepanciesat the heartof the organisation.66
A review
oftheopposition
afterthe 9/Jrelections
While a fresh election victory for Per6n was hardlyunexpected,the early
electionsof November 319 I held specialpoliticalinterestfor two reasons.
First,theywould measurerelativesupportfor Per6n and his opponentsat a
nationallevel; voting for UCR candidatesessentiallymeant not voting for
Per6n. Second, female suffragehad more than doubled the electoralroll
since 1946.The opposition faced considerabledifficultiesin the campaign.
Peronism'snear-monopolyof radioleft littleroom for the Radicalcandidates
to spreadtheirelectoralmessage.67
Balbinand Frondiziaddressedtraditional
65
deunmilitante
On the splitsin the PS, see Dickmann,Recuerdos
socialista,
pp. 197-242 andR.
Walter,TheSocialist
chapterssix and
PartyofArgentine,
18o-i93o (Austin,1977),particularly
ten.
66
67
On the differencesbetween Ghioldi and Gonzalez, see NuevasBases(15Nov. I95o);

delPartidoSocialista.
sobresu accidnfutura
J. Gonzilez, La oportunidad
(BuenosAires,
Refjexiones
el seiorPerdn
o
gPerdn
essocialista
y el PartidoSodalista,
195o); and A. Ghioldi,Los trabajadores,
? Discurso
enel_37congreso
delPS (BuenosAires, 1950).
retrigrado
pronunciado
From mid-I947, the majorityof radiostationshad not managedto escape the control of
the mediaby the governmentandbecamethe propertyof companieslinkedto government
I, pp. zo206-8;
Confalonieri,Perdncontra
Perdn,
figures.SanchezZinny,El cultodela infamia,
pp. 190-i;
and Sirven, Perdny los mediosde comunicacidn,

p. i i8.
334
politicalmeetings as part of an extravagantnation-widetour to reach the

voters,althoughthose who hadalreadydecidednot to vote for Per6nneeded
little persuasion.As we have seen, not all Radicalsagreedwith the idea of
presentingcandidatesat theseelectionsor withthe candidatesfinallyselected.
The alternativeof joininga militarymomentto preventPer6nfrombeingreelectedpresidentwas attractiveto severalsectorsof Radicalism,particularly
and the renovatedUnidadRadical.Participation
the intransigentes
sabattinistas
of
these
several
leaders
by
groups in the revolt led by GeneralBenjamin
in
Menendez, mid-campaign,showeda clearchangein the opposition'sview
of their chances of participatingin a fair political contest.68The Radical
leadership'ssilence over this event gave certain credibilityto those who
sought to widen the politicalspace for oppositionby abandoningthe commitmentto respectpoliticalrulesand challengingthe constitutionalorder.
The November 1951 electionresultssecuredPeronism'shold on power
andwere the best politicalindicatorof the relativestrengthof Peronismand
its adversaries.Per6n won almost 62 per cent of the vote and the UCR
approximately32 per cent; the otherpoliticalgroupsgainedsix per cent.The
concentrationof the anti-Per6nvote in Radicalhands confirmedthe Peronists and the UCR as the main parties at nationallevel and the practical
disappearanceof the remainingoppositionparties- the PartidoDem6crata
Progresista,the PartidoDem6crata(ex PartidoDem6crataNacional),and
the PS. In this sense, these electionscan be seen as the originof Argentina's
two-partysystemwhich thereafter- wheneverdemocraticcompetitionwas
possible- consisted of a contest between Peronism and Radicalism.The
new electoralruleshad restrictedthe opposition'schancesof representation.
Despite their relativeshareof the vote, the UCR won only 14 seats in the
NationalCongresswhilethe Peronistpartygained135 (io and 90 per cent of
the total,respectively).
Peronismhad imposeda redefinitionof the relationshipbetweengovernment and opposition,and the unequaldistributionof institutionalresources
at the beginningof Per6n'ssecond term of governmentmade the work of
opposition much more difficult.This eventuallybecame a factor in convincinganti-Peronistsof the legitimacyof challengingthe constitutionalorder. Both Menendez'sfailedcoup in November 1951and a laterconspiracy
headedby ColonelJose F. Suarez(uncoveredin Februaryi9522)revealedthe
presenceof differentactorsand conflictswithinthe oppositionto Peronism.
The involvementof severalRadicaland socialistleadersin the militaryrevolts signalledthe possibilityof creatinga broaderopposition front to the
68 On Menindez's coup, see R. Potash, El ejircito
y la politicaen la Argentina(II), 194J-1962.
De Pern a
(Buenos Aires, 1986), II, pp. 176-94 and D. A. Tussie and A. Fedeman,
Frondi:
'El golpe de Men~ndez,' Todoes Historia, No. 67 (Nov. 1972), pp. o10-23.
RadicalsandSocialists
toPeron 335
government, thus increasing the polarisation of Argentine political life between Peronists and anti-Peronists. Following his electoral consolidation and
with a view to spiking opposition 'disloyalty', Per6n speculated about creating a climate of dialogue with opposition forces. At the beginning of 19 52
contacts were established with leading members of the conservative Partido
Dem6crata and the PS, including Reynaldo Pastor and Enrique Dickmann.
As a result, Pastor lost the chairmanship of his party and Dickmann was
expelled from the select group of socialist leaders, but the change did allow
several opposition leaders implicated in the military revolts to return to the
political stage.69Peron's proposals for dialogue were partly accepted by the
Radical grassroots. In June 195 2 the National Committee decided to mandate its parliamentarygroup to hold a meeting with the Interior Ministry to
demand the release of several political prisoners implicated in the military
coup and also the lifting of the 'estadode guerrainterno',decreed after its
failure.70 In the end, the meeting never took place and it was Cris61ogo
Larralde,party agent of the Federal Capital's committee who, on the pretext
of denouncing the obstacles placed on the organisation of the party's internal
elections in this district, met Angel Borlenghi to agree the release of some of
his colleagues from prison.71
The government's more open stance towards the opposition was due to
its need for the existence of an alternative political identity to Peronism and
for its need to be perceived as flexible. However, Peronism's electoral success had allowed it to extend its power to different areas of society and this
limited the possibilities of compromise or political dialogue with the opposition parties. The Peronist state endeavoured to politicise certain aspects of
everyday life and popular culture such as education, the military, the universities, the public administration, the media, welfare and sport, eventually
creating a symbolic exchange between Per6n and his followers and the creation of a political imagery without equal in Argentine political culture.72
Among the many examples of this are the social and welfare services carried
out by the Fundaci6n Eva Per6n for the working classes and the poorest
sectors of society in general; party political indoctrination in textbooks and
through cultural and leisure activities organised for students and youth; and
the control of radio stations by individuals close to the government. These
69
Dickmann's approach to Per6n was promoted by A. Borlenghi, see M. D. Bejar, 'La

entrevista Dickmann-Per6n,' Todoes Historia, No. 143 (Apr. 1979), pp. 83-93.
70 Tcach, Sabattinismo
yperonismo, p. 198.
71
F. Luna, Perdn)ysu tiempo,III (Buenos Aires, 1987), p. 247.
72 See
Plotkin, Maulanaes San Perdn,particularly part IV; Rein, Peronismo,populismoy politica,
chapter III; M. Esti Rein, Politicsand Educationin Argentina,1946-1962 (New York, 1998);
J. L. Bernetti and A. Puiggr6s, Peronismo,culturapoliticayeducacidn
(sy4y-yyy) (Buenos Aires,
1993) and Ciria, Politicay culturapopular.
336
MarcelaGardaSebastiani
attemptsto politicise society in order to achieve 'una comunidad

organizada'
contributedto an increasein the polarisationof Argentinepoliticallife between Peronismand anti-Peronism.With this climate,so unfavourablefor
oppositionparticipation,certainanti-Peronistsfrom politicalandintellectual
backgroundsbecameinvolvedin conspiratorialplans.In short, the governmentpartyandthe oppositionpursuedthe sameobjective:to underminethe
legitimacyof theiropponent'sparticipationin the publicsphere.Thisclimate
of politicalinstabilitymoved up a gearin AprilandMay 1953when the party
in the FederalCapital
headquartersof the socialists,Radicalsand demdcratas
were attackedand burnt down. The governmentaccused the opposition
parties of causing these incidents themselves and their leaderswere imprisoned.The relationshipbetween governmentand opposition reacheda
high point of politicaltension.
Internaldisputesin the Radicaland socialistpartiesgrew apace.The PS
congress in Mar de Plata in April 1953 refused to listen to Dickmann's
explanationof his approachto the governmentand he was expelled.With
the backingof other leaderssuch as Repetto,Ghioldi or AliciaMoreaude
Justo,Dickmannwent on the offensive.He foundedthe PartidoSocialistade
la Revoluci6nNacional and called for the legal dissolutionof the PS. The
judge ruled in favour of the dissidentgroup, proclaimedthe lapse of the
PS CEN's authorityand transferredthe control of publicationof La Vanguardiato a group close to Dickmann,now recognisedas the only socialist
authority.The politicalrow causedby Dickmann'sapproachto the Peronist
governmenthad been latentwithin the socialistgroupingsince the beginnings of Peronism.The differencesexpressedby severalsocialistleadersin
the searchfor a strategyto recovervotes and politicalspace from Peronism
had been constantsince 1946.The period had also witnessedthe expulsion
of middle-ranking
partyofficialswho had opted for a shift towardsPer6n.73
In Dickmann'scase therewere more seriousimplicationsbecausehe was a
historic socialistleader who had held key posts in the party directorate's
institutionalapparatusfor decades. Moreover, this separationprovoked
family splits among partymembersrelatedby marriageor descent which
were never to be reconciled.In the end, Dickmannand his groupaccepted
the criticismslevelled four years earlier by Julio Gonzalez in the 1950o
partycongress.Dickmann,who relentlesslyprotestedagainsthis expulsion
73 This was the case, for example,of AlfredoL6pez,who was accusedof beginningtalkswith
the governmentagainst the partyline; of Carlos MariaBravo from the administrative
commissionof socialistcentreVicente L6pez (BuenosAires province);and ofJose Oriente Cavalieri,who expresshis objectionsto partypolicy throughEl Socalista,the thenofficial PS newspaper due to the closure of La Vanguardia.The party's CEN held an
extraordinary meeting at the end of 1948 to decree the expulsion of these middle-ranking
officials. El Socialista, 14 Dec. 1948.
inthePolitical
toPeron 337
andSocialists
Radicals
Opposition
from the party, justifiedhis position of collaborationwith the Peronist
se embarco
enunaintransigencia
aburdelpartido
governmentbecause'la direccidn
rida,en una oposicidn
suicida,en una luchaestril ...'.74 Months later a partial
reversalof the judicialsentencerecognisedtwo forces as representativesof
the PS: the traditionalgrouping,which addedthe heading'CasadelPueblo'to
its name, and Dickmann'sgroup which became known as the 'PS de la
The latterpresentedtheirown candidatesat the April
Revolucidn
Nacional'.75
and
Senate
Assemblyby-electionsbut were resoundinglydefeatedboth
1954
in the CapitalFederaland in Buenos Aires province.Manymembersof this
to
group ended up workingfor officialbodies, thus helpingLa Vanguardia
remainin circulationuntilthe definitivefall of Per6n.
Followingthe 1951 elections,the Radicalsheld on to a mere 14 seatsin the
sector and the
NationalCongress,of which seven belongedto the unionista
The differencesbetweenthese two tendencies
othersevento the intransigentes.
decisionstakenby the
withinthe UCR were well known.The parliamentary
held
at
of
the
on
who
the presidencyof the
the
end
day,
partydepended,
At
this
time
it
held
the
Oscar
was
by
group.
intransigente Alende,representative of the provinceof BuenosAires,and the deputieswho were not of this
tendencywere marginalisedfrom partyresolutions.The internalelections
held between May and June 195'2 did not substantiallychange the balance
of power within the organisation,except in the FederalCapitalwhere the
won a close-foughtcontest.The electionsconfirmedthe leaderintransigentes
ship of the Movimientode Intransigenciay Renovaci6nat a nationallevel,
but re-opened the political strugglebetween the differentpolitical forces
of Buenos Aires province
withinthis strandof Radicalism.The intransigentes
had joined forces with their colleagues from this sector in the Federal
Capital,led by Frondizi,in the internalconfrontationwith the sabattinistas.
The sabattinistas
attemptedto maintaintheircontrolover the NationalCommittee by opening up to the representativesof the nationalterritoriesin
returnfor their supportfor their managementof the partyline. However,
the incorporationof these new partyrepresentativesendedup producingthe
opposite effect. At the 1953 National Conventionthe disputeswithin the
and
partyorganisationwere renewed.The motion by Cordobanintransigentes
in favourof abstentionin the coming electionswas not supthe unionistas
delegates,who defendedthe stanceof
portedby the majorityof intransigente
Moises Lebensohnfrom BuenosAires.The latter'ssuddendeathin June of
that year worsened the correlationof forces in the internalfront against
Sabattiniandhis followers.It was Frondizi,andnot Balbindespitehis image
74
s-uSeeLuna,Perdny tiempo,
III,p. 83.
Actual
desarrollo.
socialista.
Suorigeny
75 Onthe divisionsin the PS, see P. VerdeTello,La divisidn
delPartidoSodalista
Democrcitico
organizaci6n
338
as politicalleader of the anti-Peronists,who gained the consensus of the

majorityof the party'sintransigente
groups,includingthose from the interior.
In September1953 an agreementbetween intransigente
leadersfrom Buenos
Airesprovince,the CapitalFederaland
the LitoralallowedFrondizito become
the Movimientode Intransigencia
y Renovaci6n'scandidatefor the Radical
presidencyand he was dulyelectedpresidentof the NationalCommitteein
and sabattinistas.76
January1954in a session thatwas contestedby unionistas
This internalconflictwithinthe mainoppositionpartyleft littlechanceof
conciliation
nominatinga Radicalinterlocutorin anygovernment-promoted
strategy.Some Radicalleadershad left the politicalstageandgone into exile,
in favourof the rail
fearinggovernmentreprisalsfollowingtheirparticipation
strikersor Menendez'scoup in 195I. In December 1953, withby-electionsto
the Chambersof Congressand the post of Vice President,an amnestywas
passedin orderto reducepoliticaltension.However,other electoralregulations that affected the proportionalityof the ballot ended up furtherrestrictingthe opposition'schances of gainingrepresentation.The new legal
frameworkfor elections removedthe options of the abstentionistposition
defended by sabattinistas
and unionistas
and obliged the Radicalsto define
proposalsand candidatesin a highly conditionedsituation:those political
partieswho did not presentcandidatesat the electionswouldlose theirlegal
status.
The designationof Frondizias head of the UCR's highest partybody
markeda head-onclashwith the internaloppositionover the party'spolitical
survival.He orderedthe windingup of severaldistrictsopposed to the new
conflictive,as was the case of
partyauthorities,but otherswere particularly
the FederalCapital.Althoughthe balanceof powerhad been democratically
decidedin favourof the intransigentes,
the unionistas
held on to a considerable
shareof power. Frondiziwas able to put aside these differencesby drawing
up an electorallist which distributedthe 14 contestedcandidaciesfairlybetween the differentgroups. In order to conciliatedifferenceswith radical
factions from the interior,FrondizibackedCris61ogoLarralde'scandidacy
for the post of nationalVice President,which was supportedby the Party
Conventiondelegates.The resultswere no worse for the Radicalsthan in
195I. At a nationallevel, the oppositiongroupswon 36 per cent of the vote
and Peronism63 per cent. The differencein the FederalCapitalwas somewhat smaller;here the Peronistsreceived 844,000 votes and the Radicals,
645,000. Despite the Radicals'good showing, however, the new electoral
regulationsmeantthat they only gainedone seat in the FederalCapital.77
76 Tcach,Sabattinismoyperonismo,
pp. 20zo9-22.
77 According to the new electoral regulations, the districts of Federal Capital, C6rdoba, Entre
Rios and Buenos Aires had to elect all their deputies by constituencies, except one. This last
seat would be awarded to the candidate in that district who had received the most votes
toPeron 339
inthePolitical
Radicals
andSocialists
Opposition
and
The disputewithin Radicalismbetween,on the one hand,frondicistas
and unionistas,
their alliesand, on the other, sabattinistas
pushed the latterto
considerconstitutionallydisloyalandconspiratorial
options outsidethe party
leaderssuch as MauricioYadarolaor MiguelAngel
line. Traditionalunionista
Zavala Ortiz had returnedto politics in 1954. Yadarola,who maintained
well-knowncontacts with sectors of the army,had been elected national
deputyfor C6rdobaprovince.These were the most visible interlocutorsin
the late approachof Radicalismto the anti-Peronistconspiracyin which the
Churchand the militaryhad been immersedsince mid-1954.78The shift by
the main opposition party away from options loyal to the constitutional
frameworktowardsconstitutionallydisloyalones was linked to the internal
power strugglewithin Radicalism.Frondizi's apparentcontrol over the
structuresandpartydecisionswas not enoughto reconcilethe
organisational
differentforces within the UCR. In mid-I955 when antagonismbetween
Peronism and anti-Peronismhad reached a point of no return and also
involved other actors apart from the political parties, Frondizi accepted
Per6n's offer of politicalconciliation.He spoke on the radio as the representativeof the opposition,callingfor guaranteesfor the democratisation
of politicallife, internaldetenteand the liftingof the 'estadodeguerrainterno'
decreedat the end of 1935. It was the firsttime in nine yearsthat an opposition politicianhad been allowedto use the radioto state his position and
Frondizi'sspeechhad a far-reaching
impacton publicopinion.Althoughthe
UCR had been defined since I95I as the partywhich capturedthe antiPeronistvote, ultimatelythe partyleadershiplost control of the opposition
to Per6n.It was those Radicalswho had supportedabstentionismwho gave
the go-ahead to the revolt againstPeronism led by the militaryand the
Church.The differencesbetweenthe differentstrandsof Radicalismover the
party'spositionin the finalmonths of Peronistrulewould eventuallylead to
irreconcilablestanceswhich were to dividethe partyafterPer6n'sfall.
withouthavingbeen electedin theirrespectiveconstituency.In these districts,therefore,

the representationof the minoritywas reduced.
Perdn
78 For detailsof this process,see Caimari,
y la IglesiaCatdlica,
particularly
partIV;
delyy(BuenosAires,1994).Also, Potash,El ejircito
and I. RuizMoreno,La Revoluci6n
y la
politica,chapterVI.

García Sebastiani - The Other Side of Peronist Argentina Radicals and Socialists in The Political Opposition To Perón (1946-1955)

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

García Sebastiani - The Other Side of Peronist Argentina Radicals and Socialists in The Political Opposition To Perón (1946-1955)

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

The Other Side of Peronist Argentina: Radicals and Socialists in the Political Opposition to Pern

j Lat.Amer.Stud.35, 311-339 ? 2003 CambridgeUniversityPress

The Other Side of Peronist Argentina:

almost ten yearsduringwhich Per6n was in power cannot be definedwith

centres of oppositional action beyond formal institutionalchannels is

See,J. Linz,'Democraciapresidencialo parlamentaria.

See E. Dickmann, Recuerdos

R. Larra,Lisandrodela Torre.VIday dramadelsolitario

Popularhad arousedstrongcriticismfrom the conservativesin power,but,

socialiststriedby all meanspossibleto exploitthe possibilitiesof an alliance

Fitte and SanchezZinny, Ginesisdeunsentimiento

14 F. Luna, Alvear (Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 331.

restorationof democraticinstitutions,called by extra-partyorganisations

the Uni6n Democraitica1,207,080 (42.51%), D. Cant6n,Eleccionesy

On the formationof the PartidoPeronistaand the conflictswithin the its rise,see M. M.

respectively. Also, C. Tcach, Sabattinismoyperonismo.Partidos

enCerdoba,I94i-syy(BuenosAires, 1991),pp. 89-90. On socialistsconvertedto the

Interviewwith OscarAlbrieu,ArchivodeHistoriaOral,InstitutoTorcuatoDi Tella.Colom,

argentino.La dimensi6ndel conflictocon la Uni6n CivicaRadical(1946-1951),'Revistade

the party to maintainthe same quotas of institutionalrepresentationin

tain reforms introducedin the Constitutionaccentuatedthe presidential

debate was pepperedwith protests by the opposition over procedures.33

to conserveparliamentas an organof institutionalcontrolover the Peronist

only a revisedversion to Congress.A new institutionalfigurewas introduced:'el estadode

p. 227 and passim;and W. Little, 'Party and State in Peronist Argentina,1945-1955,

diminished,Peronismmade greateffortsto reducetheir possibilitiesof becominga viablepoliticalalternative.An officialcampaignof intimidationand

presidenciales de 1951 : Balbin, Lebensohn y el comit&de la UCR de la provincia de Buenos

The Buenos Aires provinceintransigentes

editionsof 24 March 1951 and 5 Apr. 1951; and UCR, Informe

19 5o); I CongresoAgrario 'Tierray Libertad' (Bahia Blanca 2 i and 22 July 1951);

decade,the Buenos Aires municipalgovernmentdispensedwith its Concejo

1-83 and Torre, La vieja

57 La Nacidn, 7 May 1946.

methods of politicalpropagandaand campaignorganisation.The cornerof some of the functionsof

'Informe de la Comisi6nelectoralnacional,'in XXXVT Congreso

63 El Socialista, 24 Aug. I948.

On the differencesbetween Ghioldi and Gonzalez, see NuevasBases(15Nov. I95o);

and Sirven, Perdny los mediosde comunicacidn,

politicalmeetings as part of an extravagantnation-widetour to reach the

Dickmann's approach to Per6n was promoted by A. Borlenghi, see M. D. Bejar, 'La

attemptsto politicise society in order to achieve 'una comunidad

as politicalleader of the anti-Peronists,who gained the consensus of the

withouthavingbeen electedin theirrespectiveconstituency.In these districts,therefore,

Potrebbero piacerti anche