TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs.

Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing
the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka
Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel
was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart
invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latters
gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be
heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied
him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the
plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart
did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt
able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want to
interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party
should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff
to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him
at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed each other. Considering
the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr.
Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff
failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to
ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20
years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such
matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code.
TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO
CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors headed by
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters
at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the
plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result
was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors
advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter
was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After
an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless

they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be
disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process,
lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held
them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential
of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including
attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the
deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand
are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in
preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights
of the people. Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) mayimmediately disconnect
electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was
present.

Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only
upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the injure position where it
was before it was injured.
TITLE: Spouses Yu vs. PCIB
CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several
parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial
International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition
for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998.
City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on
September 10, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale
was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before
the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before
RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to
strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then
filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial
issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of
propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment
of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since

the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction
independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue
raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal
case.
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and
had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result,
Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped
studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint
was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the
court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim
compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So
ordered.
Geluz vs. Court of Appeals2 SCRA 801 July 20 1961Fact of the Case:
Respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva who voluntarily procuredher abortion, filed an
action to recover damages against petitioner Antonio Lazo whocaused the same. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo. When thecase reached the Court of Appeals but it sustained the award
to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals and the Trial Court predicated the award of damages in the amount
of P3,000upon the provision of Article 2206 of the Civil Code for the death of person.
Issue:
(1)Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child.(2)Whether or
not the unborn child acquires civil personality.
Held:
No action for damages could be instituted on unborn child on account of injuriesit received, no such right
of action could derivatively accrue to its parent or heirs. Thelaws states that civil personality of the child
commences at the time of its conception, provided that it be born alive or if it had an intrauterine life of
less the seven months, thefoetus is not deemed born if it dies within twenty four hours after its complete
deliveryfrom the maternal womb.

TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia

CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even
wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on
time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and
hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where
they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that
was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the
status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco
for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore,
there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second
baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out
that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.
TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience
to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate

the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code,
estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement
and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those
surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
TITLE: Dumlao v Quality Plastics
CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro
Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal
rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land,
which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths
hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has
given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on
Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy
sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack
in juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case
T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of
Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.
Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria
was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not
follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662
against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by
OCT No. 28732 is also void.
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter thePhilippines. She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On thedate of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed
a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines onor before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or
within theperiod as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions,she was
allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage
with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigrationto confiscate her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expirationof her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction
with preliminary injunction.The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer
forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying aFilipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows thePhilippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether
the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through anaturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it shouldfollow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege. Everytimethe citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative
case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to suchcitizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion
may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to havebecome a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al asEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.