G.R. No.

187456, June 02, 2014

ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION , Petitioner,
v. ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION AND RAFAEL
TINIO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 27, 2009, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88864.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as
summarized by the CA, are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case traces its roots to the Complaint for Injunction and
Damages filed [with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa
City] on October 19, 2006 by [herein petitioner, Alabang
Development Corporation] ADC against [herein respondents,
Alabang Hills Village Association, Inc.] AHVAI and Rafael Tinio
(Tinio), President of AHVAI. The Complaint alleged that [petitioner]
is the developer of Alabang Hills Village and still owns certain
parcels of land therein that are yet to be sold, as well as those
considered open spaces that have not yet been donated to [the]
local government of Muntinlupa City or the Homeowner's
Association. Sometime in September [2006], ADC learned that
AHVAI started the construction of a multi-purpose hall and a
swimming pool on one of the parcels of land still owned by ADC
without the latter's consent and approval, and that despite
demand, AHVAI failed to desist from constructing the said
improvements. ADC thus prayed that an injunction be issued
enjoining defendants from constructing the multi-purpose hall and
the swimming pool at the Alabang Hills Village.
In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, AHVAI denied ADC's

asseverations and claimed that the latter has no legal capacity to

sue since its existence as a registered corporate entity was
revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on
May 26, 2003; that ADC has no cause of action because by law it
is no longer the absolute owner but is merely holding the property
in question in trust for the benefit of AHVAI as beneficial owner
thereof; and that the subject lot is part of the open space required
by law to be provided in the subdivision. As counterclaim, it
prayed that an order be issued divesting ADC of the title of the
property and declaring AHVAI as owner thereof; and that ADC be
made liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees.
Tinio filed his separate Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,
practically reiterating the defenses of AHVAI. 2
On January 4, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276,
rendered judgment dismissing herein petitioner's complaint on
the grounds (1) that the latter has no personality to file the same;
(2) that the subject property is a reserved area for the beneficial
use of the homeowners, as mandated by law; and (3) that the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the RTC,
has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between petitioner and
respondents.3cralawred
Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC
decision. Herein respondent AHVAI, on the other hand, moved
that it be allowed to prosecute its compulsory counterclaim
praying, for this purpose, that the RTC decision be amended
accordingly.
In its Order dated February 20, 2007, the RTC approved
petitioner's notice of appeal but dismissed respondent AHVAIs
counterclaim on the ground that it is dependent on petitioner's

complaint. Respondent AHVAI then filed an appeal with the CA.

In its assailed Decision dated March 27, 2009, the CA dismissed
both appeals of petitioner and respondent, and affirmed the
decision of the RTC. With respect to petitioner, the CA ruled that
the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint as the same
was filed when petitioner was already defunct and, as such, it no
longer had capacity to file the said complaint. As regards,
respondent AHVAIs counterclaim, the CA held that where there
is no claim against the [respondent], because [petitioner] is
already inexistent and has no capacity to sue, the counterclaim is
improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the complaint
is dismissed at the instance of the [respondent].
Thus, the instant petition based on the following
grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING
ON THE CASE OF COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. v. COURT OF
APPEALS IN RESOLVING PETITIONER'S LACK OF CAPACITY
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
LACK OF CAPACITY OF THE PETITIONER IN FILING THE CASE
CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE THAT PETITIONER IS MANDATED
TO CEDE PROPERTIES TO RESPONDENT AHVAI4
Anent the first assigned error, the Court does not agree that the
CA erred in relying on the case ofColumbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals.5cralawred
The CA cited the case for the purpose of restating and

distinguishing the jurisprudential definition of the terms lack of

capacity to sue and lack of personality to sue; and of applying
these definitions to the present case. Thus, the fact that, unlike in
the instant case, the corporations involved in theColumbia case
were foreign corporations is of no moment. The definition of the
term lack of capacity to sue enunciated in the said case still
applies to the case at bar. Indeed, as held by this Court and as
correctly cited by the CA in the case of Columbia: [l]ack of legal
capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of
his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to
appear in the case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims[;] 'lack of capacity to sue' refers to a
plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
insanity, incompetence,lack of juridical personality or any
other general disqualifications of a party. ... 6 In the instant case,
petitioner lacks capacity to sue because it no longer possesses
juridical personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse of the
three-year grace period provided under Section 122 of the
Corporation Code, as will be discussed below.
With respect to the second assigned error, Section 122 of the
Corporation Code provides as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 122. Corporate liquidation. Every corporation whose
charter expires by its own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or
otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is
terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued
as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it
would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close
its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute
its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for
which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, said corporation is

authorized and empowered to convey all of its property to

trustees for the benefit of stockholders, members, creditors, and
other persons in interest. From and after any such conveyance by
the corporation of its property in trust for the benefit of its
stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all
interest which the corporation had in the property terminates, the
legal interest vests in the trustees, and the beneficial interest in
the stockholders, members, creditors or other persons in interest.
Upon winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable
to any creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or
cannot be found shall be escheated to the city or municipality
where such assets are located.
Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by
this Code, no corporation shall distribute any of its assets or
property except upon lawful dissolution and after payment of all
its debts and liabilities.
This Court has held that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that the time during which the corporation,
through its own officers, may conduct the liquidation of its assets
and sue and be sued as a corporation is limited to three years
from the time the period of dissolution commences; but there is
no time limit within which the trustees must complete a
liquidation placed in their hands. It is provided only (Corp. Law,
Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122]) that the conveyance to the trustees must
be made within the three-year period. It may be found impossible
to complete the work of liquidation within the three-year period or
to reduce disputed claims to judgment. The authorities are to the
effect that suits by or against a corporation abate when it ceased
to be an entity capable of suing or being sued (7 R.C.L., Corps.,
par. 750); but trustees to whom the corporate assets have been

conveyed pursuant to the authority of Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122] may

sue and be sued as such in all matters connected with the
liquidation...7
In the absence of trustees, this Court ruled,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Still in the absence of a board of directors or trustees, those
having any pecuniary interest in the assets, including not only the
shareholders but likewise the creditors of the corporation, acting
for and in its behalf, might make proper representations with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which has primary and
sufficiently broad jurisdiction in matters of this nature, for working
out a final settlement of the corporate concerns. 8
In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioner's corporate
registration was revoked on May 26, 2003. Based on the abovequoted provision of law, it had three years, or until May 26, 2006,
to prosecute or defend any suit by or against it. The subject
complaint, however, was filed only on October 19, 2006, more
than three years after such revocation.
It is likewise not disputed that the subject complaint was filed by
petitioner corporation and not by its directors or trustees. In fact,
it is even averred, albeit wrongly, in the first paragraph of the
Complaint9 that [p]laintiff is a duly organized and existing
corporation under the laws of the Philippines, with capacity to sue
and be sued. x x x10cralawred
Petitioner, nonetheless, insists that a corporation may still sue,
even after it has been dissolved and the three-year liquidation
period provided under Section 122 of the Corporation Code has
passed. Petitioner cites the cases of Gelano v. Court of
Appeals,11Knecht v. United Cigarette Corporation,12and Pepsi-Cola

Products Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 13 as authority to

support its position. The Court, however, agrees with the CA that
in the abovecited cases, the corporations involved filed their
respective complaints while they were still in existence. In other
words, they already had pending actions at the time that their
corporate existence was terminated.
The import of this Court's ruling in the cases cited by petitioner is
that the trustee of a corporation may continue to prosecute a
case commenced by the corporation within three years from its
dissolution until rendition of the final judgment, even if such
judgment is rendered beyond the three-year period allowed by
Section 122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is nothing in
the said cases which allows an already defunct corporation to
initiate a suit after the lapse of the said three-year period. On the
contrary, the factual circumstances in the abovecited cases would
show that the corporations involved therein did not initiate any
complaint after the lapse of the three-year period. In fact, as
stated above, the actions were already pending at the time that
they lost their corporate existence.
In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its
corporate existence was terminated but also beyond the threeyear period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. Thus,
it is clear that at the time of the filing of the subject complaint
petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a corporation. To allow
petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it until final
judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the
sole purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the
provisions of Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal issue in the
instant case is petitioner's capacity to sue as a corporation and it
has already been settled that petitioner indeed lacks such

capacity. Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from

the ruling of the CA finding it unnecessary to delve on the other
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864,
sustaining the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 06-138, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180416

June 2, 2014

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO and BONIFACIO C.

SUMBILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
CEZAR T. QUIAMBAO and ERIC C. PILAPIL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 from the
Orders2 dated 4 June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 154, of Pasig City in S.C.A. No. 3047.
The facts:
Background
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) is a
domestic corporation operating as a business development and
investment company.
On 1 March 2004, during the annual stockholder's meeting of
STRADEC, petitioner Aderito Z. Yujuico (Yujuico) was elected as
president and chairman of the company.3 Yujuico replaced
respondent Cezar T. Quiambao (Quiambao), who had been the
president and chairman of STRADEC since 1994. 4

With Yujuico at the helm, STRADEC appointed petitioner Bonifacio

C. Sumbilla (Sumbilla) as treasurer and one Joselito John G. Blando
(Blando) as corporate secretary.5 Blando replaced respondent Eric
C. Pilapil (Pilapil), the previous corporate secretary of STRADEC. 6
The Criminal Complaint
On 12 August 2005, petitioners filed a criminal complaint 7 against
respondents and one Giovanni T. Casanova (Casanova) before the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City. The complaint
was docketed in the OCP as LS. No. PSG 05-08-07465.
The complaint accuses respondents and Casanova of violating
Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 or
the Corporation Code. The petitioners premise such accusation on
the following factual allegations:8
1. During the stockholders' meeting on 1 March 2004, Yujuico-as
newly elected president and chairman of STRADEC-demanded
Quiambao for the turnover of the corporate records of the
company, particularly the accounting files, ledgers, journals and
other records of the corporation's business. Quiambao refused.
2. As it turns out, the corporate records of STRADEC were in the
possession of Casanova-the accountant of STRADEC. Casanova
was keeping custody of the said records on behalf of Quiambao,
who allegedly needed the same as part of his defense in a
pending case in court.
3. After the 1 March 2004 stockholders' meeting, Quiambao and
Casanova caused the removal of the corporate records of
STRADEC from the company's offices in Pasig City.
4. Upon his appointment as corporate secretary on 21 June 2004,
Blando likewise demanded Pilapil for the turnover of the stock and
transfer book of STRADEC. Pilapil refused.

5. Instead, on 25 June 2004, Pilapil proposed to Blando to have

the stock and transfer book deposited in a safety deposit box with
Equitable PCI Bank, Kamias Road, Quezon City. Blando acceded to
the proposal and the stock and transfer book was deposited in a
safety deposit box with the bank identified. It was agreed that the
safety deposit box may only be opened in the presence of both
Quiambao and Blando.
6. On 30 June 2004, however, Quiambao and Pilapil withdrew the
stock and transfer book from the safety deposit box and brought
it to the offices of the Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM) in
Quezon City. Quiambao thereafter asked Blando to proceed to the
STRADCOM offices. Upon arriving thereat, Quiambao pressured
Blando to make certain entries in the stock and transfer books.
After making such entries, Blando again demanded that he be
given possession of the stock and transfer book. Quiambao
refused.
7. On 1 July 2004, Blando received an order dated 30 June 2004
issued by the RTC, Branch 71, of Pasig City in Civil Case No.
70027, which directed him to cancel the entries he made in the
stock and transfer book. Hence, on even date, Blando wrote
letters to Quiambao and Pilapil once again demanding for the
turnover of the stock and transfer book. Pilapil replied thru a letter
dated 2 July 2004 where he appeared to agree to Blando's
demand.
8. However, upon meeting with Pilapil and Quiambao, the latter
still refused to turnover the stock and transfer book to Blando.
Instead, Blando was once again constrained to agree to a
proposal by Pilapil to have the stock and transfer book deposited
with the RTC, Branch 155, of Pasig City. The said court, however,
refused to accept such deposit on the ground that it had no place
for safekeeping.

9. Since Quiambao and Pilapil still refused to turnover the stock

and transfer book, Blando again acceded to have the book
deposited in a safety deposit box, this time, with the Export and
Industry Bank in San Miguel A venue, Pasig City.
Petitioners theorize that the refusal by the respondents and
Casanova to turnover STRADEC's corporate records and stock and
transfer book violates their right, as stockholders, directors and
officers of the corporation, to inspect such records and book
under Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code. For such violation,
petitioners conclude, respondents may be held criminally liable
pursuant to Section 144 of the Corporation Code.
Preliminary investigation thereafter ensued.
Resolution of the OCP and the Informations
After receiving the counter-affidavits of the respondents and
Casanova, as well as the other documentary submissions 9 by the
parties, the OCP issued a Resolution 10 dated 6 January 2006 in I.S.
No. PSG 05-08-07465. In the said resolution, the OCP absolved
Casanova but found probable cause to hail respondents to court
on two (2) offenses: (1) for removing the stock and transfer book
of STRADEC from its principal office, and (2) for refusing access
to, and examination of, the corporate records and the stock and
transfer book of STRADEC at its principal office.
Pursuant to the resolution, two (2) informations 11 were filed
against the respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City. The informations were docketed as Criminal
Case No. 89723 and Criminal Case No. 89724 and were raffled to
Branch 69.
Criminal Case No. 89723 is for the offense of removing the stock
and transfer book of STRADEC from its principal office. The
information reads:12

On and/or about the period between March 1 and June 25, 2004,
inclusive, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above accused, being then members of the Board of
Directors and/or officers, as the case maybe, of Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation (STRADEC, for short), conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
remove the stock and transfer book of the said STRADEC at its
principal office at the 24th Floor, One Magnificent Mile-CITRA City
Bldg., San Miguel A venue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, where they
should all be kept, in violation of the aforesaid law, and to the
prejudice of the said complainants.
Criminal Case No. 89724, on the other hand, covers the offense of
refusing access to, and examination of, the corporate records and
the stock and transfer book of STRADEC at its principal office. The
information reads:13
On and/or about the period between March 1 and June 25, 2004,
inclusive, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above accused, being then members of the
Board of Directors and/or officers, as the case maybe, of Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC, for short),
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, refuse to allow complainants Bonifacio C. Sumbilla
and Aderito Z. Yujuico, being then stockholders and/or directors of
STRADEC, access to, and examination of, the corporate records,
including the stock and transfer book, of STRADEC at its principal
office at the 24th Floor, One Magnificent Mile-CITRA Bldg., San
Miguel Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, where they should all
be kept, in violation of the aforesaid law, and to the prejudice of
the said complainants.
Urgent Omnibus Motion and the Dismissal of Criminal Case No.
89723

On 18 January 2006, respondents filed before the MeTC an Urgent

Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and
To Defer Issuance of Warrants of Arrest (Urgent Omnibus
Motion).14
On 8 May 2006, the MeTC issued an order15 partially granting the
Urgent Omnibus Motion. The MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No.
89723 but ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
respondents in Criminal Case No. 89724.
In dismissing Criminal Case No. 89723, the MeTC held that
Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code
only penalizes the act of "refus[ing] to allow any director, trustee,
stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy
excerpts from the records or minutes of the corporation" 16 and
that act is already the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 89724.
Hence, the MeTC opined, Criminal Case No. 89723-which seeks to
try respondents for merely removing the stock and transfer book
of STRADEC from its principal office-actually charges no offense
and, therefore, cannot be sustained.17
Anent directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest in Criminal
Case No. 89724, the MeTC found probable cause to do so; given
the failure of the respondents to present any evidence during the
preliminary investigation showing that they do not have
possession of the corporate records of STRADEC or that they
allowed petitioners to inspect the corporate records and the stock
and transfer book of STRADEC.18
Unsatisfied, the respondents filed a motion for partial
Reconsideration19 of the 8 May 2006 order of the MeTC insofar as
the disposition in Criminal Case No. 89724 is concerned. The
MeTC, however, denied such motion on 16 August 2006. 20
Certiorari Petition and the Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724
After their motion for partial reconsideration was denied,
respondents filed a certiorari petition, 21 with prayer for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), before the RTC of

Pasig City on 27 September 2006. The petition was docketed as
S.C.A. No. 3047.
On 16 November 2006, the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the MeTC
from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 89724
for twenty (20) days.22
On 4 June 2007, the R TC issued an Order23 granting respondents'
certiorari petition and directing the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
89724. According to the RTC, the MeTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing a warrant of arrest against respondents in
Criminal Case No. 89724.
The RTC found that the finding of probable cause against the
respondents in Criminal Case No. 89724 was not supported by the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation but was,
in fact, contradicted by them:24
1. The R TC noted that, aside from the complaint itself, no
evidence was ever submitted by petitioners to prove that they
demanded and was refused access to the corporate records of
STRADEC between 1 March to 25 June 2004. What petitioners
merely submitted is their letter dated 6 September 2004
demanding from respondents access to the corporate records of
STRADEC.
2. The allegations of petitioners in their complaint, as well as 6
September 2004 letter above-mentioned, however, are
contradicted by the sworn statement dated 1 July 2004 of
Blando25 wherein he attested that as early as 25 June 2004, Pilapil
already turned over to him "two binders containing the minutes,
board resolutions, articles of incorporation, copies of contracts,
correspondences and other papers of the corporation, except the
stock certificate book and the stock and transfer book."

3. The RTC also took exception to the reason provided by the

MeTC in supporting its finding of probable cause against the
respondents. The R TC held that it was not incumbent upon the
respondents to provide evidence proving their innocence. Hence,
the failure of the respondents to submit evidence showing that
they do not have possession of the corporate records of STRADEC
or that they have allowed inspection of the same cannot be taken
against them much less support a finding of probable cause
against them.
The RTC further pointed out that, at most, the evidence on record
only supports probable cause that the respondents were
withholding the stock and transfer book of STRADEC. The RTC,
however, opined that refusing to allow inspection of the stock and
transfer book, as opposed to refusing examination of other
corporate records, is not punishable as an offense under the
Corporation Code.26 Hence, the directive of the RTC dismissing
Criminal Case No. 89724.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, 27 but the R TC
remained steadfast.28
Hence, this petition by petitioners.
The Instant Petition
In their petition, petitioners claim that Criminal Case No. 89724
may still be sustained against the respondents insofar as the
charge of refusing to allow access to the stock and transfer book
of STRADEC is concerned. They argue that the R TC made a legal
blunder when it held that the refusal to allow inspection of the
stock and transfer book of a corporation is not a punishable
offense under the Corporation Code. Petitioners contend that such
a refusal still amounts to a violation of Section 74 of the
Corporation Code, for which Section 144 of the same code
prescribes a penalty.

OUR RULING
The RTC indeed made an inaccurate pronouncement when it held
that the act of refusing to allow inspection of the stock and
transfer book of a corporation is not a punishable offense under
the Corporation Code. Such refusal, when done in violation of
Section 74(4) of the Corporation Code, properly falls within the
purview of Section 144 of the same code and thus may be
penalized as an offense.
The foregoing gaffe nonetheless, We still sustain the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 89724 as against the respondents.
A criminal action based on the violation of a stockholder's right to
examine or inspect the corporate records and the stock and
transfer book of a corporation under the second and fourth
paragraphs of Section 74 of the Corporation Code-such as
Criminal Case No. 89724--can only be maintained against
corporate officers or any other persons acting on behalf of such
corporation. The submissions of the petitioners during the
preliminary investigation, however, clearly suggest that
respondents are neither in relation to STRADEC.
Hence, we deny the petition.
The act of ref using to allow inspection of the
stock and transfer book of a corporation,
when done in violation of Section 74(4) of
the Corporation Code, is punishable as an
offense under Section 144 of the same code.
We first address the inaccurate pronouncement of the RTC.
Section 74 is the provision of the Corporation Code that deals with
the books a corporation is required to keep. It reads:
Section 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. - Every
corporation shall keep and carefully preserve at its principal office

a record of all business transactions and minutes of all meetings

of stockholders or members, or of the board of directors or
trustees, in which shall be set forth in detail the time and place of
holding the meeting, how authorized, the notice given, whether
the meeting was regular or special, if special its object, those
present and absent, and every act done or ordered done at the
meeting. Upon the demand of any director, trustee, stockholder
or member, the time when any director, trustee, stockholder or
member entered or left the meeting must be noted in the
minutes; and on a similar demand, the yeas and nays must be
taken on any motion or proposition, and a record thereof carefully
made. The protest of any director, trustee, stockholder or member
on any action or proposed action must be recorded in full on his
demand.
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the
minutes of any meetings shall be open to inspection by any
director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at
reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in
writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his
expense.
Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall refuse to allow
any director, trustees, stockholder or member of the corporation
to examine and copy excerpts from its records or minutes, in
accordance with the provisions of this Code, shall be liable to such
director, trustee, stockholder or member for damages, and in
addition, shall be guilty of an offense which shall be punishable
under Section 144 of this Code: Provided, That if such refusal is
made pursuant to a resolution or order of the board of directors or
trustees, the liability under this section for such action shall be
imposed upon the directors or trustees who voted for such
refusal: and Provided, further, That it shall be a defense to any
action under this section that the person demanding to examine
and copy excerpts from the corporation's records and minutes has

improperly used any information secured through any prior

examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of
any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a
legitimate purpose in making his demand.
Stock corporations must also keep a book to be known as the
"stock and transfer book'', in which must be kept a record of all
stocks in the names of the stockholders alphabetically arranged;
the installments paid and unpaid on all stock for which
subscription has been made, and the date of payment of any
installment; a statement of every alienation, sale or transfer of
stock made, the date thereof, and by and to whom made; and
such other entries as the by-laws may prescribe. The stock and
transfer book shall be kept in the principal office of the
corporation or in the office of its stock transfer agent and shall be
open for inspection by any director or stockholder of the
corporation at reasonable hours on business days.
No stock transfer agent or one engaged principally in the business
of registering transfers of stocks in behalf of a stock corporation
shall be allowed to operate in the Philippines unless he secures a
license from the Securities and Exchange Commission and pays a
fee as may be fixed by the Commission, which shall be renewable
annually: Provided, That a stock corporation is not precluded from
performing or making transfer of its own stocks, in which case all
the rules and regulations imposed on stock transfer agents,
except the payment of a license fee herein provided, shall be
applicable. (5 la and 32a; P.B. No. 268.) (Emphasis supplied)
Section 144 of the Corporation Code, on the other hand, is the
general penal provision of the Corporation Code. It reads:
Section 144. Violations of the Code. - Violations of any of the
provisions of this Code or its amendments not otherwise
specifically penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of not
less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not more than ten

thousand (P10,000.00) pesos or by imprisonment for not less than

thirty (30) days but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the
discretion of the court. If the violation is committed by a
corporation, the same may, after notice and hearing, be dissolved
in appropriate proceedings before the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Provided, That such dissolution shall not preclude
the institution of appropriate action against the director, trustee
or officer of the corporation responsible for said violation:
Provided, further, That nothing in this section shall be construed
to repeal the other causes for dissolution of a corporation
provided in this Code. (190 112 a) (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Orders, the RTC expressed its opinion that the act
of refusing to allow inspection of the stock and transfer book,
even though it may be a violation of Section 74(4), is not
punishable as an offense under the Corporation Code. 29 In
justifying this conclusion, the RTC seemingly relied on the fact
that, under Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code, the application of
Section 144 is expressly mentioned only in relation to the act of
"refus[ing] to allow any director, trustees, stockholder or member
of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from [the
corporation's] records or minutes" that excludes its stock and
transfer book.
We do not agree.
While Section 74 of the Corporation Code expressly mentions the
application of Section 144 only in relation to the act of "refus[ing]
to allow any director, trustees, stockholder or member of the
corporation to examine and copy excerpts from [the
corporation's] records or minutes," the same does not mean that
the latter section no longer applies to any other possible
violations of the former section.
It must be emphasized that Section 144 already purports to
penalize "[v]iolations" of "any provision" of the Corporation Code

"not otherwise specifically penalized therein." Hence, we find

inconsequential the fact that that Section 74 expressly mentions
the application of Section 144 only to a specific act, but not with
respect to the other possible violations of the former section.
Indeed, we find no cogent reason why Section 144 of the
Corporation Code cannot be made to apply to violations of the
right of a stockholder to inspect the stock and transfer book of a
corporation under Section 74(4) given the already unequivocal
intent of the legislature to penalize violations of a parallel right,
i.e., the right of a stockholder or member to examine the other
records and minutes of a corporation under Section 74(2).
Certainly, all the rights guaranteed to corporators under Section 7
4 of the Corporation Code are mandatory for the corporation to
respect. All such rights are just the same underpinned by the
same policy consideration of keeping public confidence in the
corporate vehicle thru an assurance of transparency in the
corporation's operations.
Verily, we find inaccurate the pronouncement of the RTC that the
act of refusing to allow inspection of the stock and transfer book
is not a punishable offense under the Corporation Code. Such
refusal, when done in violation of Section 74(4) of the Corporation
Code, properly falls within the purview of Section 144 of the same
code and thus may be penalized as an offense.
A criminal action based on the violation of a
stockholder's right to examine or inspect the
corporate records and the stock and transfer
book of a corporation under the second and
fourth paragraphs of Section 74 of the
Corporation Code can only be maintained
against corporate officers or any other persons
acting on behalf of such corporation.

The foregoing notwithstanding, and independently of the reasons

provided therefor by the RTC, we sustain the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 89724.
Criminal Case No. 89724 accuses respondents of denying
petitioners' right to examine or inspect the corporate records and
the stock and transfer book of STRADEC. It is thus a criminal
action that is based on the violation of the second and fourth
paragraphs of Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code.
A perusal of the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74, as
well as the first paragraph of the same section, reveal that they
are provisions that obligates a corporation: they prescribe what
books or records a corporation is required to keep; where the
corporation shall keep them;
and what are the other obligations of the corporation to its
stockholders or members in relation to such books and
records.1wphi1 Hence, by parity of reasoning, the second and
fourth paragraphs of Section 74, including the first paragraph of
the same section, can only be violated by a corporation.
It is clear then that a criminal action based on the violation of the
second or fourth paragraphs of Section 74 can only be maintained
against corporate officers or such other persons that are acting on
behalf of the corporation. Violations of the second and fourth
paragraphs of Section 74 contemplates a situation wherein a
corporation, acting thru one of its officers or agents, denies the
right of any of its stockholders to inspect the records, minutes and
the stock and transfer book of such corporation.
The problem with the petitioners' complaint and the evidence that
they submitted during preliminary investigation is that they do
not establish that respondents were acting on behalf of STRADEC.
Quite the contrary, the scenario painted by the complaint is that
the respondents are merely outgoing officers of STRADEC who, for
some reason, withheld and refused to turn-over the company

records of STRADEC; that it is the petitioners who are actually

acting on behalf of STRADEC; and that STRADEC is actually
merely trying to recover custody of the withheld records.
In other words, petitioners are not actually invoking their right to
inspect the records and the stock and transfer book of STRADEC
under the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74. What they
seek to enforce is the proprietary right of STRADEC to be in
possession of such records and book. Such right, though certainly
legally enforceable by other means, cannot be enforced by a
criminal prosecution based on a violation of the second and fourth
paragraphs of Section 74. That is simply not the situation
contemplated by the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74
of the Corporation Code.
For this reason, we affirm the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
89724 for lack of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petlt10n is hereby
DENIED. The Orders dated 4 June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 154, of Pasig City in S.C.A. No.
3047, insofar as said orders effectively dismissed Criminal Case
No. 89724 pending before Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, of
Pasig City, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS,

G.R. NO. 142509

JR.,
Petitioner,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
(Chairperson)

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE
J. PIERAZ,

Promulgated:
Respondents.

March 24, 2006

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by

Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the
Decision[1] dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him of the
crime of libel. Also assailed is the appellate courts
Resolution[2] dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are

as follows:
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty.
Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox
addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in
an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her husbands desk.
On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out
its content. It reads:

DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE

Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila
August 18, 1995
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila
Subject:

Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995

addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco

Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter
dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client;
using carabao English.

May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue

harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No.
1582 Mngo St., Bgy.Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila--undersigned much to his regrets shall be constrained/compelled
to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you.

You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full
consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to
the present case. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by
no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative
charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious
activities.

Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face

you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove who is
who once and for all.

Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these

matters, I remain.

Yours in Satan name;

(Signed)
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in- Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes

Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz,
nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered
mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr.
dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.

Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly:

Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a
complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and
its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his
children as well and they all chided him telling him:
Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.

Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result of the

filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz frail health was likewise
affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.

The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was

denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of
the organization
Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan
or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had
dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of
private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.

Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether
he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to
Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent
another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz.
Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed
before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could
not deny its contents, among which was his admission that
indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter
dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.[3]

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision

dated April 30, 1997[4] finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL
defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as
minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days,
as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount
of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount
of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory
penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. [5]

The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer inutil, stupid and
capable of using only carabao English, is intended not only for the
consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of
the libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was
prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his

standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to

him, was representing a client in whose favor he sent a demand
letter to the person represented by petitioner; the letter is
libelousper se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly understood
as set against the entire message sought to be conveyed;
petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the
defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter could
have been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the
intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent that demand
was not proper and legal but instead petitioner was seething with
hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic intention.
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or
brought to the attention and notice of other persons other than
the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of
identity was also established since the letter was intended for
respondent. It rejected petitioners stance that the libelous letter
resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly
admitted that he had to reply to respondents letter to
Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of
petitioners association.

The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory

damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory
imputation was to impair respondents reputation although no
actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral
damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of
the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a
reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.

Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTCs decision to the CA

which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its
entirety the decision of the trial court.

The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for
and defamatory in character as they impeached the good
reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It
rejected petitioners claim that the letter is a privileged
communication which would exculpate him from liability since he
failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to
resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of
ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called duty
in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was
publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged.

The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in a

Resolution dated March 13, 2000.

Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by

petitioner, raising the following issues:
A.
CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN
POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING A MEMBER OF
AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM
HER DWELLING PLACE?

B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE
FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE (sic)
COMMUNICATION?

C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO
ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME? [6]

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of

the People and respondent filed his own Comment praying for
the affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties
submitted their respective memoranda.

The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is

guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply
the ruling in People v. Velasco[7] that if the act/matter charged as
libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has another
objective, the crime is not libel; when he made his reply to
respondents letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to
vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that
Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez
estate which is claiming ownership over the area
of Brgy.Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-infact of the administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication
in whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under
obligation to defend a clients cause is but a privileged
communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged
communication which is lost only by proof of malice, however,
respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence
of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that
petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was
ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the
publication of the defamatory imputation which were not at all
indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings
of the CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter

which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to

abate any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco.

Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous

letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for the
use of those words, to wit: lousy but inutile threatening letter
using carabao English was due to the fact that the demand letter
was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose as
respondents client has no legal right over the property and
respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just
making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid; that the
words Yours in Satan name is only a complementary greeting
used in an ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to
the sender but not to the person being communicated and which
is just the reverse of saying Yours in Christ.
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must

concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it
must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.
[8]

The last two elements have been duly established by the

prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication

means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to

someone other than the person against whom it has been written.
[9]
Petitioners subject letter-reply itself states that the same was
copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel
complained of has communicated it to a third person.
[10]
Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open,
not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.

The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject

letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.

We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether

the imputation is defamatory and malicious.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words

used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense. [11]

For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication

alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,
[12]
to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341),
the court had the following to say on this point: In determining
whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of
construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction
must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as

is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the
public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The
published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a
whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the
court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by
the publisher on being called to account. The whole question
being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the
readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered
explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the
effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used
in the publication.[13]

Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the

letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is
defamatory. In using words such as lousy, inutile,
carabao English, stupidity, and satan, the letter, as it was
written,casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation
of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidencealiunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said,
these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public
ridicule as even his own family have told him:
Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.[14]

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and,

under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus,
when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not
prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law
already presumes that petitioners imputation is malicious (malice
in law).[15] A reading of petitioners subject letter-reply showed

that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a

demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said
letter which showed petitioners good intention and justifiable
motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal
inference of malice.

Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private

communication made in the performance of his moral and social
duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez
estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom
respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the
nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354.
Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1.
A private communication made by any person to another
in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2.
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the

defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a

qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as
claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the
one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an
officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought;
and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good
faith and without malice.[16]

While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out
of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads,
and was written to respondent as a reply to the latters demand
letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject letterreply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation
concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to
the premises as against the claim of respondents client. The
letter merely contained insulting words, i.e, lousy and inutile
letter using carabao English, stupidity, and satan, which are
totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingcos right over the
premises. The words as written had only the effect of maligning
respondents integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as
legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards
as consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The
letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in
answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public
ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on
petitioners part.

Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made

out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such
statement must be communicated only to the person or persons
who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who
have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of
the statement.[17] A written letter containing libelous matter
cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated among the public.[18] In this case, petitioner admitted
that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the
same and made a print out of the computer. [19] While petitioner
addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed
that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity
is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication.[20] Such publication had already created upon the
minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and
shame to respondents reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is
presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The
presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as
discussed above.
Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming
the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime
of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and
it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the
appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. [21] We
find that the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages
should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be entitled to actual
and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof
constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof.
[22]
Respondent had not presented evidence in support thereof.

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of

writings or similar means with prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or
both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a

single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose
a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty
of both fine and imprisonment.

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[23] where petitioners therein were

convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for alternative penalties of
fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted
the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead
ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount
of the check. We held:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino
entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national
economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all
good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have
accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation
to evade prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal
justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion
allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due
regard to the protection of the social order. [24]

In the subsequent case of Lim v. People,[25] we did the same and

deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a fine
for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the
ends of criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 122000. On February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular
13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by
stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 122000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties provided for in B.P. 22.

While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons
behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable
to petitioners case of libel. We note that this is petitioners first
offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the
demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then
sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of
the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a
civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In
fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison
term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a
crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the
social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic
usefulness and other social ends. [26] Consequently, we delete the
prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine
of six thousand pesos.

This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of

imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of

libel. InSazon v. Court of Appeals,[27] petitioner was convicted of

libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and
upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but
changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall
be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P133132 (Formerly A.M. No. 12354RTC), June
04, 2014
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT
INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL,
SARANGANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLASBERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from the letter 1 dated March 15,
2011 of Executive Judge Jaime L. Infante (Judge Infante) of the
Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38.
(RTC), addressed to complainant the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA),2 inquiring about the employment status of
respondent Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court Interpreter III of
the said RTC since August 3, 1993. In the aforementioned letter,
Judge Infante informed the OCA that despite Ampongs dismissal
from service by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which
dismissal was affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received any
official information or directive from the OCA on the matter. As
such, Ampong remains employed in the RTC and has been

continuously receiving all her monthly salary, benefits,

allowances, and the like.
The Facts
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative
case against Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having
impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. JunioDecir
(Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to
having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a
resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory
penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her
Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating.
Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the
said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to
the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any
jurisdiction over her. Ampongs motion was later denied, thus,
prompting her to file a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals (CA).4
On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampongs petition and
affirmed her dismissal from service on the ground that she never
raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her
and, thus, she is estopped from assailing the same. 5 Similarly, on
August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for review
on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal from service in G.R.
No. 167916, entitled Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service
Commission, CSCRegional Office No. 116(August 26, 2008
Decision).
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office
(FMO) of the OCA, which did not receive any official directive

regarding Ampongs dismissal, continued to release her salaries

and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infantes letter
notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a
Memorandum7 dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that
starting June 2011, it had started to withhold Ampongs salaries
and allowances.8
In her Comment9 dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that
the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality
because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its
enforcement.10 Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that
the CSC did not have any jurisdiction over the case against her. 11
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum12 dated March 27, 2013, the OCA
recommended that Ampong be found guilty of Dishonesty for
impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service
Eligibility Examination for Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be
dismissed from the service on the ground that she no longer
possesses the appropriate eligibility required for her position, with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits except accrued leave
credits and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
any government agency or instrumentality, including any
governmentowned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution.13
The OCA found that Ampongs act of impersonating and taking
the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers for and on behalf of another person indeed constitutes
dishonesty, a grave offense which carries the corresponding
penalty of dismissal from service. It added that the fact that the
offense was not connected with her office or was committed prior
to her appointment in the judiciary does not in any way exonerate

her from administrative liability as an employee of the court. 14

Further, the OCA found that Ampongs appointment as Court
Interpreter III did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to
discipline employees from all branches and agencies of the
government in order to protect the integrity of the civil service.
Consequently, the CSC could validly impose the administrative
penalty of dismissal against her, which carries with it that of
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided. In this relation,
the OCA emphasized that the CSC ruling effectively stripped
Ampong of her civil service eligibility and, hence, could no longer
hold the position of Court Interpreter III. 15
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Courts resolution is whether or not
Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as Court
Interpreter III of the RTC.
The Courts Ruling
The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.
As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court
had already held Ampong administratively liable for dishonesty in
impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service
Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of
Decir, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as
an act which includes the procurement and/or use of
fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to
ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating,

collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which

amounts to any violation of the Civil Service
examination. [Ampong] impersonated Decir in the PBET
exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing
mark. By intentionally practicing a deception to secure a
passing mark, their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the (d)isposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray. [Ampongs] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her
unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that
[Ampong] should not have been appointed as a judicial
employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating
that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be
that as it may, [Ampongs] present status as a judicial
employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she
deserves.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Notably, the Court also addressed Ampongs misgivings on the
issue of jurisdiction in the same
case,viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and
governmentowned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its
administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to control,
supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations. This
authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any
irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme

Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over
all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify
its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution
granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts
and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the
judiciary.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that
impersonating an examinee of a civil service examination is an
act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial
employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court
validated.
A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton,
involving judicial employees who also impersonated civil service
examinees. As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary
charges before the OCA because respondents were judicial
employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and meting
the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that respondents
machinations reflect their dishonesty and lack of integrity,
rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public servants
and employees of the judiciary.
Compared to Sta. Ana and Bartolata, the present case involves a

similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee.

But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the
offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the
time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under
the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil
service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously
took the CSCsupervised PBET exam in place of another person.
When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty
in a civil servicesupervised examination.
That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC
does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the
Supreme Court.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court
employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.17 (Emphases in the original;
citations omitted)
Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states
that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law,18 Ampong could no longer seek the August 26,
2008 Decisions modification and reversal. Consequently, the
penalty of dismissal from service on account of Ampongs
Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. In line with
Section 58(a)19 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it
the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil
service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c)
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government
agency or instrumentality, including any governmentowned and

controlled corporation or government financial institution.

Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same.
To clarify, however, despite Ampongs dismissal on the ground of
dishonesty, she should nevertheless be entitled to receive her
accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the aforementioned
provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of
the same. It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from
the service, government employees are entitled to the leave
credits that they have earned during the period of their
employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be
deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to
their dismissal.20
It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be
an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public
servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also
in her personal and private dealings with other people, to
preserve the courts good name and standing. The image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise,
of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest
of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to
the exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good
name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to
meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and
does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary. 21
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the dismissal of respondent
Sarah P. Ampong, Court Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of
Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38, on the ground of
Dishonesty. Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits are
forfeited except accrued leave credits, and she is perpetually

disqualified from reemployment in any government agency or

instrumentality, including any governmentowned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution, effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9317 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3615), June 04,
2014
ADELIA V. QUIACHON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR A.
RAMOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V. Quiachon
(complainant), against her lawyer, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos
(respondent). The latter represented complainant, who was then
the plaintiff in a labor case filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding case
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). 1 Complainant charges
respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision
on 26 November 2007. Upon appeal, it was reversed and set
aside by the NLRC in its Decision dated 25 July 2008. 3 On 24
October 2008, the NLRC also denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainants behalf. A
Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA),
but it affirmed the NLRCs reversal of the LAs Decision. The
Notice of the CA Decision was received by respondent on 23
November 2010.
After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant would

always ask respondent about the status of her case. The latter
always told her that there was no decision yet.
Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in respondents
office waiting for him to arrive, she noticed a mailman delivering
an envelope with the title of her labor case printed
thereon.4Complainant asked the secretary of respondent to open
the envelope and was surprised to discover that it contained the
Entry of Judgment of the CAs Decision. Thereafter, complainant
tried repeatedly to contact respondent, but to no avail. When she
finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that it was
alright as they still had six months to appeal the case to the
Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor
case were ever communicated to complainant.
With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent did
nothing to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of
Judgment was received on 28 October 2008.
On 28 November 2011, complainant filed the instant disbarment
Complaint5 against respondent.
In his Comment,6 respondent averred that complainant was
informed of the status of the case. He claimed that he had told
complainant that he cannot cite any error of law or abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals decision that
necessitates a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court; 7
thus, he supposedly advised her to respect the decision of the
Court of Appeals.8Respondent prayed that a Decision be
rendered dismissing the instant disbarment Complaint for lack of
merit.

In a Resolution9 dated 13 June 2012, the Court referred the case

to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
During the pendency of the proceedings, specifically on 5
February 2013, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint.10
In his Report and Recommendation dated 23 April 2013, IBP
Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Almeyda)
declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
True enough, it seems clear that respondent had been remiss in
failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases
being handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was
a failure to inform complainant (the client) of the status of the
cases that thereafter prevented the client from exercising her
options. There was neglect in that regard. 11cralawlawlibrary
However, in spite of finding neglect on respondents part, he
recommended the dismissal of the case against him, stating that
with the decision to withdraw the complaint, there does not
appear basis to go ahead with the proceedings since without the
complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability. 12
On 11 May 2013, a Resolution was passed by the Board of
Governors of the IBP resolving to adopt and approve the Report
and Recommendation of investigation commissioner Almeyda.
The case against respondent was dismissed with a warning that a
repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
This Court finds this to be an opportune time to remind the
investigating commissioners and the members of the Board of
Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a disbarment case

against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of

the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding
against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. 13
In the present case, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the
case against respondent, even after finding that the latter had
been negligent. On the basis of this finding, the latter was
declared to have been remiss in failing to update complainant in
what had happened to the cases being handled by him in behalf
of complainant.14 Still, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of
the case, because without the complaint, there will be no basis
to make any finding of liability.15 The Board of Governors of the
IBP affirmed the recommendation.
The IBP Board of Governors should not have supported Almeydas
stance.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the
case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court.16 There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination
in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the
bar.17 Public interest is the primary objective. We explained why
in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,18 viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly
executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome

except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration

of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges x x x.
In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, it
should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the
desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.
The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision
without any justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who
disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw
their appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel. 19
In Abay v. Montesino,20 the respondent-lawyer and his client
disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed
case. The lawyer therein strongly advised the client to abandon
the appeal and to consider the other available remedies. The
client, on the other hand, wanted to pursue it. Without obtaining
the assent of his client, the respondent-lawyer deemed it wise to
abandon the appeal without informing the former. In finding the
respondent-lawyer guilty of negligence, the Court
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Not filing an appellant's brief is prejudicial because, as happened
in this case, such failure could result in the dismissal of the
appeal. The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to
exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude
towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former
of the latter's cause made him unworthy of the trust that his
client reposed in him. Even if respondent was "honestly and
sincerely" protecting the interests of complainant, the former still
had no right to waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge

and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to

continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his
appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer. 21
In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client
informed of the status of the case, but also to avail of the proper
legal remedy that would promote the clients cause. It is clear
that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.
All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. 22 Regardless of their
personal views, they must present every remedy or defense
within the authority of the law in support of that
cause.23Whenever lawyers take on their clients cause/s, they
covenant that they will exercise due diligence in protecting the
clients rights; their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance
and attention expected of a good father of a family makes them
unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their client/s and make
them answerable to the client, the courts and society. 24
In Pilapil v. Carillo,25 this Court upheld the recommendation of the
IBP to suspend a lawyer from the practice of law for six months
after finding that he had failed to file a petition for certiorari of the
adverse decision rendered in the case of his client despite the
latters repeated follow-ups.cra1awlaw1ibrary
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos is found GUILTY of
negligence and is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He
isWARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent
as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be served on the
IBP as well as on the court administrator, who is directed to

circulate these copies to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9881
June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD 10-2607)
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors of the administrative
Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty. Manuel
Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a
contract on the complainant's client who had never been a party
to the agreement.
The facts are as follows:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit
compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City.
The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M.
Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients
of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda
San Juan.
The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other
unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a
document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of
internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the

common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking

areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty.
Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not
agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for
Dishonesty1 with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against
Atty. Molina2 for allegedly giving legal advice to the latters clients
to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr.
Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.
In his Answer,3 Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty
quarrel among neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square
Preamble4 was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in
the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu,
signed the document.5
Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs.
Gregorio Abreu filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs.
William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the
Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which was an action to
declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was
an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to
respondent, were dismissed.6
Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in
court, this time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file
a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own
hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the
Lims, thus blocking the latters egress to Times Street. The Lims
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for
the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-

63579. According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief

prayed for in an Order dated 12 December 2008.7
Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as
his answer to the Complaint.
On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez rendered a Report and Recommendation. He
recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following
grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and
2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal
advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof
of malice or bad faith.8
On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XIX-2011-210, adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 9
Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August
2011, but was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on 29
December 2012.10 Notices of the denial were received by the
parties on 21 March 2013.11
No petition for review has been filed with this Court.
It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the
complainant does not file a petition with the Supreme Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution. This rule is
derived from Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the
disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue
a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The
case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards

resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring

supplied)
In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Boards resolution
on 21 March 2013, as evidenced by a registry return receipt. To
this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for review from
Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with
the Court within 15 days, this case is deemed terminated
pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c).
Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no
reason to deviate from the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two
things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires
clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on
the complainant.12
In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual
basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges Atty. Molina with
providing legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the
Times Square Preamble is binding on complainants client, Mr.
Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. The allegation
of giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this
case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings.
Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent
giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations
are not proof.13
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal
advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any
showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The
rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their
profession is as follows:
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an
honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice

Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God
forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or
even a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x x. 14
The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand,
bad faith is never presumed.1wphi1 It is a conclusion to be
drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and
is evidentiary.15 There is no evidence, though, to show that the
legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad
faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore,
stands in this case.
The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by
clear preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
adopting and approving the Decision of the Investigating
Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
(DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZONCAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a

person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the
NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East
with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected
his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education.
By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed
to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave
of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4,
1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner
had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be

reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of
the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their competence
and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school
on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the
general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps
most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized
as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion
of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for
admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What
we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of
this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of

admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting

admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current state of our social and
economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and
quite probably, in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the
failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove
otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to
treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that
the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld
only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing
about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot
apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the
academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded

any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State.
Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires
the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does
not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any
other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State
has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see
to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all.
These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace

to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better
as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he
may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may
not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who
has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside
to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may
be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent
is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen
has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give
way to those better prepared. Where even those who have
qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded
medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who,
like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal
protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists
between medical students and other students who are not
subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike
other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant
regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an
equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly
treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have

passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified
are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection
requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to
quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must
show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five
times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is
certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in
the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not
for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding.
It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality
education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the
sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a
brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of
dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who
should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and
enrich our system of education by directing the student to the
course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests
and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with
mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are
lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the

respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with
costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
A.M. No. P-13-3123

June 10, 2014

ALBERTO VALDEZ, Complainant,

vs.
DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter refers to the failure of respondent
Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, to act on a writ of execution issued by
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk, Kalinga on 3
December 2003 in Criminal Case No. 4050, entitled "People v.
Jorge Macusi y Wayet," for reckless imprudence and negligence
resulting in homicide. Sheriff Macusi was charged with
misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
In a letter-complaint1 dated 12 May 2009 sent to Judge Victor
Dalanao (Judge Dalanao), presiding judge of the MTCC of Tabuk,
Kalinga, complainant Alberto Valdez (Valdez) alleged that Sheriff
Macusi failed to act on the writ of execution issued by the MTCC in
violation of Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In his Comment2 dated 14 July 2009, Sheriff Macusi stated that he
was appointed as Sheriff IV in the Province of Kalinga on 24 May
2004. Sheriff Macusi explained that in a Report 3 dated 6 January
2004, his predecessor, Francisco C. Mabazza, served on accused
Jorge Macusi the writ of execution issued by the MTCC on 5
December 2003. However, the accused replied that he had no

money to pay for the execution. Thus, the notation in the writ of
execution was "unsatisfactory (sic) served. "Thereafter, Sheriff
Macusi stated that he tried to serve the order again by entering
the residence of defendant looking for personal properties that
could be confiscated on account of the writ but to no avail. Sheriff
Macusi then asked accused to voluntarily comply with his legal
obligation but found out that accused had suffered a stroke and
could no longer fend for himself and his family and resorted to
accepting charity from his sister.
In a Partial Report4 dated 3 May 2006, Sheriff Macusi filed a return
of the writ of execution stating that it was still unserved. The
relevant portions of the Report state:
1. That the accused because of the incident suffered a stroke and
therefrom could no longer find a livelihood for himself and his
children and as stated in the order of the Honorable Court is now
living on the charity of his sister. His sister is also tending to the
needs of their mother who also suffered the same fate because of
illness that befell her son;
xxxx
3. That the court battle begun armed with the hope that the
accused was never given his day in court (in fact an ocular
inspection was done to determine the seriousness of the illness of
the accused and at that time he could hardly speak and walk yet
the court continued hearing his case; thus, his right to be present
in all the stages of the court proceedings of his case was denied)
will be imprisoned should the decision of the Hon. Court will (sic)
be against him;
xxxx
Sheriff Macusi averred that he could not be held liable for
misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service since he carried out all the possible legal

remedies on execution and satisfaction of judgment under the

rules.
On 19 June 2006, Judge Dalanao issued an Order5 stating that the
Partial Report dated 3 May 2006 of Sheriff Macusi was an
improper and inadequate report as required under the Rules. The
relevant portions of the Order state:
It appears therefrom that the said report is not the report
contemplated by law, which should be submitted monthly to the
Court (Section 14, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Instead, the Sheriff appears to be lawyering for accused, even
going to the extent of accusing the Court of having denied the
accused his day in Court. Certainly, this comment, from a
responsible officer of the Court is unwarranted or without any
justification at all. Not only that, it will certainly diminish the good
image of the Court, and worst, tarnish the faith and confidence of
the litigants in our judicial processes.
The Court just came to know that the accused in this case is the
brother of Sheriff Desiderio Macusi. The least that he should have
done was to inhibit himself from handling this case.
Furnish a copy of this Order to the Executive Judge for his
information and/or appropriate action without prejudice for this
Court to take measures appropriate under the premises, where
warranted.
SO ORDERED.
Valdez, in the letter-complaint, added that Sheriff Macusi did not
submit another report to the court since the time the MTCC issued
the Order dated 19 June 2006. Acting on the letter-complaint,
Judge Dalanao issued an Order dated 13 May 2009 endorsing the
letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action.

In a Report dated 1 June 2010,the OCA recommended that the

administrative complaint be referred tothe Executive Judge of the
RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, Branch 25, for investigation,
report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of notice.
In a Resolution6 dated 28 July 2010, this Court adopted the
recommendation of the OCA and referred the matter to Executive
Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas).
In an Investigation Report7 dated 20 April 2012, Judge Wacas
found no substantial evidence to hold Sheriff Macusi for the
offense charged and recommended the dismissal of the
complaint. In a Resolution8 dated 4 July 2012, this Court referred
the Investigation Report to the OCA.
In its Report9 dated 23 April 2013, the OCA disagreed with the
recommendation of Judge Wacas and found Sheriff Macusi liable
for (1) simple neglect of duty for his failure to submit the proper
returns, and (2) violation of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel for his failure to disclose that the accused in "People v.
Jorge Macusi y Wayet"is his brother. The OCA recommended that
Sheriff Macusi be suspended from office for two months without
pay. The recommendation of the OCA states:
1. The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter;
2. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Branch 25, Regional Trial
Court, Tabuk, Kalinga, be held LIABLE for Simple Neglect of Duty
and Violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; and
3. Sheriff Macusi be SUSPENDED from office for two (2) months
without pay, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 10
We adopt the findings of the OCA but modify its recommendation
on the penalty.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Section 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution

shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt
of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the
reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion.
The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days
on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied
in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be
filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties.
The 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the
judgment has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic
report every 30 days, is mandatory under the rule. In Aquino v.
Martin,11 we held that it is mandatory for the sheriff to execute the
judgment and make a return on the writ of execution within the
period provided by the Rules of Court. Also, the sheriff must make
periodic reports on partially satisfied or unsatisfied writs in
accordance with the rule in order that the court and the litigants
are apprised of the proceedings undertaken. Such periodic
reporting on the status of the writs must be done by the sheriff
regularly and consistently every 30 days until they are returned
fully satisfied.
In the present case, the records show that Sheriff Macusi
submitted only one return of writ of execution in his Partial Report
dated 3 May 2006 and did not file any other report to the court.
Sheriff Macusi failed to implement the court order and failed to
submit periodic reports of the actions he had taken on the writ
"every 30 days until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its
effectivity expires," as required by the Rules. In Dilan v.
Dulfo,12 we held that sheriffs play an important part in the

administration of justice because they are tasked to execute the

final judgment of courts. If not enforced, such decisions are empty
victories on the part of the prevailing parties. Clearly, Sheriff
Macusi was remiss in his duties and is thus liable for simple
neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or
the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Under
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,13 simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense
punishable with suspension of one month and one day to six
months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. 14
Further, aside from Sheriff Macusis long delay in the enforcement
of the writ, it has also been verified by the OCA that Sheriff
Macusi is the brother of the accused Jorge Macusi in Criminal Case
No. 4050. Section 1(a)(i) of Canon III of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel provides:
Section 1. Court personnel shall avoid conflicts of interest in
performing official duties.1wphi1 Every court personnel is
required to exercise utmost diligence in being aware of conflicts of
interest, disclosing conflicts of interest to the designated
authority, and terminating them as they arise.
(a) A conflict of interest exists when:
(i) The court personnels objective ability or independence of
judgment in performing official duties is impaired or may
reasonably appear to be impaired; x x x
As an officer of the court, Sheriff Macusi should have informed the
court and inhibited himself from enforcing the writ knowing fully
well that there is a conflict of interest since the accused is his
brother. It is incumbent upon him, as an agent of the law, to
adhere to high ethical standards in order to preserve the good
name and standing of the court. In Office of the Court

Administrator v. Sheriff IV Cabe,15 we emphasized the heavy

burden and responsibility which court personnel bear in view of
their exalted positions as keepers of public faith. They must be
constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed
or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. We agree with the OCA that Sheriff Macusi violated the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel for his failure to disclose that
the accused in "People v. Jorge Macusi y Wayet"is his brother. The
Rules classify this violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules
a serious offense punishable with suspension of one month and
one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense.16
We disagree with the penalty of suspension for two months
without pay as recommended by the OCA. This is the second time
that Sheriff Macusi was found guilty of simple neglect of duty. In
the 2013 case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Macusi,
Jr.,17 this Court found Sheriff Macusi liable for simple neglect of
duty for his "failure to file periodic reports on the Writ of Execution
dated 10 September 2008 in Civil Case No. 429-06, as well as on
the writs of execution in the other cases in Judge Dalanaos
inventory." However, instead of imposing on him the penalty of
suspension from service in accordance with the Rules, the Court
imposed on him the penalty of fine ofP4,000 since he was
deemed resigned from government service after filing his
certificate of candidacy for the 2010 local elections.
Here, respondent is found guilty of committing two offenses: (1)
simple neglect of duty (second offense), and (2) violation of civil
service law and rules of a serious nature (first offense). Thus, the
penalty for the more serious offense must be imposed. This is
expressly laid down under Section 55, Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which
states:

Section 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. If the

respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the
penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most
serious charge or count and the rest shall be considered as
aggravating circumstances.
In view of the circumstances, the penalty that should be imposed
is dismissal from the government service. However, considering
that Sheriff Macusi was deemed resigned after filing his certificate
of candidacy making the penalty of dismissal no longer feasible,
we impose on him the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government owned and controlled corporations, since he had
been previously warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely.18
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, GUILTY of
SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and impose on him the
penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841
June 2, 2014
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2388-MTJ)
GERSHON N. DULANG, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARY JOCYLEN1 G. REGENCIA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT (MCTC), ASTURIAS-BALAMBAN,
CEBU, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case for gross inefficiency, gross
ignorance of the. law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct,
and serious dereliction of duty against respondent Judge Mary
Jocylen G. Regencia (Judge Regencia) of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Asturias-Balamban, Cebu (MCTC), commenced thru a
Verified Complaint2 dated May 28, 2011 filed by complainant
Gershon N. Dulang (Dulang) before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an ejectment complaint with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 212-B, entitled "Spouses Gershon
Dulang and Luzviminda Dulang, represented by Reynaldo Moldez
v. Emmanuel Flores," which was filed before the MCTC on
Februrary 2, 2000 (ejectment case).
In the Verified Complaint, Dulang alleged that on May 4, 2009, he
moved3 for the resolution of the above-mentioned ejectment case,
given that the same had been filed as early as year 2000 and had
already been submitted for resolution.4 Notwithstanding the
summary nature of the ejectment proceedings, Judge Regencia
rendered a Judgment5 dismissing the ejectment case only on
February 18, 2011(February 18, 2011 Judgment), or more than 11
years since its filing. Consequently, the Notice of Judgment was
issued only on March 7, 2011 and mailed on March 15, 2011. 6
Dulang likewise noted that Judge Regencia was previously found
administratively liable for gross inefficiency in Tam v. Judge
Regencia7 and was thereby ordered to pay a fine of 5,000.00 and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.8

On September 1, 2011, Dulang filed a Verified Supplemental

Complaint to the Verified Complaint dated May 28, 2011
(supplemental complaint)9 before the OCA, alleging that despite
the filing of a notice of appeal from Judge Regencias February 18,
2011 Judgment, the latter nevertheless issued an Order 10 dated
August 1, 2011 (August 1, 2011 Order) directing the postmaster
and postal carrier of the Cebu Central Post Office, Cebu City to
certify Dulangs receipt of a copy of the said Judgment. In this
regard, Dulang accused Judge Regencia ofgross ignorance of the
law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious
dereliction of duty, contending that by filing his appeal, the latter
was already stripped of her (Judge Regencia) jurisdiction over the
case and should not have issued the said order. Dulang claimed
that this effectively stalled the administration of justice, much to
his prejudice.11
In her Comments (to the Verified Complaint)12 dated August 7,
2011, Judge Regencia maintained that no trial was held in Civil
Case No. 212-B as the parties merely filed their respective
position papers and that she could have easily resolved the said
case if not for another case pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (Toledo City RTC), i.e., Civil Case
No. T-862, entitled "Spouses Emmanuel Flores and Daisy Flores v.
Spouses Jose G. Paulin and Eleodora Ganhinhin, et al.," which was
closely intertwined with the former.13
As such, she found it prudent to defer the resolution of Civil Case
No. 212-B until Civil Case No. T-862 was decided. She also averred
that she should not be faulted for the long delay in resolving the
ejectment case as she assumed her post as MCTC judge only in
November 2002 and, thereafter, began presiding over the same
starting on November 15, 2007.14
In opposition to the accusations contained in the supplemental
complaint, Judge Regencia commented that she issued the August
1, 2011 Order because the defendant in the ejectment case,

Emmanuel Flores (Flores), opposed Dulangs notice of appeal. She

explained that this order was merely intended to determine
whether or not Dulang filed his appeal within the reglementary
period.15
Pursuant to the Courts Resolution16 dated July 30, 2012, the
administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of the
Toledo City RTC for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Consequently, in his Report and Recommendation 17 dated
December 20, 2012, Executive Judge Hermes B. Montero (Judge
Montero) found Judge Regencia administratively liable for gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence,
serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty in handling the
ejectment case, and thereby recommended that she be dismissed
from service.18Judge Montero opined that Judge Regencia failed to
observe the Rules on Summary Procedure as she did not resolve
said case with dispatch; despite the case having been submitted
for resolution on October 17, 2008, she only rendered judgment
on February18, 2011, or after more than 11 years since the case
was filed. Judge Montero also pointed out that contrary to Judge
Regencias contentions, there was no suspension of the
proceedings that was agreed upon by the parties and that no
prejudicial question ever existed to warrant a discontinuance of
the same.19
Meanwhile, Judge Regencia filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 of
the Courts Resolution dated July 30, 2012 referring her
administrative case to Judge Montero for investigation, report, and
recommendation. She argued that Judge Montero cannot be
expected to make an impartial investigation of her case as he is
the "compadre" of Dulangs lawyer and that he had constantly
shown a hostile attitude towards her. Judge Regencia also sent
two (2) letters,21 both dated April 10, 2013, informing the Court
that Dulang was reportedly killed and that she had verified this

information with Flores. In view of Dulangs death, Judge Regencia

prayed that the administrative case against her be dismissed. 22
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum23 dated November 22, 2013, the OCA
recommended that Judge Regencia be held administratively liable
for undue delay in rendering a decision, and thereby fined her in
the amount of 20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. It
agreed with the findings of Judge Montero that there is no
justifiable excuse for Judge Regencia not to render judgment in
the ejectment case within the 30-day reglementary period
mandated by the Rules on Summary Procedure. In this relation,
the OCA brushed aside Judge Regencias charge of partiality
against Judge Montero for lack of factual support and equally
disregarded the fact of Dulangs death, holding that such
circumstance does not automatically result in the dismissal of his
administrative complaint.24
However, the OCA no longer determined Judge Regencias
administrative liability with respect to the charges of gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence,
serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty. Hence, in due
deference to her right to be afforded due process, said charges
shall no longer be tackled herein.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue raised for the Courts resolution is whether or not
Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision.
The Courts Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OCA,
with the modification, however, as to the penalty imposed on
Judge Regencia.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the

efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not
possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable
to the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be
imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. 25 This
is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which states that "[a] judge shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods" and
echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary26which provides that "[j]udges shall
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness."
Here, it is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B was already
submitted for resolution on October 17, 2008. Being an ejectment
case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which
clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the
last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon
must be issued.27Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment
only about two (2) years and four (4) months later, or on February
18,2011. While rules prescribing the time within which certain
acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays
in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should
be regarded as mandatory,28 the Court has nevertheless been
mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of
circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of
their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due
to justifiable reasons.29
However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason
in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making
her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.
Further, as adverted to earlier, Judge Regencia tried to justify the
delay in resolving Civil Case No. 212-B by claiming, inter alia, that

there exists a prejudicial question brought about by the existence

of a pending case in the Toledo RTC and that the parties agreed
on the suspension of the proceedings. However, Judge Montero
found that there was neither a prejudicial question nor an
agreement between the litigants that would warrant substantial
delays in the proceedings a finding which is subscribed to by the
OCA.30 Verily, Judge Regencias clear and blatant attempt to
mislead the Court is deplorable and should never be
countenanced.1wphi1
Undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious
charge, punishable either by: (a) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than
three months; or ( b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.31 In imposing the proper sanction on Judge
Regencia, the Court notes that aside from her aforementioned
misrepresentation, she was also previously found administratively
liable for gross inefficiency where she was ordered to pay a fine of
PS,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.32 Moreover, as correctly
observed by Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations of this
case, her length of service of more .than 17 years should be taken
against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor as she
should have already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an
ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought to be
expeditiously resolved.33 Hence, a fine of P40,000.00, instead of
suspension, should be the appropriate penalty for Judge Regencia'
s misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Mary Jocylen G.
Regencia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Asturias-Balamban,
Cebu, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision. Accordingly,
she is ordered to pay a fine of P40,000.00 and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.