Nietzsche's Morality: Affirming and Denying Ethics

The Morals of an Immoralist-Friedrich Nietzsche.
I
Author(s): Alfred W. Benn
Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Oct., 1908), pp. 1-23
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS
OCTOBER, 1908.
THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST-FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE.'
ALFRED W. BENN.
I.
GERMANY, so rich in everyotherkind of phil-
osophical literature,has not contributedmuch to

ethicalthought. InnumerableSittenlehrenhave doubtless flowedfromthe laborious pens of her professors;
and her great writershave given utteranceto many
casual thoughtson the problemsof good and evil, virtue and vice. But withthe singleexceptionof Kant's
categoricalimperativeshe has producednothingthatthe
world in general has accepted as comparableto the
achievementsin the same field of Greece, Rome and
Britain. Fichteand Schopenhauer
comenextto Kant for
interestand value. Theycannot,however,be said to have
producedmuchimpressionoutsideGermany; and their
moralityis, or at least claimsto be, so closelyboundup
withtheirmetaphysics
as inevitablyto sufferby detach' The following was written before I had the advantage of reading the
articles by Mr. Pigou and Miss Atkinsonin the April (1908) number of this
JOURNAL,of which one deals entirely and the other partially with Nietzsche 's ethics. Both writers approach the subject from a point of view
somewhat differentfrom mine, and their interpretationof Nietzsche seems
to me rather too favorable. But that there should be so much general
agreement between three critics working on independent lines seems to me
on the whole a rather satisfactory result.
Vol. XIX.-No.
1.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
ofexistence.And
mentfromtheirillusiveinterpretations
evenKant reallydid no morethanemphasizeand preciutterlyfailingin his
sionizetheidea of moralobligation,
subsequentattemptto fill up the blank form with a
specificsumof moralprescriptions.
This speculativeweakness,assumingit to exist,is not
easy to explain. It certainlyis not connectedwithany
on the practicalside. The Germans
admitteddeficiency
yield to no othergreat nationin moral seriousnessand
dutifulness;suchtriumphsas theyhave achievedin war
a frivoand peace wouldhavebeenimpossibleto a selfish,
race. Nor has the disposition
lous or a self-indulgent
to theorizeon what they do ever been lacking among
them; if anythingit is presentto excess. And in fact
what one missesis not ethicaltheorizingbut originality
and lifein thetheories.
It maybe thattheextremelibertyoftheologicalspeculation in Germany,combinedwiththe want of political
liberty,accountsfor this anomaly,as the reversecondiofethical
tionsaccountfortheextraordinary
development
thoughtin the schoolsof Athensand in Great Britain.
For at Athens always,as among ourselvesuntil quite
into
recently,
thepopularreligionpervertedmetaphysics
an abstractmythology,
whilethepopularrespectforpersonal libertygave free play to real or ideal reconstructionsof life. Plato is nearlyas cautiousas Mill whenhe
toucheson theultimaterealitiesof nature; Mill is nearly
as bold as Plato when he sets up ultimatestandards
of conduct. Whatever freedomof thinkingfor ourselves in cosmicsciencewe possess is due to Germany.
Whateverfreedomof social action the Germanspossess theyowe to us. Their Frauenbewegungis there
to proveit.
Withinour ownmemoryGermanyhas forthefirsttime
withwhomprobproduceda trulyethicalgenius,a thinker
frombeginningto end the
lems of conductconstituted
supremeif not the sole interestof life. It may seem
strangethat I shouldsay so muchof the demonicand
THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST.
tragicfigurewhosenamestandsat thehead of thisstudy.

For FriedrichNietzschehabituallyposed as an immoralist, an emancipatorfrommoral restrictions,
speakingof
whathe called"moralin" as a deadlypoison. Nietzsche's
friends,however,a mostrespectableset of people,were
not in the least appalled by such language,nor need we
take it in verydeadlyearnest. They saw in it no more
thana strongway of sayingthatmuchofwhatpasses for
absolutelyrightand goodis onlytruewithincertainvery
narrowlimitations,
and thatthereare impulses,supposed
to be veryvirtuous,whichtendon thewholeto do mankindmoreharmthangood.
In giving this paradoxical form to his morality
Nietzschewas merelyfollowingthe constanttraditionof
Germanphilosophy. We are accustomed,and for that
matterhis own countrymen
are accustomed,to look on
Hegel as a quite exceptionalinstanceof what may be
done in the way of settingcommonsense at defiance.
But Hegel,withhis immanentdialecticof self-contradictorypositions,only broughtto a pointwhat had been
moreor less the methodof all his predecessors,
and was
destinedto be the methodof his chiefsuccessorsalso.
Kant naivelysupposedthat he was dissipatingHume's
skepticism
by an audacityof negationbeforewhichHume
wouldhave shrunkback appalled; and, not contentwith
that performance,
he proceededto integrateFree Will
with a systemwhichliterally,to all appearances,left
Determinism
masterof the field. Fichte,afterreducing
the non-ego-thatis, the whole objectiveworld-to an
oftheego,setstheego thetaskofnegatingits
assumption
ownnegation,whichis at the same timethe conditionof
its existence,withthe comfortable
assurancethata consummationwhichwould be fatal to both partiesneeds
all eternityfor its achievement.More impatientthan
his master,Schellingboldlyidentifies
the two underthe
names of object and subject,and the worldgoes on as
before-indeed,accordingto him, always has gone on
preciselybecause it alwaysknewthattherewas no difThis content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Mon, 20 Apr 2015 22:11:53 UTC
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
afterdisdainfully
ferencebetweenthem. Schopenhauer,
as so
rejectingthe systemsof his fellow-metaphysicists
many absurdities,sets up a new absolutewhich,after
intoexistence,learnsfrom
willingitselfout of nonentity
of willingitselfback from
sad experiencethedesirability
existenceintononentity.Andto thiscontradiction,
which
lies at theverybasis of his system,he,adds anothernot
less serious contradictionin workingout its details.
While assertingthe substantialidentityof all our individual willswithone anotherand withtheuniversalwill
of whichtheyare 'so manypartialmanifestations,
he yet
limitsthe self-negating
powerof each will to itself. On
enteringinto Nirvana I redeemmyselfalone; the infiniteanguishof the world goes on as before. Yet at
thesame timethe shortcut of suicideis barredto me by
the solemnwarningthatself-inflicted
deathamountsto a
of thewillwhichit seemsto deny.
rebelliousreaffirmation
This immanentself-contradiction
of Germanthought,
althoughit firstbecameopen and scandalousin Kant's
criticism,is older than Kant. To go no furtherback,
it alreadyafflicts
themonadologyof Leibniz. Those minute individualexistencesof which the world consists
have no windowsopening on the world,nor do they
of any kindfromone another,but all
receiveinfluences
go on developingat the same pace, each by virtueof an
evolutionary
principlepeculiarto itself. Thus,although
theuniverseat an angle of its own,
everymonadreflects
it has no reasonto believethatthisphantasmagoria
represents an objective reality,for its whole experience
wouldbe the same supposingno suchrealityto be present; and although,by the hypothesis,solipsismis not
true,thereseemsto be no evidenceof its untruth.
It appearsthenthata Germanmoralphilosophy,
to be
nativeand smackingof the soil,mustat once
thoroughly
affirm
and denymorality.We shall therefore
notbe surprised to findthat Nietzsche,whileofferinga brilliant
exceptionto therulethathis countrydoes notbreedpure
confirms
moralists,
therulethatherphilosophies
willingly
assume the form of a square circle-that bold construction which Professor Meinong, no doubt on the strength
of long experience, has recently declared to be quite
conceivable.
Furthermore it is necessary, or at least traditional,
that a German philosopher, to be original, should not
only end by contradictinghimself, but that he should
begin by contradicting another German, preferentially
his own master. And we shall find that the author of
Zarathustra was quite up to the mark in this respect
also. The teacher to whose school he firstbelonged,and
who afterwards became the chief object of his attacks,
was Schopenhauer. Nietzsche was twentyyears of age
and a university student when, in 1865, he first came
across the great pessimnist'swritings,at that time only in
the firstdawn of their popularity. What chieflyattracted
him seems to have been their high literarymeritand the
sincerityof their author, a sinceritydisplayed above all
in his attitude toward theology. Schopenhauer really
stood no fartherfromthe central beliefs of Christianity
than Hegel, if as far; but he never bowed down in the
temple of Rimmon to the extentof passing himselfoffas
an orthodoxLutherainor other churchmanof any kind.
He venerated the figureof Christ; but there could be no
doubt that his metaphysicsexcluded the notion of a God
and of a future life just as much as they excluded the
possibilityof a happy life. And that was why the bankruptcy of Hegelianism, after 1848, left the system of
Kant's rival continuatorin a position no betterthan before. For to the pietisticand obscurantistreaction that
succeeded the abortive revolution,free thought was as
hateful under the form of pessimism as under the form
of optimisticpantheism. We are apt to look on Germany
as the great emancipator from superstition; but in this
instance, as in the early eighteenthcentury,she seems
to have been led out of darkness by light fromthe West,
by the influenceof Buckle and Darwin, and by Renan's
Vie de Jesus, followedup as this was by Strauss's second
Leben Jesu. At any rate a far more liberal tone prevailed in the sixtiesthan in the previousdecade; and
Schopenhauer'sphilosophyprofitedby the new spirit,
whichit also stimulatedin thehighestdegree,to achieve
a rapid and dazzlingsuccess.
Nietzschewas the son of a Protestantpastor,and belonged also on his mother'sside to a clerical family.
Broughtup on strictreligiousprinciples,he had learned
to set a particularvalue on veracity,regardingit rather
oddlyas a speciallyChristianvirtue,whereas,in theory
at least,it is more Greekthan Christian. He also was,
or believedhimselfto be, descendedfroma noblePolish
-familyexiled on account of their religion early in the

eighteenthcentury; so that in his case the obligation of
fidelityto truthwas heightenedby the consciousness of
representingan aristocratic and martyr tradition.

Finally,Nietzschehad chosenclassicalphilologyforhis
and obtaineda chairat Basel whenstillunder
profession,
so that for some years afterwardshis life
twenty-four,
was chieflydevotedto the studyof Greekliteratureand
philosophy.Nowwhilegiving,as I have said,morecredit
to Christianity
thanit deservesas a disciplinein truthfulness, he still acknowledgesthat "the Greekshad the
faithfulness
and the veracityof children"'(WW., IX, p.
104; writtenin 1871).2
loved to mainAt a muchlater periodour immoralist
tain thatthe sincerity
which,as a religioushabit,revolts
againstthe professionof a false religionis, as a moral
of the moralitywhichis no morethan
habit,destructive
in contemptuous
a convention.And he also maintained,
referenceto George Eliot, that to believe in Christian
is a weak inconsistency
moralityapart fromChristianity
both
was
ungraciousand un(WW., VIII, p. 120). It
just to tauntour greatethicalmoralistwithbeingcharacteristically
English or womanishin this respect; for
2 In
the referencesWW. Nietzsehe's Werice,Leipzig, 1895, 1904, large

8vo ed.; W. z. M.= Wille zur Macht,Leipzig, 1901, small 8vo ed.; Leben
=Das Leben Fr. Nietzsches,von ElizabethForster-Nietzsche.
THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.
whowas continental
and virile,had made
Schopenhauer,
the same mistake,if mistakeit is, and Nietzschehad at
firstfollowedhis master's example. Acceptingpessimismto this extentthat the search for happinessmust
be abandonedas a chimera,in his workon the Originof
Tragedy(published1872),he tellsus thata chiefnoteof
of
tragiccultureis "an attemptto make the sufferings
the world our own by an effortof sympathetic
love"
(WW., I, p. 128). Greektragedypreachesa gospel of
universalharmonywherebyeveryonefeels himselfnot
merelyunited,fused and reconciled,but absolutelyone
withhis neighbor(lb., p. 24). And in a subsequentwork
on theStudyof History,amongthe redeemingrepresenhe names not onlythosewho have
tativesof humanity,
passed throughexistencein pride and strength,or in
profoundmeditation,
but also thosewho have come "to
pityand help" (lb., p. 297). Later again he tellsus that
"there is not enoughgoodnessand love in the worldto
let thembe wastedon imaginaryobjects" (Menschliches,
Allzumenschliches,
p. 129; WW.,II, p. 133). And he had
previouslymade the perfectlysane and sufficiently
obvious remarkthatgoodnessand pityfortunately
do not
depend on the decay and growthof religion; although
"practicalmoralitywill sufferby its collapse." At the
same time this dependenceof action on religioussanctionsdeprivesit,in his opinion,of all ethicalvalue (WW.,
X, p. 214).
Returningto Schopenhauer,it is noticeable that
Nietzscheacceptedhis teachingnot only on the ethical
but also on the metaphysicalside. His work on the
Originof Tragedyis a bold attemptto read the philosophyof pessimismintotheGreektragicdrama. It arose,
accordingto him,froma combination
of theworshipof
Dionysuswiththe worshipof Apollo. The one god representsthe elementof Will and the otherthe elementof
Representationin his master's great work. Dionysus
standsfor "that originaland eternalpain whichis the
sole substanceof the world," "the true reality and
INTERNATIONALJOURNALOF ETHICS.
primordialone withits eternal sufferingand self-contradiction,seekingfor deliveranceby the creationof

beautifulappearance-the Apolline element of Greek
tragedy" (WW., I, pp. 34 and 35).
Schopenhauerhad conceivedmusic as a directinterWill whichis the true subpretationof that suffering
stanceoftheworld,whereastheotherartshave fortheir
materialtheseriesof PlatonicIdeas, theformsand forces
of naturewhichare one degreefartherremovedfromits
absolutereality. And NietzscheconceivesGreektragedy
as having originatedfrommusic preciselybecause it
furnishessuch an artisticrevelationof the awfulsecret
at the heartof things. Now RichardWagnerhad long
adopteda theoryso flatterbeforehim enthusiastically
ing to his ownart; and,partly,no doubt,on thestrength
he and the youngproof theirphilosophicalagreement,
fessor of philologyat Basel had become fast friends,
the two frequently
spendingtheirweek-endstogetherat
the house of the great composernear Lucerne. Indeed,
Wagner is so glorifiedas a modernIEschylus in the
Originof Tragedy,that,ratherto its author'sannoyance,
thegeneralpublicregardedthatworkchiefly
as a rapturous panegyricon the Music of the Future.
As an interpretation
ofGreekarttheOriginofTragedy
has no value, and was very properlydenouncedby one
destinedto becomein afteryears the foremostHellenist
of his age, Wilamowitz-Mbllendorff.
With regard to
Wagnerno moreneed be said than that Nietzschesoon
opinionof his performcame to forma very different
ances,givingmusica muchlowerplace amongthemeans
of culture,and a muchlowerplace amongmusiciansto
that particularcomposer. But in a generalway Wagner's influenceproved of decisive importancefor his
philosophicaldevelopment.Combinedwiththe studyof
Schopenhauerand of the Greeks,it led him to conceive
the promotionof genius as the highestformof moral
effort.This,as we shall see, was by no meansidentical
withthetheoryof the superman,althoughit led theway
to that theory; nor was it at firstinconsistenteitherwith

pessimism or with the commonmorality. Assuming that
the contemplationof beautifuland sublime objects is the
chief if not the sole refreshmentavailable in a world of
universal and incurable misery, the power of creating
beauty is a valuable asset for humanity,anol ought by
every means to be encouraged.
Unfortunatelywhat we may call the moral end of
genius has, so far, been very imperfectlyfulfilled. "Artists undoubtedly create their works for the benefit of
other men; and yet none will ever understand and love
their works as they did." It would have been a better
arrangementhad the relation been reversed, so that the
effectshould far exceed the cause (WW., I, p. 467 seq.).
Such blunders are, however, to be expected. "Nature
always wills the commongood, but is incapable of choosing the best means for that purpose. She shoots philosophers like arrows at the human race in the hope that they
will strike and stick somewhere"- whereas they are
mostlywasted (Ib.).
Nature then must be taught better,she must receive a
more intelligentdirection; and here morality comes in
with effect,but not quite according to the highest ideals
now prevalent. " The goal of human endeavor has
hithertobeen sought in the happiness of all men or of
the majority, or in the developmentof great communities; and under this false persuasion people will be
found ready enough to give their lives for the state;
whereas they would hesitate to make the sacrificewere it
demanded not by the state but by an individual. As if
value and significancewere to be determinedby counting
heads !" A much mistakenview, thinksour author,with
the old bias of a university teacher. "Humanity must
be ever workingat the production of great individuals:
that and nothingelse is its task, . . . a considerationsuggested by everyspecies of animal and plant" (lb., p. 442).
In our case education must supplementnature. "Young
men should be taught to compensate for their own imThis content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Mon, 20 Apr 2015 22:11:53 UTC
10
perfectionand failureby contributing

to the developmentof somethinghigherand more humanthan themselves" (Ib.). But thehope thusawakenedsoon droops.
"It is hard to producesuch a state of mind,for love
alone can inspire the consciousnessof one's own imperfection;and love cannotbe taught" (444). Indeed,
things are tending in a directlyopposite direction.
Writingin 1874,Nietzschetells us that"the worldwas
nevermoreworldly,neverpoorerin love and goodness"
(WW., p. 388). A commonview is to value cultureas a
means for procuringits possessorthe greatestpossible
amountof earthlyhappiness(447). Or again,theselfishness of the state demandsthatall cultureshall be made
instrumental
to its serviceand aggrandizement.Christianity,in particular,whichbegan as one of the purest
expressionsof the impulsetoward culture,has "been
divertedfromthe productionof saintsinto a meansfor
ofusefulcitizens" (448). Scienceoffers
themanufacture
no help; it is "cold, dry,loveless; it ignoresthe deep
senseof dissatisfaction
and longing" (453). And "such
is thehatredfororiginality
now prevailingthatSocrates
could not have lived amongus, or at least not lived to
seventy"(462).
It will be seen fromthe above extractsthat,up to the
age of thirtyat least,Nietzschestillacceptedthosealtruistic ideals whichin later life he was never weary of
denouncing.In this respecthe followedSchopenhauer,
whocontrivedto combinethemostabsolutedisinterestedness in theorywiththemostabsoluteselfishness
in practice. A reallyconsistent
pessimismwouldremainneutral
as betweenegoism and altruism,since the furtherance
of life is of equallylittlevalue to myselfand to others.
But Nietzschehad neverbeena pessimistin thecomplete
or Hindoo sense of cultivatingthe will not to live, regardingsuch an aspirationas self-contradictory,
or at
least unthinkable.And apart fromlogic his personal
experiencesweresuchas to disgusthimwiththemaster's
ideal of pleasureas what alone makeslife worthliving.
11
While still a studentat Leipzig the Prussian military

law obligedhimto servefora timein the artillery.His
careeras a gunnerdid notlast long,fora ruptureof the
thoracicmuscles,causedbytheattemptto mounta restive
horse,resultedin an illnessthatincapacitatedhimfrom
continuedservicein the ranks; and a shortattendance
withthe ambulancecorpsbeforeMetz in 1870had a still
more ruinouseffecton his constitution.But even so
muchof a soldier'slife,chimingin well withthe aristoinstinctsof his Polish blood,gave the
craticand fighting
idea of thepossiblevalue of life.
a
new
professor
young
If existenceyieldedno happinessit stillaffordedthejoy
resistingthe assaults of pain; and from
of victoriously
continuedin afteryears throughinthatheroicconflict,
he came forthan optimist,
tense agonies of suffering,
in his faithto the end.
continuing
to his converHellenic studies no doubt contributed
of
sion. In his firstwork,whenstillunderthe influence
interhad
falsely
Nietzsche
Wagner and Schopenhauer,
and by
pretedGreektragedyas a pessimisticmanifesto,
he had
a strangelypervertedreadingof literaryhistory,
ascribedits dissolutionto the oppositeteachingof Socrates and Euripides. We have already come across a
passage indicatinga muchmore favorableview of Socrates; and in another passage writtenabout 1877 a
good timeis lookedforwardto whenXenophon'sMemofor the Bible as a manual of
rabilia will be substituted
rationalmorality(WW., III, p. 248). Earlier stillthe
age had been referredfor its modelsto the old Greek
world,"so great,so naturaland so human"'(WW., I, p.
352). "It was throughthe higherpowerof theirmoral
nature that the Greekswere victoriousover all other
civilization"(lb. 384).
Familiaritywith Hellenic ideals inevitablydrew our
philosopheraway from Richard Wagner's romanticist
views of art and life. The-breachbetweenthembegan
at the Bayreuthfestivalof 1876, when some traits of
in the master's character
pettyvanity and selfishness
12
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
firstbecame painfullyapparentto his young admirer.

What made it irremediablewas a questionof morality
and religion. Up to 1874 Wagner had been a declared
and uncompromising
atheist. During the last years of
his life he developeda sort of mysticalChristianity
in
whichthe ideas of a humanfall and recoverythrough
atonement
playedthemostconspicuouspart. His opera
Parsifal was intendedto illustratethe new departure,
and the plans for its composition
formedthe subjectof
frequentconversations
betweenhimselfand a group of
friendsat Sorrentoin the autumnof 1876. Nietzsche,
who was one of these,listenedwithdismayand disgust
to what he consideredan insincerebetrayalof the convictionsthey had once held in common(Leben, II, p.
857), all the more offensive
because it was symptomatic
of a generalpietisticreactionsetup by thehigherclasses
in Germany,witha view bothto consolidating
the new
empireand resistingthe spreadof socialism.
Wagner's apostasy seems to have' had the effectof
drivingNietzscheintoan attitudeof moreopen hostility
toward Christianity,
and, indeed, toward all theism.
Since religioncould exercisesuch a fatal effecton the
intellectualintegrityof geniusit was not onlyfalse but
dangerous,and oughtto be destroyed. His nextwork,
Menschliches,
Allzumenschliches
("So Very Human"),
appearedin 1878,the centenaryof Voltaire's death,and
is dedicatedto his memory. It consistsof loose critical
notes couchedin the aphoristicformwhichthe writer
afterwardscame to handlewith such suprememastery,
and whichalone suited his disconnectedand irresponsible mode of thinking.The generaltrendof reflection
offersa seriesof strikingcontraststo thewriter'searlier
shows
pointsofview; althoughan attentive
consideration
that the transitionwas already being silentlyprepared
towardthe close of the firstperiod. In dealingwithso
verypersonala writerwe shall bestunderstandtheevolutionof his ideas by constantreferenceto the eventsof
his life.
13
It will be remembered
that in embracingpessimism
our moralisthad also embracedthe ethicalideal of universal benevolenceassociatedwithit by Schopenhauer
and theHindoos; andhow,undertheconcurrent
influence
of Wagnerand theGreeks,he had soughtto concentrate
the passion fordisinterested
on the systemself-devotion
atic cultureof genius. Unfortunately
the onlytwogreat
men that he recognizedas such in recenthistoryhad
bothprovedfalse guides,and this seemsin the firstinstance to have made him distrustgenius as a social
danger. Its worship,he remarks,is a survivalof the
adorationformerly
givento gods, and to kingsas their
representatives. " The elevation of individuals into
superhumanbeings encouragesthe idea that large sectionsof the people are baser and morebarbarousthan
theyreallyare'" (WW., II, p. 340). Geniuseven "acts
as an enemyof truthby keepingup an intenseardor of
convictionand discouragingthe cautious and modest
tone of science" (lb., p. 411); while "never to have
changedone's opinionsis the sign of having remained
in a belatedstage of culture" (lb., p. 407).
As a consequenceof the new departurescience,so
latelydenouncedfor its coldnessand dryness,now takes
theplace of art as theleadingmeansof culture. Before
the breachwithWagner signs of a growingpreference
forpureknowledge
had notbeenwanting.We had been
told in a trulypositivistspiritthat "the proper ques.
tion for philosophyis to determinehow far thingsare
unalterable;thatthetaskof improving
them,in so far as
they can be improved,may then be fearlesslyundertaken" (WW., I, p. 514). The noteof moralenthusiasm
will not be overlooked. It had already been associated
witha higherstandardof intellectualism
in the reminder
that "the mostfearfulsufferings
have been broughton
mankindby the impulseto be just withoutjudgment;
so that nothingis more requisitefor the generalwelfarethanthewidestpossibledissemination
of judgment"
(lb., p. 329).
Vol. XIX.-No.
1.
14
Wagnerwas intenselyGerman,intenselyanti-French;
and Nietzschewhenhe wroteaboutthe originof tragedy
sharedhis patrioticviews. He thenlookedforwardto
"the regenerationof the Germansoul by the elimination of everyLatin elementunderthe externalstimulus
of thelast war, and inwardlyby the exampleof Luther
togetherwith all our great poets and artists" (lb., pp.
164,165). His expectations
werenotfulfilled;at anyrate
Germanywas not regenerated,but the contrary; and
it is remarkable
thaton lookingbackin 1878to theperiod
afterthewar,whatmostoffended
himwas themoralcorruptionof his countrymen.Their notionsof rightand
wrongwere unsettled;theirrage forluxuryand enjoymentknewno bounds; theirsensualitywas disgusting;
nearlyevery Germanbecame a degreemore dishonest,
avariciousand frivolous(WW., XI, pp. 94,
sycophantic,
standardsis also
95). A generalloweringof intellectual
complainedof,butthisis onlyanothersymptonof moral
decay. WithWagnerthelast hope failed,and he turned
to foreigncountries,especiallyto England and France,
forwhat Germanycould not supply.
In thewritingsof the secondperiodthe referencesto
England are particularlycomplimentary.She is "now
[1877-1878]unmistakably
ahead of all othernationsin
philosophy,naturalscience,history,discoveriesand the
spread of culture." This is due to the strength
of individual character,resultingfroma long nationalinheritance, enjoyed by her great men of science,and from
theirindependence
of learnedassociations(WW., XI, p.
"we must allow English writersthe
68). Furthermore
credit of having made admirablecontributions
toward
an ideal scientific
for
literature the people. Theirhandbooks are the workof theirmostdistinguished
scholars
-men of whole-minded,
rich and generous natures"
(WW., III, p. 102). Nor is it onlyamongmenof learning that thisstrengthof characteris exhibited. "English artisanswork hard at theirtrade not merelyfor
profitbut for power,and not merelyfor powerbut for
15
the utmostfreedomand individualdistinction"(WW.,

II, p. 359). Schopenhaueris now praised for the apto be
preciationof hard facts and the determination
clear and reasonablethat oftenmake him seem so English and so littleof a German(WW., V, p. 130).
Everythingwrittenat this time bears what on the
Continentis called a positivistimpress. Nietzschedoes
not seem to have read Comte,but he refersadmiringly
to himas "that great,honestFrenchmanwithwhomno
Germanor English thinkercan compare for comprehension and mastery of the exact sciences,"' while totally
elementof his
rejectingthe religiousand constructive,
teaching(WW., IV, pp. 348,349). For himselfour philosopherprofessesto knowlittleaboutthe resultsof sciserviceable
ence; "but thatlittlehas been inexhaustibly
in clearingup obscuritiesand abolishingformermodes
of thoughtand action" (WW., XI, p. 402). As thequintessenceof our positiveknowledgethreepropositionsare
stated: (1) There is no God; (2) there is no moral
for good or evil conduct; (3)
world,i. e., no retribution
good and evil are determinedby the ideals and directionsof life,the best part of thesebeing inherited,but
with a possibilitythat.the resultingjudgmentsmay be
by thedemandsof our actualideal (lb., p. 334).
falsified
the
With
disappearanceof theismpessimismceases to
have any meaning. The worldis neithergood nor bad;
such notionsapply only to humanbeings,and in their
ordinaryacceptationcannotrightlybe applied even to
these (WW., II, p. 46). For "free will is an illusion"
undercover of
(lb., p. 36), "that intelligiblefreedom""
which Schopenhauersought to rehabilitatemoral reis a fable (63), and "the thingin itself"
sponsibility
an illegitimate
inferencefromphenomena(31 seq.). In
fact, Schopenhauer'smetaphysicswas simplya revival
knowlof medievalChristianity
due to want of scientific
edge (44).
At firstthe new ardor for destructivecriticismextendsto morality,whichwe are told in so manywords
16
is annihilatedtogetherwithreligionby our way of looking at things(WW., II, p. 52). But the reasongivenis
merelythat sciencecan admitno motivesexceptpleasure and pain,usefulnessand injury(lb.). Such an arbitraryrestriction
seemsitselfto be a survivalof theology;
and in factit is traceableto the Frenchfreethinking
literature of the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies,
whichNietzschewas now studyingwithdelight. He observes,trulyenough,that "in the metaphysicalsense
thereare no sins,but also no virtues" (lb., p. 77), without remembering
that metaphysicalvalues have been
abolished. His aphoristicmethodhad the advantageof
makingcomposition
easy forhimselfand fruitful
of easy
readingforothers,but combinedwiththe passion of the
higherGermanintellectforself-contradiction
it involves
himin hopelessconfusionsof thought.
In accordancewith this mentalhabit the destructive
criticismof moralityis interspersedwith appeals to
moralmotivesand standards,or is even carriedon with
theiraid. As a conclusiveargumentagainst unselfishness we are told that"to be always actingfor othersis
almostas mischievous
as to act againstthem: it is a forcible intrusion on their sphere of action. .
. Not to
thinkof others,but alwaysto be actingmoststrictlyfor

one's self,is a highsortofmorality. The worldis imperfectbecause so muchis done forothers" (WW., XI, pp.
310, 311). An ex-artilleryman
mighthave remembered
thattheway to hit a distantmarkis notto aim straight
at it. A false and fussyaltruismis not the alternative
to takingexclusivecare of numberone. "Love mankind! But I say, rejoicein mankind,and therefore
help
to producethe sort of people in whomwe can rejoice!
The rightmoralityis to seek out and encouragethose
who delightus, and to flyfromthe others. Let the
wretched,the misshapenand the degeneratedie out.
They shouldnot be kept alive at any price" (lb., pp.
313, 314). Our fastidiousfriendmusthave comeacross
many unlovelysights when servingin the ambulance
17
corpsbeforeMetz; we may assumethattheydid notimpress him as a reasonfor shirkinghis duty. It may be

strong,healthy
said thatwoundedsoldiersare frequently
men, capable of returningto theirwork after proper
treatment.But the same is true of many patientsin
our civil hospitalswhose serviceswould be lost to the
community
but formodernphilanthropy.No hard and
fast line can be drawnbetweensuch cases and the case
of those whose continuedexistenceis altogetherundesirable. What we knowis that the passion of pity on
and thatit cannotbe
the wholesubservesrace-interests,
kept up at full strengthunless,as withotherpassions,
and go to waste. It is a questhereis enoughto overflow
tion whetherNietzschehimselfwas not a degenerate;
it is certainthat he had to give up his workas a professorowingto ill healthin a few years; and that his
literaryworkcould hardlyhave been continuedwithout
thehelp of a smallretiringpensionfromthe university.
Let me add thathe had beena singularlydevotedteacher,
among other things gratuitouslypreparing students
"from the interiorof Switzerland"'for theirexaminations in philosophy. In private life his characterwas
gentle,kind and sympathetic-toa greaterextent,indeed, than he personallywould have liked it to beand his attackson altruismwere perhaps inspiredby a
consciousnessof the injuryit had done his health. We
personal experimay also attributeto his unfortunate
encesthe prophecythathygienicswill be a primeinterest in the societyof thefuture(WW., XI, p. 69).
Throughoutthe second,or scientific
period,morality
preoccupation.There is no ancontinuesa paramounttithesisbetweenincrease of knowledgeand increaseof
humanwelfare; on the contrarytheyare mutuallysubservient. Faith in the supremeutilityof scienceand of
its possessorsshouldtaketheplace of faithin merenumbers (WW., III, p. 155). But the observationsout of
whichscienceis builtare themselvesconditioned
by sincerityand rectitude. "Even in the regionof sense-perThis content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Mon, 20 Apr 2015 22:11:53 UTC
18
ceptionthereare nonebutmoralexperiences"(WW., V,
p. 155). "The historyof scienceexhibitsthe victoryof
noble impulses; thereis muchmoralitymixedup with
its pursuit" (WW., XI, p. 204). "It is a mistaketo estimate philosophersas artists,leaving out of sighttheir
(Ib., p. 408). "Unfortunately
justiceand self-control"'
we shallneverknowthebestthingaboutgenius,theselfcontrol and self-disciplineexercised in bringing its
powers into play" (WW., IV, p. 357). "Hurrah for
physicalscience,forthediscoveryof thelaws and necessities of nature; and a double hurrahfor the honesty
thatforcesus to studyit!" (WW., V, p. 258.)
As may be gatheredfromsome of the passages just
quoted,generalutilityis the end of moral action. But
be impersonal. On the conmoralityneed not therefore
trarywe best serve our true advantageby moral action
makeup
(WW., II, p. 96). Benevolenceand beneficence
thegoodman-but theyshouldbeginwithhimself(WW.,
IV, p. 336). The greatestwondersof antiquemorality,
Epictetusfor instance,knew nothingabout that altruism which is so fashionablenowadays (Ib., p. 133).
Nietzscheas a professionalHellenistwas fascinatedby
of its mastersis shownin
Greekethics,and theinfluence
more than one reference. Epicurus countsamong the
greatestof men (WW., III, p. 355); we have not advanced beyondhim,but his dominionhas been infinitely
extended(WW., XI, p. 168). Aristotleis not named;
but we findhis doctrineof moralhabit passionatelyreby
assertedas againstLuther's doctrineof justification
faith (WW., IV, p. 30). And it is made a charge
against our systemof classical educationthat we are
exercisedin no singleantiquevirtueas theancientswere
exercisedin it (WW., IV, p. 187). As the consolations
of Christianityevaporate the consolationsof ancient
philosophyare revivedin new splendor(WW., XI, p.
168).
Oursis, indeed,an age of comparisonand selection,an
in conductas in
age which,discardingall provincialism
19
art, bids us look roundamongthelhistoriccivilizations

witha view to constructing
a highermoralityfromthe
formsand habitsofferedto our choice(WW., II, p. 41).
Now it is preciselythe adherenceto an unreasonedtraditionthatmankindhave generallyregardedas the distinctivenote of morality; so that when Nietzschefirst
what he meantto emphacalled himselfan immoralist,
size was his defianceof traditionas such,his demandfor
a reasonablebasis of action. Such a basis is not supplied by an appeal to our moral feelings,for these are
nothingbetterthaninheritedjudgments. To trustthem
and her grandmother
is to trustyourgrandmother
rather
thanthe gods withinyou,yourreason and your experience (WW., IV, p. 41).
All this sounds commonplaceenoughto a reader of
Benthamand Mill; just as Descartes and Montesquieu
may have soundedcommonplace
to the readersof Bacon
and Locke. And whenNietzscheproclaimedthesupremacy of Englandin philosophy
it was probablyto English
ethicsthathe referred. Universalistichedonismis not,
I think,anywherestatedin terms,but its elementsare
freelyscatteredthroughhis notes. Thereis, he tellsus,
no instinctof self-pieservation;everyactioninterpreted
as evidenceof such can be explainedby the searchfor
agreeableand the avoidanceof disagreeablesensations.
Speakinggenerallywe onlywishforobjectsbecausethey
are associatedwith agreeable states of feelingin ourselves (WW., XI, pp. 253 and 292). Men mightbe estimatedby the degree of happinessthey are capable of
experiencingor communicating
(lb., p. 367). One of
the chargesbroughtagainst "morality" is that it has
representedself-delight
as offensive,
self-torment
as acceptableto the deity (lb., p. 263). On the otherhand
cultureis an expressionof happiness(lb., p. 316). The
joy feltin absorbingnew ideas shouldbe carriedso far
as to outweighall otherkindsof pleasure (lb., p. 403).
Noble and magnanimousnaturesexperiencesome feelings of pleasure and pain so stronglythat the intellect
20
is eithersilencedor made instrumental

to them (WW.,
V, pp. 39, 40). Nor is happinessby any means so rare
as pessimists
wouldhave us believe. The worldabounds
in good will; and theconstantlittleeverydaymanifestations of this impulse,takingthe formof good humor,
friendlinessand unaffectedcourtesy,contributeenormouslyto the happinessof life (WW., II, p. 71). "It
needsa lifefullof pain and renunciation
to teachus that
existenceis saturatedwithhoney" (WW., XI, p. 154).
In short,"there is no life withoutpleasure; the fight
for pleasure is the fightfor life" (WW., II, p. 107).
This view does not exclude morality,for each one is
called good or evil accordingto theway in whichhe carries on the fight; and that dependson the degree and
qualityof his intellect(lb.), a sayingelucidatedby the
remarkmade elsewherethat no honeyis sweeterthan
the honeyof knowledge;so that he who has spenthis
life in its acquisitionfirstdiscoversin old age how well
he has obeyedthe voice of Nature,the Naturethatgoverns all thingsby pleasure (Lb.,p. 267).
We saw how Nietzscheat firstlookedon the discovery
that action dependedabsolutelyon pleasure and pain
as destructive
of morality. But he did not long hold to
that crudeinterpretation
of ethicalscience; for we find
a passage belongingto the same periodand muchmore
consistent
withits generaltonein whichhe tellsus that
joy mustexercisea healthyand reparativeinfluenceon
man's moral nature,or why shouldthe momentswhen
we bathein its sunshinebe just thosewhenthe soul involuntarilypledges herselfto be good and to become
perfect(WW., III, p. 166) ? And as a substitutefor
religiousexerciseshe proposesimmediately
on wakening
in themorningto thinkhow we may give pleasureto at
least one humanbeingin the course of the day (WW.,
II, p. 385).
Assuminghappiness,understoodas pleasure and the
absence of pain, to be desiredby all and to be the only
thingdesirable,it would seemto followthatutilitarianThis content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Mon, 20 Apr 2015 22:11:53 UTC
21
ism is the onlyrationalmethodof ethics; and it might

have been expectedthatNietzsche,speculatingas he did
under the combinedinfluenceof Greek and English
thought,
wouldhave franklyacceptedits principles,preserving,of course,completelibertywithregardto the
adjustmentof details. What preventedhim fromtaking that step was the pervadingskepticaland negative
cast of his intellect,aggravated,as in the case of Coleridge,of whomotherwisehe oftenremindsone, by the
use of deleteriousdrugsand by solitaryhabits. According to himtherecan be no morallaw bindingon all mankind unless we can prove that thereis some universal
end of action; and suchan end does notexist. Pleasure
will not supplyit, for the pleasuresof sensitivebeings
varywiththedegreeoftheirdevelopment
(WW., IV, pp.
102 seq.), and happinessis pursuedby oppositepaths
(XI, p. 233). Oddly enough,the second of these considerationsis directedby name against Spencer,than
whomnonewouldhave morecordiallyacceptedit. Soon
afterwardsthe most completedevelopment
of individuality is proposed as an end, characteristically
enough
withoutreferenceto the priorityof Spencerand Mill in
this direction. It is! true that Mill had certainly,and
Spencerprobably,takenhis cue fromWilhelmvon Humboldt; butNietzscheneverbetraysany acquaintancewith
thatthinker;and theway in whichhe associateshis own
individualism
withthetheoryof evolutionseemsto place
Spencer'sleadingbeyonda doubt(Ib., pp. 238 and 330).
Afterall, the effortto get rid of a morallaw speedily
results in its rehabilitation.For as a means for increasingthe numberof thosehappy accidentson which
futuredevelopments
depend,it is recommended
thatwe
shouldmaintainthe utmostvarietyof conditionsunder
whichhumanbeingscan exist (WW., XI, p. 239); and
this would surelynecessitatea code of social justice to
begin with,as Spencer pointedout long ago in Social
Statics, and as ProfessorJuvalta,of Pavia, is never
weary of insistingon at the presentday, althoughhis
22
theory,unlike Spencer's,is penetratedwith socialistic

ideas.
whenhe has to combatsocialistdeNietzschehimself,
mands,is notslowto quotejusticeas a recognizedsocial
obligation. Admittingthat the presentdistributionof
acts of injusticeand
propertyresultsfrominnumerable
violencein the past,he deprecatesthe repetitionof similar acts in moderntimes,settinghis hopes ratheron a
generalincreasein the sense of justiceand a diminution
of theviolentimpulsesall round(WW., II, pp,.334 seq.).
As a last homageto the receivedmorality,a notedating fromthe year 1880 may be mentioned,in which
Napoleon is called the greatestof men,if his aim had
been the good of humanity(WW., XI, p. 387).
Not long afterabandoningthe cultivationof geniusas
a universalend, Nietzscheseems to have takenup and
in his last period,
foriit theidea, so prominent
substituted
of breedinga superiorrace. Here again theHellenicinfluenceis prominent.In a fragmentdatingfrom1876
the Greeksare quoted as an exampleof what may be
by the selfdone in the way of intellectualstimulation
of such a race in themidstof a barbarous
consciousness
population(WW., XI, p. 33). Englishscienceand philosophy,for which so much enthusiasmis expressed,
would no doubt act powerfullyin the same direction
whichis knownto have
throughthedoctrineof evolution,
interestedNietzscheintenselyat this time. In this connectionmuchhas beenmade of his debtto Darwin; but
as he neverunderstoodthe theoryof natural selection,
camefrom
it seemsmorelikelythatthedecisiveinfluence
Spencer,whose psychologyhe certainlyacceptedto the
extentof describingknowledgeas a nervousmodification
producedby the actionof externalobjectson our organs
of sense,withoutany cooperationfromthemind(lb., p.
275). Now Spencer fromthe beginningwas interested
in evolutionmuchless as an explanationof thepast than
as a promiseof the future,as a pledgethathumanlife
mightrise to a farmoreperfectharmonybetweenorganThis content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Mon, 20 Apr 2015 22:11:53 UTC
SAVONAROLA.
23
ism and environment

thanany yet attained; and on this
side his philosophywould appeal stronglyto Nietzsche,
as also on its individualistic
side,withwhichwe have seen
himto be in completeagreement.Indeed,he bringsthe
two into directassociationby asking: "Is not everyindividualan attemptto reacha higherspeciesthanman?"
(lb., p. 238.) It is here, ratherthan in the youthful
worshipof genius,whichhis disgustwithWagner led
himto repudiate,thatwe can lay ourfingeron thegenesis
of thesuperman.
Here we reacha secondand stillmoredecisiveturningpoint in the evolutionof Nietzsche'sethics,the subsequentphasesof whichmustbe reservedfordiscussionin
anotherand concludingpaper.
ALFRED W. BENITN.
FLORENCE, ITALY.
SAVONAROLA.*
THOMAS
DAVIDSON.
for goodness. The

M
/[ORALITY is the preparation
formeris human,the latterdivine. Man's moral
life is conditioned
by two factors: (1) his ownwill,and
universal
(2) the
will,as realizedin theworld,subhuman
and human. The aim of thatlife is to bringthesefactorsintocompleteharmony.Whenthisis accomplished,
life is good,divine. God is good,not moral.
That suchis the moralproblem,and suchits solution,
has long been recognized. It is recognizedin the Veda,
in the Gathas, in the Tripitaka,in the Bible, in the
Koran, in A~schylus,in Heraclitus,in Dante, in Tenny* This lectureis one of a series deliveredat Philadelphia and other
places by the late Thomas Davidson, on "The Leaders of Spiritual
by
Thoughtin the Middle Ages," and has been given to the JOURNAL
Mr. Davidson's literary executor,Prof. Charles M. Bakewell of Yale
University.

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The Morals of an Immoralist-Friedrich Nietzsche.

GERMANY, so rich in everyotherkind of phil-

osophical literature,has not contributedmuch to

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST.

tragicfigurewhosenamestandsat thehead of thisstudy.

THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

-familyexiled on account of their religion early in the

representingan aristocratic and martyr tradition.

the referencesWW. Nietzsehe's Werice,Leipzig, 1895, 1904, large

THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.

primordialone withits eternal sufferingand self-contradiction,seekingfor deliveranceby the creationof

THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST.

to that theory; nor was it at firstinconsistenteitherwith

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

perfectionand failureby contributing

THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.

While still a studentat Leipzig the Prussian military

firstbecame painfullyapparentto his young admirer.

THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.

THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.

the utmostfreedomand individualdistinction"(WW.,

thinkof others,but alwaysto be actingmoststrictlyfor

THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.

corpsbeforeMetz; we may assumethattheydid notimpress him as a reasonfor shirkinghis duty. It may be

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.

art, bids us look roundamongthelhistoriccivilizations

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

is eithersilencedor made instrumental

THE MORALSOF AN IMMORALIST.

ism is the onlyrationalmethodof ethics; and it might

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

theory,unlike Spencer's,is penetratedwith socialistic

ism and environment

for goodness. The

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