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242
PATRICK H. HUTTON
243
For this reason, our search for the true Vico in the historiography of
modern France is not unlike Vico's search for the true Homer in the
poetry of ancient Greece. Our task in this essay is to explain how the
prophetic uses of Vico's theory of history by French scholars, especially by Michelet and Sorel who considered his work most deeply,
reflect changing perceptions of the meaning of social revolution in the
French experience. Such a study may not enable us to choose between
Michelet and Sorel. But it should help us to appreciate more fully the
relationship between continuity and change in Vico's vision of human
destiny, and the relevance of that vision to the ongoing debate among
French historians concerning the character of their Revolutionary heritage.
Vico's theory of social history is easily outlined, for it is based upon
an archetypal model of the genesis and disintegration of civilization.
The model is discovered in the study of social institutions, in whose
mythopoetic origins and rational modifications the direction of history
is revealed.5To study social history is to study human intentions as they
are manifested in the social world that men have themselves created.
Historical change corresponds to men's changing perceptions of their
social needs.6 Primitive men enter civil society for the security it offers.
The founders of civilization are quite literally the founders of cities, the
asylums in which they seek refuge from the barbarous surroundings in
which they have lost their way. They are poetic in that they evoke from
their own minds the myths with which their followers can grasp in a
preconscious way the nature of life in society. They are practical in that
their myths prepare the way for the creation of social institutions. In
this sense, the creation of civilization is a process of myth-making
through which men come to understand their social needs in the
imaginative forms which the myths provide, and to define their life
5Vico's social theory is derived principally from his study of the social institutions of
Greece and Rome: those of Greece as perceived in the poetry of Homer; those of Rome
in the Agrarian Laws. His intent is to prove that the social and juridical institutions of
Rome were not modeled upon those of the older Greek civilization, but rather evolved
independently. This interpretation becomes the basis of his "natural law of the gentes,"
in which he concludes that the autonomous yet parallel development of Greek and
Roman societies was not the consequence of an historical transmission but of an
archetypal social evolution common to all civilizations. The New Science of Giambattista Vico, 3rd ed. (1744), trans. and ed. Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch (Ithaca,
1961), 31-39, 145-76, 245, 311, 349, 393, 915ff., 1096; hereafter NS. (All references to
this work are to numbered paragraph rather than to page.) See also Max H. Fisch,
"Vico on Roman Law," in Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine,
ed. Milton R. Konvitz and Arthur E. Murphy (Ithaca, 1948), 62-88.
6For Vico, these intentions are transparent in the poetry of primitive peoples, and in
their jurisprudence, which was a "severe kind of poetry," NS, 215-33, 311, 338, 102738. For the role of poetry in Vico's theory of history, see Patrick H. Hutton, "The New
Science of Giambattista Vico: Historicism in its Relation to Poetics," Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 30 (1972), 359-67.
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PATRICK H. HUTTON
activity through the institutions upon which these myths are based.
"Wisdom" is practical knowledge of how to live in the city. Wise men
memorize the myths and imitate the institutions of the poet-founders,
whom they hold in religious awe for their power to create ideal social
forms with which to liberate themselves from the chaos of the physical
world. The history of the origins of civilization is thus a sacred history,
in which primitive man discovers his human nature in the process of his
integration into society.7
Civilization develops with the quest of the uncivilized to gain access
to the privileged enclaves of the cities. That quest promotes a conflict
between the civilized elites, who are dedicated to guarding the territorial
boundaries and sacred institutions of the cities, and the barbarous commoners, who seek the civil rights and through them the security which
the cities provide. In the course of the struggle, it is the latter who prevail, as ambitious princes find it advantageous to champion their cause.
The growth of civilization is thus the product of a struggle to extend the
sphere of application of public law. The process is fulfilled in the
progression from elitist to democratic societies, culminating in the
monarchy, which guarantees to all men equal rights under the law.8
The decline of civilization, however, is a necessary consequence of
this very accomplishment. The extension of civil rights proceeds at the
expense of the elite's sense of civic duty to act as guardians of the law.
As the monarchs assume these functions, the citizenry turns from civil
responsibilities to private interests. Under these circumstances, the
myths of the elite lose their utilitarian value as creative demonstrations
of the wisdom of law. The result is a loss of the sense of the sacred, i.e.,
of the practical need to defend civic institutions, and of the mimetic
need to affirm their value in religious ritual. The decay of civilization is
thus a process of demythologizing. In losing the memory of his mytho7Vico describes how the Greek and Roman gods personify the various social needs
of primitive peoples. Every nation, for example, has a conception of Jove, the god who
inspired the founding of civil society. Primitive man believed that Jove ruled by signs.
The power of the poet-founders, therefore, was based upon their capacity to divine
Jove's meaning. The authority of divination was thus one of lawgiving. The Roman
term for law, ius, Vico explains, originally meant Jove, and the oracle was civilization's
first juridical institution. NS, 187, 193-264, 361-67, 376-99, 433, 473-82, 489-91, 521,
553-61,925,938, 1038.
8This argument is based upon Vico's interpretation of the Agrarian Laws (the Law
of Servius Tullius and the Law of the Twelve Tables) as the essential sources of the
social history of Rome during its "heroic" age of class conflict. These laws were designed by the patricians to mollify the plebeians by granting them qualified rights of
land ownership. In fact, these measures served only to exacerbate the plebeians' demand for full civil rights, a demand which the patricians were eventually forced to
concede. The tribunes, originally chosen by the plebeians to champion their rights
against the patricians, finally took advantage of their crucial role in extending the application of public law in order to seize power as sovereign monarchs. NS, 104-15, 26593,582-86, 597-98,609-11,915-1008.
245
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PATRICK H. HUTTON
to offer the stability and discipline requiredin Naples until an opportunity for a surer, more prudent reconstructionof the Republic
might presentitself.12Michelet,of course, had little use for Napoleon,
whose reignwas all but forgottenin the optimismwith whichMichelet
greeted the post-Napoleonicage. Michelet sensed that he lived in the
midst of an historicaltransitionto an era whichofferedmankindnew
horizonsof consciousnessand new possibilitiesfor social progress.13If
he understoodthe full cycle of Vico's theory of history, he clearly favoredits risingstages.
Michelet drew several of his basic ideas directly from Vico's
model.14Essentialto his conceptionof history was Vico's insight that
humanityis its own creation. Michelet'sargumentconcerninghuman
developmentfaithfullyfollows the Vichiandialectic of challengeand
recognition.Man creates his own nature in meetingthe challengesof
his environment.In the processof freeinghimselffrom physicalnature
he begins to understandhis human nature.15This concept Michelet
linkedwith a secondandequallyimportantVichianinsight:humanityis
a social creation. The hero in history is the "people"in its collective
striving to realize its destiny: social understanding.Humanizationis
thus a process of socialization. Individualhistorical figures are but
mythologicalembodimentsof socialgroupsat particularstages of their
historicaldevelopment.16Thus Micheletwas able to explainwhy social
historyis an appropriatesubjectof historicalinquiry.
Vico also providedMichelet with an appreciationof the way in
which social understandingdevelops in time. The progress toward
social understandingresults from the interplayof two kinds of perception:individualsense and common sense. Individualsense is the capacity to grasp practical realities. Common sense is the capacity to
recognizehumanvalues.Both are utilitarianandboth providea kindof
redemption.Individualsense saves the man in the present. Common
sense saves mankindfor the future. In theirinteractionthey providea
demonstrationof the meaningof universalhistory. Historyis a saga of
man's heroic struggle for "liberty,"i.e., for a comprehensiveunderstandingof that whichhe has freelycreated:his social nature.17
Micheletlearnedfrom Vico a way to envisionhistory,but the vision
at whichhe arrivedwas very muchhis own. Micheletquiteconsciously
12Vincenzo Cuoco, Histoire de la revolution de Naples, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1807), esp. iiixxvi, 1-5, 151-94,393-412.
13ForMichelet's intellectual formation, cf. Gabriel Monod, Jules Michelet: Etudes
sursa vie et ses oeuvres (Paris, 1905), esp. ch.I.
14Michelet's most important discussion of Vico is found in his "Discours sur le
systeme et la vie de Vico," Oeuvres choisies de Vico (1835), in Oeuvres completes de
Michelet, I, 283-301. See also Michelet's article, "Vico," in the Biographie universelle,
48 (1827), 362-73; and his Histoire Romaine (Paris, 1843), 4-9.
'6Ibid., I, 280, 288-92.
'5Michelet, "Discours sur Vico," I, 279-80.
'7Ibid., I, 283, 286-89.
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PATRICK H. HUTTON
249
While these speculations led Sorel away from the orthodox Marxism of his age, they gave him a perspective upon Marxism which set
guidelines for the reinterpretation of Marx by European intellectuals in
the twentieth century.32 The majority of Sorel's Marxist contemporaries viewed ideology as a passive reflex of economic preconditions.
Vico's theory enabled Sorel to grasp the essential role of human volition in the Marxian dialectic of social development. For Vico's concept of mythopoetic creation (verum = factum) is similar to Marx's
concept of life activity (praxis), whose meaning Sorel was, among
Marxist sympathizers in France, the first to understand.33 Sorel
recognized that for Marx, as for Vico, consciousness is formed through
man's creative response to the challenges of his environment. Thus consciousness plays a positive role in social change, as knowing and acting
are aspects of the same process. In Sorel's terms, mythology is the
"language of movement" in life activity, the ideal temporal structure of
the ordeal of social creation.34
Equally important, Sorel learned from Vico that social progress
never follows from the simple imitation of existing ideas, however
radical they appear to be. The making of the good society depends not
upon a blueprint which is faithfully applied, but upon a vision which
assumes form through willful improvisation. Myth is the formative
logic of the movement from ideas dimly perceived in the face of
challenge to ideas clearly understood as challenge is overcome.35In this
way, Sorel came to understand Marxism itself as a mythology, an
insight which he believed to be his most important contribution to
Marxism as a developing social philosophy. Whereas orthodox
Marxists accepted Marxism as a law of history based upon impersonal
economic processes, Sorel preferred to view the doctrine as a mythic
vision with which to effect change. The primary value of Marxism as an
ideology was not in its transcendent perspective upon the historical
process but in its capacity to inspire men to overcome oppressive
realities. Indeed, Sorel wondered whether Marxism as a mythology had
not expended its creative resources. That is why he ridiculed his
Marxist contemporaries in France for quarreling over points of doc31Ibid., 42-50.
32Note, for e.g., Georg Lukacs's acknowledgement of his intellectual debt to Sorel
in his La Thorie du roman (Paris, 1963), 13.
33GeorgeLichtheim, Marxism in Modern France (New York, 1966), 15-16, 26-28.
34Sorel, "Letter to Halevy," 48-5 1.
35Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," II, 812-17, 906-14; Sorel, Materiaux d'une theorie du
proletariat (Paris, 1919), 66-67.
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PATRICK H. HUTTON
trine which failed to touch the concerns of the working class. The
creation of a new society of necessity meant the creation of a new consciousness. The need, Sorel asserted, was for a social myth born of
present necessities.36
The reinterpretation of Marxism as a mythology of history permitted Sorel to reconsider the place of his own age in the development of
civilization. It was to Vico that Sorel was to turn once more. For Marx
offered an explanation of progress only, while Vico provided one of decline as well. Sorel sensed that his own age was one of social dissolution
and noted that Marx had accepted the idea of progress uncritically. He
had assumed that the coming of the classless society would be the outcome of a vigorous struggle between two dynamic social classes. What
would happen, Sorel asked, if the proletarian revolution occurred in an
age of decline?37
In addressing that question, Sorel explained the revolutionary
movement in modern French history as one of decline. His analysis is
not unlike the Vichian explanation of the transition from the
aristocratic to the popular commonwealth.38 Sorel described the
French Revolution as a process of social leveling which maintained
essential lines of continuity with the past. The French Revolution did
not denote the birth of a new civilization, but represented instead the
accession of the bourgeoisie to civil rights previously denied them. Sorel
explained that most of the leaders of the Revolution were lawyers who
already enjoyed a place in the Old Regime, and who were more interested in governmental efficiency than they were in liberty. None was
more characteristic than Robespierre, who furthered the trend toward
the consolidation of public power. Sorel pointed to the ease with which
Napoleon had assumed power as proof of how little social change had
actually taken place. No new institutions had been created; no new
social vision had been born.39
Similarly, Sorel dismissed the activities of the revolutionary movement in France in the nineteenth century as manifestations of social
decadence. The activities of the Blanquists and of other Jacobin groups
were banal in that they called for the completion of a revolution that
had never taken place.40 The memory of the French Revolution
operated as a powerful myth in the early nineteenth century only because it was closely identified with the military glory of Napoleon. With
the defeat of France in the War of 1870-71, the myth of the French
36Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 126-40; Sorel, "The Decomposition of Marxism,"
in Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason, ed. Irving Horowitz, 232, 241-54.
37Sorel, Reflections on Violence (1908; English 1914), 92-93, 97; Sorel, "Etude sur
Vico," II, 930-32.
38"Etudesur Vico," II, 923-24.
39Reflectionson Violence, 94-95, 104-11, 170; "Decomposition of Marxism," 228.
40"Etudesur Vico," II, 925; "Decomposition of Marxism," 241, 247-48.
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PATRICK H. HUTTON
Michelet was oriented toward the future, yet he looked to the past
for mythic guidelines to its promise. Sorel was oriented toward the
past, yet he looked to the future for some form of mythic redemption.
The differences between their interpretations of the Vichian model of
history go deeper than those of temperament or orientation. They are
rooted in contrasting conceptions of the meaning of myth itself. For
Michelet, Vico's mythology was a vision of universal history. Its value
was derived from its insights into the historical process considered as a
whole. It was in this spirit that he praised the French Revolution as a
manifestation of the growth of human understanding. But for Sorel,
Vico's mythology was reduced from vision to fact. Vico's genius was to
perceive how myths move men to action. Historical understanding has
meaning only as a myth to inspire creative change. It was in this spirit
that Sorel declared the irrelevance of the French Revolution for the
problem of modern social change.
If the memory of the Revolutionary tradition did not prepare the
way for the coming of an "eternal July" as predicted by Michelet,
neither has it been eclipsed by more inspiring mythologies as was anticipated by Sorel. The memory of the French Revolution has continued to serve as a touchstone to which French historians have
returned countless times to reinterpret the nature of their national
vision.47The fact of that continuing return invites a closer look at the
cyclical dimension of Vico's theory of history, for it is the basis of his
conception of the relationship between social creation and historical
understanding. It is also the dimension of Vico's theory of history
which both Michelet and Sorel rejected.
The conceptions of mythology presented by Michelet and Sorel
mirror the two senses in which Vico understood history. The first was
his concern for the existential situation in which man encounters history in the act of its creation. It was the historical significance of this
creative encounter that Sorel learned from Vico. But Vico was also
concerned about the process of historical change in which man recognizes the direction in which history is tending. It was Vico's historical
perspective upon the problem of human destiny which inspired Michelet. Vico sought to find a middle way between a deterministic view of
history and a view of history without determination. In his "Final
Proofs to Confirm the Course of Nations," Vico considers this problem
in terms of two rules of law. The first rule is utilitarian; it is designed to
meet the practical needs of living in society. But there is a second rule of
law which is universal; it affirms the moral ground from which society
47For reviews of the subject, see Alfred Cobban, Historians and the Causes of the
French Revolution, rev. ed. (London, 1958); Paul Farmer, France Reviews its Revolutionary Origins (New York, 1944); Gerald J. Cavanaugh, "The Present State of French
Revolutionary Historiography: Alfred Cobban and Beyond," French Historical
Studies, 7 (1972), 587-606.
253
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PATRICK H. HUTTON
255
seems to have been unaware that Sorel himself repudiated this view of
the Revolution. If he cites Sorel to explain myth as the birth of a new
consciousness through creative ordeal, he also uses the myth of the
Revolution as did Michelet to explain its significance for a civilization
whose direction is still shaped by a consciousness of its historical
origins.
Cobban did not wish to disparage the moral legacy of the French
Revolution, but he did question whether Lefebvre's model of the Revolution corresponded to the facts that Lefebvre had himself uncovered.
"I am tempted to suggest," Cobban commented, "that in another
sense also the French Revolution might be called a myth. At first, I
must confess, I thought of entitling this lecture, 'Was there a French
Revolution?' "58 Cobban, of course, was not denying the reality of the
Revolution, but he was challenging the myth of its moral unity, and
that of its place in a universal history in which France holds center
stage. "This conception, whatever theory it is enshrined in," he concludes, "is the real fallacy behind all the myths of the French Revolution-the idea that there was 'a' French Revolution, which you can be
for or against."59
Interpretations of the relationship between the ethical and the empirical dimensions of the French Revolution thus remain unreconciled.
Hence Gerald Cavanaugh, summarizing the Cobban-Lefebvre controversy, argues that we are presently without a general theory with
which to interpret the meaning of the Revolution.60 It is nonetheless
still possible to place the debate within the orbit of the Vichian historical cycle. In Vichian terms, we should not be surprised that Cobban
seeks to explode myths, for his intention is to reduce the French Revolution to less heroic proportions. He looks at the Revolution in much
the same way that Vico looks at eras of historical decline. To view the
Revolution from this perspective is to describe it as a process of
demythologizing. Thus he notes the loss of confidence of elites and the
vulnerability of inflexible institutions as the values sustaining the old
order weakened. Nor should we be surprised that Lefebvre was willing
to identify his exacting research with the process of myth making. For
he resembles Vico in his vision of history as man's progress toward the
discovery of his rational humanity. For Lefebvre, the return to the
Revolution was not only to its events, but also to its creative values
which renew meaning and inspire confidence for present tasks.
The Lefebvre-Cobban controversy thus illustrates Vico's insight
into the relationship between fact and vision in historical understanding. In Vichian terms, it is a debate which ought never to end. To
58Cobban,"The Myth of the French Revolution," 93.
59Ibid., 108.
60Cavanaugh,"The State of French Revolutionary Historiography," 596-97.
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PATRICK H. HUTTON
believe that the opposition of fact and vision can finally be reconciled is
to believe that we can finally escape our history. For Vico, historical
knowledge remains the sine qua non for understanding the human condition, and constitutes the wisdom of the pious man: his reverence for
the way by which he has come to recognize his humanity.61 For those
who share Vico's faith in history, the prospects for further studies of
the French Revolutionary tradition appear promising.
The University of Vermont.
61NS, 1112.