CIVIL PROCEDURE

Digest #14 (Rule 10 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings)

Martha Rose C. Serrano
Leobrera v. CA
This is a PfRC on the admission by the RTC-Makati of a supplemental complaint filed by
petitioner
Petitioner Carlos Leobrera was granted a credit facility by private respondent Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI)
It was secured by two real estate mortgages and eventually converted into two 90-day
promissory notes
Upon maturity, BPI demanded the full payment of the loan
Leobrera failed to pay
This prompted BPI to foreclose the mortgages securing said loan
Before BPI could institute the foreclosure proceedings, however, Leobrera filed (before
the RTC-Makati) a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the mortgages
The trial court issued an order restraining BPI from foreclosing the real estate mortgages
securing the 90-day loans and, after hearing, issued a writ of preliminary injunction
Later, BPI attempted to foreclose a third mortgage
This prompted petitioner Leobrera to file a Motion to File Supplemental Complaint
before the trial court on 11 March 1987
A copy of the supplemental complaint was attached therein
Said copy indicated that the supplemental complaint had a notice of hearing, but
no time and place of hearing of the motion were specified
12 March 1987: the trial court granted Leobrera's motion
13 March 1987:
it was only at this point that a copy of the Motion to File Supplemental
Complaint was received by BPI, through registered mail
the TC order granting Leobrera's motion was served upon BPI
BPI filed a motion to set aside the 12 March 1987 order, but the same was denied by the
TC on 31 March 1987
BPI then filed a PfC and Prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction before the CA
Sought to annul the TC's decision and asked that the latter be prohibited from hearing
the petition for injunction prayed for in the supplemental complaint
The CA granted the petition
Leobrera thus filed the instant PfRC
Issue: W/N the CA erred in stating that the Motion to File Supplemental Complaint filed by
Leobrera was defective for lack of notice of hearing
Decision/Ratio: NO
Rule 10, Sec. 6: Section 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. - Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit
him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events
which happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court
deems it advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so order,
specifying the time therefor.

 CAB:
The requirement of 'reasonable notice' was not fulfilled: BPI had only learned of the
Motion on 13 March 1987, yet the order granting the motion was issued on 12
March 1987
Neither was the requirement of 'specifying the time therefor' fulfilled: the notice of
hearing was invalid due to there being no time and place of hearing specified
therein
There is therefore clear arbitrariness on the part of the TC which granted Leobrera's
Motion to File Supplemental Complaint despite his failure to act according to procedure
Hence, the CA did in stating that the Motion to File Supplemental Complaint
filed by Leobrera was defective for lack of notice of hearing
G.R. No. L-32162 September 28, 1984
THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE CFI of Manila and VICENTE DAVID ISIP, respondents-appellees
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X, presided by Honorable Judge Jose L. Moya, denying the
motion for reconsideration and the enforcement of the writ of execution and the issuance
of garnishment by taking possession of the amount of 600k Php from the deposits of the
Pasay City Govt in tPhil. Natl bank and delivering them to plaintif

Respondent-appellee V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates represented by Vicente David Isip
entered into a contract with the City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta

The contract entitled "Contract and Agreement" was for the construction of a new Pasay
City Hall
o Pursuant to the aforesaid contract, the respondent-appellee proceeded with the
construction of the new Pasay City Hall building
o The respondent-appellee accomplished under various stages of construction the
amount of work (including supplies and materials) equivalent to an estimated value
of 1.7M Php of the total contract price of 4.9 M Php
o The appellants paid only the total amount of 1.1M Php to the respondent-appellee

Notwithstanding demands for payment thereof, the petitioner-appellants failed to remit

the aforesaid amount of 600k Php to the respondent-appellee

Respondent appellee filed an action for specific performance with damages against herein
petitioners-appellants before the respondent Court

The appellants filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint and for bill of
particulars.
o This was denied by the respondent Court

The appellants later filed a motion for reconsideration

o This was likewise denied

The appellants filed their answer

The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement which was submitted to the Municipal
Board of Pasay City for its consideration

Protracted pre-trial hearings and conferences were held where the respondent Court
suggested and advised that "under the principle of quantum meruit, the plaintif is
forthwith entitled to at least that which is due to him for defendants under the contract
and that public interest must perforce require the continuity of construction

Municipal Board of Pasay enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the Compromise
Agreement and also authorized and empowered the incumbent City Mayor Jovito Claudio
to represent the appellant Pasay City Government, subject to the final approval of the
respondent Court herein

Respondent Court approved the said Compromise Agreement including a Manifestation

and Addendum thereto
o Requiring plaintif contractor to submit and file a new performance bond

The appellants filed an urgent motion seeking a declaration of legality of the original
contract and agreement from the respondent Court
o the respondent Court issued an order declaring that the original contract is legal
and valid

At the instance of the appellee, the respondent Court granted an order of execution
pursuant to which a writ of execution was issued

An application for and notice of garnishment were made and efected upon the funds of
appellant Pasay City Government with the Philippine National Bank

The appellant filed an urgent motion to set aside the respondent Court's order and to
quash the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto

The respondent Court issued an order stating that inasmuch as the defendant has not yet
paid the plaintif as of this date then "the writ of execution and of garnishment are
declared to be again in full force and efect ..."

The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration

o respondent Court denied and rejected the appellants' motion for reconsideration
o respondent Court ordered the enforcement of the garnishment already issued to the
City Sherif for Pasay by taking possession of the amount of P613,096.00 from the
deposits of appellant Pasay City Government with the Philippine National Bank

Respondent Court issued an order increasing the performance bond to 100k Php to make it
equal to the cost of the nextstage of construction

The appellants Med (exact word from the case) their notice of appeal from the orders of
the respondent Court

The appellants filed their manifestation and petition to suspend the writ of execution and
garnishment

The appellants filed their manifestation and withdrawal of notice of appeal

o respondent Court approved said withdrawal

The appellants filed an amended notice of appeal and a record on appeal which were duly
approved as per order of the respondent Court

The plaintif, Vicente David Isip, in the original complaint for specific performance filed an
urgent motion for permit to serve a supplemental complaint
o seeking rescission of the original contract titled Contract and Agreement and of the
Compromise Agreement
o claiming damages in the sum of P672,653.91 alleging the violations of the
defendants specially the Pasay City Government in complying with its obligations
incumbent upon it in the compromise

Supreme Court resolved to require the petitioner-appellants to file a petition for review on
certiorari

The defendants filed their cautionary answer to the supplemental complaint alleging that:
o the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the present supplemental complaint
o the cause of action is already barred by prior judgment
o the principle of res judicata applies
o plaintif's supplemental complaint states no cause of action and that the present
claim of plaintif has been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguished

The appellants filed their petition for review on certiorari

o This was denied for lack of merit by the Supreme Court

The respondent Court set for pre-trial the supplemental complaint

The Supreme Court granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and their petition
for review on certiorari was given due course

The appellees filed their brief praying that the petition for review on certiorari be
dismissed since the issues involved in the supplemental complaint are prejudicial to the
present petition for review

The appellants filed their manifestation and petition alleging that the supplemental
complaint is not prejudicial to the present petition for review

Hence, this petition

Issue:
W/N respondent Court erred in entertaining the supplemental complaint
Held: Yes
Having established that the compromise agreement was final and immediately executory, and in
fact was already enforced, the respondent Court was in error when it still entertained the
supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court had
no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a decision has become final and executory,
the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power
thereof is to order its execution
After the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot
vacate the same
Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading,
not to entirely substitute the latter
Here, the respondent-appellee originally asked for specific performance which was later settled
through a compromise agreement. After this, the respondent-appellee asked for rescission of
both the contract and agreement and the compromise agreement using a supplemental
complaint. It is clear that the supplemental complaint We have before Us is not only to "supply
deficiencies in aid of original pleading but is also meant as an entirely new "substitute" to the
latter. A supplemental complaint must be consistent with and in aid of, the cause of action set
forth in the original complaint and a new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by

such complaint, especially where judgment has already been obtained by him in the original
action
Torres v. CA
- PFROC, treated as a special civil action, praying that the judgment rendered by the CA and
the Resolution denying the MR and Petition for New Trial be set aside
- Margarita Torres cohabited Leon Arbole w/o the benefit of marriage
o Petitioner Macaria Torres was born on 20 June 1898
- Mother died on20 Dec 1931; Father died on 14 Sept 1933
- 13 Dec 1910 The Government issued to Margarita a Sale Certificate payable in 20
installments
o Last installment was on 17 Dec 1936, 3 years after Arboles death
- 25 Aug 1933 Arbole sold and transferred all his rights and interests to the portion of
Lot 551 in favor of Petitioner
- 6 June 1953 Vicente Santillan, legitimate child of Margarita, executed an Affidavit
claiming possession of Lot 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name
- 7 Nov 1957 The Bureau of Lands issued the patent in the name of the legal heirs of
Margarita
- 3 June 1954 Respondents filed a complaint against Petitioner for Forcible Entry with the
Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that Petitioner had entered a portion of
Lot 551 without their consent, constructed a house and refused to vacate on demand
- The ejectment case was decided against Petitioner and then, the latter appealed to the CFI
of Cavite
- 8 June 1954 Petitioner instituted an Action for Partition of Lot 551 before the CFI of Cavite
alleging that she is a legitimate child of Margarita Torres; Respondents averred that they
are the only heirs and that the complaint for partition be dismissed
- 20 Nov 1958 The Ejectment Case and Partition Case were jointly tried
o Lot 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita
2/3 to Respondents
1/3 to Petitioner
- Petitioner moved for its Reconsideration
- 7 Aug 1963 CFI of Cavite granted the Reconsideration
o Macaria Torres as a legitimate child
o Lot 551 is a conjugal property
o 4/6 to Macaria
o 2/6 to the other heirs
- Respondents appealed
- 2 April 1973 CA rendered a judgment
o Macaria Torres is not a legitimate child
o Lot 551 is a conjugal property
o to Macaria
o to the other heirs
- 16 April 1973 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial
o A notarial document, dated 5 March 1930, was presented by Petitioner arguing that
it was found only later as it was allegedly found among the belongings of Vicente,
alleging that the latter may have tried to suppress
o Respondents argued against new trial, arguing that it is not newly discovered
evidence which could not have been produced during trial by the exercise of due
diligence
- 24 Aug 1973 Denied both Motions

Issue: W/N the CA overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente
Santillan and the Respondents that Macaria and Vicente are siblings with their common
mother, Margarita
Held: No
- Without taking account of the notarial document, she cannot be considered a legitimate
child
o Continuous possession of the status of a natural child will not amount to automatic
recognition but that an action for compulsory recognition is necessary; Hence,
Petitioner refers to Par. 3 of Respondents original complaint in the Ejectment Case
The plaintifs and the defendants Macaria Torres are the legal heirs...
- Petitioner then avers that the statement is an admission of her legitimation and is
controlling
- However, in the Amended Complaint filed by the Respondents, the said portion referred to
by the Petitioner was deleted
- In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The Original is
regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
Original complaint no longer forms part of the record
- If Petitioner had desired to utilize the Original complaint, she should have ofered it in
evidence
- Having been amended, the Original Complaint lost its character as a judicial admission,
which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the
admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal ofer
- Therefore, there can be no estoppels by extrajudicial admission made in the Original
Complaint, for failure to ofer it in evidence
- It should also be noted that in the Partition Case, Respondents denied the legitimacy of the
Petitioner
- However, it is the Courts view that the notarial document can reasonably qualify as newly
discovered evidence as per Petitioners allegation (that the document was allegedly
suppressed)
- The case is hereby REMANDED to the Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial
[G.R. Nos. 119511-13. November 24, 1998]
WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON USON, Respondents

Petition for Review seeking to set aside the consolidated January 31, 1994
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
Fe Giron Uson mortgaged his land to Wilfredo Verzosa
Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have the mortgage
foreclosed

To prevent the foreclosure sale from taking place, Uson filed with the RTC a complaint
against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial Sherif for annulment of mortgage
Masongsong made several demands but Memita failed to pay

defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by
plaintif Fe Uson

Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the court

Fe Uson then filed her amended complaint which bears the proper verification

Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sherif to proceed with the foreclosure of mortgage

Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sherif requesting him to discontinue the
foreclosure sale in deference to the said pending case

foreclosure sale was conducted and property was sold to Verzosa being the
highest bidder

RTC issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson

TCT was issued in the name of Verzosa who sold the land to Pilar Martinez
thereafter

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court

Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional defendants the
Register of Deeds and Pilar Martinez and praying, among others, the annulment of
the latters title

upon Usons application for preliminary injunction embodied in her Second Amended
Complaint, respondent court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist
from entering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or
ownership over the land

after hearing and upon posting of a bond by Uson, respondent Judge issued an order
directing defendants Verzosa and Martinez and/or any and other persons acting under
their command to desist and cease from entering, intruding and making constructions
on the land

Verzosa filed a motion for clarification of the order

Lower court issued an order to the efect that the status quo being maintained
is the possession of plaintif Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does
not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner of T.C.T. No.
11107

Court of Appeals held that the last peaceable uncontested status that preceded the
controversy was that point when private respondent Fe Uson was the registered
owner of the land in dispute

Petitioners insist that the status quo refers to the point when Pilar Martinez was
already the owner of the property, having purchased it from Verzosa

Petitioners further contend that the controversy started only when the Amended
Complaint was filed, because the previous Complaints were expunged from the
records
He argued that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date
of the filing of the original and that the original pleading is deemed abandoned
when it is amended

ISSUE:

What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive writ, in the
event a complaint is subsequently amended?

HELD:

Although the Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began when the
first Complaint was filed

The status quo is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ

when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, or demands,
the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on
the date of the filing of the amended complaint.
for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to
have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint.
for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint
is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the
amended complaint introduces a new or diferent cause of action or demand

an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates
back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but before
service of amendment
when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, or
demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was
filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint. I
for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to
have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint.
for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint
is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the
amended complaint introduces a new or diferent cause of action or demand.
an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged
relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the
statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint
but before service of amendment
It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission
of the amended
the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or diferent cause of action or demand.
The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter
to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa

MAGASPI vs. RAMOLETE

*okay guys, this case is just about the 2 parties arguing about the freagin
docket fee. Quite lengthy, sorry, but I feel that I have to include just in case dean asks
for little details. Basta, theyre all arguing about how the docket fee should be
calculated. Also, theyre questioning if the 1st docket fee that has been paid is enough
to say that the case has been filed. Ganito lang yung drama nung case. Sorry.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in
Civil Case No.R-11882 in respect of the correct amount to be paid for the filing of the case as
provided in Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
September 16, 1970, petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages against The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd.
and/or The Shell Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and
Cebu City Savings & Loan Association in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Upon filing and the payment of P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sherif fees, the
complaint was assigned Civil Case No. R11882.
The complaint contains the following:
o Declare TCT issued in the name of the Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc.
as null and void and hence of no legal efect;
o Declare the plaintifs as heirs of the deceased Sps. Magaspi as owners of the land in
question;
o Order the RD of Cebu to cancel TCT and issue a neew one under the name of the
plaintifs;
o For the defendants to pay the plaintifs damages.
September 18, 1970, Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings
and Loan Assn. filed a motion to compel the plaintifs to pay the correct amount for docket
fee.
The motion reads:
o The complaint of the plaintifs contains or states two, if not three alternative causes
of action:
Reconveyance of real property.
If the plaintifs are unable to have the property reconveyed and the title
cancelled, having passed to an innocent purchaser for value, their recourse
would be for damages, i.e., recovery of the value of the land and other
damages.
Cancellation of Titles.
o Further, until such time as the correct docket fee is paid, the time for filing of
responsive pleadings by the defendants be suspended.
The motion was opposed by the plaintifs (petitioners herein) who claimed that the main
cause of action was the recovery of a piece of land and on the basis of its assessed valued,
P60.00 was the correct docketing fee and that although the Revised Rules of Court do not
exclude damages in the computation of the docket fee, damages are nonetheless still to
be excluded.
October 5, 1970, the presiding judge ordered the Clerk of Court to comment on the motion
and the opposition. The following comment was submitted:
o

That in the matter of fixing the amount of fees that shall be collected by the Clerks
of Court of First Instance for the filing of an action or proceeding, Section 5, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.

If the case concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof shall be considered in
computing the fees.

In case the value of the property or estate of the sum claimed is less or more
in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the diference of fee shall be
refunded or paid as the case may be.

That a reading of the complaint in this case would show that the action is not only
for recovery of property but also for actual and moral damages as well as for
attorney's fees;

Accordingly, the correct amount of the legal fees for the filing of this case should be
fixed at P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Research fee;

October 14, 1970, Judge Mateo Canonoy issued the following order:
o

This is a motion of the defendants to order the plaintifs to pay a filing fee of
P6,730.00 on the ground that the total demand of the said plaintifs should be the
basis for computing the filing fee and not the value of the land alone. The plaintifs
paid the amount of P60.00 as filing fee in this case.

The damages are not merely incidental or ancillary but are principal demands.
Besides, Rule 141, Sec. 5 (a) of the new Rules of Court no longer excludes damages,
like interest, from computing the filing fees.

The exclusion of damages from the exemption in the computation of the filing fees
in the new Rules of Court is intentional, since oftentimes, as in the present case, the
claim for damages far exceeds the value of the land. To thus exempt the plaintifs
from paying the filing fee for damages is against reason. Besides, in determining the
jurisdiction of the court, the amount of damages claimed is taken into account.

The Court hereby overrules the opposition of the plaintifs and orders them to pay
an additional sum of P3,104.00 as filing fees.

October 19, 1970, the Shell companies filed their respective answers.
October 23, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed another
manifestation stating that an additional sum of P1,000 be imposed in accordance with the
ROC.
November 3, 1970, the plaintifs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to
include the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant.
The amended complaint still sought the return of the lot in question but the pecuniary
claim was limited to the extent that the Government of the RP is except from the joint and
solidary liability of paying damages.
November 12, 1970, the defendants (herein respondents filed an opposition to the
admission of the amended complaint. They based their opposition on the following
grounds:
o

That while the only reason given for the amendment of the complaint is the
inclusion of the Government of the Philippines as an indispensable party; the
plaintifs have taken the improper liberty of amending portions of the allegations in
the complaint and even has eliminated entire paragraph;

That these amendments are obviously intended to circumvent, it not entirely

subvert, the lawful Order of this Honorable Court for the plaintif to pay the amount
of P3,104.00 as docket fee, on the basis of the total amount claimed for damages
(plus Pl,000.00 docket fee on the P500,000.00 exemplary damages, pending
resolution before this Honorable Court);

 November 16, 1970, Judge Canonoy admitted the amended complaint although the
plaintifs had not yet complied with his Order of October 14, 1970, that they should pay an
additional P3,104.00 docket fee.
December 2, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed the motion to
dismiss if the plaintifs do not pay the proper docket fee within 7days as ordered by the
court.
The above motion was opposed by the plaintifs on the ground that the amended
complaint which had been admitted by the court had replaced the original complaint.
February 12, 1971, the Republic filed its answer to the amended complaint and the
plaintifs filed a reply on February 23, 1971.
March 13, 1971, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a petition to have their
motion of December 2, 1970, resolved by the court.
April 3, 1971, Judge Jose R. Ramolete who had replaced Judge Canonoy issued the
following order:
o

It is a rule that the correct docket fee must be paid before the Court will act on the
petition or complaint. The Court of Justice is not called upon to act on a complaint or
a petition in the absence of payment of a corresponding docket fee. Before the
payment of the docket fee, the case is not deemed registered and docketed.

The original complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered or docketed. It

follows, therefore, that there is likewise no amended complaint deemed to have
been filed and admitted.

The petitioners assail the above order. They insist that they had correctly paid the
docketing fee in the amount of P60.00, or in the alternative, that if they are to pay an
additional docketing fee, it should be based on the amended complaint.

For initial determination is the question as to

The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of its filing in court., (Malimit vs. Degamo, No. L-17850, Nov.
28, 1964, 12 SCRA 450, 120 Phil. 1247; Lee vs. Republic, L-15027, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA
65.)
Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because the question posed in the
Malimit and Lee cases was the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the
case at bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the amount that has to
be paid.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Civil Case No. 11882 may be considered as having been filed and docketed when
P60.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court even on the assumption that said payment was not
sufficient in amount.
HELD:

The petition is granted. The petitioners shall be assessed a docket fee on the basis of the
amended complaint; and after all of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the proceedings in Civil
Case No. R-11882 shall be resumed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.
Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because the question posed in the
Malimit and Lee cases was the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the
case at bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the amount that has to
be paid.
The case at bar can be distinguished from the Lazaro case in at least two respects,
namely: (a) The Lazaro case involved the timeliness of the perfection of the appeal which
was made to depend in turn on the timeliness of the full payment of the docket fee
whereas the instant case does not involve an appeal nor the timeliness of the payment of
the docket fee; and (b) in the Lazaro case, the amount (P8.00) which was initially paid was
palpably inadequate, whereas in the case at bar there is an honest diference of opinion as
to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee.
The Garcia case, supra, appears to favor the petitioners. In that case, a will was sought to
be probated in Special Proceeding No. 62818. Docket fees amounting to P940.00 were
paid. Later, a second will was sought to be probated in the same special proceeding. This
Court held that there was no need to pay a separate docket fee because the probate of
the second will was not sought in another proceeding.
We hold that under the circusmtances, Civil Case No. R. 11882 was docketed
upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient. Accordingly,
the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings
thereafter had were proper and regular.
The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. Judge
Canonoy on October 14, 1970, ordered the payment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee
based on the original complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an alternative view,
that the docket fee be based on the amended complaint which was admitted on November
14, 1970, also by Judge Canonoy.
The petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is
deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a
pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleading only. "
On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by the
petitioners should be based on their amended complaint.
MWSS vs. CA and The City of Dagupan (1986)

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision
of the CFI Pangasinan

NOTES before the case (I feel that the court was so full of it, so now, may sermon
before you read the case ) this is important when we reach appeals - KARA
-

Before proceeding further, it may be necessary to invite attention to the common error of
joining the court (be it a Regional Trial Court, the Intermediate Appellate Court, or the
Sandiganbayan) as a party respondent in an appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

The only parties in an appeal by certiorari are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee
as respondent.
o

The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said
appeal.

It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or respondent.

The joinder of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan as party

respondent in an appeal by certiorari is necessary in cases where the petitionerappellant claims that said court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.

The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the joinder of the Intermediate Appellate
Court or the Sandiganbayan becomes necessary.

FACTS:
-

The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against NAWASA, now MWSS for recovery of
ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA argues that RA
1383 vested upon it ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems and has
made some necessary expenses

The TC rendered judgment in favor of the CITY

o

It found that NAWASA was a possessor in bad faith, and is not entitled for the
reimbursement of expenses that it claims

NAWASA appealed to the CA and argues that the CITY should be liable for the amortization
of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan
Waterworks System
o

CA affirmed the TC decision

The useful expenses were made in bad faith

NAWASA, Builder in BF, therefore not entitled to indemnity

No right whatsoever to claim anything

MWSS, as successor-in-interest of NAWASA appealed to the CA

o
-

W/N it has the right to remove all the useful improvements

notwithstanding that NAWASA was a possessor in BF

The CITY argues that the rulings in the cases cited by the petitioner are not
applicable because such improvements WERE NOT ACTUALLY IDENTIFIED
o

Therefore, there should be a rehearing

That such improvement, even if they could be identified, could not be separated
without causing substantial injury or damage to the Dagupan Waterworks System.

THE COURT The CITY is correct, NAWASA should have alleged its additional
counterclaim in the alternative, for the reimbursement of the expenses it
incurred
o

MWSS argues that such issue of removal was never pleaded as a counterclaim

It was joined with the implied consent of the CITY because it never filed a
counter-manifestation or objection to petitioners manifestation wherein it
stated that the improvements were separable from the system

MWSS quotes Section 5, Rule 101

ISSUE: Whether or not NAWASA is correct in saying that the CITY gave an implied consent, that
the improvements were indeed SEPARABLE from the system?

HELD: No.

This argument is untenable because the above-quoted provision is premised on the fact
that evidence had been introduced on an issue not raised by the pleadings without any
objection thereto being raised by the adverse party. In the case at bar, no evidence
whatsoever had been introduced by petitioner on the issue of removability of
the improvements and the case was decided on a stipulation of facts.
Consequently, the pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence.

The Court set aside the procedural aspect and looked at substantive law
o

A possessor in BF does not have the right to remove useful improvements

(remember your property law)

As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made
without right to indemnity

1 SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.-When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. ...

Article 546 NCC, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful
expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed;

Article 547 only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this
can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers
the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The
right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing sufers no injury
thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value
they have at the time he enters into possession

NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION V IAC

GR NO. L-68636, 1988
Nature of Action: Appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
In connection with its exportation of cement, NCC contracted the arrastre, stevedoring and other
related services of Shipside. The understanding was that for the latter's "integrated services,"
the former would pay it at the fixed rate of P0.41 per bag of cement, which amount was, after
Shipside had started rendering its services, later increased to P0.46 by agreement of the parties.
Subsequently, Shipside advised NCC of another increase in this rate and billed it accordingly, as
well as for "regular and overtime stand-by, lighting, equipment rental, gears, empty bags, and
other charges. NCC apparently acceded to the new arrangement but about two years later
questioned this billing, contending that the agreed integrated rate of P0.46 covered all the
services rendered by Shipside and that such rate could not be increased unilaterally. Shipside
said that only arrastre and stevedoring services were included; all other services were subject to
separate billings; and, moreover, NCC had not earlier objected to the billing. In the end, as no
agreement could be reached, Shipside flied its complaint for collection of the amount allegedly
due from NCC. NCC's argument is that it had never accepted the unilateral increase of the said
fee and the other fees billed by Shipside beyond the charges for arrastre and stevedoring
services. To the contention that it never protested the billing, NCC has a rather quaint
explanation, to say the least. First, it says it continued availing itself of the services of Shipside
despite such billing because it had no choice as Shipside had a monopoly of such services in the
region. Second, it says it did not object to the billing because it was not really a demand for
payment but a mere request it could ignore. In any event, the records show that the increase in
the rates was communicated to NCC on August 12, 1974, and the billing based on these rates
was made initially on September 13, 1974
It would have been so easy for NCC to manifest its objection to the increased billing, but it did
not. It was silent for almost two years and until shortly before the suit against it was filed by
Shipside. Shipside, for its part, continued rendering its services to NCC, believing that the latter,
by its failure to object to the billing, had accepted the same. It is contended that the
respondent court erred in limiting the refund to the amount specified by the
petitioner in its counterclaim. The trial court had allowed the refund in the sum of
P526,280.53 on the justification that this had been established by the evidence adduced at the
trial. On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed, holding that this refund should be
limited to the sum of P31,652.62, which was the amount claimed in the counterclaim.
Issue: WON the TC acted with GAD in allowing the counterclaim without amending the pleadings?

Held: No.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the abovementioned rule and in light of the decisions
cited, the trial court should not be precluded from awarding an amount higher than that claimed
in the pleadings notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment. But this is upon the
condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been presented properly, with full
opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to
refute each other's evidence. We find in the case at bar that there was a failure of the abovestated condition. The record discloses that although NCC was allowed to adduce evidence in
support of its claim for refund beyond the amount indicated in its counterclaim, Shipside's
rebuttal evidence was practically brushed aside on the ground that it was not permitted by the
stipulation of facts earlier entered into by the parties, besides being hearsay and self-serving.
This was not consistent with due process and therefore vitiated the findings of the trial court
based on the unilateral assertions of the petitioner.
Valenzuela vs CA
In resolving the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in the present case, which motion
to amend was filed after the lapse of fifteen years from the filing of the initiatory pleading sought
to be amended, this Court painstakingly considered not only the peculiar circumstances
obtaining, but also accorded premium to the legal truism that "adjective law is not the
counterfoil of substantive law" and that the rules of procedure must not be perverted into
engines of injustice.1
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the decision 2 of the Court
of, which nullified and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
231. The subject orders of the RTC denied private respondents' motion to admit amended
complaint.
Facts:
Herein private respondents spouses Manuel and Leticia De Guia filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages (Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P from now on Civil Case A)
against herein petitioners spouses Jovito and Norma Valenzuela before the then CFI of
Rizal in Pasay City. The complaint prayed that the Spouses Valenzuela be ordered to
execute in favor of private respondents the necessary deed of sale covering the two (2)
parcels of land allegedly subject of a contract to sell between said parties.
Private respondents spouses De Guia, upon discovering that the subject real properties
were sold and transferred by the spouses Valenzuela to herein co-petitioners spouses
Alfredo and Bella Gonzales Quiazon, filed for annulment of sale, cancellation of title and
damages (Civil Case No. PQ 9432-P from now on Civil Case B), against spouses Valenzuela,
spouses Quiazon, and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.
In the complaint, private respondents spouses De Guia prayed specifically for the
annulment of the deed of sale executed by the spouses Valenzuela in favor of the spouses
Quiazon, cancellation of TCT Nos. 39396 and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon, and
the reinstatement of TCT No. 39142 in the name of the spouses Valenzuela, or in the
alternative, the reconveyance of the subject properties by the spouses Quiazon to spouses
Valenzuela.
Private respondents spouses De Guia amended their complaint in Civil Case B, impleading
Webb-Hegg Construction Resources, Inc. as additional defendant.
Spouses De Guia filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case B,
impleading as additional defendant Gerardo Villacorta. Prior to the resolution of such
pending motion, Civil Case B was transferred to the RTC of Makati, Branch 133 pursuant to
B.P. Blg. 129. As a result, Civil Case No. B was redocketed as Civil Case No. 2723 (From
now on still Civil Case B).
The RTC of Makati, Branch 133 issued an order admitting the second amended complaint.

Upon motion of the defendants therein, however, Civil Case B was returned to RTC-Pasay,
where herein private respondents spouses De Guia filed a motion to admit third amended
complaint seeking to implead spouses De Guzman, De Guzman Development Corporation,
Skyfreight Brokerage, Inc. and Lawyer Romeo Bobadilla, as additional defendants.
The RTC-Pasay issued an omnibus order 7 denying the motion to admit the third amended
complaint and declaring as automatically vacated the order of RTC-Makati, Branch 133,
which admitted the second amended complaint.
Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, private respondents spouses De Guia then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court which was also
dismissed.
Private respondents spouses De Guia appealed the dismissal of said case before the Court
of Appeals.
The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the lower court.
Aggrieved, private respondents spouses De Guia filed a petition before the Supreme Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. The High Court dismissed the petition for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Private respondents moved to
reconsider. The motion was denied.
Upon motion of spouses Quiazon in Civil Case A and B, the lower court issued an order
directing the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens and the Adverse Claim on two TCTs
in the name of spouses Quiazon.
Private respondents sought to reconsider the trial court's order and filed a motion to admit
another amended complaint in Civil Case A.
Prior to the resolution of the two pending motions, private respondents filed a motion for
the inhibition of the presiding judge of Branch 117, RTC-Pasay.
The court granted the motion for inhibition resulting in the re-raffle of Civil Case A to
Branch 231, presided by Judge Cesar Z. Ylagan.
Judge Ylagan denied the motion to admit amended complaint prompting herein private
respondents spouses De Guia to file a motion for reconsideration which the lower court
denied.
Private respondents elevated the lower court's order denying the motion to admit
amended complaint to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus, and ordered
respondent to admit petitioners amended complaint.
The RTC-Pasay, Branch 231 issued an order8 admitting the amended complaint.
Herein petitioners filed with the lower court a manifestation with motion to reconsider 9 to
the efect that they would file a "petition for review on certiorari" before the Supreme
Court, to which manifestation private respondents filed an opposition. Petitioners then
filed a reply to the opposition.
The lower court decreed "that the admission of the amended complaint and service of
summons are hereby held in abeyance until after the Supreme Court has resolved the
case before it which has effectively placed this court on notice."
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to
resolve the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case A.

Issue:
(a) Whether or not the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure can be applied retroactively?
(b) Whether or not the amendments can be introduced?
Held: Yes to both.
Ratio:
(a)
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow afect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to

pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from procedural laws.
(b)
Section 1, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides:
"SECTION 1. Amendment in general. - Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an
allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a
mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits
of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner." (emphasis ours)
Equally important is Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules:
"SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused
if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon
the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to
the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard."
The contention of the petitioners that the introduction of the amendments would radically
change the cause of action is untenable. Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure11 amended the former rule12 in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of
action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-of and not retained in the new rules. The
clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." 13 This should only be
true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense,
the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and
prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure, after all,
are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of
the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the Supreme Court is
empowered to suspend their operation.15 This Court will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in
favor of what is fair and just.
True enough, the delay that has so characterized the adjudication of the merits of this case
which original complaint was filed practically two decades ago has not escaped the attention
of this Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court allows the introduction of
amendments to the complaint so as to aford the party-litigants the full and genuine opportunity
to substantiate their respective claims and defenses and for the trial court to finally resolve the
matters relating to the merits of the case.
Besides, the defendants sought to be impleaded in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P are not left without
justifiable recourse. To this end, the law in no uncertain terms provide for the necessary legal
implements and the adoption of efective means and defenses sanctioned by the Rules, wherein
both parties in the controversy may very well advance and protect their respective legal
interests. By sanctioning the introduction of amendments to the complaint, the issues shall at
last be viewed, so to speak, in the clear light of day and substantial matters therein shall not
anymore be lost in the abyss of technicalities and procedural jargon.
Petition is Granted
G.R. No. 169551
January 24, 2007
SPOUSES ORLANDO M. LAMBINO and CARMELITA C. LAMBINO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 172, Valenzuela City, and
BPI FAMILY BANK, Respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The CA affirmed the Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, which denied the motion of petitioners to admit
the supplemental complaint.

On July 21, 1994, petitioners Orlando M. Lambino, a lawyer, and his wife, Carmelita C. Lambino,
secured a housing loan of P600,000.00 from private respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.
(BPI). Petitioners executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) over their property as security for
the loan.
Petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations from January 15, 1995 to May 15, 1995. On
May 22, 1995, private respondent filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the MLA with
the Ex-Officio Sherif of the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On June 26, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the MLA. They alleged therein
that private respondent had released only P555,047.19 on a staggered basis out of their
P600,000.00 loan. The court issued a TRO and the sale at public auction was reset.
April 16, 1996, petitioners ofered to settle the balance of their loan. However, private
respondent rejected the ofer.
In the meantime, the court suspended pretrial to enable the parties to settle the matter
amicably. The pretrial proceeding was terminated on July 23, 1998.
On July 10, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint wherein they
alleged the following:
The plaintifs were forced to litigate due to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage
filed by defendant bank and unlawful imposition of escalating and arbitrary rate of interest
without the consent of the plaintifs and not authorized under the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
The unauthorized deductions and advance interest charges were known by plaintifs only
for the first time at the Pre-Trial Brief of defendants.
Aside from the unauthorized deductions and advance interest payment made, defendant
bank also imposed escalating and arbitrary rate of interest.
On August 11, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion of petitioners in its
finding that the alleged escalating and arbitrary rate of interest and other charges imposed by
private respondent had accrued long before the complaint was filed. It held that under Section 6,
Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, only transactions, occurrences, or events which accrued
after the date of the complaint may be set forth in the supplemental complaint.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. January 2, 2001, the court issued an Order denying
the motion of petitioners.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to nullify the Orders of the RTC.
Petitioners reiterated that they came to know of the escalating and arbitrary charges, liquidated
damages, and attorneys fees only when they received the statements of account dated June 5,
1996, November 15, 1996, and August 15, 1998, after the filing of their original complaint;
hence, they could not have been alleged as an integral part of their causes of action in their
original complaint.
On March 7, 2005, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
W/N the petitioners Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint can be granted?
SC = No.

The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court is Section 6 of Rule 10 which reads:
Sec. 6: Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party, the court
may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief in one action and to
avoid the cost delay and waste of separate action. A supplemental pleading is meant to supply
deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter.
The supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original
complaint related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of
action.
Before they filed their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of the deductions made
on the proceeds of the loan, for interest charges, MRI premium, and fire insurance premium in
the total amount of P44,952.88. They received notices on the following dates: July 25, 1994,
September 5, 1994, October 24, 1994, and November 15, 1994. And because petitioners had
alleged all these charges in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it behooved petitioners
to have incorporated in their original complaint as a cause of action the alleged
"illegal/unauthorized and unconscionable" charges for MRI, escalating interest charges,
liquidated damages, attorneys fees, and foreclosure expenses. They should have sought to
nullify such charges in the original complaint, but they did not. They are thus proscribed from
incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint.
Philippine Ports Authority v. William Gothong & ABoitiz (WG&A), Inc.
Facts:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Philippine Ports Authority
(petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
October 24, 2002 and its Resolution dated May 15, 2003.

WGA requested PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the Marine Slip Way in the
North Harbor.
Pres. Estrada approved the request to lease from Jan 1 to Jun 30, 2001 or until such time
that PPA turns over its operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization
Project.
Believeing that the said lease already expired on Jun 30, 2001, PPA sent WGA a letter
directing the latter to vacate the contested premises not later than November 30, 2001
and to turnover the improvements made therein pursuant to the terms and conditions
agreed upon in the contract.
In response, WGA wrote PPA urging the latter to reconsider its decision to eject the former.
Said request was denied by the PPA.
Petitioner WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner WG&A amended its complaint for the first time. The complaint was still
denominated as one for Injunction with prayer for TRO. In the said amended pleading, the
petitioner incorporated statements to the efect that PPA is already estopped from denying
that the correct period of lease is until such time that the North Harbor Modernization
Project has been bidded out to and operations turned over to the winning bidder.
TRO was denied by court.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second Amended Complaint. It included
as its fourth cause of action and additional relief in its prayer, the reformation of the
contract as it failed to express or embody the true intent of the contracting parties.

The admission of the second amended complaint met strong opposition from the
respondent PPA. It postulated that the reformation sought for by the petitioner
constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will substantially alter the
latter's cause of action and theory of the case.
Court denied admission of Second Amended Complaint. Petitioner filed a MR but the
same was denied.
WGA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the nullification of the RTC
orders.
CA granted petition. MR filed was subsequently denied.

Issue:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the admission of the second amended complaint
Held:
NO.
Ratio:
Note: Old rule provides that substantial amendments may be made only upon leave
of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion
was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered.
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus: Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or
that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-of and not
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule
10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter
the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a
substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought
to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and
equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Digest #15 (Rule 11 When to file responsive Pleadings)
Martha Rose C. Serrano
Delbros Hotel Corporation v IAC
Petitioner: DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION
Respondents: IAC, HILTON INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, RICHARD CHAPMAN, FLAVIANO
MOSQUERA, JR.
Facts:
Petition for certiorari on the resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Feb. 27, 1985. Delbros filed a complaint for termination of agreement and damages, with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against private respondents Hilton.
In their Management Agreement, Delbros will financed, built, furnished and equipped a
first-class hotel and the operation and management of which was granted to Hilton.
Delbros alleged that Hilton refused to remit their share of the gross profit as stipulated in
their agreement.
In their Answer with compulsory counterclaim, Hilton said that Delbros has no cause of
action and that their claims had been waived or abandoned.
Mar. 21, 1985. The RTC then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Hilton and
Chapman from disposing, concealing corporate records and stocks, as well as disbursing
and transferring funds therefrom.
Hilton went to the IAC on a petition for certiorari assailing the said writ. July 3, 1985, the
3rd Special Cases Division of IAC issued a TRO on the injunction order by the RTC. And
on Aug. 21, 1985, the said TRO was then replaced by a writ of preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on Apr. 12, 1985, Delbros filed a motion to admit supplemental complaint in
which petitioner impleaded an additional defendant, Mosquera. The said motion was
granted and a copy of the order was received by Hilton on June 21, 1985. However, the
motion for extension to answer supplemental complaint was received by the RTC only on
July 16.
The RTC declared Hilton in default upon motion of the petitioner. And on July 15,
judgment was rendered in favor of Delbros declaring that the termination of the
agreement is valid and to surrender the Hotel to Delbros. A writ of execution was
subsequently issued by the trial court on Sept. 3, 1985.
Sept. 4, 1985. Hilton filed a petition for certiorari to assail the writ of execution having
issued with grave abuse of discretion. And on Sept 5, the 1st Special Cases Division of
the IAC issued a TRO to stop the writ of execution issued by the RTC. Delbros filed a MR
but was not acted upon. Then filed this petition arguing that the order was null and void.
Issue:

W/N the RTC erred in declaring a party in default for failure to answer a supplemental complaint.
YES.
Held:
Petition was DISMISSED. The default judgment on July 15, 1985 and the writ of execution on
Sept. 3, 1985 were set aside.
Rationale:
Default orders are taken on the legal presumption that in failing to file an
answer, the defendant does not oppose the allegations and relief demanded in
the complaint. In the case at bar, however, no such presumption can arise as proven by
the Answer filed by HILTON and Chapman to the original complaint. Their institution of the
certiorari proceedings in opposition to petitioner's attempt to interfere with and/or take
over the control and management of the hotel pendente lite; and their vigorous opposition
to the admission of the supplemental complaint under consideration. These factors, of
which the trial judge had full knowledge and notice, should have cautioned him from
precipitately rendering the default order as well as the default judgment.

"A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading substitute for the
original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original
pleading is to stand, and the issues joined under the original pleading remain as
issues to be tried in the action." While it is conceded that there is authority in support
of a default judgment being predicated upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental
complaint, the same cannot apply here. The reason is that although in the supplemental
complaint, the relief prayed for was altered from termination of the management contract
to judicial confirmation of its termination, the basic and principal issue of whether or not
petitioner was entitled to terminate the management contract, remained. As this basic
issue had been previously traversed and joined by the Answer filed by HILTON and
Chapman, there was no necessity for requiring them to plead further to the Supplemental
Complaint. Consequently, the trial judge did not have a legal ground for declaring them in
default for such failure to plead.

The Court said that the trial court should have treated the supplemental complaint as an
amended complaint, and the original answer thereto as sufficient; or otherwise to have
waited for the answer of the newly-impleaded defendant before acting on the motion to
declare the original defendants in default and rendering the default judgment, considering
that a common cause of action has been asserted against the three defendants, so that
the answer of Mosquera, Jr. could inure to the benefit of the original defendants.

Further, no prejudice wouId result to petitioner had the trial judge taken a more
prudent and judicious course of action. Acting as the trial judge did, grave, irreparable and
serious damage caused to private respondents. Mosquera was not yet declared in default,
consequently, any defense set up by him for himself and for the benefit of his co-defendants was
rendered practically inutile by the execution of the default judgment.
Barraza vs. Campos
FACTS:
Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Presiding Judge, spouses-petitioners, through the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65,
Revised Rules of Court, prayed for the annulment of the latter's judgment by default dated
January 29, 1979 rendered against them, as well as his Order declaring them in default dated
December 1, 1978 in Civil Case No. Pq-6692-P entitled "Renato Gatchalian, plaintif, versus
Spouses George Barraza and Yolanda Gatchalian, defendants" for damages and injunction filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch
Private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants' (petitioners herein) use
of plaintif's (now private respondent) trade name and style of "Gatchalian-The House of Native
Lechon and Restaurant",

petitioners were properly served with summons together with the corresponding
complaint and annexes thereof.
petitioners as defendants therein filed an "Urgent Ex- Parte Motion" for extension of
time of 15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted in its Order
Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days,
defendants filed through their counsel, Atty, Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a "Motion to Dismiss
Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction" which was filed with the Court
The same motion was set for hearing
private respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default" on
the ground that the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period allowed
by the Rules of Court.
the Court finding the reasons stated in the "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants
in Default" filed by plaintif, through counsel to be well-taken, granted said motion and allowed
the plaintif to present evidence exparte
respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintif,
defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the court's order but
the court denied the said motion.
Upon an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution" dated March 29, 1979,
the Court in its Order of April 2, 1979 granted the motion and caused the issuance of a writ of
execution.
Defendants filed an "Urgent Omnibus Motion" praying that the Order of the Court
declaring the defendants as in default, the proceedings held on the strength thereof and the
decision rendered in the case at bar be set aside and that the defendants be given three (3) days
from receipt of the corresponding order within which to file their answer in the case at bar.
the Court denied defendants' Omnibus Motion in its Order
ISSUE:
whether the Order of respondent Judge dated December 1, 1978 declaring
defendants, now the herein petitioners, in default for failure to file their answer within the
reglementary period provided by law
HELD:
NO. Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had granted petitioners an
extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer, or up to November 18, 1978. Instead of filing
the answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on November 17, 1978, one (1)
day before the expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is clearly allowed under
Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method
of testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the
interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss
the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of fifteen
(15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court.
This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to
file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within "a diferent
period (as) fixed by the court. "
In Simeon Mandae, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Eustaquio Gumarad and Regino
Lagundino, defendants and appellees, L-2202, Aug. 31, 1950, 87 Phil. 278, We ruled: "It
appearing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the expiration of the period for filing
defendants' answer as extended by the court, there was no legal reason for declaring defendants
in default. "
Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint must be resolved by the trial court and
if the Motion to Dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, petitioners shall file
their answer pursuant to Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Judgment of default was reversed and set aside by SC
SPOUSES GEORGE BARRAZA and YOLANDA GATCHALIAN-BARRAZA, petitioners, vs.
HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Presiding Judge, Br. XXX, CFI-Rizal, Pasay City, 7th Judicial
District, and RENATO GATCHALIAN, respondents.
Facts

PETITION for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
The petition at bar evolved from a dispute between brother and sister over the use of the
business name or style GATCHALIAN-THE HOUSE OF NATIVE LECHON.
CFI
Private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants (petitioners herein) use
of plaintifs (now private respondent) trade name and style of GatchalianThe House of Native
Lechon and Restaurant, with prayer for preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance.
Petitioners were properly served with summons together with the corresponding complaint and
annexes thereof.
Petitioners as defendants therein filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for extension of time of 15
days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted in its order.
Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days, defendants filed
through their counsel, a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction. Said motion moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds:
That the complaint states no cause of action;
That venue is improperly laid; and
That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, namely for Infringement of Trade Name before the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila.
The same motion was set for hearing, notice thereof served to counsel for the plaintif and the
Clerk of Court.
Private respondent filed an ExParte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default on the ground that
the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period allowed by the Rules of
Court.
The Court finding the reasons stated in the Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default
filed by plaintif, through counsel to be well-taken, granted said motion and allowed the plaintif
to present evidence. The hearing before the commissioner was held whereat plaintif presented
his evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex-parte.
Respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintif; judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the Plaintif and against the Defendants.
Defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the courts order declaring
defendants in default and of the decision on the ground that:
Defendants were denied of their rights of procedural due process and
Defendants were also denied of their day in court.
Plaintifs opposed the motion for reconsideration. The Court denied defendants motion for
reconsideration.
Upon an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the Court in its Order granted the
motion and caused the issuance of a writ of execution.
Defendants through a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that
The Order of the Court declaring the defendants as in default,
the proceedings held on the strength thereof and the decision rendered in the case at bar
be set aside and that
the defendants be given three (3) days from receipt of the corresponding order within
which to file their answer in the case at bar.
Opposition having been filed by the plaintif, the Court denied defendants Omnibus Motion in its
Order.
SC

Defendants now come before Us on a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order to restrain the execution of the decision, particularly
the sale of the petitioners properties. After hearing to render the preliminary injunction
permanent with the annulment of all the proceedings held and conducted by the respondent
judge from the declaration of default, the rendition of the decision based thereon, the levy, etc.
and enjoining said respondent judge to rule and decide the petitioners motion to dismiss or in
the alternative, to allow the petitioners to file their answer.
Issue
Whether the Order of respondent Judge declaring defendants, now the herein petitioners, in
default for failure to file their answer within the reglementary period provided by law, was issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling
The applicable provisions of the Revised Rules of Court state:
Rule 11, Section 1. Time to answer.Within fifteen (15) days after service of summons the
defendant shall file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the plaintif, unless a diferent
period is filed by the court.
Section 7. Extension of time to plead.Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the
court may extend the time to plead provided in these rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the
time fixed by these rules. Rule 16, Section 1. Grounds.Within the time for pleading a
motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x
Section 4. Time to plead.If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is
deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11,
computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court
provides a diferent period.
Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had granted petitioners an extension of
fifteen (15) days to file their answer. Instead of filing the answer, petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint, one (1) day before the expiration of the period as extended by the court.
This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
Private respondents argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts the running of the
period within which to file an answer, this refers to the original period of fifteen (15) days within
which to file the responsive pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the
answer, is without merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or
indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period within which to file an
answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court,
refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time
to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if
the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his
answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the
denial or deferment, unless the court provides a diferent period.
This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his
answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within a diferent period (as)
fixed by the court.
Without resolving petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, respondent Judge declared
defendant in default in his Order. This is clearly in contravention of the Rules for under Section 3,
Rule 16, and the court after hearing may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of
pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground
alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. And it is only from the time that the movant
receives notice of the denial or deferment of the motion to dismiss that the period within which
he shall file his answer is computed, which period is prescribed by Rule 11, unless the court
provides a diferent period.

Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners were denied their day in court; there was lack of due process. Consequently, the
decision rendered by respondent Judge is null and void and must be set aside. The writ of
execution issued by respondent Judge and the levy made by the Sherif on the properties of the
petitioners and all orders and acts proceeding or emanating therefrom are hereby declared of no
legal force and efect.
Petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint must be resolved by the trial court and if the Motion
to Dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, petitioners shall file their answer
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Digest #16 (Rule 12 Bill of Particulars)
Martha Rose C. Serrano
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107,
and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
FACTS:
Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married in church rites on January 25, 1986.
A year later their union turned sour.
They separated in fact in 1988.
Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselitas psychological
incapacity.
The petition for annulment was filed in January 7, 1992 before the RTC of Quezon City.
The petition alleged that sometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of marriage although the same became
manifest only thereafter.
Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which
the trial court granted.

Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars and argued that the assertion in the
bill of particulars is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not
an averment of ultimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a
conclusion may be properly be inferred.
The trial court found the Bill of Particulars adequate and directed Joselita of file her
responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced and she filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
The SC referred the same to the Court of Appeals.
The CA denied due course to her petition.

It was the view of the CA that the specification more than satisfies the Rules requirement
that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting plaintifs cause of action.

Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion,
not an averment of facts, and fails to point out the specific essential marital obligations
she was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not
irrelevant to her husbands cause of action.

Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars
constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires.

ISSUE: Was the Bill of Particulars submitted by respondents of sufficient definiteness or

particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading.
HELD:
The Bill of Particular filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action and to
requirement more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary
matters.
A complaint only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintifs cause or causes of
action. Ultimate facts has been defined as those facts which the expected evidence will
support.
The Bill of Particular specified that *** at the time of marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in
that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a
verily qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and eforts sot that she frequently
complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused
petitioner to loss his job.
Consequently, the SC has no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the
annulment proceedings which have already been delayed for more than 2 years now, even
before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be
immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition
and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the
right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.
G.R. No. L-15808 April 23, 1963
FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband ULPIANO
PASION,
assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL, plaintifs-appellees,
vs.
BRUNO MERCADO and ANTONIO DASALLA, defendants-appellants.
This is an appeal by defendants Mercado and Dasalla from the CFI-Isabela on a question of law
FACTS:
Plaintifs Agcanas, et al, filed an action to recover portions of parcels of land in Isabela
against defendants Mercado and Dasalla
Defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars
Notice of hearing was made on 8 Dec. 1956
The CFI received the motion only on 12 Dec. 1956
The CFI set it for hearing on 22 Dec. 1956
17 Dec. 1956: defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and set the hearing thereof on 22 Dec.
1956
22 Dec. 1956: the court issued an order postponing 'consideration' of both motions to 29
Dec. 1956
7 Mar. 1957: the court denied the motion to dismiss; ordered the defendants to file an
Answer
Defendants failed to file an Answer; on motion of the plaintifs, the court issued an
order declaring defendants in default
Upon learning of the order of default, the defendants filed a motion asking that the court
set aside the order of default and resolve the motion for a bill of particulars
The court denied said motion; it explained that the defendants had "tacitly waived their
right to push through with the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars," because of
their failure to set it for hearing or to ask the clerk of court to calendar it after denial of

the motion to dismiss

The defendants filed a record of appeal before the Supreme Court
But because they subsequently filed a petition for relief from the judgment of default,
they asked that consideration and approval of the record on appeal be held in
abeyance until said petition had been resolved
The request was granted
The petition for relief was denied
The motion for reconsideration on such denial was also denied
Hence, this appeal

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in default
RULING:
YES
Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the time to file a
responsive pleading
In a situation where:
motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars are filed;
the resolution of the bill of particulars is held in abeyance; and
the motion to dismiss is denied,
the period to file an Answer remains suspended until the motion for a bill of particulars
is denied (or if it is granted, until the bill is served on the moving parties)
CAB:
The motion for a bill of particulars had yet to be resolved.
The defendants did not tacitly waive their right to the resolution thereof by failing
to set it for hearing since it was already set for hearing (22 Dec 1956, postponed to
29 Dec 1956)
Therefore, the period to file an Answer was still suspended.
Since said period was still suspended, their failure to file an Answer could not result in a
ground for default
Hence, the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in default
JOSE SANTOS, plaintif-appellant, vs.
LORENZO J. LIWAG, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
CFI

Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag seeking the annulment of certain
documents, attached to the complaint and marked as Annexes "A", "B", and "C", as having been
executed by means of misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and other
fraudulent means, as well as for damages and costs.

LiWAG moved for bill of particulars for him to prepare an intelligent and proper pleading
necessary and appropriate in the premises GRANTED with respect to the paragraphs specified in
defendant's motion", and when the plaintif failed to comply with the order, the court, acting
upon previous motion of the defendant, dismissed the complaint with costs
Hence, the present appeal.

RULLING: The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests
within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a
discretionary nature, unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly
erroneous order.
CASE AT BAR complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and sufers from vagueness and
generalization to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify
issues and aid the court In an orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.
The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit,
machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a conclusions In
his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the documents sought to be annulled were
all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations,
threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud, deceit,
machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it was proper for the trial court to
grant the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintif failed to comply with
the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint.