Hilario v Salvador; G.R. No. 160384.

April 29, 2005

Facts:
Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblon against herein, respondent, alleging
that as co-owners, they are entitled to possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon without their knowledge and refused to vacate the
property despite demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint, however,
failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners were able to present during trial the most recent tax declaration, which shows that the
assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00. The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the
value of the land. The motion was denied. Respondent then files an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the complaint, contending that petitioners had no
cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion MazoSalvador. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and
possession of real property and that absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action
(citing Sec.33 of RA 7691). The CA then ordered the refilling of the case in the proper court.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action?
Held:
No. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit. The jurisdiction of the court over an action
involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. In the case at bar, the complaint
does not contain allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of
land. The Court noted that during the trial , the petitioners adduced in evidence a tax declaration, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php 5,
950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their
complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 0 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
action of the petitioners, since the case involved to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than Php 20,000.00. As the CA had held:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7196 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the
provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds Php 20,000.00 and the MTC, if the value is Php 20,000.00 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax
declaration secued and presented by plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention
that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be
consulted and not other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is Php 5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC of
Romblon that has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo
Sampayang v CA; G.R. No. 156360; January 14, 2005
Facts:

Issue:
Held:

Santos v Ayon; G.R. No. 137013; May 6, 2005

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Ganila v CA; G.R. No. 150755; June 28, 2005

Facts:
Overview: Herrera filed ejectment complaints against Ganila et al with the MCTC. On appeal, Ganila et al questioned the jurisdiction of the MCTC. The SC ruled that
being a case for unlawful detainer, it was within the jurisdiction of the MCTC and that Ganila et al are barred from raising their opposition for the first time on appeal.

Issue:
Held:

Statement of the Case

Petition for review on certiorari
Statement of Facts
Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints alleging that she owns Lot 1227 of Jordan, Guimaras and that she tolerated Ganila et al (18 persons and the Baptist
Christian Learning Center) to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. When she asked Ganila et al to vacate,
they refused. Barangay conciliation failed; hence, she filed the complaints. 8 claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline. 8 maintained that their houses stood on
Lot 1229. 3 asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. Geodetic engineers surveyed the area and reported that all the houses were inside Lot 1227. MCTC rendered
decision in favor of Herrera and ordered Ganila et al to vacate. RTC dismissed the appeal and the CA affirmed the denial.
WON MCTC erred in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the case and WON RTC and CA erred in sustaining the MCTCs judgment? No
Rationale
Ganila et al insist that Herrera should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment because (1) they possessed Lot 1227 in
good faith for more than 30 years and (2) there was no withholding of possession since Herrera was not in prior possession of the lot. The SC agrees with Herrera that
there was no error in her choice of remedy. The complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the allegations of Ganila et al. Besides, Ganila et al have
admitted in their preliminary statement that the complaints filed are indeed for unlawful detainer, and that the only issue to be determined is mere physical possession
and not juridical possession.
While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In
unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession
of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. Also, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession
eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically
entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior
lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.
An unlawful detainer is different from a possessory action and from a reinvidicatory action in that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Aside from
the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvidicatoria or the action to recover ownership
which includes recovery of possession, make up three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. Herreras allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful
detainer: (1) she owns Lot 1227, (2) she tolerated Ganila et al to construct houses, (3) she withdrew her tolerance, and (4) Ganila et refused to heed her demand. The
suit was well-within the jurisdiction of MCTC. Besides, Ganila et al raised their opposition only for the first time in their appeal, they are now estopped from doing so.
Judgment:
petition is denied

Ross Rica Sales Center v Sps Ong; G.R. No. 132197; August 16, 2005
Facts:
In a Decision dated 6 January 1998, the Court of Appeals overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City,
ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid CA
Decision.
1. The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by RRSC & JKI against SPOUSES ONG, before the MTC of Mandaue City. In the complaint, RRSC & JKI alleged
the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468.
2.RRSC & JKI likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots previous to theirs.
3. 26Jan1995: Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote SPOUSES ONG informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to
vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But SPOUSES ONG allegedly refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots.

4. RRSC & JKI had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty
had acquired the properties from the SPOUSES ONG through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title
consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by SPOUSES ONG in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue
Prime Estate Realty. Per record, this case is still pending resolution.
5.MTC RULING: Ordering SPOUSES ONG to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to RRSC & JKI.
6. RTC RULING: affirming the MTCs decision in its entirety.
7.SPOUSES ONGs MR was denied. Hence, appeal to CA.
8.CA RULING: that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for
unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Issue:
Held:

9. Hence the present petition- RRSC & JKI then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
WON the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC?
YES, MTC/RTC HAD JURISDICTION
RATIO:
The presence of a contract is not a requisite for unlawful detainer case. The allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to
make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession
from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a
contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
In the subject complaint, RRSC & JKI alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance,
they have allowed SPOUSES ONG, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to SPOUSES ONG asking that the
latter vacate the said lots. SPOUSES ONG refused, thereby depriving RRSC & JKI of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an
unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.

Peralta-Labrador v Bugarin G.R. No. 165177; August 25, 2005

Facts:
On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales against
respondent Silverio Bugarin alleging the following:

She is the owner of the land, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto
and that she was issued Tax Declaration and paid the taxes due thereon.

DPWH constructed a road that traversed the land thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of petitioners lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration.

Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the OCT No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous
possession and occupation thereof since 1955; that MTC has no jurisdiction since the action has already prescribed.
In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted fruit
bearing trees in the property.

Issue:
Held:

The court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to
prove prior physical possession and ownership thereof. The RTC affirmed MTC. Hence, petitioner filed
petition for review before the Court of Appeals. CA denied petition for insufficiency of evidence to prove ownership or prior actual physical possession. MR likewise
denied. Hence, this petition.
Whether or not MTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription?
YES. MTC HAS NO JURISDICTION. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint, the cause of action for
forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure
of respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus,
we have nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of

possession had exceeded one year.

After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession
of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as
well as possession.
Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.
It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by
respondent. Petitioners complaint therefore should have been filed with the proper RTC.
Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should still be
dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastra Lot No. 2650. Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal of the
complaint is proper.
Serina v Caballero
Facts:
Sps Seria filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against Caballero and his tenants Sps. Donela (Cagayan de Oro City). P alleged
that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual possession for 35 years of a parcel of land. Sometime in 1982, they allegedly discovered that C was claiming
ownership over the land and offering it for sale or mortgage.
Issue:
Held:
In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also the identity
of the property claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. Boundaries set forth in complaint not the same as in the Deed of Sale
Perez v Mendoza
Facts:
Felisa Montalbo inherited land from her father, which she exchanged with that of her aunt, Andrea. After the exchange, A donated half the land to daughter Margarita.
Margarita and husband occupied the land continuously in the concept of owners. When Nicolas sought the transfer of property in their names, he submitted the deed of
exchange. Perezes then accused sps. Nicolas and Andrea of falsifying the deed of exchange
Issue:
Held:
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Perezes
dialed to prove ownership of land
Dizon v CA
Facts:
Galang spouses owned 2 lots, which they mortgaged. Their son Dionisio redeemed the lot in his own name despite that fact that the funds came from his 5 sisters. After
a cadastral survey of the lots, CFI ordered the issuance of OCTs solely in Dionisios name. the heirs of Ds sisters claim that the 6 Galang siblings partitioned the lots in
an unnotarized affidavit
Issue:
Held:
The properties belonged solely to Dionisio and not in co-ownership with his sisters. Dionisios ownership had been judicially confirmed by the CGI, which involved a proceeding
in rem and hence, binding on the whole world.
Moreover, the sisters objected only 61 years after the issuance of the OCT.
Alim v CA
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Limitatations
Churchill & Tait v Rafferty; G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a dual question one involving the power of the court to restrain by
injunction the collection of the tax in question and the other relating to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon
the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases latter aspect as correlated to the police power of the State.
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands
in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of

section 100 of Act No. 2339.

Issue:
Held:

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground
that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious
to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons. Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon
the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a
nuisance.
Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?
The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general
welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed.

Taxicab Operators v Board of Transportation; G.R. No. L-59234; September 30, 1982
Facts:

On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable
units are used by the public, to respond to complaints by metro manila residents regarding the old dilapidated taxis, to make the commuting public more
comfortable, have more convenience and safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus profits. no car beyond 6 years can still be
operated as taxi.

Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977 applied it to succeeding years just add one year to both dates. they had to surrender the
expired taxis plates to the BoT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15,
1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the phasing out of the taxis.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the
time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
Issue:
A.
Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B.
Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and
enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
Held:
The court here did not answer the queries directly they just dealt with the ff issues
1.
WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi operators were violated NO.
2.
WON their equal protection rights were violated NO.
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of
public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine
Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other
government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation
of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be
affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.

PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit position papers or to attend conferences regarding the assailed circ.

SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather data in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE
DONE FOR POLICY TO BE VALID the board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data.

PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set oppressive they want each taxi cab to be inspected regarding their condition WON it was still safe and
roadworthy despite age.

Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can open the door to multiple standards and corruption

Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on experience and based on cost and fair returns on the units

Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair

On Equal Protection of the Law:

PET allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry = violation of their equal protection rights

Court said NO. Circs of the same kind are also being implemented in other cities like Cebu and is also in the process of conducting the same studies and policy
formulations in other cities.

Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more constant use of the taxis in MM.

SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION the traffic conditions in the various cities

CONCLUSIONS:

Manila has more traffic which means that taxis in Metro Manila are more heavily used and more likely to deteriorate.

The public has a right to convenience, comfort and safety in their public commute.

The danger posed by the dilapidated and old taxis is a valid nuisance that the Board can abate through the circular that it passed.

Absent a clear showing of any repugnancy of the circular it is deemed valid.

Petition DISMISSED
Republic v Castellvi; G.R. No. L-20620; August 15, 1974
Facts:
1 July 1947 - Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) occupied the land situated in Floridablanca, Pampanga of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the
judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi since by virtue of a contract of lease.
30 June 1956 - Before the expiration of the contract of lease, the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused, intending to subdivide the lots for sale to
the general public; filed civil case for ejectment of AFP.
26 June 1959 In view of the difficulty for the army to vacate the premises due to permanent installations and other facilities, AFP filed expropriation proceedings and
was placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959.

In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the
Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare (P.20/sqm), or a total market value of P259,669.10 when AFP first had the taking of the said property by
virtue of the special lease agreement. Respondents allege that their lands are residential with a fair market value of not less than P15/sqm.

The trial court rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is
fair and just compensation
Issue:
1.

WON the taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the action

2.

WON the P10/sqm is fair and just compensation.

1.

The "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the
property as lessee. Elements B & E were not present when Republic entered the properties in 1947.

Held:

Elements/Requisites of taking of property for purposes of eminent domain:

A.

Expropriator must enter a private property.

B.

Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.

C.

Entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.

D.

Property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected.

E.

Utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

2.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959.

The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid should not be paid based on 1947 fair market value amount.

Basic guidelines in determining the value of the land to be expropriated:

Same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties.

Estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be
reasonably expected in the immediate future.

In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market.

We have arrived at the conclusion that the price of P10/sqm is quite high. The price of P5/sqm would be a fair valuation and would constitute a just compensation. We
considered the resolution of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, that in the year 1959 the lands could be sold for from P2.50P4/sqm, and the Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by
the Republic.

City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta; G.R. No. L-34915; June 24, 1983
Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6%
of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang
Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in
the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property?
Held:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would
amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate
will come forward and not the police power of the state.
Republic v PLDT; G.R. No. L-18841; January 27, 1969
Facts:
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual relations with e parties) entered into an agreement where telephone messages,
coming from the US and received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice versa.
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private
parties. One of the many rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use.
Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service where the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls
received by the RCA's station to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or
the general public. PLDT gave a notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -which PLDT did.

Issue:
Held:

Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the
Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court finds it reasonable.
Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff?
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't
of the Phil.
When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in
nature.
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes,
implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone
systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally
sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public.

U.S. v Causby; 328 U.S. 256; May 27,1946

Facts:
Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used regularly by the United States military.
According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe
that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth.
Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the
government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Claims accepted
Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation.
Issue:
Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Held:
Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern
world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also
ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without
defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the

government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation. (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert H. Jackson took no part
in the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)
Lunod v Meneses; G.R. No. 4223; August 19, 1908
Facts:

14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, et.al., alleging that they each owned and possessed farm and, situated in the places known as Maytunas and Balot, near a
small lake named Calalaran; that the defendant Higino Meneses, is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on
one side, and the River Taliptip on the other; that from time immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there existed and still
exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of water o'er the said land in Paraanan, which easement the said
plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the
(Taliptip River. From thatyear however, the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a dam and
a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through said place into the Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded
and damaged by the stagnant waters,

They therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring that the
s a i d tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of water from the property of the plaintiffs,

Meneses denied each and everyone of the allegations of the complaint, and alleged that no
statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of the lands described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that he, together
with his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were stated by him, and which he and his brothers had inherited from their
deceased mother.
Issue:
Held:
Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th of March, 1907, entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision
in their favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the
barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy the obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the strip of land in $araanan
R a t i o : It appears to have been clearly proven in this case that the lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as well as the small adjoining lake,
named Calalaran, are located in places relatively higher than the sitio called Paraanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant are situated, and which border
on the Taliptip River; that during the rainy season the rain water which falls on he land of the plaintiffs, and which flows toward the small Calalaran Lake at flood time,
has no outlet to the Taliptip River other than through the low land of Paraanan: that the border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has existed from time
immemorial a dam, constructed by the community for the purpose of preventing the salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land in
Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of Paraanan
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the
realty in favor of which the easement isestablished is called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate. The lands of Paraanan being the lower
are subject to the easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not
constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in
the altitude of the lands in the Barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil Code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they
carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this easement, nor the one of the higher estate works increasing the burden.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural easements relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands together with the stone or earth,
which they carry with them.
The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the strict and
necessary obligation to respect the statutory easement of waters charged upon his property, and had no right to close the passage and outlet of the waters flowing
from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estates by obstructing the outlet
to the Taliptip River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the plaintiffs.