[G.R. No. 52159. December 22, 1989.

be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the wilful acts of strangers, as in the

JOSE PILAPIL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION

instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection

COMPANY, INC.,

of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

FACTS: Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus

Petitioner has charged respondent carrier of negligence on the ground that the injury complained

bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While said

of could have been prevented by the common carrier if something like mesh-work grills had

bus No. 409 was in due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga City, upon

covered the windows of its bus. We do not agree. Although the suggested precaution could have

reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to

prevented the injury complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to

Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone at the left

require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard

side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye. Private respondent's personnel lost no time

against unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or

in bringing the petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and

maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier

treated.

uses cars of the most approved type, in general use by others engaged in the same occupation,
and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot

Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr. Malabanan of

be charged with negligence in this respect.

Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since there was no improvement in his left

[G.R. No. 119756. March 18, 1999.]

eye's vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated by Dr.

FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U. CAORONG, and minor

Capulong. Despite the treatment accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left

children

eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
FACTS: On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in
Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I an

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney,

action for recovery of damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident.

including two Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary
Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner

RTC: company liable for damages

of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos

CA: reversed judgment; company not liable for damages

were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao rendered
a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of the Philippine Constabulary Regional

Petitioner argues that the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the

Headquarters at Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt. Bastasa he went to see Diosdado

assumption of certain risks, and the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to

Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, at its main office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured

petitioner-passenger is one such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from

him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken.

liability.
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be
ISSUE: WoN the common carrier should be held liable for failing to exercise the required

passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City.

diligence required by law

Among the passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as
one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of

HELD: The presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable

the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the

presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either that the carrier had

steering wheel. Then one of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the

exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due

bus, as the other held the passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the

to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no

passengers to get off the bus. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus

way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the

and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway.

negligent or willful acts of private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the

However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. At that

injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or

time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had

even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not

meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare

and ought not to be held liable.

the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The armed
men were, however, adamant as they repeated their warning that they were going to burn the bus

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport

along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan

of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however,

climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the

make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Article 1755 of the Civil Code

highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that

qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by

Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able to pull

common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What constitutes

Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City,

compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances. Article 1756 of

but he died while undergoing operation.

the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier
when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing

RTC: Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit

evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place of

CA: Reversed RTCs decision

evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common
carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its

ISSUE: WoN the common carrier was negligent

contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous
event. In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress

HELD: Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries

to curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their

suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the

business. Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation

common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good

company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries

father of a family.

sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence
that the law requires.

In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the
seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the

Common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their

Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on

passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined

the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager,

when intervening acts of strangers directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage exists.

Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect

Article 1763 governs: "Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a

the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have

passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the

failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the

common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family

circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as

could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." Clearly under the above provision, a tort

frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as

committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of

metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the

action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the

passenger's constitutional rights.

negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the
same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to

The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the

(2) These are no longer justiciable questions which would justify our issuing the peremptory writ

bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that

prayed for. The first is a question of fact on which the affirmative finding of respondent court is not

the intended targets of the violence were petitioner and its employee, not its passengers. The

reviewable by Us; and the second is one as to which there can be no possible doubt in view of the

assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision

provisions of the Civil Code and of the Motor Vehicle Law hereinbefore cited. There would be no

between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo,

point in giving the appeal due course.

the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as
they intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve

[G.R. No. L-34597. November 5, 1982.]

something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the

ROSITO Z. BACARRO, WILLIAM SEVILLA, and FELARIO MONTEFALCON, vs. GERUNDIO

bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act

B. CASTAO, and the COURT OF APPEALS

cannot be considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.

FACTS: In the afternoon of April 1, 1960, he (appellee) boarded the said jeep as a paying
[G.R. No. L-19161. April 29, 1966.]

passenger at Oroquieta bound for Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. It was then filled to capacity, with

MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, vs. MACARIA BALLESTEROS, TIMOTEO CAMAYO, JOSE

twelve (12) passengers in all. 'The jeep was running quite fast and the jeep while approaching the

REYES and JULIAN MAIMBAN, JR.,

(Sumasap) bridge there was a cargo truck which blew its horn for a right of way. The jeep gave
way but did not change speed. . . . When the jeep gave way it turned in the right and continued

FACTS: The material facts, as found by respondent court in its decision, are as follows: Private

running with the same speed. In so doing . . . the driver was not able to return the jeep to the

respondents here, plaintiffs below, were passengers on petitioner's bus, the driver of which was

proper place . . . instead, it ran obliquely towards the canal; that is why, we fell to the ditch. . . .

Jose Anastacio. In Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Anastacio stopped the bus and got off to replace

When the jeep was running in the side of the road for few meters, naturally, the jeep was already

a defective spark plug. While he was thus engaged, one Dionisio Abello, an auditor assigned to

inclined and two passengers beside me were the ones who pushed me. I was pushed by the two

defendant company by the General Auditing Office, took the wheel and told the driver to sit

passengers beside me; that is why, when I was clinging, my leg and half of my body were outside

somewhere else. With Abello driving, the bus proceeded on its way, from time to time stopping to

the jeep when it reached the canal . . . My right leg was sandwiched by the body of the jeep and

pick up passengers. Anastacio tried twice to take the wheel back but Abello would not relinquish

the right side of the ditch. . . . My right leg was broken.' He was rushed to the Saint Mary's

it. Then, in the language of the trial court, "while the bus was negotiating between Km. posts 328

Hospital where he stayed for about two (2) months. 'My right leg is now shorter by one and one-

and 329 (in Isabela) a freight truck . . . driven by Marcial Nocum . . . bound for Manila, was also

half inches causing me to use specially made shoes. . . . I could not squat for a long time; I could

negotiating the same place; when these two vehicles were about to meet at the bend of the road,

not kneel for a long time; and I could not even sit for a long time because I will suffer cramp. . . .

Marcial Nocum, in trying to evade several holes on the right lane, where his truck was running,

With my three fingers I am still uneasy with my three fingers in my right hand. There is a feeling of

swerved his truck towards the middle part of the road and in so doing, the left front fender and left

numbness with my three fingers even right now.'

side of the freight truck smashed the left side of the bus resulting in extensive damages to the
body of the bus and injuries to seventeen of its passengers, . . . including the plaintiffs herein."

"From appellee's version just set out, it appears that after he boarded the jeep in question at
Oroquieta, it was driven by defendant Montefalcon at around forty (40) kilometers per hour bound

RTC Manila: Dionisio Abello "was likewise reckless when he was driving the bus at the rate of

for Jimenez; that while approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a cargo truck coming

from 40 to 50 kilometers per hour on a bumpy road at the moment of the collision."

from behind blew its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep; that the latter, without
changing its speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such that both vehicles ran side by side for

Another defense put up by petitioner is that since Abello was not its employee it should not be

a distance of around twenty (20) meters, and that thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver

held responsible for his acts. This defense was correctly overruled by the trial court, considering

was unable to return it to its former lane.

the provisions of Article 1763 of the Civil Code and section 48 (b) of the Motor Vehicle Law, which
respectively provide as follows:

"Throwing the blame for this accident on the driver of the cargo truck, appellants, in turn, state the
main defense of defendants-appellants is anchored on the fact that the jeepney was sideswiped

ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of

by the overtaking cargo truck.

the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented

ISSUE: (1) WoN there was contributory negligence

or stopped the act or omission.

(2) WoN it exculpates the common carrier from liability

Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to drive the motor

HELD: (1) YES! There is contributory negligence on the part of jeepney driver appellant

vehicle under his control, or permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part of the car, to

Montefalcon for having raced with the overtaking cargo truck to the bridge instead of slackening

interfere with him in the operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the

its speed. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead

steering wheel, or in any other manner take part in the manipulation or control of the car.

continued to run the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking
cargo truck was running side by side for about twenty (20) meters and at which time he even

It appears further, and so the trial court found, that there were negotiations between the parties to

shouted to the driver of the truck. Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the

compromise the case, as a result of which respondents herein, plaintiffs below, considerably

time the truck was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would

reduced their claims to the amounts subsequently awarded in the judgment; that petitioner had in

have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was running,

fact settled the claims of the other passengers who were also injured in the same accident and

the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck would

even the claim for damages filed in another action by the owner of the freight truck; and that the

be too close to the jeep and would eventually sideswipe it. Otherwise stated, he should have

Government Corporate Counsel himself, who represents herein petitioner, rendered two separate

slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck because the two

opinions (Op. No. 86, May 19, 1960; and Op. No. 99, series of 1961) wherein, after analyzing the

vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time.

facts and the law applicable, he reached the conclusion that the acts of the bus personnel,
particularly "in allowing Mr. Abello to drive despite two occasions when the bus stopped and the

The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure on the part of the jeepney driver to

regular driver could have taken over, constitute reckless imprudence and wanton injurious conduct

exercise extra ordinary diligence, human care, foresight and utmost diligence of a very cautious

on the part of the MRR employees." On the basis of those opinions, the Government Corporate

person, when the diligence required pursuant to Article 1763 of the Civil Code is only that of a

Counsel advised petitioner that the offer of the claimants was reasonable and should be

good father of a family. Petitioners contend that the proximate cause of the accident was the

accepted. His advice, however, was not favorably acted upon, petitioner obviously preferring to

negligence of the driver of the truck. However, the fact is, there was a contract of carriage

litigate.

between the private respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of

ISSUE: (1) WoN Dionisio Abello acted with reckless negligence while driving petitioner's bus at

extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon. Indeed, the hazards of modern

the time of the accident

transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest.

(2) WoN petitioner may be held liable on account of such negligence, considering that he was not

Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a

its employee

common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide "using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a

HELD:

passenger in the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier

(1) A common carrier is liable for injuries suffered by its passengers due to the willful acts or

and driver are presumed to be at fault.

negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or

(2) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon respondent court in not freeing

omission.

petitioners from any liability, since the accident was due to a fortuitous event. But, We repeat that
the alleged fortuitous event in this case the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was

something which could have been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge

SARKIES TOURS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

which was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon
contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.

FACTS: On August 31, 1984, Fatima Fortades boarded petitioner's De Luxe Bus No. 5 in Manila
on her way to Legazpi City. Her brother Raul helped her load three pieces of luggage containing

[G.R. No. 85691. July 31, 1990.]

all of her optometry review books, materials and equipment, trial lenses, trial contact lenses,

BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO RIVERA, vs. THE HONORABLE

passport and visa, as well as her mother Marisol's U.S. immigration (green) card, among other

COURT OF APPEALS

important documents and personal belongings. Her belongings were kept in the baggage
compartment of the bus, but during a stopover at Daet, it was discovered that only one bag

FACTS: On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by

remained in the open compartment. The others, including Fatima's things, were missing and

Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of passengers

might have dropped along the way. Some of the passengers suggested retracing the route of the

Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.

bus to try to recover the lost items, but the driver ignored them and proceeded to Legazpi City.

The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City
passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger; that

Fatima immediately reported the loss to her mother who, in turn, went to petitioner's office in

about fifteen (15) minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier

Legazpi City and later at its head office in Manila. Petitioner, however, merely offered her

which caused commotion and panic among the passengers; that when the bus stopped,

P1,000.00 for each piece of luggage lost, which she turned down. After returning to Bicol,

passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former

disappointed but not defeated, mother and daughter asked assistance from the radio stations and

already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which

even from Philtranco bus drivers who plied the same route on August 31st. The effort paid off

caused her death later. The passenger-assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes

when one of Fatima's bags was recovered. Marisol further reported the incident to the National

but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornomino Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private

Bureau of Investigation's field office in Legazpi City and to the local police.

respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents of Ornominio while Teofilo
Rautraut and Zoetera [should be Zotera] Rautraut are the parents of Narcisa) filed a complaint for

On September 20, 1984, respondents, through counsel, formally demanded satisfaction of their

"sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay, and the driver

complaint from petitioner. In a letter dated October 1, 1984, the latter apologized for the delay and

Rivera.

said that "(a) team has been sent out to Bicol for the purpose of recovering or at least getting the

Petitioners alleged that ". . . the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their

full detail" of the incident.

respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the
bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and conductor and the

After more than nine months of fruitless waiting, respondents decided to file the case below to

defendants in this case; the defendant corporation had exercised due diligence in the choice of its

recover the value of the remaining lost items, as well as moral and exemplary damages,

employees to avoid as much as possible accidents; The petitioners also argue that they are not

attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. They claimed that the loss was due to petitioner's

insurers of their passengers as ruled by the trial court.

failure to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of Fatima's luggage and that petitioner dealt
with them in bad faith from the start. Petitioner, on the other hand, disowned any liability for the

RTC Butuan: dismissed the complaint

loss on the ground that Fatima allegedly did not declare any excess baggage upon boarding its

CA: Reversed and set aside court a quos decision

bus.

ISSUE: (1) WoN the death of the passengers was caused by force majeure

RTC: Sarkies held liable to pay damages

(2) WoN the common carrier exercised the required diligence set by the law

CA: affirmed the trial court's judgment

ISSUE: WoN common carrier must be held liable

HELD: (1) YES! There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to

HELD: YES! Under the Civil Code, "common carriers, from the nature of their business and for

carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost

reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the

diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

goods . . . transported by them," and this liability "lasts from the time the goods are

In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to

unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the

petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused

same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to . . . the person who has a right to

their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express,

receive them," unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof.

Inc. is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary
diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

The cause of the loss in the case at bar was petitioner's negligence in not ensuring that the doors

Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut on its posture that the

of the baggage compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care,

death of the said passengers was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and

almost all of the luggage was lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.

supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence
under the law, states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and

Where the common carrier accepted its passenger's baggage for transportation and even had it

Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not

placed in the vehicle by its own employee, its failure to collect the freight charge is the common

have any control.

carrier's own lookout. It is responsible for the consequent loss of the baggage. In the instant case,

The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a

defendant appellant's employee even helped Fatima Minerva Fortades and her brother load the

commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole

luggages/baggages in the bus' baggage compartment, without asking that they be weighed,

exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut

declared, receipted or paid for. Neither was this required of the other passengers.

causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
the bus is within the context of force majeure.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 13, 1993, and its

However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it

resolution dated February 19, 1993, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that

is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove

petitioner is ordered to pay respondents an additional P20,000.00 as moral damages and

that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.

P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

(2) NO! Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals the bus driver did not
immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop;
the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running;
the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the
bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law it is clear that the petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing
common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no

[G.R. No. 118664. August 7, 1998.]

merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were

JAPAN AIRLINES, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary

FACTS: On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in

diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law.

San Francisco, California bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents
Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for

[G.R. No. 108897. October 2, 1997.]

Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for traveling on the said airline, both flights were

to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines' expense, thereafter proceeding to
Manila the following day.

The Court, however, did not completely absolved JAL from any liability. While JAL was no longer
required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita, Japan on

Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko

account of fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport

Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the

private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its

airport to take their flight to Manila However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall

obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private

blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic.

respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers"

Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.

[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000.]
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound

VICENTE CALALAS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and

passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses

FRANCISCO SALVA,

for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the private
respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite

FACTS: At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G.

closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray their

Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a

hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.

passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled
to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a

Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were

wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.

16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived

As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as

in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.

she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a

Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an

fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin."

action for damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. To

Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under

support their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide

sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her

care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and

attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a

accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other words, they

cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.

insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in
Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of

vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to " force majeure."

the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a

RTC of QC: rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents holding JAL liable for damages

common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,

CA: affirmed the trial court's finding

the owner of the Isuzu truck.

ISSUE: WoN JAL should shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its passengers until they have

RTC Dumaguete: against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding

reached their final destination even if the delay were caused by force majeure

that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident.
CA: the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was

HELD: NO! A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other

based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise

contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest.

the diligence required under the Civil Code.

Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care and diligence

Petitioner: the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability

renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to

and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its

say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the same

passengers.

were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense or " force majeure"
as an exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.

ISSUE: WoN common carrier should be held liable

Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of

HELD: YES! It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the

"force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-

truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in

performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the

actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for

effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal

imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a

expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that

case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation

JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15,

between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the

1991.

law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned,
some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common

Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for

carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases

the private respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their

of death or injury to passengers.

unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL
but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once

negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is

arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence

too much of a burden to assume.

in the care of his passengers.

Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of

First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion

travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the

being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle

perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect.

of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, or the Land

After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.

Transportation and Traffic Code.

If the fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carrier's employees,

Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating

an action for damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for private respondents,

capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law.

none of these conditions are present in the instant petition.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June

which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome

21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would

the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the

be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight operations would be

evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.

normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make
the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila.

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension

After all, it had a contract to transport private respondents from the United States to Manila as

seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many

their final destination.

victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those

passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true

It must be noted that the weight submitted by private respondent Concepcion appearing at the

of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked

left-hand portion of Exhibit 8 as an addendum to the original enumeration of equipment to be

constitutes caso fortuito. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with

shipped was entered into the bill of lading by petitioner, thru Pacifico Fernandez, a company

its body protruding two meters into the highway.

collector, without seeing the equipment to be shipped. Mr. Mariano Gupana, assistant traffic
manager of petitioner, confirmed in his testimony that the company never checked the information

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED

entered in the bill of lading. Worse, the weight of the payloader as entered in the bill of lading was
assumed to be correct by Mr. Felix Pisang, Chief Officer of MV Cebu.

[G.R. No. L-31379. August 29, 1988.]

The weights stated in a bill of lading are prima facie evidence of the amount received and the fact

COMPANIA MARITIMA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE CONCEPCION,

that the weighing was done by another will not relieve the common carrier where it accepted such
weight and entered it on the bill of lading. Besides, common carriers can protect themselves

FACTS: Private respondent Vicente E. Concepcion, a civil engineer doing business under the

against mistakes in the bill of lading as to weight by exercising diligence before issuing the same.

name and style of Consolidated Construction with office address at Room 412, Don Santiago
Bldg., Taft Avenue, Manila, had a contract with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)

Private respondent's act of furnishing petitioner with an inaccurate weight of the payloader upon

sometime in 1964 for the construction of the airport in Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental.

being asked by petitioner's collector, cannot be used by said petitioner as an excuse to avoid
liability for the damage caused, as the same could have been avoided had petitioner utilized the

Being a Manila-based contractor, Vicente E. Concepcion had to ship his construction equipment

"jumbo" lifting apparatus which has a capacity of lifting 20 to 25 tons of heavy cargoes.

to Cagayan de Oro City. Having shipped some of his equipment through petitioner and having
settled the balance of P2,628.77 with respect to said shipment, Concepcion negotiated anew with

However, while the act of private respondent in furnishing petitioner with an inaccurate weight of

petitioner, thru its collector, Pacifico Fernandez, on August 28, 1964 for the shipment to Cagayan

the payloader cannot successfully be used as an excuse by petitioner to avoid liability to the

de Oro City of one (1) unit payloader, four (4) units 6x6 Reo trucks and two (2) pieces of water

damage thus caused, said act constitutes a contributory circumstance to the damage caused on

tanks. He was issued Bill of Lading 113 on the same date upon delivery of the equipment at the

the payloader, which mitigates the liability for damages of petitioner in accordance with Article

Manila North Harbor.

1741 of the Civil Code.

These equipment were loaded aboard the MV Cebu in its Voyage No. 316, which left Manila on

We find equitable the conclusion of the Court of Appeals reducing the recoverable amount of

August 30, 1964 and arrived at Cagayan de Oro City in the afternoon of September 1, 1964. The

damages by 20% or 1/5 of the value of the payloader and thereby reducing the recoverable

Reo trucks and water tanks were safely unloaded within a few hours after arrival, but while the

amount at 80% or 4/5 of P34,000.00 or the sum of P27,200.00.

payloader was about two (2) meters above the pier in the course of unloading, the swivel pin of
the heel block of the port block of Hatch No. 2 gave way, causing the payloader to fall. The
payloader was damaged and was thereafter taken to petitioner's compound in Cagayan de Oro
City.
On September 7, 1964, Consolidated Construction, thru Vicente E. Concepcion, wrote Compania
Maritima to demand a replacement of the payloader which it was considering as a complete loss
because of the extent of damage. Consolidated Construction likewise notified petitioner of its
claim for damages. Unable to elicit response, the demand was repeated in a letter dated October

[G.R. No. 29462. March 7, 1929.]

2, 1964.

IGNACIO DEL PRADO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., defendant-appellant.

Meanwhile, petitioner shipped the payloader to Manila where it was weighed at the San Miguel

FACTS: The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the

Corporation. Finding that the payloader weighed 7.5 tons and not 2.5 tons as declared in the Bill

City of Manila for the conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of November 18, 1925, one

of Lading, petitioner denied the claim for damages of Consolidated Construction in its letter dated

Teodorico Florenciano, as appellant's motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from east to

October 7, 1964, contending that had Vicente E. Concepcion declared the actual weight of the

west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the accident being at a point near the intersection of said

payloader, damage to their ship as well as to his payloader could have been prevented.

street and Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and
letting off passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed

To replace the damaged payloader, Consolidated Construction in the meantime bought a new one

under the guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance, however,

at P45,000.00 from Bormaheco, Inc. on December 3, 1964, and on July 6, 1965, Vicente E.

when the plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being

Concepcion filed an action for damages against petitioner with the then Court of First Instance of

made from the left. The car was of the kind having entrance and exit at either end, and the

Manila.

movement of the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the
moment when the car was passing.

CFI Manila: dismissed the complaint stating that the proximate cause of the fall of the payloader
was Vicente E. Concepcion's act or omission in having misrepresented the weight of the

The testimony of the plaintiff and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to show that the

payloader

plaintiff, upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire
to board the car, in response to which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping. Upon this

CA: reversed CFIs decision

the plaintiff seized, with his left hand, the front perpendicular handpost, at the same time placing
his left foot upon the platform. However, before the plaintiff's position had become secure, and

Petitioner

claims

absolute

exemption

because

private

respondents

act

constitutes

misrepresentation within the meaning of "act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods".

even before his raised right foot had reached the platform, the motorman applied the power, with
the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward. This sudden impulse to the car caused the
plaintiff's foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost. He therefore fell to the

ISSUE: WoN the act of private respondent Vicente E. Concepcion in furnishing petitioner

ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day the member

Compaia Maritima with an inaccurate weight was the proximate and only cause of the damage

had to be amputated in the hospital. Trial Court found out that the motorman slowed up slightly as

as would absolutely exempt petitioner from liability for damages

the plaintiff was boarding the car and that the plaintiff's fall was due in part at least to a sudden
forward movement at the moment when the plaintiff put his foot on the platform.

HELD: NO! The representation was only contributory and NOT the proximate cause of the loss.

Motorman: he did not see the plaintiff attempting to board the car; he in fact knew nothing of the

The petitioner, upon the testimonies of its own crew, failed to take the necessary and adequate

incident until after the plaintiff had been hurt and someone called to him to stop.

precautions for avoiding damage to, or destruction of, the payloader entrusted to it for safe
carriage and delivery to Cagayan de Oro City, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the damage

CFI Manila: awarded damages

caused to the payloader was due to the alleged misrepresentation of private respondent
Concepcion as to the correct and accurate weight of the payloader. As found by the respondent

ISSUE: (1) WoN Manila Electric Company should be held liable for damages

Court of Appeals, the fact is that petitioner used a 5-ton capacity lifting apparatus to lift and

(2) Was there contributory negligence

unload a visibly heavy cargo like a payloader. Private respondent has, likewise, sufficiently
established the laxity and carelessness of petitioner's crew in their methods of ascertaining the

HELD: YES! There is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let

weight of heavy cargoes offered for shipment before loading and unloading them, as is customary

on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless,

among careful persons.

although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do

no act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board
the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.

HELD: YES! The negligence of the carrier is the proximate cause. There is no contributory
negligence on the part of the plantiff. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad

The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature;

company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above

and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a

stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they

breach of duty (culpa contractual) under articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code.

therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It

Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons

necessarily follow s that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned

boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.

unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.

(2) YES! It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not

The only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that the plaintiff was guilty of

the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of

contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the

appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must

condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation

be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view,

thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact

but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will

that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and

increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the platform.

as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers

Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded

facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some

the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the

circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have

proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical

already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the

with that which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance

defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility

with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be

conceded that it had a right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of

shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided

them in that position gave rise to the duty to light the premises adequately so that their presence

the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. The negligence of the plaintiff was,

would be revealed.

however, contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the
Appealed judgment is modified by reducing the recovery to the sum of P2,500, the judgment, as

following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level

thus modified, is affirmed.

higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the
car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus

[G.R. No. 12191. October 14, 1918.]

reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,

JOSE CANGCO, vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even

FACTS: Jose Cangco, was in the employment of the Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of

surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of

clerk. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line

young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving

of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city

as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of

of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride

contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted

upon the company's trains free of charge.

prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.

On January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the

Women, it has been observed, as a general rule, are less capable than men of alighting with

train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car

safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement

where he was riding and, making his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the

of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was

coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.

his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty
in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the

On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement

character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff

platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's

in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by

office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of

imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuniga, also an
employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the
platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther
the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack
of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the
platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where
his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the
train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is
found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had
been brought to the station for shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous tow
sacks which had been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that
this row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks
of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the
fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform.
[G.R. No. L-55347. October 4, 1985.]
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition. His arm was amputated.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another

ROSARIO TUPANG

hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher
up near the shoulder.

FACTS: On September 10, 1972, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Winifredo Tupang,
husband of plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines

CFI Manila: plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was

Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped

therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant

at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its

company

trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell
off the train resulting in his death. The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other

ISSUE: WoN Manila Railroad Company should be held liable

passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor, Perfecto Abrazado,

called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information.
Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless

The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe

body of Winifredo Tupang.

extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives
rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract

"As shown by the autopsy report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure due to

of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow

massive cerebral hemorrhage due to traumatic injury [Exhibits B and C, Folder of Exhibits].

such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.

Tupang was later buried in the public cemetery of Lucena City by the local police authorities."
(2) YES! The deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the
CFI Rizal: held petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage

open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on
the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train.

CA: sustained the holding of the trial court

Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified
the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of

ISSUE: (1) WoN PNR is liable

exemplary damages must be set aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where

(2) WoN there was contributory negligence

the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There
being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant of exemplary

HELD: (1) YES! The train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so overcrowded that
he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the
coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it
approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time. Neither did the train stop, despite
the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at Iyam Bridge.

damages should be discarded.