"The Chambir of My Thought" - Self and Conduct in An Early Islamic Ethical Treatise - Khan

The Chambir of My Thought: Self and Conduct in an Early Islamic Ethical Treatise
Author(s): Ruqayya Yasmine Khan

Source: History of Religions, Vol. 49, No. 1 (August 2009), pp. 27-47
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Ruqayya Yasmine Khan
TH E C H A M B I R OF
M Y T H O UG H T : S E L F
A N D C O N D UC T I N A N
E A R LY I S L A M I C
E T H I C A L T R E AT I S E
introduction1
Elliot R. Wolfson has observed that religions almost universally exemplify something of the phenomenon of secrecy even though the precise
contours of the phenomenon will vary from one society to the other.2
The phenomenon of secrecy is exceedingly important in the religion of
Islam and yet it has not merited the examination that it deserves. Indeed,
there exists a powerful psychology, phenomenology, ethics, and aesthetics
of the secret in classical Islamic civilization. The secret is an important
element in Quranic eschatology, Shiite theology and practice, Arabic love
literature, and Islamic mysticism. Various scholars have penned articles
on the signicance of secrecy in one or another discourse; for example,
1
A. C. Spearing, in his study of medieval European narratives, uses the phrase the
chambir of my thought in the context of a discussion of private, inner life: the thoughts and
feelings, perhaps betrayed only eetingly and ambiguously by glances or lowered eyes,
blushing or turning pale, that are otherwise the most secret realm of allthe chambir of my
thought as a late-medieval poet puts it. Spearing goes on to note: There must be some connection, though its precise nature is hard to specify, between these two kinds of privacythe
existence of objectively private space and the cultivation of a subjective realm of individual
being. What is clear is that the inner life begins to assume greater interest and importance in
secular narratives from the twelfth century on (A. C. Spearing, The Medieval Poet as Voyeur:
Looking and Listening in Medieval Love Narratives [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993], 21).
2
Elliot Wolfson, ed., Rending the Veil: Concealment and Secrecy in the History of Religions (New York: Seven Bridges, 1999), 12.
2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

0018-2710/2009/4901-0002$10.00

28
The Chambir of My Thought
Annemarie Schimmel and William Chittick have written about secrecy in

Islamic mysticism, Etan Kohlberg has dealt with secrecy in Shiism, and
Jean-Claude Vadet has addressed the topic with regard to Arabic love
poetry.
In this article, I seek to examine the psychological signicance of the
secret in what broadly may be termed Islamic ethics, and I pursue this
through a discussion and analysis of a ninth-century Arabic work entitled
Kitab Kitman al-Sirr wa-Hifz al-Lisan (Book of concealing the secret and
holding the tongue; henceforth referred to as simply Kitman) by the eminent early Abbasid belletrist writer and Mutazili theologian known as
al-Jahiz (c. 776868 CE).3 Kitman is the locus classicus on human secrets
and secrecy in classical Arabic literature.4 A sixty-page treatise, Kitman
partakes in a trajectory within classical Arabic belles lettres that concerns
itself with examining manners, morals, and character. References are also
made in this article to several other works by al-Jahiz that address the
subject of human secrecy and discretion, among them Kitab al-Bayan
wa-l-Tabyin (Book of eloquence and exposition) and Tafdil al-Nutq ala
al-Samt (Virtues of speech over silence).5
Kitman examines the topic of the secrets of an individual self rather
than the subject of secrets of a group or collective practices of secrecy.
What is noteworthy about the discussion of the secret in Kitman is that
far more importance is assigned to the psychological state of keeping
secrets than to the nature of the content of the secretin other words, the
issue of a human inclination toward secrecy is more important than the
issue of what the secret is. This is so because, according to our ninthcentury author, human beings have a psychological propensity to keep/
3
Abi Uthman Amr b. Bahr b. Mahbub al-Kinani al-Basri, known as al-Jahiz. The most
comprehensive Western studies of al-Jahiz remain those by the French scholar Charles Pellat. See Pellat, Al-Jahiz, in Abbasid Belles-Lettres, ed. Julia Ashtiany and A. F. L. Beeston
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 7895. More recent comprehensive studies
of al-Jahiz are those authored by James Montgomery, including Al-Jahizs Kitab al-Bayan
wa-l-Tabyin, in Writing and Representation in Medieval Islam: Muslim Horizons, ed. Julia
Bray (New York: Routledge, 2006), and al-Jahiz, in Dictionary of Literary Biography,
vol. 311: Arabic Literary Culture, 500925, ed. Michael Cooperson and Shawkat M.
Toorawa (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2005), 23142.
4
I have closely consulted the Arabic text of the treatise; however, all the translations of
excerpts from al-Jahizs Kitman are (with occasional and minor modications on my part for
greater accuracy) from Nine Essays of al-Jahiz, trans. William Hutchins (New York: P. Lang,
1989). See al-Jahiz, Kitab Kitman al-sirr wa Hifz al-Lisan, in Majmu Rasail al-Jahiz, ed.
P. Kraus and M. T. al-Hajiri (Cairo: Lajnat al-Talif wa-al-Tarjamat wa-al-Nashr, 1943), and
Keeping Secrets and Holding the Tongue, in Hutchins, Nine Essays of al-Jahiz, 1332.
5 See al-Jahiz, Kitab al-Bayan wa-l-Tabyin (Book of eloquence and exposition), vol. 1, ed.
A. Muhammad Harun (Cairo: Matabat Lajnat al-Talif wa al-Tarjama wa al-Nashr, 1948),
and Tafdil al-Nutq ala al-Samt (Virtues of speech over silence) in Majmuat al-Rasail: Ithna
asharah risala, ed. Muhammad al-Sasi al-Maghribi (Cairo: Matbaat al-Taqaddum, 1906).

History of Religions
29
reveal secrets, and he demonstrates how this propensity is intimately

connected with processes of consolidating self and identity. Indeed, for
both our classical writer al-Jahiz and modern scholar Wolfson, secrecy and
revelation are essential to the very constitution of human subjectivity.
Wolfson observes that
the centrality of the secret in the phenomenology of religious experience should
come as no surprise given the importance of secrecy in the human condition.
Of the various traits that distinguish humans from other sentient beings, dissimulation is certainly one of the most obvious examples. Indeed, to dissimulate
is basic to the human way of being: we are who we are primarily because we
are not who we profess to be. The masks by which our lives are constructed are
multiple, and it is precisely through the obscurity of these masks that we are
rendered transparent. In this regard, the sphere of religion is not distinct. On the
contrary, the repeated emphasis on the category of the mystery in the religious
domain is an extension of the more general emphasis on concealment that is so
essential to our disclosure in the realm of intersubjectivity.6
self and secrecy in the broader islamic context

Secrecy is vital to Quranic concepts of human selfhood and subjectivity.
The Quran sets forth two main ideas in this regard: that self (nafs) and
subjectivity are constituted through acts of concealment and revelation,
and that this self which reveals and conceals is an embodied self. In the
Quran, God is the knower of all that is hidden and concealed (al-khabir,
the all-aware,7 al-bair, the all-seeing, and al-shahid, the all-attesting).8
Hence, God is the knower par excellence of all human secrets. This
recognition that one is always watched, observed, heard, and known by
God implies individual moral and ethical accountability. Fazlur Rahman
conveys this belowthat it is not just cognition (i.e., that one is known
by God), but that there is divine judgment involved: Gods presence is
not merely cognitive, for His condition entails other consequencesmost
importantly, judgment upon cumulative human activity. This is the meaning of the frequent Quranic reminders that God is ever wakeful, watching,
witnessing, and, so far as societies are concerned, He is sitting in a watch
tower (89:14) and no atom in the heavens or the earth ever escapes His
6
Wolfson, Rending the Veil, 2.

Derivations from the verbal root, kh-b-r, to discern, be aware, are often found in conjunction with or in place of the aforementioned verbal derivation of to know. See Hanna E.
Kassis, The Divine Name, sec. 1, 5253, and The Remaining Vocabulary of the Quran,
sect. 2, 67879, in her A Concordance of the Quran (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983).
8
The Ninety-Nine Divine Names or Attributes of God, known in Arabic as al-asma alhusna, the Beautiful Names of God. Consult Quran 17:110: Say: Call on God or on the
Mercifulwhatever names you call him, his are the most beautiful names.
7

30
notice (10:61; 34:3).9 These ideas regarding human secrecy and revelation also have a bearing on Quranic eschatology. The Quran emphasizes the secret and hidden nature of eschatological events; these are Gods
secrets. But another theme concerns the secrets of all creation, especially
human secrets, and it emphasizes how during the eschatological drama
all such secrets will be revealed, even bodily revealed, and yielded to
God. Up until the hour and Day of Judgment, secrecy reigns, but once it
dawns, the Day of Judgment is the day of Revelation par excellence.
Rahman has pointed out that, according to the Quran, on the Day of Last
Judgment, all the interior of man will become transparent.10 In 86:89,
the Quran proclaims: Surely, [God] is able to return him [to life] / On
the day that secrets will be tested.
Islamic mysticism or Susm magnies these links between secrecy and
notions regarding individual accountability and moral character. In Susm,
the cultivation of an ideal moral and ethical self that exercises modes of
self-censorship is of the utmost importance. Furthermore, it privileges
the interior self as being determinative of the external self s expression
and conduct. This sheds light on why the psychospiritual development of
the inner or interior self (al-bain) is rendered critical.11 This process of
renement of the self is often conceptualized in terms of secrecy and transparency, secrecy and revelation: for example, removing the veils of the
self 12 or polishing the mirror (i.e., the mental, spiritual and mystical
states) of the self. Not surprisingly, the Sus drew upon the Quranic
symbolism of the secret in the articulation of their metaphysical doctrines
and psychological theories.13
9
Fuzlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Quran (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994),
3738.
10
Ibid., 116.
11
This stress upon al-bain in the psychology of Susm is especially evident in the thought
and output of the early mystic al-Muhasibi (who would have been a contemporary of al-Jahiz).
He discusses how the actions of the members [or limbs] (amal al-jawarih), the outward
conduct, are under the ultimate control of the heart, which may direct them towards evil or
good. See Margaret Smith, An Early Mystic of Baghdad: A Study of the Life and Teaching
of Harith B. Asad al-Muhasibi, A.D. 781A.D. 857 (New York: AMS, 1973), 87. But then he
also draws attention to the actions of the heart (amal al-qulub), including the motives and
sources of the outward actions, the cognitive, emotional and volitional processes, the exercise of the virtues and vices, the reception of the psychological states (ah wal) and the attainment of the mystic stations (maqamat) (ibid).
12
William C. Chittick, The Paradox of the Veil in Susm, in Wolfson, Rending the Veil,
6569. The self is considered to be veiled in this life. Chittick analyzes the rich symbolism
of the veil in Islamic mysticism.
13
As S. Kamada observes, because the words sirr and khaf i (akhfa) in the Quran seem
to refer to something secret or to hidden aspects of human consciousness, Sus have incorporated them in their theories of the inner subtleties (lataif ), a type of religious psychology
that analyzes the structure of human inward consciousness (Encyclopedia of the Quran,
vol. 4, s.v. secrets). Shigeru Kamada, the author of this entry, states that many Sus and
mystic philosophers locate sirr at the deepest dimension in the human consciousness, where
they realize enlightenment with a divine encounter (57273).

31
Indeed, diverse Arabo-Islamic discourses (ethics, paedia, scripture)

identify secrecy as a marker of the self. One could argue that Quranic
constructions of the self have strong implications for understanding representations of self and subjectivity in early Islamic ethics and Arabic
love literature. Early Arabic love literature also emphasizes the role and
function of the secret in its representations of the self and self-other relations. The very rhetorical qualities of this poetry are signicantly enhanced
by the paradoxes associated with notions of self, body, and sexuality. It is
precisely to this enhancement that the critic Andras Hamori alludes when,
in discussing the Arabic love poetry of the courtly al-Abbas b. al-Ahnaf,
he observes: The secret no doubt has social realities behind it, but it is
also an element in the rhetoric of paradox in love poetry; providing for
contrast between inside and outside, feeling and behavior.14
It is my contention that this idea or concept of the secret15 essentially
functions as a powerful vehicle with which and through which to study
and analyze conceptions of the premodern self, subjectivity, consciousness, and interpersonal relations. A discussion and analysis of the secret
in Kitman, therefore, offers us an important and exciting window into premodern notions regarding the inner workings of the human personality.
Moreover, the elucidation of premodern notions of self and identity in
classical Arabo-Islamic discourses possibly has relevance for understanding current, important concepts of self and other, interpersonal relations,
and private and public in modern Arab/Islamic cultures.
My examination of the idea or concept of the secret has been inuenced
by theories and approaches from modern scholars of sociology, religion,
and psychoanalysis, including Elliot Wolfson (to whom I have already
referred), Georg Simmel, Sissela Bok, and Sigmund Freud. Throughout my
research and writing of this article, the shuttling back and forth between
the early Arabic and modern Western contexts has been and continues to
be a dialogic process, sometimes inspired and mandated by the exigencies
of my primary texts, and at other times, instigated by insights and claims
made by Western critics studying the subject of secrecyinsights and
claims that resonate richly with the content of my own material.
14
Andras Hamori, Love Poetry (Ghazal), in Ashtiany and Beeston, Abbasid BellesLettres, 21314.
15
The phrase concept of the secret is borrowed from the psychoanalyst Alfred Gross,
who employed it in an article titled The Secret (trans. George Devereux, Gisela Ebert, and
Joseph Noshpitz, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic 2 [1951]: 3744). In it, Gross differentiates the function of a secret from its content: By contrast, the secret, once surrendered, is
lost only insofar as its content is concerned. The vessel which contained it endures, ready to
be lled with new content. We see then that in the study of the concept of the secret, one
must differentiate between content and function; the hidden content of a secret is something
different from the psychological state of possessing a secret (38).

32
al-jahiz: his life and milieu

The author of Kitman, al-Jahiz, was born in 776 CE in Basra; his family
appears to have had African blood, especially on his fathers side. His
father died soon after his birth and, with the help of his mother, he attended
Quranic schooling in Basra; he had no access to any kind of formal training beyond this. He frequented the mosque as well as study and debate
circles, and he had the chance to hobnob with afuent and educated circles
(with whom he read voraciously, especially translations of Greek and
Persian Pahlavi texts). In Basra of the eighth century, there were lively
daily discussions among intellectuals over matters such as What school
of theology was best and why? and Could faith and reason be harmonized? A rationalist school of theology called Mutazilism held sway in
the Islamic world at this time. Although the reigning Abbasid caliphs
supported this school, it still was meeting with strong resistance in other
parts of the Islamic world.
Charles Pellat notes that al-Jahiz had two elds of activity: theology/
politics and belles lettres or adab.16 Al-Jahiz earned a living through his
writing, and a number of his early writings were designed to legitimate
the Abbasid caliphate or to justify important government measures.17 It
seems that al-Jahiz acted as an adviser to and apologist for the government, and he received handsome gratuities from the Abbasid ofcials for
books dedicated to them. He was not an intimate of the caliphs, but he
maintained close ties with the vizier and some relatives of the caliphs.18
He was also known to have close contacts with some of the leading
Mutazili gures of the city. Already around the age of forty, he was
being rewarded well by the Caliph al-Mamun. Around 816 CE, he
settled in Baghdad, where he stayed for a long time, but he eventually
retired to Basra and died there circa 868 CE.
As for his output, al-Jahizs range of subjects was remarkable. Over
200 authentic works are attributed to him, but only two dozen have survived intact. His major works are considered to be Kitab al-Hayawan
(Book of animals), Kitab al-Bayan wa-l-Tabyin or (Book of eloquence and
exposition), and Kitab al-Bukhala (Book of misers)all of these have
been preserved intact.
Before delving into Kitman, it is vital to address several elements in
this Baghdadi context, including the Shubiyya controversy and Abbasid
court culture, which profoundly inuenced his views on language and
expression. These views, in turn, had an impact on his ideas regarding
16
17
18
Pellat, Al-Jahiz, 83.

Ibid., 80.
Ibid.
One Line Short

33
secrecy and revelation in Kitman.19 Al-Jahizs views of language (more

precisely, the Arabic language) were powerfully shaped by the Shubiyya
debate that pitted Arabs against those with non-Arab (mainly Persian)
backgrounds in the jockeying for power and privilege in the early Abbasid
Empire. As Wen-Chin Ouyang points out, the complex processes of
assimilation and acculturation were relevant to these power struggles:
Having lived in Baghdad for the latter half of his life, [al-Jahiz] was in
touch with the thorny issues generated by the assimilation processes of
Arab and non-Arab elements into Arabic-Islamic society, and the negotiations in the emerging Arabic-Islamic culture involving whether to assimilate or reject Greek, Persian, pre-Islamic Arabic and other inuences.20
Al-Jahiz fashioned his religious beliefs regarding the relation of the
Arabic language to the Quran in the context of this Shuubi controversy.
Indeed, two of his major worksnamely Kitab al-Hayawan and Kitab
al-Bayan wa-l-Tabyin21were in part written in response to the Shuubi
attack on the literary and cultural heritage of the Arabs.22 In effect, he
chose to defend the Arab position. According to al-Jahiz, the Arabic language was unequalled in its linguistic richness and wealth, and its potential
for rhetorical eloquence was unmatched by any other language.23 Because
of the eloquence of Arabic and the beauty of its expression, God sent His
best prophet amongst the Arabs, made his language Arabic and even revealed an Arabic Quran.24
No doubt al-Jahizs views of the Arabic language and expression
arising from the Shuubi controversy only served to enhance his belief in
the power of the spoken Arabic word. As Ouyang observes regarding alJahizs position: Defending Arabs and their language by ascribing bayan
[eloquence] to them involves far-reaching consequences, for bayan is the
literary quality attributed to the Quran, denoting its inimitability.25 For
al-Jahiz, among these consequences was the development of a distinctly
19
It is somewhat difcult to assess how his Mutazilite afliation and background informed his ideas regarding secrecy in Kitman. Sufce it to note that the Mutazilite views of
the created Quran and that the Quran contained metaphorical language (the Mutazilites
maintained that scriptural phrases such as the throne of God or the face of God were not
to be literally interpreted) would have exerted an inuence on his ideas; certainly the latter
view suggests that he would have readily accepted the tropological qualities of language.
20
Wen-Chin Ouyang, Literary Criticism in Medieval Arabic-Islamic Culture (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 1023.
21
The third major work of his is Kitab al-Bukhala.
22
Ouyang, Literary Criticism, 103.
23
Jamal El Attar, Al-Jahizs View of Arabic in Relation to the Quran, in Democracy in
the Middle East: Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the British Society of Middle
Eastern Studies, July 810, 1992, University of St. Andrews, Scotland (Exeter: BRISMES,
1992), 26.
24
El-Attar quoting (and translating) al-Jahiz, 7.
25
Ouyang, Literary Criticism, 103.

34
theological cast to his theories and conceptions of speech, expression,

rhetoric, and signication. Embedded in al-Jahizs views is the recognition
that while human Arabic speech can never mimic Gods Arabic speech
(which is uniquely perfect and inimitable), it can and must be imbued
with a religiously sanctied aura26 that demands its users approximate
the superiority in eloquence and communication found in the Quran.
al-jahiz: his psychology and ethics
It would be misleading, however, to assume that al-Jahizs theory of bayan
demonstrates a narrowly theologically based dimension in his views on
Arabic language and expression. In fact, in conjunction with his interest
in signication and communication, al-Jahiz shows a deep engagement
with psychology and ethics. He persistently draws attention to the role and
function of the unconscious, consciousness, and interpersonal communication. A topic consistently addressed by al-Jahiz in his writings is human
public self-presentation, and certainly his interest in the subject of bayan
(eloquence) as analyzed in the Kitab al-Bayan wa-l-Tabyin (Book of eloquence and exposition) reects this. The art of bayan, as envisioned by alJahiz, aims at an aesthetics of the selfs public presentation that combines
psychospiritual elements with an elite-based elegance of expression.
In his Kitab al-Bayan wa-l-Tabyin, al-Jahiz quotes a number of sayings
that foreground the interconnections of spirituality, elite high culture, and
enlightenment with bayan as the use of the spoken word. These sayings
are found in chapters entitled Bab al-Balagha and Bab al-Bayan:27
The intellect is the scout of the soul, knowledge is the scout of the intellect and
explication [al-bayan] is the interpreter of knowledge.
They said: The life of chivalry is truth, the life of the spirit is chastity, the life
of forbearance is knowledge and the life of knowledge is eloquence [al-bayan].
A logician said: The goal of a human being is an eloquently, expressive life.
For al-Jahiz, the clarity of ones eloquence and expression ultimately

is connected with character and soula connection in which is discerned
an aspect of the more ethical conception of concealment of the secret,
or kitman al-sirr. We shall see that one of the primary meanings of kitman
26
Montgomery, al-Jahiz, 238. As spelled out by Montgomery: A central feature of the
bayan is the reciprocity of its function: communication is given by God to man in the form
of the Arabic Quran (indeed God refers to the Quran as the Bayan on three occasions), and
man must show appropriate gratitude to God by proper use of this gift (ibid).
27
Translations are mine. All sayings from al-Jahiz, Kitab al-Bayan wa-l-Tabyin.

35
al-sirr, as formulated by al-Jahiz, is the use of disciplined, right or proper

speech. From the aforementioned sayings, it is evident that he adds the
quality of renement to this idea of right, and proper speechan aspect
that sheds more light on the meanings of bayan as eloquence. We now
shift our focus to the treatise Kitman, in which al-Jahiz lays out an analytical conception of the workings of human secrecy and revelation.
context and audience of kitman
Kitman is a fairly structured and coherent piece. An almost modern tone
characterizes the manner in which al-Jahiz frames his inquiries and analyzes issues. For although the topic of secrecy was not a new one during
his time (it appears to be a standard topic in early Arabo-Islamic encyclopedias and dictionaries), his treatment of it is distinguished by a probing,
investigative approach. Al-Jahiz did not merely transmit existing ideas
and traditions regarding the concept of the secretthe stamp of his own
individual genius is present throughout the treatise. Kitman is both descriptive and prescriptive; al-Jahiz not only describes and analyzes secrecy
in the treatise, he also offers counsel and guidelines on how to practice
discretion.
While it is likely that part of the audience intended for the treatise was
those scholars contributing to discussions of the superiority of the Arabic
language, including those following the Shuubiyya controversy and
debate, al-Jahizs views of speech and expression were also shaped by
the milieu of ninth-century Abbasid court culture. Kitmans immediate
audience was the Abbasid court, especially its court functionaries. These
court functionaries included its secretaries, scribes, chamberlains, and
viziers. 28 Discretion, as understood within Abbasid courtly culture,
undoubtedly colors his discussion of secrets and secrecy in Kitman. This
is not surprising given that, as Pellat has pointed out, he acted as an
advisor and apologist for the [Abbasid] government.29 Issues of discretion, tact, and diplomacy loomed large in the daily tasks and dealings
of royal court ofcials such as the viziers, as they did for the court secretaries, or kuttab, who composed and wrote the court correspondence.
But it would be a mistake to reduce this treatise to merely a discourse
on ethics in the court. Al-Jahizs analysis of the secret and secrecy had
to have an appeal to a general audience. Al-Jahiz is keenly interested in
issues of conduct, morality, and ethics. In Kitman and as we have seen
28
Therefore, to some extent, this treatise on secrecy and discretion likely elicited the same
audience as his possibly apocryphal Kitab al-Hijab on the ofce of the chamberlain (hajib)
and his now lost work Kitab Akhlaq al-Wuzara (Book on the morals of viziers), a manual of
conduct for viziers.
29
Ibid., 80.

36
in his well-known work Kitab al-Bayan (Book of eloquence), he views

the clarity of individual eloquence and expression as ultimately a function of character and moral self-worth. Hence, one would think that the
strain of his belles lettres (adab) trajectory that dealt with, in Pellats
words, the study of manners and morals, analyzing character and emotion and building up pictures of entire social groups characterized by
some particular moral or psychological feature, generated a wide readership.30 A number of al-Jahizs writings are devoted to analyses of human
traits and emotions (e.g., on arrogance, enmity, and anger), examinations
of conduct (e.g., on keeping promises), and portrayals of character types
(e.g., misers). His treatise Kitman falls squarely in this strain of adab trajectorya trajectory that joins a larger one within classical Arabic belles
lettres as a whole. Pellat remarks that he was dubbed the teacher of reason
and polite learning, or muallim al-aql wa-l-adab, by some early writers
and that for al-Jahiz, adab was indeed a process of building up a new
culture in which reection, doubt, observation, and even experiment were
involved.31
It should also be pointed out that his treatise on secrecy is broadly representative of the prevailing ideas regarding the subject in diverse genres
of classical Arabic literature. In other words, Kitman encapsulates alreadycirculating ideas and elements specic to the concept of the secret
ideas circulating in various kinds of writings and not just those aimed for
a court audience. And while I have used the word encapsulates, al-Jahiz
did not, as just mentioned, simplistically convey existing material regarding the concept of the secret but rather innovatively probed its meanings
and functions.
the secret (sirr): precious internal property
We begin with a seemingly obvious assumption that al-Jahiz makes: the
assumption that the human self keeps secrets. Al-Jahiz is not explicitly
concerned with dening what a secret is. Yet an initial comment by him
regarding where secrets may be found sheds light on how he denes them:
The heart is a treasury [which guards] thoughts and secrets. It gathers [its
contents] from the good and bad of the senses and from what cravings
and desires generate as well as what wisdom and knowledge produce.32
According to the lexica, the Arabic word for heart, qalb, also means
soul, mind and intellect.33 The richness of this words semantics is
reected in the heterogeneity of the hearts contents alluded to in the
30
Ibid., 94.
Ibid.
al-Jahiz, Kitab Kitman al-Sirr, 39, and Keeping Secrets and Holding the Tongue, 14.
33
Ibn Manzur al-Ifriqi al-Misri, Lisan al-Arab, 15 vols. (Beirut: Dar Sadir/Dar Bayrut,
1956), s.v. q-l-b.
31
32

37
aforementioned denition. Evidently, al-Jahiz here is tapping into a longstanding use of the word in other Islamic discourses, including the
Quranic and mystical discourses. Certainly, in the Quran, we nd the
word qalb (heart)as well as its pluralemployed as metaphors for
hidden human recesses:34 And God knows all that is in your hearts
[qulubikum] and God is all-knowing and most forbearing (33:51). Moreover, the very word for self, nafs (plural anfus), can be employed
interchangeably with the word qalb in the Quran.35 Islamic mysticism
powerfully developed the idea that the locus of the self or nafs was
the qalb (heart) and that embedded within the qalb was the sirr (secret).
This is conveyed by the following passage, which quotes the noted
French scholar of Islam, Louis Massignon, on the subject: The seat of
thought and awareness of self lay not in the brain but in the heart, a
bodily organ . . . a morsel of esh . . . situated in the hollow of the breast
whose beats both gave life and indicated the presence of life. There in
the heart lies the secret and hidden (sirr) home of the conscience, whose
secrets (nadjwa) will be revealed on Judgment Day.36 As we shall see
shortly, al-Jahizs employment of the word qalb to indicate selfhood is
signicant and apt, given his emphasis upon the idea of ownership of the
secret.
This aforementioned denition of secrecy is intrapsychic, and it posits
secrets as a form of precious internal property. Hence, it is also signicant that the word khizana or treasury is used to describe the heart: it is
a treasure chest, that is, a storehouse that guards contents, and furthermore
this treasury is itself guarded within the cavity of the bodys breast or the
rib cage. The use of this word to describe the heart has strong implications for understanding the point that it is not so much the nature of the
secrets content, but that it is possessed and guarded that matters. Though
the heart may contain negative content (e.g., al-Jahiz mentions the good
and bad of the senses),37 the psychological value of this content is high
because it is guarded and owned by the self. Georg Simmel sheds light
on the link between ownership and valuation in this denition of secrets:
In the rst place, the strongly emphasized exclusion of all outsiders makes
for a correspondingly strong feeling of possession. For many individuals,
property does not fully gain its signicance with mere ownership, but
only with the consciousness that others must do without it. . . . Moreover
34
Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung
(Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964) also has pointed out that
qalb, as used in the Quran, should be understood as an inward psychological and mental
capacity.
35
Consult Quran 2:235, 5:52, 5:117, 11:31, and 33:37.
36
Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed., vol. 4 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), s.v. kalb.
37
al-Jahiz, Kitab Kitman al-Sirr, 39.

38
since the others are excluded from the possessionparticularly when it

is very valuablethe converse suggests itself psychologically, namely,
that what is denied to many must have special value.38
Ownership is central to this denition of the secret as precious inner
property. Not just al-Jahizs employment of the words qalb and khizana,
but also his use of terms such as master/owner of the secret (aib
al-sirr) or possessor of secret (malik li-sirrihi) corroborate this idea
of ownership of the secret.39 A certain value inheres in the possession of
this internal property (irrespective of the nature of its contents). In other
words, the selfs containment and guarding of this possession are processes
that impart a sense of selfhood. Keeping the secret therefore augments
the core self, and, by contrast, the loss of the secret depletes this core self.
It is no coincidence that some of the vocabulary employed by al-Jahiz to
describe concealment and revelation is borrowed from the language of
valuation and economics. For example, the verb istawdaa, which means
to entrust or deposit a trust with someone, to give something valuable to
someone for safekeeping, is used by al-Jahiz to describe the disclosure
of a secret to a trusted condant.40
Al-Jahiz implies that the contents of the heart are abstract and latent:
thoughts and secrets. Just how heterogeneous this inner psychological
property is can be glimpsed through his observation concerning the
gathering or sifting function of the heart: secrets are culled by the heart
from what it sifts through of the senses, desires, and faculties of the intellect; in other words, secrets are culled from sensations, feelings and
affects, impulses, thoughts, impressions, ideas, dreams, and memories.41
No distinctions are made between unconscious forms of secrecy (e.g.,
memories, repressed content, forgotten material, and dreams) and conscious forms (e.g., a secret one deliberately keeps) in this denition. Indeed, it could be said that while, for modern theorists, the difference
between unconscious and conscious secrets is deemed important, for our
classical theorist, a distinction of equivalent importance is that between
ones own secrets and others secrets.
the secret (sirr): an interpersonal definition
Toward the end of his work, al-Jahiz conveys a second denition of sirr
(the secret). Concerns with morality (ikhlaq) as well as ethics and virtues
( fud5 u l ) predominate in this denition. All talk (adith), except what
is pointless, is talk about people (dhikr al-nas), idle gossip, coarse and
38
Georg Simmel, The Secret and Secret Society, in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed.
Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950), 332.
39
40
Ibid., 44.
41
Ibid., 39.
One Line Long

39
unseemly talk, delirium and raving, backbiting, slander and reproach. One
of the sages said to his son, My son, man is nothing but talk, so if you
can, be good talk. Every secret on earth is nothing but a report (khabar)
about a person or something concealed from a person.42 Secrets are linked
with interpersonal modes of communication (primarily speech-related). In
this denition, secrecys connections with discourse, gossip, and slander
on the one hand, and with defamation of character on the other hand, are
rendered prominent. That a secret is dened as a report assumes it already
has been told and publicized to someone and simultaneously concealed
from someone. Secrets consist of information (about a persons character)
that is put into circulation in the public sphere (i.e., it is traded, shared,
withheld, etc.). Al-Jahiz maintains that people love to talk about and publicize things; fondness for the giving and seeking of information is an
aspect of human nature (maabbat al-ikhbar wal-istikhbar).43 According
to him, this give-and-take between people degenerates frequently into
negative talk about individuals: it turns into gossip, chitchat, slander,
hearsay, faultnding, backbiting, and so forth. Such negative talk hinges
upon the premise of an injured third party; as implied by al-Jahiz, at its
most basic, gossip or slander or chitchat about others is a shared secret
between two persons that is concealed from a third.
Of signicance is al-Jahizs use of the Arabic term khabar (report) to
dene a secret. This oft-discussed termand it is a formal term especially
important in Arabic literary and historical discourseshas a wide range
of meanings and functions: rst and foremost, it is something disclosed and
rendered public; second, it often is something reported (i.e., it is a form
of hearsay); third, its mode of transmission may be oral and/or written. As
far as content is concerned, it may consist of a news item, biographical/
historical content, or anecdotal/informational tidbit. Al-Jahizs use of this
Arabic term to dene a secret sheds light on how the idea of secrecy has
links with the genre of biography (a genre for which the term khabar is
crucial). As commented upon by Michael Cooperson in his study entitled
Classical Arabic Biography, when secrets are reported (i.e., scandals)
in a biographical account, an air of accuracy accrues to the account: By
reporting secrets, biography assumes an air of veracity . . . [and therefore] . . . commands interest, and exudes authority because it offers (or
purports to offer) insights into character and disposition that were missing from annalistic history.44
42
Again, I have closely consulted the Arabic text of the treatise throughout this article.
However, all the translations of excerpts from al-Jahizs Kitman are (with occasional and
minor modications on my part for greater accuracy) from Hutchins, Nine Essays of al-Jahiz.
See al-Jahiz, Kitab Kitman al-Sirr, 52, and Keeping Secrets and Holding the Tongue, 25.
43
44
Michael Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography: The Heirs of the Prophets in the Age
of al-Mamun (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 23.

40
Yet another passage in Kitman presents a third denition of secrecy

that highlights the contentual signicance of a secret. In it, al-Jahiz briey
raises the issue of group secrets or collective practices of secrecy as
opposed to those of the individual self. He offers a tentative typology
partly based on the identity and social status of the owners and purveyors
of the secret: he refers to religious secrets (sirr al-adiyan), royal political
secrets (sirr al-muluk), and interpersonal secrets between kin and friends.
For example, religious secrets should be guarded against the victory of
passion over the soul and against the hatred of people for each other
occasioned by difference and opposition, alliance and enmity. Royal
secrets about deceptions aimed at kings enemies, concealed desires and
veiled plans [are at risk] as are the secrets of the high and mighty. . . .
Then there are the enmities of brothers. Enmity which follows affection
is stronger because of the friends knowledge of his secrets and count of
his vices.45 In a somewhat similar typology set forth by Sissela Bok in
her work on secrecy, it is stated that several . . . strands have joined with
this . . . [dening trait of intentional concealment, or hiding] . . . to form
our concept of secrecy. Although they are not always present in every
secret or every practice of secrecy, the concepts of sacredness, intimacy,
privacy, silence, prohibition, furtiveness, and deception inuence the way
we think about secrecy.46 These conceptswhich may overlap, intertwine, and even conictoffer a range of the kinds of content a secret
may hold.
In addition, al-Jahiz implies that context is important in dening secrecy.
Secrets may be found in an elegant report, a distinguished sermon, in
what is mysterious and unknown, and in the infamous and motley.47 This
observation concerns modes of revelation as much as modes of concealment: secrets can be concealed/revealed in and through writing (e.g.,
scrolls), spoken public words and signs, as well as codes.
concealment of the secret (kitma@ n al-sirr)
Having discussed the denitions of sirr, or the secret, we now turn to the
process of keeping or concealing the secret (kitman al-sirr). Paradoxically, it is through a consideration of how al-Jahiz denes revelation of
the secret that we arrive at a better understanding of what it means to
conceal a secret. In al-Jahizs view, revelation primarily occurs through
the spoken word. While he does bring up other aspects of the total being
of a person that can reveal secrets (e.g., body gestures, shifts in mood,
and excesses in expression such as excessive laughter and hilarity), he
45
Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 6.
47
46
One Line Long

41
treats them briey. Overwhelmingly, speech is the mode of revelation on

which he focuses, and, as pointed out earlier, this emphasis must to some
extent be shaped by his deep interest in and examinations of theories of
signication, rhetoric, and poetics in his other writings. Furthermore, the
complexity of the relation this emphasis on the spoken word must have
had to the religious context at hand (i.e., a nascent Islam), in which Arabic
speech is the divine revelation par excellence, deserves separate inquiry.
We will rst address what he has to say regarding speech as a mode of
revelation and then take up the issue of nonverbal modes of revelation.
speech, silence, and modes of revelation
Al-Jahiz is ambivalent about the value and importance of human

speech. On the one hand, he proclaims that all evils of the world began
with a word [kalima] which slipped out and brought protracted war.48
On the other hand, he deems speech to be one of Gods great gifts and
substantial blessings but a gift that has been misused by human beings.49
A godly way to use speech would be to use it in his remembrance
and service.50 And in another work entitled Tafdil al-Nutq ala al-Samt
(Virtues of speech over silence), he declares: You cannot convey gratitude to God, you cannot show it except through speech.51 Divine speech
or the verses of the Quran also summon human beings to use their speech
in this manner; for instance, the Quranic verse 93:11 proclaims: And
[of ] the bounty of thy Lord, speak.
Al-Jahiz does not argue that speech, because it can reveal secrets, is
therefore harmful. Again, in Virtues of Speech over Silence, he lauds the
efcacy of the spoken word, remarking that only through the tongue can
you express your needs and declare your aims, and moreover, you can
describe silence with words, while you cannot do the converse.52 Furthermore, he notes that were silence more preferable . . . the superiority . . .
[of ] human beings over other [creatures] would not be recognized.53
Hence, according to al-Jahiz, silence is not superior to speech. But, if not
so much in Kitman, elsewhere he does recognize the merits of silence in
certain interpersonal contexts. In fact, al-Jahiz demonstrates great interest
in how one should optimally and discreetly present oneself in a public
context, and he indicates that the meanings of silence and its relation to
secrecy can be an integral part of relations between self and other. Consider his comments on the use of silence in the following interpersonal
48
49
50
51
52
53
Ibid.
al-Jahiz, Tafdil al-Nutq ala al-Samt, 136.
Ibid.
Ibid.

42
context: Or it may chance that people are talking casually on some topic
about which you know as much or more than they, all vying with one
another to display their knowledge. If then you join in the context, you
become merely one of them. If however you keep silent, they will press
you to speak; you will appear to be doing them a favour by giving your
opinion, and they will listen more attentively to you than to any of the
others.54 Al-Jahiz suggests that interpersonal uses of silence (here it being
the withholding of information or knowledge) can allow one a sense of
authority. These observations on the presentation of the self hint at the
relation between secrecy and power.55 As Bok has pointed out, to realize
that one has the power to remain silent is linked to the understanding that
one can exert some control over eventsthat one need not be entirely
transparent, entirely predictable,56 or, as al-Jahiz above describes it, one
need not be indistinguishable from the rest of humanity.
However, keeping a secret is not just a matter of being silent before
others or of suspending speech in a given context. Rather, keeping the
secret is a function of a continuous process of mental sifting and discrimination, and this process yields selective speechselective in all the manifold ways: selective in what is said, how it is said, how much is said, to
whom it is said, when it is said, and why it is said. These processes of
sifting, self-censorship, and discrimination are vital to how concealment
and revelation of the secret are dened in Kitman. Indeed, a self that exercises discrimination and reserve with regard to the entirety of the speaking experience is practicing concealment of the secret, or kitman al-sirr.
Again, Boks perceptive assertion that at the heart of secrecy lies discrimination of some form, since its essence is sifting, setting apart, drawing
lines resonates powerfully with this conceptualization of kitman al-sirr.57
Furthermore, according to al-Jahiz, concealing the secret is a form of
discretion that involves speaking only at the right occasion (wad alqawl ). This seemingly simple observation is critical. At the very least, it
means that one must choose the right words for whatever occasion of
54
Charles Pellat, The Life and Works of Jahiz (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1969), 203.
55
Simmel too has discussed how pretending to keep secret something about oneself
before others can have an adorning quality. He also sheds light on how interpersonal uses of
secrecy can be deployed as a public relations gimmick when he maintains that for the
average man, all superior persons and all superior achievements have something mysterious. . . . From secrecy, which shades all that is profound and signicant, grows the typical
error according to which everything mysterious is something important and essential
(Simmel, The Secret and Secret Society, 333).
56
Bok, Secrets, 38. Elsewhere, Bok remarks: To be able to hold back some information
about oneself or to channel it and thus inuence how one is seen by others gives power. . . .
To have no capacity for secrecy is to be out of control over how others see one; it leaves one
open to coercion (ibid., 19).
57
Ibid., 11.

43
which one is a part. Or it may mean that one must choose the right occasion
for whatever words one, at a given time, is moved or inclined to utter.
More injurious than the impact of wrongful speech on others is its impact
on the self. Speech cumulatively molds and shapes character. Character
and speech are intimately related to each other. As al-Jahiz relates in the
aforementioned interpersonal denition of secret (sirr): One of the sages
said to his son, My son, man is nothing but talk, so if you can, be good
talk. As he would have it, ethical Islam is based as much on orthodicta
(right speech) as it is on orthopraxy or orthodoxy. The very title of Kitman
links secrecy with the spoken word, and al-Jahiz begins and ends his work
with this link. His opening foray into the subject is: The two matters for
which we chide you are: speaking at the wrong occasion and forfeiting a
secret by broadcasting it.58 The expression wad al-qawl fi ghayr maudi
literally can be translated as: placing speech inappropriately. Improper
and inappropriate placing of speech, that is to say, speaking the wrong
words at a given occasion, is equivalent to forfeiting or revealing the secret.
Behind this equivalence is a conception of the ethical and moral self as
being constituted through modes of primarily verbal self-containment and
disciplinemodes that entail processes central to maintaining secrecy,
that is, the processes of sifting and discrimination. Al-Jahiz concludes his
work by declaring: From this and the similar things we have previously
mentioned in the Book we need only remember to preserve the secret and
weigh the utterance.59
Kitman al-sirr, or concealment of the secret, therefore consists of
speaking purposefully and with discrimination. A number of expressions
al-Jahiz employs are suggestive of an economic valuation of speech in
which, again, ideas of ownership and possession play an important role.
Speech is a precious property of the self (as is the secret; recall his assertion that secrets are guarded by the treasury of the heart). Speaking is
a form of expending the self. There is speech that is well spent, and
there is speech that is misspent; if the latter, one may be a spendthrift or
a miser in ones misuse of speech. Speech that is to the point is speech
that is well conserved and well guarded (read: the secret well kept). Conversely, speech uttered without prior reection and discrimination is
speech misused and wasted (read: the secret revealed). Al-Jahiz compares
what he deems the nonbenecial use of speech with the two sins of the
owner of a treasure. In the case of the rst sin, the owner was necessarily
guilty of withholding it even if he did not expend it sinfully.60 And in
the second sin, the owner was guilty of spending [the wealth] in vain
58
59
60

44
and depraved ways which would . . . make him guilty of dissipation.61

The link between spending wealth and expending words again surfaces in a
saying of the prophet, or Hadith, quoted by al-Jahiz: raima allah abd
anfaqa al-fad5l min malihi wa-amsaka al-fad5l min qawlihi,62 translated as
God is compassionate to a person who expends the excess of his wealth
and withholds the excess of his talk.
bodily modes of revelation
It is during his brief elaboration of the Arabic word ilm (self-control)

that al-Jahiz enumerates some nonverbal aspects of the self that can
conceal and/or reveal the secret. According to him, the meanings of ilm
include the idea of a constant regulation and discipline of ones whole
being and character. Unfortunately, al-Jahiz merely retails these aspects
of the self that can conceal and/or reveal and does not comment on them.
Some involve excesses and imbalances in human affects and psychological states; others involve excesses and imbalances in conduct and
bodily gestures. To practice concealment of the secret and ilm, the following aspects of the self have to be managed correctly: subduing an
excess of pleasure, conquering the desires. In addition, the following
must be suppressed: evil merriment and hilarity, impatience, restlessness,
hasty praise and blame, evil character and greed, the wicked seizure of an
opportunity, excessive desire for something sought, the intensity of longing and delicacy, multiplicity of complaints and regrets, quick shifts from
pleasure to exasperation and exasperation to pleasure, and useless or pointless movements of the tongue and body.63 The reference to the body in
his nal phrase useless or pointless movements of the tongue and body
ushers in an examination of corporeal modes of revelation several passages
later: Even if the most level-headed, forbearing person subdued his
tongue, protected his secret and decreased his words, he [still] would not
be able to control the glance of his eyes, the appearance of his face, change
of his [complexions] color, his smile or frown when he remembers or
thinks of the secret. It appears on his face and in his expression when
present in his memory or when there occurs to him something comparable
or when there arrives someone who has a stake in it unless he has [achieved
the capacity for] strong dissimulation and exceptional restraint.64
Initially, al-Jahiz draws our attention to one pivotal way he denes concealment of the secret (i.e., a discriminating and disciplined use of speech,
of which paucity of words is an important element), and then he goes on
61
62
63
64
Ibid., 40; al-Jahiz, Keeping Secrets and Holding the Tongue, 19.

45
to present us with the role of body language in the secrets revelation.

This passage surfaces in the context of a discussion of disclosure of other
peoples secrets rather than ones own secrets. A recurrent theme found
in the treatise, indeed in Arabic accounts on secrecy in general, is that
other peoples secrets are much more difcult to keep than ones own,
and inadvertent error and weakness play a greater role in the disclosure
of the former. Yet in both types of situations, whether one is concealing
ones own or other peoples secrets, even the most level-headed and forbearing person who disciplines his tongue and preserves his secret is
unable to check and control unconscious body language: physical gestures,
signs, movements, and symptoms will give his secret away. Indeed, as
Freud proclaims, all secrets become available precisely through bodily
symptoms: He that has eyes to see and ears to hear can convince himself
that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his
nger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore. And thus the task of
making conscious the most hidden recesses of the mind is one which is
quite possible to accomplish.65 Freud asserts that the unconscious secrets
of a patient can be made conscious or brought to consciousness through the
intuition and understanding of bodily signs and symptoms. And indeed,
in al-Jahizs passage too, the boundaries between unconscious and conscious forms of secrecy are blurred. Only if one has long practiced strong
dissimulation and exceptional restraint66 will one be able to preserve the
secret fully, and by this al-Jahiz does not simply mean a verbal reserve,
but rather a complete and total self/body-reserve.
It follows therefore that kitman al-sirr is a complete self/tongue/body
form of discretion and reserve. Furthermore, a psychological integrity
of the core self is assimilated to the idea of physical bodily integrity
an assimilation that recurs in other Arabic writings in which the concept
of the secret is prominent. Al-Jahiz advises one to rely on suspicionmindedness, that is, to rely on a mixture of vigilance and caution in
ones relations with others: Be awake to these circumstances and use suspect thinking with all of mankind. Indeed it is related on the authority of
the prophet (peace and blessings of God be upon him) that he said: Prudence is suspicion.67 This advice surfaces in the context of a discussion
of slipups, dropping of inadvertent hints and clues, and second-guessing
on the part of mainly the secret holder but also the decoder/spy. Al-Jahiz
cautions against this kind of second-guessing and instead promotes a
65
Sigmund Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria [1905], vol. 7 of The
Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey (London:
Hogarth Press, Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953), 7778.
66
Hutchins, Keeping Secrets and Holding the Tongue, 19.
67

46
hermeneutic of suspicion or watchful vigilance and preparedness (su

al-z5ann). Prudence, according to the prophets dictum, is just this form of
preparedness.
conclusion
At one point, al-Jahiz remarks: How worthy is one whose words are
countable and from whom no statement escapes unaccompanied by a ready
guard [raqib].68 Al-Jahizs notion of concealing the secret (kitman alsirr) in Kitman ultimately embraces a watchguard within or a discriminating, ethical self that constantly sifts through its own thoughts and potential utterances, its own intentions and actions. Secrecy and revelation
constitute a marker of this watchguard within, and the emphasis is on
self-censorship and moral vigilance in thought, speech, and expression.69
Al-Jahizs Kitman also sets forth the embodied quality of the selfan
embodied self that functions as cipher, as outer signiers attest to inner
truths. Hence, another aspect of this watchguard within is the idea that
the body is implicated in the secrets disclosure. This acute awareness of,
and interest in, the embodied self that reveals is, in part, a legacy of
Quranic conceptions of the self. In my book Self and Secrecy in Early
Islam, I discuss a Quranic ideology of truth and deception70 and
examine how this ideology is inscribed in its conceptions of the self.
This Quranic construction of the embodied self has strong implications
for understanding representations of self and subjectivity in early Islamic
68
Admittedly, al-Jahiz rather infrequently relies upon the Quran in fashioning his ideas
regarding secrecy (references to Quranic verses are made six times throughout the sixtypage treatise Kitman), but as we shall see, the very rst citation of a Quranic verse (89:5)
in his work is an important element in his conceptualization of concealing the secret (kitman
al-sirr).
70
Ruqayya Yasmine Khan, Self and Secrecy in Early Islam (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 2008). I borrow this concept (including the phrase) from F. V. Greifenhagen,
Garments of Disclosure and Deception: The Joseph Story in Islamic and Jewish Scripture
and the Politics of Intertextuality (masters thesis, Duke University, 1992), 1314. Greifenhagen compares the Joseph stories in the Quran and Bible, and in so doing he discusses how
the Biblical and Quranic accounts thus inscribe differing ideologies of truth and deception.
In the Quranic account, events unfold under the lucid light of both Gods guidance of the
events and of the exposition or telling of them. What is hidden is revealed (12:102). He also
points out that this is in contrast to, for example, the Bible, where deception paradoxically
sometimes works in the service of truth and actually is a means of Gods works. Joseph, of
the many colored-coat, is known in the Quran for his shirt rather than his coat. In chapter
12 [Surat Yusuf ], it is Josephs shirt that ultimately tells the story of how his life is enmeshed
in a tangled web of secrecy, deception, and love. Greifenhagen asserts that in this Quranic
account, Josephs shirt functions to signify the disclosure of truth. . . . Garments do not
deceive but disclose. Given the context of accusations leveled against the prophet (of his
being a fabricator and forger), Greifenhagen asserts that a homology is created between the
disclosing quality and reliability of Josephs story, of Gods plan and his prophets messages (1314).
69

47
ethics and Arabic love literature. In other words, the Quran bequeathed
to these ethical and literary discourses a powerful belief in how human
intentionality and consciousness can be subverted through the body.
While the religious view deeply informs al-Jahizs composition of
Kitman, his analysis and discussion of secrecy are not framed in terms
of religious concepts. According to al-Jahiz, concealing/revealing the
secret (kitman al-sirr) is conceived more in terms of a process, more in
terms of an interpersonal mode of ethics. Given his courtly audiences, alJahizs emphasis on both moral vigilance and discretion in expression is
set within the context of the here and now; he conceives of the practice of
kitman al-sirr, like the art of bayan, to be a goal to be strived for by anyone
belonging to early Arabo-Islamic culture and societywhether a caliph,
jurist, or teacher.
Al-Jahiz almost promotes the notion that (in the context of the interpersonal relation) there cannot be a self without secrets. But just as there
cannot be a self without secrets, neither can there be a self and subjectivity
without the revelation of secrets. For al-Jahiz, it is the management of this
consciousness, the self-censorship inherent in the process and work of
concealing the secret (kitman al-sirr), that is vital. Revelation inevitably
occurs, yet how well is it contained? This is the supreme challenge to the
ethical and moral self that exercises kitman al-sirr. Arguing that through
modes of self-discipline and containment (involving verbal and bodily
forms of reserve), the self practices concealment of the secret, al-Jahiz
renders this practice most meaningful within the earthly contexta context
involving interpersonal relations, self-presentation, and ethical conduct.
Trinity University


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The Chambir of My Thought: Self and Conduct in an Early Islamic Ethical Treatise

Author(s): Ruqayya Yasmine Khan

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Ruqayya Yasmine Khan

2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

This content downloaded from 2.27.78.191 on Wed, 22 Apr 2015 18:29:22 PM