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FOR
ARSON INvESTIGATORS
FOREWORD
This pamphlet originally was prepared for the use of the
arson investigators in the employ of the National Board of
Fire U ndenvriters, an association of capital stock fire insurance companies established in 1866. Certain detailed instructions contained therein are applicable only to such investigators, but many of the general statements concerning the
conduct of investigations are applicable to any one doing this
sort of work. Therefore, in distributing this pamphlet to
persons interested in the subject of arson investigations, it
has been thought best to do so without eliminating those parts
which have special reference to the work of employes of the
National Board of Fire Underwriters.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
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INSTRUCTIONS
1. Since the attitude with which one approaches his work
is highly important, you should realize that in addition to
earning your living in this work you are rendering a real
public service. Your work is important, dignified and offers
you the opportunity of contributing by your success not only
to the lessening of property loss by fire but to the saving of
innocent lives.
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friends. Do nothing, therefore, that can be magnified or distorted so that it can be used to discredit your investigation.
8. Under no circumstances sign any complaint or make
any charges against any person for criminal conduct in relation to fires; any such action must be taken by the proper
public authorities.
Never under any circumstances represent yourself as an
official of any type, either local, state, or federal, and do nothing
to permit those with whom you deal to obtain an erroneous
idea as to your status. Agents work so closely with officials
that persons under investigation or interested in investigations
sometimes get the idea that the agent is himself an official.
This is not desirable, accomplishes no good purpose and may
be found embarrassing.
9. In so far as possible avoid saying anything concerning
persons under investigation or suspicion which might be made
the basis of a suit for slander or libel. It has occasionally
happened that suit has been instituted by some one apparently
involved in an arson case where claim has been made that
statements damaging to the reputation and standing ot the
person suing have been made by an agent of the National
Hoard but no such suit, so far, has ever resulted in more than
a nominal judgment. Care should be taken, however, to avoid
making to, or in the presence of, any third person any expression of opinion or statement of fact during the course of an
investigation concerning the guilt or innocence or connection
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of an individual with a fire.
10. Keep the office to which you are attached advised of
your whereabouts at all times, so that you can be reached
by mail or telegram without unnecessary delay.
11. Report promptly any and all requests for in vestigations which come to you locally, so that the supervisor of
your work may understand just what assignments are before
you, and companies interested may be informed.
12. Report when you have more work on hand than you
can handle in a reasonable time or when the work is unduly
light, so that in the former instance you can be given assistance, and in the latter you may be available for additional
assign men ts.
doing, as, for instance: "In conference with the district attorney in the morning, traveling in the afternoon." "In court
all day."
In each instance items of expense reported must represent
the exact amount expended for the particular purpose indicated. Any extraordinary expense, either in character or
amount, should be explained fully in the report or an accompanying letter, and in every instance where possible authorization for any unusual expense must be secured in advance.
Expenses are not to be estimated, averaged, guessed at or
charged under one head when, in fact, they represent an
expense of a different character.
19. Report specially by letter the name, description, his~
tory and location of any professional firebug or pyromaniac
who may come to your attention, stating what surveillance
or other precautionary measures are being taken by the
authorities or otherwise with respect to such person and making suggestions as to what further action you think can or
should ~e tak.en ..The prevention of future fires is as important
as the mvest1gation of fires which have actually occurred.
20. You are a part of the fire insurance business. Familiarize yourself with the business, with particular reference to
adjustments. Read the material which will be sent you from
time to time regarding the National Board of Fire Underwriters and fire insurance.
21. Any recommendation that the special agent thinks
proper to make to an insurance company with reference to
cancelation of a policy should be communicated through his
superior officer to the National Board, and not directly to the
insurance company involved, except in cases of real emergency.
22. While it is desired that special agents shall do such
traveling within their particular territory as the exigencies
of the work may require without special authority from their
supervising office, agents should not undertake any other
travel without first securing authority therefor.
Agents should neither come to their supervising offices nor
go outside their regular territory without special authority
therefor. Agents given special assignments outside their
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Arson is a peculiar crime in that there is usually no complaining witness by whom the corpus delicti may be established and it is also peculiar in that it almost always is the
result of planning over a period of time and is rarely committed without considerable preparation. It is therefore necessary to establish the fact that a fire is incendiary by circumstantial and physical evidence in most cases. Arson investigators may make this part of their work easier by procuring
the active help of firemen.
Chiefs of fire departments should be encouraged to select
one man in each unit whose definite job shall be to look
for and to preserve arson evidence. This man's duties should
begin as soon as the alarm comes in. He should note the
source of the alarm and, if possible, the person responsible
for it, and on the way to the fire he should be on the lookout
for such suspicious circumstances as persons or machines
hurrying away from the fire, persons evincing unusual interest
in the running of the apparatus or behaving peculiarly at or
near the scene of the fire. He should note whether the fire
originated on the inside or outside the building, look for footprints, tire tracks, ascertain whether the doors and windows
are locked, if forced open, note by whom, as to each entrance
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and make a care ul record of these facts. The color and
volume of the smoke should be noted, as well as odors, depth
of charring, possibility of more than one place of origin and
character of residue deposited on walls or elsewhere. Note
should be made as to whether the usual articles of wearing
apparel are on the premises, how the persons involved in the
fire are dressed, whether silverware, wedding presents, family
pictures and trophies of all kinds are in their accustomed
places. Note any unusual arrangement of furniture; look carefully for plants, trailers, electrical apparatus, finger prints. If
fire is severe, ascertain whether the normal remains are to be
found in the debris. Make notes of numbers appearing on
refrigerators, radios, washing machines, sewing machines and
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3. Determine whether the loss occurred after the commencement and before the expiration of the policy.
5. Ascertain whether the property was located and contained as described in the policy, or had been necessarily
removed to some proper place or places for preservation from perils insured against within 5 days prior
to loss.
7. Ascertain whether the insured has concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concerning the insurance or the subject thereof, or has been
guilty of fraud or false swearing, either before or after
the loss.
8. Exclude from the claim uninsurable property, or excepted property that is not specifically named in the
policy.
9. Ascertain whether the loss was caused by:
(a) Enemy attack by armed forces, including action
taken by military, naval or air forces in resisting
an actual or an immediately impending enemy
attack;
(b)
(c)
( d)
( e)
(f)
(g)
Invasion;
Insurrection;
Rebellion;
Revolution;
Civil War;
Usurped Power;
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(h) Order of any civil authority except acts of destruction at the time and for the purpose of preventing
the spread of fire, provided that fire did not originate from the perils listed above as excluded;
17. Exercise the options to take articles of personal property. at their agreed or appraised value, or to repair,
rebmld, ?r replace damaged or destroyed property, if
by so domg the company's loss will be reduced.
(j) Theft.
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case was not one for expert opinion. The physical facts which
were the subject of the investigation were so simple that they
could be readily understood, when properly described, and it
was then up to the jury to draw the appropriate conclusion .
While this decision has been accepted by many as prohibiting
expert testimony as to the origin of fires, it is not believed that
it really does so, but that the principles are the same in arson
cases as in any other criminal cases so that, if the facts in any
given case are complicated or of a nature not readily understood by laymen, expert testimony would be admissible.
In the recent case of Kansas vs. Gore (152 Kans. 551;
106 Pac. [2nd] 704) the opinion rendered by the Supreme
Court of Kansas on Nov. 9, 1940, contains the following:
. It is .well to ~r in mind at the outset that the admission of opinion
eVJdence m prosecutions for arson is governed by the same rules as are
applicable in prosecutions for other crimes. (2 R.C.L. 518; 4 Am. Jur.
[Arson] No. 52.) The gen~ral rule is, if a witness has acquired peculiar
kn'!wledge or skill, by e:ic;pen~nce, observation or practice on a subject with
w.h1ch .t~e mass. of mankmd 1s not supposed to be acquainted, he may give
his opinion on 1t. (State v. Nordmark, 84 Kan. 628, 631, 114 Pac. 1068;
State '!' Parsons, 1.40 Kan. 157, 160, 33 P. 2d 1096.) It is true there is
au!h~mty for ~he VJew that generally, subject, however, to exceptions, the
op1mon of a witness that the fire was of incendiary origin is not admissible.
(2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 2d ed., No. 956.) Appellant cites numerous decisions supporting that view.
The substance of appellee'~ position and contention was not only that
the fire had been set but that 1t had been set shortly before it was discovered. It seems to us these contentions cannot well be separated entirely
in the instant case, in determining the question of the admissibility of th~
expert's '!Pinion. The evidence disclosed appellant had gone to the shop
at approximately eleven p. m., on the evening of April 28th. He was away
from his lady companion between an hour and a quarter or an hour .and a
half. The alarm concerning this particular fire was given in response to
a call at 12 :58 a~ m., April 29th. Appe)lant was. seen in a cafe just across
th~ street from his shop ten c;ir fifteen mmutes prior to the alarm concerning
this fire. He returned to his car ten or fifteen minutes after that alarm.
~t was the contention of appellee there was no outward evidence of fire
1~ the s:hop at 12 :34 a. m., that the fire had been in progress on!,- a short
time when the alarm was given, and that it was of incendiary origm.
When the expert witness, Holder, arrived, the pile in the middle of the
floor had already settled, to some extent, by reason of the fact the fabrics
at the bottom of the pile had been burned. He stated the fire burned from
the bottom t:P There was no objection to that opinion. The record discloses .the Witness examined the burned fabrics, their location in the pile
t~e umque and unusu.al arrangement of fast-bur?ing and slo~-burning fat>'.
r!cs, and other materials. He named and described the fabrics which consisted of .fast-burni.ng and. those which consisted of slow-burning contents.
He exammed the hght weight dresses on the hangers which in his opinion
were scorched from above by the heat as it descended fr~ the top of th~
balcony. He, also, named the clothing which was in part slow-burning
and in part, fast-burning. The ability to analyze the texture of fabric~
and to state the quick or slow effect of heat upon them was definitely a
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maf.ter of professional knowledge. The unique manner in which these various fabrics were arranged in the pile, in all probability, suggested far more
to this experienced fireman, whose business it was to search out the cause
of fires, than it did to the ordinary layman. Was his knowledge, his inference or opinion, based upon facts in evidence, and his reasons for his opinion
as to the cause of .the fire, to be withheld from the seekers of the truth,
the triers of the fact? Could the reasons for his opinion, in addition to the
mere explanation of what he found, afford assistance to the jury in determining the issue before them, and if so were they competent? In the rather
early case of Duncan v. Railway Co., 86 Kan. 112, 119 Pac. 356, this court
referred to a much earlier case and said:
"In Erb v. Popritz, 59 Kan. 264, 52 Pac. 871, certain witnesses
without railroad experience had been permitted to give their opinion
as to the cause of a certain derailment, and this was held error on the
ground, not only that the witnesses bad no expert knowledge, but that
the appearance of the wreck could have been easily and adequately
described to the jurors so that they could have formed an opinion as
readily as the witnesses. Had the structure and situation been such
that the witnesses by their railroad experience were able to afford the
jury any assistance in addition to that furnished by an explanation of
the facts and the photograph of the bridge it would have been proper
to receive their opinions.'' (p. 119.)
It may be conceded the foregoing were negligence and not arson cases.
It is also true that there is not entire unanimity of opinion in the various
jurisdictions on the subject of admissibility of opinion evidence in arson
cases. In frankness it may, also, be said that in our own earlier decisions
the strict rule against the admissibility of opinion evidence was more rigorously applied than in our more recent decisions. It will serve no useful
purpose to again review the numerous aspects of the question. The complexity of the subject is conceded. However, in the recent case of Malone v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 148 Kan. 555, 83 P. 2d 639, it was stoutly contended a doctor should not be permhted to give his opinion as to the distance
a gun was located from the head of the insured when it was discharged.
Numerous authorities were there reviewed, the conflict in authorities was
recognized, and it was said :
"Distinction between facts and conclusions was involved in Bank v.
Robinson, 93 Kan. 464, 144 Pac. 1019, and it was there said:
'The modern notion of the admissibility of evidence is that it is
more important to get the truth than to quibble over impractical distinctions between facts and conclusions.' (Sy!. 2.)"
In Tovey v. Geiser, 150 Kan. 149, 92 P. 2d 3, the question pertaining
to the admissibility of the opinion of experts upon the subject of which of
two persons died first in a common disaster, was presented. The subject
again received e:ichaustive treatment, and the court concluded:
"While the ordinary rule of evidence is that witnesses should not
be permitted to testify to the ultimate facts which it is the province of
the jury itself to decide, that rule is not strictly applied when the opinions of experts are offered to aid the jury in reaching its decision.
( Sillix v. Armour & Co., 99 Kan. 103, 109, 160 Pac. 1021 ; Malone v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 148 Kan. 555, 557, 83 P. 2d 639.)" (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 156, 157.)
In Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed. Vol. 4, the principle is stated thus:
"But the only true criterion is: On this subject can a jury from
this person receive appreciable help? In other words, the test is a
relative one, depending on the particular subject and the particular witness with reference to that subject, and is not fixed or limited to any
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3. MOTIVE. It is extremely important, although not absolutely necessary, to establish a positive motive on the part
of the accused in the trial of a case of arson. The motive
for this crime is usually revenge or a desire to defraud the
insurer. Over-insurance is not always necessary to prompt
an attempt at burning to defraud. Straitened financial circumstances, a desire to change location or some other motive
may be sufficient to prompt a man criminally inclined to
attempt a quick "sale" of his property to some insurance
company.
lt is important in all cases in which a desire to defraud
the insurer is the motive that the value of the property
destroyed be determined as accurately as possible. It is sometimes advisable, when the destruction has been partial, to have
an inventory taken by some person who can qualify before
the court as an expert on values.
In case of arson, expert and opinion testimony as to values
are of great aid in establishing motive, particularly when mercantile stocks that are grossly over-insured are concerned.
The average adjuster is competent to qualify as an expert on
values. When it is not advisable to use an adjuster's testimony,
a local dealer experienced in buying and selling stocks of merchandise similar to the one at issue, and who has been
accorded an opportunity to inventory and appraise this stock,
can be qualified as an expert and testify accordin&ly.
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Where a signed confession details the defendant's connection with the crime charged and also contains an account of
flight shortly following the crime and the actions of himself
and one or more of his confederates, the entire confession is
competent and relevant.
State vs. Doty
94 Ohio 258
How Competency of Confession is to be Determined. The
competency of a confession is to be determined by the trial
court upon the facts in evidence at the time it is offered,
and in all cases inquiry should be made whether ihe defendant
spoke through fear or in the expectation of immunity, and
when he is under arrest it should also be asked whether he
spoke to the magistrate, or to the officer in charge, or in their
presence, because he felt that he was compelled to for any reason, and it is proper to allow a preliminary examination by the
defendant's counsel to test the competency of a confession
before it is received. After it is received, if a question of fact
arises as to its voluntary character, the jury should be instructed to disregard it wholly, unless they find that it was
voluntarily made, without threat or menace by acts, words
or situation, and without compulsion, real or apprehended,
and without the promise, express or implied, that the defendant should not be prosecuted or that he should be punished less severely.
People vs. White
176 N. Y. 331
Admissibility of Confessions. The question of whether a
confession was improperly introduced or not is for the court
on preliminary inquiry, and its decision is controlling, unless
it appears by the record to be clearly against the evidence.
Rossczcvnilia vs. State
125 Wis. 414
Connors vs. State
95 Wis. 77
Confessions made by a prisoner while under arrest are
admissible if not elicited by coercion, threats or artifice, and
mere advice that it would be better to tell the truth, or words
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of similar import, will not vitiate them. Rintz vs. State, 125
Wis. 403, on Page 412, the court says:
"If, after the admission of testimony, conflicting
evidence renders it doubtful whether the confession
was voluntary, that question may properly be submitted to the jury."
It was held in State vs. Anderson, 133 Wis. 601, that a
statement is voluntary unless made under the influence of a
threat or menace which inspires dread or alarm or induced by
artifice or a promise or inducement of some profit, benefit or
amelioration of punishment.
The presumption is that confessions are voluntarily made.
In the case of Campbell vs. Germania Fire Insurance Company, 163 Wis. 329, on page 339, where the nature of an
alleged confession was such as to arouse a suspicion that it
was not made freely and intelligently, and the circumstances
under which it was made were consistent with that view, there
was no prejudicial error in instructing the jury that the
alleged admissions were not entitled to weight, unless the
jury were satisfied that they were freely made and not under
such compulsion, threats, intimidation, promise of immunity
or persuasion, as to prevent him from being a free agent
in the matter.
In Terasinski vs. State, 146 Wis. 508, on page 512, the
court said:
"Obviously the mere fact that the confession was
made during an examination by an officer, while the
confessor was at somewhat of a disadvantage, in that
he had no advisor or disinterested person at hand,
assuming that the officer and his associates were
prejudiced in the matter, DID NOT RENDER THE
CONFESSION NECESSARILY INADMISSIBLE.
The question here presented is whether under the circumstances it was fair to believe the confession was
made freely and voluntarily. If THERE WAS
ROOM IN THE EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO
COME TO THAT CONCLUSION, IT WAS
PROPER TO ADMIT THE EVIDENCE. THAT
IS ELEMENT ARY. True, if a confession is clearly
induced by fear, favor, or the promise of reward,
evidence of it is not admissible. It is not incompetent
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merely because there is room for a reasonable conclusion THAT IT WAS SO INDUCED. If there
are reasonable conflicting inferences in that regard
from all the circumstances, that being a judicial question, the evidence is competent, leaving it to the jury
to give heed thereto or reject it in their deliberations
according as they may find the proper inferences."
Ibid. 518-"All other evidence of undue influence
going to show that the incriminating disclosures were
not freely and voluntarily made was controverted so
what the real facts were was a jury question."
Who Is An Accomplice? To constitute an accomplice one
must be so connected with the crime that at common law he
might himself have been convicted, either as a principal or as
an accessory before the fact (People vs. Cohen, 223 New
York). A person is not deemed to be an accomplice merely
because he had knowledge of the intended commission of the
crime unless he in some way aids or incites its commission
(People vs. Doyle, 107 Misc. 268).
)
:)
Corroboration of Accomplices. In many states the defendant may not be convicted wholly upon the testimony of accomplices, but this is not so in other states, nor is it the law in
the federal courts. Testimony of an accomplice must always
be received with caution, and the court must so instruct the
jury. In states where defendants may not be convicted upon
the testimony of an accomplice, corroboration by such o):her
evidence as tends to connect him with the crime is necessary
and one accomplice may not corroborate another, so that the
testimony of several accomplices is no more sufficient than
that of a single one. There is an exception to this rule in the
State of Georgia, where, if two or more accomplices testify,
the corroboration may be sufficient. (Chance vs. State, 33 Ga.
App., 137.)
There is a distinction between the corroboration of an
accomplice and the corroboration of a confession, the nature
of the corroborative evidence being different. In the case of
the confession, there must be additional proof that the crime
was committed. In the case of the testimony of an accomplice, there must be other evidence tending to connect the
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defendant with the commission of the crime. Thus, the testimony of an accomplice on the stand is sufficient to establish
the corpus delicti, a1'though insufficient to convict the defendant without other independent evidence. (People vs. O'Neill,
48 Hun. 36, 5; N. Y. Cr. 302, affd. 109 N. Y. 251, 16 N. E. 68,
6 N. Y. Cr. 48. People vs. Dixon, 231 N. Y., 111.)
False Statements. The fact that the accused has made
false statements is often important evidence, especially if
made to persons investigating the fire or contradicting other
statements made by him at other times, or suggesting a theory
as to the cause of fire which he must have known to be false.
False statements regarding the fact or amount of insurance
are also frequently important. There are many decisions concerning admissibility of such testimony, a number of which
are listed in Curtis on Arson, page 333.
Opportunity. Evidence of opportunity, of course, is admissible, as is evidence of lack of opportunity admissible, on behalf
of the defense. Where exclusive opportunity can be shown-that
is, where the premises are locked and the only known keys in
the possession of the assured-the weight of the evidence, of
course, is greatly increased. An interesting case involving this
principle, but in reverse, is found in the case of Commonwealth
vs. Alba, 271 Massachusetts 333, where the defendants had
testified that they locked the premises but the firemen found
the premises unlocked, giving rise quite properly to the inference that the person who set the fire had gained access to the
property with the keys of one or both of the defendants. (See
also Notes 54 and SS, page 314, in Curtis' "The Law of
Arson.")
Previous Fires. Evidence of previous fires is frequently
competent, especially in support of the theory that the defendant had guilty knowledge and intent in the particular transaction in connection with which he is being tried. Evidence of
this kind may also be admitted to show a plan, a scheme or a
system. In a recent case the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in
an opinion filed January 30, 1937 (Thompson vs. State, 171
Tenn. 156; 101 S. W. [2nd] 467), quoted with approval the
following rule from Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Volume I,
page 527:
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link, so that a number of perjured witnesses would be necessary to cause an unjust conviction, whereas one perjured witness giving direct testimony might accomplish such a wrongful
act. Justice Walworth, in delivering a charge to a jury in
New York, after setting forth the above reasons, said:
"For this reason, although from the imperfection and
uncertainty which must ever exist in all human tribunals,
I have no doubt that there have been cases in which
innocent persons have been convicted on circumstantial
proofs, yet from my knowledge of criminal jurisprudence,
both from reading and observation, I have no hesitation
in expressing the opinion that where there has been one
unjust conviction upo.n circumstantial evidence alone,
there have been three mnocent persons condemned upon
the positive testimony of perjured witnesses."
The fact, therefore, that evidence is wholly circumstantial
should not deter the investigator, for the facts and circumstances shown may well be so convincing as to demonstrate
to a certainty the guilt of a defendant.
Probably as clear and condensed a discussion as may be
found anywhere of what evidence is admissible in an arson
case appears in Volume 5 of the well-known reference work
"Corpus Juris." Therein, on page 572 and succeeding pages:
appears the following:
. Admissible Arson Evidence. "Any circumstances tendmg to rebut the presumption that the burning was accidental may be given in evidence as proof of the corpus
delicti (the body of the crime), and when the fact of the
burning is clearly and satisfactorily proved, and the circumstances are such to exclude accident or natural causes
as to the origin of the fire, a foundation is thus laid for the
introduction of any legal and sufficient evidence direct or
cirr.umstantial, that the act was committed by the accused
~nd that it was ~one 'Yith criminal intent. Accordingly, it
1s proper to receive ev1d_ence tending to fix the description,
character and surroundmgs of the building at the time of
the fire, and its possession, occupancy or control. For this
puri;~os~, evidence of the contents of the building is
adm1ss1ble, except when the character of the building is
not controverted.
"Not only the burning of tl1e building in question, but
also the extent of the conflagration and the burning of
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other buildings by the same fire, may be shown in evidence; and while evidence that other fires occurred in
the vicinity at or about the same time as the burning of
the building alleged in the indictment, or that the same
or other property of the accused or prosecutor was on
fire on previous or subsequent occasions, is not generally
admissible in the absence of anything directly to show
defendant's connection with the charge for which he is
on trial, yet if it directly tends to connect defendant with
the burning alleged in the indictment, or to establish
intent, or to show the incendiary origin of the fire in
question, it may be received. So evidence of the burning
of other property belonging to the same owner at almost
the same time is admissible to show that the two fires
were parts of a scheme concocted and carried out by the
assured. The fact that defendant, a few months before
the burning charged, requested another to burn the house
is admissible in evidence.
"Evidence of incriminating circumstances, tending to
show accused's motives, malice or intent is admissible.
Thus on the question of motive, evidence is admissible
which tends to prove that assured set the fire for reward,
or gain, to secure employment as watchman, to destroy
evidence of title, to destroy the record of a pending indictment against him, or to conceal a murder of another.
The acts and declarations of the accused showing the
intention to burn the property in order to collect the
insurance money are admissible against him .
"Threats made by accused against the person or property. of the prosecutor, regardless of whether it is th,e
identical property burned or adjacent property may be
shown, not only for the purpose of proving malice, but
also to connect the accused with the commission of the
offense; and the competency of testimony of threats is
not affected by a considerable lapse of time intervening
between their making and the burning of the building,
or the fact that the ownership changed in the interim,
or that the threats were general, vague, or indirect. However, evidence of a threat made after the fire is not
admissible.
"Ill feeling or unfriendly relations between accused
and owner may be shown.
"It is proper to admit evidence of incriminating circumstances tending to show that the fire was of incendiary origin, and that the accused was connected therewith,
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such as evidence of defendant's act, conduct and whereabouts, at or near the time of the fire, and his acts or
preparation or his possession of goods proved to have
been in the building immediately before the burning or
that he removed insured goods from the building immediately before it was burned."
In connection with the question of control of the premises
(pp. 21 and 32) it is important to show whether all doors and
windows were locked, whether any evidence of breaking and
entering, the whereabouts of all keys, etc., for, if motive and
incendiary character of the fire are established and exclusive
opportunity shown as to the assured, he may, at least in some
jurisdictions, be convicted either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact to an unknown principal.
ANTICIPATED FIRES
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notice, but that an attempt should be made to catch the perpetrators in the act. In some cases, of course, where adequate
precautions cannot be taken against property loss or conditions make too difficult or too uncertain the apprehension of
the criminals in the act; the insurance carriers should be notified and the insurance canceled, thus doing away at least
temporarily with the motive for the crime. In the ordinary
case, however, it is usually possible to take such precautions
as will insure no loss of life, little property damage and the
arrest of the perpetrators. Persons arrested in the act of committing arson almost invariably confess their guilt and many
times give to the authorities statements of past crimes. No
investigator, however, should take the responsibility for determining the course to be followed in a given case, but should
give the facts to the highest public official available who has
jurisdiction, and be guided by his advice and the principles
above set forth.
THE PYROMANIAC
Pyromania is that term applied to a monomaniac whose
obsession centers around fire. He is the firebug who starts
fires without rhyme or reason and without any apparent
motive.
There has always been a great deal of superstition in regard to fire. It has been used as a means of sacrifice and
devotion, and the Bible is full of references to the destruction
of the wicked by fire. It is within the bounds of possibility
that our ancestors, generations ago, were fire worshippers or
sun worshippers, and it is not at all strange that, playing so
important a part in our sane existence, the phenomenon of
fire should manifest itself to the aberrant mind.
The monomaniac is the person with a systematized delusion. When this delusion centers around fire, we have the
pyromaniac, just as we have the kleptomaniac in the uncontrollable thief. Every institution for the care of the insane
contains many inmates who might properly be classed as
pyromaniacs. Unfortunately, asylums do not hold all of these
insane firebugs. They are to be found in practically every
community and their contribution to the fire loss of the coun-
38
REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS
Reports are an important part of your work and you will
assist the work of the Committee materially by making them
complete and accurate.
The proper preparation of a report is almost as important
as the proper investigation of a fire; our reports should be as
full and complete as possible, confined to the facts developed
by the investigation and not contain any conclusions of our
own or statements of what we believe might have happened.
Theories, conclusions and suggestions, however, of the
investigating agents on the ground may be of great value and
in all instances should be fully set forth in separate letters
accompanying the reports.
39
40
42
44
45
46
47
48
50
51
52
53
~:l~~li~~h;~-:~:.::::::::.::::::~.::::::::::::::~.:~:~:~.::.::::~.::::::::::::::::.:.:~.::.::::::::.:::
~i~~h~:~:
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Naphthaline -
Olive oil ----------
Cottonseed oil ---------
Rosin oil -----
Paraffin oil ---
Paraffin wax ---- 360 to
Linseed oil .................................................................................................. 600 to
Lard oil ------Lubricating oil ----- 500 to
Light motor oil..........................................................................................
Spermaceti ----
Tar -------- 160 to
En!?ine spindle oil......--- 275 to
"Vanrolene" (trade name) --- 95 to
54
111
35
50
55
66
72
80
49
62
77
95
40
41
59
5
4
150
O
130
40
95
78
44
86
108
66
73
}~i
392
420
336
266
224
400
660
464
600
392
482
180
374
112
Statutes of Limitations
Nevada-4 years
New Hampshire-None
New Jersey-2 years
New Mexico-None
New York-On Arson, 5 years. A
prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years
after its commission.
North Carolina-None
North Dakota-3 years
Ohio-None
Oklahoma-3 years
Oregon-3 years
Pennsylvania-5 years, felony
2 years, misdemeanor
(depends on class of
building burned)
Rhode Island-3 years
South Carolina-None
South Dakota-3 years
Tennessee-real property, 4 yrs.
personal property, 2 yrs.
Texas-Arson, 5 years
Burning to defraud, 3/years
Filing false proof, 2 years
Utah-4 years
Vermont-None
Virginia-None
Washington-3 years
West Virginia-Arson, none
1 year on a misdemeanor
Wisconsin-6 years
Wyoming-None
Alabama-None
Arizona-5 years
Arkansas-3 years
California-3 years
Colorado-None
Connecticut-5 years
Delaware-2 years
District of Columbia-3 years
Florida-5 years
Georgia-4 years
ldah~ years
Illinois-none as to dwellings;
other buildings 3 years
Indiana-None
Iowa-3 years
Kansas-2 years
Kentucky-none
Louisiana-On what amounts to
arson under civil law,
none ; on statutory
burnings not defined
as arson, 1 year, from
time prosecutor gets
information
Maine-None
Maryland-None
Massachusetts-6 years
Michigan-6 years
Minnesota-3 years
Mississippi-none
Missouri-3 years
Montana-3 years
Nebraska-None
55
IN DEX
Page
Accidental Origin
Elimination of .......................... 26
Presumption of - 17
Accomplice
Who is- 31
Corroboration of ........................ 31
Adjacent Buildings - 10
Adjusters, Agents' Cooperation
with -12-15
Alarm, source of - 9
Analyses -- 10
Anticipated Fires .......................... 37-38
Arson
Degrees of ................................45, 46
Attempts ........................... .46, 47, 48
Attempts ..................................46, 47, 43
Circumstantial Evidence ................ 18
Weight of ---33-34
Confessions..... .11, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29, 30
Admissibility of .......................... 29
Competency of --- 29
Confirmation -- 11
Extra-judicial ----.18, 19
Conspiracy ......................................46-47
Corpus Delicti....... .17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
Confessions to establish
corpus delicti -.18, 19, 20
Debris -- 9
Debts ---- 10
Doors --- 9
Electrical Apparatus -9, 26
Enemies ----.10, 35
Expert Testimony
As to origin --22-23-24-25
As to values ---- 27
False Statements -- 32
Financial Condition - 10
Fingerprints --9-10, 26
Page
Fireman
Evidence, preservation by.......... 9-10
Evidence, gathering by..-- 9-10
Footprints --9, 20
Foreclosures ----- 10
Frauds ..............................................36-37
Furniture Arrangement. __.......9, 21, 26
Gases and Liquids, inflammable....53-54
Guards ........................................... 10
Incendiary Origin...............21, 22, 23
Inflammable, gases ........................53-54
Instructions for National Board
Agents - 3
Attitude of investigator....... _. 4
Cancellation of policies............ 7
Complaints - 5
Cooperation...- ......4, 11, 12, 13, 14
Expenses -- 7, 8
Firebugs ....................................7, 38
Frame-up - 4
Induced crimes ---- 4
Libel ............................................ 5
Personal conduct ...................... 4-5
Physical evidence - 6
Publicity ----- 4
Pyromaniacs ......................7, 38-39
Record of cases -- 6
Reports
INDEX-Continued
Page
Page
Intent -------26-27, 35
Law of Arson------- 16
Limitations, Statutes oL ............ .48, 55
Loss Information Service...---- 41
Mail Frauds ...................................... 36
Membership Roll ---- 41
Model Arson Law....43, 44, 45, 46, 47
Motive ----21, 27-28, 35
Names ................................................ 41
Precise spelling .......................... 42
Relatives ---------- 41
Odors ------9, 22
Opinion Testimony ___ ....22-23-24-25
Opportunity -----21, 32
Origin of Fires -----.17-18
Over-Insurance --- 27
Pictures --9, 10
Plants ------- 9
Police
Investigation by -10-11
Preparation for Trial ........49-50-51-52
Previous Fires -11, 32
Prosecuting Attorney -- 11
Pyromaniacs ....................................38-39
Radios ---- 9
Recent Insurance - - - - 28
Records-previous fires ____11, 32
Daily -- 6
Preliminary ..................--- 6
Status ---- 8
Summary .............. 39, 40, 41, 42
Slander -.. 5
Status of agents...-- 5
Status of work....----- 5
Traveling --- 7-8
Whereabouts -- 5
Insurance --.10, 28, 35
56
57
Refrigerators --------
Requests to Btml-..-----Residue -----------Scorching -------Sewing Machines ----Silverware -----
Smoke ----9, 17,
Statutes ...................................43, 48,
Taxes -----
Telephone Records -----
Tire Tracks ---9,
Trailers ---
Trophies ..............................................
Two or More Fires..........................
Visits and Visitors.................... _......
Washing Machines ---Wearing Apparel------
Wedding Presents -----Windows -------
35
9
17
9
9
22
SS
10
11
20
9
9
9
10
9
9
9
9