HERBERT CANG VS CA

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce
from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor
children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children.
Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA
affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay
monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent
of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of
the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx
and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the
decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
"any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in
his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find
pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his
wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to
their whims.

REYES vs. MAURICIO

FACTS: Eugenio owns a parcel of land covered by a TCT adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents. Librada F. Mauricio
(Librada, DECEASED) and her daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) filed a complaint before
the DARAB alleging that theyre the legal heirs of Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land (that from
1936 until his death in May 1994,Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced
improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other
permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio
caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan to eject respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public; that Librada never appeared
before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not
read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy,
ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering
it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject
respondents from the subject property). Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity
of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the subject property. According to Eugenio: Godofredos occupation
of the subject premises was based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio
denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He
maintained that Librada, accompanied by are lative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the
Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada
received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio
also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is
the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida?
HELD: NO. Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition. The
legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article335) which provides: The
contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint
before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to
the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs
and within the periods fixed in the present articles. In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. The same rule
is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v.
Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedents estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the
legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.

Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased
by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Respondent
Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly
supported byan Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur,
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. Pedro sought
to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of
thedeceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned
the validity of the marriage between Appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.Appellant
claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C.
Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original
copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented
as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities
on the reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the
Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere
thumb mark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said reconstructed marriage
contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary signature as
affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities
surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentionedin the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in
the testimony admitted by the appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of
the purported marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage
was allegedly solemnized. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendantappellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. The
Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.
Issues
1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed valid
Held: Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.
Ratio: Pilapils claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was
misplaced. An affidavit executed by the appellan t and the la te Dr. Ja cob that the y live d
to ge ther as husba nd and wif e for at lea st f ive ye ars exempted them f rom
the marriage license requirement (Article 76 of the Civil Code).Also misplaced was Pilapils
argument that the marriage was void because of the absence of a marriage contract and the
absence of entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar and in the National
Census and Statistics Office. A marriage cont ra ct is the best e viden ce of a marria ge
ce remon y. Ho we ve r, the con tent s of a document may be pro ven b y comp etent
e viden ce othe r than the document itself , provided that the offer o r estab lish es
its due execut ion and it s subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of
marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract. In the instant
case, appellant provided competent evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was solemnized
between her and the late Dr. Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness
Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing officer Msgr. Yolanda through their sworn testimonies both in
open court and in writing, and through the photographs taken during the ceremony. The
absence of an ent ry pertainin g to 1975 in the Books of Ma rriage of the Lo cal
Civil Re gistrar of Man ila and in the Na tio nal Ce nsu s and Stat istics Office
(NCS O) does not in valida te the marria ge. It is p rimary dut y of the so lemn izin g
officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to
be duly recorded. In the absen ce of an y counte r p resump tion or evide nce sp ecial to
the ca se, a man and a woman depo rt ing themse lve s as hu sband and wif e a re
p resumed to have ente red into a la wf ul contract of marriage. As the fact tha t Dr.
Ja cob and appe llant Tomasa lived together as husband and wife was not disputed in this
case, but was in fact even accepted, it would follow that the presumption of marriage was not
likely rebutted.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.

Issue:May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in
the instant case.
Ruling:
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname
of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be
an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the
Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother.

Republic vs. Hernandez

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran
and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of
said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade
which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name
are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from
and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of
law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change
of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the
adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is
sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this
would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and
adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption
with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows
permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is
argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption
and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action
in a single petition.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the
given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Held: No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change

of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of
the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to
change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview
of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the
name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with
all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot
be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident
or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.