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Was the military culture in Imperial Germanys colonial officership incompatible

with Huntingtons concepts of a single military mind and military professionalism?

In The Soldier and the State, Huntington presents Imperial Germanys civil
military relations as a near perfect model of objective civilian control and of a
cultivated military mind present throughout the officership.1 This assumption
cannot be extended to the colonial officership. There was not a singular military
mind and the model of military professionalism so praised by Huntington did not
extend throughout the Imperial Germanys officership to its colonial ranks;
manifest in the political role many commanders played in the colonies, most
destructively in the Herero Genocide in Southwest Africa from 1904 to 1907.2
Therefore, the destructive civil military relations of Imperial Germany in the
First World War were a continuation of, and not a change from, their dictatorial
colonial military culture.

Huntington, in his argument, makes three broad and refutable claims

about civil-military relations in, and the military culture of, Imperial Germany.
Firstly, using a quote from Chief of Staff von Moltke, Huntington claims that
commanders were separate from statesmen and military victory was the only
goal for the officership.3 Secondly, Huntington claims that the army, unlike the
navy, were almost unanimously opposed to bellicosity and imperialism,
ratifying Vagts opinion that the armed forces were non-aggressive before 1914
except in its strategy.4 The third refutable claim made by Huntington is that
ultimately the civilians, not the generals, made the decisions.5

1 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the theory and politics of Civil-Military Relations

(Cambridge, 1967), p. 98.

2 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial
Germany (New York, 2006), p. 5.
3 Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 100.
4 Ibid., p. 101.
5 Ibid., p. 101.

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To take first the claim that commanders operated in a distinct sphere

separate from statesmen, it certainly cannot be said that this was the case due
the politicisation of the role of Imperial German colonial officer especially with
the proliferation of martial law in unsettled colonies. The treatment of enemy
prisoners and practice of summary and exemplary executions in China,
Southwest Africa and German East Africa provides examples of this. Indeed, the
Colonial Department made explicit the point that revolutionary adversaries in
the Herero in 1904 should be treated as prisoners of war and not as illegal
combatants.67 And yet, not only was any opposition in Southwest Africa treated
with brutality in battle, 8 if caught males were subjected to trial by the military
through court martial and could then be executed in deemed guilty by field
courts consisting of three officers without any approval from the governor
necessary. 91011 One might argue that the punishing of captured males falls
under Huntingtons remit, borrowed from Lasswell, of the officerships
management of violence,12 yet as the officership made no distinction between
men, women or children, or between combatants and non-combatants all being
labelled either prisoner or prisoner of war13 the argument that this was to
do with the management of violence becomes untenable. Therefore it can be
seen, in the Colonial Departments intervention in military affairs and in the
officerships control over judicial affairs that officers were not separate from
statesmen in colonial conflict.

A lack of distinct separation between issues of the military and those of

statesmen can also be seen in the concurrent conflict in German East Africa.

6 Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R1001, No. 2090, Colonial Department to governor of the Kamerun,

Berlin, 7th January 1905, p. 12.

7 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 146.
8 Katherine Anne Lerman, Bismarckian Germany, in James Retallack (ed.), Imperial Germany
1871 1918 (Oxford, 2008), p. 29.
9 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 19.
10 Isabel V. Hull, The Measure Of Atrocity: The German War Against the Hereros, German History
Institute Bulletin (No. 37, 2005), p. 40.
11 Sibylle Scheipers, Prisoners of War, in Sibylle Scheipers (ed.), Prisoners in War (Oxford, 2010)
p. 15
12 Huntington, Solider and the State, p. 11.
13 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 17. 149.

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Indeed, in August 1905 a state of war was declared in Mohorro, but it was not
declared by the governor, nor the local authority, but by Captain Merker of the
armed forces.14 This was declared, according to the diary of Lieutenant von
Paasche, so that Merker may court-martial three local men thought to be
opposition leaders.15 Herein there is another example of the officership engaging
in a political role in the colonies, contrary to Huntingtons claim that the Imperial
German military remained apolitical. Furthermore, in the case of German East
Africa, it was the case the executions could be ordered by any of three different
groups the local administrator, the commander of the naval troops, or the
unit military commander showing further that judicial matters were handled
and decided by both military and political figures, diminishing the case for
separate political and military spheres in the colonies.1617 Therefore, it can be
concluded that Huntingtons assumptions that statesmen were separate from
commanders and that military victory was the only goal of the officership is not
borne out in the case of Imperial Germanys African colonies as the officership
both sought and commanded political roles and responsibilities.

To take second Huntingtons claim that the army were almost

unanimously opposed to bellicosity and imperialism and Vagts claim that the
armed forces were non-aggressive before 1914 except in its strategy,18 it
certainly cannot be argued that colonial officers were averse to both bellicosity
and imperialism, in fact those two attributes were espoused by colonial officers
in both African conflicts. This can be quantified first in the human cost of both
wars.

Hull argues that the tactics used by the military in the Herero War

represented pursuit and annihilation which, if borne out, certainly resembles

14 Ibid., p. 146.

15 Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, RM 121, No. 452, War diary of Lt. Paasche, 6 August 1905, p. 7.
16 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 146.
17 Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R 1001, No. 723, Gtzen to Foreign Office, 12 December 1905, p. 191.
18 Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 101

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both bellicosity and imperialism.19 Indeed, the Department for the History of
War of the General Staff in Berlin noted in 1907 that:
This bold operation shows in a brilliant light the reckless
energy of the German leadership in pursuing the beaten
enemy. No trouble, no deprivation was spared to rob the
enemy of the last remnants of his capacity to resist The
waterless Omaheke would complete the task begun by
German force, the annihilation of the Herero people.20
This description from the General Staff itself shows the extents to which the
officership, under the generalship of von Trotha, would go to exterminate the
Herero people. This alone is certainly a far cry from a General Staff statement
from 1902 upheld by Huntington as reflective of the officerships professionalism
that proclaimed; we want to conquer nothing, we merely want to defend what
we own. We shall probably never be attackers but rather always be the
attacked.21 Indeed, the genocidal consequences of the pursuit and annihilation
tactic went beyond mere bellicosity and into imperialism; for murder on such as
mass scale was not necessary for mere military victory but instead acted to stake
control over a rebelling people. Such military extremism is incompatible in
absolute terms with Huntingtons contention that the military mind viewed
violence as the last resort of policy.22

Such examples of the officerships bellicosity and imperialism can also be

seen in the Boxer War. Summary executions ordered by army commanders were
also prevalent and occurred often without courts-martial.23 The additional fact
that many such executions were recorded as decapitations adds to the bellicosity
of the measures taken by colonial officers in the Boxer Rebellion.24 Furthermore,

19 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 44.
20 Jrgen Zimmerer (trans.), Die Kmpfe der deutschen Truppen in Sdwestafrika, Department for

the History of War of the General Staff vol. 1 (Berlin, 1907), p. 211.
21 Quoted in; Huntington, The Solider and the State, p. 101.
22 Ibid., p. 101.
23 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 147.
24 Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism: 1800-1914 (Westport, 2008), p.
103.

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executions were ordered against prisoners of war who had not committed crimes
worthy of execution, including those who were guilty of nothing more than
sniping at German troops during a battle.25 The infliction of such punishment on
Chinese rebels, as in Africa, yet the lack of this in, say, the Franco-Prussian war is
additionally suggestive of imperialism as well as bellicosity in the military
extremism. Indeed, the use of violence in colonies to establish order was the root
of imperialist violence.

Furthermore this extreme treatment was uniquely German, though
certainly there were atrocities and executions carried out by other nations in the
conflict.26 A reporter noted this at the time, writing whereas the German grasps
the casus belli with joy, the Briton postpones the decisions as long as possible and
tries to move the opponent to retreat by negotiation.27 Evidently, Huntingtons
claim that the armed services were to some degree non-aggressive is not borne
out in such colonial examples of bellicosity and imperialism.

To take Huntingtons third claim that the civilians, not the generals, made
the decisions whilst the General Staff stuck to strictly military matters28, this
was certainly not the case in the Herero war, where the genocide order came post
facto. Huntington does, however, point out the case of Bismarcks rejection of
advice offered by Moltke on treaties and foreign policy with Russia29 yet it
certainly is not uncommon to seek advice in policy matters from all quarters,
receive different perspectives and discount some. What is notable, however, is
when generals made decisions without political approval, other than that which
was retrospective and ratifying, rather than prescriptive.

Such was the case with the genocide in German Southwest Africa in 1904.
This was begun months before General von Trothas proclamation to the

25 Hull, Absolute Destruction, p. 147.

26 Hodge, Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism, p. 103.

27 Binder-Krieglstein, Berlin, Kmpfe des Deutschen Expeditionskorps, 1902, p. 265
28 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 101.
29 Ibid., p. 101.

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surviving Herero women (he had just before hung the men) and his troops on
October 2nd. It was proclaimed that within the German border every male
Herero, armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot to death. I will no
longer receive women or children but will drive them back to their people or
have them shot at.30 This order came not from the Reichstag, nor the Kaiser, but
from the General himself, and partly in response to the military failure to secure
decisive victory at the Battle of Waterberg months earlier. There are a number of
factors that provide evidence for this being solely a decision made and ordered
by the General himself, thus disproving Huntingtons contention that civilians and
not generals made the decisions.

This comes first from accounts of fellow German colonial officers in
Southwest Africa at the time. Ludwig von Estorff, later a World War One General,
wrote at the time:
we could have saved a great number of them [the Hereros] and
their herds if we had spared them and helped them to recover.
They had been sufficiently punished. I made this suggestion to
General von Trotha but he wanted their total extermination.31
This shows, to some degree, that the decision was one made personally by von
Trotha himself, and certainly maintained by himself when challenged (notably
not by political forces) by officers.

This comes second from written documentation by von Trotha himself.

The same day of the issue of the proclamation, von Trotha sent a copy to the
General Staff, attaching a covering letter explaining his proclamation in more
detail. He firstly distinguishes himself from local political authority, claiming my
opinion is completely opposite to that of the governor I believe that the nation

30 Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R1001, No. 2089, Proclamation of 1904, p. 7.

31 Quoted in, Jrgen Zimmerer, War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in South-West Africa:
The first German genocide, in Jrgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (ed.), Genocide in German
South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904 1908 and its Aftermath (Pontypool, 2010), p. 49.

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must be destroyed.32 This, again, removes civilian decision making from the
equation and shows action directly against that which civilian control had
recommended symbolic of a military dictatorship in Imperial Germanys
colonial officership that Huntington claims did not come until 1914.33 This is
further notable because Trotha only, at this point, informed military leaders
according to Hull before civilian policy makers could inaugurate a
counterpolicy of their own,34 highlighting again the distancing of civilian
decision making from the process and reinforcing the fact that this was colonial
military dictatorship, in disregard for civil political opinion.

Finally, this comes third from the eventual political semi-ratification of the

proclamation post facto. Trotha did not notify either the Colonial Department or
the chancellor of his proclamation, with the former only finding out about it in
late November after the genocide had been committed.35 Certainly, any party
who even were informed about the proclamation immediately could have done
little as the genocide had begun ante proclamation. Nevertheless, Governor
Leutwein is thought to have become aware of the proclamation in October and
yet, in spite of his aforementioned opposition to such a response, wrote in a letter
dated 28th October 1904 (24 days after the proclamation and 3 months after the
genocide begun) that the chancellor and the Colonial Department would be best
to allow the military dictatorship of Lieutenant General von Trotha continue
until resolved.36 This is certainly not reflective of civilian decision-making and
instead is the beginnings of a military dictatorship 10 years prior to when
Huntington claims it became destructive. The proclamation is furthermore a
reinforcement of the imperialism and bellicosity of the colonial officership as well
as an example of a politicised generalship.

32 Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R 1001, No. 2089, Trotha to Schlieffen, 4th October 1904, p. 5.
33 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 106.
34 Hull, Absolute Destruction, pp. 62 63.
35 Ibid., p. 63.
36 Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R1001, No. 2089, Leutwein to Blow, 28th October 1904, pp. 21 22.

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It can therefore, ultimately, be argued that Huntingtons three

aforementioned claims pertaining to the military professionalism and military

mind in Imperial Germany do not extend to the colonial officership in three
separate colonial conflicts. Additionally, it is evident that Huntingtons dating of
Imperial Germanys domestic military dictatorship was preceded by years of
unproductive civil-military relations between colonial officers, colonial
governors, the Colonial Department, the chancellor and the Reichstag.


Word Count 2,405

Bibliography
Secondary Sources

Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism: 1800-1914 (Westport,

2008).

Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial
Germany (New York, 2006).

Isabel V. Hull, The Measure Of Atrocity: The German War Against the Hereros, German
History Institute Bulletin (No. 37, 2005).

Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the theory and politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge, 1967).

James Retallack (ed.), Imperial Germany 1871 1918 (Oxford, 2008).

Sibylle Scheipers, Prisoners of War, in Sibylle Scheipers (ed.), Prisoners in War (Oxford,
2010).

Jrgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (ed.), Genocide in German South-West Africa: The
Colonial War of 1904 1908 and its Aftermath (Pontypool, 2010).

Archival Sources

Binder-Krieglstein, Berlin, Kmpfe des Deutschen Expeditionskorps, 1902.

Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R1001, No. 2090, Colonial Department to governor of the Kamerun,
Berlin, 7th January 1905.

Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R 1001, No. 723, Gtzen to Foreign Office, 12 December 1905.

Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R1001, No. 2089, Leutwein to Blow, 28th October 1904.

Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R1001, No. 2089, Proclamation of 1904.

Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R 1001, No. 2089, Trotha to Schlieffen, 4th October 1904.

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Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, RM 121, No. 452, War diary of Lt. Paasche, 6 August 1905.

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