[G.R. No. 143468-71.

January 24, 2003]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FREEDIE LIZADA @ FREDIE LIZADA, accusedappellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, finding accusedappellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him the
death penalty for each count.
I. The Charges
Accused-appellant[2] was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape under four separate Informations. The
accusatory portion of each of the four Informations reads:
That sometime in August 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one
ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter
removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about November 5, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd designs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one
ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter
removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about October 22, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd designs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one
ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter
removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about September 15, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd designs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter
removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
The four (4) Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390, 99-171391, 99-171392 and 99171393, respectively.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by counsel de parte and entered a plea of not
guilty to each of the charges.[4] A joint trial then ensued.
II. Evidence of the Prosecution[5]
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three (3) children, namely:
Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985;[6] Jepsy, who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine years
old. However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with her
young children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.
In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband and wife at No. 1252 Jose
Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. In 1996, Rose resigned from her job as a waitress. She secured a
loan, bought a truck and used it for her business.
In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof to put up a video shop in her
house. She sold Avon products from house to house to augment her income. Whenever she was out of their house,
Rossel and Analia took turns in tending the video shop and attending to customers.
Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant entered. He laid on top of her, removed
her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis in
her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis. She also felt pain in her sex
organ. Satiated, accused-appellant dismounted but threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to

her. Accused-appellant then returned to his room. The incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the threats
on her life, Analia kept to herself what happened to her.[7]
Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia, placed himself on top of her
and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his finger into her sex organ (fininger niya ako). Satiated, accusedappellant left the room. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused private
complainant two times a week.
On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Analia was in the sala of their house studying her
assignments. Accused-appellant was also in the sala. Rossel tended the video shop while his mother was
away. Analia went into her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room because her brother
might enter any time. She wanted to sleep but found it difficult to do so. Accused-appellant went to his room next to
the room of Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. He was wearing a pair of short pants and was naked
from waist up. Analia did not mind accused-appellant entering her room because she knew that her brother, Rossel
was around. However, accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed, placed himself on top of her, held her hands
and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled to extricate herself. Accused-appellant removed her panty and
touched her sex organ. Accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and then inserted his
penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant ejaculated. Analia felt pain in her sex organ. Momentarily, Rossel passed
by the room of Analia after drinking water from the refrigerator, and peeped through the door. He saw accusedappellant on top of Analia. Accused-appellant saw Rossel and dismounted. Accused-appellant berated Rossel and
ordered him to go to his room and sleep. Rossel did. Accused-appellant then left the room. Analia likewise left the
room, went out of the house and stayed outside for one hour. Rose arrived home at 6:00 p.m. However, Analia did
not divulge to her mother what accused-appellant had just done to her.
On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-appellant was in the sala of the
house watching television. Analia tended the video shop. However, accused-appellant told Analia to go to the
sala. She refused, as nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated accused-appellant who threatened to slap
and kick her.
Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and stayed in the video shop. When Rose
returned, a heated argument ensued between accused-appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour and hit
Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. Ayoko na, ayoko na. Shortly thereafter, Rose and Analia left the house on
board the motorcycle driven by her mother in going to Don Bosco Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some
tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement,
ayoko na, ayoko na, she told her mother that accused-appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body
and that he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked and incensed. The two proceeded to Kagawad Danilo
Santos to have accused-appellant placed under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western
Police District where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita Nocum in the presence of SPO2 Fe H.
Avindante. She related to the police investigator that accused-appellant had touched her breasts and arms in
August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November 5, 1998, at 3:00 p.m. Analia then submitted
herself to genitalia examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the NBI. The medico-legal officer
interviewed Analia, told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m. and November 5, 1998 at 3:00 p.m. [8]
Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on Living Case No. MO-98-1265 which contained her findings during
her examination on Analia, thus:
x x x
Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject. Breasts, developed, hemispherical, firm.
----, brown, 3.0 cms. in diameter. Nipples brown, protruding, 0.7 cms. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vetibular mucosa,
pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact. Hymenal orifice measures, 1.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities,
prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an averagesized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. [9]
Subsequently, Analia told her mother that mabuti na lang iyong panghihipo lang ang sinabi ko. When Rose
inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement, Analia revealed to her mother that accused-appellant
had sexually abused her. On December 15, 1998, Analia executed a Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla and
charged accused-appellant with rape.[10]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant

Accused-appellant testified in his defense. He declared that after a month of courtship, he and Rose agreed in
1994 to live together as husband and wife. He was then a utility worker with the Navotas Branch of the Philippine
Banking Corporation. Rose, on the other hand, was a waitress at the Golden Bird beer house at Rizal Avenue,
Manila.
Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the children of Rose as if they were
his own children. He took care of them, as in fact he cooked and prepared their food before they arrived home from
school. At times, he ironed their school uniforms and bathed them, except Analia who was already big. Analia was
hard-headed because she disobeyed him whenever he ordered her to do some errands. Because of Analias
misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose oftentimes quarreled. Rose even demanded that accused-appellant leave
their house. Another irritant in his and Roses lives were the frequent visits of the relatives of her husband.
Sometime in 1997, accused-appellant was retrenched from his employment and received a separation pay
of P9,000.00 which he used to put up the VHS Rental and Karaoke from which he earned a monthly income
of P25,000.00. While living together, accused-appellant and Rose acquired two colored television sets, two VHS Hifi recorders, one VHS player, one washing machine, one scooter motor, two VHS rewinders, one sala set, one
compact disc player and many other properties.
Accused-appellant ventured that Rose coached her children Analia and Rossel to testify against him and used
them to fabricate charges against him because Rose wanted to manage their business and take control of all the
properties they acquired during their coverture. Also, Rose was so exasperated because he had no job.
IV. The Verdict
On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each count. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court concludes that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him in these four (4) cases, convicts him thereof, and sentences him
to DEATH PENALTY in each and every case as provided for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[11]
V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court
Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his brief that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING OF FACT IN ITS DECISION AND
SUCH FAILURE IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.[12]
XXX
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF FOUR (4)
COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
VI. Findings of the Court
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the decision of the trial court is null and void
as it failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings of facts in its
decision. The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and those of
accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the decretal portion of said decision. The trial court
even failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on
him. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that there should be no mechanical reliance on the
constitutional provision. Trial courts may well-nigh synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that courts are
harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Even if the trial court did not elucidate the grounds as the legal
basis for the penalties imposed, nevertheless the decision is valid. In any event, the Solicitor General contends that
despite the infirmity of the decision, there is no need to remand the case to the trial court for compliance with the
constitutional requirement as the Court may resolve the case on its merits to avoid delay in the final disposition of the
case and afford accused-appellant his right to a speedy trial.
The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if
there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice,
or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by
the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.[14]
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was
reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has
formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of the
trial court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge. [15] More substantial
reasons for the requirement are:
For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may
elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision if well-presented
and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead
of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and
the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of
case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies. [16]
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions culled
therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution. [17] Trial courts
should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal
conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accusedappellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of the parties
then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of
rape and sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on their evidence, the
issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases
for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The trial court rendered judgment against accusedappellant with the curtdeclaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the
prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution. It failed to explain in its
decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence of the prosecution. Reading the decision of the
trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not
even bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its imposition of the supreme penalty of death on accusedappellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example of what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should not be.
The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the decision of the trial
court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of the cases,
the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering that all the records as well as the evidence
adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court. [18] The parties filed their respective briefs articulating their
respective stances on the factual and legal issues.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy
but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. [19] By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material
element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence, the prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt and hence, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal.
Anent the second assignment of error, we will resolve the same for convenience, as follows:
Re: CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-171392 and 99-171393 (covering the crime of rape committed on or about
October 22, 1998 and on or about September 15, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite quantum of evidence that he raped
the private complainant precisely on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical findings of
Dr. Armie Umil show that the hymen of the private complainant was intact and its orifice so small as to preclude

complete penetration by an average size adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury. The physical evidence belies private complainants claim of having been deflowered by accused-appellant on
four different occasions. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the prosecution through the
private complainant proved the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged on both counts.
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The private complainant testified that since
1996, when she was only eleven years old, until 1998, for two times a week, accused-appellant used to place himself
on top of her and despite her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs and sex organ and inserted his finger and
penis into her vagina. In the process, he ejaculated. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she divulged to
anyone what he did to her.[20] Although private complainant did not testify that she was raped on September 15,
1998 and October 22, 1998, nevertheless accused-appellant may be convicted for two counts of rape, in light of the
testimony of private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to have been committed on
or about September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998. The words on or about envisage a period,
months or even two or four years before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution may prove that
the crime charged was committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998.
In People vs. Gianan,[21] this Court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant of five (5) counts of rape, four
of which were committed in December 1992 (two counts) and one each in March and April, 1993 and in November,
1995 and one count of acts of lasciviousness committed in December 1992, on a criminal complaint for multiple
rape, viz:
That sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own twelve (12) year old daughter,
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have
repeated carnal knowledge of Myra M. Gianan, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. [22]
On the contention of accused-appellant in said case that his conviction for rape in December 1992 was so
remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the Information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as
being as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as provided under Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court held:
Accused-appellant nevertheless argues that his conviction for rape in December 1992 is so remote from the date
(November 1995) alleged in the information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as being as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as provided under Rule 110, 11.
This contention is also untenable. In People v. Garcia, this Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape based on
an information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rape from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994, a
time difference of almost four years which is longer than that involved in the case at bar. In any case, as earlier
stated, accused-appellants failure to raise a timely objection based on this ground constitutes a waiver of his right to
object.[23]
Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-appellant defiled her two times a week from
1996 until 1998, accused-appellant raised nary a whimper of protest. Accused-appellant even rigorously crossexamined the private complainant on her testimony on direct examination. The presentation by the prosecution,
without objection on the part of accused-appellant, of evidence of rape committed two times a week from 1996 until
1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998) to prove the charges lodged against him
constituted a waiver by accused-appellant of his right to object to any perceived infirmity in, and in the amendment
of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her having been
repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The private complainant being of tender age, it is possible that
the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant
was still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-appellants commission of the crime. [24] Even the slightest
penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated
rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.[25] In People vs.
Baculi, cited in People vs. Gabayron,[26] we held that there could be a finding of rape even if despite repeated
intercourse over a period of four years, the complainant still retained an intact hymen without injury. In these cases,
the private complainant testified that the penis of accused-appellant gained entry into her vagina:
Fiscal Carisma
(continuing)
After your underwear was removed by the accused, what happened next?
Witness:
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q What did he do while he was on top of you?

A
Q

He inserted his finger (Finenger nya ako, ipinatong nya yong ano nya)
Can you please describe more specifically what is this and I quote Pinatong nya yong ano nya and
where did he place it?
A His organ, sir.
Q Where did he place his organ?
A In my organ, sir. (sa ari ko po.)
Q At this very juncture madam witness, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir, and I also felt that there was a sticky substance that was coming out,
sir.[27] (Underlining supplied)
We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple rape, instead of qualified
rape. The evidence on record shows that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of
private complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as
amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accusedappellant is the common-law husband of the victims mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the
imposition of the death penalty.[28] However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court
because it is favorable to the accused. [29] Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance
of minority of private complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant being the common-law husband of her
mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape. Under the given law, the penalty for simple rape is reclusion
perpetua. Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is liable to private complainant for civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a
total of P200,000.00.
Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390 and 99-171391 (covering the crime committed on or about August 1998 and
November 5, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that (a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-171390 is defective because the
date of the offense on or about August 1998 alleged therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense.It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a) [30]
Accused-appellant further asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped private complainant in
August 1998. Hence, he argues, he should be acquitted of said charge. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its
part, argued that the date on or about August 1998 is sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the commission of
the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. The prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accusedappellant raped private complainant on or about August 1998, as gleaned from her testimony during the trial.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the
crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was
committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is
carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly, accused-appellant did not even bother to file a motion for a bill of
particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed,
accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without
any plaint on the sufficiency of the Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his evidence after the prosecution
had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant questioned for the first time the
sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now too late in the day for him to do so. Moreover, in People vs.
Salalima,[31] this Court held that:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information
defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element
of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at
any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases,
we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed before and until October 15, 1994, sometime in the year 1991
and the days thereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto and
on or about and sometime in the year 1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the dates when the sexual assaults took place,
we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were committed sometime during the month of March 1996 or
thereabout, sometime during the month of April 1996 or thereabout, sometime during the month of May 1996 or

thereabout substantially apprised appellant of the crimes he was charged with since all the elements of rape were
stated in the informations. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the
nature of the cases filed against him. Accordingly, appellants assertion that he was deprived of the opportunity to
prepare for his defense has no leg to stand on.
The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant that accused-appellant raped her two
times a week in 1998. As in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is guilty only of
simple rape.
As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant avers that he is not
criminally liable of rape. We agree with accused-appellant. The collective testimony of private complainant and her
younger brother Rossel was that on November 5, 1998, accused-appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants but
naked from waist up, entered the bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her
panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, accused-appellant saw Rossel peeping through
the door and dismounted. He berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to
sleep. Accused-appellant then left the room of the private complainant. The testimony of private complainant on
direct examination reads:
Fiscal Carisma:
Q In between 1996 and August 1997?
A Yes, sir, sometimes two (2) times a week.
Q In November of 1998, do you recall of any unusual experience that happened to you again?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was this unusual experience of yours?
A He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q You said he whom are you referring to?
A Freedie Lizada Jakosalem, sir.
Q The same person you pointed to earlier?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said he placed himself on top of you in November, 1998, what did he do while he was on top of you?
A Hes smashing my breast and he was also touching my arms and my legs, sir.
Q What else if any madam witness?
A He was also touching my sex organ, sir.
Q What else, if any?
Atty. Estorco:
May we take note of the same objection your honor, the prosecution - - Court:
Same ruling. Let the complainant continue considering that she is crying and still young.
Witness:
None else, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
With what part of his body did he touch your sex organ?
Atty. Estorco:
Your Honor, that is - - Court:
May answer.
Fiscal Carisma:
I will re-propound the question, your honor.
You said that he touched your sex organ, will you tell the court with what part of his body, did he touch your sex organ?
Witness:
With his hands, sir.
Q What about after November 1998 - - -was this the last incident, this unusual thing that you experienced from the
hands of the accused was this that last time, the one you narrated in November 1998?
A Yes, sir.[32]
On cross-examination, the private complainant testified, thus:
Atty. Balaba:
Q Who was that somebody who entered the room?
A My stepfather Freedie Lizada, sir.
Q He was fully dressed at that time, during the time, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, he was dressed then, sir.
Q And he had his pants on, is that correct?
A He was wearing a short pants, sir.
Q Was it a T-shirt that he had, at that time or a polo shirt?
A He was not wearing any shirt then, sir, he was naked.
Q When you realized that somebody was entering the room were you not afraid?
A No, sir, I was not afraid.

What happened when you realized that somebody entered the room, and the one who entered was your stepfather,
Freedie Lizada?
A I did not mind him entering the room because I know that my brother was around but suddenly I felt that somebody
was holding me.
Q He was holding you, where were you when he held you?
A I was in the bed, sir, lying down.
Q You were lying down?
A Yes, sir.
Q What part of the body did the accused Freedie Lizada touched you?
A My two arms, my legs and my breast, sir.
Q Do you mean to tell us that he was holding your two arms and at the same time your legs, is that what you are
trying to tell us?
A He held me first in my arms and then my legs, sir.
Q He held you first by your arms, is that what you are trying to tell us?
Fiscal Carisma:
Already answered your honor, he held the arms and then the legs.
Court:
Already answered.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Your honor, I am just trying to - Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
Q He held your arms with his two hands?
A Only with one hand, sir.
Q Which hand were you touched?
A I do not know which hand, sir.
Q Which arm of yours was held by Freedie Lizada?
A I could not recall, sir.
Q Which side of your body was Freedie Lizada at that time?
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q What was the position of Freedie Lizada when he held your arms?
A He was sitting on our bed, sir.
Q Which side of your bed was Freedie Lizada sitting on?
A I do not know, sir. I cannot recall.
Atty. Balaba:
Can we take a recess your honor?
Court:
How long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:
We will confront the witness with so many things your honor.
Court:
Yes, thats why I am asking you how long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:
About another hour, sir.
Court:
So we will be finished by 11:15, proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
You cannot also remember which leg was held by Freedie Lizada?
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q When this happened, did you not shout for help?
A I did not ask for help, I was motioning to resist him, so that he would go out, sir. I was struggling to free myself
from him, sir.
Q And you were not able to extricate yourself from him?
A I was not able to extricate myself, sir.
Q You were struggling with one arm of Lizada holding your arm, and the other hand was holding your leg, is that what
you are trying to tell us?
A No, sir, its not like that.
Q Could you tell us, what happened, you did not shout for help and you were trying to extricate yourself, what
happened?
A He suddenly went out of the room, sir.
Q Now, he went - - Court:
You did not shout during that time?
A No, your honor.[33]
Rossel, the nine-year old brother of the private complainant corroborated in part his sisters testimony. He testified on direct
examination, thus:

Fiscal Carisma: (continuing)

Q Now, on November 2, 1998 do you recall where you were at about 3:00 oclock?
A I was outside our house, sir.
Q Where was your house again, Mr. witness, at that time? Where was your house at that date, time and place? At
that date and time?
A 1252 Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Court:
Q The same address?
A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q On that date, time and place, do your recall where your sister Anna Lea Orillosa was?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was she?
A She was sleeping, sir.
Q Now, on that date, time and place you said you were outside your house, did you stay the whole afternoon outside
your house?
A No, sir.
Q Where did you go next?
A Inside, sir.
Q For what purpose did you get inside your house?
A Because I was thirsty, sir.
Q So you went to the fridge to get some water?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened as you went inside your house to get some water?
A I saw my stepfather removing the panty of my sister and he touched her and then he laid on top of her, sir.
Q Do you see your stepfather inside the courtroom now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you point to him?
A He is the one, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person who when asked answers to the name Freedie Lizada.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q This thing that your father was that your stepfather did to your elder sister, did you see this before or after you
went to the fridge to get some water?
A I already got water then, sir.
Q What did you do as you saw this thing being done by your stepfather to your elder sister?
A I was just looking at them when he saw me, sir.
Q Who, you saw who? You are referring to the accused Freedie Lizada?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, what did you do as you were seen by your stepfather?
A He scolded me, he shouted at me, he told me something and after that he went to the other room and slept, sir. [34]
Rossel testified on cross-examination, thus:
Q So you got thirsty, is that correct, and went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you took a glass of water from the refrigerator?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was at this time that you saw the accused Freedie Lizada touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was this refrigerator located?
A In front of the room where my sister sleeps, sir.
Q So the door of your sisters room was open?
A Yes, sir.
Q And --- okay, you said your sister was sleeping. What was the position of your sister when you said the accused
removed her panty?
A She was lying straight, but she was resisting, sir.
Q Were you noticed by your sister at that time?
A No, sir.
Q And your sister did not call for help at that time?
A No, sir.
Q And all this time you saw the accused doing this, from the refrigerator where you were taking a glass of water?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not say something to the accused?
A No, sir, I was just looking.
Q So your sister was lying down when the accused removed her panty, is that what you are trying to tell us?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where was the - - - and the accused saw you when he was removing the panty of your sister?
A Not yet, sir, but after a while he looked at the refrigerator because he might be thirsty.

Q So---you said the accused was touching your sister. What part of her body was touched by the accused?
A Here, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing at the lower portion of the body.
Atty. Balaba:
Q You saw with what hand was the accused touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.
Q What hand was he touching your sister?
A This hand, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness raising his right hand.
Atty. Balaba:
Q And which part of your sisters body was the accused touching with his right hand? Your sisters body was the
accused touching with his right hand?
A Her right leg, sir.
Q How about his left hand, what was the accused doing with his left hand?
A Removing her panty, sir.
Q Removing her?
A Panty, sir.
Q Which hand of your sister was being removed with the left hand of the accused?
Court:
Which?
Atty. Balaba:
Which hand, which hand?
Fiscal Carisma:
The question is vague, your honor.
Atty. Balaba:
Because he said that removing the hand --Fiscal Carisma:
He said removing the panty.
Atty. Balaba:
Is that panty? Im sorry.
Q So, the accused was touching with his right hand the left thigh of your sister --Fiscal Carisma:
The right thigh.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Rather the right thigh of your sister and with his left hand removing the panty, is that what you are telling to tell us?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your sister all the time was trying to ---was struggling to get free, is that not correct?
A Yes, sir, she was resisting. (witness demonstrating)
Q She was struggling --- was the accused able to remove the panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q And all the time you were there looking with the glass of water in your hand?
A Yes, sir.[35]

In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the
aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally
liable for consummated rape.[36]
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of consummated acts of
lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said
Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence
on record, we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of
either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision
correccional.[37]
For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence
of the following essential elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.[38]
Lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has
relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.[39]

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.[40]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.[41]
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following
its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. [42] The raison detre for the law requiring a
direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has
never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being
equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so
for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is.[43] It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the
design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of
the offense after the preparations are made. [44] The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. [45] In the
words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.[46]
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist
of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. [47] One perpetrating
preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a
consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. [48] The Supreme Court of
Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is
necessary that their objective be known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves
should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground
for designation of the offense.[49]
There is persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the material damage is wanting, the nature
of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained but the same must be inferred from the nature of the
acts executed (accion medio).[50] Hence, it is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their
nature, by the facts to which they are related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. This Court emphasized
in People vs. Lamahang[51] that:
The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to
produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to
avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to cause a particular injury. [52]
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his spontaneous desistance, he is not
guilty of an attempted felony.[53] The law does not punish him for his attempt to commit a felony. [54] The rationale of
the law, as explained by Viada:
La Ley, en efecto, no hiere sino a pesar suyo; prefiere impedir el crimen que castigarlo. Si el autor de la tentativa,
despues de haber comenzado a ejecutar el delito por actos exteriores, se detiene, por un sentimiento libre y
espontaneo, en el borde del abismo, salvo esta. Es un llamamiento al remordimiento, a la conciencia, una gracia un
perdon que concede la Ley al arrepentimiento voluntario.[55]
As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:
First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily abandoned. There is no conceivable overt
act to which the abandoned purpose could be attached. Secondly, the policy of the law requires that the offender, so
long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan, should be encouraged to do so, by saving him harmless in case of
such retreat before it is possible for any evil consequences to ensue. Neither society, nor any private person, has
been injured by his act. There is no damage, therefore, to redress. To punish him after retreat and abandonment
would be to destroy the motive for retreat and abandonment.[56]

It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal
liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his desistance. [57]
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-appellant intended to have carnal
knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere
preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if
not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from
performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only
because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.
[58]
In a case of similar factual backdrop as this case, we held:
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant can
only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing
and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival
of the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joys private organ. Accordingly, as the crime
committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor which is two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.
[59]
Accused-appellant should be meted an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which should be taken from prision
correccional which has a range of from six months and one day to six years and the maximum of which shall be
taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight years and one day to ten years,
without any modifying circumstance. Accused-appellant is also liable to private complainant for moral damages in the
amount of P25,000.00.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, is SET ASIDE. Another
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also
hereby ordered to pay private complainant Analia Orillosa the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from six
years of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to ten years of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; and,
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of simple rape, defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount
of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for each count, or a total amount
of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37271 June 25, 1980

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ROMIE V. BRAGA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAGNO B. PABLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, Branch
XIII, ROGELIO CARACE, GODOFREDO CARACE, GIL CASTRENCE, ROGELIO CARANZA and DAMIAN
SENIT, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan, Rogelio Carace, Godofredo
Carace, Gil Castrence, Rogelio Caranza and Damian Senit were charged with Homicide in an information filed on
February 6, 1973, for the killing of Benjamin Atcha (Criminal Case No. 254-A).

Alright, you better elevate this to the appellate court if you think ... interrupted.

Arraigned on March 29, 1973 before Hon. Magno B. Pablo, all the aforenamed accused pleaded not guilty. Hearing
started on April 23, 1973 and was reset on May 3, 1973 after the presentation f state witness Pepito Ordonio, there
being another case also scheduled for hearing.

May we pray that their petition be made in writing so that we could make our corresponding
answer thereto, since the prosecution is elevating this incident to the appellate court, Your
Honor.

On May 3, 1973, the prosecution moved for postponement, and without objection on the part of the defense, trial was
postponed to May 29 and 30, 1973. One witness, Eudocia Caspi, and two witnesses, Irene Torino and Derico
Tacadena, were presented on May 29 and 30, respectively.

COURT:

Trial was reset for continuance on June 13 and 22, 1973. On June 13, 1973, only one witness, Santiago Atcha, was
presented for lack of material time, and on June 22, 1973, Santiago Atcha was cross-examined, after which the
prosecution moved for postponement, and without objection on the part of the defense, hearing was reset for July
17, 1973.

ATTY. TAMAYO:

Well, it is up to the prosecution to do so, they may elevate this case to the appellate court.
(Transcript p. 8. July 17, 1973, emphasis supplied)
ATTY. AREOLA:

On July 17, 1973, for failure of its last witness, Dr. Francisco Q. Duque, to arrive, the prosecution moved for
postponement on the ground that Dr. Duque is a vital and indispensable witness who would testify on the cause of
death of the victim in this case, Benjamin Atcha.

Your Honor please, we have here a pending motion for continuance and in view of the denial of
these motion for reconsideration, may we pray for ten days within which to elevate this case to
the appellate court, Your Honor.

The presiding judge, Hon. Magno B. Pablo, denied the motion for postponement and ordered the prosecution to
proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The prosecuting fiscal asked for reconsideration of the order denying
the motion for postponement, but the judge denied the motion for reconsideration, prompting the prosecution to file a
second motion for reconsideration in writing, signed by both the fiscal and the private prosecutor, stating inter alia :

COURT:

4. That this is the first time that the prosecution is moving for a postponement of this case or. the
ground of the absence of the last witness Dr. Francisco Q. Duque and it appears on the records
that the subpoena sent to Dr. Duque was received by his secretary who may not have conveyed
the same to Dr. Duque and the second time on the part of the prosecution since the beginning of
the hearing on this case;
5. That to serve the better ends of justice the prosecution should be given another opportunity at
least to secure and resort to other processes to enable it to present Dr. Francisco Q. Duque at
the next scheduled hearing (pp. 4-5, Rollo)
Presiding Judge Magno B. Pablo denied the written second motion for reconsideration. Forthwith, the prosecution
asked for 10 days within which to elevate the question of the propriety of the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration to the appellate court. What transpired on this request is recorded as follows:
FISCAL:
In view of the fact, and in view of the denial of this Honorable Court of our second motion for
reconsideration, may we pray that we be given ten days within which to elevate this incident to
the appellate court.

Alright, you can do that, we do not have to preclude or prevent you in elevating this incident to
the appellate court if you think that the Court exceeds his discretion or his authorities, in
compelling the prosecution to proceed with the hearing of this case then the Court is willing to be
corrected.
(Transcript pp. 10-11, July 17, 1973) (pp. 74-75, Rollo)
Despite the granting of the request for ten (10) days within which to elevate the incident of the denial of the motion
for postponement, Judge Pablo granted a "Motion to Consider Prosecution's Case Rested and Motion to Dismiss"
filed by the defense in the afternoon of the same day, July 17, 1973, in an order also dated July 17, 1973, acquitting
all the accused for failure on the part of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt their guilt, with cost de
oficio, without giving the prosecution time to file its opposition to the aforesaid motion, which the prosecution in fact
filed promptly on July 18, 1973 after receipt of a copy of the defense motion of July 17, 1973.
On July 19, 1973, the presiding judge issued an order which reads:
For the purpose of making the record straight, what has been stated in the third par. of the
prosecution's OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONSIDER PROSECUTION'S CASE RESTED
AND MOTION TO DISMISS, dated and filed July 18,1973, at 1:45 P.M. to the effect that the
court has given the prosecution ten days to elevate by certiorari to the appellate court, the order
denying the prosecution's "SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" is not correct
because such order is interlocutory, otherwise, the denial by the court of the prosecution's
motion for continuance will be defeated (p. 13, Rollo)

COURT:

To the above order, the prosecuting fiscal immediately filed a motion for clarification and prayed that the court's order
of July 18, 1973 be clarified, and that it issues an order expressly granting, as requested, the prosecution ten (10)
days from July 17, 1973 within which to elevate the matter of the court's denial of the prosecution's motion for
postponement of the hearing of the case.
The prosecution's motion for reconsideration filed on July 18, 1973 and its motion for clarification were both set for
hearing on July 20, 1973. However, on July 19, 1973, the court issued an order amending motu propio its order of
July 17, 1973 by ordering "the dismissal of the case" instead of "the acquittal of the accused". And on July 20, 1973
when its motion for reconsideration was argued orally by the prosecuting fiscal, the court denied the motion without
issuing any formal order.
Upon the foregoing facts, this petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on August 10, 1973 with the following
prayer:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, petitioner pray that this
petition be given due course and a writ of certiorari and mandamus be issued ordering the
proceedings herein complained of to be certified up for review and after due hearing let
judgment be rendered:

knowledge thereof, he failed to come to court, his arrest may be ordered, as is the precise procedure enjoined upon
the court to follow under Section 11, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 11. Compelling attendance. in case of failure to attend, the court or judge issuing the
subpoena, upon proof of service thereof, and of the failure of the witness, may issue a warrant to
the sheriff of the province, or his deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the court or
officer where his attendance is required, and the costs of such warrant and seizure of such
witness shall be paid by the witness if the court issuing it shall determine that his failure to
answer the subpoena was willful and without just excuse. (p. 71, Rollo)
The authority of the court to order such arrest and to declare one, not obeying a subpoena, in contempt of court as
provided in Section 12 of the same Rule, is deemed necessary for an effective and fair administration of justice and
to impose due respect to the judicial process of which the courts are its most visibly majestic symbol. The court's
failure to exercise sound discretion in denying the prosecution's motion for postponement is to Us palpable, in the
light of the lack of objection on the part of the defense on the prosecution's second motion for postponement, as
shown by the following recorded proceedings:
COURT: (To Atty. Tamayo)

1. Declaring the orders of respondent Judge Magno B. Pablo dated July 17, and 19 denying the
prosecution's motion for postponement, denying its motion for reconsideration and the order
acquitting the accused or dismissing the case null and void;

Before we will proceed with the case, did you receive the written motion

2. Ordering the respondent Judge Magno B. Pablo to proceed with the hearing of Crim. Case
No. 254-A;

Yes, Your Honor.

3. Such other and further relief as are just and equitable under the premises. (p. 18, Rollo)
We are constrained to hold that the action of the respondent judge, Hon. Magno B. Pablo in issuing the orders
denying the prosecution's motion for postponement and granting the defense motion to consider the prosecution
case rested and to dismiss the case, as tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The motion for postponement was fully justified. It is based on the absence of Dr. Francisco Duque who is the last
and a very vital prosecution witness, whose attendance was religiously sought by the prosecution by asking for the
issuance of a subpoena each time the case was set for hearing. The respondent judge ought to know that it is Dr.
Duque's testimony that will prove the causal relation between the wounds inflicted by the accused who assaulted the
victim and the latter's death. The alleged denial of the right to speedy trial as constitutionally granted to the accused
was a flimsy ground for the court to deny the postponement as requested by the prosecution, much less to dismiss
the case, without even a recital of the facts as established by the evidence already presented, which appears to have
at least proved the commission of a crime by the accused against the victim, although perhaps a lesser one than the
offense charged.

ATTY. TAMAYO:

COURT:
What do you say to that?
ATTY. TAMAYO:
We submit to the discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
You have any objection
ATTY. TAMAYO:
We submit Your Honor.

There are several actions which the respondent judge could and should have taken if he had wished to deal with the
case considering the gravity of the crime charged, with fairness to both parties, as is demanded by his function of
dispensing justice and equity. But he utterly failed to take such actions. Thus, he should have first given warning that
there win definitely be no further postponement after that which he reasonably thought should be the last. He should
also have ascertained whether Dr. Duque had personally known of the subpoena, so that if despite his personal

(Transcript p. 7, July 17, 1973). (pp. 71-72, Rollo).

The records also disclose that trial was never postponed due to the non-appearance of Dr. Duque. The first and only
postponement sought on that ground was denied.

Having failed in exercising his rightful authority as indicated above, the respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not
only denying the motion for postponement, but also in immediately granting the defense written motion to consider
the prosecution's case rested, without giving the prosecution a chance to oppose the same, and without reviewing
the evidence already presented for a proper assessment as to what crime has been committed by the accused of
which they may properly be convicted thereunder, acquitted the said accused, although, realizing later the
improvidence in his action, he amended his order of acquittal of the accused to that of dismissal of the case. It is in
completely ignoring the evidence already presented, for no mention thereof was made in its order of July 17, 1973,
dismissing the case, on motion of the defense, which in reality is a demurrer on the evidence, that the respondent
judge committed a grave abuse of discretion for disregarding plain procedural requirement, not a mere error of
judgment.
The order of dismissal, under the circumstances pointed out above, would amount to an acquittal because evidence
had already been presented by the prosecution. An evaluation of said evidence is thus indispensably required,
where, as in this case, the evidence presented even if the prosecution's case is considered submitted at a stage
short of the presentation of its complete evidence, obviously suffices to prove a crime, even if a lesser one than the
offense charged. The dismiss was sought to be justified upon an invocation of the right to speedy trial. Precisely, the
respondent judge, allegedly, to avoid a violation thereof, denied further postponement. It is therefore, a palpable error
to base the dismissal of the case, as the respondent judge did, on the ground of the violation of accused's right to
speedy trial. If at all, the dismissal may be decreed by reason of the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused of any crime under the information, even on the basis of the evidence presented when its case was deemed
submitted on motion of the defense. The respondent court, however, failed utterly to show this to be what actually
obtained after the hearings held on at least six days, as the order of the respondent judge acquitting the accused, or
dismissing the case, as he later amended his order, made no mention whatsoever of the evidence presented by the
prosecution during the six times the case was set, for hearing merely stating, by way of an obviously baseless
conclusion, that the guilt of the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The basis of the dismissal of
the case is, therefore, both legally and factually incorrect. In his answer, the respondent judge stated that he
dismissed the case on the strength of the following cases:
After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the
Court, the Fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and consequently fails to prove the
defendant's guilt, the Court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal
amounting to an acquittal of the defendant. (Gandicela vs. Lutero, L-4069, May 21, 1951 and
People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954).
The Court below did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant any further postponement, and
upon refusal or inability of the Fiscal to proceed, it did not err in dismissing the case. (People vs.
Barroya, 61 Phil. 318, VI L. J. 825).
The right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution was adopted and enforced upon
considerations borne of past experiences and was intended to prevent the government from
oppressing its citizens by allowing criminal prosecution suspended or hanging over them for an
indefinite time, and thus incidentally forestall delays in the administration of justice. For the
enforcement of this constitutional precept, judges are under obligation to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases (Benavides vs. Hon. Maglanoc, CA-G.R. No.
28307, Jan. 31,1961). (pp. 47-48, Rollo).
If as admitted by the respondent judge, he dismissed the case solely on the alleged violation of the accused's right of
speedy trial, the records will show that there was no such violation, for on the day the case was last set for hearing
on July 17, 1973, and because of the absence of the last witness of the prosecution, the latter moved for

postponement, the court denied the motion precisely to protect the right to speedy trial from being violated despite
that, as previously shown even the defense did not insist on its objection to the second written motion for
postponement leaving the matter to the sound discretion of the court. All previous hearings saw the prosecution
presenting its witnesses in the most normal course of the proceedings. No delay whatsoever was complained of by
the defense, for it left the matter of postponement as requested by the prosecution entirely to the court's discretion.
As previously noted, there has been no single postponement based on the non- appearance of Dr. Duque the first
one sought on that ground having been denied by the respondent judge who is, on that account now made a
respondent in this instant petition. We hold that under the circumstances, the respondent judge gravely abused its
discretion in not granting the postponement prayed for. As the Solicitor General has pointedly argued :
Applications for continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. This discretion
should, however, be exercised in such a way as to subserve justice. In the case at bar, the
denial of petitioner's motion would clearly result in a miscarriage of justice, especially
considering the fact that the prosecution had already established that the accused had inflicted
blows on the deceased and all that remained to be proven was that death resulted from the
assault. As this Court stated in a similar case:
In passing upon applications for continuance in a criminal case, the court should bear in mind
that it is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as those of the people at large, and
should not unduly force him to trial nor for light causes jeopardize the rights or interest of the
public. (22 C.J.S. 742) (People vs. Romero, 93 Phil. 128,132) (pp. 72-73, ROLLO)
It may be added that the right of the offended parties, who usually take active part in the trial, are equally entitled to
the protection offered by the courts to the public at large when trying a criminal case.
Aside from this series of missteps and legal error committed by the respondent judge, which in their totality clearly
constitute grave abuse of discretion, the records also show that the court, after denying the second motion for
postponement filed in writing by the prosecution, granted on request, the latter ten (10) days within which to elevate
the matter of the denial of the aforesaid second motion for reconsideration. The respondent denies this fact, but We
find the records demonstrably showing respondent's denial totally devoid of truth. His alleging that to grant said
request would be to defeat his act of denying the motion for postponement seems only to show the erratic turn of his
mind. There is nothing inconsistent between denying the motion for postponement and allowing the denial to be
tested by a higher court where it is alleged that the respondent judge in denying postponement, committed a grave
abuse of discretion. A judge who refuses to have his judicial acts tested in a higher court would be acting with
tyranny, a judicial norm hardly proper of one exercising judicial function in the lower echelon of the judicial hierarchy.
While the respondent judge never raised the issue of double jeopardy, the private respondents may have in mind
invoking the principle of double jeopardy, although not expressly, when they contend that the dismissal of this case
amounts to an acquittal (p. 5, Memorandum for Private Respondents). The principle, however, may not be
successfully invoked because the action of the respondent judge complained of in this petition being clearly one
constituting grave abuse of discretion, same amounts to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy
from attaching (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; People v. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29; and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA
264).
Moreover, in the cases where double jeopardy was sustained, dismissal was due to failure of the prosecution to
present evidence, and after the dismissal, an entirely new information was filed for the same act or one included in
the act previously charged. In this case, only one information was filed, and this petition is a mere incident of the
criminal proceedings taking place in the court of respondent judge under that single information, in one continuous
process, to question the legality of the judge's action in terminating the case, the way he did, which as already

intimated, was in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (See People v. Gomez, 20
SCRA 293; People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389; People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119).
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent judge dismissing Criminal Case No. 254-A of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan is hereby set aside. The respondent judge is
hereby ordered to set the case for further proceedings by having the accused therein arrested to face further trial
subject to their right to bail, the prosecution to be given reasonable time and opportunity to complete the presentation
of its evidence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE, PETER DOE AND
JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accusedappellants.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the
accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by court-appointed
counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan
Escober.
A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence, summarized by the Solicitor General in
his Consolidated Brief, as follows:
One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte, * was formerly a
co-security guard of appellant Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family
corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled
compound about 50 meters away from the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace
Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was relieved by
Domingo Rocero for being always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug.
16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983).
At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in the
morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was
relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay Balingasa in
Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with
three companions, one of whom he later Identified as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 411, tsn, April 22, 19831.

G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVII, QUEZON CITY and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y
Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the
victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R. No.
69564 is the automatic review of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on certiorari of said
decision, the recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan Escober 'to cut short that long period of wait for a final
resolution of his fate." 1
Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan
Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in an
Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito
de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.

After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng Electrical
Supply as he usually does after office hours, accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6year old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post. At the office, the
two children watched a television program, as their father proceeded to the bathroom to take a
bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the gate. Appellant
Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after Abuyen had talked with Escober,
the former asked Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions
went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].
At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her husband
and two children. On her way, she noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the
appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened, but nobody
answered. Suddenly, she heard of shot coming from the direction of the garage; and when she
looked thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober walking towards the gate. So, she
rushed back inside the house to contact her husband through the intercom. But since the
intercom was out of order, she hurriedly went outside and met appellant Escober who
volunteered the information "that he was not hit." [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].
Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard the gunshot. He
hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany
was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a scissor blade
[Exhibit 'E' fun of blood. He also observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all Ms

10

drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in one of the drawers was
lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the car as their children
was (sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son drove a second
one. After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children inside the two cars, they were
brought to the Chinese General Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp.
22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator Oscar Francisco
was dispatched to investigate the incident. And, since the victims were already brought to the
Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto. When he arrived at the hospital
at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a
cursory examination of the victim and indicated on two separate sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"),
the 12 and 11 stab wounds sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there,
he proceeded to the scene of the crime, where he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a
police photographer, who arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5, 1983].
Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor (Exhibit "E") which the
former said was found beside the pool of blood inside the room where the incident happened. In
the course of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the office of Vicente
Chua were forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview with
Vicente, he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00 was taken by the culprits in one
of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].
Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters appellant Escober, the
security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his version
of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober, the written statements of the victims'
parents, Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively).
Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "I") the result of his
investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at the left hand margin thereon the following notations:
"Detained the accused allprima facie case exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof.
No bail recommended. [pp. 13-23, Ibid].
Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police apprehended the appellant
Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily Identified by the victims' mother, Una Chua, as one
of those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound during the night of the incident on
December 2 (sic), 1982. Another statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken on December 10,
1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the previous statement she gave on December 8,
1982. Also taken on even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa (Exhibit
"K") and that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects who claimed that her
son, Amadeo Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including the herein two
appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant Punzalan waived his constitutional
rights under custodial investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit "M")
wherein he did not only admit his participation in the commission of the crime, but also
implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].
Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal, Police
Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario

Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias Dodong and a
certain Peter Doe, albeit, only the herein two appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6,
1983]. 2
Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his defense. His testimony is deed in
his Brief, thus:
Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western Private Detective Security
since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St. Grace Village,
Balintawak, Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On December 3, 1982, at
7 p.m. he reported for work. When his companion left and he arrived (to take over) he cleaned
the guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did not like to see the guardhouse
dirty and also because after the security guard leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it.
There was a janitor but the security guards used to clean the guardhouse. As security guard, he
had a gun but on this occasion he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the guardhouse.
Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and talked to him because he, Alorte
alias Abuyen, wanted to, and two men [also accused named Does as they are also still at large]
entered and one man [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober was not able to talk
to Alorte alias Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his companions aimed a gun at
Escober and also a knife and they said they would kill him. He does not know the man who
aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte because he Alorte used to be his co-guard at Vising
Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into (climbed) the pick- up car inside the
garage and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte and his companion went up the
Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is
Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the man who was left near the gate but he knows him by
face and he was then in the courtroom and he pointed to the person who answered by the name
of Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co- accused. Escober did not see what Punzalan was doing
because he, Escober, was made to climb the vehicle (pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the
locker. He was not able to get that gun when these four men entered because a gun was
already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker because he was formerly a
security guard at Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why Alorte did not
continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went up the office, they came down
and talked to the man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was able
to avoid it and after that, the four men suddenly left. Escober went down from the pickup and he
heard Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs. Chua at the
house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed. So Escober went to the house
and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called him, Alorte and his companions were no longer at
the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he,
together, returned to Vising Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was
shouting and he could not understand him because he was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua
went back and got the car, parked it and returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the
office, he was bringing his son and placed him at the parked car of the office. When Chua
returned to the office (after he called Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him with his son
and placed him at the balcony. The two children who were stabbed were carried in two cars
because there were only two cars at the driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know
to what hospital they went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he could
help him (Escober) call the police. Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey
gave him a directory and asked him (Escober) to look for the telephone number of the police but
he told Jeffrey to look it up himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes, the police
came and after that, the owner of the security agency arrived. Other policemen not in uniform

11

also arrived. They interviewed Escober and forced him to go with them to the police precinct. He
refused because the owner of the agency had not then arrived. When owner arrived, he called
another security guard to guard the Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the
security brought Escober to the precinct to get his statement and there the police was forcing
him to adroit he was the one who robbed and killed the children of the Chuas and he told them
do not know everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him together with Abuyen
Alorte inside the garage is not true because he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their
children were being stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was finding (sic)
to call him (Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing
something. Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He Identified his statement,
Exhibit I for the defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature
there are his. He knows the police who investigated him but he does not know the person.
Escober was at the precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic) October 3,
1983, the date he testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 3

portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are those Identified as Exhs.'11-A and 11-B (TSN, pp.
19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4
On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his manifestation in
open court immediately after the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to this Court, Atty.
Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the prosecution.
Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as counsel for
accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration for the said accused, which
was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the
prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the petition in
G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.
In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of his testimony is found in his
Brief as follows:
PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9,
1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at "the market of Monumento." In the afternoon of 3
December 1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive
ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a place near Abonce Beer House; ABUYEN/ALORTE was with
two companions whom he introduced all his relatives; after several drinks, he was requested to
join the group to proceed to another place for which reason they boarded a tricycle; and the
group stopped 'at a place with a high gate' because ABUYEN/ ALORTE wanted 'to drop by
someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little door and
the security guard (PUNZALAN Identified accused Escober as the security guard) opened the
door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed PUNZALAN "to wait for
him outside;" and thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions entered the compound
(TSN, pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).
PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that while waiting he
heard the mourn (sic) of a child that he was then about to enter the premises but he met
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with blood stains in their arms;' that
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started running and he followed them; that in response
to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they
boarded a taxi and he was brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN pp. 1418, Nov. 9, 1983)
PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at the Monuments market. No
lawyer assisted him during his custodial investigation despite the fact that he informed the police
officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator
proceeded to interrogate him. He disclosed that he was invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink;
and that they drank beer 'in a place near Abonce Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that, when
Exh. M was presented for his signature he refused to sign (Exh. "M") because 'many statements
thereon are not correct that he nevertheless signed Exh. "M" because he was already tired and
was forced to sign it after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to water therapy and he
could not endure the pain, when they gave (him) the electric shock treatment;" and that the

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-PAGE DECISION IMPOSING DEATH
SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...;
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH
HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE
THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE
COMPOUND IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN,
JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A
GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT':
AND THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER 'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING
THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING PETITIONER TO DEATH AS SUCH
PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ... OF
SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984. 5
These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.
On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:
PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE
NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO RE MAIN SILENT AND TO
COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY ININVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF LAW, PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE
FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME WAS
ROBBERY;

12

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT COMMITTED;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE
DOUBT;
THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS
ATTENDED WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND. 6

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection interposed to the form and substance of
the decision under review. Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and void for it does not
conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution and that it was rendered even before all
the stenographic notes of the proceedings had been transcribed.
We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a
number of handwritten notations and insertions. It reads:
The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of Robbery with
Homicidedefined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that on or
about December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation again persons
robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon
City and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of said robbery
employed personal violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing
them and inflicting thereby multiple serious mortal wounds directly causing their immediate
deaths, to the damage of their heirs.
Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo
Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr. Josefina
Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence consisted of the
testimonies of the two named accused above and some exhibits, contained in Pages 1 to 454 of
the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.
In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both parties, the
arguments and authorities cited therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the
above information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan,
Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as principals by
indispensable cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating circumstances, and
attended by aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission of the
crime, taking advantage of number and superior strength, treachery, in band, among others, and
that the defenses and excuses of the accused are unnatural, incredible, contradictory and
uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact, among others, are the
following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason of accused Juan Escober in opening the gate of
the compound in question, against the testimony of his co-accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of
knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion of firing a gun just before the exit of
the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and volunteering the information that he was not hit. The
version of Juan Escober regarding his actuation during the half-hour robbery homicide was
replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted being fetched by, going with and talking

to, immediately prior to taking a tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as lookout for, his
co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some drinks, not to get drunk
admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve better to commit the crime planned.
WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the amended information, this Court holding
firmly that when a hired security guard opens the compound under his protection to four men
who turn out to be robbers and murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and
meets with said malefactors immediately before the commission of the offense and stands guard
at the gate and flees with said malefactors then the burden of proof is shifted to him to exculpate
and excuse himself by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, which the named accused
failed to do, but succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their rediculous (sic)
justifications for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent and helpless children on the occasion
of that robbery in question, of being held-up at gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of
throwing garbage and being fired at but not getting hit but not knowing so many vital details a
truthful witness would certainly not forget, among others, thus that this court after a total
appreciation of all the evidence on record is convinced that there being apple (sic)
circumstances present that could only possibly point to the guilt of said accused for the most
heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby sentences the said accused Juan
Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment provided by Article 294,
Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is DEATH and orders the said
accused further to pay the heirs of their victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each,
jointly and severally, and moral damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984.

Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based ...
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's
tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.
Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without specifying which
of the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober
because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what
"vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by
the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others," but did not
particularly state the factual bases for such findings.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480, reiterating Montelibano v. Director
of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular Government 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Phil.
71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v. Millora, 3 Phil. 458:
Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts alleged and proved at the
trial, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as
when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is impossible to
administer justice, to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who
has the law on his side.

13

It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts brought out in an action
suit, the circumstances of each question raised, and the nature and condition of the proofs
furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the facts alleged by the contending
parties which he finds to have been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom and the opinion
he has formed on the issues raised; then only can be intelligently set forth the legal grounds and
considerations proper in his opinion for the due determination of the case.
As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a particularization of the evidence,
testimonial or documentary, upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible for the appellate
court to determine whether or not such findings were sufficiently and logically supported by the evidence relied upon
by the trial court.
Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by respondent-judge to
administer justice in this case in the most speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our admonition
that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on
the notes of the proceedings personally taken by them. For this is what respondent judge did. The records show that
he took copious notes of the testimonies of the witnesses on which he apparently based this decision, as the
transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the
review of the case suffered some delay due to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the
transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.
Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and judges. More than this is the
essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge lamentably
disregarded the latter for the former.
The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another trial court in the case of People v.
Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We said:
At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent attitude displayed by
the trial court towards a murder case it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision, the
body of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three typewritten pages, doublespaced and wide-margined. While brevity should characterize a court's decision and length is
not necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding this murder case
nonetheless should haveoutlined in greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence presented
by both prosecution and the defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on the evidence
on record and the jurisprudence and the authorities supporting the court's decision.
This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the decision. The
issues raised by the appellant include allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a dying
declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. The issues raised are
quite serious and they deserved better treatment. [Emphasis supplied].
With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of Section 9, Article X of
the 1973 Constitution, the case should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment.
However, since the records of the case, including all evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt
of the accused- appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the
accused-appellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases. 8

The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with
homicide. In support thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during the incident in question were done with
the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefahous plan. These acts consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate
of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the
alleged mastermined, after the gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not
hit. The prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion and that
Escober's version of the incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.
After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One who imputes an evil motive or
purpose thereto must prove his allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of Macario Punzalan,
Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be
believed, the same would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had knowledge of the nefarious
plan. The worse that could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as
a security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude from the
premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in. For it must be
remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not surprising that he
should open the gate for him. In fact, even Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and
who was not as familiar with Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the
compound thus:
20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang beses
mo ng nakita si Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?
S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una noong
buwan ng Septyembre at pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.
21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?
S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang babae at
hindi ko na siya pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply. 9
The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was a mere ritual in
avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that "... it is not a common experience
that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He would be the stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to
avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with malefactors The least or perhaps the safest way for that evil
purpose is to allow himself to be rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding him so he
would live if he were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 10
Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour as found by the
trial court, a time too short to enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if it were a
pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua
at the scene and the need for immediate escape.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the same could have been done to
scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.

14

That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal plan are further bolstered by the
statement made by Macario Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and extra-judicial statement of the alleged
mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986, submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial
of said Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement reads:
FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay matagal ng
magkakilala?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung Alorte.
FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]
PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty]
FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa? Kung
mayroon pa?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng
bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at
binuksan naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya kong paano ang
buhay-buhay niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril
sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON-DON iyong baril na .22
kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr.
Chua. Ako naman ay pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang
nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an pala
ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong
matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na sila at tumakbo na kami ... 12
These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co- conspirators and therefore may ordinarily be
considered "polluted," deserve credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even responsive to the
question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which it was given lends credence to his statement,
that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/ Alorte that he
himself fired at E scober although the latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun was
aimed at him. That Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a
mere ritual because the same could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its execution.
On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any complicity in the crime if
this were not the truth. The usual practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the blame to a coconspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime charged is indeed very grave and serious. However
undesirable a person may seem, there may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness. Without passing judgment
on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was this sense of justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his
extrajudicial confession.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni
Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.
PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi
po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak
eh. 11
On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:

Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove either that he was a co-conspirator. It
was but natural that he would want to inform and assure his superior who is presumed to be concerned with his
safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act by the prosecution is therefore too conjectural and farfetched to pass the test of logic and reason.
The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's complicity is the testimony of Mrs.
Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked at the garage where the shot sounded to have come from and saw
Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind.
We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was the
last among the prosecution witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave her statement on December 8,
1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So, soon after the violent incident her appreciation of what
she saw may have been faulty when she attributed the blame on Escober whose lack of better judgment and laxity in
the performance of his job resulted in the tragic event.
Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted above, Mrs. Chua's narration of the
situation would suffer from inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other interpretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared
that immediately after the shooting, he called his companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's
testimony was of the same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started running and he [Punzalan]
followed them. This was precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at
which point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where he was held captive. Thus, Mrs.
Chua claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who was not walking, but running away
from the scene of the crime.

15

Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described having seen. She was then in an
agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate of the compound open, which was Escober's duty to keep closed.
Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua, Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was
such that it would be difficult for her to determine for certain the distance between Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and
whether the latter was merely walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.
Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that 'they
[referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were nagmamadali [in a hurry]." 13This
description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the impression gathered from her previous statement of seeing
Escober walking behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the 'walking" by the descriptive term
'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/ Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of the
crime, and tills can be interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.
The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by
itself, sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the
crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers, must be
shown, and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a
finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. 14
The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that [1]
Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime, such as the
opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious
plot. This being the case, the prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's testimony regarding
his actuations during the incident at bar can not improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved 15 and its corollary rule that
the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 16
Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime and his having opened the gate
to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could have
been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on
mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.
We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his rights to remain silent and to counsel
during the custodial investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits.
Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17 is prefaced by the for lowing:
PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.
Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping
kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka
tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay kung
hindi mo nais.

2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili.

Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito
maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang bayaran ang paglilingkod
nito.
3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag na maaaring gamiting
katibayan laban sa iyo.
4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring karahasan o pamilit para ikaw ay
magbigay ng salaysay.
Tanong Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at
mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas
ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob
ng salaysay?
Sagot Opo.
Tanong Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang
abogado na sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?
Sagot Opo.
Tanog Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin or
gamitan ng anomang uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong
sarili?
Sagot Opo.
Tanong Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo
magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?
Sagot Opo..
Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra-judicial statement, 18 the latter carried
the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the
investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the
custodial investigation. The Identical manner by which the police sought to inform Escober and Punzalan of their
constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard for individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in
intelligence level, educational background and personal experiences. No effort was exerted to see to it that Punzalan
really understood what was being told, considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The
so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act,
performed not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law as to give a semblance of compliance thereto.
Besides, the phraseology used by the police respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was
misleading. It gives the impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during
the court proceedings, not during the custodial investigation.

16

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's extrajudicial
statement cannot be considered intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact that it was done without the
assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid. 19 Needless to say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence. 20
With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the preliminary investigation, suffice it to
say that such irregularity which amounts to an absence of preliminary investigation, should have been raised before
the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and consistent in ruling that:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other
crimes. Accused- appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal in the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00,
SO ORDERED.

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the
Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has
held that the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in
abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As
stressed in People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the proper procedure since the
'absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it
defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The right to a
preliminary investigation, being waivable does not argue against the validity of the proceedings,
the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation
could be conducted.
... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the
Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of
preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of
the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to
be inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate court. 21
While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court to appoint a counsel de oficio for
Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such failure did not constitute prejudicial error
to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was
biased in favor of Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano defended both accused
with equal zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version
of having knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have suffered
was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding Punzalan's presence at
the scene of the crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was merely corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua
and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano. 23
Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of robbery and we are convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three companions would fetch him
on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to the scene of crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to
the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the scene of the crime with his companions and his failure, if he were
truly innocent, to report to the police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers further
demonstrate his knowledge of the plan.
While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and as such, he did
not participate in the killing of the two helpless victims, he cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well-established is
the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of
a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty as principals in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it
clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 24

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding
them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify each
set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta
R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of
P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:

17

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine)
kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were fortyeight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However,
Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose's three
children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To
have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to
go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to
Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an
Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about seven
o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano
Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the
address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an
employee of the agency, they proceeded to her employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos.
Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his
pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at
Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for
their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train
left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of twopassenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated
the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the
back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy
was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more
than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head
resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the
brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was
on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old
baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos
which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the evening.

Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed
the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite him. She was not
able to get up anymore. 1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could
escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers
scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the
coach. 2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that
occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car
to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He
immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor
near the toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9,
holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to
the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his
knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the
blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and
was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors
(Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he received the
information that there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach,
he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a
woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were
prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about
to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol,
knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him.
Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and
turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained
scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad tracks between
Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The
dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer
took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).

18

Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted
to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died
and others that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of
them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as
he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines" who
was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons
who were demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and iron bars.

(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N
to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid being
killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.

When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was
trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the
scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him to
avenge himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao,
Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of
Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple
murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after
jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio
Naawa rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.

(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and

(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma,
Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn
January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first
brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National
Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she was
not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an expected earning of one
hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos
aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of
Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the
statements of the Toling brothers were taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.

In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the
appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two
homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the
Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket
counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out his money from the right pocket of his
pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance
from them were allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected
that the four men harbored evil intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They were talking in a low
voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the window being on the right of
Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions towards
them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves behind them. Some old women were near
them. When the train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and
pointed a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was holding also
a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if he would not hand over the

19

money. Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt him, adding
that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long
including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor
with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had
stabbed as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the second man, another
person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor
(Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded his brother.
Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in
the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He
fell down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors
which he himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital who treated them
during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on
the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right, penetrating
thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the
thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the
midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which resulted in the
macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It appears that the
accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard earned money and suffering
privations, even to the extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as recompense with
respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and
with respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not
locate in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite
some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some
persons who easily get angry when stared at, however, the accused, when stared at by the
persons in front of them, immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them
(accused).

To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused coupled with
their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them
that broke the limit of their self-control and actuated them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the
limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through
some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking about
them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial minds,
they might have entertained the notion or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their ignorance
and naivete, might victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-passengers.
Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses
confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according to a
Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and
Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was
Jose. They confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3,
1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn statements
(Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11).
Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who was
armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed
with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was
armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which
he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the
person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing
himself on the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11,
wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the
former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That fact is
contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their
credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several
passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's decision. He
argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the
supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony is that he saw
one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he
knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea.
Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render

20

Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not
compare notes.

to three of them, the information charges that the accused committed homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge
for lack of evidence.

Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is
not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that
Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers
of perception and recollection are not the same.

No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony
showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter
would be criminally responsible for their deaths.

Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her testimony that
one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins.
The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who
admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab
wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own
admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the
CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS
investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one
actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in
order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal
knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was
lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by
the other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The
injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop
their murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B.
Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs.
Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant
behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached manhood without coming into contact with the
mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are
convinced that the record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court, because they died due to
stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name
in judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A.
Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries
consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to
K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they met their
untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to
try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the
injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes
himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the
instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus,
U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already named precludes
the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder
based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3
to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not
testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder
qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated
by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act likejuramentados and who
were unable to defend themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of
execution that insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The
conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be
regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a
single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo
hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para
cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de las penas", is
that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el
agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 403).

21

The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where
the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate
murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan
massacre case, where six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil.
607, where a person who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham,
15 Phil. 272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs.
Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-103; People
vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94
Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682;
People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex
on the theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse or intent).

SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE JAYME,
**,petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and
Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN.
PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR.,
CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO
MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT.
ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT.
PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, *** , respondents.
RESOLUTION

As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty
imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted
murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision
mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the
seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez,
or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the penalties, the fortyyear limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs
against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986

SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS; S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO,
JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA,
SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ, JOSE B.L.
REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J. ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V.

Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the third anniversary of the
treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for
almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he
was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been committed
long before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial
process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but
mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by him under the General Orders issued by
him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted
and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when
he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda
bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November,
1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator
Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to the communists
but the truth has never been known. But the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil
courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to undergo successful heart
surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home
"to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under
escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at
past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military
viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military investigators reported within a
span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was
revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio
who picked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts
gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and
continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted
the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of
August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the
purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."

22

The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free world. The large masses of
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly
public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the treacherous and vicious
assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a
national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and
local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth through fare, independent and
dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the
Board 6 on October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in
Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377
pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and
24, 1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day
ahead by the ponentethereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then President who
treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to
respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was
better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other members was submitted on the following day
to the then President who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with
the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the
chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that
"only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was
"not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who
escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story
to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in
short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot The only difference
between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the
title of the case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore
"indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August
21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons
who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because
the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue to our work lies in what will
transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The fourmember majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien
and intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered
institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked
evil would be capable of doing." They wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to determine the facts
and circumstances surrounding the death of the late former Senator. Of greater significance is
the awesome responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice,
rationality over irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the
inevitable result of which will restore our country's honored place among the sovereign nations
of the free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.

More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the late former
Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the
concretization of the horror that has been haunting this country for decades, routinely
manifested by the breakdown of peace and order, economic instability, subversion, graft and
corruption, and an increasing number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble
institutions in our country-the military and law enforcement agencies. We are, however,
convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the officers and men of these institutions have
remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the service of our country
and people.
The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked
evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody
who has great authority can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits." Social apathy,
passivity and indifference and neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on
destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public officials should regard
public service as a reflection of human Ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and
integrity are strictly required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that followed, would have
normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the Armed Forces in a country where public
office is viewed with highest esteem and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public
officials transcend all other considerations.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and statements from the beginning
disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's
assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he
told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced
that if any member of my government were involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I
would have known. I know how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in
May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict
earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate that some of
the guards may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are
the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The
evidence still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows
that there were intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the
killing. 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of absence upon release of
the Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the
circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great
contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you
have been so accused by some members of the Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family
for a speedy resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to his position as

23

AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency,
as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those
witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10

acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our
dissent.

It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother
and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former
Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to
due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to
exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the
prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and
that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino
assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had
scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a

On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached therewith.
The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a
Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez
and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused
and produce a verdict of acquittal.

At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two
votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page
memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been
submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to
dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted
from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on
them and which they alleged was "very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to
file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice
Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the
legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of
partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an
impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict
because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating
their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration but issued
no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision
acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. This marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim
Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of

On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the
respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased
to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales,
but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his
actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the
case after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases
below against herein private party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much
that need be said about the existence of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has
never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect
complicity or participation in any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this
Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such
development so that any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of
herein respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that
he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M.
Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as,
in fact, he urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the
trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law
applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the
Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial,
Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to
take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that
he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the
writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and
requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the note passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the allegations in the second motion
for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by
Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:
1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the fate of the criminal
case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was

24

doomed to an ignominous end. Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a prepared
resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto
Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a
resolution charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on
January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former President)
summoned to Malacaang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan
Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and an the members of the Panel
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The former President had a copy of the
panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as principals), evidently furnished him in
advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot Aquino at the tarmac.
Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet
posture when the former President became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino and the
communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he
rumbled on such statements as: "It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is
getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know what to do". . . 'our understanding with Gen.
Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious "the boys were frantic
when they heard that they will be charged in court, and wig be detained at city jail."
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic approach. The former
President more or less conceded that for political and legal reasons all the respondents should
be charged in court, Politically, as it will become evident that the government was serious in
pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the
other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would
inure. The former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was ordered to get in
touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on
record that they had no place in their respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950
(giving custody to commanding officers of members of AFP charged in court) was never
mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally handle the trial, and
assurance was made by him that it would be finished in four to six months, pointing out that, with
the recent effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly mapped out, the
former President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na lang kayo."

The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your cooperation. I know how to
reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his desire to the
Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as well as other moves to this
effect, had always been refused. Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently
presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial would be conscience-pricked and realize
the futility and injustice of proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to
say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding of a "make-believe raffle"
within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there
were no members of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a
"war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of
the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of
rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should
not decide these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding
Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two
informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years
that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil
liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He "associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and
likewise prayed that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a declaration of mistrial will
depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He
submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body of
commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No.
70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case
is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double
jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas
contended that the proper step for the government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at
a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become
moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondentsaccused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment
where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause
of the nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a
three-member commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired
Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive
evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior
notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted
hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day, respondents
announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected deposition of former President

25

Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and
Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16wherein it discussed fully the
evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the Special Investigating
Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was
originally of the view that all of the twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board
majority report should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the death of
Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft Resolution
recommending such course of action, President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree
members of the Special Investigating Panel, and justice Pamaran to a conference in
Malacanang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with the
recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava
Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the advisability of filing
the murder charge in court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer
be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail during the
trial, considering that they would be charged with capital offenses, President Marcos directed
that the several accused be "categorized" so that some of them would merely be charged as
accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be handled personally by
Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were followed to the letter; and
compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific instances in the course of the
proceedings, such as, the changing of the resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing
of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of
some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witneses who gave adverse
testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of
proceedings, and even in the very decision rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-Galman
case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on those involved in said task
to comply with the same in the subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion against
complying with the Malacaang directive, justice Herrera played his role with manifestly
ambivalent feelings.

10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and pre-determined manner of
handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as stage-managed from
Malacaang and performed by willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones
whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of an authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not
only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it
could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the
Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment
of this Honorable Court that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due
process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of
a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia
et al.," be granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the Report and required them to
submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986
and the matter was submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence
received and appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set
forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder
case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist', and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also pre-determined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents
accused of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and findings and conclusions are
duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of proven
integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral
and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the grain, 17 the
Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a manner
suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to be expected. The case had
stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide international attention. Not invariably, the finger of
suspicion pointed to those then in power who supposedly had the means and the most
compelling motive to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not
by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder
that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration
of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.

26

The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this purpose. . . .

President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From the start, he
expressed irritation and displeasure at the recommendation of the investigating panel to charge
all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder. He insisted
that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not
supported by evidence that could stand in court. He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera
on this point. Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of the
charge in court would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent further street
demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the
benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it, but with some of
the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and the question of
preventive custody of the accused having thereby received satisfactory solution, President
Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and how long it would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point blank' to personally
handle the case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice
Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such
order could not have been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan
would try the case and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a
particular Justice thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such presidential
directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact that the case was indeed
handled by him after being assigned to the division headed by him. A supposition of mere
coincidence is at once dispelled by the circumstance that he was the only one from the
Sandiganbayan called to the Malacanang conference wherein the said directive was given. . . .
The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his admission that he
gave President Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to how long it would take him to
finish the case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an agreement was
reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the accused, President Marcos told them
"Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;" and that on their way out of the room President
Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered "I know how to reciprocate," did not
receive any denial or contradiction either on the part of justice Fernandez or justice Pamaran.
(No other person present in the conference was presented by the respondents. Despite an
earlier manifestation by the respondents of their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and
Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any reason having been given
therefor.)

The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the mind of the
Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that pressure from
Malacanang had indeed been made to bear on both the court and the prosecution in the
handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity of this pressure is readily
deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over
those to whom his instructions were directed, the motivation behind such instructions, and the
nature of the government prevailing at that time which enabled, the then head of state to
exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or stage-manage the
prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that
should be kept away from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but
those directly involved were caned to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the
Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the
President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the
meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to
see the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever made of this conference until Justice
Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15) months later when the former president was no
longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted to take up with
the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do it personally, and not merely through
trusted assistants. The lack of will or determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice
Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite their realization of its unwholesome
implications on their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily inferred from their
unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most
valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or "out of
respect to the Office of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons
from the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure
and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to Malacanang and
their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves
pressure dramatized and exemplified Their abject deference to President Marcos may likewise
be inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given seats during the two-hour
conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not say how long) in which
President Marcos did the talking most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can
be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became
illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985. 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is on whether the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by their
subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by
President Marcos in the conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino
Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under
the heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six accused as principals by
conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and
the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be
completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient evidence to justify that
all of the accused be charged as principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and

27

recommended that all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may
hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard practice of the prosecution to charge
accused with the most serious possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in
the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and
practical course of action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all the
accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly,
was in consonance with the Malacaang instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual
categorization came only after the then President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty.
Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez
himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in
conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of
the crime of double murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never denied the claim of
Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals]
was to have been the subject of a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to
the summons for them to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt, that a party's case is as strong
as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken
the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable
evidences were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse
witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner
favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta
Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be
discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial. WitnessesViesca and Raas who also testified before the
Board "disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to
stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described
them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to
Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable
alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his
testimony before the Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission
that the English transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was
inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of the
discrepancy from the original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on
invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by
media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration
officials to leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he
could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the
Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed testimony and its
unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as
much as, if not more than those in the case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in
constant fear of her life, having been hunted by armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay
was ransacked, her family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the
local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to talk with
her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William Farias offered her plane tickets for a
trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Farias of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States
to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Farias offered her two million pesos

supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio, the dropping of her
estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her
father, if she would refrain from testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or perhaps
because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera
was told by justice Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus at justice Herrera's
going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to
attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's
testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did
not end with her taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were
passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which
suggested that she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having
coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another occasion, at a crucial point in
her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the
courtroom into darkness, and making most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms.
Quijano to pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the courtroom. It was
verified that the brownout was limited to the building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having
affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building. Justice Herrera declared that the
main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the room
occupied by Malacaang people who were keeping track of the proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana
and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the
informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took them away,
also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of
Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since
then, despite his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons because
they said Marcos was in Power [despite his appeal to the Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no
one is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true that the U.S. airmen's proposed
testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other
place, such showing would not necessarily contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator
Aquino was killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such attempt of
scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three
other plans designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even assuming
that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully contended that it was prudent or wise
on the part of the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained
therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor
the defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have been totally
uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the
petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by
Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a
motion for the reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a

28

favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of
finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified that President Marcos
ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such
instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having been complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President Marcos to handle the case
personally by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to
a division thereof. The evidence before the Comission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran
evinces a strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the
respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why
Justice Escarel could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the
Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to
corroborate the claim of Justice

and to take remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly admitted that television
cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for
that purpose. There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military and
Malacaang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacaang showed its
results on several occasions specified in the Report. Malacaang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness
Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by
having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise,Col. Balbino Diego,
Malacaang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying
lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of her.
"It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy
sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The
Commission's inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to
how the case should be handled He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six
accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of the
scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves,
but favorable both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the
suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may
again be prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.

xxx xxx xxx

"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were filed by Justice Herrera on
January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. oronly 18
minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be
categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may be included in the raffle, there is
need for a certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case
within the limited time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people
would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually conducted which resulted in the
assignment of the case to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on
how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one of the
two other members of his division. . . .
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of
custody came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement
of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by the
Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same information was
given when the custody was proposed to be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National
Bureau of Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the
custody of the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that
the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then
Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after
sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel: "There is
an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments
of the case outside the Court had been monitored by Malacaang presumably for it to know what was happening

"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality
in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and
disregarded. ... It was deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on thestandard ground that
their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate way of justifying
the acquittal in the case, there not being a total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the
accused. The decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations,
and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to see a person accused of a
crime to be favored with such total absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who concurred with the majority
decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the
decision was being prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the accused
should be convicted he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice Herrera that
Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacaang had instructions to acquit all of the
twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this
statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked
about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by
the happenings (res ipsa loquitur 22) since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was
unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23) and at any rate was not acceptable to the
Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the
Malacanang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the
suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double
jeopardy. 24

29

Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan
Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings
to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and
jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas
corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who
shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first which would
otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he himself appointed to
investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino
and "to ventilate the truth through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four majority members and
instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were the majority and
controlling report; and rebuked the four majority members when they presented to him the next day their report
calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under
the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's
majority and minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer
of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security
for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin
notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence to the
contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to convict some of
the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the
two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the
basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer
a "perjured story, given deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed
with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of
the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been
confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is
without precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission
noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that
any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they
stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an
amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging

the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial,
as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over
criminal offenses committed by military men 26-a) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be
an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed
into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly
Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness
suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an
accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at
the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The
courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they
were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead
of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who
seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military
tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil
courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and
vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due
process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to
declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside
of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in
criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case its right
to due process is thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420
[Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell
Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino
vs. Zosa, supra).

30

xxx xxx xxx

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the
sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined final outcome
of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of
Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual
resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming
powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass,
intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify,
respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to
terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject
of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise
complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain
period, they will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its
evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time
where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the
sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In
legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To
paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he breeds contempt
for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be
appealed or re-opened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs.
Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid
judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having
been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void.
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx

"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be equally
considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily
spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where
the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private prosecutors had filed a motion to
disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality
to the defense and arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had
been passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing
of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case
on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between
him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of Malacanang.
PJ PAMARAN
Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal
later on with that. After all, the most important thing here is, shall we say,
the decision of the case.
J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the
capacity of the justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than
anything else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied by
Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly
not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:
... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the contempt proceeding.
Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution neither joined that petition, nor did it at any
time manifest a desire to file a similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision.
To do it now is not alone out of season but is also a confession of official insouciance (Page 22,
Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of respondents Justices pursuant to the
procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by
respondent court might result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in
view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out
a case of denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the
complete evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the temporary
restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the
Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order
was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of
all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the court

31

in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the
cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But
prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without
awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part
amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."

As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the new members of the Bar last
May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this
state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality.
In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true
manifestation."

3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face
of the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio.

Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith and confidence in the
courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public
confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of
objectivity and impartiallity integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which
compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the
Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and
directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as
we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of
another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the
people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved
parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.

(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment, instead of the present action
which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the
hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent proof heard
by the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only
by lack of due process but also by the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the
rendition of a pre-determined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings or errors of
judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are not entitled to due process
is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied by the authoritarian
president on public respondents and that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in
the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is
inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not
speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and
sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro formamotion for reconsideration reiterating
the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the
first motion for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion
for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February 4th of the first
motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being
resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were
heard by the Court only last August 26th. The second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material
ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration,
i.e, the secret Malacaang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March,
1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that
the authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members
of the Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor.-There has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in
September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself was staged to
trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the
abolition of the office of the Vice-President.

The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary allegiance to the
appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public
service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered
to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late
Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they
have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance
with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the invaluable services rendered by
the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of
Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they
rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service in discharging their tasks of
hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within
the scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985
dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside
and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its
judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther
Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with
careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to an
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

32

[G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and
MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No.
066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a
ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate
court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas
and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of
P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of
an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along
the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner,
without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles
Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a
passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at
Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank
one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his
companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour,
they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldoand then they decided to go
home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased
and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was
driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the
middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a
passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his
body away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided
with each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway immediately at
the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front
portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point
of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters
at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still
inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then
he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from
the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night
(Exhibit B) while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.[2]
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution,
except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the
accident, the defense claimed that:
The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road at about 30
kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with
bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the cars lane
and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep
stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit 1) and a sketch
(Exhibit 3) drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the drivers side. As a result of
the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the
Flores Clinic where they were all brought for treatment. [3]

The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal
at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George
Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera butsaid that the accused also
wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical
School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the
farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or
3:00 oclock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the
house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They
ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago,

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No.
066 in petitioners favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime
charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.[4]

33

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial courts
judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision
appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?

On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses,
thus:

(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CAG.R. CV No. 19240?

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable for
his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and
sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in
a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9
a.m. and 11 p.m.[6] It found that petitioners act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136) [7]and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code, [8] a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation. [9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the
motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our consideration:
FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSEDS
(PETITIONERS) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME
ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY
TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR
AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF
CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONERS ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS
IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL
ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL
COURT.
THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CAG.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE
MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS
PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES
NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial
court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues
that the trial courts finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not
reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only
placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy.
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioners guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished
in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the
trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.[10] When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either
by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be
charged with the same or identical offense. [11]This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following
elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. [12] In the instant case,
petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated
by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the
Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged
anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly
show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower courts
judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal
case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak
of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. [13] There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. [14] The second instance
is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.[15] This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, [16] where the civil action for
damages is for the same act or omission. Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed
in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal
proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both

34

actions involve the same act or omission. [17] The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court
of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioners
negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally
negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that
when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial courts judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal
did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioners negligence or imprudence. Hence, they
argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come
into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate
court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial courts declaration that did not discount the possibility that the accused was really
negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court and since said hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict
of conviction.[18] The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt
had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a
suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of
the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988. [19] He avers that since Manchester held that
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees, the appellate court
was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to
note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while
the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not
allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the civil
damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding
payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court,
the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of
the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. [20] As correctly pointed out by private respondents,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private
respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a
curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed
by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be
paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. [21] Recall that the
information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of
Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing
fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for
petitioners allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24,
1992, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-65017 November 13, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
STALIN GUEVARRA y PAPASIN accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro A. Venida for accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

35

Stalin Guevarra was convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Oriental
Mindoro. 1 On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered judgment on August
17, 1983, increasing the indeterminate penalty from "TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, of prision mayor, as
minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS, of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs," imposed by the trial court, to reclusion perpetua, and affirmed in all other respects the appealed
decision. 2 However, considering that this case involves a capital offense, the appellate court could not enter
judgment. Conformably, therefore, to Daniel, 3 Ramos, 4 Galang, 5 and similar cases the entire records were certified
and elevated to us for review.
The facts are as follows:
On November 29, 1980, Joselito de los Reyes, twenty-three years of age, assistant chief security guard at "Baklad"
Naujan Oriental Mindoro, together with Teofilo Martinez, a thirty-two year-old fisherman of Bancurro Naujan attended
a dance sponsored by the San Agustin Barangay High School. Teofilo saw Eduardo Romero (still at large) and Stalin
Guevarra together at the dance hall. The affair was interrupted abruptly when someone stoned the school. At about
midnight, Joselito and Teofilo went home to Bancurro. Together with them were Rosabel , Magno and Babylyn
Martinez, both students, seventeen and seventeen and eighteen years of age, respectively. Along the way, Teofilo
held a flashlight to illuminate the rocky path whereon Joselito, Rosabel, and Babylyn walked. Suddenly, they were
waylaid by Stalin and Eduardo. Stalin, 27 years old, went immediately behind Joselito, and embraced him with both
hands. 6 Joselito struggled from the clutches of Stalin but in vain; the firm embrace locked the whole body and both
arms of Joselito. Facing the hapless Joselito, Eduardo got his knife from his pocket, opened it, 7 and thrust the shiny
and pointed end of the weapon at the right side of Joselito's body just below his navel. 8 "May tama ako," were the
words uttered by Joselito just before he fell to the ground. 9 Teofilo, Babylyn, and Rosabel froze where they stood.
The abruptness of the incident petrified them. But after the stabbing the assailants fled in the direction of San Agustin
and disappeared in the dark. The beam of light from the flashlight Teofilo carried, however, was sufficient to enable
him and his two female companions to witness clearly the stabbing of Joselito and to recognize the appellant and
Eduardo Romero, both known to them (Teofilo, Babylyn, and Rosabel), as the perpetrators of the crime.
Bathed in blood, the victim was pedalled in a tricycle to the Naujan Police Station. Unfortunately, Private First Class
(Pfc) Henry Aceremo, the officer-in-charge, was not able to get an ante mortem statement because the victim could
hardly talk. 10 He was hovering between life and death when he was rushed to the clinic of Dr. Nicolas B. Balbin.
As a result of the mortal wound inflicted by Eduardo Romero, Joselito died.
Dr. Nicolas B. Balbin who conducted a post mortem examination, certified that the cause of death was hemorrhage
within the adbominal cavity, and that the wound might have been caused by a sharp-bladed instrument, probably a
"balisong." 11
As a consequence, Pfcs Bautista and Aceremo accompanied by Rosabel and Babylyn, went to the house of the
appellant where he was found drunk. As to Eduardo, he vanished from the barrio without a trace.
Subsequently, an information was filed stating:
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1980 at around 12:00 o'clock in the evening, in
Barangay San Agustin II, Municipality of

Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, conspiring and confabulating with Eduardo Romero, who is still at large
and therefore no preliminary investigation has yet been conducted against him, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a sharp- pointed instrument
one Joselito delos Reyes, who was then unaware and helpless, inflicting upon the latter a fatal
stab wound, as a result of which caused his udden and unexpected death.
That in the commission of the offense, the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, in addition to the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and nocturnity,
were present.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

12

After trial, the trial court found Stalin Guevarra guilty and imposed the penalty adverted to at the outset.
The appellant vehemently denies killing Joselito de los Reyes. He argues that if indeed he had embraced the victim
from behind to facilitate the commission of the crime without posing any danger to his supposed co-conspirator or
,without fear of reprisal from the victim, then he could have fled the scene out of a sense of guilt, out of fear, or to
avoid arrest and ultimate imprisonment. He did not leave his barrio, however, instead, a few hours after the alleged
commission of the crime, he was found by the policemen boiling and eating bananas with the Hernandez girls. He
quotes: "It has been truly said, since long ago that the wicked teeth, even when no man pursueth whereas the
righteous are brave as the lion." 13
We can not accept the appellant's submission. As a review of the records shows, after the stabbing incident, both the
appellant and Eduardo Romero hastily fled into the night. This flight from the stabbing scene is a strong indication of
a guilty mind. 14 In small localities where people generally know one another and are inclined, nay, expected, to show
great concern for neighbors and even nodding acquaintances who fall victim to cruel and inhuman acts, it would
have been natural for the appellant, if indeed he was innocent of the crime charged, to have gone to the succor of
the fallen Joselito; he would have taken him to the nearest hospital. Or, at the very least, he could have reported the
incident to the local police authorities. But he did neither of these Good Samaritan acts. By his account, he went
home, obviously confident that he was not Identified as it was nighttime. While it may be true that Romero escaped
and remains at large, the appellant, appearing like a brave lion, stayed home, Yet it now appears that he did so not
because he was innocent but because he believed he could not be Identified. But he was wrong. He was clearly and
positively Identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses. Teofilo Martinez recognized Stalin as the person who
embraced the victim to ensure the killing15 of Joselito. Rosabel Magno, one of the student companions of Joselito,
pointed an accusing finger at Stalin as one of the culprits. 16 Babylyn Martinez, likewise, Identified the appellant as
the one who immobilized the hands of the victim to render him vulnerable to the assault of Eduardo. 17
In his attempt to absolve himself of guilt, the appellant contends that there is an absolute variance between the
allegations in the information and the proofs presented by the prosecution witnesses. But Rosabel Magno's
testimony on cross-examination showed her unwavering Identification of Stalin Guevarra as a co-perpetrator of the
killing of Joselito.
xxx xxx xxx

36

Q. Now, you stated that a stabbing incident transpired while you and your
companions were walking towards the direction of your respective houses.
Please tell the Court what happened?
A. We were walking side by side, sir. While we were walking side by side on
our way there was a sudden appearance of two persons one of whom was
Stalin Guevarra, one of those persons who appeared went immediately
behind Joselito de los Reyes and embraced the latter and immediately
thereafter Eduardo Romero stabbed Jose de los Reyes. 18

The alleged contradictions are minor inconsistencies. Whether or not Teofilo saw Stalin at the dance is immaterial.
That has nothing to do with the stabbing of the victim. At any rate, Teofilo's narration of the incident was replete with
details, clear and straight-forward, which is a convincing indication that he had actually witnessed the killing of
Joselito. Hence, the trivial and unimportant details that the appellant emphasizes do not detract from the veracity of
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
Secondly, Stalin contends that he could not have embraced Joselito to give Eduardo Romero the chance to stab the
former as he was not at the scene of the crime in the evening of November 29, 1980 at about 12:00 o'clock midnight.
This defense of alibi was not established at all.

Q. Please tell the court?

A. I told the police investigators that Eduardo Romero stabbed Joselito while
Stalin Guevarra embraced Joselito. 19
xxx xxx xxx
The defense deposits that the prosecution witnesses uttered contradictory statements, in effect trying to raise doubts
as to their veracity.

Alibi is one of the weakest of all defenses. lt can be easily concocted. To sustain the defense of alibi, the accused
must not only prove satisfactorily that he was at some other place at the time the crime happened, but more so, that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed. 21
The very evidence for the defense convinces us that it was physically possible for the appellant to be where the
prosecution witnesses testified he was, at the scene of the crime, and then rush away to his house after the fatal
incident. The place where the stabbing took place is only about seventy meters from the appellant's house.
xxx xxx xxx

First, the appellant points out that Teofilo Martinez contradicted his own testimony:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you arrived there at the dance at ten o'clock of November 29,
1980, in the evening, did you see Eduardo Romero and Stalin Guevarra at
the dance.
A. Yes, sir.
Yet, 12 pages later, he did not see them:
Q. Let us go now to the incident in the dance floor. You stated that you did
not see the accused Stalin Guevarra and Romero dancing. In what part of
the dance floor or in the dance hall were they before the incident in
question?
A. It was already on our way home when we saw them.
Q. So, while you were witnessing the dance you did not see them in the
dance hall that evening?
A. That is right, sir. 20

He Stalin Guevarra) however, admitted that he and his companions were walking towards the
direction of his house on the same evening of November 29, 1980, where they were about
seventy (70) meters away from the place of the incident. The testimony of the accused was
corroborated by defense witnesses Myra Hernandez and Julio Guevarra when they took the
witness stand. 22
xxx xxx xxx
We have stated, time and again, the almost inflexible rule that alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
prosecution witnesses and their clear Identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 23 In the instant
case, prosecution witness Teofilo Martinez, who carried a flashlight, positively and clearly pinpointed the appellant as
one of the assailants. Likewise, Babylyn Martinez and Rosabel Magno, the female companions of the deceased,
sufficiently corroborated Teofilo Martinez's Identification of Stalin.
Thirdly, the appellant disputes the finding that he had conspired and confabulated with Eduardo to attack, assault,
and stab Joselito. Thus, he denies conspiracy. We do not agree.
Conspiracy, it is true, is "always predominantly 'mental in composition' because it consists primarily of a meeting of
minds and an intent." 24 Hence, direct proof is not essential to establish it. By its nature, conspiracy is planned in
utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. 25
Although here there is no well founded evidence that the appellant and Romero had conferred and agreed to kill
Joselito, their complicity can be justified by circumstantial evidence, that is, their community of purpose and their
unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act of assaulting the deceased. 26

xxx xxx xxx

37

The appellant cooperated with Romero in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished. Therefore, the appellant is guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article
17, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The requisites for criminal liability under this provision are: 1)
participation in the criminal resolution, i.e., there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention immediately before or simultaneously with the commission of the crime charged; and 2) cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. 27

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the civil indemnity which is hereby
increased to P30,000.00.
Costs against the appelant.
SO ORDERED.

At the locus criminis was the appellant. His presence did not merely give aid or support, but emboldened the attacker
as the victim was immobilized by the appellant.
There can be no question that the appellant's act in holding the victim from behind immediately before the latter was
stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and an overt act towards the realization of a common criminal intent,
although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. 28 The act was impulsively done on the spur of the moment. It
sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting with the criminal design of the slayer immediately before the
commission of the offense. That is termed as implied conspiracy. 29 The appellant's voluntary and indispensable
cooperation was a concurrence of the criminal act to be executed. Consequently, he is a co-conspirator by
indispensable cooperation, although the common desire or purpose was never bottled up by a previous undertaking.

G.R. No. L-51745 October 28, 1988

It can be safely inferred that the appellant was animated to cooperate in the taking of the 'life of the deceased. Had it
not been of the appellant's embrace of the victim from behind, the latter could have fought back, parried the thrust, or
could have even run away.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

If, indeed, the appellant intended to save the deceased from the attack, he could have wrestled for the "balisong"
from Eduardo's hands and prevented the assault. Or, he could have placed himself between the assailant and the
victim, instead of grabbing him from behind and holding both his arms. The appellant's actuations thus belie his
claimed innocence.
True, the appellant did not inflict any wound or injury materially contributing to the death of the victim. But, as already
stated, his act of immobilizing Joselito's arms establishes the indispensable cooperation required by law to make him
equally guilty with Romero who alone stabbed and wounded the former.
Curiously, appellant Stalin Guevarra filed in the Court a motion to withdraw his appeal, dated July 22, 1985. He
expressed that he was no longer interested in his appeal and manifested his willingness to serve his sentence and
subsequently apply for executive clemency or parole. Considering that the appellant in his motion was un-assisted
by counsel, the Court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the crime committed by the appellant is "murder as the killing is qualified by evident
premeditation." We do no agree. Not one of the three basic elements of evident premeditation was proven, to wit:
First, the time when the offender determined to commit the crime itself, second, an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had tenaciously clung to his obsession to commit the crime; and third, a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act. On the other hand, what the
evidence on record shows is that both the appellant and Romero, assaulted the victim spontaneously and
cooperated fully. This circumstance, we rule, precludes evident premidatation.
Be that as it may, the crime committed is still murder, the killing being qualified by treachery. The evidence shows
beyond reasonable doubt that the attack by Romero, with the indispensable cooperation of the appellant, was so
sudden and unexpected as to deprive the victim of any opportunity to defend himself or to inflict retaliation.

RAMON F. SAYSON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Federico P. Roy for petitioner.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision finding him guilty of attempted estafa.
On March 25, 1972, an information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document was filed
against the herein petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson before the Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
... the said accused having come in possession of a blank US dollar check #605908142, with
intent to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify or cause to be forged and falsified the said check, by
then and there writing or filling or causing to be written or filled up the following words and
figures: "March 10, 1972," "Atty. Norberto S. Perez," "2,250.00" and forging the signature of the
Asst. Cashier, Manager of the Bank of America, Dania Branch, making it appear, as it did
appear, that the said check was duly issued by the Bank of America, when in truth and in fact, as
the accused well knew, the said check was never issued nor authorized by the said bank; that
thereafter, said accused wrote or affixed the signature "Norberto Perez" on the back of said
check as indorser; that once the said cheek had been forged and falsified in the manner above
described, the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which he made to Ernesto Rufino, Sr. that he is "Atty. Norberto Perez" who is the payee of the
said Check, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said
Ernesto Rufino, Sr. to change said dollar cheek, as in fact, said Ernesto Rufino, Sr. issued
Manufacturer's Bank Check No. 87586 dated March 22, 1972 payable to "Norberto Perez" in the
amount of "Pl 4,850.00" in exchange for said dollar check; ... [Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

38

Arraigned on December 8, 1972, petitioner pleaded not guilty. On October 9, 1974, after several postponements, the
prosecution rested its case. At the hearing of December 9, 1974, when the defense was scheduled to present its
evidence, only the petitioner appeared. He said that his counsel had another case in a different court. In the morning
of the said day, his lawyer also sent a telegram to the court requesting cancellation of the hearing because he was
sick. The court denied the motion for postponement and the case was considered submitted for decision without
petitioner's evidence.
The trial court rendered judgment on January 30, 1975, finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prison correccional to pay a
fine of P2,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed but modified the
penalty by imposing six months of arresto mayor and eliminating the fine. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The background facts as found by the appellate court as well as its conclusions thereon follow:
On March 22, 1972, appellant Ramon Sayson y Fernandez was introduced by Vicente Jaucian a
former employee of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. to Anselmo Aquiling, private secretary to Ernesto
Rufino, Sr., General Manager of the corporation. Vicente Jaucian had known appellant as "Fiscal
Perez" who wanted to exchange dollars for pesos, having been introduced to him in that
capacity by his (Jaucian's) cousin. Thinking that Rufino might be interested in dollars, Jaucian
accompanied appellant to the offices of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. and Mever Films, Inc. at the
Avenue Hotel on Rizal Avenue, Manila. Upon being introduced to Anselmo Aquiling, appellant
showed the latter an Identification card indicating that he was Norberto S. Perez, a Prosecuting
Attorney from Angeles City. After making the introduction, Jaucian left. Mr. Rufino said that he
was not personally interested in dollars but suggested to his secretary to inquire if Mever Films,
Inc. needed dollars.
Mr. Rufino was also Chairman of the Board of the aforesaid corporation; and when told that
Mever Films needed dollars, he authorized the transaction. Appellant then presented to Edgar
Mangona, the assistant accountant of Mever Films, a Bank of America check in the amount of
$2,250,00 payable to the order of Atty. Norberto S. Perez, a xerox copy of which was introduced
in evidence as Exhibit E. Actually, Exhibit E appears to be a bill of exchange or draft drawn by
the Dania, Florida Branch of the Bank of America on its San Francisco Branch in favor of said
payee and bears serial number 605908142. Edgar Mangona prepared a check of the
Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of P14,850.00 at the exchange rate of
P6.60 to a dollar (Exh. B). He then walked over to the office of Mrs. Teresita Rufino Litton whom
he asked to sign the check and thereafter Mangona asked Mr. Rufino to countersign it. Finally,
the check was exchanged with appellant's Bank of America draft and the latter signed the
voucher for the peso check.
On the same day, March 22, 1972, appellant repaired to the Tayuman Branch of the Banco
Filipino and informed its Branch Manager, Mrs. Maria Fe Relova that he wanted to open a
savings account. He was given an application form which he filled up with the name Norberto S.
Perez as the applicant, among other things. Appellant then presented the Manufacturer 's Bank
check Exhibit B, payable to the order of Norberto S. Perez, and after endorsing the same, it was
posted in the passbook issued to him. Unknown to appellant, however, Mrs. Relova, an astute
woman had been auspicious of the former's actuations. So that after he left, she called up the
office of the PLDT and inquired if the telephone number which appellant had unsolicitedly given
her was listed in Perez' name. She was told that the number referred to had not yet been issued
by PLDT. She then telephoned the office of Mever Films, Inc., the drawer of the check, and

inquired if the check was in fact issued by it and she was answered in the affirmative. Despite
this assurance, she tested her suspicions further by sending out a bank employee to deliver a
brochure to the address given by appellant and the messenger returned without locating the
place.
Within a short time, the officials of the Mever Films, Inc. became doubtful of the genuineness of
the Bank of America draft. And on March 24, 1972, two days after the issuance of the
Manufacturer's Bank check and one day after the check was cleared with the Central Bank,
Mever Films which was convinced that the draft was spurious ordered its payment stopped
(Exhibit D). On the same day, Vicente Jaucian who had introduced appellant to Anselmo Aquiling
and the latter himself went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and there
gave written statements on what they knew about appellant (Exhibits F and G). Also on the
same day, the Assistant Manager of the Bank of America, Manila Branch, who must have been
informed of the transaction involving the draft, addressed a letter to the NBI authorities (Exh. B)
which reads:
Gentlemen:
This is to certify that U.S. Dollar draft No. 605908142 drawn on the Bank of
America NT & SA, San Francisco, in favor of Atty. Norberto S. Perez for
$2,250.00 and dated March 10, 1972, is one of the blank drafts
surreptitiously taken from a shipment sent to us by our San Francisco
Headquarters sometime in the latter part of 1970.
Issuance of the above-mentioned draft was not authorized by this bank.
Jose R. Lopez, the abovementioned assistant manager who issued the aforestated certification,
testified that the draft in question was one of the 900 blank drafts which were missing from a
shipment received from their head office in the United States sometime in 1971. He declared
that the words "Dania Branch" and "Dania, Florida" appearing on the face of the draft were
superimposed so as to make it appear that the draft was drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch of
the Bank of America on the San Francisco Branch, when in fact the blank draft was for the
exclusive use of the Manila Branch, as revealed by the first four code figures of the draft's serial
number.
We are satisfied with Lopez' testimony that the draft in question was a forgery. Since the same
was a blank draft appertaining to the Manila Branch of the Bank of America, of which he was the
Assistant Manager, Lopez was competent to state whether or not the draft was a forgery. And
the fact that appellant had openly and falsely represented himself to be Atty. Norberto S. Perez
indicated in the forged draft as the payee, is a strong circumstantial evidence that he was
instrumental in its forgery. [Rollo, p. 25-30.]
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant has raised the issue of due process, alleging denial of his right to be heard and to present evidence.
This requires inquiry into the extent of the rights accorded an accused in a criminal case and whether the accusedappellant has been denied the rights to which he is entitled.

39

The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the accused. But while the accused
has the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional
grant, such right is not exempt from the rule on waiver as long as the waiver is not controverted to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law [Article 6, Civil
Code.] There is nothing in the Constitution nor in any law prohibiting such waiver. Accordingly, denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made, as in this case.
Petitioner claims though that he was not waiving such right; on the contrary, he was vigorously asserting his right to
be heard by counsel and to present evidence in his verbal motion for postponment due to absence of his counsel de
parte. He thus assails the denial of his motion as it in effect deprived him of his day in court.
It is too well established to require citation of authorities that the grant or refusal of an application for continuance or
postponement of the trial lies within the sound discretion of the court. Justice Malcolm, in a 1919 decision,
expounded on such judicial discretion as follows:
Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In this respect,
it may be said that the discretion which the trial court exercises must be judicial and not arbitrary.
It is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as those of the people at large, and should
not unduly force him to trial nor for fight causes jeopardize the rights and interests of the public.
Where he consideration--that it to be necessary for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has
the power upon the motion of either party to continue the case. But a party charged with a crime
has no natural or inalienable right to a continuance.
The ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion. When the discretion of the court is exercised with a reasonable degree of judicial
acumen and fairness, it is one which the higher co is loathe to review or disturb. The trial judge
must be to a certain extent free to secure speedy and expeditious trials when such speed and
expedition are not inconsistent with fairness. Since the court trying the case is, from personal
observation, familiar with all the attendant circumstances, and has the best opportunity of
forming a correct opinion upon the case presented, the presumption will be in favor of its action.
It would take an extreme case of abuse of discretion to make the action of the trial court a denial
of due process. (Emphasis supplied; U.S. v. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738 (1919).]
The factual background of the case penned by Justice Malcolm, which was quoted with approval in the case
ofPeople v. Mendez [G.R. No. L-27348, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 880], is very similar to that of the case at bar. In the
instant case, the information was filed on March 25,1972 and arraignment was held on December 8,1973. The
prosecution started presenting its evidence on March 12,1973 and after 1 year, 10 months and 1 day from the day of
arraignment, it rested its case. During this time, petitioner had already secured seven postponements, which it
admitted in its brief filed with the Court of Appeals [Rollo, p. 20] thus prompting the trial judge to remark that "this is a
notoriously postponed case' and that "the defense had abused the rules" [TSN, December 12,1973, pp. 2-3.]. Since
the judge's comments were home out by the record regarding the postponements which were admitted by petitioner
himself in his brief filed before the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot rightfully cast aspersion on the integrity of said
judge by attributing to him a non-existent attitude of bias and hatred toward the petitioner-accused.
No grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for postponement can be imputed to the trial court.
First, the petitioner's motion was not seasonably filed as the three-day notice required by the rules (Rule 15, Section
4 of the Revised Rules of Court) was not complied with. Moreover, it was not accompanied by an affidavit nor a
medical certificate to support the alleged illness of counsel, controverted to what Rule 22, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 5. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or counsel.A motion to
postpone trial on the ground of illness of a party or counsel may be granted if it appears
upon affidavit that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial is indispensable and that the
character of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable.
Besides, when petitioner himself sought postponement of the case during the December 9 hearing, he claimed that
his counsel had another case in a different court. Certainly, the conflicting stories advanced by petitioner and his
counsel only indicate the lack of a good cause for the postponement.
Petitioner's lament that 'at least, in the name of justice and fair play, the trial court should have warned accused that
no further postponements shall be entertained by the court' [Rollo p. 97] is baseless. As he was aware that the case
had already been postponed seven times at his initiative, he had no right to assume that his motion would be
granted; rather, he should have foreseen that any further motions for postponement might not be met with approval
by the trial court. Besides, the record of the case clearly shows that the accused had repeatedly appeared in court
without his counsel, seeking postponements which were liberally granted by the court with an order directing his
counsel to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for repeated failure to appear at the trial of the case.
In fact, the court, in its Order dated August 1 2, 1974, categorically declared: "In the meantime, let the trial of this
case be DEFINITELY POSTPONED FOR THE LAST TIME to August 14, 1974 at 8:30 a.m. as previously scheduled,
with the warning to the accused to be ready with his present counsel or another counsel on said date as the court
will not entertain any further delays in the proceedings in this case and shall proceed with the trial of this case with or
without his counsel." [Original Records, p. 430]. This, certainly, was enough warning.
Finally, the motion for postponement was properly denied inasmuch as the defendant failed to present any
meritorious defense. This Court's pronouncementthat in incidents of this nature before the trial court, two
circumstances should be taken into account, namely, 1) the reasonableness of the postponement and 2) the merits
of the case of the movant should not be lightly ignored [Udan v. Amon G.R. No. L-24288, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
837.] There may be an accident, surprise or excusable neglect justifying postponement or reconsiderationbut if the
movant does not present a meritorious claim or defense, denial of his motion for postponement may not be
considered as an abuse of the discretion of the court.[De Cases v. Peyer G.R. No. L-18564, August 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 11 65.]
Absent any meritorious case in defendant's favor, his motion for postponement was properly denied. His invocation
of his right to counsel and to present evidence was an empty gesture revealing his dilatory scheme. Under the
circumstances, the petitioner must be deemed to have waived his rights and to have been extended the protection of
due process.
Moreover, the petitioner in negotiating the check presented himself as a lawyer; he was addressed in the Notice of
the Order dated September 11, 1972 as "Atty. Ramon Sayson y Fernandez" [Original Records, p. 381 and he himself
filed the Motion to Quash [Original Records, p. 22] and a pleading captioned "Compliance" dated December 2, 1972
[Original Records, p. 41.] These facts indicate that he was capable of defending himself That he himself was allowed
to file pleadings clearly negatives the alleged deprivation of his right to due process of law. Consequently, there being
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, its order will not be disturbed.
The Court finds the petitioner's plea that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to appoint a counsel de oficio who for
him when he appeared without his counsel utterly without legal basis. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de
oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the
time of arraignment (Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court This is no longer so where the accused has
proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of
the evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was

40

inexcusable. This Court's holding in a previous case that there is no deprivation of the light to counsel in such a case
is squarely applicable:
As the appellant was represented by counsel of his choice at the arraignment, trial and in the
incidental motions to dismiss and to postpone the resumption of the trial of the case, the trial
court was not in duty bound to appoint a counsel de oficio to assist him in his defense. His
failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated
postponements and warnings that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver on the part of
the appellant to present his evidence and the case would be deemed submitted for decision
upon the evidence presented by the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the trial
court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it. Taking into consideration all
the steps taken by the trial court to safeguard the rights of the appellant, the latter cannot
pretend that he was deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel and to present evidence in
his behalf. Moreover, the repeated failure of the appellant to appear with counsel at the
resumptions of the trial of the case may be taken as a deliberate attempt on his part to delay the
proceedings. [People vs. Angco, 103 Phil. 33, 39 (1958).]

xxx xxx xxx

(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to properly
Identify the particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the true
name to be inserted in the complaint or information or record.
xxx xxx xxx

At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in situations like the present case is discretionary with the trial
court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of abuse. Here, the trial court had been liberal in
granting the postponements secured by the petitioner himself, at the same time admonishing the latter to be ready
with his present counsel or another counsel [Original Records, p. 430]. Notwithstanding this admonition, the
petitioner kept on attending the hearings without securing another lawyer to substitute his present counsel who was
constantly absent during the hearings. Still, as admitted by petitioner in his memorandum, the trial court, at the
December 9, 1974 hearing, allowed him to look for a lawyer but no one was available at the time (Rollo, p. 94).
These steps undertaken by the trial court removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been described in
the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the
defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where
the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed
without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of
the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be
immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such
particularity as to properly Identify the particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime
against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of
convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and
not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.

The last issue to be resolved dwells on the effect of the alleged variance between the prosecution's allegation and
proof.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the appellant.

The petitioner vigorously maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the information charging him of
attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America because the totality of the evidence presented by
the prosecution show very clearly that the accused allegedly attempted to defraud Mever Films, Inc., a corporate
entity entirely separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr. He firmly asserts that his conviction was in gross
violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's claim is unavailing. The rule in this jurisdiction is that "variance between the allegations of the information
and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support thereof does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal."
[People v. Catli G.R. No. L-11641, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 642.]

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious
name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly Identified. Thus,
Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:

LITO VINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
RESOLUTION

Section 11. Name of the offended party-

41

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court dated January 18,
1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light
of the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion,
Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto,
the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice
saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house.
Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet
Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their
lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito
Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar
was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his
armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his antemortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as
his assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the following-

by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as
maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere
accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS
BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE
REASON THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN
LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE
ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL
VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4

Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax 1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the
Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case
of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the
case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was
indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial
Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered

During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to
the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder in the same
Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated
November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a decision
that was rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by the Solicitor General in
behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to
sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the
present motion for reconsideration to which the respondents were again required to comment. The required
comment having been submitted, the motion is now due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a principal for the
crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised
Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the
accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence
tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its commission or must
have known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen
driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least
two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted
Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.

42

This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established by the evidence,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the defendant
shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that
which is proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a mistake in charging
the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense
necessarily included therein, in which case the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good
cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the said crime was
established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or
complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the
evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility
necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an
information charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then and there. The degree of
responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial
rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the
result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of
the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of the
petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding
the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal
Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of the
principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed
inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.

The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as his assailant
on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to
his aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure of the prosecution and law
enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and
the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from
the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law
enforcement agencies to gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of
concern of the public prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the successful
prosecution of the case. 9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution to adduce the
quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as the person who was
seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as passenger
holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The
commission of the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In
such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried and sentenced.
Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense and the responsibility of the
accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses
saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above
discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with
the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce
evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he
assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material
significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory
was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had been proven in
the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the
assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding
on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and
Renato Parvian who were listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not
presented by the prosecution.

43

On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against
private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti
David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3
Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The
complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of
searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC
issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; while only
Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. 3
G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT,
SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT and FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum 1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment 2 in
this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners, children of the deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, may be
summarized as follows:
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN: (1)
GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM
WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY Of THE LAW;
and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID
PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH THE
ARRAIGNMENT AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT AND RECONSIDERATION
THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER AND DIRECTING THE
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol,
Pampanga.

On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution 4 in Criminal Case No. 95-360
finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused were
probably guilty thereof. His findings of fact and conclusions were as follows:
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago
"Docsay" Yabut, including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went
to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol, Pampanga
inquiring about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for
the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until
finally, they were able to reach the house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol,
Pampanga.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding,
stopped and parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused
descended from the truck and positioned themselves around the house while others stood by
the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard.
Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went inside the house of Virgilio
Dimatulac [and] were even offered coffee.
[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to
see the Mayor outside in front of his house to say sorry.
[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and then, the
son of Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to shout the following words: "What did you do to
my father?!"
One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he
died; and before he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor "Docsay"
Yabut as the one responsible.
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay" Yabut ordered his men to go on
board the truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for
help.

44

On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut gave money to accused John
Doe Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy" Yambao was asked to bring the accused John Doe to
Nueva Ecija which he did.
Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to
Masantol.
The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the
witnesses presented, [is] satisfied that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the
crime of murder was committed and that the accused in conspiring and confederating with one
another are probably guilty thereof.
Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.
That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago
Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy
Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail
recommended.
However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the police
authorities to furnish the court [a] description personae of the accused for the purpose of issuing
the needed warrant of arrest.
The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for them to file
their counter-affidavits in accordance to [sic] law.
As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the
others waived the filing of the same.
A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which the court
finds it [sic] straightforward and more or less credible and seems to be consistent with truth,
human nature and [the] natural course of things and lack of motives [sic], the evidence of guilt
against him is rather weak [compared to] the others, which [is why] the court recommends a
cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty, and the court's previous order of no bail for
said accused is hereby reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward he entire records
of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together
with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to be remanded to the provincial
Jail of Pampanga. 5 (emphasis supplied)
In a sworn statement, 6 petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a
number of bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk about a problem between the Mayor
and Peter Paul's uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed the group and even prepared coffee for them.
Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio to come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had
Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it
was one of Mayor Yabut's companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter spoke to the

people of Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor, Peter Paul added in a supplemental statement (Susog na
Salaysay) 7 that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.
It his Sinumpaang Salaysay, 8 Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police Station in Masantol,
Pampanga, declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., while he was at the polite station, three
men approached him and asked for directions to the house of Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the
men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of Minalin, Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but one of
the three returned to ask whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at
home. The group left on board a military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2
Michael Viray received a telephone call at the police station reporting that someone had shot Virgilio Dimatulac.
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation.
However, it is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private
respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut (hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not
submitted their counter-affidavits before the MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding," submitted their
counter-affidavits to Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.
In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, 9 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs
and the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one another, but that the
offense committed was only homicide, not murder. In support of such finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:
The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must be
noted that to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the employment of
the [sic] means of execution were give [sic] the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted . . . .
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the evidence,
such that the attack upon the victim while descending the stairs was so sudden and unexpected
as to render him no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. However, the circumstances, as
portrayed by witness Peter Paul Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second requisite.
According to the said witness, the victim was already descending when Mayor Yabut
commanded the assailant to shoot him, and immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This
would therefore show that the assailant did not consciously adopt the position of the victim at the
time he fired the fatal shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford
no opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act of Mayor
Yabut in giving the command to shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not
concert the means and method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there would have
been no necessity for him to give the order to the assailant. The method and manner of attack
was adopted by the assailant at the spur of the moment and the vulnerable position of the victim
was not deliberately and consciously adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and
the crime reasonably believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would
qualify the killing to murder.
Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:

45

1. An information be filed with the proper court charging Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut,
and one John Doe alias Danny as conspirators in the crime of Homicide;
2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco
Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano Magnaye, Gilberto
Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda.

Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.

The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and clarificatory questions
were propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.
On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners, appealed the
resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ). 10 They alleged in their appeal that:
1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
THE PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:

On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution 11 ordering the release of
accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then detained) in view of the
aforementioned resolution of Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the order, the Provincial Prosecutor approved "on
February 7, 1996."
On 28 February 1996, an Information 12 for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial
Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe,
Pampanga, against the YABUTs and John Doe alias "Danny Manalili" and docketed as Criminal Case No. 961667(M). The accusatory portion of the information read as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol, province of
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent to take the life of PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on his abdomen with the use
of a handgun, thereby inflicting, upon him a gunshot wound which cause[d] the death of the said
victim.
All contrary to law.

(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN AND WITH THE
USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY;
(B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
(C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN
THE SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING" WAS RAGING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1995;
(D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;
2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT
CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT
CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.

The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on "2/27/96",i.e., a
day before its filing in court.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the
YABUTs, each in the amount of P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest. 13
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor, filed two (2)
motions with the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All Accuseds 14 [sic]; and an (2)
Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, 15 copies of which were furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga. The second motion was grounded on the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice and a
copy thereof was attached to the motion. Judge Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. 16
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili.

To refute Alfonso-Flores' finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted, petitioners asserted that
the meeting of the accused and the victim was not accidental as the former purposely searched for the victim at the
height of a typhoon, while accused Mayor Santiago Yabut even remarked to his co-accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo
lang, alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what to do). Thus,
Danny positioned himself near the stairs to goad the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari
represented to the deceased that the latter was being invited by a certain General Ventura. When the victim declined
the invitation by claiming he was sick, accused Servillano Yabut persuaded the victim to come down by saying, "[T]o
settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in the truck." In view of that enticement, the victim came down,
while Danny waited in ambush. To emphasize the accused's resolve to kill the deceased, petitioners further narrated
that when the deceased ran away after the first shot, the gunman still pursued him, while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who
was a doctor, kept away at a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, "Tama na, bilisan ninyo," (That's enough,
move quickly) without giving medical assistance to the deceased and without exerting any effort to arrest the
gunman.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.

17

On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition 18 to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order and the Motion to
Defer Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting bail bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court and were bound by the condition therein to "surrender themselves whenever so required by the
court, and to seek permission from the court should any one of them desire to travel;" and, as to the second, the
pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial
court had to consider their right to a speedy trial, especially since there was no definite date for the resolution of the
appeal. Then invoking this Court's rulings in Crespo v. Mogul 19 and Balgos v. Sandiganbayan, 20 the YABUTs further
asserted that petitioners should have filed a motion to defer the filing of the information for homicide with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from the Secretary of Justice, an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to
defer the filing of the information in court.
In a Reply 21 to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on
the need for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the accused's right to a speedy trial would not
be impaired because the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the

46

DOJ and there was clear and convincing proof that the killing was committed with treachery and other qualifying
circumstances not absorbed in treachery; and contended that the accused's invocation of the right to a speedy trial
was inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory motions during the preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a
Rejoinder 22 to this Opposition.
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until "such time
that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as he found no
compelling reason therefor, considering that although the appeal was filed on 23 February 1996, "the private
prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge
Roura also set the arraignment of the accused on 12 April 1996. 23

e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.

f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.
g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation of
Criminal Case No. 95-360, containing the testimony of:
a. Peter Paul Dimatulac
b. Vladimir D. Yumul

It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to Defer Proceedings
since, on 12 April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order 24 giving the private prosecutor "ten (10) days from today
within which to file a petition for certiorari questioning the order of the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of
the order of March 26, 1996." Arraignment was then reset to 3 May 1996.

c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan

d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao

On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura 25 from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) on
the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the former's appeal in the DOJ was still pending
evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court that there was "nothing in the records of the
case that would qualify the case into Murder." At the same time, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition 26 with the
Court of Appeals docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).

h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.

On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment 27 with the trial court wherein
he opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that "there is nothing in the record . . . which shows that
the subject killing is qualified into murder;" and announced that he "will no longer allow the private prosecutor to
participate or handle the prosecution of [the] case" in view of the latter's petition to inhibit Judge Roura.

k. Unscaled Sketch

On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to Branch 54 of the
RTC, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon. 28
On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of Criminal Case No. 961667(M). 29
On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation 30 submitting, in connection with their Motion to
Defer Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence to support their contention that the
offense committed was murder, not homicide. The documents which they claimed were not earlier submitted by the
public prosecution were the following:
a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.
b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.
c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.

i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.

j. Sketch

Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a Resolution 31 directing
respondent therein to file his comment to the petition within ten days from notice and to show cause within the same
period "why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued as prayed for in the petition." However, the Court of
Appeals "deferred action" on the prayer for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment [was]
submitted."
On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation 32 with the RTC, furnishing the trial court with a copy of
the aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the attention of the trial court to the rulings of this
Court in "Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals . . . as well as the decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals."
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May 1996.
date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. 34

33

On the latter

Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment, 35 citing the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 which, inter
alia, deferred resolution on the application for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment is
submitted by the respondent;" stressed that the filing of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was
"clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of the unquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to
murder;" and asserted that a number of Supreme Court decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in view
of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ.

d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.

47

On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order 36 directing the accused to file their comment on the Urgent Motion to
Set Aside Arraignment within fifteen days from notice.

The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution,

of the DOJ." 40

In a letter 37 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary Teofisto
Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled that treachery was
present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga "to amend the information filed against
the accused from homicide to murder," and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information. The
findings and conclusions of Secretary Guingona read as follows:

In an Ex-Parte Manifestation 41 dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial court's attention to the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation and Motion 42 dated 1 July
1996, petitioners asked the trial court to grant their motion to set aside arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of
the Manifestation and Motion 43 of the Solicitor General dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 40393 wherein the Solicitor General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the better interest
of justice, [the] Petition for Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED forthwith." In support of said
prayer, the Solicitor General argued:

Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3
Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the victim was suddenly shot while he was descending the stairs. The
attack was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and on his way to make peace with Mayor
Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to speak. From the circumstances surrounding his killing, PO3
Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and deliberately
adopted by the respondents to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The
admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on how the principal respondent,
Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately
adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime. According to him, while they were on their
way to the victim's house, Mayor Yabut already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo
lang, alam no na king ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" This explains why Danny positioned
himself near the stairs of the victim's house armed with a handgun, such positioning was
precisely adopted as a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor
Yabut ordered nobody else but Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his
position was very strategic to ensure the killing of the victim.
As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1)
employment of means of execution that gives the person [attacked] no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted
(People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994]). In the case at bar, these two (2) requisites are
present as established from the foregoing discussion. Hence, there being a qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the crime committed herein is murder, not homicide (People vs.
Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).
Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao, we find
sufficient evidence against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against Yambao. As can be
gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to be credible, Mallari tried also to
persuade the victim to go with them, using as a reason that he (victim) was being invited by
General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun which was used in killing the victim.
These actuations are inconsistent with the claim that his presence at the crime scene was
merely passive.
On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed, under the
obtaining circumstances, Yambao had no other option but to accede to the request of Mayor
Yabut to provide transportation to the assailant. There being an actual danger to his life then,
and having acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear, reason dictates that he should be
freed from criminal liability. 38

39

citing Section 4 of "Administrative/Administration Order No. 223

2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice would

find their Appeal meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be directed to
upgrade the Information to Murder and extreme prejudice if not gross
injustice would thereby have been avoided.
3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining respondent Judge from holding
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-1667-M, particularly in holding
the arraignment of the accused, pending resolution of the Appeals with the
Secretary of Justice.
The YABUTs opposed 44 petitioner's Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already
been arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor not
the private prosecutor had control of the prosecution of the case.
In his letter 45 dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary of Justice set
aside his order to amend the information from homicide to murder considering that the appeal was rendered moot
and academic by the arraignment of the accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty. The
Secretary stated:
Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been arraigned
on May 20, 1996 and had pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as shown by a copy of
the court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition for review insofar as the respondents-Yabut are
concerned has been rendered moot and academic.
However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information for homicide.
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and to Admit
Amended Information. 46 The Amended Information 47 merely impleaded Fortunato Mallari as one of the accused.
In his Order 48 of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment, citing Section 4,
DOJ Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved
for reconsideration 49 of the order, arguing that the Motion to Defer the Proceedings filed by petitioners was
meritorious and did not violate the accused's right to speedy trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense
to be charged was murder and did not reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor General's stand 50 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 that holding accused's arraignment in abeyance was proper under the circumstances. Finally,
petitioners contended that in proceeding with the arraignment despite knowledge of a petition for prohibition pending

48

before the Court of Appeals, the trial court violated Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt.
The YABUTs opposed the motion on the ground that it raised no argument which had not yet been resolved. 51

(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in open court that there was no prima facie case for
murder, notwithstanding the pendency of petitioners' appeal with respondent Secretary of Justice.

On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, 52 which the trial
court granted in view of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying petitioners' motion to set
aside private respondents' arraignment. 53 As expected, Mallari moved to reconsider the trial court's order and
clamored for consistency in the trial court's rulings. 54

(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura's order inhibiting himself and the order regarding the transfer of the
case to Branch 54, public respondent Judge Villon set the case for arraignment and, without notice to petitioners, forthwith
arraigned the accused on the information for homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the petition for prohibition
before the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.

In an order 55 dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying petitioners' motion to
set aside arraignment, citing the YABUTs' right to a speedy trial and explaining that the prosecution of an offense
should be under the control of the public prosecutor, whereas petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the
prosecutor before they filed various motions to defer proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon deemed
accused Mallari's motion for reconsideration moot and academic. 56
On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 57 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 dismissing the
petition therein for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Roura's voluntary inhibition, the arraignment
of the YABUTs and the dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of petitioners' appeal as it had been mooted by said
arraignment.
Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura was ordered by
the Supreme Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga,
which was previously presided over by Judge Villon. 58 Judge Roura informed the Office of the Court Administrator
and this Court that he had already inhibited himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 59
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. They urge this
Court to reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment
of private respondents; order that no further action be taken by any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this
petition is resolved; and order respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the
information from homicide to murder.
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private respondents
tricked the victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was going down the stairs. There was,
petitioners claim, "an orchestrated effort on the part of [private respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative
appeals with the end in view of evading prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder," as shown by the
following events or circumstances:
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature of the crime committed to homicide, a bailable
offense, on strength of a motion for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs who had not yet been arrested.
(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the killing and went into hiding for four (4) months until
the offense charged was downgraded.
(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal
filed with the Secretary of Justice and request to defer any action on the case.
(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.

(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor's Office did not object to the arraignment nor take any action to prevent further
proceedings on the case despite knowledge of the pendency of the appeal.
(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June 1996 of the Secretary of Justice directing the

amendment of the information to charge the crime of murder.

Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 60 respondent Judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction in proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide and denying petitioners' motion to set
aside arraignment. Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393;
he should have deferred the proceedings just the same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC
could proceed with the arraignment despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice.
Further, Judge Villon unjustly invoked private respondents' right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely three (3)
months from the filing of the information on 23 February 1996; overlooked that private respondents were estopped
from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only to resurface when the charge was reduced to
homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of private respondents. Judge Villon should
have been more circumspect as he knew that by proceeding with the arraignment, the appeal with the DOJ would be
rendered technically nugatory.
Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the Secretary of
Justice once the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants are the
accused, since by submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their appeal.
In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set aside private
respondents' arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 may 1996, due to petitioners'
pending appeals with the DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996, due to the transfer of this case to Branch 54.
Moreover, as of the latter date, the DOJ had not yet resolved petitioners' appeal and the DOJ did not request that
arraignment be held in abeyance, despite the fact that petitioners' appeal had been filed as early as 23 February
1996, at least 86 days prior to private respondents' arraignment. They point out that petitioners did not move to
reconsider the RTC's 26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer, opting instead for Judge Roura's recusal and
recourse to the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, it was but proper
for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment of private respondent, to which the public and private
prosecutors did not object.
Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did the exercise of
discretionary powers, is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of separation of powers, petitioners'
recourse should have been to the President. While as regards petitioners' plea that the Secretary be compelled to
amend the information from homicide to murder, private respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as the
determination as to what offense was committed is a prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the
President.

49

As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by complainants is allowed
only if the complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a finding of probable cause, in which case,
only the accused can appeal. Hence, petitioners' appeal was improper.
Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the public prosecutor of
the private prosecutor's authority to handle the case.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the petition be denied
because: (a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon arraignment of the accused, the appeal to
the Secretary of Justice shall be dismissed motu proprio; (b) the filing of the information for homicide was in
compliance with the directive under Section 4(2), D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation from a
resolution finding probable cause shall not hold the filing of the information in court; (c) the trial court even
accommodated petitioners by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition
for prohibition, and since said Court did not issue any restraining order, arraignment was properly had; and (d)
reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and others had not been arraigned and respondent
Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending resolution of their petitions before the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.
Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude that something
had gone awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in manifest advantage to the
accused, more particularly the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State and to private complainants, herein
petitioners.
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for their temporary
liberty. However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they
surrender. Hence, they were never brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes,
either motu proprio or upon motion of the YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large,
Alfonso-Reyes should not have done so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation, as here, this difference of opinion must be on the basis of the review of the record and
evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as she had no other option under the circumstance, she
was without any other choice but to sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs and all other accused, except Francisco
Yambao, waived the filing of their counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching her magnanimity in favor of the accused,
Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender
because of the standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make a
mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense
of homicide.
Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused "Danny," despite
the fact that they were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives from justice for having avoided
service of the warrant of arrest issued by the MCTC and having failed to voluntarily surrender.
Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecution's appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. She could
not have been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her finding that there was no qualifying
circumstance attending the killing, and that the private prosecution had convincing arguments to support the appeal.
The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of Justice confirmed the correctness of the private prosecution's stand
and exposed the blatant errors of Alfonso-Reyes.

Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28 February 1996. It
is interesting to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996, it was approved by the Provincial
Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996. This simply means that the Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry
to file the Information. No undue prejudice could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later for the
YABUTs were still at large; in fact, they filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If
Alfonso-Flores was extremely generous to the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why she could not afford the
offended parties the same courtesy by at least waiting for instructions from the Secretary of Justice in view of the
appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter for instructions. Clearly, under the circumstances, the latter
course of action would have been the most prudent thing to do.
Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga did not
even bother to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private prosecution had appealed from the resolution of
Alfonso-Flores and had sought, with all the vigour it could muster, the filing of an information for murder, as found by
the MCTC and established by the evidence before it.
Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor did
not even have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing knowledge of the pendency of the
appeal. This amounted to defiance of the DOJ's power of control and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which
we shall later elaborate on. Moreover, in an unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu, had the
temerity, if not arrogance, to announce that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the
prosecution of [the] case" simply because the private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge Roura. Said
prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here had not waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their
right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they had the right to intervene in the criminal case
pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 1l0 of the Rules of Court.
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last
paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or
move for the dismissal of the complaint or information.
It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended party or the
accused.
More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretary's power of control over prosecutors. Thus,
in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 16 we emphatically held:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, 62 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors;
and who, may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Sec. 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the
secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City
Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph
1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:

50

(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; . . . .
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
Sec. 3. . . .
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State
Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall . . . perform such other duties as may be
assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a
specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau,
office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the
proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof,
or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office,
division or service.
"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative
law as follows:
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected
by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are
exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions in
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides,
thus:
Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Prosecutor or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to
the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not barred from appealing from the
resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide
was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder. Accordingly,
petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to forever bar redress of a valid grievance, especially
where the investigating prosecutor, as in this case, demonstrated what unquestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the

accused. Section 1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the offended parties are allowed only in cases of
dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court would be meaningless.
We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that Section 1 of DOJ Department Order No.
223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second paragraph thereof the appeal of petitioners did not hold the filing of the
information. As stated above, Section 4 applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon a
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of minifest error or grave
abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the
appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the
Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing
of the information in court. (emphasis supplied)

The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held
in Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals, 63 that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul, 64 reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 65 forecloses the
power of authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an
information already having been filed in court. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as
practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or
information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the
Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went
further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said power or authority of the Secretary of Justice "without
doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court" which is quoted
above.
Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the information for
homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.
As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of
26 March l996, 66 he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until "such time that all the accused
who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that the "private
prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice."
Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic, supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely,
immediate action thereon was called for as the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to
leave the country if they wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure
order could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to the second motion, Judge Roura was fully aware of the
pendency of petitioner's appeal with the DOJ, which was filed as early as 23 February 1996. In fact, he must have
taken that into consideration when he set arraignment of the accused only on 12 April 1996, and on that date, after
denying petitioners' motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to defer proceedings, he further reset arraignment
to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within which to file a petition forcertiorari to question his denial of
the motion to defer and of the order denying the reconsideration. In any event, the better part of wisdom suggested
that, at the very least, he should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned them that if
the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same time, moved to
inhibit Judge Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily" inhibit himself from the case on 29

51

April 1996 67 and to transfer the case to the branch presided by public respondent Judge Villon. The latter received
the records of the case on 30 April 1996. From that time on, however, the offended parties did not receive any better
deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch, Judge Villon issued an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused
on 20 May 1996. If Judge Villon only perused the record of the case with due diligence, as should be done by
anyone who has just taken over a new case, he could not have helped but notice: (a) the motion to defer further
proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners ten days within which to file a petition with the Court of
Appeals; (3) the fact of the filling of such petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; (4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals
directing respondents to comment on the petition and show cause why the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted and deferring resolution of the application for a temporary restraining order until
after the required comment was filed, which indicated a prima facieshowing of merit; (5) the motion to inhibit Judge
Roura precisely because of his prejudgment that the crime committed was merely homicide; (6) Judge Roura's
subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary evidence submitted by petitioners on 30 April 1996
supporting a charge of murder, not homicide; and (8) most importantly , the pending appeal with the DOJ.
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these
were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately held.
However, Judge Villon cursorily ignored all this. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's
resolution of the appeal, as he had, procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition
thereof rested on his sound discretion, 68 his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted
on 30 April 1996 and to initially determine, for his own enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the ultimate
goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a
resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, Judge Villon should have
heeded our statement inMarcelo 69 that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of the
prosecution agency, dictated that he should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending before the
DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of
the YABUTs on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties were deprived of due
process.
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to function in a
manner consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the public trust character of a public office. Judges
Roura and Villon and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need be reminded that it is in the public interest that every
crime should be punished 70 and judges and prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate
duty to see justice done, i.e., not to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent to
suffer. 71
Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, 72 they are the representatives not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case
but that justice be done. As such, they are in a peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose twofold aim is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected to prosecute the
public action with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally aggrieved, but at all times cautious that
they refrain from improper methods designed to secure a wrongful conviction. 73 With them lies the duty to lay before
the court the pertinent facts at the judge's disposal with strict attention to punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions
and sealing all gaps in the evidence, with a view to erasing all doubt from the court's mind as to the accused's
innocence or guilt.

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge
of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." 74 He must view himself as a priest, for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the
performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality
commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him. 75 Although the determination of a criminal case
before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, 76 his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must
be exercised within reasonable confines. 77 The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused,
nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. 78
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict
of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. 79 Justice then must be rendered evenhandedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was gross,
grave and palpable, denying, the State and the offended parties their day in court, or in a constitutional sense,due
process. As to said judges, such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the
jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby nullifying as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to
defer further hearings, the denial of the motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their
plea of not guilty.
These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must remedy the situation
before the onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse, for as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
pronounced in Galman v. Sandiganbayan: 80
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial
power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek
the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention of redress of a wrong, without fear or
favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice.
We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere ministerial task
to process each accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our democratic society under a
rule of law.
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that
murder was committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on the
basis of the information that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of
control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and
meekly surrendered to the latter's inappropriate conductor even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste of Judge Roura and Villon in
respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins of omission or commission of said prosecutors and judges
resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was murder, in unwarranted benefit to the
YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended parties. The DOJ should have courageously exercised its
power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the final analysis,
to prevent further injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause

52

with petitioners to set aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the
DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in not, inter alia, even asking
the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the
status of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from further
participating in the case.

For automatic review is the judgment [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, dated
November 23, 2000, in Criminal Case No. 6014-98-C, the fallo of which reads:

Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of
arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.

The two accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of two million pesos each.

We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was
attended with grave abuse of discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused 81 or the dismissal of the case 82 is void, hence double
jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and
plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the
Motion to Defer Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the denial of said Motion to Defer
Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3 May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20
May 1998 and of 25 October 1996 denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M)
are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut
and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the
order of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7 June 1996
REINSTATED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary
of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended information for murder. Thereafter the
trial court shall proceed in said case with all reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.[2]
Appellants herein are Vilma Almendras y Zapata, alias Apple, and her husband, Arsenio Almendras y Locsin,
a.k.a. Scout. They are residents of Sta. Ana, Manila. They were arrested by operatives of the Philippine National
Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) in Calamba, Laguna as a result of a buy-bust operation on June 19,
1998.
In an information dated August 4, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna charged the
appellants of violating Sec. 21 (b)[3] in relation to Sec. 15,[4] Art. III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7925. The offense was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about June 19, 1998, at Brgy. Pansol, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as SHABU weighing one (1) kilogram a regulated drug, to a
poseur buyer for and in consideration of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and the rest in boodle money arranged
into bundles to make it appear as real and genuine payment of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as full
payment of the agreed price, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Assisted by their defense counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. [6] The
case then proceeded to pre-trial.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 145915. April 24, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VILMA ALMENDRAS y ZAPATA and ARSENIO ALMENDRAS y
LOCSIN, appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Vilma Almendras and Arsenio Almendras guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Sec. 15, Title III of Republic Act 6425 as amended by Republic Act 7659, and are hereby sentenced to
suffer the death penalty.

At the pre-trial the defense admitted that: (1) appellants are not residents of Calamba, Laguna; (2) they are the
same persons charged in the information; (3) that they were arrested at 4:00 a.m. of June 19, 1998 at Pansol,
Calamba, Laguna; (4) there were two (2) photos of a Mercedes Benz car where the supposed shabu weighing
990.97 grams was supposedly found; (5) the existence of a Police Arrest Investigation Report, the photocopies of the
alleged buy-bust money, Receipt of Items Confiscated, Request for Laboratory Examination, and Examination
Report as part of the records, subject to cross-examination. The prosecution, in turn, marked the aforesaid
documents as Exhibits A to F without prejudice to the presentation of additional documentary exhibits. It likewise
admitted that there was only one laboratory qualitative examination conducted on the alleged shabu, the result of
which was contained in the report marked as Exhibit F for the prosecution and Exhibit 1 for the defense. The
parties agreed to limit the issues for trial to the following:
1. Whether in fact there was a buy-bust operation;
2. Whether the alleged prohibited drugs were found inside the car of the accused; and

53

3. Whether the quantity of the alleged prohibited drugs was 990.97 grams.[7]
During the trial, the prosecution established that:
At around 5:00 p.m. of June 18, 1998, the PNP NARCOM, Region IV, in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna
received a tip from a confidential informer that a supplier of shaburecently arrived from Manila and was looking for a
buyer.[8] The quantity of the drug was one kilo, with a street price of one million pesos (P1,000,000).
Acting thereon, P/Supt. Emelito T. Sarmiento, PNP NARCOM Region IV Chief, immediately instructed his men
to organize a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. P/Insp. Mauricio M. Cadano [9] headed the team and designated
SPO3 Rico Atienza to be the poseur-buyer.[10] The police informer then called up one Apple on his mobile phone
and arranged for a meeting the following day, between the hours of three oclock to six oclock in the morning, at the
Mountain View Resort Restaurant in Pansol, Calamba, Laguna.[11]
The team proceeded to prepare marked money consisting of ten P1,000 bills.[12] Bundles of boodle money
were also prepared to make it appear that SPO3 Atienza was carrying a million pesos in cash. [13] The marked bills
were placed on top of each bundle.
Early in the morning of June 19, 1998, the police operatives, accompanied by their informer, proceeded to
Mountain View Resort on board two vehicles.[14] On arriving at the resort, SPO3 Atienza parked at the resorts parking
area, while the other members of the team remained outside the gate of the resort, to act as a blocking force.
SPO3 Atienza and the informer then went inside the resorts restaurant where they ordered coffee. [15] After a
few seconds, the police informer approached a couple seated at a nearby table and talked to the woman. He then
introduced SP03 Atienza to the woman who called herself Apple. [16] When Apple was told that SPO3 Atienza was
interested in buying shabu, she asked him whether he had the money for the drug. [17] SPO3 Atienza replied that the
money was in his vehicle.
Apple then introduced her male companion as Scout. All four of them proceeded to the parking lot. SPO3
Atienza then took out a bag from his car, showed the buy-bust money to Apple and Scout. [18] The latter then
went to his vehicle, which was parked nearby, opened its trunk and pulled out a black box. [19] Scout then showed its
contents, a white crystalline powder wrapped in a transparent plastic bag to SPO3 Atienza. SPO3 Atienza handed
over the bag with the marked money to Apple and got the box. Once the box was in his hands, SPO3 Atienza gave
the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the team. The back-up team approached, introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents, and arrested Apple and Scout. The marked money was recovered from Apple and the
suspected shabu was turned over to P/Insp. Cadano. The police then brought the suspects to Camp Vicente Lim for
further investigation. Interrogation by the PNP NARCOM operatives revealed that Apple was Vilma Almendras y
Zapata while Scout was her husband, Arsenio Almendras y Locsin.
The confiscated bag containing the white substance was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV
for testing. PNP Forensic Chemical Officer P/Insp. Lorna R. Tria tested the said substance and found it positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug.[20] The quantity of the seized
drug amounted to 990.97 grams.
On May 6, 1999, the prosecution rested its case. Reception of the defense evidence was then set for May 12,
13, and 17, 1999.[21]

On May 10, 1999, defense counsel moved for leave to file a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence and the
admission of said Demurrer with Alternative Prayer for Bail. [22] The defense submitted that the prosecution failed to
establish the element of lack of authority to sell and deliver the alleged shabu. It further alleged that the prosecution
failed to present any concrete evidence establishing that the substance tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory was the
same substance seized from appellants. The defense then prayed for an acquittal.
In view of the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defense, the lower court cancelled the scheduled hearings for
May and new settings were made for June 8, 14, and 21, 1999.[23]
On June 8, 1999, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence.[24] It ruled that what is material in a
prosecution for a sale of an illegal drug is proof that the transaction took place. The trial court pointed out that both
the marked money and the shabu were presented in open court. The trial court also pointed out that the poseur
buyer, the police investigator, and the forensic chemist identified in court the shabu seized from the Almendras
couple, had placed their initials on the bag containing the same, and hence, established that it was the same drug
seized from appellants. The lower court likewise denied appellants prayer for bail since the amount
of shabu involved was 990.97 grams, for which the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua to death, making the
offense non-bailable.
On June 21, 1999, the defense manifested that it was seeking a review of the trial courts Resolution denying
its Demurrer to Evidence from the Supreme Court. The reception of the defense evidence was then reset anew to
September 7, 15, and 23, 1999.[25]
The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before
the Court of Appeals, which docketed the same as CA-G.R. SP No. 54343. [26] In their petition, appellants alleged that
the trial court gravely abused its judicial discretion in denying their Demurrer to Evidence and in denying their prayer
for bail.[27]
In view of the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 54343, the trial court moved the dates for the hearing of Criminal Case
No. 6014-98-C to March 7, 14, and 21, 2000.[28]
On March 14, 2000, defense counsel Jimenez was not present at the hearing. The trial court then ordered him
to appear for the defense on March 21, 2000, failing which it would appoint a counsel de oficio for the Almendras
couple, to expedite the disposition of the case.[29]
On March 20, 2000, defense counsel moved to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case No. 6014-98-C pending
the final disposition by the Court of Appeals of their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 54343. [30] The prosecution was then
given ten days to comment on the motion and the trial dates were moved anew to April 6 and 10, 2000 and May 10,
2000.[31]
On May 10, 2000, the trial court cancelled the scheduled hearing and reset new hearing dates for July 5, 12,
and 19, 2000.
At the hearing of July 5, 2000, defense counsel again failed to show up. The trial dates were then moved anew
to September 21 and 28, and October 5, 2000.[32]
When trial resumed on September 21, 2000, defense counsel was absent once again. The trial court then
advised appellants to coordinate with their counsel to ensure his presence at the next scheduled trial date. [33]

54

On September 25, 2000, the defense moved that the trial court cancel the hearing set for September 28, 2000
to await the final disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 54343 by the Court of Appeals.[34]

On September 14, 2001, the law firm of Puyat, Jacinto & Santos formally entered its appearance for appellant
Vilma Almendras.[43]

On September 28, 2000, trial resumed. Since defense counsel, Atty. Jimenez, again failed to show up, the trial
court appointed Atty. Vicente Carambas of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel de oficio for the Almendras
couple in the event counsel Jimenez was absent at the next scheduled hearing. The trial court also denied the
defenses motion of September 25, 2000. New trial dates were then set for October 5, 11, 12, and 19, 2000.[35]

In our resolution dated October 2, 2001, we granted the motion of the PAO and required appellants to submit
to the Court the name and address of a new counsel of choice, other than Atty. Jimenez.

However, counsel de parte (Jimenez) was absent for the October 5, 2000 trial. Appellants counsel de
oficio then manifested that the Almendras spouses refused to testify in court. When questioned by the court,
appellant Arsenio Almendras affirmed the manifestation of Atty. Carambas. The trial court then reset the hearing for
October 26, 2000 and ruled that in the event the defense failed to adduce its evidence on said date, the defense
would be considered as having waived its right to present evidence and Criminal Case No. 6014-98-C would be
deemed submitted for decision.[36]
On October 10, 2000, appellants filed a Motion for an Order Enjoining Observance of Judicial Courtesy in CAG.R. SP No. 54343.[37] They prayed that the appellate court issue an order enjoining the trial court to observe judicial
courtesy by suspending proceedings in Criminal Case No. 6014-98-C so as not to preempt the decision of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 54343. Appellants contended that the order of the trial court compelling them to
present their evidence with assistance of a counsel de oficio was violative of their right to due process.
On October 24, 2000, appellants moved that the trial court judge voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing
Criminal Case No. 6014-98-C.[38]
At the hearing of October 26, 2000, the trial court denied the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition for lack of merit.
Since counsel de parte (Jimenez) was again not in court, counsel de oficio(Atty. Carambas) appeared for appellants.
After due consultation, Atty. Carambas manifested that the Almendras spouses told him that they would not testify in
court unless assisted by Atty. Jimenez. When questioned by the lower court, appellants affirmed the manifestation of
Atty. Carambas. The prosecution then moved that the defense be deemed to have waived its right to present its
evidence and the case be considered submitted for decision. The trial court granted the prosecutions motion and set
promulgation of judgment for November 23, 2000.[39]
On November 15, 2000, appellants filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 54343 a Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.[40]
On November 23, 2000, the trial court promulgated its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 15 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentenced both appellants to death. Since
counsel de parte (Jimenez) was not around for the promulgation of judgment, appellants were assisted by Atty.
Carambas as counsel de oficio.[41]
Hence, the need for this automatic review of the appellants conviction and sentence by this Court.
On September 6, 2001, the PAO manifested to this Court that they talked to appellant Vilma Almendras to
ascertain if she wanted to be represented by them. Said appellant told the PAO that her counsel was Atty. Jimenez.
Out of respect for the right of appellants herein to be represented by a counsel of their choice, the PAO moved for
the suspension of the period to file appellants brief.[42]

On August 27, 2002, the Court noted the failure of appellant Arsenio Almendras to comply with the resolution of
October 2, 2001 and appointed the PAO as counsel de oficio for him.[44]
On October 1, 2002, Atty. Jimenez moved for leave to enter his appearance as counsel for appellant Arsenio
Almendras and admit his constancia.[45]
In a manifestation and motion dated October 15, 2002, the PAO moved to be excused from filing a brief for
appellant Arsenio Almendras in deference to appellants right to be represented by a counsel of his choice. [46]
On November 12, 2002, we directed Atty. Jimenez to file a supplemental brief for appellant Arsenio Almendras.
On November 26, 2002 we granted the motion of the PAO and directed Atty. Jimenez to file appellants brief for
Arsenio Almendras.[47]
In her brief, appellant Vilma Almendras assigns the following errors to the trial court.
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO HAVE WAIVED HER RIGHT TO PRESENT
DEFENSE EVIDENCE, RESULTING IN DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PROCEEDING TO RESOLVE THE CASE WITHOUT AWAITING THE RESOLUTION
OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO ANNUL THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING HER DEMURRER TO PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[48]
For his part, appellant Arsenio Almendras submits that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN WAIVING APPELLANTS RIGHT TO PRESENT
THEIR DEFENSE AND PROCEEDING TO CONVICT THEM PENDING THEIR CERTIORARI IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ON
THE DENIAL OF THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND ALTERNATIVE PRAYER FOR BAIL NOTWITHSTANDING. [49]

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the issues presented by appellants in this case are identical
to those raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 54343, which boil down to the question of whether the denial of their Demurrer to

55

Evidence was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The pivotal issue in this case concerns, in our view, the
sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to sustain a conviction.

certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended,
or misapplied.[52]

Appellant Vilma Almendras submits that in convicting appellants, the trial court merely relied on legal
presumptions that were not established by the prosecution due to the inconsistent and contradictory nature of its
evidence.

In the present case, the trial court ruled that appellants had waived the right to present evidence because of
their failure to proceed with the presentation of evidence despite several postponements granted to them. On the
sole basis of the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, and sentenced both appellants to death.

First, with respect to the testimonies of the police officers, the trial court found these to be credible and
believable. Vilma, however, points out that a closer look at the testimony of SPO3 Rico Atienza will show that he
contradicted himself on several material points, namely: (1) what transpired when the confidential informant arrived
at Camp Vicente Lim; (2) whether surveillance was conducted by the NARCOM agents; and (3) who prepared the
marked money to be used in the buy-bust operation. Further, she argues that the testimony of Atienza was
contradicted by the police investigator, SPO3 Edgar Groyon, on several material points. Moreover, she likewise
points out that the integrity of the physical evidence, namely, the alleged shabu supposedly taken from them by the
police operatives is placed in doubt as the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the
alleged confiscated drug. Finally, she stresses that inasmuch as the shabu allegedly taken from them by the
NARCOM personnel was not tested in its entirety, but only an alleged sample consisting of more or less five
milligrams, the drug content of said substance was not adequately proven. Thus, she concludes that the trial court
should have, on that basis, granted their Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted them of the charge.
Appellant Arsenio Almendras, in his Brief, contends that under the Rules of Evidence, the prosecution had the
obligation to prove that they sold and delivered one kilogram of shabu, without any authority of law, for a price of one
million pesos. He points out that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to show that appellants had no
authority to sell and deliver the said regulated drug. Furthermore, according to him, there can be no sale of shabu in
the instant case as, the price was simulated because as the Information itself alleges in consideration of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000) and the rest are boodle money arranged into bundles to make it appear as real and
genuine amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000) as full payment of the agreed price. He concludes that since
contracts which are absolutely simulated are inexistent and void from the beginning, there can be no prosecution for
the charged sale and delivery of shabu.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the trial court did not commit any grave
abuse of jurisdiction in denying appellants Demurrer to Evidence. For one, said the OSG, there is no showing of a
broken chain in the custody of the shabu from the moment of its seizure to the laboratory examination. According to
the OSG, it was duly established by documentary, testimonial, and object evidence including the markings on the
plastic bag containing the shabu, that the substance tested by the forensic chemist was the same as that taken from
appellants. To require that the whole caboodle of 990.97 grams of shabu be tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory
would be absurd, said the OSG, in view of the doctrine that a sample taken from a package is logically presumed to
be representative of the entire package unless proven otherwise. Appellants had not adduced any evidence to prove
the exception to said doctrine. Finally, says the OSG, all that is required of the prosecution in cases for illegal sale of
prohibited or regulated drugs is that it proves the: (1) identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these elements were duly proven by the prosecution
hence, concludes the OSG, the trial court was not only correct in denying appellants Demurrer to Evidence; it was
likewise correct in convicting them as charged.
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conduct the
buy-bust operation.[50] Hence, in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law, appellate courts tend to
heavily rely upon the trial court in assessing the credibility of witnesses, as it had the unique opportunity, denied to
the appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and
cross-examination.[51] Hence, its factual findings are accorded great respect, even finality, absent any showing that

To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence of a party is a matter
which lies in the discretion of the trial court, [53] but it is a discretion which must be exercised wisely, considering the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view to doing substantial justice.
Here, appellants lost their chance to present evidence due to the delaying strategem of their original counsel of
record.[54] Recall that after the prosecution has rested its case, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence that was denied by
the trial court.[55] Having expressed his intention to seek relief from this Court, the trial court gave the defense three
months, or until September 1999, before resuming with the reception of defense evidence. [56] Although there was no
order from the Court of Appeals enjoining the court a quo from resuming its proceedings, the trial court postponed
the resumption of hearing for six months, or on March 2000, so as not to pre-empt the action of the Court of Appeals
on appellants prayer for Temporary Restraining Order.[57]
Despite the 6-month leeway given by the trial court to defense counsel, he failed to appear in the March 7, 14,
and 21, 2000 hearings. Then on March 20, 2000, instead of presenting evidence, he filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings.[58] Although properly notified, he still failed to attend the scheduled hearings for the months of April,
May, July, and September of 2000.
On September 25, 2000, defense counsel filed an Urgent Motion for Further Continuance [59] to await the ruling
of the Court of Appeals in their prayer for a restraining order. Because there was still no injunction from the Court of
Appeals to proceed with the trial of the case, the Regional Trial Court denied the motion. [60] Due to the persistent
absences of their counsel, in the subsequent settings the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio for appellants with
a warning that failure of the defense to present evidence on October 26, 2000 would be considered waiver of their
right to present their evidence.[61]
Still undaunted by said warning, defense counsel filed a Motion for an Order Enjoining Observance of Judicial
Courtesy with the Court of Appeals. [62] He moved for the voluntary inhibition of the hearing judge. [63] This time, the trial
court mindful that there should be a limitation or an end to unnecessary postponements, not only denied the motion
for inhibition, but also ordered the case to be deemed submitted for decision sans the presentation of evidence from
the defense.[64]
Defense counsel Jimenez caused no less than 15 continuances in a span of two years. [65] Delay is obviously
the name of his game.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must
do so only within the bounds of the law.[66] The case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, which was filed by defense counsel with the Court of Appeals to assail the trial courts denial of their
demurrer to evidence, did not interrupt the course of the principal action in Criminal Case No. 6014-98-C nor the
running of the reglementary periods involved in the proceedings. [67] Settled is the rule that to arrest the course of the

56

principal action during the pendency of certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.[68] There was none in the instant case.

counsels tactics that took the case on its lethargic course. The trial court merits commendation for its manifestation
of zeal and determination to expedite the case and render justice.[79]

Further, in filing various motions for continuances, defense counsel heavily relies on the case which he cited
as: Factoran, Jr. v. Hon. Judge Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-90517, Feb. 7, 1991[69] to justify his motion for suspension
of proceedings in the trial court. For one, the case citation is incorrect; the resolution is dated February 11,
1991. For another, the rule is settled as far back as People v. Mercado[70] that the judicial action on the motion for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself is left to the exercise of the courts sound judicial
discretion. This doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of People v. Singh.[71] Section 23 of Rule 119, 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure,[72] provides that the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or
the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

However, in view of the death penalty imposed on appellants, we are constrained to rule that accusedappellants be allowed to present evidence for their defense now. In People v. Cabodoc,[80] this Court said:

As may be gleaned from the records, defense counsel apparently lost sight of the above-mentioned cardinal
rules of procedure. In filing motions of various denominations, namely: Motion to Suspend Proceedings, Motion for
an Order Enjoining Observance of Judicial Courtesy, Urgent Motion for Further Continuance, and Motion for
Voluntary Inhibition, all anchored on the certiorari case pending with the CA, counsel regrettably exposed his
disregard of quite elementary legal principles, in the false hope of gaining tempo in the pursuit of dilatory tactics.
From the numerous pleadings filed by defense counsel, he has demonstrated that he is not a novice in milking
the cow of procedure to the hilt. Rather, he has well demonstrated valued skills in the realm of litigation, considering
that he also adroitly cross-examined all of the prosecution witnesses, exhaustively scrutinized every minute detail of
the buy-bust operation, facets of appellants arrest, and the chain of custody of the prosecution evidence. Such
forensic display must have been purposive, directed at a singular goal: delay, delay, and delay some more till the
mills of justice grind to a halt. In appellants brief he filed before this Court, he now prays for the alternative relief of
remanding the instant case to the lower court for the reception of evidence. [73] We shall take him at his word that he
would present evidence, not verbiage of technicality, at last!
It bears stressing that a lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of ferreting the truth
and administering justice to all. [74] His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions. He had, after all, taken the oath upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Far from being an empty
exhortation, this oath embodies a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. [75]
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[76] we held that in cases where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in outright deprivation of the
clients liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by
reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence. [77] This ruling found positive resonance in Doroteo
Salazar and Dozen Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[78] Both are civil cases, where we
granted new trial on motion of petitioners who stood to lose property due to the negligence of their respective
counsels. In the present case, involving the death sentence, with more reason do appellants deserve to be heard,
because their lives are about to be forfeit. Not that we are rewarding defense counsels apparent antics, nor do we
denigrate an appellants stubborn refusal to be represented by a counsel de oficio. Having engaged the services of
counsel, however, a party has justifiable reason to expect that only his chosen counsel could amply protect his
interests in the case.
At the same time, we cannot in fairness ascribe any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court. What brought the trial courts order forfeiting the right of the defense to present evidence was defense

Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate[d] to aid and not to obstruct the proper administration of
justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses justice,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the purposes of justice or, in a
proper case, disregard them.
Court litigation is primarily a search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. [81] We note that although
Section 2 of Rule 121,[82] the Rules of Court enumerates the specific grounds in granting new trial or reconsideration,
none of which is present here, nonetheless Section 6 on the effects thereof considers the interest of justice as a
gauge in the introduction of additional evidence, to wit:
SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. - The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, all the
proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may,in the interest of
justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall
stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the paramount interest of justice militates against closing the door of the courtroom against
appellants. For unless granted a day in court now, an appellant may be doomed without competent counsel
presenting a proper defense at his disposal. We are not predisposed to such an eventuality that could taint seriously
our adversarial system. We must, however, warn the defense to proceed with the presentation of its evidence with
dispatch, lest this final opportunity to be heard now be lost. Needless to stress defense counsel, Atty. Rodolfo
Jimenez, is put on notice that further dilatory tactics on the part of the defense shall be dealt with most severely.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, dated November 23,
2000, in Criminal Case No. 6014-98-C is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for reception
of defense evidence and other appropriate proceedings conformably with this decision, without further delay.
FURTHER, counsel de parte, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, is hereby ordered to show cause why no administrative
action should be taken against him for what appears to be misconduct as a member of the bar and abuse of judicial
process, within 10 days from notice.
Costs de oficio.

57

SO ORDERED.

house and told his father what had happened. Ronaldo was taken to the Pakil Hospital for treatment. Tirso, who had
also been taken to the same hospital, suffered a gunshot wound on his stomach.[2] He died from his injuries the next
day, on July 9, 1994.[3]
On July 11, 1994, Ronaldo Narez executed an affidavit identifying his assailant as a certain Boy Marantal. In
his affidavit, marked as Exhibit B, Ronaldo stated:
[G.R. No. 127130. October 12, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO EBIAS y MAGANA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on automatic review in view of the imposition by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Siniloan, Laguna of the death penalty on accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias for the complex crime of murder with
frustrated murder. A new trial is sought by accused-appellant on the ground of newly-discovered evidence.
The facts are as follows:
On December 13, 1994, accused-appellant Ebias and a John Doe were charged with murder with frustrated
murder in an information[1] filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna who alleged That on or about 12:00 oclock noon on July 8, 1994 at Barangay Dambo, Municipality of Pangil, Province of Laguna
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while conveniently armed with a deadly
weapon (home made gauge 12 sulpak) with evident premeditation and with treachery and take advantage of
superior strength, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot once Ronaldo Narez and Tirso Narez by the said weapon
thereby inflicting upon Tirso Narez multiple gun shot wounds in the abdomen and right shoulder which caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim; and Ronaldo Narez sustained gun shot
wound in the right leg, thus, accused has performed all the acts of execution which could have also produced the
felony of Murder as a consequence with respect to said victim which nevertheless did not produce the felony by
reason of cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Ronaldo Narez which prevented his death and to his damages and prejudice.
That the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime.
When arraigned, accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias pleaded not guilty whereupon trial proceeded. Evidence
was presented by the prosecution showing the following:
On July 7, 1994 at around 12 noon, Ronaldo Narez and his cousin, Tirso Narez, went to get some jackfruit in
Barangay Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. On their way, they saw two men sitting by the roadside. As they were nearing the
place where the two men were, the latter waved at them. Ronaldo and Tirso Narez ignored the summon and
continued walking. When they were about 15 meters from the men, they heard one of the men, who was brandishing
a bolo, say Boy, tirahin mo na. The other man then drew his sulpak and shot them. Ronaldo and Tirso Narez ran
towards the kaingin. Ronaldo Narez realized that his right leg was bleeding. Nonetheless, he managed to reach his

2 : Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay nandidito sa tanggapan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna at ikaw ay kinukunan ng
salaysay?
: Sa dahilan po na kami ay binaril na ang aking kasama ay namatay at ako ay may tama.
3 : Kailan at saan naman nangyari ang bagay na ito, kung iyong tanda?
: Noong pong petsa 8 ng Hulyo, 1994, humigit kumulang sa oras alas 12:00 ng tanghali sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil,
Laguna.
4 : Sino naman ang bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong nakikilala?
: Ang bumaril po sa amin ay akin po lamang nakilala sa alias Boy Marantal at kung aking makikitang muli ay
aking maituturo.
5 : Maaari bang iyong isalaysay ang buong pangyayari sa ikaliliwanag ng imbistigasyong ito?
: Noong pong kami ay nasa karsada ay may nakita kaming dalawang tao na kami ay tinatawag at kinakawayan
at kami po ay hindi naman lumapit at pagkatapos po ay sila ang lumapit sa amin at nang ang layo sa amin
ay humigit kumulang na labing limang dipa ay aking narinig itong may dalang itak na mahaba na
nakalagay sa kaluban na nakasukbit sa baywang at ang sabi dito sa kasama niya na nakasoot na patigue
ang pangitaas ay BOY TIRAHIN MO NA at pagkatapos po ay may kinuha sa likod itong alias Boy sa
kanyang likod na isang parang tobo at ito ay pumutok at kami pong dalawa ng aking kasama ay nanakbo
na papuntang kaingin at sa pagtakbo naming iyon ay kami ay nagkahiwalay hanggang sa aking
maramdaman na ang aking binti ay kumikirot at nang aking tingnan ay may sugat ito hanggang sa ako ay
makarating sa aming bahay at sinabi ko sa aking Tatay na ako ay may tama ng baril at ako po ay dali-dali
nilang inilabas sa karsada at ako ay kanilang dinala sa hospital ng Pakil, Laguna upang magamot at hindi
pa ako gasinong natatagalan ay may dumating na isang traysikel at aking nakita na ang ibinababa ay ang
aking pinsan at ito ay may tama din at nang kami po ay isakay sa Mobile ng Pangil PNP upang ilipat sa
Sta. Cruz, Laguna sa hospital ay aking nakita na ang aking pinsan ay may tama sa tiyan at ibaba ng
kanang balikat at pagkatapos po ay nitong madaling araw ng petsa 9 ng Hulyo 1994 ay namatay ang
aking pinsan.
6 : Ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari, kung mayroon man?
: Wala na po akong alam.
7 : Paano mo naman nalaman na Boy Marantal ang pangalan nintong bumaril sa inyo?
: Dahil po sa iyon po ang aking pagkakilala sa kanya na aking natandaan.

58

8 : Ito bang si Boy Marantal na ito ay matagal mo nang nakikilala?

: Dahilan po na ngayon ko po lamang nakita ang taong bumaril sa amin.

: Hindi ko po siya masyadong kilala pero isang beses ko na siyang nakita at pangalawa ay nang kami ay barilin.

6 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang nakita?

9 : Alam mo ba naman kung tiga saan itong si Boy Marantal?

: Sa dahilan po na ako po ay nagtigil sa San Pablo City at nang ako po ay umuwi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil,
Laguna ay doon ko po nakita ang bumaril sa amin.

: Hindi po pero sa aking pong palagay sa naninirahan din sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna.
7 : Ano naman ang ginawa mo nang iyong makita at makilala ang taong bumaril sa inyo?
10 : Anong klasing baril naman ang ibinaril sa inyo, kung iyong alam?
: Isa pong de sabog na yari sa tobo na kung tawagin ay Sulpak.
11 : Ilan beses naman kayong binaril?
: Isa pong beses lamang.
12 : May mga nakakita ba naman sa pangyayari ng kayo ay barilin?

: Nang aking pong makita ang taong bumaril sa amin ay aking pong ipinaalam sa Hepe ng Brgy. Tanod na si
Jose de Guia.
8 : Inuulit ko sa iyo, may taong nandito sa aming Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna, ito ba ang iyong
nakikilala?
: Iyan pong taong iyan ang bumaril sa amin (Witness identified the person of ERNESTO EBIAS residing at Brgy.
Dambo, Pangil, Laguna).

: Wala po dahil sa malayo sa kabahayan ang pinangyarihan.

9 : Nang makilala mo ba na si Ernesto Ebias, ito ba ay mapapatunayan mo sa Husgado na siya na ang bumaril
sa inyo?

13 : Ano naman ang tunay na pangalan ng iyong pinsan na namatay na iyong kasama ng barilin?

: Opo.

: Tirso Nariz po na nakatira sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna.[4]

10 : Hindi ka kaya nagkakamali sa pagkakilala mo kay Ernesto Ibeas na siya ang bumaril sa inyo?

About a month later, on August 16, 1994, Ronaldo executed another affidavit (Exhibit F) in which he said that
accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias was the same Boy Marantal who shot him and his cousin on July 8. Ronaldo said
in his latest affidavit:
2 : Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay nandidito sa tanggapan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna at ikaw ay kinukunan ng
salaysay?
: Sa dahilan po na nais kong ipabatid na nakilala at nakita ko na ang bumaril sa amin noong July 8, 1994,
humigit kumulang sa oras alas 12:00 ng tanghali sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna.
3 : Kailan mo naman nakita o nakilala ang taong iyong sinasabi na bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong tanda?

: Hindi po.
11 : Sino ang kasama mo nang ikaw ay barilin?
: Ang akin pong pinsan na si Tirso Nares at ito ay namatay.[5]
During the trial, Ronaldo Narez reiterated in open court that accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias and Boy
Marantal were one and the same person. [6] However, he could not identify accused-appellants companion as the
latters face was covered with a yellow handkerchief.[7]

4 : Ano naman ang pangalan ng bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong nakikilala at iyong nakita?

Accused-appellants defense consisted of denial and alibi. A defense witness, Isagani Maray, claimed that
accused-appellant Ebias, together with several laborers, was working in a citrus plantation in Pangil, Laguna on the
day in question.[8] Maray admitted, however, that the plantation where accused-appellant was allegedly working was
only around 10 meters from the place of the incident. [9] Accused-appellant claimed that he was at the Vista
Villamayor Citrus Plantation at the time of the commission of the crime. At around 12 noon of that day, when the
shooting took place, he ate lunch at his house with Isagani Maray and other members of his family.[10]

: Napagalaman ko na lamang po dito sa Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna na ang pangalan ay si Ernesto
Ibeas na naninirahan sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna.

On May 15, 1996, the court rendered a decision, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder with
frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

: Noong pong petsa 15 ng Agosto, 1994, humigit kumulang sa oras alas 7:00 ng gabi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil,
Laguna.

5 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang itinuro ang bumaril sa inyo, sa anong dahilan?

59

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ERNESTO EBIAS y MAGANA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER as charged,
qualified by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and
pursuant to the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences him the maximum penalty of
death. To indemnify the heirs of Tirso Narez, in his death the amount of P50,000.00 and as actual damages the
amount of P12,000.00 representing the amount spent in the wake, funeral and for coffin. To indemnify Ronaldo
Narez as actual damages the amount of P2,000.00 representing medical expenses. To pay the cost.

4. Na noong ika-8 ng Hulyo 1994, alas 6:00 pa lang umaga habang hinihintay namin ang pagdaan
noong Bombay na aming inaabangan, may dalawang lalaki na hindi namin kilala ang lumabas mula
sa gubat;
5. Na noong sila ay papalapit na sa amin ay medyo kinabahan kami at naglakad papalayo subalit
patuloy pa rin kami nilang sinundan;
6. Na agad naman dumaan ang sasakyan ng Bombay na dapat sana naming hoholdapin. At dahil sa inis
dahil hindi namin naisakatuparan ang planong panghoholdap sa Bombay ay binaril ko ang dalawang
taong sumusunod sa amin na may kalayuan na humigit kumulang sa limampung metro, sa
pamamagitan ng armas ko na shotgun;

SO ORDERED.[11]
On appeal to this Court, accused-appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to comply with the rules for
the protection of the rights of the accused during confrontations with alleged eyewitnesses before the police. He
further contended that the trial court erroneously gave credence to the testimony of a perjured eyewitness upon
whose sole testimony hinged the entire case against him. Lastly, he argued that the trial court failed to appreciate
uncontroverted facts established by the defense as well as admissions against interests made by the prosecution
witnesses.[12]
On November 20, 1998, accused-appellant filed a motion seeking the appointment of a counsel de oficio for
Leonardo Eliseo, a death convict at the National Bilibid Prison, who wrote a letter confessing to the commission
of the crime for which accused-appellant was held liable.[13] In a resolution, dated April 27, 1999, the Court denied
accused-appellants motion for lack of merit.[14] On February 3, 2000, accused-appellant moved for new trial on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence. Accused-appellant averred that new and material evidence had been
discovered by the defense, consisting of a confession made by Leonardo Eliseo, also a death row convict, that he
committed the crime for which accused-appellant was convicted and sentenced to death. Accused-appellant further
alleged that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced during his trial because it was only after
his conviction that he came to know of Eliseos responsibility for the crime and his willingness to confess. Accusedappellant asserted that Eliseos confession would probably change the judgment if it was introduced in evidence. [15]

7. Na tinamaan ko po ang isa sa tiyan samantalang ang isa ay sa hita, at habang ang isa sa kanila ay
bumulagta at ang isa naman ay paika-ikang tumakbo, kami naman ay naglakad lang papalayo at
papauwi sa aming bayan;
8. Na ako ay nagbibigay ng salaysay ngayon dahil naawa po ako sa taong nahatulan ng bitay sa
kasalanan na ang may kagagawan ay ako.
9. Na ginawa ko ang salaysay na ito sa harap at patnubay ni Public Attorney Abelardo D. Tomas, Public
Attorneys Office Muntinlupa, matapos niyang ipaliwanag sa akin ang aking mga karapatan at
maipaalala na sa salaysay kong ito ako ay mananagot sa isang napakabigat na krimen.
BILANG PATUNAY na ang lahat ng aking isinalaysay dito ay pawang katotohanan lamang, ay nakahanda po akong
lagdaan ito ngayong ika-4 ng Disyembre 1999, dito sa Lungsod ng Muntinlupa.
(signed)

Attached to accused-appellants motion for new trial was an affidavit [16] executed by Leonardo Eliseo narrating
his participation in the shooting of Tirso and Ronaldo Narez. The affidavit reads in full as follows:
AKO, si bilanggong LEONARDO ELISEO Y SAN LUIS, 33 taong gulang, kasalukuyang nakakulong dito sa
Pambansang Piitan at nakaselda sa I-B, Maximum Security Compound, Muntinlupa City, matapos makapanumpa ng
ayon sa Saligang Batas, ay malayang nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na noong ika-20 ng Hunyo 1994, pumunta kami sa Barangay Lambak, Mabitak, Laguna sa bahay ng
aking kumpare na si Berting mga ganap na alas 9:00 ng gabi na kasama ang aking kaibigan na si
Boy, para mag-inuman.

The question now is whether or not Eliseos confession constitutes newly-discovered evidence warranting a
new trial in favor of accused-appellant. For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, could probably change the judgment.
[17]

2. Na may isang bisita si Berting na hindi ko na matandaan ang pangalan na nagkwento na may isa daw
Bombay sa kanilang barrio na maganda daw holdapin dahil pag nadale daw namin ito at tiba-tiba
kami dahil kadalasan ay marami daw itong dalang pera at alahas;

Accused-appellant claims that it was only during his confinement at the Maximum Security Compound of the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa that he met Leonardo Eliseo, a fellow death convict, and learned from the latter his
alleged participation in the shooting of Tirso and Ronaldo Narez and that even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence could not have earlier known of the confession of Leonardo Eliseo.

3. Na aming tinandaan ito at kinabukasan ay minatiyagan na namin itong bombay at pinagplanuhan

naming holdapin ito. Hinanap namin ang lugar na madalas niyang puntahan at may nag-tip sa amin
kung kailan ang magandang petsa na siguradong may dala itong malaking pera. At natiyak namin sa
ika-8 ng Hulyo 1994 ay may dalang malaking pera daw itong Bombay;

The Solicitor General does not dispute these allegations. He opposes accused-appellants motion for new trial,
however, on the ground that Eliseos confession can not change the outcome of the judgment against accusedappellant because it can not overturn Ronaldo Narezs positive and unerring identification of accused-appellant as
the person responsible for the crime.[18]

60

To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the conviction of the accused
if it is credible, positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the latter is guilty.[19] In this case, the trial
court relied primarily on the positive identification made by Ronaldo Narez in convicting accused-appellant. The trial
court ruled:
The Court after a perusal of the testimonies of these witnesses for the prosecution, and the defense, is more inclined
to believe the former. Accused Ernesto Ebias alias Boy Marantal and his companion whose name remains unknown,
and is still at-large, were positively identified by Ronaldo Narez to be the person who shot them. He could not be
mistaken. The incident happened at more or less 12:00 oclock noon of July 8, 1994. The distance of accused from
the victims is about fifteen (15) meters only.
The defense was not able to overthrow the testimonies of the prosecution, which was straightforward, convincing as
to leave no space for doubt. Accused w[as] positively identified to be the author of the crime. It is a well settled rule
that greater weight is given to the positive identification of accused by prosecution witness. (Peo. vs. Canada, G.R.
No. 65728, Sept. 15, 1986 (144 SCRA 121)
Defenses negative evidence cannot outweigh prosecution witnesses testimony on affirmative matters. At best, his
denial is a self-serving negative evidence that can not be given greater weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. (People of the Philippines vs. Ramir Carizo, et. al., G.R. No.
96510, July 6, 1994)[20]
To be sure, Ronaldo Narez remained steadfast and unshaken in his testimony that it was accused-appellant
whom he saw shoot him and his cousin. However, questions arise regarding the circumstances surrounding the
identification made by Ronaldo Narez of accused-appellant as the person who shot him and his cousin resulting in
the latters death.
First. Ronaldo Narez identified the person who shot them as Boy Marantal. But it was not established how he
came to know him by that particular name. In both his affidavit and his testimony, Ronaldo quoted the assailants
companion as telling the latter, Boy, tirahin mo na.[21] Obviously, the surname Marantal did not come from the
unidentified companion. Ronaldo Narez stated in his affidavit that he knew accused-appellants name to be Boy
Marantal. He said:
7.) : Paano mo nalaman na Boy Marantal and pangalan nitong bumaril sa inyo?
: Dahil po sa iyon po ang aking pagkakilala sa kanya na aking natandaan.
8.) : Ito bang si Boy Marantal na ito ay matagal mo nang nakilala?
: Hindi ko po siya masyadong kilala pero isang beses ko na siyang nakita at ang pangalawa ay nang kami ay
barilin.[22]
How Ronaldo came to know accused-appellants alias to be Boy Marantal has not been shown. When
questioned on cross-examination, Ronaldo Narez testified:
Q You do not know the full name of Ernesto Ebias according to you before the incident?

Q But you know a certain Boy Marantal?

A Yes, mam.
Q Who is that Boy Marantal?
A One and the same person Ernesto Ebias.
Q Presumably Ernesto Ebias is more popular in your locality as alias Boy Marantal?
A Yes, sir.[23]
Indeed, it appears from his affidavit executed on August 16, 1994 that it was only later when he learned from
the police that the real name of Boy Marantal was Ernesto Ebias. This raises the suspicion that Narez was
influenced by matters other than his own personal perception in identifying Ebias as the person who had shot them.
While Ronaldo Narez insisted that accused-appellant was known by the alias of Boy Marantal, no other
witness was presented by the prosecution to corroborate his testimony that accused-appellant was known in their
locality by that name. To the contrary, Santiago Narez, a prosecution witness, testified that accused-appellant was
known by the nickname or alias Estoy.[24]
Second. Accused-appellant had been a long time resident of Barangay Dambo, Pangil, Laguna before the
incident.[25] In fact, Ronaldo Narez testified that he knew accused-appellant personally because the latter was a
family friend who would sometimes visit their house. [26] Yet, in the affidavit he executed before the police on July 11,
1994, he stated that he was not familiar with the person who shot them because he only saw the latter once before
the incident.[27]
It is settled that the prosecution bears the burden not only of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a crime
has been committed but also the identity of the person or persons who should be held responsible therefor. [28] The
identification of the culprit by an eyewitness must thus be examined with caution to determine whether it fulfills the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. There seems to be no reason why eyewitness Ronaldo Narez should
fail to recognize accused-appellant as the person who shot them considering that the crime was committed in broad
daylight and the latter was a neighbor who was even considered as a family friend. In a similar case, the credibility of
the eyewitness was considered diminished by the fact that she remained silent as to the identity of the perpetrator
during the initial investigation of the crime and inexplicably failed to state why she remained so if she truly knew who
the culprit was.[29]
Third. Ronaldo Narez said in his second affidavit (Exhibit F):
3 : Kailan mo naman nakita o nakilala ang taong iyong sinasabi na bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong tanda?
: Noong pong petsa 15 ng Agosto, 1994, humigit kumulang sa oras alas 7:00 ng gabi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil,
Laguna.
4 : Ano naman ang pangalan ng bumaril sa inyo, kung iyong nakikilala at iyong nakita?

A Not yet, mam.

61

: Napagalaman ko na lamang po dito sa Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna na ang pangalan ay si Ernesto
Ibeas na naninirahan sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil, Laguna.
5 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang itinuro ang bumaril sa inyo, sa anong dahilan?
: Dahilan po na ngayon ko po lamang nakita ang taong bumaril sa amin.
6 : Bakit mo naman ngayon lamang nakita?
: Sa dahilan po na ako po ay nagtigil sa San Pablo City at nang ako po ay umuwi sa Brgy. Dambo, Pangil,
Laguna ay doon ko po nakita ang bumaril sa amin.
7 : Ano naman ang ginawa mo nang iyong makita at makilala ang taong bumaril sa inyo?
: Nang aking pong makita ang taong bumaril sa amin ay aking pong ipinaalam sa Hepe ng Brgy. Tanod na si
Jose de Guia.
8 : Inuulit ko sa iyo, may taong nandito sa aming Himpilan ng Pulisiya ng Pangil, Laguna, ito ba ang iyong
nakikilala?
: Iyan pong taong iyan ang bumaril sa amin (Witness identified the person of ERNESTO EBIAS residing at Brgy.
Dambo, Pangil, Laguna).[30]
It would thus seem that accused-appellant was the only person shown to Ronaldo Narez for identification. We
have set our face against such procedure. The identification of the accused during a show-up or where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification is highly suggestive. [31] For confronted with a single
suspect, an eyewitness would most likely yield to police pressure to identify the suspect as the perpetrator of the
crime, substituting fancy for fact, suspicion for guilt. We cannot with certainty say that such is not the case here. This
on the one hand.
On the other hand, we cannot say that Ronaldo Narez was mistaken in identifying accused-appellant as the
person who shot him and his cousin. After all, he never deviated from his testimony that he saw accused-appellant
when the latter shot them. The crime was committed at noontime with the shooter a mere fifteen meters away from
his victims. Ronaldo Narez was thus able to see his attacker in full view. We cannot, therefore, discount Ronaldo
Narezs positive identification of accused-appellant as the person who shot him and his cousin.
There is thus a need for a new trial in order to determine the veracity of Ronaldo Narezs positive
identification vis--vis the alleged confession made by Leonardo Eliseo since no less than a life is at stake. We
recognize that [c]ourt litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which
both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. [32] Hence, a
liberal interpretation of the rule granting a motion for new trial is called for. [33] We cannot in good conscience convict
accused-appellant and impose upon him the death penalty when evidence which would possibly exonerate him may
be presented by him in a new trial. Neither can we acquit him on the sole ground that another person confessed to
having committed the crime.
In previous cases, we granted the accuseds motion for new trial on the basis of affidavits executed either by
witnesses or by the perpetrators of the crime as they tend to establish the innocence of the accused. [34] In People v.

Amparado[35]and Cuenca v. Court of Appeals,[36] affidavits confessing to the actual commission of the crime were
executed by the supposed culprits. The Court remanded the cases to the trial court because of the possibility that,
should the affidavits be proven true, the conviction of the accused could be reversed or at least modified. As has
been said, the overriding need to render justice demands that an accused be granted all possible legal means to
prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged.[37]
On the other hand, we cannot discount the possibility that the confession by Leonardo Eliseo is a last-ditch
effort by accused-appellant to avoid the death penalty. For this reason, this case should be reopened only for the
purpose of allowing the defense to present the testimony of Leonardo Eliseo and for the prosecution to present any
rebutting evidence which it may desire to present.
WHEREFORE, without vacating the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, at Siniloan, Laguna, this
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, of Muntinlupa City for the purpose of allowing the
presentation of the testimony of Leonardo Eliseo and any evidence which the prosecution may wish to present to
rebut such testimony. In accordance with Rule 121, 6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, evidence already in the
record shall stand and the new evidence shall be taken into account by the trial court and considered with evidence
already in the record and, thereafter, judgment should be rendered accordingly.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are asked to play the role of an
infallible God by exercising the divine right to give or take away life. We cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for
our error will be irrevocable. Worse, our error can result in the worst of crimes murder by the judiciary.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide 1 in an Information
which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE
MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation
fractured cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse
hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct cause of
her death.

62

CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of
Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.

4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.

5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:

After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for
reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so desired. 2
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old
victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at
Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every now and then would take leave and return.
Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m.,
Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.

a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.

b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.

Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2) arm's length from the house of
appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the victim at the window of appellant's house. She offered to buy
her "yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached appellant's house
and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her appellant was naked, on top of
the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together
and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome
with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife
searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were
looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant from her window
and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not know.

EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left
forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right
forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:

As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of
nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the
police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that
appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow
up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the
prosecution.
The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His autopsy report reveals the
following injuries sustained by the victim:
HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck, down to the
medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.

a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum..

b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the
promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and anal
openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.

2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero- inferior chest wall.

C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL

OPENINGS.

63

Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to prove that the proximate cause
of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with Homicide penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
Arnel Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer a (sic) penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of
the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00.
The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the
method of carrying out his sentence shall be changed by gas poisoning (sic).

also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a national
language is still in the process of evolution. 4 Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos
have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official languages for purposes of
communication and instruction. 5 The importance of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in
the language or dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or
dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown
whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant.
Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect
before his plea of guilt. The scanty transcript during his arraignment, reads: 6
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Edwin Fama Appearing as public prosecutor

Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for the grievous offense he
had committed. He deserves no mercy.

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.

Cost against the accused.

Interpreter (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)

SO ORDERED.

Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)

The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court. A new counsel,
Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court as a
travesty of justice.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors, both substantive
and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic
logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116
on arraignment. Said section provides:

One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated section
1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of
law. 7 It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted.
When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must be
sure.
Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule
116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section provides:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has
been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or
clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information.
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him is a
new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It implements the constitutional right
of an appellant ". . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 3 The new rule

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching
inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the transcripts reveal the following: 8
Note (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
Court Question (sic) of the court to the accused.

64

Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous crime, because of your plea
of guilty without the consent or even against the discretion of the court, the court will give you a
mandatory death penalty because of the crime charged, do you understand?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.

Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any force or intimidation from any
one or whatever?

Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.

Accused None, Your Honor.

Court Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the prosecution Arnel Alicando, please
come here. (at this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near to the court)

Q Are you sure?

The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the prosecution after you plead guilty to the
crime charged at, do you understand?

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

A Yes.
Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and that will just be the
consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his body from waist up.)
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court You were not maltreated in the jail?
Accused No, Your Honor.

Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary without force, intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?

Court Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined by a physician to the
order of the court?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court Okey, proceed.

Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no use because there will be a mandatory death
penalty, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your civil rights hut not until
the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the decision of this
Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in an unbroken line of cases. 11 The bottom line of the rule is that
the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must
be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions
demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any
information about the personality profileof the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant
were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a
nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the
essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.

Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the records of this case.)

In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange transpired, viz: 9

65

A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will
show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not
ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the
following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his
arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma, viz:
c-0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM, P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP MFC, informed this office
thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about 9:00 AM this date when the suspect ARNEL
ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24 yrs. old, residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP, been arrested and
mobbed by the irrate residents of Zone II Rizal, Palapala, GP, in connection of the Rape with
Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA Y DRILON, 4 yrs, old, residence of
same place who was discovered dead under the house thereat. Suspect when turned over to
this office and put on lock up cell was also mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing upon him
hematoma contusion on different parts of his body.
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining the
meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It
cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without telling the appellant what those
"effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are involved.

These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a
result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of
counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:
Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see Arnel Alicando?
A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.
Q Previous to that you have never seen him?
A Yes, sir.
Q When for the first time did you start investigating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished investigating the body of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla.
Q And that was also after you were informed that Arnel Alicando was a suspect in the raping of Khazie
Mae Penecilla?
A Yes, sir

Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We stress that under the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of
Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior
jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the
information without need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the criminal
process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination
of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free. 12

Atty. Antiquiera:
Q And who was that person who informed you of the suspect?
A Luisa Rebada.
Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?

Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet,
were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the prosecution. To quote its
Decision, 13 viz:

A Yes, sir.
Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with
bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its
bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate
the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.

A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated him.

66

Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994 in interrogating and investigating Arnel Alicando?

Q On what hour did you inform him?

A Yes, sir.

A After the witness identified him.

Q And the investigation you conducted continued in the afternoon of the same date?

Q What constitutional rights did you inform Alicando of?

A Yes, sir.

A The right to remain silent, and right to get his lawyer and I have interpreted in Visayan language.

Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still investigated and interrogated Arnel Alicando.

Q And during your investigation for almost two (2) days the accused was never represented by counsel,
is that correct?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and interrogating Arnel Alicando?
Atty. Antiquiera:
A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation to this case.
Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public officer to inform the person of his constitutional rights?
Q What date did you stop your investigation?
A Yes, sir.
A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white T-shirt and pair of earring.
That is all, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness, you never informed the court that you apprised the accused of
his constitutional rights, is that correct?

It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized

as inadmissible evidence uncounselledconfession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx

A I apprised him.

Pros. Fama:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one.These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?

xxx xxx xxx

Court:

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.

Q My question is, during your testimony before this court under the direct examination of the
prosecution you never informed the court that you apprised the accused of his constitutional rights?

Sustained.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q When did you inform, the date when you informed Alicando of his Constitutional rights?
A On June 13.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the
appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to have
competent and independent counsel despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court
allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom.
The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession
illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Again, the testimony of PO3 Tan makes this all clear, viz: 17

67

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the place of the
incident?

A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place did you recover those things?
A Inside the room where he raped the child.

A Yes, sir.
Q Whose house is that?
Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?
A The house of Imelda Alicando.
A He pointed to the fish basin.
Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?
Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by Arnel
Alicando?

A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.

Q In what particular place is that situated?

Q Please point?

A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.

A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)

Pros. Fama:

Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?

Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the accused?

A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he answered that
he used the fish basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla when she was already
dead.

A Yes, sir.

Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?
A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old mat and
the pillowwherein he layed the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla
Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the incident that
time?
A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio, my
companion, who went to the place of the incident.

Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside the room of
Imelda Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the mat?
A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)
Q Did you find something on the pillow?
A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.
. . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat as
Exhibit "I".
Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?

Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?

68

A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the accused
Arnel Alicando further informed me that he kept the gold earring of the
victim and her clothes inside the room of the house of Imelda Alicando.
Q Where?
A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where the rape
took place hanged on the clothes line. And I found the pair of earring at the
bamboo post of the fence.
Court:
Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?
A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from gate on the right
side.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the items
accompanied by the accused?

vs. Salanga, et al., 21 a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing
of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They gave
him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear was later identified as that of the
victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons , we ruled that "the underwear allegedly taken from
the appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree." 22
But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the trial court erred in
holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped." For one, there
was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt were human bloodstains. The
pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For
another, there was no testimony that the stains were caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In
addition, there was no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the
crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by
occupation. Romeo Penecilla himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant "because he used to
accompany me during butchering of animals." 23
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a
confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show
that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be
discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides
only one mode of waiver the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the
records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the
hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed
evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.

A No more, I only followed his direction.

Q He made verbal direction to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?
A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)
Q Please examine that white t-shirt?

There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court should be concerned with the
heinousness of the crime at bar and its despicable perpetration against a 4-year old girl, an impersonation of
innocence itself. The Court should also be concerned with the multiplication of malevolence in our midst for there is
no right to be evil, and there are no ifs and buts about the imposition of the death penalty as long as it remains
unchallenged as part of the laws of our land. These concerns are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they
transcend the transitoriness of time.
Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and punish violators of our
laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection, apprehension, conviction and incarceration
of criminals should be accomplished with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a death
penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will
leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.

A The t-shirt have a bloodstain.

We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the
libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. 18 According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "
fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same
illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but
it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained. 20 We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People

In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the procedural irregularities
committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24ponencia of
Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void.
In fairness to the appellant, and in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for further
proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without any semblance of fairness and
justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

69

SO ORDERED.

- Negative for any evidence of external physical injuries like hematoma nor abrasions.
INTERNALLY
VAGINAL CANAL - with the use of gloves, nasal speculum with special lightened instrument.
[G.R. Nos. 119964-69. September 20, 1996]

(+) Abrasion, old, 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTORINO DEL MUNDO, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION

(+) Whitish vaginal discharges with in the canal blocking the opening of the cervix
(+) Ruptured with remnants of the hymen within the vaginal opening.

ROMERO, J.:

IMPRESSION = Positive for history of vaginal penetration.

Accused-appellant Victorino del Mundo was charged with six counts of rape filed by his ten-year old daughter,
Marivic del Mundo, before Branch 27, RTC-Cabanatuan City.[1] The records of the case show that the incidents of
rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 5977, 5978, 5980, 5981 and 5982 were committed on different days in October 1993
while that in Criminal Case No. 5983 took place on July 22, 1994. Hence, the court a quo took cognizance of the
fact that only Criminal Case No. 5983 is covered by Republic Act No. 7659[2] which took effectDecember 31, 1993.

Dr. Concepcion testified that the contents of and entries in the medico-legal report he prepared are true and correct,
that is, there were abrasions, injury and lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions and that the hymen was ruptured
indicating a penetration of the vagina. The salient portions of Dr. Concepcion's testimony were quoted in the court a
quo's joint decision, thus:

The criminal complaints, all six of them similarly worded except the time of commission, state:
"Q And with respect to the examination of her external part of her sex organ, what are your findings?
"The undersigned accuses VICTORINO DEL MUNDO of the crime of rape, committed as follows:
That sometime in October, 1993, at 8:00 a.m. or thereabout, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
MARIVIC DEL MUNDO, a ten (10) year old child who is her (sic) natural child, against the latter's will and consent
and to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cabanatuan City, this 23rd day of August, 1994."

There was evidence of external injury, sir.

How about in the internal examination of the sex organ of the victim?

Internal examination shows that there was (sic) six penetration, sir.

In this medico-legal report there is an entry here which says 'abrasion old 3 and 9 o'clock xxx Will
you please tell us what does this entry mean?

3 and 9 o'clock indicates the position of the injury sustained by the victim in her private internal
organ, sir." (p. 6, tsn, hearing of Oct. 27, 1994)

Finding that the complainant, the accused, the witnesses and the evidence in these six (6) cases are common
to all the cases, the court a quo tried them jointly.
Among those who testified for the prosecution was Dr. Jun Concepcion, City Health Officer
of Cabanatuan City who conducted Marivic's medico-legal examination. The medico-legal report dated August 23,
1994[3] reads:
"xxx

xxx

OCCULAR (sic) INSPECTION of the body plus the external reproduction organ

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Q How about this last entry which I again quote: 'Rupture with remnants of the hymen within the
vaginal opening." Tell us as to what this entry mean (sic)?
A

It simply means that if the hymen is ruptured there is penetration, sir.

As a result of this medical examination conducted by you, what was your impression?

After that my overall impression, sir, that there is really a penetration, sir, of the vagina.

70

That is your medical impression?

It is medical impression, sir, there is vaginal penetration." (p. 7, tsn, hearing of Oct. 27, 1994).[4]

Thereafter, all documentary and testimonial evidence were offered by the prosecution and admitted by the
Court. When the time came for the defense to present its evidence, complainant Marivic del Mundo was called as
witness. She identified an affidavit of desistance executed by her dated November 17, 1994, the salient portions of
which are hereunder quoted:

Aside from Marivic's affidavit recanting her testimony, accused-appellant, thru his counsel, submits to this
Court annexes to afford him the opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged and to warrant a new
trial, the most important of which is Annex "L" [6]- Medical Report of the examination conducted on Marivic del Mundo
by the NBI Medico Legal Division, bearing Living Case No. MG-95-993, dated August 30, 1995 re: determination of
her physical virginity. The pertinent findings read:
"xxx

xxx

xxx

GENITAL EXAMINATION:
"1. Na, ako ang siyang naghahabla sa isang asunto Kriminal na lalong kilala bilang Criminal Case No. 5981, 5983,
5977, sa salang Rape, People of the Philippines vs. Victorino del Mundo na nabibinbin dito sa Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Cabanatuan City, Branch III;
2. Na wala na akong interest pang ipagpatuloy ang aking nasabing habla sapagkat matapos ang isang masusing
palinawagan ay napagalaman namin na ang lahat ay bunga lamang ng hindi pagkakaunawaan at kami ay
nagkasundo na;

Pubic hair, fine, short, scanty. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa,
pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact. Hymenal orifice measures 1.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities,
prominent.
CONCLUSIONS
Physical Virginity Preserved.

3. Na, dahil dito ay magalang kong hinihingi sa Kgg. Na Taga-usig ng Lungsod ng Kabanatuan na pawalang bisa na
ang aking nasabing habla o asunto."[5]
Notwithstanding complainant's affidavit of desistance, the court a quo sentenced accused-appellant to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Cases Nos. 5977, 5978, 5980, 5981 and 5982, and death in Criminal
Case No. 5983. Hence, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
On August 11, 1995, the Judicial Records Office of this Court sent notices to Attys. Napoleon Reyes and
Adriano Magbitang of the Provincial Legal Assistance Office, Nueva Ecija, directing them to file appellant's brief and
another letter addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, to confirm the confinement of
accused-appellant within five days from receipt hereof.
In a letter dated August 17, 1995, Assistant Director Jesus Villanueva of the Bureau of Corrections informed
this Court that accused-appellant was received therein on February 11, 1995.

Approved:

Examined by

(Sgd.) Alberto Reyes

(Sgd.) Aurea P. Villena

Alberto M. Reyes
Chief

Aurea P. Villena, M.D.

Medico-Legal Officer

Noted:
(Sgd.) Prospero A. Cabanayan
Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D.

On October 6, 1995, Atty. Procopio Beltran of the IBP Free Legal Aid Program filed a Formal Entry of
Appearance for accused-appellant, which we resolved to note in our resolution ofNovember 14, 1995.
Under date of January 24, 1996, accused-appellant, thru his counsel, filed a verified motion for new trial on the
following grounds:
1. New and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced in the trial which, when introduced and admitted, would
probably change the judgment.
2. Irregularities have been committed during the trial pre-judicial to the substantial rights of the
defendant.
3. The principal witness and alleged victim has recanted her testimony which, if not considered, will
result in a miscarriage of justice.

Deputy Director, Technical Services"

In our resolution of February 20, 1996, we resolved to require the Office of the Solicitor General to comment
within ten days from notice. In its comment dated March 21, 1996, the Solicitor General interposed no objection to
the motion for new trial in the interest of substantial justice.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, this Court notes that aside from the recantation by
complainant Marivic del Mundo, the medical report submitted and issued by the Medico Legal Division of the NBI is
diametrically opposed to the medico legal report of Dr. Jun Concepcion, City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City,
which was relied upon by the court a quo in rendering the judgment of conviction inasmuch as it was submitted four
weeks after the last act of rape committed by accused-appellant in 1994. Although the NBI report executed a year
later stated that Marivic's physical virginity was preserved, the earlier report by the Cabanatuan City Health Officer
stated that there were abrasions, injury and lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions and that the hymen was ruptured,
indicating a penetration of the vagina. While the NBI-Medico Legal report cannot be considered new and material

71

evidence which accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, [7] we grant
the motion for new trial on the broader ground of substantial justice, taking into account the variance in the two
aforesaid reports. It is the sense of this Court that such serious discrepancy raised substantial doubt as to the guilt
of the accused-appellant. Furthermore, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is death. Here is a situation
where a rigid application of the rules must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice to secure to
every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

The rule for granting a motion for new trial, among others, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in
obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a
liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best
way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred
by technicalities.[8]

On April 23, 1970, an information for bigamy was filed against the petitioner, Avelino C. Agulto alleging as follows:

In the case of Jose v. CA,[9] the Court held:

"Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to aid and not to obstruct the proper administration of
justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispense justice,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the purposes of justice or, in a
proper case, disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal
cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel,
improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, and
where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.
Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent
the failure of justice."
WHEREFORE, we hereby SET ASIDE the judgment of conviction of accused-appellant Victorino del Mundo
and REMAND the cases to the court a quo for a new trial only for the purpose of allowing said accused to present
additional evidence in his defense. The trial court shall inform this Court the final outcome of the cases within a
reasonable time. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-52728 January 17, 1990

AVELINO C. AGULTO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court
of First Instance of Davao; and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated December 10, 1979 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 06198, affirming the trial court's order denying the accused's motion to reopen the trial for the purpose of
presenting newly discovered evidence in his favor.

That on or about December 30, 1968, in he City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with one Maria Pilar Gaspar, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without
having been legally dissolved, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contracted a second marriage
with Andrea Suico. (p. 11, Rollo.)
After the trial was finished and the parties had rested, but before judgment was promulgated, the accused filed on
November 12, 1975 a motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, i.e., a copy of a
marriage contract between Andrea Suico and one Romeo Vergeire supposedly contracted on July 19, 1960, or
before Andrea's marriage to the petitioner.
On March 23, 1976, the court denied the motion on the ground that it was filed too late because the accused, with
due diligence, could have discovered the so-called newly-discovered evidence sooner and could have presented it
during the trial, it appearing that he was appraised of the alleged marriage of Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire on
October 17, 1972 yet.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the court's order was also denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals alleging that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to allow him to adduce
the newly discovered evidence which would have shown that his second marriage on December 30, 1968 to Andrea
Suico was null and void because the latter was previously married on July 19, 1960 to a certain Romeo Vergeire;
that said evidence was not available to petitioner at the time of the presentation of his evidence but only after the
parties had rested their case.
The respondents opposed the petition contending among others, that the alleged newly discovered evidence (the
marriage contract between Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire) does not bear the seal of the justice of the peace
who solemnized the marriage. The Court notes, moreover, that the document does not indicate the municipality and
the province where the municipal court is located. The xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract is not properly
certified and authenticated, and, on its face it appears that the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license
(p.21 Rollo).
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.
The issue boils down to whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in refusing to
reopen the trial.
A distinction should be made between a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Reopen Trial.

Federico Y. Alikpala for petitioner.

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A Motion for New Trial may be filed after judgment but within the period for perfecting an appeal (Sec. 1, Rule 37,
Rules of Court).
NARVASA, J.:
A Motion to Reopen Trial may be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their
evidence, but before judgment. There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court for motions to reopen trial. It is
albeit a recognized procedural recourse or devise, deriving validity and acceptance from long established usage. The
reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence before judgment is not the granting of a new trial (Alegre vs.
Reyes, 161 SCRA 226).
A motion for new trial in civil or criminal actions may be applied for and granted only upon
specific, well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules 37 (Section 1) and 121 (Section 2).
On the other hand, the reopening of a case for the reception of additional evidence after a case
has been submitted for decision but before judgment is actually rendered is, it has been said,
controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice, resting entirely in the
sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court; and its concession, or denial, by said Court in the
exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner's motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence of a previous marriage between
Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire, assuming the marriage was valid, was not supported by evidence that said
marriage was still existing when Andrea Suico wed the petitioner. On the other hand, the fact that the fiscal did not
charge her with bigamy is significant. Unlike Agulto, she was found by the fiscal to be under no impediment to
contract a second marriage.
Considering the defects of the xerox copied document which the accused Agulto claims to be his "newly-discovered
evidence," the trial court's order denying his motion to reopen the trial was properly sustained by the Court of
Appeals. His motion bears the earmarks of a merely dilatory pleading. Still, it has succeeded in delaying this case for
fourteen (14) years.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-56923 May 9, 1988

RAMON J. ALEGRE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL T. REYES, etc., and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday & Tuason Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

A motion to reopen the trial is quite distinct from a motion for new trial. And it is the refusal of the Trial Court to
reopen the case for presentation of additional defense proofs after the close of the trial but before promulgation of
judgment, that is the grave error claimed by the petitioner to have been committed in the criminal case against him,
resulting in a denial to him of the right to present all the evidence material to his defense.
Petitioner Alegre was indicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila 1 for the felony of malversation of public funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The amended information alleged that
... in or about and during the period comprised between October 17, 1975 to April 30, 1976 ...
(Alegre), being then the President and General Manager of the Philippine Jai-Alai & Amusement
Corporation (PJAC), ... and a public officer within the contemplation of law (Art. 203, Penal
Code) because of the fiduciary nature of the duties which he exercised in respect to the
disbursement of the trust funds impressed with public attributes and character and as such are
government funds which he received for and in behalf of the government with the obligation to
account for the same, thereby taking part in the performance of public functions in the
government, who, by reason of his position in said office, is charged with among others,
approving disbursements of Petty Cash Vouchers of said PJAC, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously approve Petty Cash Vouchers for the aforesaid period in payment of
claims for lost and torn winning tickets and reimbursement of erroneous payments made by the
paying cashiers thereat in the total amount of P18,170.00, chargeable against public funds
destined for charitable purposes and which were then held in trust by the ... Corporation, and
that by his approval of these payments and reimbursements, disbursements were in fact. made
and charged against said public funds which consisted of dividends for unclaimed winning
tickets held in trust by said ... Corporation, and that by approving such disbursements of said
amounts the accused through negligence, flagrant recklessness and utter disregard of
precautions in safeguarding said public funds, allowed other persons to take, misappropriate,
misapply and convert said funds to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of P18,700.80, Philippine Currency.
On arraignment, Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. Trial commenced on November 17, 1977 lasting for about two
and a half years, or until March 24,1980 when the prosecution rested its case. All told, the prosecution presented
twenty-nine (29) witnesses and voluminous exhibits, marked from Exhibits A through the KKK, inclusive. Among the
documents presented by the State were thirty-three (33) affidavits, admitted over the defendant's objection that they
were hearsay since the affiants had not been called to the witness stand for cross-examination.
Alegre's evidence, on the other hand, consisted only of his sole testimony, and a few exhibits. He submitted his
proofs during only two trial settings, on September 24, and on September 29,1980. Memoranda were thereafter
submitted by the parties, inclusive of replies by both of them.
Twelve (12) days or so after receiving a copy of the prosecution's reply memorandum and before rendition or
judgment Alegre filed under date of February 12, 1981 a "Motion to Reopen Trial for Presentation of Additional
Evidence" to prove "that the funds in question are not public funds and are not impressed with a public character,"
and "that he is not a public officer." His motion specified the matters that would be subject of the additional evidence
meant to be presented, including the alleged ultra vires character of the resolution of the Games & Amusements
Board of November 21, 1956, involved in the offense charged, and whether it was valid and binding since it had not

73

been published in the Official Gazette; the nature of the funds alleged to have been malversed, as private;
circumstances in refutation of particular stated portions of the NBI Report (Exhibit A) presented by the State, as well
as the affidavits of more than 30 persons who were never called to the witness stand to personally give evidence of
the facts set out in their sworn statements; the fact that payments for lost or torn winning tickets came from an
account called "betting dividends payable," not from the account of unclaimed dividends already earmarked for
charity; the additional fact that reimbursements of erroneous payments made by cashiers and tellers of PJAC came
from the petty cash funds of the corporation and not from said unclaimed dividends declared forfeited in favor of
charitable institutions; the standing practice of the PJAC, sanctioned by its Board of Directors, of paying claims for
dividends based on lost or torn, winning tickets; the fact that Alegre had not personally profited from said practice;
and the fact that "(a) PJAC is a private corporation, and (b) that its funds are treated like those of any private entity
(itemizing the particulars thereof)." Alegre quote candidly admitted his mistake and oversight in failing to lay these
additional proofs before the Court prior to his resting his case, realization of the gravity of the error, and the gaping
omissions in his evidence having dawned on him in the course of drawing up his memorandum-in-chief and reply
memorandum. The motion was opposed by the prosecution, it being argued in substance that the additional
evidence would not affect the essential question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and that the latter had been
accorded adequate time and opportunity to put on all his proofs but he had failed to do so. Alegre filed a reply.
Thereafter the motion was denied by the Trial Court, by Order dated February 26, 1981 reading as follows:
Acting on accused's motion to reopen trial for presentation of additional evidence on the grounds
therein specified, to which motion the prosecution filed an opposition putting up point-by-point
refutation of the given grounds, and finding the motion not well taken, considering that the
accused had all the opportunity to present his evidence to prove his innocence and in fact the
record has been extensively saturated with evidence on the points raised in the motion such that
further evidence on said points would only be unnecessarily cumulative and a superfluity, the
motion is hereby denied.
On the theory that the Trial Court had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in declining to grant reopening under the circumstances, Alegre applied to the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Lower Court from proceeding with
promulgation of judgment, and required the Solicitor General to comment in the People's behalf. However, without
waiting for the required comment, the Appellate Court dismissed Alegre's petition for certiorari for lack of merit, by
Decision dated April 28, 1981. 2
It was with the the objective of reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals of April 28,1981 and the Lower Court's
Order of February 26, 1981, that Alegre filed with this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. Acting
thereon, this Court issued a temporary restraining order dated May 25, 1981, inhibiting the respondent Judge from
further proceeding in Alegre's case. 3
As pointed out in the opening statement of this opinion, a motion to reopen the trial is different and distinct from a
motion for new trial.
For one thing, a motion to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered,
and closed their evidence, 4 but before judgment. On the other hand, a motion for new trial is proper only after
rendition or promulgation of judgment. 5
For another, a motion for reopening, unlike a motion for new trial, is not specifically mentioned and prescribed as a
remedy by the Rules of Court. There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court governing motions to reopen. It is
albeit a recognized procedural recourse or device, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage.

A motion for new trial in civil or criminal actions may be applied for and granted only upon specific, well-defined
grounds, set forth respectively in Rules 37 (Section 1 ) and 121 (Section 2). On the other hand, the reopening of a
case for the reception of additional evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment is
actually rendered is, it has been said, controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice,
resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court; and its concession, or denial, by said Court in the
exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. 6 A brief review of
precedents treating of the matter of reopening a trial provides a clearer insight into the nature of the remedy, and is
not inutile at this point.
The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence before judgment is entered therein
is not the granting of a new trial. U.S. v. Visquera, 4 Phil. 380.
... It was within the power of the judge below to open the case for the admission of further
evidence and for the presentation of an amended petition. That was all that the first decision
amounted to. Any other rule would work great hardship upon the petitioners in that court, and
would require them to commence an entirely new proceeding when a slight amendment in the
proceedings already instituted would accomplish the same result. Capellania de Tambobong v.
Antonio, 8 Phil. 683, 687-688.
The (trial) court after hearing the evidence in regard to the commission of the offense, declared
the testimony closed. Afterwards, not being entirely satisfied on the subject of amnesty, he gave
permission to the parties to summon other witnesses upon that point. This was done , their
testimony was taken, and final judgment afterwards rendered. The appellants claim in this court
that this was error, and that a new trial can only be granted upon the motion of the defendants.
This opening of the case, however, before a judgment is rendered, was, not a new trial of the
case, and such action was clearly within the discretion of the trial court. United States v.
Vizquera, et al., 4 Phil. 380, 381.
This Court has already held that the trial court, exercising his discretion within reasonable limits,
may reopen the case for the purpose of hearing further proofs upon either side. (U.S. v. Cinco, 8
Phil. Rep., 388). U.S. v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, 308.
Under the circumstances of the case, it lay within the discretion of the court below to permit the
reopening of the case before the rendition of judgment, and it does not appear from the record
that in doing so, it abused its discretion. Alvarez v. Guevara Wee, 47 Phil. 12, 13.
The reopening of the case by the court on its own motion was largely a matter in its discretion
and for the orderly administration of justice, and there is no merit in the first assignment of error.
Gaas v. Fortich, 54 Phil. 196, 200.
... It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party
offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has
clearly been abused. (64 C.J., 160). More, it is within the sound discretion of the court whether
or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion
or request for a nonsuit or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the
court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion or demurrer, or has
granted it or has denied the same, or after the motion has been granted if the order has not
been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed. (64 C.J., 164)

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In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective
direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court,
for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their
original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears. (Siuliong & Co. v. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U.S. v. Alviar, 36 Phil 804) So,
generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been
omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct
evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d. ed., 545; 64 C.J.,
160-163.) The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not
been deliberate. lt was due to a misapprehension or oversight. Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429,
433.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, and the relevant facts, it appears that the Trial Court had acted unreasonably,
capriciously, whimsically, and oppressively in spurning Alegre's plea for reopening the trial so that he might present
additional evidence. The record shows that it took the prosecution no less than two and a half years to adduce its
proofs; the accused presented evidence witliinthan a span of five (5) days and only on two (2) hearing dates. The
prosecution called to the stand twenty-nine (29) witnesses and introduced more than sixty (60) exhibits; the accused
offered naught but his sole testimony and a few documents. There was withal no undue delay in Alegre's
presentation of his motion to reopen. Of significance, too, is the absence of showing of any substantial prejudice to
the State which would have been occasioned by the reception of Alegre's proferred additional evidence. There was
moreover a frank avowal of error and oversight on Alegre's part; he had quite apparently underestimated the State's
evidence and overrated his own meager proofs. All these circumstances, taken together, should have persuaded the
Trial Judge to give the accused the few hearing dates that the presentation of his additional evidence would have
entailed; and the resultant delay in the termination of the trial would certainly not have caused serious or substantial
injury to the State's cause, It was moreover unreasonable, in the premises, for the Trial Court to justify denial of the
application for reopening by simply adverting to the fact that "the accused had (been given) all the opportunity to
present his evidence" which the accused does not at all deny, but as to which he pleads that serious error on his part
prevented him from fully availing of that opportunity or by stressing that "the record has been extensively
saturated with evidence on the points raised in the motion such that further evidence on said points would only be
unnecessarily cumulative and a superfluity" since the "saturating evidence" did not proceed from the appellant, in
the first place, and hence his additional evidence would not be cumulative thereto but in refutation thereof, and could
not, in any event, be characterized as "a superfluity." By extension, it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to
have sustained the Trial Court's aforesaid action.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 21, 1981 and the Order of the Trial Court dated
February 26,1981 thereby affirmed, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is hereby
ORDERED to reopen the case for reception of the petitioner Alegre's proferred evidence in accordance with the rules
of evidence, and under the control of said Judge. Without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-67422-24 October 31, 1984

FERNANDO VALDEZ alias WILSON VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial
Region, Branch XVI, Kabacan, North Cotabato, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:+.wph!1

This is a petition for certiorari which was posted on March 22, 1984, in Cotabato City by speed airmail but was
received only on April 26, 1984. The petitioner is accused of rape in three cases Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and
15 filed in the court presided by the respondent judge. The private complainant is the same in all the three cases
but the rapes were alleged to have been committed on different dates, namely: February 10, 1982, March 17, 1982
and April 10, 1982.
The petition seeks to annul the proceedings which were conducted by the respondent judge and to disqualify him
from the case. Because the verified petition imputed serious irregularities to the respondent judge, this Court issued
a temporary restraining order on May 21, 1984, restraining him from further proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 13,
14 and 15.
In the comment which the respondent judge was required to submit, he said that he had already decided the three
cases. (Petitioner Wilson Valdez was convicted of rape in each of the three cases and was sentenced to
three reclusion perpetua plus indemnity.) The decision is dated April 2, 1984, but the petitioner claims that it was
promulgated on May 3, 1984, without the presence of his counsel and even of the Fiscal; that no notice was issued
in respect of the promulgation; and that no copy of the decision was given to the defense counsel of record.
The case was set for hearing on August 6, 1984, and thereafter the Court issued a resolution which reads: t.
hqw
At the hearing this morning the following appeared: Attys. Jose V. Juan and Antonio T. Nicolas of
the Special Appealed Cases Division, Citizens' Legal Assistance Office, Ministry of Justice,
Padre Faura, Manila, for the petitioner; respondent Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan on his own
behalf; and North Cotabato Provincial Fiscal Aquiles Narajos who brought the record of Criminal
Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15 in the sala of the respondent judge.
Counsels for the petitioner mentioned several irregularities said to have been committed by the
respondent judge in the handling of the case above-mentioned. Resort to the record proved to
be fruitless because it was grossly deficient.
Counsels for the petitioner are hereby given ten (10) days from notice hereof to submit a
memorandum specifying the irregularities said to have been committed by the respondent judge
with supporting evidence. A copy of the memorandum shall be furnished to the respondent judge
who is required to answer the same point by point within ten (10) days from receipt. (Rollo, p.
127.)

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The memoranda are now before this Court and the immediate reaction is that the petition is highly impressed with
merit.

The witness demonstrating to the supposed victim the pressing of the pointed scissors at the left side abdomen.
Q Did he also use that during the accord rape he committed

In the hearing of the three criminal cases on May 26, 1983, the private complainant was to be cross- examined
inasmuch as her direct examination had been finished at the previous hearing on April 7, 1983. On May 26, the
private prosecutor, Atty. Norberto Ela, was absent. Thereafter, the respondent judge stated: "It appears in the records
that the complaining witness is still under cross. It is the Honorable Judge who is examining her ... (Addressing the
witness) During the last hearing of this case, the Honorable Court reserved its right to cross examine you on your
testimony." And the respondent judge examined the witness but the examination is better described as direct rather
than cross. Witness the following: t.hqw
COURT: ... After going over the records of the cases and the supposed exhibits, you mentioned about a pair of scissors used to
intimidate you, coerced and forced by the accused, by pressing the same at your left side?
A. Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Proceed Fiscal.
FISCAL FULVADORA:
Q You mentioned about a pair of scissors used by the accused. Showing to you this scissors, what relation is this scissors
which was used by the accused in threatening you on February 10, 1982?
A Yes, sir, this is the one being used by him.

A Yes your Honor.

Q About the third time, he use also?
A Yes your Honor. (TSN, May 26, 1983.)

To be sure a trial judge has the right, nay even the duty, to address questions to witnesses. But the questions should
be clarificatory; they should not build the case for any of the adversaries.
On June 23, 1983, a hearing was scheduled. The transcript for that day shows that Fiscal Camilo Fulvadora
appeared for the prosecution but private prosecutor Ela, was absent. Also absent was Atty. Jorge Zerrudo, counsel
for the accused. The transcript does not show whether or not the accused was brought to court. Notwithstanding the
absence of counsel for the accused and probably the accused himself, the respondent judge continued his "crossexamination" of the private complainant. The respondent judge explained his behaviour thus:t.hqw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the absence of Atty. Zerrudo who in spite of due
notice in open court, during the last hearing of this case and without justifiable reason failed to
appear, however, for the sake of justice in order not to prejudice the right of the accused as the
complaining witness was on cross- examination, stated the witness is being cross examined by
the court in order to get an illustration of certain facts needed by all defense here or the
prosecution of the accused Wilson Valdez alias Willy. (TSN, June 23, 1983.)

COURT:
Q Is this the very scissors that you saw when he pressed it?
A Yes, your Honor.

In his memorandum the respondent judge claims that he "did not proceed with the trial but merely sought
clarifications on vital aspects taken up in the hearing of April 7, 1983."
The explanation of the respondent judge is belied by the transcript which shows that he asked the private
complainant searching questions and this is reflected on pages 4 to 12 of the transcript.

Q When was this used by the accused Wilson Valdez?

A On February 10, 1982, your Honor.
FISCAL FULVADORA:
May we request that this scissors Identified by the witness be marked as Exh. "F", your Honor.
COURT: t.hqw
Mark it.
Q Please demonstrate to the Court how this Exh. "F" was used by the accused in intimidating you?
A (Witness demonstrating to the Court)

The statement of the respondent judge that he wanted to protect the right of the accused to a speedy trial is not
appreciated. He "protected" the rights of the accused by holding a trial in the absence of the latter's counsel. If an
accused has a "protector" like the respondent judge, there is no need for a fiscal or a private prosecutor. It may not
be amiss to state in this connection that the accused did not complain of delay in the trial of his case probably
because he was not there. At any rate if the respondent judge had wanted to expedite the trial he should have
appointed a temporary counsel for the accused.
The hearing on the three cases was resumed on August 18, 1983. In the meantime, Atty. Zerrudo was replaced by
Atty. Julian Ruiz as counsel for the accused because he wanted an Ilocano lawyer to represent him for better
communication. On that day. the private complainant was still on cross-examination. Without any request from the
parties, the respondent judge decided to hold the hearing in his chamber "due to delicadeza." Present in the
chamber were counsel for the accused, the fiscal and the stenographer only; the accused was not allowed to go
inside. t.hqw
The respondent judge claims, however, "that the accused together with his guard were at the
door of a make-shift room, so-called judge's chamber." This might well have been the case but

76

the accused was entitled as of right to be inside the room because it was his liberty and honor
which were at stake. On August 31, 1983, the respondent judge announced, "We will hear this in
chamber." And then the following took place: t.hqw

these cases. As a counsel for the accused, I would like to reiterate that the accused be recalled to the
witness stand.
FISCAL FULVADORA:

ATTY. RUIZ:
Now, last time this case was presented and was scheduled for hearing inside the chamber. Counsel for
the accused requested that the accused be given chance to confront the complaining witness but this,
your honor was denied so at this instance it is reiterated that the accused be given again a chance to
be present during the investigation (sic).

The Honorable Court will decide on that part of presentation of the accused, whether to grant it or not
the manifestation.
COURT: t.hqw
How many questions are you asking?

COURT:t.hqw
ATTY. RUIZ:
Fiscal.
FISCAL CAMILO FULVADORA: t.hqw
With the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT: t.hqw
Denied. (TSN, August 31,1983.)

Due to lack of material time, the three cases, I forgot to ask few questions regarding the evidences or
exhibits which are the panty, knife, and scissors, in the direct examination in that, it was overlooked in
the part of this representation that the three after presented some of the exhibits per prosecution, were
not questioned.
FISCAL FULVADORA:
It is not the matter of forgotting the exhibits of the counsel, there are time given to present this trial. I
remembered that he propounded few questions for the defense and he manifested that he is through in
his direct examination and it is my time to cross the testimony of the accused.

On February 7, 1984, the following took place:

ATTY. RUIZ:
ATTY. RUIZ:
Your honor, we are still in the process of direct examination for the accused. We are recalling the
accused in the witness stand. I understand your honor last time, due to lack of material time, we
requested for a resetting of these three cases inasmuch as the matter whether to give the accused for
the meantime your honor, I am petitioning that he must be recalled and placed in the witness stand.

I forgot, before the Honorable Court that this representation have reasons of overlooking why I was not
able to question to all the matters considering of the lack of material time and that there are other
cases waiting which are ready for the hearing. It is the discretionary on the part of the Honorable Court
specially that the criminal penalty is death and while the Provincial Fiscal having further presentation of
exhibits at the beginning of the case, where the questioning we were already finished, yet the
Provincial Fiscal continued separately to the presentation of other cases.

COURT: t.hqw
COURT': t.hqw
It is discretionary on the part of the Judge. What can you say Fiscal?
Denied.
FISCAL FULVADORA:

Under cross. (TSN Feb. 7, 1984.)

I remembered right that it is the purpose for the trial, that the manifestation of the defense counsel that
he is through with the testimony of the witness, he requested that the prosecution will be continued in
some other time.
ATTY. RUIZ:
We concur with the Provincial Fiscal but prior, we are petitioning the Honorable Court to recall the
witness for further direct examination and I am requesting that will have to continue the proceeding. We
are convinced with the observation of the Court that it is discretionary of the Honorable Court but this
representation however, we would like to request and reiterate and manifest for the petition that he be
recalled. It is not the intention of the defense counsel, your honor, to delay the speedy termination of

It is obvious from the foregoing that the respondent judge did not manifest the requisite cold impartiality which the
petitioner deserved.
The petition which questions the actuations of the respondent judge and seeks his disqualification was received by
him on March 29, 1984. Prudence dictated that he refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in
abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the
respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases on April 2, 1984, and promulgating his decision on May 3
of the same year. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to
lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

77

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision in Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of the respondent
judge is set aside; the aforesaid cases shall be transferred to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court in Kidapawan
for trial de novo which shall also resolve the petitioner's motion for release on recognizance under Sec. 191 of P.D.
No. 603. No costs.

A Yes, sir.
Q And, who were the witnesses that you were able to produce during the trial for your defense?
A Only those witnesses who testified for the defense as shown in the case record.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
G.R. No. L-48656 December 21, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORMAN AMPARADO, defendant-appellant.

Q According to the evidence on record, the prosecution contended that late Manuel Maghanoy was stabbed by you, by means of
treachery, while he was walking in the road; while you contended that you stabbed Manuel Maghanoy in self-defense and/or to
repel his unlawful aggression in the house where you were staying as a boarder; during the trial were you able to produce or
present as witness or witnesses any person or persons who were the first to render assistance to the deceased immediately after
the incident in the house?
A No, sir.
Q During the trial, were you able to present any witness or witnesses who may be in the road while the incident was taking place in
the house and when Manuel Maghanoy went out to the road after having been stabbed?

FERNAN, J.:
A No, sir.

Accused-appellant Norman Amparado was found guilty by the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte,
Branch 1, Dipolog City, of the crime of Murder for the death of one Manuel Maghanoy. He was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P12,000.00 and the cost of suit.1 On
appeal, this Court affirmed said judgment with the modification that the civil liability should be increased to
P30,000.00. 2 Accused-appellant now seeks a new trial, citing as grounds therefore: [1] the discovery of new and
material evidence [2] errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial prejudicial to his substantive rights as an
accused; and, [3] interest of substantial justice and avoidance of a failure of justice. Plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines thru the Solicitor-General opposes said motion.
The newly-discovered evidence relied upon by accused-appellant consists of the testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr.,
Manuel Henry Auza and Violeta Amparado. While, as contended by the Solicitor, the testimony of Violeta Amparado
could not be considered as newly-discovered nor could it materially affect the judgment, said testimony being merely
cumulative in character, We find the proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr., and Manuel Henry Auza to be
newly-discovered and of sufficient weight and character as to alter the outcome of the case.
In his affidavit attached to the motion under consideration, accused-appellant explained in detail why the evidence
could not, even with the use of reasonable diligence, be presented at the trial and how he happened to discover
them. The pertinent portion of his affidavit reads:
Q During the trial of said criminal case and the pendency of its appeal, where did you reside?
A In Ilaya, Dapitan City.
Q Where was your lawyer, Atty. Godardo Ad. Jacinto, also residing within that period?
A In the Poblacion, Dapitan City.
Q During the trial and the pendency of the appeal in said criminal case, did you and your counsel exert earnest efforts and
reasonable diligence to locate, discover and produce evidence and witnesses for your defense?

Q Why, please state the reason when according to you, you exerted earnest effort and reasonable diligence to produce evidence
and witnesses for your defense during the trial?
A Because I did not know then of any person or persons who were in the road and able to render assistance to late Manuel
Maghanoy after he was stabbed, considering that after the stabbing in self-defense, I was just inside the house; when I went with
the Policemen that same evening, Manuel Maghanoy was no longer there and during the trial and the pendency of the appeal, I
did not go back to the scene, premises and environment of the incident of Estaka, Dipolog City, to gather information as to the
possibility of any person or persons who might have rendered assistance to Manuel Maghanoy after he was stabbed in the house
or who could be present in the road when the incident happened, for fear of retaliation from his relatives and friends, especially that
I received information that they were hunting me.
Q As of April 1, 1969, did you already know Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza?
A I have seen Antonio Cachin Jr. in Saint Vincent's College where I was studying but we were never friends; but I have never
known Manuel Henry Auza.
Q After that incident on April 1, 1969, have you seen again Antonio Cachin Jr.?
A No, sir, because I stopped studying in Saint Vincent's College for eight [8] years and I stayed and lived in our home place in
Ilaya, Dapitan City and I did not go to Saint Vincent's College premises within those years due to my fear of retaliation. When I
resumed my studies in the school year 1977-1978, Antonio Cachin Jr. was no longer studying in said school. And I did not meet
him again.
Q When, for the first time did you discover that Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza were present in the road in front of the
home of Deling Velasco when the incident between Manuel Maghanoy and you happened in the house where you were boarding
and that they were the first persons who rendered assistance to Manuel Maghanoy after he was wounded by you in self-defense or
to repel his unlawful aggression?
A Only after I received a copy of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court on October 15, 1985.
Q How did you discover it?

78

A After I received the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, I went to Dipolog City to look for a lawyer for an advice or
consultation. Coincidentally, I met Roseller Ladera who was one of the prosecution witnesses and I regretably told him that I was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment principally due to the testimony of Rogelio Patangan, and Roseller Ladera told me
that it was surprising for the reason that Rogelio Patangan was not present during the incident, it was a certain Antonio Cachin Jr.
and his companion who were present based on what he knew.
Q And so, what did you do then?

G.R. No. L-4934

November 28, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, Judge of the First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and FIDEL SALUD, Jr., Respondents.

A I exerted earnest effort to contact Antonio Cachin Jr. When I have contacted him, he related to me everything about the incident
of April 1, 1969 involving the late Manuel Maghanoy and he told me farther that he and Manuel Henry Auza were there present and
they were the first persons who were able to render assistance to Manuel Maghanoy and that the person named Rogelio Patangan
was not there present.

Provincial Fiscal Mateo L. Alcasid for petitioner.

Q When did you met [sic] Roseller Ladera ?

FERIA, J.:

A On October 29, 1985, but it took me some few days until I was able to contact Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza.

The essential facts in this case are the following:chanrobles virtual law library

Q How were you able to contact Manuel Henry Auza?

On April 17, 1951, the respondent promulgated its decision sentencing the defendant in criminal case No. 158 of said
court to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A Through Antonio Cachin Jr. 3

Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the evidence sought to be presented are newly-discovered
as defined by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry
Auza, who aver to be the first persons to render assistance to the victim immediately after the stabbing incident, if
admitted, would tend to show that the alleged eyewitness Rogelio Patangan, whose version of the crime was given
full faith and credence by the trial court and sustained by this Court, was not present at the scene of the crime. 4 If
this is true, then, the version of the prosecution might perforce fail and that of the defense prevail. Consequently, the
judgment of conviction could be reversed, or at the very least, modified.
Finding that the evidence sought to be presented by accused-appellant conforms to the requisites laid down by
Section 2[b] of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the Court Resolved to GRANT accused- appellant's motion for new
trial. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of this Court dated October 3, 1985 is reconsidered and set aside. The judgment of
the trial court dated April 11, 1978 is likewise set aside and the records of the case are remanded to the lower court
for new trial pursuant to Rule 121, Section 2[b] and [c] of the Rules of Court, at which the evidence already taken
shall stand and the testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza and such other evidence of both
prosecution and defense as the trial court may in the interest of justice allow to be introduced, shall be taken and
considered with the evidence already in the record, and a new judgment thereafter rendered by the lower court.
SO ORDERED.

R E S O L U T I O N chanrobles virtual law library

The defendant filed on May 2, 1951, a motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the court erred "in
appreciating the age between seventeen and eighteen of the defendant as ordinary mitigating circumstance which
lower the penalty by one degree, and in not appreciating the surrender of the defendant, admitted by the fiscal, as
another mitigating circumstance, on the ground that the mere previous issuance of an order for his arrest precludes
the appreciation of his surrender as mitigating circumstance."chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent judge, on June 18, 1951, granted the motion and amended its original decision promulgated on April
17, 1951, by considering the attendance of the above-mentioned mitigating circumstances in the commission of the
offense, and sentencing the defendant to an indeterminate sentence of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional as a minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. A motion for
reconsideration of the second judgment was held by the prosecution and denied by the
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the provincial fiscal of Batangas has filed this petition for certiorari
against the respondents on the ground that the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
amending his original judgment promulgated on April 17, 1951, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendant on the grounds above set forth, citing in support of his contention the decision of this Court in the case
People vs. Tamayo, * G.R. No. L-2233, promulgated on April 25, 1950, wherein it was said that "the period at the end
of which a judgment becomes final, which is fifteen days, is never, under any circumstances, suspended except by
the filing of a motion for new trial by the defendant under section 1 of Rule 117," and that "the judgment in a criminal
case may be revised or modified only within the period to appeal or fifteen days from the date of its
promulgation."chanrobles virtual law library
The decision in the case of Tamayo above quoted though not concurred in by the majority, who concurred in the
result is correct. The last quoted portion of the decision in "Peoplevs. Tamayo" was taken from Section 7 of rule 116
which provides that "A judgment has become final or appeal has been taken," but it does not support and is not
applicable to the contention of t petitioner. What is applicable is the first quoted portion of the decision, though not in
its literal sense, to the effect "that period at end of which the judgment became final is never under any

79

circumstances suspended except by the filing of a motion for new trial by the defendant, it follows that it is also
suspended by a motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant on errors of law which is one of the grounds for
new trial, for such motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A motion for new trial filed in criminal case in a Court of First Instance may be based either (1) on the ground of
errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial in its general sense, that is, errors of law committed during the
period from the arraignment to the rendition of the judgment, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant,
and (2) on newly discovered evidence material to the case. A motion of new trial on the ground of errors of law in the
judgment may be properly called a motion for reconsideration, because the court is not asked to reopen the case for
further proceeding, but only to reconsider its findings or conditions of law and make them conformable to the law
applicable to the case in the judgment the court has to render anew, as was done by the court in the present case.
Such a motion for reconsideration has, according to Section 6 of Rule 118, the same effect as a motion for new trial,
of interrupting the period for perfecting an appeal after which the judgment becomes final, in accordance with the
following ruling laid down in the case of Rodriguez vs. Rovira, applicable by analogy to criminal cases:
This Court has repeatedly held that a motion for reconsideration based upon any of the causes enumerated in
section 145 of the code of Civil Procedure as a ground for the motion for a new trial has the same effect as a motion
for a new trial, regardless of the fact that it is styled differently and the ground is stated in a different manner but with
an identical meaning. (Pascua vs. Ocampo, 59 Phil., 48; Blouse vs. Moreno and Garcia, 60 Phil., 741; Lavett vs. Sy
Quia, 61 Phil., 847.) [63 Phil. 476]
If a motion for a new trial of reconsideration is filed within the period of 15 days from the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction of the defendant, as the motion filed in the present case, it may be decided or passed upon
validly at any time thereafter by the court. Because, although the granting, after said period, of a motion for new trial
would place the defendant in double jeopardy, he waived his right not to be placed therein by the filing of such a
motion. And section 6, Rule 118, provides that "this period for perfection of an appeal shall be interrupted from the
time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant."chanrobles virtual law library
The dissenting opinion contends that the phrase "during the trial" used in section 2, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court,
is used not in its general sense, but in its restricted sense limited to the period for the introduction of evidence. This
contention is groundless. It is obvious that the word during the trial is used in said section 2 in its general sense,
including the rendering of the judgment (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Volume 2, p. 3320), because it was taken from
section 42 of the General Orders No. 58, which provided that within a like period after conviction a case may be
reopened on account of errors of law committed at the trial in its general sense; the word trial covers sections 31 to
41 of said General Orders No. 58 and includes the rendition of the judgment. The same Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, in speaking of the "the rights of the defendant at the trial," provides in its section 1 that "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall entitled to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the
proceeding, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." And American Jurisprudence, Volume
14, pp. 898, 900, says: "In common law and under the decisions of many courts it is the right of the prisoner in a
criminal case to be present throughout the entire trial from the commencement of the selection of the jury until the
verdict is rendered and jury discharged. (Emphasis ours)chanrobles virtual law library
To construe the phrase "during the trial" used in section 2 (a) of Rule 117 in its restricted sense, as the dissenter Mr.
Justice Jugo does, would be circumscribe the first found for new trial in criminal cases to only errors of law
committed by the court in the admission or exclusion of evidence. Errors of law or irregularities committed before and
after the introduction of evidence such as those committed in denying the defendant his right to be informed of the
offense charged, in refusing to grant him a previous preliminary investigation, in not informing the defendant of his

right to be assisted by an attorney before pleading guilty or not guilty, and in not giving him at least two days to
prepare for trial, could not be alleged as grounds for new trial. And the object of a new trial on errors of law in the
judgment, which is to invite the attention of the trial court to such errors so that they may be corrected in order to
avoid taking an appeal for the same purpose, would be thwarted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
From the fact the Rule 115 treats of trial, and Judgment or Sentence is treated in Rule 116, it does not follow that the
word "trial" in the phrase "errors of law at the trial or during the trial" as a ground for a new trial used in section 2 (a)
of rule 117, is used in its limited sense and refers only to the production of evidence, and not in its general sense
which includes every stage of the trial from arraignment to judgment. In the same way that arraignment is treated in
rule 112 separately from Motion to Quash treated in Rule 113 and Plea in Rule 114, although arraignment does not
include motion to quash and plea, and plea is a part and parcel of the arraignment, which consists of the information
to a defendant of the charge against him and his answer to plea to that charge. It is obvious that the separation of
trial from judgment as subject matter of different Rules of Court was made only for clearness' sake, and not because
the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure uses the word "trial" throughout the Rules of Court in its limited
sense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After our reply to the dissenting opinion was inserted in the majority's decision, the dissenting opinion was amended
by eliminating the dissenter's arguments in support of their theory that the errors of law committed during the trial do
not include errors of law in the judgment, for the alleged reason that the word "trial" in section 1 (a) of Rule 117 is
used in its restricted sense limited to the period for the introduction of evidence, and inserting in the amended
dissenting opinion the following: "It is obvious that the rule section 2 (a) Rule 117 refers to errors of law committed
during the trial, which cannot be corrected except by a new trial, because it would be idle to pray for a new trial when
the errors of law can be corrected without it . . ." (page 1 of the dissenting opinion), and that "all errors of law
requiring new trial for their correction are deemed errors corrected committed during the trial. Many examples of
these errors, besides the error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, are given by Chief Justice Moran in his
Comment on the Rules of Court, Volume II, pages 806, 807, 3rd edition."chanrobles virtual law library
This new theory advocated in the dissenting opinion has absolutely no legal basis and runs counter to the contention
that the errors of law committed during the trial refer to those committed during the period for the introducing of
evidence or trial in the restricted sense of the word under section 2 (a) of Rule 117. The examples of errors of law
given by the former Chief Justice as grounds for new trial in his comments, such as the trial of an accused without a
preliminary investigation, or without having been informed of the offensed charged, are errors committed during the
arraignment and before the period for the introduction of evidence as we have already pointed at the beginning of
this decision, and said examples support our conclusion. Such errors of law require a new trial for their correction
because they affect the validity of the whole proceeding taken after they have been committed in accordance with
provisions of Section 5 of Rule 117. But as errors of law in the judgment do not affect or invalidate the whole
proceeding prior to the judgment, but only the judgment itself, to correct such errors no new trial is required but only
a reconsideration of the original and rendition of a new judgment, without necessity of granting new
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 5 (a) of Rule 117 provides that:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, all the
proceedings and evidence not affected by the commission of such errors and irregularities shall stand, but those
affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of
additional evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

80

(c) In all cases, the original judgment shall be set aside and a new judgment rendered, and the former shall not be
used or referred to in evidence or argument on the new trial.

1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,4 and sentencing them to suffer the supreme
penalty of death.

This rule in criminal cases is stated in civil cases in the following way in Section 3 of Rule 37, which is substantially
the same as the rule above quoted, to wit:

The information against accused-appellants reads:

If the motion is made upon the cause mentioned in sub-section (c), section 1 of this Rule, and the Court finds its
judgment to be contrary to evidence or law, it may amend such judgment accordingly without granting a new trial,
unless the court deems the introduction of additional evidence advisable.
In the United States where from the provisions of our criminal law on new trial have been taken, errors of law in the
judgment or verdict in criminal cases are grounds for new trial. "A new trial will granted where the verdict is against
the law." (16 C.J. Sec. 2706; Wharton's Criminal Procedure, Sec. 1747. This principle or doctrine on grounds for a
new trial in criminal cases is applicable by analogy in these Islands; because "We have always felt ourselves bound
by the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States in construing and applying statutory enactment modelled or
borrowed from English or American originals" (Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil., 100,
107).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
And in our resolution of the motion for reconsideration in the case of People vs. Romero, 89 Phil., 672, we have
already laid down the ruling, in which the two dissenters concurred, that in criminal cases a motion for
reconsideration on the ground of errors of law in the judgment is equivalent to a motion for new trial, and interrupts
the period of fifteen days for the perfection of an appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge did not act in excess of the court's jurisdiction in amending its former
judgment, and therefore the present petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merits. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. 133917

February 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accusedappellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to
make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty
depend.1
For automatic review is the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No.
37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y
Malaguraalias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of

That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are
prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
them.6Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at
Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher
in Davao City.7 The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July
1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had
no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to
the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher
will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning. 9 Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same
day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team
of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to
pass by.10

At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad"
carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers.
Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." 11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from
where the accused-appellants were accosted.12
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the
same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accusedappellant Molina to open the bag.13 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the
bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police
officers.15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 16 The demurrer was denied by the trial court. 17A motion for reconsideration was filed by

81

accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 18 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both accused who waived
presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the
offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO
MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection
under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act
7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate
action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.19
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court
on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH. 20

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both
accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is,
by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent
provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 21

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2,
which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 22 Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.23
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures;24 and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to
an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the process cannot be reversed. 26 As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest
effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped prisoners ).27
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accusedappellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.28 This brings us to the issue of whether
or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly
indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,30probable cause means an actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,31 it was held that "the

82

accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do
so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the MNWilcon 9 and there was
no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,32 the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :.. [while] holding ...
[one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse
suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed or was at
least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada,33the Court ruled that no
probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.1wphi1.nt
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,34 the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime
as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and
'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'"35 In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the
Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.36
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the comer and were not creating
any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale
bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. 37
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.38
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a
bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to
the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the
arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone
will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers),
accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.

While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula,
SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is more,
it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the
arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of
the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula,
considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With
respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the arrest, to wit

"QWhen you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did you know that
it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?
ABecause I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when they pass
by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is
Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina"39
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned
the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the
surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing
for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even before the
arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest
effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the
consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior
when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a
felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances." 40
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.41
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules.
Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace
officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but
to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our lawenforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental
rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.

83

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario
Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy", areACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

At about 4:30 a.m. of March 10, 1994, Arsenio Pascua was conversing with Gerard Canapi in
front of Ever Disco Pub located on M.H. del Pilar, 3rd Avenue, Kalookan City (tsn., p. 2, Pascua,
October 11, 1994). They were waiting for their companions who were coming from nearby
International Cabaret (ibid.).

G.R. No. 117732 October 10, 1995

Suddenly, appellant emerged behind both Pascua and Canapi and then sidled up to Canapi.
Without any warning, he stabbed Canapi at least twice with a homemade knife, and then quickly
ran away (tsn., p. 3, 11, Pascua, October 11, 1994). When Pascua saw what happened, he
shouted at his companions who were about ten to fifteen meters away and told them to pursue
appellant (ibid.).

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
JESUS SALILING y CHICA, accused-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

MELO, J.:
Jesus Saliling was charged with murder in an Information reading:
That on or about the 10th day of March 1994 in Kaloocan City, M.M. and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one GERALD
CANAPI Y PAGULAYAN, hitting the latter on his left upper portion of his chest and on his right
elbow, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries upon the said victim which caused his
instantaneous death.
(p. 1, Rollo.)
After trial following a plea of not guilty, the trial court found accused guilty as charged in a decision dated October 25,
1994, and imposed on him the extreme penalty of death, aside from ordering him to pay civil indemnification, moral,
and actual and compensatory damages. Disposed thus the trial court:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused, JESUS
SALILING Y CHICA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and sentences
him to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS as actual and compensatory damages; to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and another sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages. With costs.
(p. 16, Rollo.)
Automatic as the review of said decision is as mandated by law, still, a notice of appeal was filed, and we now have
accused-appellant maintaining that neither premeditation nor treachery was proved by the prosecution.
The background facts, as established by the evidence, were synthesized in the brief filed by Solicitor General Raul I.
Goco, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio L. Villamor, and Solicitor Eviess J.S.A. Acorda in this wise:

Pascua hurriedly brought Canapi in a tricycle to the MCU Hospital for treatment but the latter
was pronounced dead on arrival (tsn., p. 4, Pascua, October 11, 1994).
Appellant was thereafter arrested by operatives of the 6th Avenue Detachment of the Philippine
National police and turned over to PO3 Feliciano Almojuela for investigation (tsn., p. 1, 2,
Almojuela, October 12, 1994). On March 18, 1994, he was charged with Murder before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Kalookan City.
(pp. 3-4, Appellee's Brief; pp. 55-56, Rollo.)
In the present appeal, accused-appellant has abandoned the defense of denial and alibi he put up during the trial
below and now admits the fact that he indeed stabbed Gerald Canapi. However, he contends that the killing of
Canapi was not attended by treachery. He argues that judging by the location of the wounds inflicted on the victim,
which were at the left side of the chest and at the left elbow of the victim, the attack was frontal and thus the
"deceased must have been forewarned by the impending danger to his life", which circumstance, accused-appellant
implies, must have afforded the victim the opportunity of protecting himself. The stark facts of the attack; as strikingly
depicted by Arsenio Pascua, greatly militate against accused-appellant's argument. Even a frontal attack can be
treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed (People vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA 469
[1994]).
In flashback, at around 4 o'clock in the morning of March 10, 1994, we see Arsenio Pascua and Gerald Canapi
waiting for a ride while conversing in front of the Ever Disco Pub located at M.H. del Pilar, 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City.
They were likewise waiting for their companions who were at the nearby International Cabaret. While thus occupied,
they were approached from behind by accused-appellant who then sidled up to Canapi and suddenly without
warning stabbed Canapi twice with a knife, first at the left side of the chest and then at the left elbow. Accusedappellant then immediately thereafter scampered away. The stabbing happened in a split second (pp. 2-11, tsn.,
October 11, 1994). The foregoing circumstances manifestly disclose the treacherous nature of the attack upon the
victim by accused-appellant.
Verily, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (2nd par., No. 16, Article 14, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. Parangan, 231 SCRA 682 [1994]; People vs. Pajares, 232 SCRA 63 [1994]). In the case under
review, the suddenness of the attack, without any provocation on the part of the victim, who was innocently
conversing with Pascua and was thus totally unaware of the impending attack upon him, and the fact that the victim
was unarmed demonstrate the treacherous nature of the attack.

84

There is treachery when the attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected and from behind
and without warning, with the victim's back turned towards his assailant, or when the attack was
so sudden and unexpected that the victim was unable to defend himself, thus ensuring the
execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.
(People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653, 671 [1993]).
The conclusion, therefore, is unavoidable that the attack upon the victim was perpetrated with alevosia, thus,
qualifying the killing to murder.
We, however, are in agreement with accused-appellant in his submission that there is insufficient evidence to prove
the existence of evident premeditation.
The following requisites must concur before evident premeditation may be appreciated: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences his act (People vs. Rodriguez, 193 SCRA 231 [1991]; People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 [1993];
People vs. Estrella, 221 SCRA 543 [1993]; People vs. Rivera, 221 SCRA 647 [1993]; People vs. Cayetano, 223
SCRA 770 [1993]). The prosecution omitted or failed to present any evidence to show (a) the time when accusedappellant made the determination to commit the crime, (b) any act to indicate that he persisted in his determination,
or (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution.
We thus find that the killing although qualified by treachery was not attended by evident premeditation, or any other
aggravating circumstance. Neither was there any mitigation thereof. In consequence, the penalty must be reduced to
the indivisible penalty ofreclusion perpetua in line with People vs. Lucas (240 SCRA 66 [1995]) where we had
occasion to hold through Justice Davide:
Verily, if reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of
Section 20 of the amended R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
whenever the dangerous drugs involved are of any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63
of the Code were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible
penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for determining when either reclusion perpetua or
death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for
imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug cases, regardless of the attendant modifying
circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article 63 assumes serious
proportions since it does not involve only drug cases, as aforesaid. Under the amendatory
sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on treason
by a Filipino (Section 2), qualified piracy (Section 3), parricide (Section 5), murder (Section 6),
kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8), robbery with homicide (Section 9),
destructive arson (Section 10), rape committed under certain circumstances (Section 11), and
plunder (Section 12).
Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, then it
should have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter is the law
on what are considered divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the duration of

the periods thereof. There are, as well, other provisions of the Revised Penal Code
involving reclusion perpetua, such as Article 41 on the accessory penalties thereof and
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61, which have not been touched by a corresponding amendment.
What then may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua? The
deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee and in both Chambers of Congress do not
enlighten us on this, except the cryptic statement of Senator Tolentino adverted to above on the
elimination of the "new penalty" of life imprisonment by the Bicameral Conference Committee. It
may, however, be pointed out that although the Revised Penal Code did not specify the
maximum of reclusion perpetua, it is apparent that the maximum period for the service of this
penalty shall not exceed forty (40) years. In People vs. Reyes, this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, stated:
We hold that there is legal basis, both in law and logic, for Presidential Decree No. 818 to
declare that any penalty exceeding twenty (20) years, or the maximum duration ofreclusion
temporal, is within the range of reclusion perpetua.
It will be observed that Article 27 of the Code provides for the minimum and maximum ranges of
all the penalties in the Code (except bond to keep the peace which shall be for such period of
time as the court may determine) from arresto menorto reclusion temporal, the latter being
specifically from twelve years and one day to twenty years. For reclusion perpetua, however,
there is no specification as to its minimum and maximum range, as the aforesaid article merely
provides that (any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after
undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some
other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.
The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in Article 70 of the code which, in
laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the culprit has to serve more
than three penalties, provides that "the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be
more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him," and (i)n applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual
penalties (pena perpetua ) shall be computed at thirty years.
The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as the
basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule
in the service of multiple penalties. Since, however, in all the graduated scales of penalties in the
Code, as set out in Article 25, 70 and 71, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next
higher to reclusion temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum orreclusion
perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with a maximum duration thereafter to last for the
rest of the convict's natural life although, pursuant to Article 70, it appears that the maximum
period for the service of penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years. It would be legally absurd
and violative of the scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the minimum of reclusion
perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby be a resultant lacuna whenever the
penalty exceeds the maximum twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but is less than thirty (30)
years.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects except for the modification that the
penalty of death imposed by the trial court on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

85

Judge Marcelo R. Obien[2] rendered judgment on March 7, 1985, the dispositive portion of which was amended
on March 26 to read as follows:

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

"WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The dismissal of the criminal case against Antonio J. Villegas, on account of his death on November
16, 1984, is hereby reiterated;
2. Ordering the estate of Antonio J. Villegas, represented herein by his legal heirs, namely: Lydia A.
Villegas, Ma. Teresita Villegas, Antonio Villegas, Jr., Ma. Anton(i)ette Villegas, and Ma. Lydia Villegas
(sic), to pay plaintiff Antonio V. Raquiza Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), itemized as
follows:

[G.R. No. 82562. April 11, 1997]

LYDIA A. VILLEGAS, MA. TERESITA VILLEGAS, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, JR., and MA. ANTONIETTE VILLEGAS, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, respondents.

a)

One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00) as moral damages;

b)

Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as actual damages;

c)

Forty-nine Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P49,800,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

d)

The cost of suit.

[G.R. No. 82592. April 11, 1997]

ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LYDIA A. VILLEGAS, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, JR., MA.
ANTONETTE VILLEGAS, MA. LYDIA VILLEGAS and ESTATE OF ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. He did this on several occasions in August 1968 through (a) a speech before the Lion's Club of
Malasiqui, Pangasinan on August 10; (b) public statements in Manila on August 13 and in Davao on August 17,
which was coupled with a radio-TV interview; and (c) a public statement shortly prior to his appearance before the
Senate Committee on Public Works (the Committee) on August 20 to formally submit a letter-complaint implicating
Raquiza, among other government officials.
The Committee, however, observed that all the allegations in the complaint were based mainly on the
uncorroborated testimony of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility turned out to be highly questionable.
Villegas also failed to submit the original copies of his documentary evidence. Thus, after thorough investigation,
Raquiza was cleared of all charges by the Committee. [1] All these acts of political grandstanding received extensive
media coverage.
On July 25, 1969, an information for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then Court
of First Instance of Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for
the United States where he stayed until his death on November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial proceeded in absentia;
by the time of his death in 1984, the prosecution had already rested its case. Two months after notice of his death,
the court issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect.
No memorandum was ever filed in his behalf.

SO ORDERED." [3] (Amendments underscored)

The heirs of Villegas (the Heirs), through their father's counsel, Atty. Norberto Quisumbing, appealed the
decision on these three main grounds:
"1. Whether the trial court, three months after notice of the death of the accused and before his counsel could file
a memorandum in his behalf, could validly render judgment in the case?
2.
Whether, in the absence of formal substitution of parties, the trial court could validly render judgment against
the heirs and estate of a deceased accused?
3.
Whether, under the facts of the instant case, deceased Villegas was liable for libel, and assuming he was,
whether the damages awarded by the trial court were just and reasonable?"
On March 15, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment modified only
with respect to the award of damages which was reduced to P2 million representing P1.5 million, P300,000.00,
and P200,000.00 in moral, exemplary and actual damages, respectively. Both parties elevated said decision to this
Court for review.
In their petition (G.R. No. 82562), the Heirs once again raise the very same issues brought before the Court of
Appeals, albeit reworded. On the other hand, petitioner Raquiza (G.R. No. 82592) questions the extensions of time
to file appellant's brief granted by the appellate court to the Heirs, as well as the drastic reduction in the award of
damages.

86

It is immediately apparent that the focal issue in these petitions is the effect of the death of Villegas before the
case was decided by the trial court. Stated otherwise, did the death of the accused before final judgment extinguish
his civil liability?
Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue
of People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) on September 2, 1994,[4] viz.:
[5]

with

the

promulgation

of

the

case

[6]

"It is thus evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival
of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than
delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely
based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(I)n recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code,
the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused (under Sec. 1, Rule
87, infra.) and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from
contract, express or implied.[7]
xxx

xxx

xxx

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.'
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a)

e)

b)

Contracts

c)

Quasi-contracts

d)

xxx

Quasi-delicts

4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability
is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with (the) provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription."
(Underscoring supplied)
The source of Villegas' civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet,
this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 [9] in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil
Code. If the Court ruled in Bayotas that the death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not
only his criminal but also his civil liability unless the latter can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the
act or omission complained of, with more reason should it apply to the case at bar where the accused died shortly
after the prosecution had rested its case and before he was able to submit his memorandum, and all this before any
decision could even be reached by the trial court.
The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased accused's civil liability dependent on two
factors, namely, that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended. Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed
instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the
same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private offended party in a
criminal case such as this which must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where the civil action
was impliedly instituted with it?
The answer is likewise provided in Bayotas, thus:
"'Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.'" [10] (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, logically, the court a quo should have dismissed both actions against Villegas which dismissal will not,
however, bar Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his claim for damages against the executor or
administrator of the former's estate, notwithstanding the fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a separate
civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Law

xxx

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.[8] This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator o(f) the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

xxx

It cannot be argued either that to follow Bayotas would result in further delay in this protracted litigation. This
is because the resolution of the civil aspect of the case after the dismissal of the main criminal action by the trial
court was technically defective. There was no proper substitution of parties, as correctly pointed out by the Heirs
and repeatedly put in issue by Atty. Quisumbing. What should have been followed by the court a quo was the
procedure laid down in the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 17, Rule 3, in connection with Section 1, Rule 87. The
pertinent provisions state as follows:
"Rule 3

87

Sec. 17.
Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order,
upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within
a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. x x x The heirs of the deceased may be allowed
to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Rule 87
Sec. 1.
Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon
a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a
lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him."
Accordingly, the Court sees no more necessity in resolving the other issues raised by both parties in these
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82562 is GRANTED and the petition in G.R. No. 82592 is DENIED.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02186 dated March 15, 1988, and of the Manila Regional
Trial Court, Branch 44, dated March 7, 1985, as amended, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without
prejudice to the right of the private offended party, Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the appropriate civil action for damages
against the executor or administrator of the estate, or the heirs, of the late Antonio J. Villegas in accordance with the
foregoing procedure.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 104, respondents.

On February 7, 1998, this Court denied [3] petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the death
penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL
INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
[5]
Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules") [6] and directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to
prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.[7]
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition [8] for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to
enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by
lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for
being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per seas well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary,
unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international
covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent
Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of Court [9] to Amend and Supplement
Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition [10] attached thereto, invoking the additional ground of violation
of equal protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin said public respondents from acting under the
questioned rules by setting a date for petitioner's execution.
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties "to
MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."
On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement Petition, and
required respondents to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice.

DECISION

On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To clarify Status Quo Order, and (2) For the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order expressly enjoining public respondents from taking any action to carry
out petitioner's execution until the petition is resolved.

On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed [1] the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape
of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.

On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General [11] filed a Comment (On the Petition and the Amended
Supplemental Petition)[12] stating that (1) this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; (2)
execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or
the gas chamber); (3) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit
the imposition of the death penalty; (4) R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director;
and that (5) R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice,
Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659[2] (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.

88

On March 17, 1998, the Court required the petitioner to file a REPLY thereto within a non-extendible period of
ten days from notice.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights [13] filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae[14] with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus Curiae[15] alleging that
the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading
and outside the limits of civil society standards, and further invoking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."; (b)
Article III of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person," and Article V thereof, which states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."; (c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular,
Article 6 thereof, and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming
At The Abolition of the Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International statistics showing that as of October 1996, 58
countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 15 countries have abolished the death penalty for ordinary
crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto, which means that they have retained the death penalty for
ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists in practice that they have not executed anyone during the past ten
(10) years or more, or in that they have made an international commitment not to carry out executions, for a total of
99 countries which are total abolitionists in law or practice, and 95 countries as retentionists; [16] and (e) Pope John
Paul II's encyclical, "Evangelium Vitae." In a Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court duly noted the motion.
On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply[17] stating that (1) this Court is not barred from exercising judicial
review over the death penalty per se, the death penalty for rape and lethal injection as a mode of carrying out the
death penalty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment; (3) lethal injection is cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment, and that being the "most modern" does not make it less cruel or more humane,
and that the Solicitor General's "aesthetic" criteria is short-sighted, and that the lethal injection is not risk free nor is it
easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights considering that the Philippines participated in the deliberations of and voted for the Second Optional
Protocol.
After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition, which it now resolves on the
merits.
In the Amended and Supplemental Petition, petitioner assails the constitutionality of the mode of carrying out
his death sentence by lethal injection on the following grounds:[18]

LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND THE QUESTIONED RULES, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY AND WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN ON A PERSON AND IS,
THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
IV.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE POWER TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
V.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
VI.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND
UNLAWFULLY USURPED THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RULES.

VII.
SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AS
WELL AS FOR BEING AN INVALID EXERCISE BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE.
VIII.
INJUCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DAMAGE AND INJURY TO PETITIONER'S
RIGHTS BY REASON OF THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID AND IMPLEMENTING RULES.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b)
violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.

I.
The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issues in seriatim.
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT.

I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION

19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

II.
THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, WHICH IS
PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
III.

The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The prohibition in
the Philippine Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against governmental
oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act
declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,' passed in the year 1689. It
has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of America) and into most constitutions of the
various States in substantially the same language as that used in the original statute. The exact language of the
Constitution of the United States is used in the Philippine Bill." [19] "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935

89

Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' xxx In the
1973 Constitution the phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986
Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was
thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the present text
which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with the meaning desired and with
jurisprudence on the subject."[20]
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage
for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177
and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix
the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility
of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner claims, that respondent Director is an untrained and untested
person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. Such supposition is highly speculative and unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of
phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. [31] Petitioner
simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and
agonizing death for the convict,[32] without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel
involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume
that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty (by lethal injection) will carefully avoid
inflicting cruel punishment.[33]

Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of administering lethal injection is in
order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into the execution
room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline
solution. At the warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous line. The deadly
concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate;
(2) lethal doses of pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which stops
the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are commonly used during surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax
muscles; the third is used in heart bypass surgery.[21]
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.[22] In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons,[23] this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal
injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed,
the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials.[24]
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16[25] of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of
execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the
"court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused, that is, after this Court
has reviewed the entire records of the case[26] and has affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the
procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. [27] Neither is there any
uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the
implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides
that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from
the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by
the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of
eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory [28] wherein
he can seek executive clemency[29] and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.[30]

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a
limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean
that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." [34] The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.[35] Numerous federal and state courts of the United States have been asked to review
whether lethal injections constitute cruel and unusual punishment. No court has found lethal injections to implicate
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue state in one or two
sentences that lethal injection clearly is a constitutional form of execution. [36] A few jurisdictions, however, have
addressed the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have found that lethal
injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After reviewing the medical evidence that indicates that
improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to have little
training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few minutes of pain does not rise to a
constitutional violation.[37]
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."[38] Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have focused on 'standards of decency'
finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it comports with contemporary norms." [39] the
primary indicator of society's standard of decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the country's
legislatures to the sanction.[40] Hence, for as long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the
most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No.
8177, whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We find that the legislature's
substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no
constitutional rights of petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates our international
obligations, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966
and October 23, 1986,[41] respectively.

90

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to
the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
(emphasis supplied)
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall
authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the
provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The
Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.[44] Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our obligation under
the Second Optional Protocol is misplaced.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT
SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. [45] Corollary to
the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest."[46] The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon
or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all-cases.

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall
not be carried out on pregnant women.

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any
State. Party to the present Covenant."

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of
the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the
limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Pursuant to Article 28 of the Covenant, a Human Rights
Committee was established and under Article 40 of theCovenant, State parties to the Covenant are required to
submit an initial report to the Committee on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights
recognized within the Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights one year of its entry into
force for the State Party concerned and thereafter, after five years. On July 27, 1982, the Human Rights Committee
issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating that "(while) it follows from Article 6 (2)
to (6) that State parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in
particular, to abolish it for other than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their
criminal laws in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death penalty to the most
serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2 (2) and (6) that abolition is desirable. xxx The Committee is of
the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty should
be a quite exceptional measure." Further, the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death
Penalty[42] adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most
serious crimes' should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by the Philippines on December 19,
1966 and August 22, 1989,[43] respectively. The Optional Protocol provides that the Human Rights Committee shall
receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth
in the Covenant.

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[47]

Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of
legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of
government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.[48]
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate[49] - and (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[50]

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Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority.[51]
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative purpose may be carried out. [52] R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution."[53]Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps
to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict."[54] The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection
shall be trained prior to the performance of such task."[55] The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would
be served by requiring greater detail.[56] The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal
offense,[57] but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, to use the words of
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice and the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for
the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable of reasonable application. [58]
It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which originally provided for the death penalty
by electrocution was not subjected to attack on the ground that it failed to provide for details such as the kind of chair
to be used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place of attachment of electrodes on the death
convict. Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with respect to lethal injection must fail.

Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would
not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under
R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of
the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should
he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern "which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transaction, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law."
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition
of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.[63] In the same way that free discussion
enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, [64] access to information of general interest aids
the people in democratic decision-making [65] by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the
nation.[66]
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID
FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section of the implementing rules which provides:

A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the
Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice. [59] Further, the
Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of the correctional
system."[60] Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the
Department of Health.[61]

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal
injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or
while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death
penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article
40 of the Revised Penal Code."

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be
overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides:

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid
exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances
when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to, during and after
administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the Director. The manual
shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events before and after execution; procedures in
setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the
removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized prison personnel."
Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The
Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the

Article 83 f the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 now reads as follows:
"ART. 83, Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.- The death sentence shall not be inflicted
upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy
years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with the accessory penalty provided in Article 40. x x x".
On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. While Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death
penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing

92

rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended,
and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible
contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and
in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry
out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." [67] An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. [68] In
case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the
statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman within
the three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.
One member of the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as unconstitutional insofar as it delegates
the power to make rules over the same subject matter to two persons (the Secretary of Justice and the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections) and constitutes a violation of the international norm towards the abolition of the death
penalty. One member of the Court, consistent with his view in People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682, 734-758 (1997)
that the death penalty law (Republic Act. No. 7659) is itself unconstitutional, believes that Republic Act No. 8177
which provides for the means of carrying out the death sentence, is likewise unconstitutional. Two other members of
the court concurred in the aforesaid Separate Opinions in that the death penalty law (Republic Act No. 7659)
together with the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) are unconstitutional. In sum, four members of the Court
voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as unconstitutional. These Separate Opinions are hereto annexed, infra.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act
No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17
contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and
unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict
and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the
aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
NO COSTS.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated
January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

1.

The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as
trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will
never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a
law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever
question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the
6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge
looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of
judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal
or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the
death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the
law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and
that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and
duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its
power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved
or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5)
there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and
considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The
instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January
7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to
intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor
General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over
the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are
invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important
that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not
changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the
Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in
this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was
filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare
the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby
declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659;

93

and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal
Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the
manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from
enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid
Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas,
filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as
required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable
mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this
Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality
of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice
Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By
the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it. 3There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment
has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the
judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances
may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced
and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has
terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for
execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the
court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having
then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are
certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely
under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of
the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a
capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2)
by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this
principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the
convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the
facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is

acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . .
and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and
there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed
while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the
investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is
the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control
of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135
provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It
bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.1wphi1.nt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to
restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of
republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which,
among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that
courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their
decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs
judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance
of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was
subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
10
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in
the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so.
Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . .

94

which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may
be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it
the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no
jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and
supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less
than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a
certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of
death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution
date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the instant
Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent
of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional
guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide
the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of
his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of

Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for
the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by
the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried
out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For
instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time,
might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when
the date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and the public
violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may
be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the
duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may
be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of
the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
[1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by
his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's
right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on
the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted
the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15,
1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending
that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the
convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and
executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO,
the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their
authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction
by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed
in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of
law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No.
7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United

95

States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches
of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective
as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1)
that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either
sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that
Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment
be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator
Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty
five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume
session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on
January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to
resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law
are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately
dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were
made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial
notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose
views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress
that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the
Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify
petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as
Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an
extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary
"until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by
the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the
petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the
legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand
no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue
whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite
posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law.
He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No.
629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to
reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate,
the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging
the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez
resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended
up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor
amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed
the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President
has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous

crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal
and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been
the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our
clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of
capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and antideath partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than
an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of
words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to
assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the
very purpose of the Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities."20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the
courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by
the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the
mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only
when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of
January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of
law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 121176. July 8, 1999]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON PARAZO Y FRANCISCO, accusedappellant.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:
This case was docketed on November 27, 1995, upon the elevation for automatic review of Criminal Case
Nos. 6167 and 6168, for rape and frustrated homicide, from Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, which
imposed on accused-appellant Marlon Parazo y Francisco the supreme penalty of death.
On May 14, 1997, this Court handed down a Decision, [1] affirming with modification subject Joint Decision of
Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, in Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the joint decision appealed from dated March 24, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED with respect to Crim.
Case No. 6167, and accused Marlon Parazo y Francisco is found guilty of the crime of rape under Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to impose
reclusion perpetua.
The decision appealed from with respect to Crim. Case No. 6168, for frustrated homicide is MODIFIED in that the
accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum penalty
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum penalty.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On May 29, 1997, appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the
attention of the Court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true would
warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.
On February 10, 1998, the Court resolved [2] to grant appellants Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in
abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his medical examination; (2) to allow a
supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for
examination by a physician of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, or on January 19, 1999, to be precise, appellant

96

was allowed to be brought to the UP-PGH Medical Center, with appropriate escorts, to undergo the necessary
neurologic and otolaryngologic evaluation and work-up.[3]
In compliance with the said resolution of the Court, Dr. Rosa Mendoza, Senior Chief Staff Officer of the
Supreme Court Clinic Services, submitted two (2) Memorandum Reports, dated July 29, 1998 and March 5, 1999,
respectively, on the mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation of appellant.
On July 20, 1998, the appellant was examined, on the basis of which examination SC Medical Services
Psychologist III Beatriz O. Cruz came out with the following findings and general observation, to wit:
GENERAL OBSERVATION AND TEST BEHAVIOR:
xxx
An encounter with this person revealed him to have an average physique and height, with fair complexion and
somewhat curly hair. Throughout the testing session he was in a pensive mood. Doubt and an agitated appearance
was written all over his face particularly when he struggled to say something, but which ideas could not get
across. One security officer, Mr. Gutierrez, came to our aid and communicated to Mr. Parazo through sign language
to comprehend and answer the question being asked [what he was guilty of]. When he could not understand it, we
wrote the question in tagalog in the paper and to our surprise he could not even read. However thru some efforts
made he was able to utter rep [rape].
Another inmate whom they call mayor [he is the leader of the group] and another close friend of Mr. Parazo where
(sic) called in to provide help to the examiner. And with difficulties being experienced by the undersigned in giving
instructions in gestures, he was able to draw the geometric figures and a person, respectively. Hand tremor was
noticeable [Mr. Parazo is left handed]. With the help of mayor, an attempt was further made by the examiner to show
him the ink blot test, counting on the idea that the examiner might get something out of his responses to the task just
like in the previous paper and pencil test. But our efforts proved futile at this time. No amount of gestures could
make him comprehend the instructions given. It was during this time that he was able to verbalize dilam in high
pitched, cracking voice which the undersigned took for di alam [I dont know]. The examiner did not go further from
this point hence, the termination of test administration.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Good enough Figure Drawing Test
TESTS RESULT & DISCUSSION:
The results of the paper and pencil test reveal that Mr. Parazos intelligence function based on the Goodenough is
gauged on the Mild to Moderate degree of Mental Retardation with an estimated IQ of 60. His mental age on the
other hand, is equivalent to 7 years and 9 months.
Further, signs of regressive features and distortion of the gestalt figures are manifested with strong indication of
impulsive behavior. His inability to reproduce from memory the same figures was noteworthy. His writing output is
unsteady that gives an inkling of difficulty in the motor area.
The above clinical findings are typical reproduction of a person with history of neurological dysfunction as maybe true
in the case of Mr. Parazo who is deaf. It cannot be discounted also that his intellectual and psychological
deficiencies are not only based on organic brain pathology but primarily on the basis of mental retardation which
impedes the effective use of whatever abilities he does have and which renders him psychologically incompetent to
comprehend fully the significance of the acts he commits.[4] (italics ours)
In connection therewith, there was presented the Memorandum Report of July 29, 1998, stating thus:
Based on the foregoing, it appears that the problem of appellant Marlon Parazo is the severe hearing defect or
deafness. The presence of an organic disorder cannot be determined because of the latters inability to
communicate. However, some degree of mental retardation was gathered with the use of Paper and Pencil
Test. His mental age is seven (7) years and nine (9) months. His Intelligence Quotient (IQ) is 60.
This mental retardation could be secondary to an inherent defect in the brain or secondary to the sensory deprivation
[deafness], which connotes a substantial limitation in intellectual and adaptive functioning. (italics ours)
Appellant was then examined at the UP-PGH Medical Center, and the Memorandum Report of Dr. Rosa
Mendoza, dated March 5, 1999, summarized the findings of the UP-PGH Medical Center as follows:
Quoted hereunder are the report on the test conducted:
Ma. Luz S. Casimiro-Querubin, MD, DPBP, Psychiatrist, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine, College
of Medicine and Philippine General Hospital, Manila in her Psychiatric Assessment Report, stated that:
On the day of assessment, Mr. Parazo was seen sitting on the examining table. His hands were cuffed in front of
him. He was feeding himself a sandwich. He was appropriately groomed. He wore the orange bilibid prison uniform
with denim jeans and rubber shoes. He appeared tired and fearful. His mood was generally anxious and his affect
was appropriate to the situation. When approached, Mr. Parazo would look down but would glance at the examiner
after a few seconds. He was unable to follow simple instructions initially and was able to do so only after much
coaxing from those around him and repeated demonstrations of the task he was being asked to do. He was unable

to read. The only thing he could write is his name. Mr. Parazo was able to copy simple patters (sic) but could not
participate in any verbal assessment procedure. His thought content, thought process and flow of ideas could
not be determined because of his inability to speak. (Underscoring supplied). He was able to maintain good eye
contact. The client remained calm during the assessment procedure. It was evident that he felt insecure with the
manipulative tasks he was presented with. Initially, Mr. Parazo appeared resistant to the examiner but he eventually
warmed.
Throughout the examination, Mr. Parazo sought for encouragement by looking at the examiner after each and every
task. He worked quietly, exerted obvious efforts to perform well and was visibly careful in trying not to commit
mistakes. It was only when he was signaled that he could use both hands that Mr. Parazo did so. His behavior was
consistent throughout the period of the examination.
The above behavioral description strongly supports the fact that Mr. Marlon Parazo is indeed hearing impaired and
suffers from mental retardation. He is unable to understand both written and spoken language, needs repetitive
sign language instructions and demonstration to understand the task he was being asked to do.
Meredith F. Castro, MA, Psychologist, PGH, Manila, on the other hand, supported the assessment findings of Dra.
Ma. Luz C. Querubin and reported as follows:
Psychological Evaluation Report Summary
XXX
Measure
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Rev. (WISC-R), Performance Scale. (This is a comprehensive test of
intelligence that measures both verbal and non-verbal aspects and is intended for children aged 6-16 years old and
for adults suspected of mental deficiency. It is composed of two scales that can be administered separately. Given
the examinees sensory impairment and absence of speech, this present assessment used only the performance
scale, which taps the non-verbal intelligence).
xxx
Performance Prorated Scale Score: 23
Performance IQ: 659
Mean Test-Age: 8 years, 5 months
Impressions
Given his sensory impairment and limited educational background, M.P. Fared poorly in this intelligence test for
children and has been assessed to be within mild mental deficiency to borderline range of intellectual functioning.
Charlotte M. Chiong, M.D., Otology, Neurotology, Neurotologic Skull Base Surgery, Diplomate, Philippine Board of
Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, PGH certified that:
I examined Mr. Marlon Parazo, 28-year-old death convict last February 3, 1999. Brainstem auditory evoked
response audiometry was done and with 2000 click stimuli no wave responses were generated in the left
suggestive of profound hearing loss in that ear. In the right ear there was a response 80 db click
intensities suggestive of a severe hearing loss. Puretone Audiometry was done and patient was also noted to
have bilateral profound hearing loss. Speech Testing could not be done due to severity of hearing loss. From my
evaluation Mr. Marlon Parazo has a severe disability and could not possibly understand conversational speech
without powerful amplification such as a hearing aid. (Underscoring supplied)
For her part, Dr. Grace O. Orteza, MA, MD, FPNA, Section of Neurology, Department of Medicine, UP-PGH, Manila,
in her Assessment stated that XXX there are no significant neurologic findings aside from the
manifest deafness and muteness of patient.
To corroborate the medical findings of the Medical Team from the Philippine General Hospital, we conducted an onthe-spot gathering of vital informations on the physical infirmities of Marlon Parazo to determine whether the same is
congenital or acquired.
Mrs. Eufrocina Zenaida Francisco, the mother of Marlon admitted that her son was born deaf and mute. Their day
to day communications relied simply by a pat at the back, a tap on the lap or sometimes by the very basic sign
language that could best convey the message to him. He never had any formal education. Medical intervention,
according to her, never crossed her mind because of their poverty. If food, which is a very basic need is already a
problem how much more with medications.
The Barangay Chairman of Caimito, Palayan City, Mr. Antonio Sebastian, on the other hand, claims that he has
known Marlon since childhood. In the locality he was branded as Pipi because of his inability to
communicate. Nothing significant was noted in his childhood days. It was only when he was about his late teens
that he was involved in petty theft.
An interview with Mrs. Juliana Baltazar, a retired schoolteacher, likewise strengthened the fact that Marlon was deaf
and mute. Marlon, according to her, never actively participated in class though his enthusiasm to learn was
present. He never completed a Grade I full school term, even on a sit in basis since he and his sister were forced to
drop from the class during the harvest season to earn a living.

97

The Department of Social Welfare and Development, Field Office, Palayan City, on the other hand added the
information that since 1975 Marlon was a beneficiary of their projects relative to Persons with Disability. During his
early childhood, he was an active participant of their project. As he grew older however, he did not anymore bother
to visit their office.
Based on the collateral informations (sic) gathered from persons who have known the patient since childhood,
together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and evidenced by the psychological report, it is now
established that Marlon Parazo is suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss, right
ear; (3) Mental Retardation, Mild.
The American Association of Mental Deficiency and the Fourth Edition of Diagnostic and Statistical/Manual of Mental
Disorder enumerated the Diagnostic Criteria for Mental Retardation as follows:
1. Significantly sub-average intellectual functioning: an I.Q. of approximately 70 or below on an individually
administered I.Q. test.
2. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the persons effectiveness in meeting the
standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, home-living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety).
3. Onset before age of 18.
xxx
During the tympanovactic examination, the intense sound given to ear of the patient that is above the normal hearing
threshold will elicit facial and neck contraction of the muscle, which this patient (Marlon) did not manifest. Instead,
he continued staring blatantly [blankly] at the roof of the room.
For her part, Dra. Querubin elucidated that given the physical infirmities coupled with mental retardation there is no
way that Marlon can determine the propriety of his actions. Perhaps, it would have been different if he had a formal
education and given the opportunity to communicate effectively through the sign language. He, however is in a
situation where due to immense poverty never had a chance to improve his lot.
In conclusion, as per Resolution of the Court En Banc, the undersigned [Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D.] conducted hand in
hand with Dr. Charlotte M. Chiong, in the medical evaluation of Mr. Marlon Parazo, together with the panel of Medical
Specialist of UP-PGH, the S.C. Medical Team and the lawyer representative from the Office of the Court
Administrator, it is our unanimous opinion that Mr. Marlon Parazo is deaf and mute with mental retardation mild.
The affidavits[5] of Rev. Fr. Roberto A. Olaguer, the National Bilibid Prisons Chaplain, and Rev. Fr. Roy Rolando
L. Cosca, S.J., Executive Director of Philippine Jesuit Prison Service, state that appellant is a deaf-mute. The results
of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that appellant is really a deaf-mute, a mental retardate,
whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9) months, and with low IQ of 60 only.
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. The fact
that he was helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983, as noted by the trial court of
origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent
any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and
interpret the actions and mutterings of appellant.
As held in People v. Crisologo[6]:
The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts
of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accuseds own version of the
circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accuseds final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust
circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to
inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The
accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not
safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at
stake.
All the foregoing studiedly considered, the court is of the irresistible conclusion that movant richly deserves a
re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may he be consigned to
the lethal injection chamber.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court promulgated on May 14, 1997 is VACATED, the Joint Decision
rendered by Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija in Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168 is SET
ASIDE; and appellant is hereby GRANTED a RE-ARRAIGNMENT and RE-TRIAL, with the assistance of counsel
and a competent sign language expert, before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO GALLO y IGLOSO, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of
Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed by
this Court in its decision promulgated on 22 January 1998.
On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Re-open Case (with Leave of Court) seeking a
modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant proffers that the reduction sought by
him would be in line with the new Court rulings which annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances introduced
in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded in the
indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty.
The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia,[1] speaking through then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
ratiocinated that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and, if not pleaded as such, could only be
appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.[2]
The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or sometime in the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force
or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13 year old girl,
Marites Gallo y Segovia.[3]
The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victims father; accordingly,
accused-appellants relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial, cannot be considered to be a
qualifying circumstance.[4]
The next crucial point is whether the Court must now apply retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction
of accused-appellant.
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains control over a case
until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal processes. It has the authority to
suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in
the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.[5]
The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its reiteration in People vs. Ramos,[6] People vs. Ilao,
[7]
and People vs. Medina,[8] came only after almost a year from the promulgation of the instant case.
The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to comment on the aforesaid 24 th August 1999 motion of
accused-appellant, had this to state:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the land
(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and effect of law, forms part of our penal
statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an accused who is not a habitual criminal, and
notwithstanding that final sentence has already been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly, the
Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellants prayer for reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion
perpetua.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its above observations and sees merit in its stand
to join accused-appellant in praying for a modification of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and the decision sought to be reconsidered is
MODIFIED by imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and
ordering him to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.
Considering that the records of all cases where the death penalty is imposed are forwarded to the Office of the
President in accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of the
President with a copy of this resolution for appropriate guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 118098. August 17, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNULFO BARRO, SR., ARNULFO BARRO, JR.,
BENIGNO BARRO, JUAN BARRO, JOEL BARRO, WILFREDO ARROYO, JOEY FLORIN, and
CRISTOBAL SARTE, accused,

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BENIGNO BARRO and JOEL FLORIN, accused-appellants.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 11, 1994 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San
Jose, Camarines Sur, finding Benigno Barro, Joel Florin and Joel Barro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Benigno Barro is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
inherent accessories provided by law; the accused Joel Florin to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; the accused Joel Barro to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
eight (8) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor, and the three (3) of them to indemnify, jointly and severally the
heirs of the late Virgilio Saba the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), the sum of Thirty Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy Six Pesos (P38,176.00), as actual damages, and the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00),
all of Philippine Currency, as moral damages, which civil liability shall be enforced pursuant to Art. 110, RPC, and for
each of them to pay the proportionate costs.
The accused, Benigno Barro, is entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment upon proper showing that he
agreed to abide with (sic) the rules imposed upon convicted persons, otherwise, he shall only be entitled to four-fifths
(4/5) credit thereof. As to the accused, Joel Barro and Joel Florin, pursuant to Art. 197 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, being Youthful offenders, both of them shall be credited in the service of their sentence with the full
time they spent in actual confinement and detention.
The case against the accused, Arnulfo Barro, Sr., Arnulfo Barro, Jr., Juan Barro, Wilfredo Arroyo and Cristobal
Sarte is hereby ordered archived subject to reactivation as soon as the court acquires jurisdiction over them.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The facts of the case, as correctly summarized in the Peoples Brief, are as follows:
On June 29, 1989, around 6:00 oclock in the evening, at Sitio Catduce, Turague, Sangay, Camarines Sur, while
waiting for the drizzle to subside, the group of Virgilio Saba, Danilo Libang, Rufino Saba, Exequiel Dacuno and
Hilario Cristo, opted to down a few bottles of gin before going home. The group proceeded to a store owned by
one Eli Credo where they ordered two bottles and some polotan. Eli on his part allowed the group to use the kitchen
of the said store where the group could enjoy their drink. (TSN, April 8, 1991; TSN, October 16, 1991, p. 3)
At about the same time, Nimfa Saba, wife of Rufino also arrived to buy some viands for supper and
kerosene. (TSN, October 16, 1991, p. 20) However, upon learning of Rufinos presence, she decided to stay and
wait for her husband. While waiting, she conversed with Edwina Credo, wife of Eli, who was attending the store at
that time. (Ibid., p. 3)
Outside the store was an awning where Juan Barro, Arnulfo Barro, Jr., Joel Florin, Joel Barro and Cristobal Arte
(invariably referred to in the records as Cristobal Sarte) were playing cards known as pusoy. (Ibid, pp. 4-5; pp. 2021)
At around 7:00 oclock that evening, since the drizzle had stopped and considering that Hilario Cristo was already
losing his normal dexterity due to excess alcohol intake, Virgilios group decided to wrap-up their drinking spree and
went home instead. Since it was already dark, Nimfa who went along with them carried an improvised kerosene
lamp known in the local dialect as caraba. (TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 7; Ibid. p. 8)
On their way home while traversing the National road going to Tiwi, Hilario who was drunk kept on hurling
invectives and making oral challenges to anybody: Siisay an maorag. (who is tough) (TSN, April 8, 1991, pp. 8-9;
TSN, August 14, 1991; Ibid. p. 5)
Without their knowledge, such oral invectives hurled by Hilario infuriated the group of Joel Barro who was then still
playing pusoy at the store. And while they were about seventy (70) meters away from that store, Juan Barro
confronted Hilario Cristo, followed immediately by Arnulfo Barro, Jr., Benigno Barro, Joel Barro, Joel Florin, Cristobal
Arte and Wilfredo Arroyo. Exasperated, Juan Barro acrimoniously asked Hilario what he wanted. (TSN, October 16,
1991, pp. 5-6; August 14, 1991, p. 11)
Suspecting that something untoward might happen, Virgilio, Rufino and Nimfa, confident that the irate group would
do them no harm, since the latter were laborers of their father in his lemon plantation, tried to pacify the group telling
them to brush aside and ignore Hilario and his importunities, since he was under the influence of liquor. (TSN, April
8, 1991, p. 8; TSN, October 16, 1991, p. 6) However, instead of mellowing down, their actuations all the more irked
Benigno Barro, resulting in a heated confrontation between the latter and that of Virgilio. To calm down the almost
tense situation and to avoid an imminent physical confrontation between the two groups, Danilo Libang pulled away
Virgilio from Benigno. (TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 10)
Believing that everything was already settled, Virgilios group continued headway to their respective houses. But to
their great consternation and surprise, an enraged Arnulfo Barro, Sr. instantaneously alighted when the group
passed by his house located along the National road and which was around fifty (50) meters from the place where

they were first accosted. Arnulfo Sr., brandishing a bolo known as dinalayap confronted Virgilios group fiercely
uttering Haen an mga hayop na iyan? (Where are those animals?) Immediately thereafter, sensing another trouble
Virgilio embraced Arnulfo, Sr. telling the latter, Wala ito Nol, wala pang nangyayari. (TSN, October 16, 1991, pp. 79; April 8, 1991, pp. 10-11)
At this precise moment, Arnulfo, Sr.s attention was diverted upon seeing Exequiel Dacuno who was then one of
Virgilios companions. Thenceforth, he challenged the latter, O, ano Exequiel, ano malaban ka? Exequiel, as if
hearing nothing ignored the challenge and casually left the place thereby leaving the others. (TSN, April 8, 1991, p.
12; TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 9; October 16, 1991, p. 9)
It was at this juncture that Wilfredo Arroyo, Benigno Barro, Juan Barro, Arnulfo Barro, Jr., Joel Barro, Joel Florin and
Cristobal Arte spontaneously positioned themselves in front of Virgilio and without forewarning the latter, Wilfredo
Arroyo suddenly struck Virgilio with a knife directly hitting him on the abdominal region. Thereafter, the Barros, Joel
Florin and Cristobal Arte, all armed with bladed weapon briskly took turns in ganging-up mercilessly Virgilio Saba,
hitting him all over his body several times. (TSN, October 16, 1991, pp. 10-11, TSN, April 8, 1991, pp. 12-13; TSN,
August 8, 1991, p. 8)
Nimfa, Rufino and Danilo were dumbfounded upon witnessing the gruesome crime happening right before their
very eyes. Trepidation overpowered Rufino such that unmindful of his wife, he ran away leaving behind Nimfa,
Danilo and Virgilio who was still being mauled. Danilo on his part was about to extend some help but was prevented
since Cristobal Arte and Juan Barro knowing that Danilo was about to aid Virgilio chased him, so he was left with no
other alternative but to also run away. (TSN, October 16, 1991, p. 13; TSN, April 8, 1991, p. 15)
Beleaguered though she was, Nimfa on her part was able to cry for help. But this was the most that she could do
under this most compelling circumstances. Hence, while yelling thats enough she could just witness how Virgilio
was being mauled to death by Barros group. She also witnessed how Virgilio, who was already severely wounded,
was grappling to walk towards a coconut tree beside the road, approximately about three (3) meters from where the
brutal slaying happened, where he subsequently fell down. (TSN, October 16, 1991, pp. 11-15)
Still confused, Nimfa was about to approach Virgilio after he fell down when she (was) tripped (off), throwing away
the improvised lamp she was carrying. Hence, with no other option, she went back to look for another. Upon
reaching the house of one Angeles Aquino, she was able to borrow one and while carrying the said lamp on her way
back, Arnulfo Barro, Jr., carrying a knapsack and a pair of shoes passed by her. Since her attention was on the fate
of Virgilio, she did not mind him. (TSN, October 16, 1991, pp. 15-16)
Upon reaching the place where the killing happened, Nimfa already saw many people gathered including Eli Credo,
her husband Rufino and Virgilios wife Tedia Saba. She and Tedia decided to board Virgilio to a jeep and brought
him straight to St. John Hospital at Naga City. However, in the hospital, the attending physician of Virgilio
pronounced him dead. (TSN, October16, 1991, pp. 16-18)
So, the late Virgilio Saba was brought back to Sangay, Camarines Sur, where Dr. Roger Atanacio conducted an
autopsy on his cadaver (Exh. A).[2]
In his report[3] Dr. Atanacio found out that Virgilios death was caused by massive hemorrhage, secondary to multiple stab
wounds. (Exh. A-2) Per Medico-Legal Certificate, Virgilio suffered the following injuries:
1. Wound stab non-penetrating, 2 cm in length, 3 cm in depth, mid axillary line, level of 7 th rib.
2. Wound stab non-penetrating, 2 cm in length, 3 cm in depth, posterior axillary line, level of 9 th rib.
3. Wound stab non-penetrating, 2 cm in length, 2 cm in depth, along the left nipple line, level of 8 th rib.
4. Wound stab penetrating, 2 cm in length, along the left nipple line, 5 cm above umbilicus, with omental evisceration.
5. Wound stab penetrating, 2 cm in length, 3 cm above left paraumbilical area with omental evisceration.
6. Wound stab penetrating, 2 cm in length, 5 cm below left paraumbilical area.
7. Wound and avulsion, 2 x 1 cm subcutaneous depth 3 cm below right paraumbilical area.
8. Wound, incised, 3.5 cm in length, 4 cm in depth left mid upper arm.
9. Wound, incised, 3 cm in length, 4 cm depth, mid forearm left.
10. Wound, incised, 3 cm in length, 4.5 cm depth, Distal 3 rd left forearm.
11. Wound, stab, penetrating 2 cm in length along right nipple line, 6 cm above umbilicus with omental evisceration.
12. Wound, stab, non-penetrating 2 cm in length, 3 cm depth, located at right posterior axillary line, 3 cm above the
level of umbilicus.
13. Wound, stab, penetrating, 2 cm in length, right posterior axillary line, level of 9 th rib with omental evisceration.
14. Wound, hacked, 3 cm in length, 4 cm depth, upper thigh left.
15. Wound hacked, 4 cm in length, bone depth, right parietal area.
16. Wound, hacked, 5 cm in length, 4 cm depth, left outer lumbar area.
17. Wound, stab, non-penetrating, 2 cm in length, 3 cm depth, level of T12 5 cm right para vertebral area (back).
18. Wound, stab 2 cm, 6 cm depth, right upper outer quadrant buttocks.
19. Abrasion, confluent 2 x 2 cm left knee.
Internal Findings:
1. There is a perforating injury at the head of pancreas, apparently an extension of wound #4.
2. There is a thru and thru injury of the splenic flexure.
3. There is a thru and thru injury of the duodenum, severely damaged gastroepeploic artery.
4. The inferior mesenteric artery is severely damaged.

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CAUSE OF DEATH:
Massive Hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds.
On October 31, 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur filed an Information dated October 26, 1989
which reads:
The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Arnulfo Barro, Sr., Arnulfo Barro, Jr., Benigno Barro,
Juan Barro, Joel Barro, Wilfredo Arroyo, Joel Florin and Cristobal Arte with the crime of Murder defined and punished
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of June, 1989 at Sitio Catduce, Barangay Turague, Municipality of Sagnay, Province
of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, accused Joel Barro, who is a minor,
15 years of age, at the time of the commission of the offense and who acted with discernment with the seven (7)
remaining accused who were still at large, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with sharp bladed instrument, with treachery and evident premeditation, with cruelty and abuse
of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one after the other
one Virgilio Saba y Libang thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
That as a consequence of the illegal acts of the accused, the heirs of said deceased suffered damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 plus other forms of damages that may be proven in Court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
For their part, Benigno Barro and Joel Florin interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that they were in the
house of Arnulfo Barro, Sr. in Catduce, Turague, Sangay, Camarines Sur, when the incident happened. Joel Barro
failed to testify because he escaped from his confinement at the Tinangis Penal Farm, in a jailbreak.
As aforestated, on April 11, 1994, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the herein assailed Decision.
As Joel Barro escaped from his confinement during the trial, a notice of appeal was filed only by Benigno Barro
and Joel Florin through their counsel Atty. Briones. In a Resolution[5]dated October 14, 1996, this Court granted
appellant Joel Florins motion to withdraw appeal. The sole appellant in the case at bar is Benigno Barro.
Appellant raises the following errors:
I
The trial court erred in convicting the three (3) accused of the offense charged on the basis of the
contradictory and irreconcilable testimonies of the two (2) prosecution witnesses Danilo Libang and Nimfa
Saba, who are blood relatives of the victim, and on the basis of the wounds sustained by the latter.
II
The trial court erred in holding that, with the nineteen (19) wounds inflicted on the body of the deceased,
Virgilio Saba, conspiracy is established.
III
The trial court erred in giving undue reliance on the medical findings of Dr. Roger Atanacio on the cause of
death and the surrounding circumstances thereof notwithstanding the fact that said witness relevant practical
experiences, special knowledge and skill of the subject-matter about which he is to testify, did not qualify him
as an expert; and in not disallowing hypothetical questions asked that tends to elicit conclusions as to the facts
directly in issue.[6]
After a careful study of the records of the case and the pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court finds the
appeal to be without merit.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant faults the court a quo for its reliance on the testimonies of the
vital prosecution witnesses, namely: Danilo Libang and Nimfa Saba. He contends that such testimonies are replete
of contradictions and are diametrically opposed on such material points as to cast serious doubt on their integrity and
credibility. Appellant alleges that there are irreconcilable variance in the testimony of prosecution witnesses,
namely: Nimfas claim that after the first confrontation was pacified, both groups parted ways which, allegedly,
contravenes Danilos testimony that after such mollification, Juan Barros group followed them and tried to block their
way; and the exact participation of Arnulfo Barro, Sr., for, according to Nimfa, the latter simply accosted them with a
bolo, hurting nobody, while Danilo positively identified him as the one who inflicted injuries upon the body of the
deceased Virgilio Saba.
Appellants contention is not impressed with merit.
It has become a doctrinal rule for this Court to accord great respect to the factual conclusions drawn by the trial
court, particularly on the matter of credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the
behavior and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. [7] We will not disturb the findings of trial courts with respect to
the credibility of the witnesses unless there are facts, or circumstances, of weight and influence appearing in the
record which have been overlooked, or the significance of which have been misapprehended or misinterpreted by
the trial courts.[8]

The alleged variance in the testimony of the prosecutions two eyewitnesses relate to inconsequential
details. At any rate, herein appellants participation in the slaying of Virgilio Saba is not being contested.
Moreover, the existence of conspiracy was proven by the prosecution. Where conspiracy is adequately
shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary, the
applicable rule being that the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them. [9] What is important in this case is that
the herein appellant Benigno Barro was positively identified by the vital prosecution witnesses in a straight-forward,
categorical and candid manner to have participated in the overt act before and during the killing of Virgilio Saba. The
alleged inconsistencies do not in any way refute the positive identification made by the two eyewitnesses that it was
Benigno Barro, Joel Barro and Joel Florin, among others, who killed the victim.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.[10] It bears
emphasis that witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in every detail as differences in
recollections, viewpoints, or impressions are inevitable. [11] Even the most candid witness oftentimes make mistakes
and fall into confused and inconsistent statements but such honest lapses do not necessarily affect their credibility.[12]
As to the appellants allegation that the witnesses were allegedly interested blood relatives of the deceased
victim, and thus the trial court erred in relying on Danilo Libang and Nimfa Sabas testimonies, suffice it to say that no
law disqualifies relatives of the victims of a crime from testifying about the facts and circumstances of the
crime. Relationship per se of a witness to the victim, whether by consanguinity or affinity, is no indicator of an
impaired credibility of a witness, nor would it affect his positive and clear testimony and render it unworthy. [13] The
defense did not even present evidence to indicate that the said prosecution witnesses were moved by improper
motives. Thus, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith
and credit.[14]
With regard to the second assigned error, appellant claims that the trial court erred in holding them guilty of
conspiracy for the murder of Virgilio Saba on the basis of the nineteen (19) wounds inflicted on the
deceased. According to them, the evidence on record is bereft of proof to establish facts and circumstances that
could lead to a reasonable and logical inference that the three accused agreed to kill the victim and actually decided
to commit it.
The Court is not persuaded.
Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement by the parties to commit the crime. The
conduct of the malefactors before, during or after the commission of the crime is sufficient to prove their conspiracy.
[15]

The following telling circumstances attending the instant case all point out unequivocally to the existence of
conspiracy: the prosecution witnesses were able to categorically identify the accused as among those present in the
store of Eli Credo playing pusoy during that fateful night; they were the companions of Juan Barro when the latter
tried to accost an unruly Hilario Cristo; they were all there, present, and armed with bladed weapons, during the
precise moment when Arnulfo Barro, Sr., brandishing a bolo, ferociously confronted the group of the deceased; and
their active participation in the mauling, stabbing and killing of the helpless victim.
In People vs. Datun[16]this Court ruled that conspiracy was shown to exist when the appellants and their
companions surrounded the victim and, without a word, hacked and stabbed him to death. The same thing could be
said in this case, considering the following testimony of Danilo Libang on cross-examination:
Atty. Orino: When Virgilio Saba was then being assaulted by the group of the Barros namely Arnulfo Barro,
Sr., Arnulfo Barro, Jr., Benigno Barro, Juan Barro, Joel Barro, Alfredo (sic) Arroyo , Josel (sic) Florin and
Cristobal Arte, some of them were behind Virgilio Saba, correct?
A While he was still stepping backwards the group was in front of him but when the group caught up with him
that was the time when they ganged-up with (sic) him and was surrounding him.
Q And the others were stabbing the back of Virgilio Saba?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many did you see stabbing the back of Virgilio Saba?
A The group was encircling Virgilio Saba.
Q So you want to impress this Honorable Court that all of them stabbed the back of Virgilio Saba?
A There were those who were in front, there were those who were on the side, there were those who were at
the back. [17]
Taking into consideration the foregoing testimony of prosecution witness Danilo Libang, conspiracy may be inferred
therefrom as it is clear that the acts of the accused were characterized by unity of purpose, intent and design in order
to effect a common unlawful objective to kill the victim Virgilio Saba.
The above quoted testimony also serves to negate appellants allegation that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is not attendant in this case. Appellant cites the principle that for treachery to be appreciated, the offender
employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its

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execution without risk to himself, arising from the defense which the offended party might make, which means that no
opportunity was given to the latter to do so.
This was precisely what the appellant and his co-accused did to the victim Virgilio Saba. The accused, all
armed with bladed weapons, surrounded the accused, who was not armed, and together, attacked the victim thereby
insuring the execution of the crime without risk to themselves, and giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself
nor harm his attackers. Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that treachery is attendant in this case.
On the third assigned error, appellant assails the trial court for according credence to the medical findings of
Dr. Roger Atanacio as to the cause of death and other surrounding circumstances of Virgilio Saba, notwithstanding
that said witness relevant and practical experience, and special knowledge do not qualify him as an expert witness.
This contention is misplaced.
The testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable to a successful prosecution for murder. While the
autopsy report of a medico legal expert in cases of murder, or homicide, is preferably accepted to show the extent of
the injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to prove the injuries and the fact of
death. The testimonies of credible witnesses are equally admissible regarding such injuries and the surrounding
circumstances thereof.[18]
Hence, granting that Dr. Atanacios opinions as to the instrument used in the killing of Virgilio, and the cause of
death should be expunged from the record as he might not qualify as an expert witness, conviction of herein accused
is still in order. Dr. Atanacios opinion on the matter was merely corroborative, as he was presented merely as an
ordinary witness, and, under the laws of evidence, corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons
to warrant the suspicion that the witness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. [19]In the case at
bar, since credibility of prosecution witnesses was established and these witnesses were able to positively identify
the three accused to be among those who brutally slew Virgilio with bladed instruments, resort to, and reliance on Dr.
Atanacios testimony were mere surplusage.
We now discuss the penalties imposed on the appellants.
As heretofore stated, the circumstances recited indicate the attendance of conspiracy among the
appellants. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed
equally guilty of the crime committed.[20]
However, mitigating circumstances are personal to an accused in whose favor they are determined to exist and
cannot be enjoyed by his co-conspirators or co-accused.[21]
The trial court correctly ruled that:
The court, however, believes that the accused, Joel Barro being then 14 years old, eleven (11) months and twentytwo (22) days, who acted with discernment at the time of the commission of the offense as alleged in the information
and therefore, a fact deemed admitted by the prosecution, said accused is entitled to a privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, and pursuant to Art. 68, par. (1), Revised Penal Code, he is entitled to a discretionary
penalty which is lower by two (2) degrees from that provided by the law for the crime which he committed. And with
respect to accused Joel Florin, then 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense he is entitled to the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law shall be imposed to him but always in the proper period.

As to accused, Benigno Barro neither is their (sic) aggravating nor mitigating circumstance is attendant in the
commission of the offense, the penalty to be imposed shall, therefore, be in the medium period. As such, the
indeterminate sentence law is not applicable as regards the said accused. But, as regards the accused, Joel Barro,
who escaped from jail during the pendency of this case, he is disqualified from the benefits of the indeterminate
sentence law (People vs. Manabat, L-8904, December 28, 1956 O.G. 6090 cited in 78 SCRA 57). However, as
regards the accused Joel Florin the indeterminate (sentence) law is applicable to him and the penalty imposable
shall be within the range of a penalty next lower to that prescribed by the code for the offense, and the maximum
shall be that, which after taking into account the circumstance attending the commission of the offense shall be
properly imposed under the rules of the code.[22]
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68, par. 1 [23] of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.[24] Two degrees lower is prision correcional maximum
to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped from jail, hence, he is disqualified [25] from the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight penalty of eight years which is within the
medium period (6 years 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court erred in
imposing the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the range of said penalty. The
records show that Joel Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not
appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed on the accused who did not
appeal can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can
never become final and executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court to have it conformable
with law.[26]
Joel Florin, 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Art. 68, par. 2 [27] of the Revised Penal Code. One degree lower than the penalty
imposed by law is prision mayor in its maximum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period. The maximum of
the indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period (12 years, 5 months and 11 days to 14 years, 10
months and 20 days). The minimum of the indeterminate penalty is anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower, which is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 10
years). As to Joel Florin, the trial court correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to accused-appellant Benigno Barro, there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty for murder.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused Joel
Barro is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.

101