I.

LABOR ORGANIZATION

1) KNITJOY MANUFACTURING CO. vs. FERRER CALLEJA

FACTS: In the bargaining history of KNITJOY, the CBA has been consistently limited to the regular
rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis (represented by Federation of Filipino
Workers - FFW). On the other hand, the rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly basis were
never included within its scope. Prior to the expiration of the CBA, FFW was split into 2 factions - the
Johnny Tan and the Aranzamendez factions. The latter eventually became the Confederation of
Filipino Workers (CFW) while the former retained the name of FFW.
Respondent KMEUs membership is limited to the latter class of employees, KMEU does not seek to
dislodge CFW as the exclusive bargaining representative for the former. The records further disclose
that in the certification solicited by TUPAS and during the elections which followed thereafter,
resulting in the certification of CFW as the exclusive bargaining representative, the monthly-paid
employees were expressly excluded. Thus, the negotiations between CFW and KNITJOY following
such a certification could only logically refer to the rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piecerate basis.

ISSUE: Is there a violation of collective right of employees to selforganization?

Whether or not petitioner KNITJOYs monthly-paid regular rank-and-file employees can constitute an
appropriate bargaining unit separate and distinct from the existing unit composed of daily or piecerate paid regular rank-and-file employees, and

HELD: Yes.

The suggested bias of the Labor Code on one company-one union policy must yield
to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to
self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the
Constitution guarantees. In tus

2) VICTORIANO v ERWU
FACTS: Victoriano was employed at Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. The
company had a closed-shop agreement with its union, the petitioner, where it
imposes as a condition of continued employment the necessity to be a
member of the union so as to retain their employment from the company.
Hence Victoriano, had been a member of the union since the start of his
employment. However, because of his religious affiliation which prohibits the
joining of labor organization and the subsequent enactment of RA 3350
introducing the amendment to RA 875 giving exclusion to closed-shop
agreement by allowing the members of religious sect prohibiting affiliation
from labor unions to be excluded from union security clause. Consequently,
Victoriano disaffiliate himself from the union in 1962. Hence, the union sought
for his dismissal from the company.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to self-organization had been violated.
HELD:

The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two (2) broad
notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of restraint which guarantees that the
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law, and (b) the power, by virtue of which
an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. (Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54). Although the freedom to associate may be curtailed by a

closed-shop agreement so as to protect the membership of the union, the enactment of RA 3350 as
an exercise of the legislature of its police power nevertheless constitute an exception to the said
clause. Hence, the right to self-organization was not violated.

3) JUAT v CIR
FACTS: On December 1, 1959, a collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the Bulaklak

Publications and the BUSOCOPE LABOR UNION, to remain in effect for 3 years, and renewable for another
term of 3 years. The agreement contains, among others, a closed shop proviso which provides that as a
condition of their continued employment, members of the union as of Jan. 1, 1960 must maintain their
membership to the union during the duration of the agreement and that all employees who on Jan. 1, 1960 are
not yet members of the union is required to become members as a condition to retain their employment to the
company. Due to the said clause, Santos Juat, an employee of Bulaklak Publication since August 1953, was
requested on or about July 1960 and several occasions thereafter, to join the Buscope Labor Union. Due to
Juats refusal to join the union, he was suspended for 15 days. He was consequently dismissed from work after
his refusal to comply yet again of the order to report to work sent to him by his superior officer.

ISSUE: Is there a violation of right to self-organization?

HELD: None. The validity of the closed-shop stipulation in the CBA is upheld
to be a valid clause to protect the union and promote solidarity as it was also
chosen by the Congress to approve, in its exercise of policy-making power.
Hence, there can be no violation of right to self-organization that may
happen. Moreover, the closed-shop proviso of a collective bargaining agreement
entered into between an employer and a duly authorized labor union is applicable not
only to the employees or laborers that are employed after the collective bargaining
agreement had been entered into but also to old employees who are not members of
any labor union at the time the said collective bargaining agreement was entered
into. Juat, as an employee of the petitioner and who is not a member of any

union since employment which was prior to the effectivity of the CBA is
therefor required to become a member of the existing union.
4) POST WORKERS UNION v LAGUESMA
FACTS: Nearing the expiration of the CBA between the International Container
Terminal Service Inc. (ICTSI) and Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union
(APCWU), the incumbent union, several unions expressed their motives to
represent the laborers in the next CBA. Among these unions are Sandigan ng
Manggagaw sa Daungan (SAMADA), evidently, when it filed certification election
and garnering consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees.
Subsequently, petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a
petition for intervention. Still another petition for certification election was filed
by the Port Employees Association and Labors Union (PEALU).
Both petitions were dismissed for lack of compliance of the required # of consent
signatures but the same was appealed before the Secretary of Labor. Thereafter,
ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new CBA, concluded on Sept. 28,
1990 and ratified on Oct. 7, 1990 by majority of the workers in the bargaining
unit (910 out of 1223 members) and was subsequently registered with the DOLE.

ISSUE:
HELD: We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the
right to self-organization and collective bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this
Court" has been "to require a certification election as the best means of ascertaining which labor
organization should be the collective bargaining representative." 4
The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can
freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the
establishment where they are working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 6 the
holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the
representation case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or
during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation
case. As the new CBA was entered into at the time when the representation case was still pending, it
follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.
It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification election, in which event the new CBA it
concluded with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union will be
chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its own negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the
adoption of a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA having expired, it is necessary to lay
down the rules regulating the relations of the workers with the management. For this reason, the
Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall remain effective
between the parties, subject to the result and effects of the certification election to be called.
The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the crucial
question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a collective
bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there be
no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous management and a union covertly
supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated
because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval and support. It is therefore
sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers be resolved in favor of
the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the
workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over substantial
justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order dated August 21, 1990, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold
certification election among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc., this to
be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.

5) GALLEGO v KAPISANAN TIMBULAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA

FACTS: Respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relation a complaint alleging that it is an
organization of tenants and farm laborers duty registered in accordance with law counting with more
than 1,200 members who are tenants of petitioners Manuel Gallego. Manuel Alzate, Victor de los
Reyes Emilio Veloso Consuelo de los Santos de Barcelona and Jose Mariano de Santos owners of
haciendas situated in the municipalities of Nampicuan and Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija and that petitioner
"had, by means of threat, intimidation, fraud and deceit, taken advantage of the ignorance of their
tenants, forced tenant represented by petitioner (herein respondents) to enter into contracts of
tenancy the provision of which are against existing laws and public policy and that the nonimmediate settlement or arbitration of the controversy " will cause or likely cause an agrarian
disorder among the but in all other places where general discontent and social unrest prevail among
the tenants who feel they have long been cheated of the benefits provided for them in the tenancy
law."
Complainants prayed that the contracts be declared repugnant to the spirit and the provision
of the Philippines Rice Share Tenancy Act (No. 4054, as amended), and null and void that
with intervention of the court other tenancy contracts be executed embodying substantially
the provision of order be entered restraining the herein petitioner from ejecting any of their
tenants except for just cause or causes and with the previous and consent of the court

HELD:
Respondent's allegation to the effect that the complaining tenants are members of respondent
Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa. A labor organization duly registered in accordance with
law is enough to give said organization legal personality for purposes of filing the complaint with the
court of Industrial Relation. . Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 2113 provides:
SEC. 2. All association which are duty organized and registered with and permitted to
operate the Department of Labor shall have the right to collective bargaining with employers
for the purpose of seeking better working hours for laborer and in general to promote the
material social and moral well being of their members and no labor organization shall be
denied such whose object is to undermine and destroy the constituted government or to
violate any law or laws of the Philippines in which case it shall be refused registration and
permission to operate as a legitimate labor organization. The registration of and the issuance
of a permit to any privileges granted by law.
The foregoing provision is in line with the modern trend of the law in recognizing the personality of
labor union to represent heir member before the constituted authorities. The existence of labor union
is necessary development of the industrial revolution and is recognized as one of the effective mean
by which laborers may obtain protection to their right and privileges social justice within an economic
set-up dominated by capitalism and vindicate the laborer's just claims to human dignity and his due
share in the benefits accruing in the interplay of the modern social system of production distribution
and consumption.

Petition dismissed.
6) ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER vs RUBEN TORRES
FACTS: confronted with an unresolved representation issue.
CBA effective date: Aug. 1, 1987 to July 30, 1990 petitioner and

private respondent union (ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER

ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS ("SLMCEA-AFW"),)
Before expiration of the CBA, AFW was plagued with internal
squabble splitting its leadership between Gregorio Del Prado &
Purita Ramirez, resulting in filing of petition before the DOLE
where a declaration was sought on the legitimacy of Del Prados
faction as bona fide officers of the federation. Pending resolution
of the case, SLMCEA-AFW brought to the attention of petitioner
that the CBA was about to expire and manifested in the process
that private respondent wanted to renew the CBA.

Jan 28,
1991

In response to the mandate under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and
amidst the labor controversy between petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center
and private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center Employees AssociationAlliance of Filipino Workers (SLMCEA-AFW), then Secretary of Labor Ruben
D. Torres, issued the Order of January 28, 1991 requiring the parties to
execute and finalize their 1990-1993 collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
to retroact to the expiration of the anterior CBA. The parties were also
instructed to incorporate in the new CBA the disposition on economic and
non-economic issues spelled out in said Order (p. 48, Rollo). Separate
motions for re-evaluation from the parties were to no avail; hence, the
petition at bar
Petitioner charges that public respondent, in making such award,
erroneously relied on the extrapolated figures provided by respondent
SLMCEA-AFW, which grossly inflated petitioner St. Luke's net income.
Petitioner contends that if the disputed award are sustained, the wage
increases and benefits shall total approximately P194,403,000.00 which it
claims is excessive and unreasonable, considering that said aggregate
amount is more than its projected income for the next three years.
Finally, petitioner attacks the Order of January 28, 1991 for being violative of
Article 253-A of the Labor Code, particularly its provisions on retroactivity
On the basis of the foregoing, petitioner St. Luke's concludes that it would be
in a very poor position to even produce the resources necessary to pay the
wage increases of its rank and file employees.

ISSUE: PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN HE CURTAILED THE PARTIES' RIGHT TO FREE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, AND WHEN HE GRANTED MONETARY AWARDS AND
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO THE EMPLOYEES GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE
TO THE OPERATING INCOME OF PETITIONER.

Do petitioner's evidence and arguments provide adequate basis for the charge of
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent in his Order of
January 28, 1991 as to warrant its annulment by this Court?

HELD: We do not see merit in petitioner's theory that the awards were granted prematurely. In its
effort to persuade this Court along this point, petitioner denies having negotiated with private
respondent SLMCEA-AFW. Petitioner collectively refers to all the talks conducted with private
respondent as mere informal negotiations due to the representation issue involving AFW. Petitioner
thus argues that in the absence of any formal negotiations, no collective bargaining could have taken
place. Public respondent, petitioner avers, should have required the parties instead to negotiate
rather than prematurely issuing his order.
We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. It is immaterial whether the representation issue within
AFW has been resolved with finality or not. Said squabble could not possibly serve as a bar to any
collective bargaining since AFW is not the real party-in-interest to the talks; rather, the negotiations
were confined to petitioner and the local union SLMCEA which is affiliated to AFW. Only the
collective bargaining agent, the local union SLMCEA in this case, possesses legal standing to
negotiate with petitioner. A duly registered local union affiliated with a national union or federation
does not lose its legal personality or independence (Adamson and Adamson, Inc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations and Adamson and Adamson Supervising Union (FFW), 127 SCRA 268 [1984]).
In Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) vs. Noriel (180 SCRA 681 [1977]), then Justice Teehankee reechoed the words of Justice Esguerra in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills,
Inc. (66 SCRA 512 [1975]), thus:
Too, petitioner is in error in contending that the order was prematurely issued. It must be recalled
that immediately after the deadlock in the talks, it was petitioner which filed a petition with the
Secretary of Labor for the latter to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In effect, petitioner
submitted itself to the public respondent's authority and recognized the latter's power to settle the
labor dispute pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code granting him the power and authority to
decide the dispute. It cannot, therefore, be said that public respondent's decision to grant the awards
is premature and pre-emptive of the parties' right to collectively bargain, simply because the Order of
January 28, 1991 was unfavorable to one or the other party, for as we held in Saulog Transit,
Inc. vs. Lazaro, (128 SCRA 591 [1984]):
It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke jurisdiction at one time and
reject it at another time in the same controversy to suit its interests and convenience.
The Court frowns upon and does not tolerate the undesirable practice of same
litigants who submit voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment when
favorable to them and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. (Tajonera v.
Lamaroxa, 110 SCRA 447, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 35). (at p. 601.)
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of
arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, such
as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.