Apeiron Volume 45 Issue 4 2012 (Doi 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0006) Trivigno, Franco v. - Technē, Inspiration and Comedy in Plato's Ion

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion
FRANCO V. TRIVIGNO
Philosophy Department
Marquette University
PO Box 1881
Milwaukee, WI 532011881, USA
franco.trivigno@mu.edu
The Ion portrays Socrates in dialogue about the nature of the rhapsodic
techn with Ion, a rhapsode or actor, who performs Homers poetry both
in contests and for private audiences. Three related interpretive difficulties
have confounded scholars. First, while scholars seem to agree that Socrates
means to target or attack something, they have disagreed over what or
whom the real topic of the dialogue is: the sophists, the poets, the authority of poets, the criticism of poetry, the notion of poetical inspiration, and
art have all been suggested,1 but it is striking that the overt topic of the
dialogue, rhapsody, is hardly ever taken to be a serious target. Second,
scholars, noticing the comedic and playful tone of the dialogue, in particular, the comic ludicrousness of Ion,2 have had trouble finding a serious
philosophical point in it, with earlier scholars going so far as to declare
the dialogue spurious.3 Third, to the extent that the dialogue offers any
positive views at all, two wildly different and logically incompatible views
of rhapsody and poetry are given. Both views seem clearly inadequate. Initially, Socrates puts forth what I will call the technical account of poetic
composition and interpretation, which assumes that both are fully rational
Flashar 1958 claims that the Ion concerns the sophists; Tigerstedt 1969, poetry and
the notion of poetical inspiration; Murray 1996, the authority of poets; LaDrire
1951, the criticism of poetry; and Dorter 1973, art. See LaDrire 1951, 269, for
further discussion of the various possible topics of the dialogue.
Murray 1996, 98, claims that Ion himself is so stupid that he is not worth attacking;
the real target of the dialogue must be something other than this proverbially silly
rhapsode.
According to Murray 1996, 96, the debate largely in Germany about the authenticity of the dialogue was begun by Goethe, who saw the dialogue as little more than
a satirical attack on a foolish rhapsode. See also Tigerstedt 1969, 1820; Moore
1974, 4214.
apeiron, vol. 45, pp. 283313

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Franco V. Trivigno
and technical activities (530a533c). Then, reversing course entirely, Socrates articulates what I will call the inspired account, by which divine
inspiration accounts for poetic composition and interpretation (533d
536d).4 Most scholars have taken one of these to be Platos considered
view, but there is no consensus as to which one it is. In this paper, I aim
to resolve these interpretive difficulties.
I formulate and critique the technical account in 1 and the inspired
account in 2. I claim that these two models contradict each other at almost every level but what they share is the appeal to an originating
authority as the source of poetic truth. The rhapsode Ion, in struggling to
explain the nature of his own expertise, endorses each account in turn;
through his discussion with Socrates, both are shown to be inadequate and
importantly wrong. In short, I claim that the dialogue endorses neither
model. In 3, I argue that, in the third section of the dialogue, through
the problematic analyses of several passages of Homer (536e539e), the
dialogue gestures at what I call the oracular account, which incorporates
elements of inspiration and technique but eschews the need for an originating authority. This alternative model is anti-authoritative oriented
toward encouraging the active intellectual engagement of the audience.
In 4, I argue that Plato depicts Ion as a laughable figure, particularly
in the last section of the dialogue (539e542b), in order to expose the
moral danger of taking poetry as authoritative. Thus, the comic portrayal
has a serious philosophical point, and, I shall argue, Ions role as rhapsode
is a crucial aspect of it.5 By letting us see Ion as a comic figure, Plato
Critics have panned Plato both for endorsing the technical account and for endorsing
the inspired account, and for good reasons which I shall lay out in 12. Some
commentators, especially the Romantics, have found the inspired account congenial:
see e.g., Schaper 1968, 358, 12034. On Shelleys Defense of Poetry, which admires
and draws from the inspired account: see Murray 1996, 312; Stern-Gillet 2004,
192194. As several scholars have noticed, Shelley does not seem to be aware of
Socrates irony in the passage: see e.g., Haines 1997, 80. United in their opposition to
the Romantic reading are Woodruff 1982; Pappas 1989; Stern-Gillet 2004.
Part of what makes the rhapsode important is his role as mediator between the poet
and the poets audience. Dorter 1973, 66, claims that the rhapsode provides the double perspective of poet and audience. I will not be claiming that the dialogue exclusively targets rhapsody; this would be hard to justify because the discipline of rhapsody is parasitic on that of poetry. Indeed, I claim that poets, poetry and a particular
attitude towards poetry are crucial targets as well. That there was a tradition of rhapsodic interpretation seems well established by Richardson 2006. Despite the certain
affinities between rhapsodic and sophistic interpretation (see note 75 below), and
thus the ways in which the criticism of the former would also apply to the latter, I
see no reason to see the sophists as standing behind Ion as Platos real targets in the
dialogue, as Flashar 1958 claims. For a judicious refutation of Flashar, see Tigerstedt
1969, 225.
285
encourages us his audience both to reject Ion as model and to use the
Ion itself, not as a fount of authoritative wisdom, but as an invitation to
philosophical dialogue.
1 The Technical Account

At the very beginning of the dialogue, we discover that Ion must be an
excellent rhapsode as he has just won first prize in a festival contest. Socrates and Ion try to find an explanation for Ions excellence by examining
the skill for which he was rewarded, namely rhapsody. Socrates lays the
foundation for the technical account when he assumes that Ions rhapsodic skill constitutes a techn.6 He begins by ironically claiming to envy
[the] rhapsodes for [their] techn (530b56).7 As it emerges through the
conversation, a techn is a thorough, masterful knowledge of a specific
field that can be taught to others and can be recognized, certified, and
rewarded.8 Ion and Socrates understand the rhapsodic techn to comprise
both performance and critical evaluation (530c34).9 As Socrates articulates the rhapsodic techn, the rhapsode:
must learn the poets thought (), not just his verses that is enviable! I
mean, no one would ever get to be a good rhapsode if he didnt understand what is
meant () by the poet. A rhapsode must serve as the interpreter () of
8
9
Techn can be translated as art, craft, skill, expertise, or profession but I will
leave it, and related terms like technits, transliterated in this paper. See LSJ s.v. On
the notion as employed by Plato, see Roochnik 1996.
Socrates here clearly appeals to Ions self-conception as an expert on Homer; later,
when the inspired account is introduced, Socrates again appeals to Ions sense of his
own wisdom. Socrates irony here serves both to get Ion into the conversation and to
begin to expose the latters claim to wisdom as fraudulent. Ion is, as I will argue in
the last section, an imposter, or , a bombastic figure from comedy whose pretensions to wisdom are exposed. On the imposter, see note 81 below.
Roochnik 1996, 1.
Dorter 1973, 68, seeks to translate Socrates questions about exegesis into questions
about performance, a move I find hard to justify. He claims that a separate field of
literary criticism existed at that time. But this neither precludes rhapsodes from engaging into critical assessment of poetry nor justifies downplaying the critical role of
the rhapsode which both Ion and Socrates avow. See Richardson 2006, who argues
that there was a separate field of Homeric criticism, which included Ion and those he
mentions as rival interpreters, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotus of Thasos and
Glaucon (530c9d1). Further, there is nothing surprising about the mixture of performance and criticism, especially given the historical example of Aristophanes, who
may well be considered the first literary critic. On Aristophanes as critic, see Grube
1965, 2231.
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Franco V. Trivigno
the thought of the poet for his audience. It is impossible to do this well ()10
without knowing what the poet means. (530b8c5)11
On this account, the rhapsode is an interpreter, a : the word is

the etymological ancestor of hermeneutics and derives from Hermes, the
messenger god.12 As an interpreter, the rhapsode must transmit the poets
thought his message to the audience with as little distortion as possible. Thus, the thought intended by the poet is a regulative ideal for the
rhapsodic techn.13 The rhapsodes performance can be appraised on the
basis of how well it represents the poets intentions.14
The rhapsodes critical interpretation involves both explaining the
thought of the poet and taking an evaluative stance toward it. According
to Socrates, any techn will have [1] a determinate subject-matter and [2]
a unified method; the expert technician will be able to employ the method
to the entire subject-matter. Ion seems to agree with this characterization
of the rhapsodic techn as a theory of poetic criticism, which enables him
to assess the relative merits of all poets.
When the content of poetry comes to the fore, both Socrates and Ion
treat Homer as though his poetry were explicitly didactic as a wealth of
technical information. They proceed as though the thought of Homer
was constituted by an endorsement of the proper way to execute technai,
in other words, as if Homer thinks that we should perform various activ-
10
11
12
13
14
The use of this word in the context of the technical account is important for my
interpretation in 3 below. Within the parameters of the technical account,
can only mean well or correctly; it almost never means beautifully. In the inspired
account, the reverse is true. See LSJ s.v. . See note 44 below.
I translate as to mean here in order to provide a proper object for the rhapsodes understanding corresponding to the poets thought. Socrates claims that the
rhapsode needs to do more than just memorize the verse, i.e., know the words; he
must know what is meant by them. See LSJ s.v. All translations of the Ion in this
paper are from Woodruffs Hackett edition in Cooper 1997, with slight alterations.
See LSJ s.v.
One might claim that by introducing the intentions of the author, I am either reading too much into the text or translating as both thought and intention.
Both are perfectly acceptable translations of : see LSJ s.v. The main point of
introducing authorial intention in this context is to emphasize what the technical
account emphasizes, i.e., the author as the independent creator of his poems. The
thoughts underlying the verse are there because the author wants them to be there;
an interpretation is right because it coheres with how the author wants his work to
be interpreted. There is no unintended content, nor is there a more primordial
source of content.
The upshot of this approach is that it gives interpretation a determinate goal and
some procedural guidelines. The downside is that the authors intentions are notoriously hard to reconstruct, a problem that has prompted some literary theorists to
deny that authorial intention is at all relevant for understanding a text.
287
ities the way he describes and imitates them in his narrative. This understanding of the thought of the poet may seem very peculiar to us from
the perspective of a literate culture, but it was not so for the Greeks in the
5th century, who were still emerging from an oral culture, in which important information was precisely preserved in song.15 On this account, no
critical interpretation could ever genuinely assess a passage of poetry without knowledge of the techn it described. Only experts in the relevant subjects would be so qualified. Socrates evokes the possibility that two poets
might have differing thoughts, for example, about divination the art, or
techn, of decoding divine messages:
S:
Take all the passages where Homer and Hesiod speak of divination (),
both where they agree and disagree: who would explain these better (),
you or one of the good diviners?
I: One of the diviners. (531b37)
Poetry, then, is or can be true in an obvious sense, that is, it can correctly
describe the method of technical disciplines and imitate them properly,
i.e., to the satisfaction of the relevant technician.16
Given the fact that rhapsody is parasitic on poetry, any account of the
former will have implications for the latter. Indeed, on the technical account, poetry must itself be a techn.17 For, if the rhapsodic techn gives
one a method or procedure for interpretation, there must be some discernible principles of poetic composition, which inform or are informed by
this method. In other words, the determinate subject matter must possess
clear, discoverable principles in order to account for the methods general
applicability. In short, poetry itself must be a unified techn. There is an
15
16
17
As Havelock 1963, 3660, has demonstrated, oral cultures depended on song for the
retention of cultural knowledge, including technical knowledge, and it is not implausible to think that, on the cusp of moving from an oral to a literate culture, there
continued to persist a strong cultural assumption about the role of poetry in society
as a source of wisdom, both cultural and moral. On Homer as an encyclopedia, see
Havelock 1963, 6186. Further, as Urmson 1982, 1334, has persuasively argued,
the idea that poetry is supposed to be edifying has found its defenders in every era,
and so Platos attack on them for failing in this regard is still relevant today.
The word, , does not appear in this dialogue; however, is implicated by
the notion of correctness as a standard for poetic criticism. Dorter 1973, 71, claims
that the conception of art as imitation is clearly implicit in the Ion. Murray 1992,
34, also sees the notion as implicit in the dialogue, but for reasons that I do not find
persuasive; in short, she thinks that the reason that Plato treats the ideas of inspiration and separate in his dialogues is that, for Plato, mimsis and inspiration
are identical (46).
See Janaway 1995, 189, for an elegant reconstruction of the argument, which distinguishes between the critical- techn and the object- techn.
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Franco V. Trivigno
art of poetry as a whole, as Socrates contends in this section (532c89).18

Socrates supports this conclusion via an analogy with the other fines arts: it
is because sculpture (533a6b5) and painting (532e5533a6) are technai
that critics are able make adequate judgments about their relative merits.19
Let the above suffice as a sketch of the technical account. This position is untenable for several reasons. First, as Ion protests again and again,
it fails to account for his excellence as a rhapsode. Thus, Ion stands as a
counterexample: he is good at rhapsody, but he does not possess the
knowledge that such excellence would seem to imply. By his own admission, Ion lacks familiarity with and interest in all poets (531a14;
533c48); indeed, he even claims to doze off when other poets are discussed (532c2). Thus he does not possess knowledge of the alleged subject-matter of the rhapsodic techn (criterion [1] above). Nor does he possess some consistent means or criteria for deciding amongst these poets
(criterion [2] above). Rather, he simply declares without any argument
at all Homers verse to be superior (531d611). Thus, he fails to possess
[2] a unified method applicable to the entire field of poetry. Ion thus fails
to possess the knowledge that would qualify him to adjudicate amongst
competing poets. As Socrates argues, the ability to explain why one speaker
on a topic is good implies the ability to explain why others are bad, and
vice versa (531d532a). This is not necessarily decisive, however, because
the possibility of the rhapsodic techn ought not to hinge on a single
counterexample. Ion may be very lucky.
The second problem has to do with the viability of the rhapsodic
techn itself. It is not clear that the rhapsodic techn can be said to have a
determinate subject-matter, i.e., it would fail [1] above. If the rhapsode
needs to be an expert in the topics covered in poetry, and poetry deals with
everything, then the good rhapsode would have to be an expert in everything. Put differently, the rhapsodic techn has an indeterminate subjectmatter. Socrates own description of the subjects of poetry confirms this:
Doesnt Homer mainly go through tales of war, and of how people deal with each
other in society good and bad people, ordinary people and craftsmen; how the
gods deal with each other and men; what happens to those in heaven and in
Hades; and the births of the gods and heroes? (531c4d1)
18
19
. On the proper way to translate this claim, see SternGillet 2004, 1845.
Socrates adduces, in addition, the examples of flute-playing, cithara-playing and singing as being structurally similar. This has led some commentators, notably Dorter
1973, 66, to see the Ion as targeting the fine arts in general and Ion himself as a
representative of art. Since the overt content of the dialogue concerns rhapsody and
poetry, I will restrict my own analysis to these topics. Though I am sympathetic to
much of what Dorter says, it is not clear to me that such an extension of the scope
of the dialogue is warranted.
289
Homeric epic recreates the entire world and everything in it, including the
moral realm.20 If such is the subject-matter of rhapsody, then it is no
techn.
A third problem concerns the extension of this line of reasoning to
the poet. The poet, then, would also have to be a kind of universal expert,
and this would seem to rule out the possibility that there is a poetic
techn. Now the passage seems to be more like a reductio ad absurdum of
the possibility of Ions rhapsodic expertise: If Ion is an expert, then he
would possess the rhapsodic techn. If there is a rhapsodic techn, then it
has [1] a determinate subject matter and [2] a unified method. If it does,
then the poetic techn possesses [1] a determinate subject matter and [2] a
unified method. Actual poetry does not possess [1];21 therefore, there can
be no rhapsodic techn. Because there is no rhapsodic techn, Ion cannot
be an expert by possessing it.
To this one might add two final and not inconsequential complaints.
First, this conception of the rhapsodic skill takes no account of rhapsodic
performance, and this is arguably the distinctive expertise of the rhapsode.
Second, the conception of the rhapsodic skill takes no account of the esthetic qualities of poetry, like beauty, in which case poetry might just as
well be prose, and the poets, consigned to imitating technical disciplines,
might just as well be technits.22 To put this point another way, the technical account focuses on the content of poetry to the exclusion of its form.
For all these reasons, we should reject it as an inadequate conception of
rhapsody and poetry.
2 The Inspired Account

In the next section of the dialogue (533d536d), the emphasis shifts from
criticism and interpretation to poetic composition and performance, and
the beauty of poetry becomes central. Socrates makes divine inspiration a
necessary condition of writing beautiful poetry: it is not by techn but by
being inspired () and possessed [that poets] compose beautiful po20
21
22
On the indeterminate scope of Ions alleged expertise as a defeating feature of his

claim to have a techn, see Roochnik 1987, 2856; as he further notes, 291n.25,
poetry seems to be about everything, in philosophical parlance, the whole, but is not
quite about everything. Indeed, given the focus on events and narrative, poetry does
not, for example, seem to be about stable objects of knowledge.
The question of whether poetry has a unified method is not directly broached in the
dialogue, but, as I suggest above, the notion of seems implicit in the technical
account.
Thus, a widely made complaint in the literature is that Plato holds the poets to an
unfair and inappropriate standard: see e.g., Guthrie 1975, 205.
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Franco V. Trivigno
etry (533e58).23 The articulation of the inspired view seems itself inspired, since it employs rich poetic images and metaphors throughout.
The technical account of poetry, by contrast, lacks a spiritual resonance
entirely.24 It is this section for which the Ion has been historically famous
or infamous: Shelley found the true basis for a defense of poetry in it;25
Goethe saw an attack on poetry with Aristophanic malice.26
When Socrates describes the composition of verses, he goes to great
length to emphasize the poets lack of agency. Using the metaphor of frenzied religious festival celebration, Socrates compares the poets to Corybantic dancers and Bacchic revelers. But the primary analogue to the inspired
poet is the diviner, or inspired seer.27 This passive understanding of the
poet presents a stark contrast with the technical account whose framework
assumes that the thought of the poet is the goal of interpretation. On the
inspired view, the poets have no thoughts to interpret, at least not when
they are composing. While composing, the poets are quite literally out of
their minds.28
It is rather the Muse who plays a seminal role in poetic production.
Using the metaphor of a magnet and iron rings, Socrates describes how
the Muse begins a chain of inspiration:29
Its a divine power ( ) that moves you, as a magnetic stone moves
iron rings. This stone not only pulls those rings, if they are iron, it also puts
power in the rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does pull
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
Tigerstedt 1969, 26, claims that Plato was the first Greek writer to describe poetic
inspiration as possession; on his view, inspiration was a common motif, but not
possession.
Arist. Po. clearly conceives of poetic production as a technical expertise and his accounts of epic poetry and especially tragedy at once delineate the theoretical bases of
poetry and provide practical advice for the aspiring poet. It is interesting to note that
Aristotles Poetics de-emphasizes the mythic, religious and musical bases of poetry in
general and of tragedy more particularly. On this, see Halliwell 1998, 82108.
Murray 1996, 312.
See Tigerstedt 1969, 189, 26, for an account of Goethes judgment and influence.
According to Murray 1992, 33, the association between diviners and poets is ancient
and widespread and a commonplace in early Greek poetry.
This conception of poets as out of their minds when they compose has Aristophanic
precursors in Ach. 395ff.; Th. 40ff. Murray 1992, 34, claims that, in reality the figure
of the mad poet is a Platonic myth and constitutes a radical break with the past.
This is only true if Plato is taken to be expounding doctrine here, as opposed to
mocking the poets. If taken in the latter sense, he is firmly in line with the traditions
of Old Comedy. On the possible influence of Democritus on Plato, see Tigerstedt
1969, 726.
Murray 1996, 113 notes that the magnet metaphor for inspiration has no known
precursors. This use of the word seems to be the origin of our magnet and its cognates.
291
other rings In this same way, the Muse makes some people inspired herself, and
then through those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended.
(533d3e5)
With the Muse functioning as the magnetic force, the first ring in the
chain is the poet. Socrates makes clear that the god speaks through the
poet: the god himself is the one speaking ( ) these things and
through these poets, speaks () to us (534d35). While the
sounds come through the poets, the poets, like diviners, are merely the
passive vehicle for the gods intended meaning:
[T]hese beautiful poems are not human nor are they from humans but they are
divine and from the gods; these poets are nothing other than interpreters ()
of the gods (534e25).
One should notice that, on this account, interpretation has the sense of
passive transmission a stark contrast to its more active meaning in the
technical account.30 The poet, as interpreter, deserves no credit for his
own poetry and he is barely afforded even a potentially disruptive role; at
most, one could say that the poet is blessed.31
This account relegates the rhapsode to the role of ,
an interpreter of interpreters (535a9). As the middle ring in the chain of
inspiration, his mediating function makes him twice removed from the
source. An upshot of this account is that it can make sense of Ions exclusive interest in Homers poetry (536bc). The other poets simply do not
inspire Ion.32 Since Homer does inspire him, Ion is drawn to Homer, and
others in the audience are drawn to Homer through him. Ions excellence
as a rhapsode has to do with his being inspired and, thus, inspiring others:
he is, in short, a link in the chain of inspiration.
When Socrates focuses on the poetic quality of the verses and their
beauty,33 he recognizes esthetic considerations, e.g., lyrical features of the
30
31
32
33
See Murray 1996, 121. See also Partee 1971.

Indeed, on Socrates account, to prove this, the Muse provided the example of Tynnichus, who apparently wrote an exceptionally beautiful and popular paean but absolutely nothing else of note (534e). He was, one might say, the worlds first one-hit
wonder.
While in the technical account, interpretation was presented as a technical method
in principle applicable to every poet, in the inspired account, interpretation is radically individuated. The poet interprets one god; the rhapsode interprets one poet.
What was earlier presented as an absurdity, namely, the idea that one could interpret
one poet exclusively, now seems perfectly natural.
Woodruff 1982, 1402, claims that Plato denies that there is an esthetic sense to
. On his reckoning, Plato takes esthetic beauty to be radically distinct from the
fine or beautiful itself ( ). He claims that Socrates views mere beauty as a
deception. As I will argue, there are two senses of beauty at stake in the dialogue:
one which is superficial and potentially deceptive, the other which is deeper and conBrought to you by | provisional account
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verses, ignored in the technical account of poetry. Beauty becomes the criterion for the goodness of poetry. In articulating this view, Socrates employs highly poetic language as a kind of performative demonstration. His
metaphors are richly drawn and articulated in a religious and almost ecstatic tone:34
[Poets] are not in their right minds when they compose these beautiful lyrics, but
as soon as they sail into harmony and rhythm they are possessed by Bacchic frenzy.
Poets tell us that they gather songs at honey-flowing springs, from glades and
gardens of the Muses, and that they bear songs to us as bees carry honey, flying like
bees. And what they say is true. For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy
(534a1b4)
In the inspired account, we find a preponderance of words relating to

. The concern with beauty marks a shift away from the technical
accounts concern with correctness. Poems have immense value, coming as
gifts from the gods, but it is not clear that they can be true in any sense.
One can experience the divinely inspired vision of the poet through his
poems and thus experience a poems beauty. As the standard by which
poetry is judged, beauty, conceived of as harmony and rhythm on this
account, is the outward manifestation of that vision.35
Turning to Ions actual performances absent from the technical account we see that emotion is central to the inspired account. Ion vividly
describes the way he works himself up into an emotional frenzy when he
performs a particularly jarring and passionate scene (535cd). According
to Socrates, Ions inspired soul believes [] that it is present at the
events that are described and enacted (535c13). When Ion illustrates
his effect on the audience, he focuses on the emotional state that he induces in them, indeed, the way that Ions own experience is reproduced in
the spectator (535d89). When Ion performs an emotionally jarring
scene, the audience members are crying, terrified and amazed (535e16).
Thus, they too believe that they are present at these wondrous events.
They are passive recipients of the inspiration which moves Ion.
34
35
nected to truth. In other words, contra Woodruff, I will be claiming that Plato thinks
that there is an esthetic sense to , which is not in itself worth very much and
may be deceptive. It can, however, be useful in leading us toward the deeper sense, as
in Symp. 210ae; Phdr. 249e50d.
Socrates imagery is indeed evocative with roots in traditional Greek religion. However, Socrates analogies are also reminiscent of comic accounts of poets. The comparison of poets to bees is traditional and generally favorable; however, the image of
poets flying has mocking precursors in Ar. Pax 827ff.; Av. 1373ff. On the roots of
the inspired account, see Murray 1992, 302.
For the moral implications of harmony and rhythm, see Rep. 401d402a; Tim.
47ce.
293
Though Socrates exposition is shot through with irony and exaggeration, I have reconstructed the view as though it were seriously meant. In
critiquing the view, I will be giving voice to what the irony indicates. Indeed, one finds that there are several reasons for dissatisfaction. First, as
with the technical account, this account fails to account for Ions own
activity. When Ion finally realizes that the account subtly mocks him, he
protests: Youre a good speaker, Socrates, but I would be amazed if you
could speak well enough to convince me that I am possessed or crazed
when I praise Homer (536d47). Socrates account overstates the degree
to which the rhapsode gives up his agency. For example, Socrates claims:
Are we to say that this man is in his right mind at times like these: when hes at festivals
or celebrations, all dressed up in fancy clothes and golden crowns, and he weeps,
though hes lost none of his finery; or when hes standing amongst millions of friendly
people and is terrified, though no one is undressing or harming him? (535d15)36
In short, Socrates account makes the rhapsodes out to be delusional lunatics, and while Ion is surely unintelligent, he is certainly not insane.37
Second, we might extend this line of criticism to the author and the
audience, the two other main links in the chain of inspiration. Since what
is transferred from poet to rhapsode to audience is a kind of experience of
being carried away, an implication of the view seems to be that poets and
audiences are, when inspired, just as crazy as the rhapsodes. In describing
the poets composition, Socrates says he is not able to make poetry
until he becomes inspired [], and goes out of his mind [] and
his intellect is no longer in him [ ] (534b46).
Through this accumulation of near-synonymous expressions, Socrates effectively executes a move from inspiration to insanity.38 In addition, while
we might agree that there is some sense in which the audience gives up its
agency when it is transported into the world of the poet through the
rhapsode,39 as with the rhapsode, Socrates presentation makes the audience seem like it is completely insane, and this seems unwarranted.
36
37
38
39
Cp. Ar. Ach. 4105; Th. 14950, for comic portrayals of the way that poets confuse
themselves with their characters in real life. Such a confusion is, on my reading, a
core feature of the comic portrayal of Ion (see below in 4).
See also Pappas 1989, 3813, who rightly sees that the inspired account amounts to
an imputation of insanity.
The term probably had an original medical sense of insanity, since its earliest
use can be found in the Hippocratic corpus. See LSJ s.v. It clearly indicates an impaired level of cognitive engagement, though, in the Lg., Plato uses in connection with Bacchic revelry (790e). The last term, , though
redundant, drives home the point. This line is an instance of what Stern-Gillet 2004,
178, describes as Socrates cunning mix[ture of] flattering and unflattering language.
Cp. Mx. 235ac, where Socrates describes the effect of funeral oratory on him. He feels
so good about himself that he feels nearly transported to the Islands of the Blessed.
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Third, Ion presents a counterexample when he claims to notice the

effect of his performance from the rostrum. One would think that, being
divinely inspired, Ion would be unable to remember or comment on the
effect of performance, but Ion always has his eyes on the proverbial prize:
I look down at the audience from the rostrum, and they are crying and looking
terrified, and as the stories are told, they are filled with amazement. I must keep
my wits and pay close attention to them: if I start them crying, I will laugh as I
take their money, but if they laugh, I shall cry at having lost money. (535e16)
For this to be possible, the inspired account must be wrong. How could
someone who is possessed and out of his mind pay enough attention to
the audience to make calculations concerning his potential earnings?40
What Ion describes is a plausible enough scenario for a performer and
would seem to present a more general problem with the account, and not
just an idiosyncratic one about Ion. Socrates overstates the irrational and
non-cognitive aspect of rhapsodic performance, i.e., he makes the poets
and rhapsodes out to be far more passive than they are or even could
possibly be.41
Fourth, at the end of the account, Socrates extends the magnetic chain
of inspiration to include the audience and draws out to absurdity the implications of the magnet metaphor. He includes iron rings hanging off to
the side and the chain of inspiration becomes unwieldy. Not only are
poets, rhapsodes and audiences inspired, but so is anyone who has anything to do with poetic production and performance, including the choral
performers, chorus trainers and assistant chorus trainers. What is lost entirely by the magnet metaphor is the content of the poetry in the end,
there are no thoughts at all and the only thing produced by the Muse is
more inspiration. Socrates is surely right to deny that Ion has knowledge
and even that there is no rhapsodic techn. However, one might say that
the core problem with the inspired account is that it pushes the inspiration line so far that there is no discursive content in the poems at all, nor
for that matter in the minds of poets, rhapsodes or audiences. Pushing the
magnet metaphor further, we would have to vacate the minds of the choral performers, chorus trainers and assistant chorus trainers as well. Again,
this seems to go well beyond what is warranted. Indeed, Platos strategy
here is similar to the reductio used to disarm the technical account; by
40
41
This point has been noticed by other commentators: see e.g., Tigerstedt 1969, 21.
Woodruff 1982 rightly finds in the Ion a radical separation of the poet from his
poetry. Building on this, he concludes that the inspired individuals could not possibly
compose poetry and that the inspiration story is simply false: Platos story about gods
and passive poets is absurd, and he cannot be sincere when he tells it (146). I agree
with this assessment of the inspired account, but as I will show in the next section, it
contains certain elements of truth.
295
amplifying the core components of the view to absurdity, Socrates mocks

and undermines them.42 For the reasons stated, we should reject the inspired account.
3. An Oracular Account
Both the technical account and the inspired account seem at least initially
to be endorsed by the dialogue, but neither supplies a satisfactory account
of rhapsody or poetry. As with the technical account, the inspired account
fails to find a source for Ions excellence in rhapsody and his alleged expertise. The two models provides two completely different origins as authorities (poet or gods) to which Ion might appeal in order to verify his expertise. As I have shown, neither account is adequate. One provides such an
exaggerated focus on knowledge and content that it leaves out considerations of inspiration and beauty; the other provides such an exaggerated
focus on inspiration and beauty that it leaves out considerations of knowledge and content. Part of Platos purpose is to show that no account of
poetry would afford rhapsody with an appropriate authority to ground
Ions rhapsodic alleged wisdom. On both accounts, Ion is the passive recipient of the authoritys wisdom and his self-conception is dictated by his
relationship to that authority.
I suggest that the dialogue points to, though never fully articulates, a
view what I call the oracular account which draws from both the
technical and inspired accounts but eschews the need for an originating
authority. Thus, there is some truth in both accounts, though each is, on
its own, false.43 I defend and elaborate on this suggestion in three ways in
this section. First, Socrates, in discussing three passages from Homer
(536d538d), uses the term ambiguously: he initially employs to mean correctly, i.e., in a way that conforms to the technical account, but then he uses it to mean beautifully, i.e., in a way that resists
the technical account and conforms to the inspired account. Through this
ambiguity, the dialogue points to a more fundamental unity and provides
the impetus for a combination of the two views. Second, in discussion of
the passages suitable for a diviner to judge (538d539d), Socrates chooses
passages which highlight two different aspects of divination: inspired vi42
43
See Woodruff 1983, 137, 147. On Platos use of amplification as a parodic strategy,
see Trivigno 2009; Trivigno 2012.
Socrates seems to endorse the technical account at 532d8, when reflecting on the
preceding discussion, he says, I speak nothing but the truth and the inspired account
at 534b3, when he says of the poetic descriptions of poetry: what they say is true.
Since they are logically incompatible, Socrates cannot mean to endorse all aspects of
each account.
296
Franco V. Trivigno
sion of future events and technical interpretation of signs. Thus, the figure
of the diviner, who can be either passively inspired or a technits, provides
a second impetus for a view of rhapsody and poetry that incorporates both
inspiration and technique. Finally, I fill out some of the details of this
account using the model of the oracle, a kind of divination which explicitly incorporates both inspired vision and technical interpretation.
3.1 The Ambiguity of
When Ion retreats back to the technical view, Socrates puts him to the
test by citing three passages from Homer and asking who would best judge
Homers account. The first Homeric passage Socrates and Ion discuss describes what Nestor said to Antilochus about driving a chariot (537a2).
What is at issue is: who will know whether Homer speaks correctly
( ) in these lines (537c1). Nestor counsels Antilochus about
managing a turn in a chariot race; he gives direct, specific guidance on the
appropriate way to lean, use the reins and handle the horses.44 The passage
is thus quite congenial to analysis by a technical expert. When Socrates
poses his question a second time, he substitutes for ; he asks:
who will know better whether Homer speaks , you or a charioteer?
(538b23). The questions are taken to be identical by Ion, and indeed, in
most cases, and are interchangeable.45
In the second Homeric passage, Socrates recites a section of the Iliad
in which Homer narrates how Hecamede, Nestors woman, gave to
the wounded Machaon a barley potion to drink (538b).46 It is unclear
whether this passage depicts a medical treatment rather than, say, a few
people sitting around having a drink together. Socrates asks:
44
45
46
The charioteer is the best qualified candidate for assessing these lines because the
charioteers techn includes this information. Socrates argues that each techn has its
own object of knowledge and that it is only in virtue of the techn that the expert is
able to judge what is done well and what not. This argument precludes the possibility
that several technai might account for the knowledge of a single matter. This is, at
best, a disputable claim.
LSJ s.v. lists the three main senses of as the esthetic, utilitarian and moral in
that order. The adverb form, , emphasizes the utilitarian sense; it is generally
best translated as well or correctly and understood as the performance of some
activity in accordance with its appropriate uses, methods and/or goals. It also has an
adverbial sense that correspond to the esthetic and moral sense of . In artistic
endeavors, note that the utilitarian and esthetic senses will overlap. On the ambiguity
of in the Ion, see also Dorter 1973, 756. On the wide variety of things that
can be described as , see HipMa; Symp. 210a-e.
This passage is a badly misquoted mixing of three lines: Il. 11.63940 and 630: see
Murray 1996, 1278.
297
Whether Homer speaks (correctly) or not, would this be diagnosed

(beautifully? correctly?) by the doctors profession (), or the rhapsodes
()? (538c45)
In asking whether a doctor would diagnose whether Homer speaks

, Socrates somewhat surprisingly juxtaposes with the doctors
expertise and with Homers poetry; one might expect that the doctor would diagnose and Homer would compose , not the
other way around. In this subtle way, the dialogue unsettles the first examples semantic identity of and and reveals an ambiguity in the
sense of .
The third passage Socrates invokes has Homer narrating a simile of
Iris traveling to fetch Thetis (Il. 24.802):
Leaden she plunged to the floor of the sea like a weight
That is fixed to a land cows horn. Given to the hunt
It goes among ravenous fish, carrying death. (538d13)
Socrates asks if the rhapsode or the fisherman would know whether in

these lines, Homer speaks or not. Here, the notion of falls to
the side, but the ambiguity of is most evident. Homers similes are
one of his distinctive stylistic achievements; they are not simple comparisons. According to Lesky, Homeric similes create many correspondences,
include a brilliant wealth of detail, and give depth and coloring to the
action they describe.47 A fisherman would almost certainly not be expected to give a proper assessment of these lines. The technical account
seeks to make all poetry univocal and thus genial to interpretation; the use
of metaphorical speech problematizes the univocal understanding of
in the technical sense (as correctly) and invites us to acknowledge the
existence of its esthetic sense (as beautifully). Even if the fisherman tells
us that Homer has correctly described weighted fishing hooks by acknowledging the fact that hooks are often connected to a cows horn, he will
have assessed the passage in a superficial way and have missed its esthetic
qualities entirely.
What these successive analyses open up for, I suggest, is the possible
coexistence of beauty and correctness. This is not, in itself, implausible:
surely a line of poetry can be both correct (to the extent that it properly
imitates some aspect of the world) and beautiful (to the extent that such a
line is harmonious and rhythmic). If this is right, then and
techn and inspiration are compatible, and this points us toward the
possibility of an account of poetry, which conceives of it as both technical
and inspired. Indeed, there may be both a deeper sense of beauty and a
deeper sense of correctness implied here whereby they do not merely
47
Lesky 1963, 64.

298
Franco V. Trivigno
overlap in an incidental way (a technically correct imitation that happens

to be beautiful) but come together in a more fundamental way. They do
come together, I suggest, in the notion of divine truth.48 While technical
correctness concerns imitating the practical activities of a craftsman, divine
truth concerns the underlying structure of reality, which is the object of
the philosophers inquiries.49 While superficial beauty concerns the formal
features of verse, i.e., their pleasure-giving harmony and rhythm,50 the deeper sort of beauty understood as divine truth concerns the harmony
and rhythm of the cosmos, i.e., its order, which makes it knowable and
ripe for inquiry.51 If this deeper, philosophical sense of beauty is gestured
at in these passages, an important question remains: whether and to what
extent the poet can represent this beauty in his poetry and thus transmit
truth to his audience. I return to this question later in section 3.3.
48
49
50
51
Dorter 1973, 756, also sees the dialogue as pointing to divine truth as a deeper
sense of beauty, but, appealing primarily to Phdr., he develops this idea in a radically
different way. In his view, beauty is a sensuous reflection of the primal order underlying the whole of reality and, via this connection, all harmony and rhythm can be
said to contain some truth irrespective of content. For Dorter, this means that the
poetry can be an imitation of the divine; this strikes me as an overly optimistic view
from Platos perspective about what the poets can accomplish. On Dorters view,
the divine truth of a poem its affinity with the primal order can be directly
experienced by the audience through the poems rhythm and harmony. This seems to
contradict the depictions of poetic experience, as we see them in the Ion itself.
This need not be understood in a robustly metaphysical sense as implying commitment to the theory of forms. Socrates famous what is it? question expressly seeks
the principle which serves to unify an object or property, i.e., the one underlying the
many.
Dorter 1973, 76, denies that Plato thinks of beauty as giving pleasure, but his argument does not work. While he locates the beauty of verses in their form, i.e., their
harmony and rhythm, he denies that beauty gives pleasure on the grounds that the
Iliad, the most frequent example of beautiful art, has gruesome and thus unpleasant
content. Dorter cannot have it both ways: after locating the beauty in the Iliads metrical form, he cannot draw conclusions about its beauty by consideration of its representational content. Though Plato does not admittedly focus on the pleasure-giving
qualities of poetry in the Ion, the connection between beauty and pleasure is made in
HipMa. 297eff., with music mentioned prominently at 298a. Interestingly, this suggestion comes only after two more promising definitions suggesting a deeper sense of
beauty (the appropriate (293eff.) and the useful (295bff.)) have failed to generate a
proper account.
This suggestion obviously has Pythagorean resonances and is further developed by
Plato in later dialogues, but the connection itself is embodied in the very word for
the universe, : the word primarily means order but also means ornament. See
LSJ s.v.
299
3.2 Two Kinds of Divination

Given the use of divination both as a paradigmatic techn in the technical
account (Socrates very first example at 531b) and as a primary analogy for
poetic inspiration in the inspired account (534d), it is surely interesting
that Socrates comes back to it yet again in quoting two long passages from
Homer (539ad). Its role, I suggest, is to provide a model for the compatibility of techn and inspiration. Continuing his refutation of Ions view of
himself as a technical expert, Socrates asks for (and supplies) passages in
Homer which are supposed to be appropriate for a diviner to judge. Two
features of the passages are important: first, the passages are in fact pointedly inappropriate passages for a diviner to judge; second, each passage
would require the judgment of a different kind of diviner.52
In the first passage (Odyssey XX.3517),53 Theoclymenus perceives
that Athena has made Penelopes suitors mad, and he has an inspired vision of their impending deaths. It does not take a diviner to know that
Theoclymenus has truly seen their coming deaths. Anyone familiar with
the Odyssey knows that he is right about that. In fact, Socrates alluded to
the very scene in which Odysseus slays the suitors earlier in the dialogue
(535b). But in order somehow to judge the passage for technical accuracy,
another diviner would need the impossible: access to the inspired vision.
While the future to which the vision refers is available to any reader of
the Odyssey, the inspired vision itself is located in the mind of the seer. In
the second passage (Iliad XII.2007), Homer describes an eagles encounter with a snake. Here we have a different problem. We are told the birdsign, but not its interpretation.54 How could a diviner know if the mere
description of a birds struggle with a snake is well, correctly or beautifully
done? There is nothing for a diviner to judge without knowing the interpretation.55
The different ways that these passages are unsuitable for analysis by an
expert highlights the significant differences between the types of divination
implicated.56 The first case fails because of the inaccessibility of a divinely
52
53
54
55
56
On the different kinds of diviners, see Cic. Div. 1.12; Halliday 1913.
Plato omits line 354.
On the interpretation of bird-signs, see Halliday 1913, 24671.
In Il. XII.210ff., the sign is taken by Polydamas to mean that the Trojans should not
proceed beyond the walls to burn the ships of the Achaeans. It is unclear whether the
sign is interpreted properly.
Two other differences between these passages are of note. In the first passage, Homer
speaks as a character, Theoclymenus, while, in the second, he speaks as the narrator.
Also, in the first, he employs metaphors and rich imagery, while, in the second, he
gives a bare description of the events. I pass over these differences as their possible
implications are not directly related to my task here.
300
Franco V. Trivigno
inspired vision, and the latter, because the omen does not become comprehensible as a divine sign prior to its interpretation as such. If the inspired
account is right about the fully passive and irrational nature of inspiration,
then the inspired vision itself would require a rational interpretation in order for the content or meaning of the vision to be rationally understood.
Otherwise, it could not play a role in practical reasoning. The figure of
the diviner is on the border, as it were, between techn and inspiration.
This passage not only provides a second impetus for a view that combines
techn and inspiration, but it suggests using the analogy of divination to
help formulate it.
3.3 The Oracular Model
Given the two impetuses for a combination of the technical and inspired
views and the prevalence of divination in the dialogue, I use the example
of oracular divination, which incorporates both inspired vision and rational interpretation, in order to fill out some details of this account.57 An
oracle, e.g., the oracle at Delphi, contains a divine seer and a technical seer,
the prophts. The divine seer has a more direct relationship with the god;
ecstatic and possessed, she is the passive vehicle of the gods message. But
such proclamations must be rationally interpreted. Consider Platos own
description of this process from the Timaeus:
While he is in his right mind, no one engages in divination, however divinely inspired and true it may be, but only when his power of understanding is bound in
sleep or by sickness, or when some sort of possession works a change in him. On
the other hand, it takes a man who has his wits about him to recall and ponder
the pronouncements produced by this state of divination or possession, whether in
sleep or while awake. It takes such a man to thoroughly analyze any and all visions
to determine how and for whom they signify some future, past or present good or
evil. This is the reason why it is customary practice to appoint prophets
() to render judgment on an inspired divination. (71e372b1)58
57
58
Though the Ion makes no particular mention of oracular divination, the importance
of divination in the dialogue as a whole and the resolution of the tension between
inspiration and technique which oracular divination provides makes the move irresistible. The connection between poets and seers is affirmed by Socrates in Ap. 22ac, a
dialogue in which the basic model of divination is the Oracle at Delphi (20eff), and
Socrates makes repeated reference to his interpretation of the oracles message. Cp.
Meno 99cd.
The translation is Zeyls in Cooper 1997. On the use of this passage to help understand the nature of poetical inspiration, see Tigerstedt 1969, 712, where the parallel
between poem and oracle is suggested, but not developed. While I am certainly sensitive to worries about using a late dialogue like the Tim. to interpret an early one
like the Ion, the account of divination offered here does not seem connected in any
301
At Delphi, the interprets the fragmentary message uttered by the

divine seer into dactylic hexameter as an ambiguous response,59 which in
turn has to be further interpreted by whoever asked the oracle for help.60
This means that inside the oracle itself, two motions are contained, one
divine and the other technical. Once the oracular response is given to the
petitioner, yet another interpretation must be conducted in order to make
sense of the oracles ambiguous reply. Crucially, the petitioner begins the
whole process by actively seeking out the answer to an important question;
since the petitioner must see something true in the text of the oracles
response to her question and interpret that response, the petitioner and
the oracle engage in a kind of dialogue.
It is worth pausing here to look at the Apology and Socrates own
response to the Oracle at Delphis proclamation to Chaerephon that there
is no one wiser than Socrates (21a68). Socrates considered it to present
a riddle (21b4), was initially at a loss to the gods meaning (21b7), and
then set about an investigation in order to attempt to refute the oracle
(21c1). Socrates thus sought to interpret the oracles meaning and only
after he could not manage to refute the oracles apparent content did he
accept its proclamation as legitimate. Socrates initially assumed that the
oracle means that he is wise in the sense of possessing divine wisdom, and
on that basis approached the supposed experts; but he later came to realize
that there is a human sort of wisdom worth very little that is being
attributed to him (20de; 23aa). Thus, the proper interpretation only
emerged after much testing and inquiry. Socrates claims that the god does
not lie (21b6); however, the authority of the proclamation does not
merely stand on its own.61 Socrates, in short, subjects the oracular pronouncement to rational testing, without which he would have had no real
understanding of the oracles pronouncement and no guidance as to how
59
60
61
way to any of the metaphysical and epistemological views that are characteristic of
the later dialogues and absent in earlier ones. Indeed, it seems implausible that, over
the course of Platos life, the nature of divination had changed so radically that what
he describes as customary later in his life is irrelevant to what he says earlier.
The primary sense of is to be an interpreter of the gods (LSJ s.v.). I did
not translate as interpreter only to avoid seeming as though I were conflating it with . In Zeyls translation, in this passage, is rendered as
interpreter.
See OCD s.v Delphic oracle. This account is controversial with respect to the nature
of the priestesses uttering and thus the nature of the priests translation.
On the debate over Socrates attitude toward the oracles proclamation, see Brickhouse and Smith 1990, 967. They are surely right to see that Socrates does not
merely dismiss the oracle, but I am not in agreement with their larger picture of the
role of the oracle in Socrates mission.
302
Franco V. Trivigno
to respond to the oracle from a practical standpoint, i.e., how to live and
what to do.
How does this account of oracular divination help us to understand
what the Ion suggests about poetry, inspiration and techn? I have argued
that the dialogue, by showing the inadequacy of both the inspired and
technical accounts of poetry, points us in the direction of a combination.
This is not accomplished by the dialogue, but rather suggested by it. Thus,
in attempting to fill in the details of the oracular account, I am inevitably
going beyond what the dialogue explicitly offers.62 I take as my model the
three steps contained in the oracular paradigm, and this model provides
me with a way of understanding the origin of poetry, its value and the
proper way to approach it.
On the view of the origin of good poetry that I am suggesting, steps
one and two are both internal to the poet: the poet plays the role of both
the divine seer and the technical interpreter.63 The Muse inspires the poet,
who must interpret the vision and, using poetic techniques, gives it expression in rhythmic and harmonious verse. Thus, the poet and the Muse are
both, in their own ways, responsible for the poem. The poet may be responsible for any superficial beauty and correctness the poem might have,
but only the Muse can be said to be responsible for a poems deep
beauty.64 This explains how the poets can say many beautiful things without any understanding of what they say (Ap. 22c23).65 Socrates nowhere
denies that the poets say many beautiful things; he even goes so far as to
claim that they say many true things (Meno 99c35). What he denies
consistently is that knowledge can be attributed to them on that basis.
62
63
64
65
As I will show, the fact that the dialogue points to a view without actually articulating it is just what one would expect given the picture of poetry that emerges in the
oracular account. Plato, as author, provides us, his readers, with provocations to philosophical reflection and with avenues of inquiry, but not with clear and decisive final
answers.
Woodruff 1982, 150n.17, considering a view that would assimilate poetry to prophecy, complains that the analogy between poetry and prophecy breaks down. Prophets speak in tongues only a specialist can decipher; but any Greek can make a go
of interpreting Homer. By focusing on the oracles message to the petitioner, as generated in two steps by distinct types of seers, my use of the analogy restores the sense
in which prophetic utterances are accessible to non-experts. Surely anyone can attempt to interpret the oracle at Delphi.
Woodruff 1982, 145, claims that all the beauty of a poem comes from the inspiring
gods. In my view, all of the deep beauty, i.e., truth, comes from the inspiring gods,
while the superficial beauty what Woodruff calls aesthetic beauty may come
from the poet.
Cp. Men. 99b-d. Even if Stern-Gillet 2004, 195, is right that, in the inspired account,
inspiration serves as a kind of stand-in for dearth of explanation, there is still something to be explained, namely the fact that the poets sometimes get it right.
303
Indeed, if we take Socrates to mean deep beauty here, then we have an

explanation for why Plato pays attention to, quotes and analyzes poetry so
frequently in his dialogues.66 On this view, the poets audience must interpret the poetic articulation of the inspired vision to see where its truth
lies, i.e., one must subject the poem to rational scrutiny.67 It is only
through this active process of testing and investigating that the truth of
the poets vision can be accessed by another.
Just as the oracular model requires that the oracles petitioner take
an active role in interpreting the oracles meaning, so too does this model
of poetry require that the audience take an active part in approaching a
work of poetry, determining its meaning and using it in order to seek the
truth. Unlike with the oracle, however, one does not have a guarantee that
there will be some truth in the poem. On the inspired account, only good
poets are inspired (533e), and only when they are writing good poems
(534de).68 It is simply not possible to know ahead of time whether a
poet has been inspired by the Muse, or whether he is merely an inferior
poetic technits.69 The poem itself must be tested, and if a deeper truth
emerges from ones reflections on the poem, only then can we conclude,
66
67
68
69
For the extensiveness of Platos quotation of and reference to poetry, see Tarrant
1951; Halliwell 2000. As Halliwell 2000, 94, puts it, [i]n the case of Plato, an engagement with the culturally powerful texts and voices of poetry is so evident, so
persistent, and so intense as to constitute a major thread running through the entire
fabric of his writing and thinking.
LaDrire 1951, 31, argues that part of the point of the dialogue is to establish that
there is no science of as literary criticism, and further, that no such thing is possible. I
am in full agreement with this. I am not claiming that Plato thinks that one needs a
literary critical techn to understand a poem; rather, he is suggesting that one needs a
philosopher to see whether a poem contains any truth. For Plato, all other considerations are ultimately unimportant. See Trivigno forthcoming.
Given the example of Tynnichus, it seems clear that being inspired in one case does
not imply that one is inspired in all cases. It may very well be that only certain lines
of a poem are inspired. This restriction insulates my account from the kind of criticism that Woodruff 1982, 146, levels, namely, that poets, being mouthpieces of the
gods, should all say the same thing.
Woodruff 1982, 145, considers the possibility that poets have some skills at prosody
or diction but then claims that Plato denies the poets a techn, even of pure style.
He adduces Phdr. 263a in support, but strangely ignores Phdr. 245a: If anyone
comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet by acquiring
expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses madness, he will fail, and his selfcontrolled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been driven out of
their minds. Indeed, the contrast being drawn is explicitly between a poet composing
merely with techn and one composing also with the inspiration of the Muses. On
this issue, see also Janaway 1995, 167, 1689.
304
Franco V. Trivigno
retrospectively as it were, that the poet was inspired when he wrote it.70
Indeed, one must be careful not to confuse merely superficial beauty with
the deeper kind, though this is in practice difficult to do. The value of
poetry consists in its deep beauty and correctness, i.e., in its divinely inspired truth.71 There is, by contrast, little value in technical correctness or
superficial beauty, and its similarity to deep beauty makes its positively
dangerous (more on this below in 4). A poem may very well properly
imitate the charioteer using verses that are harmonious and rhythmic, but
this does not imply that the poem contains any deeper beauty that may be
uncovered by reflection. It should be emphasized that neither in the case
of a poem that has superficial beauty and correctness nor in the case of
one with deep beauty are we warranted in attributing any content-knowledge to the poet. By extension, then, neither the rhapsode nor the audience can be said to have knowledge on the basis of their familiarity with a
poet.
The oracular model, I suggest, shifts the focus away from uncovering
the nature of poetic composition and origin of poetic authority and refocuses attention on the audience of poetry. The process of investigation that
the poem provokes becomes central, and the poet as authority figure recedes. Indeed, to ask about the authority of the poet is to ask the wrong
question because it assumes that poets can be counted on to be reliable
guides to truth. They cannot, and poetry cannot transmit truth to a passively receptive audience.72 Poetry can, however, help us to see matters in a
certain way by sparking an insight, but the truth of the vision is only
accessible to an individual who interprets and critically engages the insight
for herself, in short, who approaches the poem as a philosopher. A work
of poetry, like an oracle, does not wear truth on its sleeves.73 The oracular
model, as I suggested at the outset, is anti-authoritative, and the role of
poetry is subordinate to the pursuit of truth. By encouraging the active
engagement of the audience and downplaying the authority of the poet,
70
71
72
73
This view is consistent generally with Platos use of inspiration, as Woodruff 1982,
139, notices, as a common factor in Platos explanations of human success.
Cp. Moravscik 1982, 30, who claims that according to Plato the objects and products of inspiration have at best instrumental value insofar as they contribute to the
seeking of understanding on higher, more theoretical levels.
Plato is thus attempting to instill in his audience a more critical attitude towards
poetry, while at the same time preserving the idea that, through poetry, one can come
to the truth. The path to the truth involves distrusting the authority of the poets and
subjecting the poetic claims to rigorous philosophical analysis. See Trivigno forthcoming.
One might say that the truth of the poem is not in the poem, but rather discoverable
through the poem. The poem cannot, contra Dorter 1973, 75, directly imitate the
divine; rather, it can provoke a true insight into the divine.
305
this oracular model guards against the danger that poetry might supply
one with a false sense of wisdom, as in the case of Ion. More positively,
poetry can be the impetus to philosophical reflection;74 it can provoke an
insight, but that insight should not be the endpoint of interpretive and
critical reflection but rather a beginning. In this way, poetry can put one
on the quest for wisdom.75
One may have noticed that the rhapsode has vanished from this model. Indeed, on the positive view that I am defending, the rhapsode loses
any importance he might have been thought to possess. Only on one of
the false authoritative models does the rhapsode really have anything to
offer. Indeed, on the oracular model, the rhapsode, one might say, is replaced by the philosopher. However, as I will show in the last section, the
figure of Ion as a rhapsode is crucially important to the critical implications of the dialogue and the threat that taking poetry as authoritative
poses towards ones self-knowledge and identity. This threat is clearest of
all in the portrayal of Ion in the dialogues final section (539e542b).
4 The Philosophical Purpose of the Comic Figure of Ion

Many scholars have noticed that the Ion, amongst Platos dialogues, seems
particularly comedic.76 Woodruff calls the Ion a comic dialogue; Oates,
high comedy; Wilamowitz, an Aristophanean farce.77 The dialogue was
74
75
76
77
To usurp the magnetic ring motif for the oracular account, we might say that a poet,
in turning his audience to philosophy, might inspire them to turn still others. See
Socrates account of his own protreptic task as a philosopher in Ap. 30b-31c; 33d34a; 39c-e. Cp. the account of the statesmans art in Euthyd. (291cff.), which, while
aporetic, at least suggests that one of the tasks of the art is to teach the art to others
who will in turn teach others (292de)
Cp. Symp. 209c6-e4, where Diotima claims that the progeny of Homer and Hesiod
are finer or more beautiful than human children because, as Janaway 1995, 74, puts
it, they give rise to wisdom and excellence. Of course, given the attendant dangers
and the presence of a better, more direct route to wisdom, namely philosophical dialectic, reading poetry will not be a primary method for education. For the methodological debate between Socrates and Protagoras about the value of poetic interpretation, see Prot. 338e348c. In my view, what distinguishes rhapsodic interpretation
from sophistic interpretation is that the former takes the poet to be an actual authority, while the latter only pretends to take the poet as an actual authority, using the
poets words for his own rhetorical purposes, whatever they happen to be. For an
analysis of sophistic interpretation, see Trivigno forthcoming.
There is quite a lot of comedy to be found in Platos dialogues: see e.g., Greene 1920;
Brock 1990.
Woodruff 1983 in the title of the Hackett edition; Oates 1972, 35; Wilamowitz, as
quoted in Tigerstedt 1969, 18
306
Franco V. Trivigno
declared spurious in the 19th century by scholars who could not see how
a work could be both comic and seriously philosophical.78 Despite the
wide acknowledgement of the comic character of the dialogue, no scholar
that I know of has tried to incorporate the comedic elements into a coherent interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. I wish to focus my analysis
on Platos portrayal of Ion as a comic imposter, or , especially as he
appears at the very end of the dialogue (539e542b). One common complaint about the dialogue is that, put bluntly, Ion is just so dumb.79 This
fact has forced scholars to speculate as to the real target of the dialogue, as
Ions stupidity is thought to be unhelpful and even distracting from the
philosophical content of the dialogue. I hope to make some sense of this
with my analysis to show how something philosophically significant is
brought out through the character of Ion.80 In short, the portrayal of Ion
as an imposter shows how treating poets as authorities makes one ridiculous and self-ignorant.
The comic imposter, a standard figure from Old Comedy, is an impudent and absurd pretender who attempts to lay claim to that what he
does not deserve.81 In the Philebus, Socrates defines the ridiculous or the
laughable as a dispositional lack of self-knowledge, most commonly instantiated as a pretension to wisdom (48e). Socrates glosses this condition
as standing in direct opposition to the Delphic inscription to Know thyself (48c69). In Ions case, appealing to Homers authority, the rhapsode
78
79
80
81
Woodruff 1983, 1, 5. For the fallacy involved in the thought that comedy cannot
have serious meaning or intention, see Silk 2000, 31020.
Scholars are fond of claiming that the rhapsodes had a reputation for stupidity in
Platos time, but such claims are not, in my view, very persuasive. The evidence adduced for them comes either from the Ion itself and its portrayal of Ion, or from texts
that have clearly been influenced by the Ion, like Xen. Symp. Indeed, in Symp. 3.6,
the character Antisthenes suggestion (along with Niceratus agreement) that no
group of people is more stupid than the rhapsodes seems to have played a unduly
prominent role in the historical reception of the rhapsodes. The power of Platos
comic portrayal of Ion, coupled with the absence of any contravening evidence, seems
to have been the decisive factor.
Tigersted 1969, 189, rightly sees Ion as a figure from comedy, but does not pursue
this point in his interpretation. Ranta, 1967, 2226, also sees Ion as playing the role
of the imposter, but his analysis remains at the level of the dramatic and does integrate this function into the larger philosophical content of the dialogue.
Cornford 1961, 122. On the imposter generally, see Conford 1961, 11533. Cp.
Arist. EN. 1108a2022; 1127a13b32; EE 1124a2425; Theophr. Char. 23. One
finds a definition in pseudo-Pl. Def. 416a1011:
. (Being an imposter is the state of pretending to a good
or some goods which are undeserved). Cornford 1961, 120, further claims that the
imposter is exposed by an ironist, who masks his cleverness under a show of clownish
dullness. Though it is tempting to pursue the association of Socrates as ironist, I will
let it pass here. On Socrates as ironist, see Ranta 1967, 2202; Vlastos 1991.
307
falsely believes himself to be wise. Socrates exposes this lack of self-knowledge, first by ironically submitting to Ions authority through ironic praise
(530b5c6), and then by undermining that authority through the failed
attempts to explain it. Both the technical and inspired accounts subtly
mocked Ion the first by insisting that he possessed far more knowledge
than possible, the second by making him out to be insane. Throughout
the dialogue, Socrates attempts to subvert Ions false self-conception, generated by his purported access to the authority of Homeric wisdom; in my
view, he does not do this simply to expose and mock Ion but rather to
open up for him the possibility of self-knowledge and thus philosophy.
Plato, by letting us see what Ion in the end does not see that his claim
to wisdom makes him absurd cautions us against taking his dialogues as
authoritative sources of wisdom and rather asks us to take them as an
invitation to philosophy.82
In the last section of the dialogue, the arguments take on a pointedly
ad hominem character, with Socrates trying to get Ion finally to think for
himself. When Socrates tries to force Ion to take ownership of his views
by pointing out that he holds logically incompatible claims, Ion simply
shifts his position. When asked what Homeric passages are appropriate for
a rhapsode to judge, Ion initially says every single one of them (536e);
and even after Ion has conceded that some passages are the provenance
of technical experts, he still claims to be an expert concerning all of the
[passages] in Homer (539e6). An exasperated Socrates exclaims: No, Ion!
You do not say, All of them! (539e7), pointing out the contradiction.
Socrates then mockingly supposes that Ion has forgotten what he has just
agreed to but, recalling a similar barb in Hippias Major, rescinds it immediately: It wouldnt be fitting for a rhapsode to be forgetful! (539e79).83
When Socrates reminds Ion that, on Ions own view (540a6), there are
passages that fall outside of the rhapsodes expertise, Ion attempts to marginalize these passages by casting them as exceptions; as Socrates points
out, these exceptions extend throughout the entirety of the Homeric corpus, which, as we saw, deals with everything (540b).
Socrates fails to get Ion to take a stand, and the latter grasps at yet
another position, claiming to know whats fitting to say for a man or a
woman, or for a slave or a free man, or for a follower or a leader (540b3).
We begin to see here that the problem is not merely that Ion cannot stake
out a philosophical position, but that his professional obsession has left
him with an identity problem. He is, in a way, the sum of the characters
82
83
This is not to vacate the dialogues of positive philosophical content, but rather to
insist that the content is partial and that it is up to us, Platos audience, to follow the
philosophical paths that the dialogue leaves unexplored.
Cp. HipMa. 285e; HipMi. 369a.
308
Franco V. Trivigno
he plays, but only in the most superficial way. He does not seem to understand the distinction between knowing what someone would say and possessing the knowledge that makes what is said appropriate. Thus, in this
final attempt to formulate his expertise, Ion comes across as most absurd.
Though admitting that he would not know what navigator, doctor, cowherd and woolworker should say, when asked whether he would know
what a general should say, Ion jumps on it: Yes! The rhapsode will know
that sort of thing (540d23). He claims that the generals techn and the
rhapsodes are identical, but naturally enough refuses the implication
that all good generals are good rhapsodes. Since he is the best rhapsode in
Greece, Ion agrees that he must also be the best general in Greece:
S: Are you also a general, Ion? Are you the best in Greece?
I: Know it well, Socrates this too I learned from Homers poetry! (541b35)
Socrates seizes upon this with a wickedly ironic rebuke: Why in the name
of all that is holy, if you are both the best general and the best rhapsode,
do you bother to go around Greece rhapsodizing when you could be leading an army? (541b68). Ions response, that his hometown of Ephesus is
ruled by Athens and that the Athenians and Spartans think they are adequate to the task, implies that he would be willing to fight for either of
the two main powers locked in a war for nearly 30 years.84
Socrates provides some examples of foreign generals fighting for
Athens and proceeds to compare Ion to Proteus:85
Really, you are just like Proteus; you twist up and down and take many different
shapes, until finally youve escaped me altogether by turning yourself into a general,
so as to avoid proving how wonderfully wise you are about Homer.
(541e6542a1)
In the Odyssey, Proteus takes all sorts of different forms in order to scare
off anyone trying to ask him a question (4.385ff.). Socrates charge against
Ion is obviously apt; Ion has endorsed and dropped positions without the
slightest hesitation. He has explicitly endorsed inconsistent claims, and his
thoughtlessness extends to that most important question of who he is. By
claiming to be a general, Ion has simply continued a trend that he started
at the beginning of the dialogue. Ion has no self-knowledge; worse, he
84
85
Apollodorus of Cyzicus, Phanosthenes of Andros and Heraclides of Clazomenae.

Nails 2002, 316, uses this passage to set the dramatic date of the dialogue at 413,
after the Sicilian disaster but before the Ionian revolt of 412, after which Ephesus
was no longer under Athenian control: according to Nails, the reason that Athens
began using foreign generals had to do with the acute shortage of leadership, materials and manpower after the Sicilian disaster.
For the use of Proteus as a metaphor for constantly shifting ones ground, cp. Euthyph. 15d; Euthd. 288b.
309
hardly has a stable self-conception.86 This is because of his shallow and

unreflective relationship to himself. Ion cannot engage in a proper dialogue because he will not offer his own views; instead, he consistently relies
on the authority of Homer. The one thing he emphatically claims to
know about himself is his superior and exclusive expertise with respect to
Homer (533c).
Ions particular self-ignorance embodies two distinct tendencies: as
rhapsode, Ion plays a dual role of both interpreter and performer. As performer, Ions self-conception is determined by his rhapsodic performances;
he thus mistakes himself for the characters he imitates.87 Through his ability to plausibly reproduce various characters for his audience, Ion convinces himself that he is adequate to the tasks for which they are genuinely
qualified. Not only does this harm his self-knowledge but it proves problematic for the stability of his very identity. As interpreter, Ion lets his conception of the world be dictated to him by Homer, thus losing himself in
the world of the poet.88 Just as he persuasively reproduces his characters
for his own audience as performer, so too does Homers poetry persuasively recreate the world to which Ion lays claim as interpreter. His passivity with respect to the authority of Homer makes him an imposter, a
laughable figure who is simply incapable of thinking for himself.
Though neither the technical nor inspired accounts were satisfactory,
Ion cannot escape the dilemma: he endorses the technical account until
reduced to aporia (533c) and the inspired account until he understands
that it makes him into a kind of lunatic (536d); but then he simply re-
86
87
88
Woolf 1997, 189, finds in the Ion a theory of the self whereby only knowledge
qualifies one for selfhood. A core piece of evidence for this theory is to be found in
the comparison to Proteus. It seems much more plausible and true to Platos text to
see Ions lack of a stable identity in his deferential relationship to Homers poetry
rather than in his lack of a techn, as Woolf 1997, 1956, would have it. Further,
Woolfs view has a clearly unacceptable implication, namely, that carpenters and all
manner of technits possess selfhood, while Socrates himself, famously lacking in
knowledge, is, to use Woolfs own elegant phrase, a nobody.
An anonymous reviewer has suggested that the expertise peculiar to the rhapsode is
surely his facility in performance. As I argue above, the technical account makes no
mention of performance, while Ions clearheaded state during his performances is one
argument against the inspired account. In the end, however, it is the rhapsodes knack
for imitative performance that puts his very identity in question; given the criteria
for what constitutes a techn, such a thing could never qualify as genuine expertise.
See Pappas 1989, 3856, who calls this aspect of Ions ignorance perverse and
charges the rhapsode with choosing ignorance over knowledge. While I agree that
Ion turns his back on a search for truth based on the authority of Homer, it is less
clear to me that this is particularly perverse. Given the prominent role of Homer in
education, the tendency in Ion to look to Homer for guidance, while certainly exaggerated in Ion, is surely not exclusive to him.
310
Franco V. Trivigno
verts to the technical model, which he abandons for the inspired model
again at the very end of the dialogue (542b). At the end, Socrates presents
Ion with the choice: either he is divine or unjust. If Ion has a techn, he
should be able to give an explanation of it; since he does not, Ion is either
unjust (because he refuses) or he is unable (in which case he has no techn
but is divine). Ion replies, Its much lovelier [] to be thought divine (542b12). This final response shows that Ion ultimately does not
care whether either account is true he only cares about the extent to
which each justifies his special claim to authority. Here we see the ambiguity of in play again, and it is clear that Ions own ideas about
beauty only amount to the most superficial kind of estheticism. Not only
is Ion not oriented toward the deeper beauty of truth, but because his
passive submission to the authority of Homer has left him unable to think
for himself, he cannot see any other alternatives, much less begin to formulate them.
As the dialogues in general amply attest, there are many paths to selfignorance and many purported authorities promising wisdom. Platos use
of comic technique in drawing Ions character reveals Ion as a pretender
to wisdom with no self-knowledge. Ion becomes a ridiculous figure at
whom we are meant to laugh. But the laughter is hopefully not without
philosophical fruit. When we laugh, we negatively assess Ion for his lack
of self-knowledge. More importantly, the laughter can remind us to take
the opportunity to reflect on ourselves in order to ensure that we do not
fall prey to the same seduction. Indeed, we are invited to see some of our
own attitudes towards Homer and poetry reflected in the character of
Ion.89 In showing us the figure of Ion as a comic imposter, and tying his
lack of self-knowledge explicitly to an inauthentic relationship to Homers
89
There is a danger here, as Nehamas 1998, 48, points out. If Plato puts an insurmountable gap between his readers and the interlocutors, then this might actually harm
them. Nehamas thinks it does: he claims that Plato uses irony as a means for lulling
the dialogues readers into the very self-complacency it makes them denounce. It is
deep, dark, and disdainful. In my view, Plato evades this danger through what Miller
1999, 2569, calls mimetic irony, i.e., the partial identification of the audience with
the interlocutor. While we are surely not meant to identify with Ion fully, we surely
are meant to recognize certain tendencies in ourselves that are caricatured in Ion, e.g.,
the admiration of great poets. Blondell 2002, 8893, attempts to refute Millers notion on the grounds that it would be morally dangerous for the readers to identify
with the interlocutors at all. She rather claims that readers are meant to disapprove
of all but Socrates. Blondells criticism, in my view, assumes an over-strong sense of
identification. The reader might partially identify with the interlocutor without
much risk. I doubt that there is any danger in understanding, from a first personal
perspective, Ions love of Homer Socrates himself admits to loving Homer in the
Rep. (595b-c). Without some such partial identification at work, it is hard to see how
Platos pedagogical aims could get a foothold in his audience.
311
poetry, Plato shows us precisely how not to read to his own dialogues. Ion
passes on Socrates invitation to philosophy. We should not make the
same mistake with Platos.
5 Conclusion
I hope to have resolved the three interpretive difficulties I mentioned at
the outset. First, both poetry and rhapsody are targets of the dialogue, but
the core target is the conception of the poets as authorities. Second, the
comic presentation of Ion has a philosophical purpose, namely, portraying
the deleterious effects on ones character, if one takes the poets as authorities. Third, the dialogue endorses neither the technical nor the inspired
accounts, because they both make poetry out to be authoritative, but
rather gestures toward an oracular model which is anti-authoritative. Good
poetry is oriented toward provoking a critical, philosophical reaction in its
audience, and it would seek to avoid being cited as an authoritative store
of wisdom. The Platonic dialogue, I suggest, is the exemplar of this conception of good poetry insofar as it attempts to inspire in its audience
critical examination rather than passive acceptance. It aims, in short, at a
philosophical response.90 Any interpretation of Plato that takes what the
dialogues try to show us as provocations for serious philosophical inquiry
is prima facie an interpretation in the spirit of the dialectical nature of the
dialogues. The dialogues point us not in the direction of their author, but
right back to ourselves. They invite us to follow the philosophical tracks
that Plato has left us in his dialogue in order to seek the truth.
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Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

apeiron, vol. 45, pp. 283313

Brought to you by | provisional account

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

1 The Technical Account

On this account, the rhapsode is an interpreter, a : the word is

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

art of poetry as a whole, as Socrates contends in this section (532c89).18

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

2 The Inspired Account

On the indeterminate scope of Ions alleged expertise as a defeating feature of his

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

See Murray 1996, 121. See also Partee 1971.

In the inspired account, we find a preponderance of words relating to

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

Third, Ion presents a counterexample when he claims to notice the

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

amplifying the core components of the view to absurdity, Socrates mocks

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

Whether Homer speaks (correctly) or not, would this be diagnosed

In asking whether a doctor would diagnose whether Homer speaks

Socrates asks if the rhapsode or the fisherman would know whether in

Lesky 1963, 64.

overlap in an incidental way (a technically correct imitation that happens

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

3.2 Two Kinds of Divination

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

At Delphi, the interprets the fragmentary message uttered by the

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

Indeed, if we take Socrates to mean deep beauty here, then we have an

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

4 The Philosophical Purpose of the Comic Figure of Ion

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

Apollodorus of Cyzicus, Phanosthenes of Andros and Heraclides of Clazomenae.

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

hardly has a stable self-conception.86 This is because of his shallow and

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

Cooper, J.M. (ed.) 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Brought to you by | provisional account

Techn, Inspiration and Comedy in Platos Ion

Brought to you by | provisional account

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