What Socrates Knew

Daniel W. Graham

Thus came about the end, O Echecrates, of our companion, the man, we
should say, who of all those we knew of his generation was most noble
and wisest and most just. (Phd 118al5-18)

Of all the paradoxes associated with Socrates, perhaps none is more

deeply rooted in the life and death of the man himself than the problem
of whether he was, in his own terms, virtuous. By both his portrayals
and his testimony, Plato makes him a paragon of virtue. On the other
hand, Socrates' own principles seem to make philosophical wisdom a
prerequisite of virtue. And Socrates notoriously claims to have no special
wisdom. Was Socrates virtuous because of his being a philosopher, or
rather in spite of or independently of his philosophical theory? Or, to put
it another way, was Socrates philosophically virtuous or simply conventionally virtuous? The answer to the question seems to depend crucially
on what Socrates knew.
Consider three characteristics of Socrates' philosophy, method and
life:
Disavowal of Knowledge (DK). Socrates has no special
knowledge.
VK.

Virtue is knowledge.

SV.

Socrates is virtuous.

These three points seem to be incompatible. If Socrates has no special

knowledge, and if virtue is knowledge, then Socrates is not virtuous; if

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26 Daniel W. Graham

he has no special knowledge but yet is virtuous, then virtue must not be
knowledge; if virtue is knowledge and Socrates is virtuous, then he must
have knowledge. Thus DK and VK entail not-SV; DK and SV entail
not-VK; while VK and SV entail not-DK. Clearly some sort of revision
of the list is needed, or some point or points must be reinterpreted or
qualified if we are to arrive at a consistent interpretation of Socrates' life
and teachings. Several options may be considered a priori. It may be that
Socrates is only feigning ignorance and that in reality he has a well
worked out theory which would count as philosophical knowledge and
which would qualify him as having philosophical virtue and hence as
being virtuous. It may be that the apparently stringent claim that virtue
is knowledge, when properly interpreted, points to something much less
idealized than perfect theoretical knowledge, so that even with a modest
amount of knowledge, Socrates can be virtuous. Finally, it may be that
DK and VK should be taken at face value, and that Socrates is indeed
lacking in virtue, at least in the kind of virtue he seeks to attain, namely
that based on philosophical wisdom. There is some prima facie plausibility in each of these options, and they all deserve, no doubt, to be
explored in detail. However, I shall not undertake to pursue any of these
courses. I wish to suggest that all three of the principles in question are
true in some important sense. But when we understand them, we shall
see that they are all compatible.

II

We can take it as a datum that Socrates is virtuous. As he says on his own

behalf at his trial,
Throughout my whole life, in whatever acts I have done in public, I
have manifestly behaved as I have in private, never consenting to
injustice by anyone, much less to injustice by any of those whom my
slanderers claim are my disciples. (Ap 33al-5)

However apologetic Socrates may be about his reputation for wisdom,

he finds nothing to repent of in his actions, whether public or private.
His behavior has been above reproach (he gives examples at 32aff. and
28e). The question at hand is whether his behavior is grounded in theory
whether he is philosophically virtuous in some important sense. It
will remain a further question whether Socrates thinks, all things considered, that he is a philosophically virtuous person by his own stand-

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What Socrates Knew 27

ards. For now let us concentrate on the question whether we think he is

philosophically virtuous by our standards. I propose that we consider
two criteria for philosophical virtue.
(i) A philosophically virtuous person acts on the basis of ethical
principles. It will not be enough to be philosophically virtuous that one
should act in such a way that some good outcome result from his action.
One could achieve such a result by chance or by whim or for evil or selfish
or self-serving reasons. Minimally one should act on the basis of some
kind of recognizable principle. We need not require that the principle or
principles in question be rules: the act utilitarian may well qualify as a
philosophically virtuous person even though he acts not on a rule per se,
but by subjecting an individual act to a philosophical principle. But that
principle does have objective value as at least an allegedly general basis
for evaluating acts that any potential agent could invoke. The important
thing is that the principle in question purport to offer an objective basis
for moral action that does not amount to a mere personal preference on
the agent's part.
(ii) The ethical principles referred to by the agent must be appealed
to on the basis of philosophical reasons. Imagine for instance that I am
virtuous because I adhere to the principle that one should always do unto
others as one would have done unto oneself. I could adhere to that
principle either because it was commanded by Jesus in the Sermon on
the Mount, or because it was equivalent to the Categorical Imperative
enunciated by Kant. An action based on the principle would, I assume,
be virtuous in either case. But in the former case I would not be said to
be philosophically virtuous, but religiously virtuous. In the latter case I
might be philosophically virtuous. Note, however, that even in the latter
case, I might be less than philosophically virtuous if, for instance, I did
not understand a word of Kant, did not know what the Categorical
Imperative was, and did not have any theoretical ability to explain,
defend, or otherwise evaluate the theory behind the principle. I might,
for instance, have been impressed by a follower of Kant and wish to
become a disciple without any philosophical equipment to understand
the theory for myself. At that point I would accept the principle of
treating others always as ends, but I would accept it on authority; I would
not have philosophical reasons for adhering to it. Thus rather than
holding to an ethical principle for philosophical reasons, I might hold to
it for various other reasons: religious faith, the recommendation of some
recognized authority, tradition, social constraint, et cetera.
If, on the other hand, I act on the basis of an ethical principle, and I
adhere to the principle for philosophical reasons, I would seem to have

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28 Daniel W. Graham

at least a prima facie case for being philosophically virtuous. Now it may
be that on reflection we shall put further stipulations on philosophical
virtue. But for now it seems desirable not to restrict unduly the notion
of philosophical virtue. Our preliminary specification provides the
means of an evaluation of Socrates' behavior relative to his principles.
The best test case of Socrates' virtue is perhaps the Crito, where
Socrates is faced with an ethical choice of his own to make: should he
accept Crito's invitation to break out of jail, or should he remain to be
executed? There is no conventional interest to be served by his remaining
in prison. He has had his trial; there is no appeal, no hope of his sentence
being commuted, no personal benefit (as Plato presents it) to his remaining no life insurance policy or state death benefit. Crito aims to save
Socrates from personal harm that will come to him by remaining. To
Crito's urgent pleas Socrates replies,
Let us consider whether we should do this or not, as I am not now for
the first time but always committed to follow none of my own inclinations but only the argument1 which seems to me to be most reasonable.
(Cn46b3-6)

In what follows Socrates makes it clear that he has a well-worked-out

position on the matter from which Crito must dissuade him if he will
convince him to flee prison. Socrates directly asks Crito whether he
thinks Socrates should abandon (ekballeiri)2 his principles now that he is
in trouble. But clearly Socrates will abandon them only if Crito can
advance some powerful reasons that will contradict his own established
principles.
There is no need to rehearse Socrates' argument. But I would like to
point out a few crucial moments in the argument. After distinguishing
between the many and the expert craftsman, Socrates asks whose advice
we should follow. Clearly that of the expert, who, because he has
knowledge, will counsel us to our benefit and not to our harm. "Thus we
should not/ Socrates concludes, 'consider what the many will say to us,

1 Bumet ad he translates 'rule'. But as the understood cognate accusative of

(line 6) the noun seems the carry more of the sense of the verb.
2 With the sense of 'throw overboard' as Bumet ad loc notes: threatened with shipwreck one may be forced to lighten ship; but the act, Aristotle notes, is ultimately
voluntary (EN HI, 1110a8-14).

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What Socrates Knew 29

but what the expert on justice and injustice will say, the one and truth
herself' (48a5-7). It becomes clear in what follows that Socrates is not
invoking some flesh-and-blood expert here, but only truth herself, which
will appear only in the conclusion of the argument. Socrates does not
seek an ex cathedra announcement from a self-proclaimed moral expert,
but the results of an elenctic examination.
Having dismissed the concerns of the many, Socrates presents an
ethical principle for Crito's approval: it is always bad to do wrong (49b).
Furthermore, to do wrong in return for a wrong is likewise bad (49b-c).
And there is no difference between harming someone and doing wrong
(49c). After inviting Crito to consider carefully whether he agrees with
these principles, and offering to discuss them if Crito demurs, Socrates
goes on to lay them down as the basis for a discussion about whether he
should flee prison or not. Subsequently, Socrates himself is subjected to
an elenchus conducted by the imaginary persona of the Laws of Athens
(SOaff.), who argues that Socrates would be harming and doing wrong
to the laws if he should escape from prison. Clearly the notion of an
ethical principle is prominent and central to the whole deliberation here.
If Socrates can escape prison only by violating his ethical principles, he
is not justified in fleeing. Socrates' decision is based on his ethical
principles.
But what is his relation to those principles? Does he hold them for
religious reasons, on the basis of authority, the mos maiorum, or some
other non-philosophical justification? Apparently not; consider his appeal to Crito: have held these views for a long time and I still hold them;
but if you have some other view, speak and instruct me. On the other
hand, if you hold to your former views, listen to my next point' (49el-3).
Why has Socrates held these views for a long time? If they come to him
merely by tradition or habit, they will not serve as ethical principles held
for philosophical reasons. But it appears that Socrates has at least two
reasons for holding these views, both philosophical. In the first place, he
has just argued that if life is not worth living with one's body ruined,
inasmuch as the soul is more valuable than the body, a fortiori life is not
worth living with the soul ruined (47c ff.). Further, the only way to live
well is to live justly, i.e., to do what justice demands (48b ff.).
Thus Socrates has an argument to show that it is always best to do
justice rather than to harm or do injustice; and that argument specifically
provides a reply to Crito's concern about death: it is better to live well
than just to live, it is better to care for the soul than for the body. Yet
Socrates offers to Crito the opportunity to test his views if he has now
embraced some moral principles other than those he has shared with

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30 Daniel W. Graham

Socrates. The test would be, of course, an elenctic examination. And if

that is what Socrates has in mind, he will hold his principles precisely
because they have stood up to elenctic scrutiny over a period of many
years. He will hold them for philosophical reasons.
If the argument of the Crito itself seems too much driven by prudential
considerations, we may note that Socrates has available another argument that does not appeal to the welfare of the soul. This argument
depends purely on logical and ethical considerations. In Republic I Socrates defends precisely the view discussed in the Crito, that it is never
right to harm or do wrong to anyone. In examining Polemarchus' Simonidean definition of justice as rendering to each his due, Socrates
leads him to interpret the definition as requiring that we should harm
the unjust and benefit the just (334d). But Socrates goes on to argue that
to harm is to make something worse, to make something worse is to
damage it with respect to its appropriate virtues, i.e., to make an unjust
person worse is to make him more unjust, and hence on this account it
will be just to promote injustice surely a contradictory conclusion
(335). Thus Socrates has available a philosophical argument to establish
precisely the ethical principle that he shares with Crito. It can be defended elenctically, and has been defended in the dialogues. As far as
we see, there is no other reason for accepting the principle of not harming
others: the negation of the principle simply leads to a contradiction.
Thus far, then, we see that Socrates' deliberation on a moral question
of the greatest importance, both for Socrates' future and for his personal
integrity, is founded on ethical principles grounded in philosophical
reasons. Whether his principles are right or not, whether they are ultimate, whether they form part of a coherent moral philosophy, these
questions we may leave for another occasion. What is important for our
purposes is that we see Socrates acting as a moral agent inspired by
philosophical principles. He is, it appears, acting in accordance with his
best philosophical understanding when he makes a choice to accept
death rather than life because the argument, and truth herself, require it.
We should say, accordingly, that Socrates is philosophically virtuous
by our standards. Is he philosophically virtuous by his own standards?
More would need to be established to verify the assertion that he is.
Among other things, we would have to understand better what Socrates
demands of the philosophically virtuous person. If we are right in
attributing the thesis that virtue is knowledge to Socrates, we will
eventually have to understand what Socrates understands by 'knowledge' in the relevant sense. Here I shall not attempt to answer directly
the question of what Socrates understands by philosophical virtue. But

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What Socrates Knew 31

in what follows, I hope to provide some indirect evidence that will

suggest an answer to the question.

Ill

In the Apology Socrates professes to have only a small advantage over

other individuals: he has 'a sort of wisdom' which is best regarded as
Imman wisdom' (20d7-8). He recounts how, spurred on by the oracle
that said no one was wiser than he, he discovered his advantage in
comparing himself to politicians:
It is likely that neither of us has any special knowledge [
]3 but this fellow thinks he knows something when he does not,
whereas I, inasmuch as I do not know anything, do not think I do know
anything. So I am probably a tiny bit wiser than he by this very fact,
that what I do not know I do not think I know. (21d3-7)

Socrates concludes that by saying no one is wiser than Socrates, the

oracle must mean that he is wisest who knows that his wisdom is
worthless (23a-b). Socrates does not claim to know absolutely nothing,
but what he does seem to hold is that whatever wisdom he has consists
in knowing his own limitations and in avoiding the delusions of wisdom
others are prone to.
At the same time Socrates is professing to have a very humble sort of
wisdom, Plato portrays him as a man of exceptional valor. His acts of
courage seem to be in part a matter of public record: he did not flee in
panic at the rout at Delium (La 181b, Smp 221aff.). He stood up to the
whole assembly when he was a president of the senate during the trial
of the ten generals, refusing to allow an unconstitutional trial he was
almost lynched for his action (Ap 32b-c). And when he was ordered by
the Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leon of Salamis, he went home without
complying, at the risk of his own life (Ap 32c-3). The dialogues add some
striking examples of courageous behavior: Socrates will not entertain an
offer to stop philosophizing in return for his freedom or his life (Ap 29d,
30b-c). And, as we have seen, he will not cooperate with Crito's plan to

3 The term here does not mean 'noble' or the like; see Bumet ad loc, contrary to the
treatment of the passage in LSJ, s.v. .

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32 Daniel W. Graham

arrange a jail break, even though the consequence will be his own death.
Do these actions have a causal connection with Socrates' philosophical
theory and method? Are the theory and the life merely accidental conjuncts, or does the theory somehow dictate the behavior?
One salient feature in Socrates' response to moral challenges is his
refusal to consider the threat of death as a motive. In opposing the
unconstitutional trial of the ten generals, Socrates observes, thought it
better to take my chances on the side of the law and justice rather than
to side with you when you were seeking injustice, for fear of prison or
death' (Ap 32b8-c3). In the Crito Socrates explicitly rejects the threat of
death as a motive: 'we must not consider whether we shall die if we
remain here and keep quiet, or whether we shall suffer any other
misfortune, but only whether we shall be doing wrong/ (Cri 48d3-5).
There seems to be an incommensurability between considerations of
death and personal misfortune, on the one hand, and considerations of
right and wrong, on the other. Considerations of the latter sort always
outweigh considerations of the former sort and render them, if not
irrelevant, at least impotent.
But why should considerations of right and wrong outweigh considerations of death and life? There is a brief but illuminating hint in the
Apology: 'To fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else but to seem to be wise
when you are not' (29a4-6). Socrates adds, by way of explanation, 'it is
to think you know what you do not know' (a6). He goes on to say that
no one knows whether death is the greatest good. For Socrates the
question what value, negative or positive, death has for an individual,
is unanswerable: we do not have the information necessary to make such
a judgment. But those who do, de facto, make the judgment that death
is the greatest evil, make an unjustifiable assumption. Socrates is discussing his behavior in battle and in other situations of danger; he remarks
that if he deserts the post he has been assigned to by the oracle now, he
will be acting in as cowardly a manner as if he deserted his place in the
phalanx. The desertion itself is for Socrates evidence of a tacit belief: the
belief that death is more terrible than disobedience. It is to take as a
certainty the fact that death is a great (perhaps the greatest) evil a fact
that reflection shows we cannot know.
Here is a case in which one's awareness of one's own ignorance might
make a significant difference in one's behavior. If to act rationally is to
calculate for oneself the benefits and disadvantages of a proposed action,
and then to act so as to maximize the benefits and to minimize the
disadvantages, then it will matter a great deal what factors are allowed
into the calculation. In conventional valuations, life and death normally

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What Socrates Knew 33

seem to command the greatest attention. Traditionally the death penalty

is attached as punishment to the most grievous crimes and the citizen's
right to life is protected by the threat of death. If, however, one were to
rule out considerations of life and death, other factors would immediately increase in significance for deliberation. If, furthermore, it is rational to take into account in deliberations only those factors which one
knows to be beneficial or harmful, and if the value of life and death are
unknowable, then we effectively rule out the consideration of life and
death. Ignorance in this case invalidates an important factor for moral
deliberation. And awareness of one's ignorance changes fundamentally
the basis for making decisions in precisely those cases in which the threat
of death is a factor.
Now the awareness that one did not know the value of life and death
would fall short of some ultimate philosophical wisdom. Such wisdom
would be able to discern, either in particular cases or in general, what
the value of life and death was. One might, then, regard the acknowledgment of ignorance in the present case as a shortcoming. On the other
hand, to pretend to know the value of life and death when one had no
knowledge would, for the reflective moral agent, constitute culpable
ignorance. It would be better to have the ultimate philosophical wisdom;
but in the absence of such wisdom, it would behoove one to acknowledge
his ignorance and to proceed to enter into moral deliberations considering only those factors that one knew to be relevant. At the same time,
those who, whether reflectively or unreflectively, admitted life to be the
greatest good and death to be the greatest evil, would deliberate using
a different and incompatible set of principles. Conventionally we call a
soldier who flees his post in battle a coward. Philosophically we could
identify his moral failure as arising from a cognitive failure: the failure
to recognize what he did not know, whether death was an evil. It begins
to appear that moral failure might be caused by unfounded beliefs.
Assuming that at least one large and important class of moral actions
are unfavorably influenced by unjustified beliefs, one has a clue as to
how to reform moral life. One must replace false or unjustified beliefs
with true beliefs. We might also observe that one special genus of beliefs
is more troublesome than the others, namely that involving predications
of good and evil.4 We are prone to assume without further ado that some

4 Euthphr7b-d

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34 Daniel W. Graham

things are evil and some things are good because of, say, instinctive fears
and attractions. Death is evil, life is good; pain is evil, pleasure is good;
poverty is evil, wealth is good; sickness is evil, health is good; weakness
is evil, power is good, et cetera. Now some of these judgments may be
true, but some may be false, and others may be indeterminate given our
present state of knowledge. What would be truly dangerous for moral
calculations would be to assume these judgments without proper reflection. Other beliefs, e.g., those about the facts of a situation, could also, of
course, cloud our ability to make correct moral judgments. But factual
beliefs would presumably be more amenable to revision and their failures more quick to be recognized than those about the very values on
which the judgments were made in the first place. Evaluative beliefs
would be among the most hidden and the most intransigent. Hence the
possibility of moral reform might well hinge on the ability to identify
and correct evaluative beliefs.
Let us take one step farther. Suppose that not only some, but all moral
failures were ultimately traceable to erroneous beliefs; and that all
vicious behavior was due to the acceptance (tacit or otherwise) of false
or indeterminate evaluative beliefs. In this case, all moral failure would
amount to thinking one knew what one did not know. The remedy for
such a defect would consist in the replacement of false or indeterminate
beliefs with true ones. Wisdom, in other words, would consist of one's
knowledge of what judgments one was entitled to and what one was not
entitled to in particular, what evaluative judgments one was entitled
to. Obviously, the small advantage Socrates had over his contemporaries
would loom very large indeed. Socrates would have found the key to the
moral law, and with it, moral autonomy.
Does Socrates, however, consistently appeal to a principle of choosing
goods over evils and indeterminates? Consider his reasoning concerning
proposing a counter-penalty to death:
Being convinced that I do not wrong anyone, I am certainly not going
to wrong myself and accuse myself of being worthy of some evil and
to propose such a punishment for myself. What am I supposed to be
afraid of? That I should suffer the punishment Meletus proposes for
me, one I maintain I do not know whether it is good or evil? Instead
should I choose as my punishment something that I know perfectly well
is an evil? (Ap 37b2-8)

Socrates carefully threads his way through the possibilities by calculating what things he knows are good, what things are evil, and what things

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What Socrates Knew 35

are indeterminate. Based on this train of reasoning, Socrates rejects some
alternatives that might save him from the death penalty and chooses a
fine i.e., a payment of money, a commodity that Socrates has shown
himself to be supremely indifferent to. He is not, as some commentators
from Xenophon on have suggested,5 flirting with death as a quick way
out. Nothing could be farther from the truth: he is dismissing death as a
relevant consideration and asking what punishment would be appropriate, whatever the reaction of the judges may be to his proposal. The
present passage confirms Socrates' adherence to the principle that one
should take into account only known goods and evils. Here as in the Crito
and earlier in the Apology questions of life and death are expressly ruled
out of court.
Notice how strong is the principle of dismissing indeterminate values.
If one could indeed calculate how to act without bringing into account
one's own life and death, as Socrates so blithely assumes one could, there
would be no motivation to flee from battle, to desert one's post, to back
down from the mob, to give in to the tyrant's unlawful command. The
threat, uttered or tacit, if you do not comply, we shall put you to death would
carry no weight. Of course the threat of death would not necessarily be
the impediment to virtues other than courage. But some similar belief
may be found. The belief that we should harm those who harm us or
who are our enemies might be the source of injustice. But philosophical
reflection shows us that it is never right to do wrong, and never right to
harm (Cri 49b-c). Here the interfering belief is not only indeterminate, it
is false, as can be demonstrated by an elenctic examination (Rep I,
335b-d). Without the offending belief, we have no motive to harm and
we become just. To be unjust is only to think you are wise when you are
not to think you know something you do not, namely, that it is right
to do harm to enemies. Similarly the incorrect belief that pleasure is the
greatest good might interfere with one's ability to make personal choices;
to lack the belief would be to exemplify the virtue of prudence.
This may be precisely what Socrates has in mind when he says that
he has only one small advantage over his allegedly wise contemporaries.
That small advantage is enough to ground the claim that Socrates has a
kind of knowledge; and that kind of knowledge seems to be productive
of the type of state of character Socrates has. In sum, it would appear that

5 Xenophon Apology 6-9,27,32.

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36 Daniel W. Graham

Socrates himself has the grounds for admitting that he is virtuous, indeed
philosophically virtuous.
Evidently, we have arrived at an interpretation in which DK is true,
for Socrates does not have a certain kind of knowledge; in which VK is
true, for Socrates' awareness that he lacks a certain kind of knowledge
keeps him from making a certain kind of unwarranted assumption
which would lead to moral failure; and in which SV is true, for Socrates'
moral choices are based on moral principles derived from philosophical
reasoning based on the knowledge which blocks erroneous beliefs and
hence errors of moral judgment. Indeed, on this interpretation it turns
out that the conjunction of DK and VK, far from being incompatible with
SV, actually entails that principle. Socrates does the right thing not by
chance, because of religious conviction, trust in authority or tradition, or
because of an innate disposition or good moral training, but by knowledge. The relevant knowledge presupposes a kind of ignorance: Socrates
knows what he does not know; he knows the limits of his moral knowledge. He has second-order knowledge of first-order ignorance.6 Precisely because he has knowledge of his own ignorance, he avoids falling
into the errors engendered by that ignorance. He avoids vice and wickedness. His knowledge presupposes ignorance, and his awareness of
ignorance constitutes a humble kind of knowledge. That knowledge is
not enough to make him a wise man in the conventional sense of the
phrase. But it is enough to make him virtuous. And perhaps it is enough
to make us rethink our concept of wisdom, and to recognize a sense in
which we can recognize a powerful, if very human, sort of wisdom in
what Socrates knew.
Bibliography
Bumet, J., ed Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924

6 This concept of knowledge is presented at Charmides 167a and subsequently criticized. Is Plato rejecting Socrates' concept7

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