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fruit of the poisonous tree after the search. The court holds
Plaintiff-Appellant:
v.
Defendant-Appellee:
ORDER REVERSED
EN BANC
February 1, 2010
order.
its owner sat in the front passenger seat and a third passenger
routine traffic stop with the driver, while his partner and
2
Acting upon a suspicion that there were illegal drugs in
the vehicle, the officers ordered all occupants out of the car,
asking them to sit on the curb between the patrol car and sedan
bag of marihuana.
3
Minor was charged in Denver District Court with possession
and lack of a visible license plate, the court ruled that there
of a vehicle over which he had control, but the court also found
1
In ruling the search unconstitutional, the court relied upon a
string of cases speaking to probable cause in the context of
warrantless vehicle searches, which is a different analysis than
the consensual search upon which we decide the case today. See,
e.g., People v. Daverin, 967 P.2d 629, 632-33, 633 & n.4 (Colo.
1998) (holding that an officer had probable cause to search the
bed of a pickup truck after finding drugs and paraphernalia in
the cab during a search incident to arrest); People v. Moore,
900 P.2d 66, 70 (Colo. 1995) (holding that probable cause
supported police search of the defendant’s vehicle and wallet
for drugs).
4
The People brought this interlocutory appeal of the Denver
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
standard); United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 504 (5th Cir.
novo review); People v. Olivas, 859 P.2d 211, 214 (Colo. 1993)
5
62-63 (Colo. 1998). These factual determinations include the
provided, and whether consent was in any way limited. See id.
officer and the suspect?” People v. Najjar, 984 P.2d 592, 596
B. Findings of Fact
504; Dumas, 955 P.2d at 62-63. Here, the trial court found that
fact that there was some evidence to the contrary. 2 We adopt the
2
Both Minor and a passenger testified at the motions hearing
that consent was never given to search the vehicle, and Officer
Waidler failed to include the detail of consent in his initial
written report on the incident.
6
trial court’s findings of fact because the record clearly
error here.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does
3
In its findings of fact, the trial judge stated: “For reasons
that will become very obvious, I am simply going to err on the
side of finding that there was consent to search the car.” We
review official findings of fact in the record according to a
clearly erroneous standard, and Officer Waidler’s testimony
supports a finding of consent. Olivas, 859 P.2d at 214.
7
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)); Najjar, 984 P.2d at 596
250-51)).
was the driver but not the owner of the vehicle, to consent to
the search. Proper consent can come from any individual with
common authority over the area or item searched, with the burden
search. United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 399 (3d Cir.
943, 948 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dunkley, 911 F.2d
522, 526 (11th Cir. 1990). Here, we endorse this reasoning and
8
authority to consent to a search of the vehicle even when the
did not violate the Fourth Amendment after the defendant had
concluding that:
9
person may be expected to know that narcotics are
generally carried in some form of a container.
Id. at 251.
10
Similarly, in Olivas, we upheld a search that produced
Id. at 215-16; see also United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118,
assume might hold the object of the search, including the trunk
search the entire vehicle, knowing that illegal drugs were the
11
individual containers when no forcible destruction of property
III. Conclusion
the trunk and closed backpack therein were reasonable under the
12