Market Welfare in The Early-Modern Ottoman Economy, A Historiographic Overview With Many Questions

Market Welfare in the Early-Modern Ottoman Economy: A Historiographic Overview with Many
Questions
Author(s): Relli Shechter
Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2005), pp.
253-276
Published by: BRILL
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MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN

HISTORIOGRAPHY OVERVIEW
ECONOMY?A
WITH MANY QUESTIONS
BY
RELLI SHECHTER*
Abstract
a sys
here meant
the notion of market welfare
economy
proposed
for the sake of economic
and efficiency
competition
stability and
even in the face of
its boundaries.1
Such a system worked
for those established
within
In early-modern
Ottoman
tem that partially
stifled
equity
economic
from "above"
and "the state")
decentralization
when
(Istanbul
regulation
political
was
on the wane.
available
research
and raising questions
for future
Discussing
seemingly
from the "middle"
forms of regulation
by local officials/notables,
study, the article examines
in cities throughout
institutions
the Empire
and the role of consumers
courts, and economic
in a later era of
in economic
The article further suggests why economic
opening
regulation.
into the world
integration
economic
life.
economy
gradually
put an end
to an
inward-looking,
early-modern
ottomane
du debut de l'ere moderne
la notion, proposee
l'economie
(17e-18e
siecles),
voire etouffait par
ici, de bien-etre
par le marche
signifiait un systeme qui decourageait
une
et une equite
et efficacite
dans
le but d'assurer
stabilite
tiellement
competition
a ceux compris dans son perimetre. Un
tel systeme fonctionnait
toujours meme
economique
Dans
venue
alors que
la regulation
de decentralisation
dans un contexte
economique
politique,
? d'en haut?
la
et de ?l'Etat?)
semblait etre en train de s'affaiblir. Considerant
(d'lstanbul
recherche
des nouvelles
effectuee a ce sujet et soulevant
pour une future enquete,
questions
? et etablies
emanant
du ? milieu
locale
le present article etudie des formes de regulation
dans
ment par des fonctionnaires/dignitaires,
des tribunaux, et des institutions economiques
dans ce proces
ainsi que le role joue par les consommateurs
des villes a travers l'Empire,
sus. L'article
la periode
tente aussi
l'ouverture
durant
pourquoi
economique
d'expliquer
a
a mis
dans
celle de 1'integration
l'economie
mondiale,
fin, progressivement,
posterieure,
une vie economique
tournee vers 1'interieur qui a caracterise
le debut de l'ere moderne.
Keywords:
Markets,
welfare,
economic
history,
consumption,
Ottoman
Empire,
early modern
* Relli
Shechter, Department ofMiddle East Studies, Ben-Gurion University, Beer
She va, Israel,

rellish@bgumail.bgu.ac.il
1
like to thank
The author would
Nimrod
and Dror
Iris Agmon,
Hurvitz,
on earlier versions
also like to acknowledge
of this article. I would
menting
useful suggestions.
readers who made many
of the two anonymous
?
Koninklijke
Also available
Brill NV, Leiden,

2005
- www.brill.nl
online
JESHO
Ze'evi
for com
the contribution
48,2
254 relli
shechter
Introduction
How are we to understand past economies? What economic goals guided
them? Under what principles, social, political, and cultural (religious), did they
operate? I approach these questions as a modernist, an economic historian who
is a visitor to the study of Ottoman history, but one who has followed the lit
erature emerging from this field for the past fifteen years or so. What triggers
my interest in asking such questions is the opportunity to look at a past, differ

ent model from the current economic system, but also at a model that has made
a lasting impact on contemporary Middle Eastern economies. I am particularly
interested in the effect of a local value
nomic
system on the nature of Ottoman
eco
life.
historiography of the early-modern era (roughly correspond

ing to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) put much effort into refuting
older perceptions of the Empire's economic "decline" and counterfactual analy
sis, based on perceptions of Ottoman vs. European economic development. As
Recent Ottoman
a result, few attempts have been made to offer a broad overview of the princi
ples governing the Empire's economic life.2My intention here is to put forward
such an overview of what I consider the centerpiece of early-modern Ottoman
economy, namely the notion of welfare through themarket, which, consciously
or not, guided the economy during this period.
By welfare through themarket (or market-welfare), I mean an economic sys

tem that partially stifled competition (and efficiency/growth) for the sake of eco
nomic stability and a certain level of equity for those established within its
boundaries. Although it had some commonalities with social-welfare and char

ity in providing a safety net for urban dwellers, my discussion of market wel
Three
such
endeavors,
and Society,
Economy
ed. Halil
1300-1914,
Empire,
see especially
Press,
1994),
Pamuk,
"Institutional
of Interdisciplinary
Revisited:
Regime
Empire,"
Politics
also
"The Ottoman
Inalcik,
inspired this article, are Halil
in An Economic
and Social History
1300-1600,"
of the Ottoman
Inalcik and Donald
Quataert
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
the section
"The Ottoman
Economic
Mind,"
44-54;
?evket
and the Longevity
of the Ottoman
Journal
1500-1800,"
Empire,
Ariel
"An Ancien
35, 2 (Autumn,
225-247;
Salzmann,
2004):
which
State:
Change
History
'Privatization'
and
Society
and Political
21,
(Dec.
in the Eighteenth-Century
Economy
393-423.
Pamuk's
A Monetary
1993):
Ottoman
History
of
theOttoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) furtherprovided a
on Ottoman
broad perspective
economics.
See also: Mehmet
"Reconsideration
of the
Bulut,
Economic
of the Ottomans
and Western
Concepts
Europeans
during the Mercantilist
Ages"
in
M.S.
(2002)
http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/meht/papers03/Bulut.doc;
Meyer,
in the Ottoman
"Economic
in the 14th-Early
19th Centuries,"
Archiv
Thought
Empire
57 (1989):
Orientali
Ahmet
of the Ottoman
"Outlines
Economic
305-318;
Tabakoglu,
System,"
TUrkiye,
in The Great
2000),
7-24.
Ottoman,
Turkish
Civilization,
vol.
2, ed. Kemal
?icek
(Ankara:
Yeni
MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN ECONOMY
255
fare only briefly touches upon such matters in the case of waqfs (term explained
below). My main purpose here is to set the framework for a better understand
ing of economic and legal institutions, rather than social ones, that provided
economic relief to cities. This is not to assert in any way that social and private
action did not contribute to welfare. Even more so, in many cases, such as the
guilds, it is hard to distinguish between an economic and a social institution.
rather than real ones,
created here are thereforemethodological
to help me better develop the notion of market-welfare.
To the discussion on the historiography of Ottoman economic institutions and
The boundaries
legal systems in the first part of the article, I later add an analysis of the often
neglected demand and consumers' agency in determining the nature of Ottoman
markets (and market-welfare). The unique nature of Ottoman commerce in an
is further studied, to demonstrate the interplay

age of European mercantilism
in
between supply and demand
contemporary markets. The article thus offers an
economy, but
understanding of market welfare that created a "good-enough"
one thatwould eventually crumble under external and internal pressures embod
ied in the semi-peripheralization of the Empire as it integrated into the world
economy. It further raises questions for future research along these lines.
from four urban markets?
I have chosen to focus largely on examples
Aleppo, Cairo, Istanbul and Izmir. I used as my selection criteria their substan
tial size and the fact that these four markets represented a variety of Ottoman
commercial centers when
experiences: Aleppo and Cairo were well-established
captured them and continued to be so throughout most of the

period under discussion.3 During the same era, Izmir developed from a small
town into a boom city with transitmarkets oriented to international commerce.
Its history well reflects the fortunes of other port-city markets in the Empire, as
the Ottomans
the latter was
gradually integrated into the world economy. Istanbul's markets

in
serving as a centrifugal/pulling economic force that siphoned
unique
economic
surplus from other parts of the Empire. Even more so, it was in
Istanbul that the state implemented its "classical" policies on the market most
were
carefully.
Ottoman markets were
not limited to the cities discussed above; those in

smaller towns and villages throughout the Empire were of no less importance
for themajority of the population living in these areas and for the Ottoman state
in general. The relevance of the market-welfare notion to towns and villages
can only be gauged from the discussion below, and needs further research.
Large city markets, however, were significant economic engines for Ottoman
I cite
the relevant
literature
on
the four cities
in the appropriate
discussion
below.
256
RELLI SHECHTER
hinterlands; transitions in such markets had a marked impact on the countryside

as well. Furthermore, we only have sufficient research on those markets for
comparative analysis on which to base certain generalizations regarding theOttoman
economy.
Current historiography and

The
debate
over Ottoman
the project
ahead
economic
"decline"
has
focused mostly on the

command economy and
of the Ottoman
the comprehensiveness
the impact of political decentralization on early-modern Ottoman economic life.
The term "command economy," sometimes implied by the notion of oriental
despotism, suggests an economy managed by the state from above, with little
function and
interference from society.4 The sultan and the central state bureaucracy, itwas
argued, tightly controlled economic surplus by efficient collection, which further
meant restricting capital accumulation beyond the state's elites. Resources were
later re-distributed according to principles denoted by the state.
The notion of "decline"
started as long ago as that era itself, with some
Ottoman writers lamenting the departed "golden-era" glory of theEmpire as against
grim present realities.5 The theme was taken up by generations of twentieth-cen

tury Ottomanists, further inspired by more recent Turkish atavistic (state-cen
to the economy, essentialist understandings of the Empire,
tered) approaches
and/or modernization
theory.6 Scholars documented an erosion of state control
over the economy, which
they equated with state deterioration because
the state
see Huri
in
On oriental despotism
"Introduction:
'Oriental
Islamoglu-Inan,
Despotism'
in The Ottoman Empire and theWorld-Economy,
ed. Huri Islamoglu
Perspective,"
World-System
Inan (Cambridge:
of the
3-7. In earlier historiography
Press,
1987),
Cambridge
University
a centralized
the notion of oriental despotism
Ottoman
mostly
Empire,
designated
political
econ
to the Empire's
devoted
system and raison d'etat;
past research
only scant attention
omy,
political
Eastern
considering
"essence."
and
of its cultural/religious
for exploration
in Middle
the oriental
paradigm
despotism
Middle
East History
beyond Oriental
Despotism,
it secondary
and redundant
on
For further discussion
see: Peter Gran,

"Modern
Studies
An Agenda
in the Social History
in New Frontiers
Article,"
of
History
beyond Hegel:
in Social
The
vol. 23, 2), ed. Enid Hill
the Middle
East,
Science,
(Cairo Papers
(Cairo:
in Cairo
American
162-198.
Press, 2001),
University
5
in early seventeenth
On the writing of Ottoman
historians
century see Gabriel
Piterberg,
at
The University
of Cali
and
Ottoman
History
Play
Historiography
(Berkeley:
Tragedy:
see
fornia Press, 2003).
For a briefer analysis
literature of the period
of the genre of advice
to the Sources
An Introduction
Ottoman History:
Approaching
(Cambridge:
Suraiya
Faroqhi,
World
Press,
University
Cambridge
6
For a critical discussion
"Introduction:
Roger Owen,
in his, The Middle
East
[1981]), 1-23.
151-156.
1999),
of the "decline"
The Middle
in the World
see:
in Ottoman
economic
history
paradigm
in the Period of So-called
'Decline',"
Economy
LB.
1800-1914
1993
Tauris,
(London:
Economy,
East
257
seemingly lost its power and failed to follow its older economic raison detat
based on three principles: provisioning of cities, army, palace, and state offi
economic
cials; increasing the fiscal revenue of the state (by encouraging
activity); and preservation of the traditional order.7
More recent historiography, however, shows that a hierarchical and central
ized state never existed independently of peripheral forces, and that the two
closely interacted.8 Consequently, with the exception of Istanbul, a "classical"
Ottoman
Eldem,
command economy never fully materialized.

Indeed, as suggested by
". . . Istanbul constitutes an aberration of a rather paradoxical nature: it
corresponds largely to the dominant ideological and ideal perception of theOttoman

state in terms of its economic configuration while in fact it represents the most
blatant exception to the general rule of the incapacity of the state to impose this
territories."9 As we shall see, contemporary scholars also
in more favorable terms, demonstrating the benefits
of a more flexible system to the economy as a whole.
model
on its own
reconsider decentralization
Closely related to the notion of "decline" has been the standard convention
of using European mercantilism (comparison with Europe or different countries
in Europe) as an external yardstick to measure economic performance in the
Empire. Such comparisons usually expose the "rigidity" of Ottoman economic

institutions, political
belief, which resisted
system, and ideology/religious
7
in: Mehmet
"Ottoman
command
See analysis
of the Ottoman
Gene,
economy
Industry
in
in the Eighteenth-Century:
and Main
General
Trends,"
Framework,
Characteristic,
ed. Donald
in the Ottoman
and Turkey, 1500-1950,
Quataert
(Albany,
Empire
Manufacturing
in the
Rizk Khoury,
Dina
State and Provincial
NY:
SUNY
59-68;
Press,
1994),
Society
1540-1834
Press,
3-10;
1997),
University
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
Empire, Mosul,
and the
Stoianovich
Accumulation,
"Cities, Capital
11-13; Traian
Pamuk, Monetary
History,
in Cities and the Rise of States
in Europe,
Balkan
Command
Ottoman
1500-1800,"
Economy,
P. Blockmans
A.D.
1000 to 1800, ed. Charles
1994),
(Boulder, CO: Westview,
Tilly and Wim
63-65.
8
a mechanism
the central state co-opted
local forces,
Karen
by which
Barkey
suggested
Ottoman
a large Empire.
and Bureaucrats:
of governing
See her Bandits
the "costs"
thereby reducing
The Ottoman Route to State Centralization
Press, 1994). Regional
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
in which
of Ottomanization
elites, on their part, went
process
they
through a complimentary
as their own. See: Ehud
socio-cultural
and political
Toledano,
practices
adopted Ottoman
in the Middle
East and North Africa,
1700-1900,"
A History
and Moshe
ed. Ilan Pappe
from Within,
For case
that further
Tauris
145-162.
studies
Academic
Macoz
Studies,
1997),
(London:
in Ottoman
The Politics
demonstrate
this point see: Jane Hathaway,
Egypt:
of Households
State and
The Rise of the Qazdaglis
Press,
1997); Khoury,
Cambridge
University
(Cambridge:
Provincial.
9
to Peripheralized
in The Ottoman
Edhem
"Istanbul:
from Imperial
Eldem,
City
Capital,"
and
East and West, Aleppo,
Between
Izmir, and Istanbul,
Goffman,
by Edhem Eldem, Daniel
141.
Bruce Masters
Press,
1999),
University
Cambridge
(Cambridge:
"The
of Ottoman-Local
Emergence
in Middle
Politics
and
Eastern
Elites
Ideas:
258
RELLI SHECHTER
change and blocked the way to imported novelties. Such inflexibility stands in
structures, which facilitated
binary opposition to dynamic (evolving) European
the development
of new technologies, financial institutions, and trade, and
that its validity is
enjoyed export-led growth. This comparison is so widespread
usually taken for granted.
In using an external economic model, however, scholarship anachronistically
assumed that performance was indeed the Ottomans' main criterion. Furthermore,
I argue that in the early-modern Empire growth was one criterion among a
wider set of values related to the function of the economy, and that stability
was no less important. My argument is corroborated by recent and more
internally oriented appreciation of the Ottoman economy, emphasizing flexibil
ity and viability of existing institutions in providing the Empire with an ade
quate economic infrastructure,10 thus compensating for the lack of novel ones
like those developed in Europe. A good example here is Hanna's
study, which
courts
in supervising
shows the multi-purpose role of well-established Ottoman
contractual transactions and financial services such as credit, deposits, and loans
one
under
roof.11
over the command economy and the comparisons with Europe

that
Ottoman
suggest
historiography is gradually moving away from contrasting
or
ideal types with early-modern economic reali
temporally
specially-removed
ties. Yet how are we to understand such realities more fully? Currently, early
The debates
modern Ottoman history "unfolds" between two distinct periods. It was preceded
by an earlier, "classical" era of Empire building that lasted roughly until the late
sixteenth century, when the Ottomans expanded their territories, placed new
economic resources (mainly agricultural lands) under state control, and engaged
in large-scale
commercial building projects to revive local economies
and
era
was
trade.
The
followed
another
distinct
early-modern
by
period
develop
that began around the middle of the eighteenth century, but became more
I
significant throughout the nineteenth century and lasted until World War
a
went
of
the
when
Ottoman
(WWI),
economy
process
through
semi-peripher
as it gradually merged
into the world economy.12 The study of
alization
10
See,
for
Pamuk,
"Institutional
example,
Change."
11
Nelly Hanna, Making Big Money in 1600: The Life and Times of Ismacil Abu Taqiyya,
NY:
Press,
1998). See especially
Egyptian Merchant
(Syracuse,
Syracuse
University
chapter
life of the merchant
Isma'il Abu
three, for the dominant
place of the court in the professional
of her book.
the protagonist
Taqiyya,
12
see Kenneth
M.
On Ottoman
into the world
The Pasha's
Cuno,
economy
integration
Peasants:
University
Land,
Press,
in Lower
and Economy
1740-1858
Society,
Egypt,
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
1760-1840
1992); Peter Gran, Islamic Roots
(Austin:
of Capitalism:
Egypt,
259
history of both the "empire building" and the "integration

into theworld economy" period is established within these two frameworks; the
task of economic historiography of the early-modern Ottoman Empire is still to
Ottoman
economic
define the modus

explain
Ottoman
itsmeaning.
operandi
"privatization"
and
of contemporary
economy
and, even more
so, to
the "circle of justice"
on changes in the political economy of the

Empire transformed the way we now consider early-modern Ottoman decentral
ization.13 Her work examined shifts in the iltizam and later malikane methods
Salzmann's
revisionist work
of landholding and surplus extraction as a more or less conscious attempt by

the ruling elites to reform a malfunctioning economic system and adjust it to
needs. Such reforms further encouraged
contemporary
stronger alliances
political elites in Istanbul and those of various provinces within the

on the creation of the "vazirite firm," a vertical integration that
based
Empire,
relied on patronage, whose aim was to compete successfully for state contracts.
between
and other sources of revenue farming supplied the growing needs of the
Ottoman state for cash and served to raise large sums in advance when the state
Taxes
was
in critical financial
as a whole was
a more
straits. The overall

efficient economic
effect of such shifts on the Empire

in the con
system, more workable
temporary conditions of a mature Empire.

framework, Salzmann's work
Although providing a good political-economic
does not cover the effects of such "privatization" on the economic welfare of
Ottoman subjects. This was a significant aspect of contemporary transitions because

in effect broke or at least weakened existing top-down
the iltizam and malikane
mechanisms of checks and balances, which were embodied in the older system
and justified by the principles of the Ottoman "circle of justice" (sometimes

to the latter, the state was responsible for
called "circle of equity"). According
political-economic
equilibrium, expressed as follows: "A ruler could have no
no soldiers without money, no money without the well
without
soldiers,
power
being of the subjects, and no well-being
without justice."14 I would
suggest that
of Texas
Ottoman
The
Press,
Kasaba,
1979);
University
Islamoglu-Inan,
Empire',
Re?at
Ottoman
the World
The Nineteenth-Century
and
NY:
SUNY
Economy:
(Albany,
Empire
Middle
The Ottoman
and European
Press,
Owen,
Pamuk,
East,
1988);
?evket
Empire
and Production
1820-1913:
Univer
Investment,
Trade,
Capitalism,
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
Press, 1987).
sity
13
"Ancien Regime."
Salzmann,
14
fn. 10, n.p.,
Bulut, "Reconsideration,"
cited
from H.
inalcik,
"The Nature
of Traditional
260 RELLI SHECHTER

such a modus vivendi meant settling for an economy whose guiding principles
were quite different from our own economic thinking, emphasizing socio-politi
cal cohesion over performance and growth through competition; the Ottomans
were ready to settle for a "good-enough" economic system thatmet such a goal.
With
a more
hierarchical (centralized) government and command economy

the
sultan and his immediate ruling elite were (in principle at least)
type control,
in a better position in the past to cater to the socio-economic welfare of their
subjects. This was by controlling intermediaries within the ruling elite, who oth
erwise might squeeze the population. Indeed, the commercialization of taxation
and surplus extraction meant a system where maximization

of profits was cen
came
it
increase
with
the
of
tral;
potential
exploitation, especially as the new
system did not officially provide new ways to curtail such injustices by the cen
tral government. This was true for agriculture, but also for industry, commerce,
in the city, all impacted by decentralization.
suggest the continuation of an economic modus
and services
Can we
vivendi emphasizing
even
welfare through themarket
though the centralized system that supported it
in the past was on the wane? I argue that implementing such a system did not
require a fully centralized, state-led command economy. Indeed, in a period of
decentralization, with the exception of Istanbul, itwas local economic institu
tions, such as religious endowments (waqf) and guilds (tariqa, ta'ifa, hirfa, in
Arabic or esnaf in Turkish) that operated midway between government and pri
vate interests to uphold economic welfare through tightmarket regulation. The
qadi and the court system also played a significant role in upholding justice
in markets. Furthermore, consumers (sometimes in the form of public opinion)
resisted economic injustices, and their agency in deciding what to buy was more
terms, while centricity gradually

significant than any written law. In Polanyi's
receded, redistribution and reciprocity took other, local forms that kept market
welfare a lively principle of the economy.15
The system outlined above provided (mostly urban) populations with minimal
standards of living through fixing quantity and prices of commodities, especially
in times of shortage. In addition, it guaranteed industries a more or less regular
supply of affordable raw material. Welfare

through the market also meant pro
tection of employment, and perhaps also stabilizing commercial rents through
in Political
Modernization
in Japan
and Turkey,
ed. R. Ward
and D. Rustow
The Ottoman
and
Princeton
Press,
Itzkowitz,
(Princeton:
1964), also N.
Empire
University
for both citations; Meyer,
"Economic
Islamic Tradition
(New York: n.p., 1972). No page mentioned
on N. Berkes,
iktisat tarihi, vol. 2 (Istanbul:
307; based
n.p., 1972), 325.
Turkiye
Thought,"
15
See especially
Karl Polanyi,
The Great
Beacon
Press,
(Boston:
1957).
Transformation
chapter four.
Society,"
261
the operations of local waqfs. The crux of my argument here is that the Empire's
economy continued to be highly regulated even after decentralization. However,
such regulation was carried by a broad consensus from themiddle (in both geo
graphical and social terms) rather than being a top-down affair (regulated by a
command economy "from above").
Such economic regulation did not provide equality in the market for all. As
Raymond has emphasized, Ottoman city dwellers were far from being equal in
it did not mean that city
their earnings or their housing facilities.16 Moreover,
inhabitants were immune from being squeezed by local officials, for example,
this economic system did support exist
by special taxation (avariz). However,
ing interests of large social segments such as organized labor. It further allowed
preferential treatment to city dwellers in face of newcomers from the country

side, and protected them from extreme hardship (starvation). Its existence indi
cated a wide interest in economic stability, which was expressed from themid
dle as well as from above and manifested a desire for a moral economy in
which markets were
embedded
in socio-cultural
secured such interest.
and political
relations
that
Another gap in market regulation and the welfare through the market that it
implied was the treatment of the peasantry. The majority of Ottomans living in
the countryside were less protected from economic distress and natural or man
made disasters. Peasants surely resisted being squeezed of surplus in a variety
of ways, ranging from hiding part of the crops to abandoning the land or even
resorting to armed struggle. They also petitioned local officials or even the sul
such manifestations of peasant agency
tan, and aired injustices in court. While
should not go unnoticed, themain beneficiaries of the existing economic system
were
cities' middle-strata
porary Ottoman
Waqfs,
political
whose
voice
and economic
(and actions)
counted more
in contem
settings.
guilds, and market welfare
In light of the above, I now further elaborate on the notion of regulation from
the middle and market welfare by discussing the role of religious endowments
and guilds in early-modern times. During an initial period of Empire building,
the waqf, an old Islamic economic

and welfare
institution,
(redistributive)
served as a key tool for state economic development projects. The growth of
markets in Istanbul, Aleppo, and Cairo after the Ottoman conquest illustrated
16
Andre
Raymond,
"Islamic
City,
Arab
City:
Orientalist
British Journal ofMiddle Eastern Studies 21, 1 (1994): 3-18.
Myths
and
Recent
Views,"
262 RELLI SHECHTER

its efficiency in enhancing urban economies
and the potential inherent
new
in the
Empire, which would reap the benefits of new economies-of-scale
era
for local agriculture, industry, and commerce.17 Even after this "classical"
well
the waqf institution remained

state-sponsored development,
was
its
far
from
presence
dynamic
diminishing economic transformation,
as past literature sometimes implied.18 During early-modern times, some waqf
revenues were surely siphoned off to support administrators, especially in cases
of concentrated
and
of the waqf's
founder, and such "carrying
they were descendants
not
at
benefit
the
did
community
large. Nevertheless, waqf institutions
charges"
were important in the day-to-day running of the city economy.19 The waqf was
a significant player in commercial real-estate markets and as such it had a
where
in determining rents. While

requiring future research, it may be
economic
that
the
argued
waqf provided
stability by keeping low rents. Taken
from another era, Geertz's discussion of the role of the habus (the local waqf)
in Sefrou, a medium-sized Moroccan
city in the 1960s, may provide some illus
tration to this point.20
role
major
In its other capacity as a redistributive mechanism,

the waqf channeled funds
to
than
the
from
markets
state)
(rather
through
religious establishments
directly
in
and facilitated religious practice, for example,
paying for the provisions of
and religious
mosques,
seminars
(madrase).21
immediate eco
It also provided
17
After
of Istanbul, Mehmet
the Conqueror
and built new
the occupation
reconstructed
in the city in order to revive the economy
at large
of his new capital and the Empire
reduced
"Ottoman
of Empire
State,"
18-19). The presence
(Inalcik,
security
significantly
a more or less unified legal and taxation
costs and facilitated
local, inter
system, enhancing
commerce.
in the case of Aleppo
and international
This was demonstrated
well
and
regional,
markets
state into the Ottoman

of the Mamluk
from the incorporation
Cairo, which benefited
Empire.
was
a proxy for
in Aleppo
Masters
of commercial
showed
that construction
establishments
core of the city (al
their number more
the commercial
economic
than doubled
growth:
in the first half century of Ottoman
the Ottoman
rule (Bruce Masters,
madina)
"Aleppo:
a similar but
in Ottoman
for Cairo
Caravan
discussed
City, 26). Raymond
City,"
Empire's
to Raymond,
slightly smaller growth of about a third in the same period. According
during
Ottoman
vanserais
out of a total of 144 in the city, and

times we find 57 new markets
out of a total of 348. See his contribution
to "Suq"
in Encyclopaedia
vol. 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1997 [new edition]), 792.

18
Miriam
Hoexter,"
Waqf
Studies
in the Twentieth
Century:
The
State
new
cara
of Islam
(EI),
228
of the Art,"
Economic and Social History of theOrient 41, 4 (1998): 479-481.

of the
19
20
Ibid.
Journal
480-483.
in Sefrou,"
in Meaning
in
and Order
The Bazaar
Geertz,
Economy
"Suq:
in Cultural
and
Geertz,
Society, Three Essays
Analysis,
by Clifford Geertz, Hildrad
123-244.
Rosen
Press,
1979),
University
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
as social and economic
in
role of waqfs
welfare
recently discussed
providers was
Clifford
Moroccan
Lawrence
21
The
inMiddle
Bonner, Mine
Ener, and Amy Singer, eds., Poverty and Charity
texts (Albany, NY:
Poor
SUNY
and
Press, 2003); Mine
Ener, Managing
Egypt's
1800-1952
Princeton University
Press, 2003),
(Princeton:
of Benevolence,
chapter
Michael
East
Con
the Politics
one.
263
nomic relief for the poor through imaret (kitchen soup) complexes attached to
further routed foodstuffs and raw material from the
large city mosques. Waqfs
to
cities.
countryside
Through such a direct, and possibly indirect (rent) welfare
mechanisms, religious endowments demonstrated a socio-cultural preference for

redistribution of private wealth through social projects, as opposed to accumu
lation and re-investment of economic resources. Even more so, waqfs stabilized
life and provided a safety net formostly city dwellers, with lit
tle involvement by the central government.
Early modern guilds regulated professional life in cities and ensured much
stability in industry and commerce. They also shielded established economic
urban economic
of newcomers of various sorts (local and for

to entry into markets. In this they served as
barriers
eign) by raising high legal
another pillar of social welfare through the market. The analysis above further
finds support in recent scholarship arising from the debate on the place of the
actors against
the encroachment
guilds between state and society.

For Lewis, and later Baer, the guild was an institution through which the
state and local authorities regulated the economic and personal behavior of indi
viduals.22 The guilds also served as conduits for surplus extraction from urban
and others took an opposite approach, which emphasized
subjects. Mantran
the autonomy of guilds as craft unions (and a nascent "civil society"). From this
internal conflicts and served as a collective
perspective, the guilds mediated
tool in their negotiations with other players in the market. This
the sovereignty of guilds as social mechanisms
approach further emphasized
aimed at ensuring a stable labor market by providing security at work, protec
tion from unrestrained competition, and a grip on price of labor, number of
bargaining
and production quotas.

Contemporary research on Ottoman
employees,
guilds suggests an intermediary position

the role of guilds from above and from the middle. Eldem has sug
. . the
gested that for Istanbul ".
guild structure was a two-edged sword which
both granted a form of autonomy and self-control to the esnaf, and potentially
between
contributed
Ghazaleh
to their relative neutralization
reached
and easier control by the state."23

". . .we should postulate nei
to understand the structure and role of the
the same conclusion
ther state control nor autonomy
for Cairo:
22
For the contour of the historiographie

debate on guilds see Suraiya Faroqhi,
"Crisis
and
in Economic
and Social
586-589.
Pascale
"The
1590-1699,"
Ghazaleh,
History,
Change,
in The State and Its Servants, Administration
Guilds
between
and Modernity,"
Tradition
in
to the Present,
ed. Nelly Hanna
Times
(Cairo: The American
Egypt from Ottoman
University
in Cairo
Press,
1995), 60-69.
23
161.
Eldem,
"Istanbul,"
264
RELLI SHECHTER
guilds in Cairo in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An examination of

the guilds' internal organization further demonstrates the guilds' complex rela
tionship with the state and society, on the one hand, and the scope of their inde
pendence concerning decision-making on the other."24Marcus developed a sim

ilar argument for Aleppo "[T]he guild system operated outside government, but
not independently of it. The latitude of the guilds was restricted by the interests
of other groups, by the existing laws, and by the economic policies and inter
ests of the state. Although not entirely instruments of government, they did sub
mit to various forms official oversight which affirmed the limits of their inde
pendent authority."25 The quotes above reinforce the impression that the guilds
were part of a "decentralized urban regime" of notables, suggested by Chal
craft,26which sits well with my argument of market welfare regulated from the
middle.
Economic
justice and governance
through the legal system
Although economic welfare through both guilds and religious endowments

was not solely dependent on its implementation from above, it did require legit
imacy and the occasional use of force to impose the law; the institutions that
regulated the local economy were dependent on mechanisms outside
to maintain their efficacy and control over economic affairs.
themarket
The legal system played a major role in the daily running of guilds as their
members brought their internal affairs to court. The court also resolved griev
ances between guilds and other players, including state officials who operated
in the same sphere. It further empowered the guilds in restricting competition
from outside, by creating legal barriers for entry into already established mar
suggested that during the eighteenth century, due to migration
into towns, the most common complaint of guilds to the courts was against
into trades.27 The courts facilitated cross
pressure of entry by newcomers
Indian
Ottoman and cross-Islamic economic activity (e.g., the case of Muslim
kets. McGowan
traders in the Empire),28 and even
24
substituted modern
financial
institutions by
65.
"Guilds,"
on the Eve of Modernity,
in the Eighteenth
The Middle
East
Marcus,
Aleppo
173.
Press,
(New York: Columbia
1989),
Century
University
26
in
John Chalcraft,
"The Striking Cabbies
of Cairo
and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds
25
Ghazaleh,
Abraham
dissertation
9-15.
1863-1914,"
(New York University,
2001),
Egypt,
unpublished
27
in Economic
Bruce McGowan,
"The Age of the Ayans,
and Social History,
1699-1812,"
see: Dror Ze'evi,
An Ottoman
in the
The District
697. For Jerusalem
of Jerusalem
Century:
1600s (Albany,NY: SUNY Press, 1996), 158.

28
Faroqhi,
"Crisis
and Change,"
524-525.
265
allowing complicated transactions.29 Ottoman courts supported the administra

tion of waqfs as well, providing the legal framework for establishing endow
ments and overseeing future matters related to theirmanagement.
legal system contributed to welfare through the market more immedi

ately, through direct interference in markets. Significant to our discussion here,
but still awaiting adequate treatment in the literature, are the transitions over
The
(the market regulator assigned by the qadi)

lieutenants.30 A major difficulty in evaluating their role is that any
investigation of locally-based officials would reflect geographical differences in
their functions, and even theirmere existence. Thus, before the eighteenth cen
time in the tasks of the muhtasib
and his many
tury in Aleppo, the hisba disappeared altogether.31 In Egypt, the position of the
muhtasib was abolished only under Mehmet Ali.32 In Istanbul, the seat of gov
ernment, the hisba also lasted until the tanzimat (reforms) of 1826.33 However,
in Cairo and Istanbul did not necessarily mean

of muhtasibs
that they carried the same weight and responsibilities.
The qadi, who was in charge of themuhtasib, was also responsible for other
market officials such as the kayyal (the person responsible for weights and mea
sures) and for the regulation of prices by determining narh (ceiling) prices, the
the co-existence
in times of economic hardship.34 Research has to pay more

latter especially
attention to the role of officials inmarkets, and the degree to which narh actu
ally determined prices, before we can better evaluate
legal-religious players in early-modern markets.
the immediate
impact of
impact of the qadi and the court went beyond regulating and adminis
trating practical solutions in the day-to-day running of markets. Their deep
involvement in market life meant that the courts were crucial in upholding the
principles guiding such economy. It may even be argued that they served as a
The
29
In her Making
Hanna
Big Money,
to the courts, convincingly
pointing out
See especially
chapter three.
30
in Ottoman
the hisba
On
(ihtisab
demonstrates
their significant
the regularity at which merchants

role as facilitators of commercial
went
life.
see:
the institution of market
sources),
regulation
to a religious mandate
The muhtasib
of
3, 485-490.
operated
according
at least) three tasks:
assuming
(theoretically
"commanding
right and forbidding wrong" when
a living in the market
in both indus
conduct among
those who made
enforcing just business
in markets
in times of crisis to secure minimal
standards of living,
try and trade, intervening
and taxing the working
population.
31
173.
Middle
Marcus,
East,
32
inModern
Times
Gabriel
Guilds
Baer, Egyptian
(Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental
Society,
"Hisba,"
in EI,
vol.
1964), 44.
33
in EI, vol. 3, 489.

in "Hisba;'
R. Mantran
34
in "Narh"
in EI, vol. 7, 964-965.
M.
S. Kutukoglu
sidered the narh a central tool in an Ottoman
"economy
Inalcik
("Ottoman
of plenty."
State,"
46)
con
266 RELLI SHECHTER

transitions in state politics and local economic transformation.
discussion
of the centrality of
argument resonates well with Masters'
in
in
economic
Islamic law
economy:
change
Aleppo's
prohibiting structural
buffer between
This
"The law's interpretation could change. We have evidence of this in the allow al
of interest under the legal guise of terming it profit rather than usury and in the
seemingly antiguild rulings of eighteenth-century Aleppo. But even in these
cases, the underlying ideology of justice in the marketplace,
including the idea
of fair pricing, the sanctity of contract, and the right for labor to receive a just
wage, makes us wonder whether conditions for a capitalist protoindustry such

as arose in Europe could ever have appeared inAleppo without a total collapse
of the Ottoman system of government, with its courts and bureaucrats."35
we
are less interested in "preconditions"

the
that would make
cen
more
in
is
the
like
Masters
economy
emphasizing
Empire's
Europe's,
right
tral place of the courts and law in safeguarding the principles of the Empire's
economy. Such principles would only collapse when a new Ottoman political
Although
economy was shaped under the (external and internal) impact of the integration
of the Empire into the world economy, especially during the nineteenth century.
laws and
The re-centralized (post-tanzimat) state stipulated new commercial
reformed the court system. Furthermore, an important sector of foreign and

now running lucrative chunks of the local economy
minority businessmen
totally circumvented local courts and developed European-like financial institu
tions thatwould
Provisioning,
take on many
of the courts' earlier tasks.
consumption, and stratification
So far I have centered

tem, and their impact on
also regulated; its study
fare on consumption in
the discussion on economic institutions, the legal sys

the supply side of the economy. However, demand was
is significant in outlining the influence of market wel
the Empire. In Ottoman economic orthodox thinking,
replaced a value-free market equilibrium by socio-cultural and

political principles of redistribution, which determined differential levels of con
sumption outside the marketplace. Provisioning aimed at two main goals: first,
it stood for financially rewarding the bureaucracy and the military for running
provisioning
the state. Second, itwas to ensure an adequate supply of foodstuffs and com
to markets in large cities where most state elites lived, and where
modities
35
Bruce
Mercantilism
University
Masters,
and
Press,
in the Middle
The Origins
Economic
Dominance
of Western
New
in Aleppo,
1600-1750
the Islamic
(New York:
Economy
1988), 221.
East:
York
267
political unrest, the result of insufficientresources, could seriously threatenOttoman

authority.
As research demonstrates, neither of these tasks was ever simple because the
state constantly competed with other players over availability and price. In fact,
provisioning was used on a regular basis only in Istanbul, the principal seat of
government and the largest city in the Empire, and even there not always suc
cessfully. For example, during the early seventeenth century there was much
timber smuggling from northwestern Anatolia, an area designated to send wood
to the Arsenal in Istanbul because prices for wood in Cairo were much higher.36
Although other cities did not exert enough economic (and political) domi
nance to allow such an efficient siphoning off of surplus, and provisioning poli
cies were less strictly imposed, local authorities did pay much attention to sec
uring minimal standards of living for city dwellers. Indeed, supplying Damascus
with reasonably-priced grain was important enough to serve as an index for
good governance.37 Grain was crucial for the survival of the city's inhabitants.
Its availability in city markets in times of scarcity meant that local authorities
were savvy or powerful enough to organize its supply in face of competition
from other players who interferedwith the local grain market to enhance their
profits. Provisioning of cities in times of crisis would be a cause of much
from the countryside, where the authorities cared less about such matters.
pull
century and of tobacco at the

the political economy of consumption
regulation in the Empire in this period.38 The introduction of these two com
modities was highly contested by the authorities on religious and moral grounds,
as well as for hygienic, health, and financial reasons. Tobacco
smoking was
The
introduction of coffee in themid-sixteenth
turn of the seventeenth well
demonstrate
also deemed unsafe as a fire hazard. Taking either substance was initially out
lawed, at times under the strictest penalties. But theywere both enthusiastically
adopted by users of various social backgrounds, and their consumption became

a leading socio-cultural practice. The cases of coffee and tobacco well exem
plify how changing consumer preferences played an active part in shaping local
demand even when banned by the state and condemned by religious authorities.
36
and Change,"
"Crisis
493.
Faroqhi,
in Eighteenth-Century
James Paul Grehan,
and Consumption
"Culture
Damascus,"
of Texas,
dissertation
110.
(Austin: University
1999),
unpublished
38
On
S. Hattox,
and Coffeehouses:
The Origins
coffee see: Ralph
of a Social
Coffee
in theMedieval
of Washington
Near East
Press,
(Seattle: University
1985); Cengiz
Beverage
Coffeehouses
of Ottoman
Kirli, "The Struggle Over Space:
Istanbul,
1780-1845,"
unpublished
37
dissertation
NY:
(Binghamton,
Binghamton
chapter one. On tobacco see Relli Shechter,
The Egyptian
Tobacco
Market
c!850-2000
State University
of New York,
2000),
University,
in theMiddle East:
Smoking, Culture, and Economy
LB. Tauris,
(London:
forthcoming),
chapter one.
268 RELLI SHECHTER

The interplay between Ottoman
sumptuary laws and local dress codes is
another illustration of the relations between market regulation and the agency
of consumers seeking to break away from it. Ottoman sumptuary laws, first
codified during the time of Suleiman Qanuni, aimed at creating social distinc
tions for different ethnic and religious communities and professional affiliations.
Even more, they were to differentiate between the ruling bureaucratic, military,
and religious elites and their subjects. This avenue of social stratification, how
ever, proved as dependent on consumer choice as on top-down enforcement of

the law. In the late eighteenth century local officials in Aleppo enforced sump
tuary laws to demonstrate authority, or simply to extort money or humiliate the
itwas Ottoman consumers who
Christian minority of the city.39 Nevertheless,
ultimately decided what to wear, based more on personal and group preferences
than on official dictates. In fact, we may probably time the emergence of new
fashions in attire by the dates on which sumptuary laws re-emerged.40 For the
eighteenth century, Zilfi suggested that the many laws that attempted to re
impose past dress codes in fact clearly indicated an anxiety over erosion in the
power of the Ottoman government and over breakdown of communal identities
associated with past clothing regimes.41
Jirousek argued that between 1550 and 1800 men's wear changed slightly.42
clothes began to change earlier, around the turn of the eighteenth cen
while encouraging inter-elite competition this was kept indoors?
because
tury,
literally, within the Ottoman harems, and symbolically, within the boundaries of
Women's
state
the
In
elite.
this
context,
women's
clothing
other
and
forms
of
conspicu
ous consumption replaced older modes of internal elite competition, and stratifica
tion through consumption became politically
important. The introduction of
new fashions also
led to the gradual destabilization of textile production and

the growing impact of foreign commerce on the local economy.43 Noteworthy
here is the fact that the Ottoman ruling elite, supposedly the guardians of the
Empire's economic traditions, played a subversive economic role in developing
new
demands.
39
Marcus,
40
Donald
Middle
East,
Quataert,
98-99;
"Clothing
Masters,
Laws,
"Aleppo,"
State, and
58-59.
Society
in the Ottoman
1829," InternationalJournal ofMiddle East Studies 29, 3 (1997): 404.

41
Madeline
Century
C.
Istanbul,"
"Goods
Zilfi,
in Consumption
in the Mahalle:
Studies
and
Encounters
Distributional
the History
of
the Ottoman
Empire,
1720
in Eighteenth
1550
Empire,
1922: An Introduction,ed. Donald Quataert (AlbanyNY: SUNY Press, 2000), 297.

42
in the Later Ottoman

Fashion
System Dress
on Hiilya Tezcan
The Top
and Selma Deliba?,
and Other Textiles
Embroideries,
Costumes,
(London:
n.p., 1986), 26.
kapi Saray Museum:
43
in the Age of the
Ottoman Manufacturing
179-196; Donald
Eldem,
"Istanbul,"
Quataert,
Industrial
Revolution
Press,
1993), 3-4.
University
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
Charlotte
Empire,"
Jirousek,
in Consumption
"The
Transition
Studies,
211,
to Mass
based
269
In the early eighteenth century (the tulip era) notions of intra-elite compe
in the unprecedented
tition and stratification-through-consumption materialized
building of palaces along the banks of the Bosphoros. This activity raised the
demand for imported household and other luxury items, and changed elite food
consumption habits.44 The era itself received its name from the renewed craze
for outdoor gardens planted with expensive tulips and the decoration of a vari
ety of commodities in the shape of the tulip. In 1730, however, such conspicu
ous consumption was fiercely resisted, and brought to a halt by a revolt that
erupted from themost densely populated quarters of Istanbul.45
The revolt reflected dissatisfaction with contemporary politics (mainly the fall
of Tabriz to the Iranians, which triggered a sense of insecurity among the inhab
itants of the capital) and was not directed against upper class consumption
the
itself; such consumption provided work for many in Istanbul. Nevertheless,
revolt did set itself against the use of much needed public space for planting
tulips, and against lavish private spending at a time when the majority of the
experienced economic hardships and insecurity. It implied that

conspicuous consumption could be tolerated only in periods of relative peace
and prosperity, and when serving the interest of the community as a whole
city's population
through stimulating local production and commerce. The overthrow of Ahmet

III as well as the destruction of Saadabad palace and its tulip gardens sounded
a call for a return to a moral economy in this new time of need, one thatwould
improve the welfare of Istanbul's residents at large.
The ending of the tulip era marked a temporary setback in elite consumption
preferences, but this process proved unstoppable in the changing economic and
political sphere of the Empire. During the eighteenth century a new commercial
bourgeoisie consisting of ethnic and religious minorities and a relatively small

took over this trend, and even outpaced state and military
group of Muslims
elites in its adoption and adaptation of Western consumption patterns.46 It was
44
TuTay Artan, "Aspects

and
'Delicacies'
'Luxuries,'
and Conflict
Confluence
of the Ottoman
in a Changing
Elite's
for 'Staples,'
Food Consumption:
Looking
Ariel
"The Age
of Tulips:
Salzmann,
Century;"
in
Modern
Culture
both
Consumer
(1550-1730),"
in Early
107-200
and 83-106
Studies,
Consumption
respectively.
45
see Salzmann,
On
the revolt and its consequences
94-98. The
revolt
"Age of Tulips,"
the elite's
consump
history of acts against
conspicuous
in Baghdad
criticism of court consumption
tion. See, for example,
Hanbali
habits
in Nimrod
to Mass
"From Scholarly
The Formation
Circles
Movement:
of Legal
Communities
Hurvitz,
in Islamic
The American
Historical
Review
I
994-998.
Societies,"
108, 4 (October,
2003),
to my attention.
thank the author for bringing
this information
46
Rise
Fatma Miige
Demise
Western
Ottoman
Gocek,
of the Bourgeoisie,
of Empire:
ization and Social
Press,
(New York: Oxford University
1996), chapter 3.
Change
was
not
the first instance
in Islamic
270
RELLI SHECHTER
only during the nineteenth century that mass consumption patterns began to
the development of new consumption habits among the rul
change. However,
and
the commercial
elites
later
ing
paved the way for future
bourgeoisie
in much of the
changes in local demand. Such changes are little discussed
literature on the integration of the Empire into the world economy, where the
European impact on local markets is most often studied. Still, it has great poten
tial for explaining why some Ottoman players gradually replaced the notion of
market welfare with that of free market, which better suited their interests.
Capitulations,
breaking away from the "old"
economy, and market welfare
Regulation and the market welfare it supported could only be maintained as

long as the Empire's economy was inward-looking and relatively secluded from
other economies. Faroqhi and Quataert rightly emphasize
that we should not
over-estimate the significance of European (and international) commerce inOttoman

markets during the period under discussion or even later during the nineteenth
century.47 This is true for the volume of imported as opposed to local trade and
for the financial contribution of imports and exports to the Ottoman economy.
Still, the impact of cross-border commerce was more significant than its imme
diate (concrete) contribution in "freeing" Ottoman markets from regulation and
leading the way to integration with the world economy.

The Ottomans themselves were aware early on of the potentially subversive
role of foreign trade, and while acknowledging its importance attempted to con
trol it via the capitulation system.48 The Ottomans were also ready to allow such
commerce
locally by ethnic and religious minorities, which would be dependent

on elite patronage and find it difficult to translate money into power outside the
system.49 However,
existing
47
Subjects
Suraiya Faroqhi,
LB.
Tauris,
2000),
(London:
forestalling major
of the Sultan:
50; Donald
change
and Daily
Life
The Ottoman
Culture
Quataert,
in their political-econ
Cambridge UniversityPress, 2000), 126.

(Cambridge:
48
The
ble
in the Ottoman
Empire,
Empire
1700-1922
international
trade by giving favorable
regulated
trading rights to amica
some of its sovereignty
seceded
In the capitulations
the Ottoman
government
by
In
in the Empire
under favorable
conditions.
traders to conduct commerce
European
Ottomans
states.
allowing
restricted political
and economic
states, the Ottomans
rights to chosen
improved
allocating
also
the inflow of needed
ties with
these countries. The
assured
their political
capitulation
raw materials,
foodstuffs, and luxury items, the latter much
sought after by the local elite.
on imported
to fill their coffers from customs
duties
the Ottomans
further enabled
They
on friendly countries were also
the Ottomans'
favorable
goods. Thus,
trading rights bestowed
to their state. Halil
beneficial
188-190.
Inalcik, "Ottoman
State,"
49
a
trade was
Curtin
that apart from direct military
intervention, cross-cultural
suggested
powerful
external
stimulus
of change
and
disruption
in any
existing
socio-economic
system.
271
not allow
significant stray from their orthodoxy of keeping

actors at bay. Thus, Pamuk rightly sug
significant economic-turned-political
the
trend
toward decentralizations of the empire
that:
general
gested
"Despite
omy, they would
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, merchants and domestic pro
in
of mercantilist
ducers?the
leading proponents and developers
policies
to
in
the
the
became
Ottoman
sway
empire
Europe?never
powerful enough
government to deviate from its traditional ways."50
To prove the Ottomans right in their suspicion of cross-boarder
the discussion
commerce,
in
of
the
role
international
trade
transforming
highlights
and gradually ending early modern regulation and market
below
the local economy

welfare.
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the Ottomans remained a

significant power in respect of Europe, they kept tight control over foreign trad
ing communities, and capitulation agreements were honored only selectively.51
Supervision of the implementation of the capitulations was also intentionally
During
delegated to relatively low-level officials, to emphasize the unequal relations between

the Empire and subjects of European states. European merchants had to play the
local power game to be allowed access tomarkets. This was well demonstrated
in the organization of foreign merchant communities (called "nations"). Consuls,
whose appointment was approved by the Ottoman state, headed these commu
nities, and their sovereignty over their communities and in relations to other
players in the market depended on their ability to negotiate with central and
local officials. As Eldem puts it for Istanbul: ". . . similarly to the Ottomans
interventions
relied on non-economic
themselves, French traders consciously
provided by their own political agents or imposed on the bureaucratic structures
of the Ottoman state itself."52 Foreign merchant communities were thus inte
grated into the Ottoman political economy that governed local markets.
One significant outcome of the above was that the implementation of capit
ulations in various urban markets depended on center-periphery relations within
the Empire. The presence of strong local officials or potent local notables meant
that the state found it hard to enforce agreements it signed, even after a foreign
send his complaint to Istanbul. During the first part of the seven
consul would
to relatively weak
social groups
trade. Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural
1.
Press,
1984),
University
Cambridge
246.
"Institutional
Change,"
evil
such necessary
Delegating
tial threat of international
(Cambridge:
50
Pamuk,
51
Daniel
Goffman,
"The
Capitulations
and
the Question
the poten
largely mitigated
in World
Trade
History
of Authority
in Levantine
1600-1650," Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986): 155-161.

52
Eldem,
"Istanbul,"
192-193.
Trade,
272 RELLI SHECHTER

teenth century, foreign consuls in Izmir cooperated with strong local powers at
the expense of the central government.53 The capitulations were most strongly
to in Istanbul, under the close supervision of the Ottoman government.

of international trade through the capitulations
Regulation
system was so
that
the
breakdown
of
its
initial
of
the
rules
and
their gradual
game,
significant
adhered
substitution by ones presenting European dominance, had a profound effect on

the Ottoman economy. In 1740 a renewed Franco-Ottoman capitulations agree
ment became a turning point, at which a strong European
state dictated and
backed new terms of trade, which clearly favored French merchants.54 As a
result, foreign merchants and their consuls gradually became significant pro
moters of export-led revenues and local power brokers in their own right, at
times even at the expense of central and local Ottoman ruling elites. This was
one of the most
Ottoman
significant factors leading to the semi-peripheralization of the

economy in the newly established European world economy. Economic
integration, however, took place not only at the behest of European powers but
also as a result of local interest groups (producers, merchants, and consumers)
who had a stake in the process. Such opening up of the economy meant the
beginning of the end for an inward-looking and highly regulated early modern
economy, which benefited the state, local elites, and urban middle-strata.
Conclusion
The article argued for a broader view of the early-modern Ottoman economy,
expressed from the perspective of market welfare, which was embedded in the
system and the institutions that regulated economic life. This con
tinued to be the case even when a top-down command economy (of sorts) grad
ually disappeared and was replaced by local regulation from the middle. The
Ottomans opted for a "good enough," stable economy that protected the inter
local value
ests of those established
in the system.
the early-modern era of decentralization,
the classical "circle of jus

re-translated into local action rather than taken up by the sul
tan and his entourage. City provisioning was adhered to as a proxy of good
During
tice" maxim was
governance, especially at times of economic trouble (food shortages). Further

more, the qadi and local courts administered the law in ways that facilitated
protectionism, catering to the interests of local production and commerce in the
53
54
Daniel
Eldem,
Goffman,
"Istanbul,"
"Izmir:
from Village
191-192.
to Colonial
Port City,"
in Ottoman
City,
91-92.
273
justice. The same can be argued for Ottoman guilds and reli
gious endowments, both shielding city inhabitants against a variety of economic
upheavals. City took over state-led economic governance (to the extent that such
name of social
governance had existed in the past) in guiding the local economy. Although
treating such an arrangement as "civil society" in practice would be an anachro
is
nism, regulation from the middle (socially) or the city-level (geographically)
a far cry from past research that suggested a vacuum in city regimes.55
The early-modern Ottoman economy is hard to envision today, as we are
caught in a modern, neo-liberal paradigm that idealizes the economy as a free
to step out of such contemporary

created by looking through them
economy gradually crumbled as the
and potentially ever-growing entity.We need

conventions ifwe are to avoid misconceptions
at bygone economies. The inward-looking

Ottoman government and powerful local players lost interest in protecting it (or
benefited from its dissolution), and external forces grew (politically and eco
nomically) strong enough to meddle in its affairs. Nevertheless, change did not
come without a struggle; the Ottoman middle had much interest in the existing
system, and a free market mostly spelled economic hardships for those earlier
benefiting from the old economy. If this analysis sounds familiar, it is not
it has often been applied in the context of the Ottoman Empire, but
because
because it echoes the economic dilemmas of Middle Eastern societies today.
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Market Welfare in the Early-Modern Ottoman Economy: A Historiographic Overview with Many

MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN

She va, Israel,

Brill NV, Leiden,

my interest in asking such questions is the opportunity to look at a past, differ

system on the nature of Ottoman

historiography of the early-modern era (roughly correspond

By welfare through themarket (or market-welfare), I mean an economic sys

boundaries. Although it had some commonalities with social-welfare and char

theOttoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) furtherprovided a

MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN ECONOMY

is further studied, to demonstrate the interplay

captured them and continued to be so throughout most of the

the latter was

gradually integrated into the world economy. Istanbul's markets

not limited to the cities discussed above; those in

the four cities

hinterlands; transitions in such markets had a marked impact on the countryside

Current historiography and

focused mostly on the

grim present realities.5 The theme was taken up by generations of twentieth-cen

they equated with state deterioration because

see: Peter Gran,

MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN ECONOMY

command economy never fully materialized.

corresponds largely to the dominant ideological and ideal perception of theOttoman

Empire. Such comparisons usually expose the "rigidity" of Ottoman economic

over the command economy and the comparisons with Europe

MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN ECONOMY

history of both the "empire building" and the "integration

define the modus

and, even more

the "circle of justice"

on changes in the political economy of the

of landholding and surplus extraction as a more or less conscious attempt by

political elites in Istanbul and those of various provinces within the

straits. The overall

effect of such shifts on the Empire

temporary conditions of a mature Empire.

Ottoman subjects. This was a significant aspect of contemporary transitions because

and justified by the principles of the Ottoman "circle of justice" (sometimes

being of the subjects, and no well-being

without justice."14 I would

260 RELLI SHECHTER

hierarchical (centralized) government and command economy

and surplus extraction meant a system where maximization

terms, while centricity gradually

supply of affordable raw material. Welfare

MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN ECONOMY

preferential treatment to city dwellers in face of newcomers from the country

which markets were

secured such interest.

guilds, and market welfare

the waqf, an old Islamic economic

British Journal ofMiddle Eastern Studies 21, 1 (1994): 3-18.

262 RELLI SHECHTER

the waqf institution remained

in determining rents. While

In its other capacity as a redistributive mechanism,

state into the Ottoman

out of a total of 144 in the city, and

vol. 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1997 [new edition]), 792.

Economic and Social History of theOrient 41, 4 (1998): 479-481.