Article 2 - Effectivity of Laws Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

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Persons and Family Relations Case Doctrines

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Article 2 Effectivity of Laws
Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 Publication of Presidential decrees and issuances of general
[G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985] application is a matter of due process It is needless to add that if
the publication of presidential issuances of a public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its content.
De Roy v. Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. 80718. January 29,
1988]
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case

should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the nonpublication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication
of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
People v Que Po Lay

G.R. No. 6791, 29 March 1954
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not
require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices
therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required
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by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts
merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different
branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of
Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of
special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day
after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official
Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the
law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law
according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29
Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars
and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle
and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.
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Article 3
Garcia v. Recio
[GR NO. 138322. October 2,
2001]
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was
a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.
Article 6
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. Issue:
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
MARIA J. JUEGO
Can the receipt of benefits under the Workmans Compensation Law
[G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001] preclude the recovery of damages under the Civil Code?
Ruling/Doctrine:
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The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in
a waiver by election. Hence, the rule that a claimant cannot
simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute
an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by
his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act
of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its
rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by
the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver
is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of the partys rights or of all material facts upon which they
depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis
upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to
make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is
made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or
by the evidence.
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy
is the basis for the exception.
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Cui vs. Arellano University

2 SCRA 205
(G.R. No. L-15127 May 30,
1961)
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the
contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the
latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
We are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to
public policy and, hence, null and void,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether
or not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University
on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy.
If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of
scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue
Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a
contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct
violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority
of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant
to sound morality and civic honesty.
And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp.
Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as
against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established
interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good
morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.
The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
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policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it
received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in
some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of
the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted
children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding
value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also
with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after
which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep
brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward
merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established
interest or a first lien.
Article 7
NAVARRO v. JUDGE
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities
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DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July
19, 1996
of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to

solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for
the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil
law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases
brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are
at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant
case.[ It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which
has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
BESO vs. Judge DAGUMAN

323 SCRA 566, January 28,
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of
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2000
the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the

office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect." (Italics ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held
outside the judges chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Article 8
People v. Licera
[G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975]
Under the rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang, the

appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes
sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the
requirements relating to firearm licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
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themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law
is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since
the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect.
The Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our
jurisprudence
and,
hence,
of
this
jurisdiction's
legal
system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.
Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely
affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied
thereon and acted on the faith thereof.
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of
Licera's appointment as secret agent, which appointment included a
grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the
time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with
the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.
People v. Jabinal
[G.R. No. L-30061, February 27,
1974]
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are

nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
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intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis
vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in
Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the
law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the
firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true
that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of
criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized
to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would
attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly,
appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was
done was held not to be punishable.
Article 9
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Chu Jan vs. Lucio Bernas
[G.R. No. 10010. August 1, 1916]
Ignorance of the special law applicable to a case does not justify the
court in terminating the proceeding by dismissing it without a
decision.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the
law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that
the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that
is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his
not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not
reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such
an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case
might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil
Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof,
the general principles of law.
People vs. Veneracion

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
[G.R. Nos. 119987-88. October justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs
12, 1995]
were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which
they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then
law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the
Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
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Article 10
People vs. Purisima
86 SCRA 542
Did
P.D. 993) repealed

Act. No. 1780 and Ordinance No.
3820 of the City of Manila as amended by
Ordinance No.
3928? We do
not agree with petitioner that the
above-mentioned statute
and the city ordinance are
deemed
repealed
by
P.D. 9(3). P.D. 9(3) does not
contain
any repealing clause
or
provision, and
repeal
by
implication is
not favored.
This
principle
holds true with greater
force with regards
to
penal statutes
which as
a
rule are to
be
construed strictly
against
the state and liberally
in
favor of
the accused. In
fact, Article
7
of
the New Civil Code provides
that laws are
repealed
only by subsequent
ones and their violation
or
non- observance shall not be
excused
by
disuse,
or
custom
or
practice
to
the
contrary.
Article 11-12
Martinez v. Van Buskirk
18 Phil. 79
ISSUE: Whether or not the cochero was negligent in tying the

driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and
going inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered? NO
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, DOCTRINE: It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof
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1910
that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise

of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the
manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities.
It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public,
finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years
without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without
prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of
decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the
sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people?
We think not.
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE

LAI CHO, AND SY CHUN YEN
VS.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL
SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE,
RODOLFO SY, AND
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
ISSUE:
G.R. No. L-55960 November

24, 1988
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was in

accordance with Chinese law and custom and was conclusively
proven.
HELD:
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45
states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of
witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of
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the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of
the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for
under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence
like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written
foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686,
700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61
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Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The
testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure
to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of
the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they
are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial
notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc
Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is
the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact
[Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Article 13
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Garcia vs. Recio [366 SCRA
437]
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
2001
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.
x
x
x."
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
However, the Court ruled that it is best to remand the case to the
lower court in order for the parties to produce evidence to the fact
that respondent really has the standing to marry petitioner. In the
event that the respond failed to do so, it is within the ambit of the
lower court to declare the nullity of such.
Article 15-17
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Miciano vs. Brimo
[G.R. No. L-22595
1927]
Renvio Doctrine. It has not been proved in these proceedings what

November 1, the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to
be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much
so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the
approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain
testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.The
refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws
does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court,
and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in
force, must be complied with and executed. Therefore, the approval
of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO

[G.R. No. L-68470. October 8,
1985]
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article

15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
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from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change
the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband
without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
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private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
vs.
HON.
CORONA
IBAY- divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
SOMERA
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil
case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was
conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot
sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
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in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Barretto v. Gonzales
[G.R. No. L-37048 March 7, 1933]
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation
until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed
that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a
purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding
divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons
and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the
matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine
Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the
husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State
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to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize
the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the
negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or
fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil
Code now in force in these Islands.
Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards
even though they reside in a foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their
property, and those intended to promote public order and good
morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a
foreign country.
Government vs. Frank
[G.R No. 2935. March 23, 1909]
CONSTANZA YAEZ DE
BARNUEVO vs. GABRIEL
FUSTER
[G.R. No. L-7487 December 29,
1913]
No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by
the law of the place where the contract is made.
[Defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the
place and time the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a
defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is
not comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife,
simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights
which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private
law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter
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of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the
nation. The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to
procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently
are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons
that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene,
since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor
to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means
(property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may
render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making
useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not
contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means
to enforce them. Justiceis a principle superior to that of nations, and
it should therefore be administered without taking into any account
whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to
foster their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations
are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to
those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it
juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty.
Testate estate of Bohanan vs. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
Bohanan
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to
106 Phil 997
personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person
January 30, 1960
whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights
and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is
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found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2
Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of
the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that
the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada,
already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G.
BELLIS vs.EDWARD A. BELLIS,
ET AL
[G.R. No. L-23678. June 6,
1967]
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and
a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system
(law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to
Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
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validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
In the Matter of the Testate
Estate of Edward E.
Christensen
Adolfo Aznar Vs. Helen
Christensen Garcia
[G.R. No. L-16749. January 31,
1963]
Deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is domiciled in the

Philippines. Therefore, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of California. So, in answering
the perennial question on whether or not Foreign nationals may
deprive their heirs of their legitimes, the answer must be qualified as
it will depend on whether or not their national laws provide for a
legitime for their heirs.
Since article 946 Civil Code of California states that when a decedent
is not domiciled in California the law of his domicile (which is
Philippines in the case at bar) should be followed. In the case at bar,
following the Renvoi Doctrine, the court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back (to California) as such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then
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be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the
country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law
as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, specifically the Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
Ultimately, since Philippine laws provide for a legitime and it is clear
that Philippine laws should govern in the instant case due to the
Renvoi Doctrine, the heir of deceased Christensen cannot be
deprived of her legitime.
Roehr vs Rodriguez
(G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003)
Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when

she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite
the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a
German court? In Garcia v. Recio, Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,
and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, we consistently held that a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,
where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
status of persons.
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In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated
December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties.
In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing
private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present
controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect
of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so
on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
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properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was
given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court
so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their
two children. The proceedings in the German court were
summary. As to what was the extent of private respondents
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records
remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she
commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the
Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two
lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to
petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect
that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is
deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue
as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private
respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in
the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the childs welfare is always
the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody.
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public
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respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she
claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations
between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of
Makati, subject of this case, that: [p]etitioner and respondent have
not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they
incurred any debts during their marriage. Herein petitioner did not
contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof. Given the factual
admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property
to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert
jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in
controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the
issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the union
between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of
property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a.
GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322. October 2,
2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our

jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our
law
on
evidence.
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Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient.
Article 19-21
Development Bank of the Phils.
Vs CA
GR No. L-109937 March 21, 1994
If the third person dealing with an agent is unaware of the limits

of the authority conferred by the principal on the agent and he
(third person) has been deceived by the non-disclosure thereof by
the agent, then the latter is liable for damages to him (V
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, p. 422 [1992], citing Sentencia [Cuba] of
September 25, 1907). The rule that the agent is liable when he
acts without authority is founded upon the supposition that there
has been some wrong or omission on his part either in
misrepresenting, or in affirming, or concealing the authority under
which he assumes to act (Francisco, V., Agency 307 [1952], citing
Hall v. Lauderdale, 46 N.Y. 70, 75). Inasmuch as the nondisclosure of the limits of the agency carries with it the implication
that a deception was perpetrated on the unsuspecting client, the
provisions of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the
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Philippines come into play.
Article 19 provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
Any person, who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
Uypitching v. Quiamco
[G.R. No. 146322. December 6,
2006]
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique

tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give
everyone his due.
If a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a
mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a
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civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step
to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or
contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a
legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention
to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach.
WASSMER vs. VELEZ
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
[G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
1964]
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil
Code. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity,
is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
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Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents
Reyes
is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or
[G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005] to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages
by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the
case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and
21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him
fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith.Its antithesis, necessarily,
is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article
20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does
not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask
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Mr. Reyes to leave.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the
party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay
for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993]
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of

the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is
in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
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surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier
adverted to.
CECILIO PE, ET AL., vs. ALFONSO
The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
PE
Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it
G.R. No. L-17396; May 30, 1962
was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is
shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family
who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative
and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs
not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached
the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going
to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita
until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent
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of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her
and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he
is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as
damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
SPS Quisumbing vs MERALCO
G.R. No. 142943 April 3, 2002
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral
damages may be recovered. One such case is when the rights of
individuals, including the right against deprivation of property
without due process of law, are violated.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.[36] Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendants
wrongful act or omission.
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of
moral damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical, mental
or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a
culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act
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or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE & RADIO Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
CORPORATION VS COURT OF performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
APPEALS
and observe honesty and good faith.
[G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989]
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
21 would be proper.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs.
ROMEO A. JADER
G.R. No. 132344
February 17,
2000
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for

misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all
the requirements for graduation when such is not the case?
Petitioner (University of the East), in belatedly informing
respondent (Jader) of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing
for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for
abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction
unconscientious. It is the school that has access to those
information and it is only the school that can compel its professors
to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with
respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades.
Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the
way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their
compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that
hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and
exclusive control over the professors with respect to the
submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive
control means that no other person or entity had any control over
the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.
Article 22
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Article 26
TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO
[G.R. No. L-19671. November 29,
1965]
The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself

in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction
between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard
to what will justify interference. A parent is liable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but
he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and
from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where
his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts
under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference
are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the
parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may
in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her
protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his
child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been
applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is
equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
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ST.
LOUIS
REALTY Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in
CORPORATION, vs. COURT OF Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and
APPEALS and CONRADO J. omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
ARAMIL
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the
[G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like
the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written
1984]
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by
the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence
from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his
private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.
Article 36
CHING VS. CA
[G.R. No. 110844. April 27, 2000]
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
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but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.It
comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial
question, the law,in no uncertain terms, requires the concurrence of
two essential requisites, to wit:
a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
ARTHUR TE VS COURT OF A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
APPEALS
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it
2000]
to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
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prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
G.R. No. 137110
August 1, 2000
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO
a.k.a. VINCENT G.
MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent
Morigo v. People
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06,
2004]
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable
marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the
Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
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Sps. Yu vs. PCIB
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every

circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held
that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that
we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good
faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes
into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of
Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession is but an incident in the land
registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise
from the existence of the two actions. The basic issue in the former is
whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to have the property
repurchased or resold to a mortgagors successor-in-interest
(petitioner); while that in the latter is merely whether the
respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory
period for redemption has expired. The two cases, assuming both are
pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction
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independent of each other. Both are civil in nature.
Donato vs. Luna
[G.R. No. 53642, April 15, 1988]
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner

Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to
the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in
the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the
same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do
not exist in the case at bar.
Art 37-51
Quimiguing v. Icao
[G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970]
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A

conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn
child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said
child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if
as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament
may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the
death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the
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Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition
that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article
40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that
the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent
to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in
his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the
Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out.
Geluz vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-16439, July
1961
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury

20, or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if
no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if
a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same
was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born
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alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
Limjuco vs. Estate of Pedro
Fragante
[G.R. No. L-770. April 27, 1948]
Question(Issue):
Whether or not the estate of the deceased(Fragrante) may be
extended an artificial juridical personality.
Answer(Doctrine):
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying
reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate
of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising
such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent
as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially
the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the
jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State,
supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the
purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . .
..
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite
just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the
civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must
be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise
these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against
being deprived of property without due process of law, or the
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it
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was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no
less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in
others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons
figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived
after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the
instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its
final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the
opposite course.
Dumlao v. Quality Plastics 70 Summons; Service of summons on a dead person is void There is
SCRA 472
no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired
[G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976] over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. As far as Oria
was concerned, the lower courts judgment against him in Civil Case
No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not,
and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no
more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
Commissioner of Immigration
[G.R. No. L-21289. October 4,
1971]
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be

overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously
deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in
extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
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allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113
Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and
Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be
satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the
Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as head of
the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the
family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity
and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose
preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216,
Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country,
there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband
and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that
of the other. (See De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should
likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of husband and
wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband
should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be
the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th
Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of the wife
follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicile became her domicile." And the presumption under
Philippine law being that the property relations of husband and wife
are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code),
the income of one is also that of the other.
Frivaldo v
Elections
Commission
on
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec

Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in totoby Comelec En
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[G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996]
Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory
after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having
been issued by this Honorable Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was
already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee
adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were
legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final
and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen
absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and
holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988
elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and
can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent
Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had
decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus
disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections. However, there is no record of any "final
judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the
Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the
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proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme
Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of
the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court,
however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is
because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter
lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again, as sthe occasion demands.
Romualdez v. Comelec [GR NO.
119976. September 18, 1995]
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of

civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic ,this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based
on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi,
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or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as
his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various
reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction
quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
50

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