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RELIGIONAND POLITICSWORLDWIDE
PippaNorris
Hat'uanl Uniaersit_y
RonaldInglehart
Uniaersitl of Mihi.qut
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A ReligiousRevival in Post-Communist
Europe?
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a long time-series, we think that the best alternarive way to probe into
long-term trends is to examinesurveyscarried out during the rggos using
generational comparisons, based on the assumption that the artitudes toward religion that were instilled during a given generation'sformative years
will leavelasting tracesin subsequentyears.If we find substantialintergenerational differences within given countries, they suggest (although they
do not prove) the direction in which prevailing rends are moving. \4rhere
important cross-national differencesare evident, such as contTastsbetween
a relatively religious Romania and a reladvely secularEstonia, then we need
to explore their causesat the societal level, examining the role of such factors as state reguladon of religious insdrutions, and the impact of human
development indicators.
A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST.COMMUNIST
EUROPE?
ll3
ll4
have only a cursory knowledge of common Orthodox beliefs and many also
believein astrologl',magic, reincarnation, and so on. The RussianOrthodox
Church is respectedbut only a minoriry of the people describethemselves
as Orthodox. Despite the grou.ing number of churchesand parishesacross
the country Kaariainen found that Russiansgo to church less often than
other Europeans.SSome have also einphasized that new forms of "individualized" spiriruaiiq' outside the church are emerging in Cenual and
Eastern Europe.6
If the processof secularizationis relatedto human developmentand existential securi6', as the evidence presentedearlier in this book suggests,then
we might expect the long-term erosion of religiosiq' acrossa broad range
of post-Communist societiesto be more complex than simpler versions of
modernization theory suggest.\\here living standardshave gradually risen
in the region, this should tend to erode religiosity gradually over succeeding birth cohorts, astradidonal secularizationtheory suggests.On the other
hand, the collapseof liring standrrds and the disappearanceof the welfare
state tiat occurred during the past decadewould lead us to expect a shortterm rez,iaalof religiosiw in low- to moderate-income societies,especially
for the more mlnerable seg:nentsof the population such as the elderly living on dwindling state pensionsrvhile facing hyperinflation in food and fuel
costs.Widespread feelings of existentialinsecurity were also engenderedby
the sudden inroducdon of neo-liberal free markets,which produced severe
recessions,throwing millions of public sector employeesout of work; and
where household savingsare threatened by hyperinfladon (asin Azerbaijan
and Belarus);where political stability and government leadershipis undermined by scandalsover corruption or a banking crisis;and where etlrnic conflict sharplv worsensor where domestic securiryis threatenedby secessionist
movements,asin the Chechnya conflict.7 In the most dramatic case,the disintegration of the tbrmer Yugoslar.ianrepublic led to the outbreak of bloody
civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,heightening ethno-religious identities and
the salienceof religiosity among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim communities co-existing in the Balkans.The tieory of secularizationbasedon
existential security therefore predicts tlat the processof societalmodernization in post-Communist Europe would tend to generatea long-term linear decline ofreligiosiry over successivebirth cohorts, but that this gradual
ffansformation w'ould tend to be offset by short-term factors linked u'ith the
collapseof communism. Thus (r) itwill onlvoccur in those Cenual and East
European countries that have experienceda long-term processof human
development and economic equaliry (z) it will be clearestamong the most
secureand affluent social sectors,and also(3) specificcountries in the region
A RELICIOUS
REVIVALIN POST.COMMUNIST
EUROPE?
ll5
ri
tl
iii
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EUROPE?
A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST-COMMUNIST
tt7
degreeof ethno-religious homogeneity and fractionalization.Any systematic study therefore will need to utilize multivariate analysiscontrolling
for tle intervening factors that could affect the relationship betu'een agJe
and religiosin'.
The most successful post-Communist societies, such as Poland,
Hungary Siovakia,Slovenia,and the Czech Repubiic, havedevelopedstable
representativedemocracieswith multiparty competition, free elections,and
thriving civic societies.Wtth economiesthat adjustedrelativel,vsuccessfully
to the free market, and positive ratesof economic growth, by the end of z ooo
thcscnrtions achieied per capitaincomesranging from $8,oooto $r6,ooo.
Just over a decadeafter achieving independence,these countries entered
dre European Union and NATO. The Baltic states,Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia also engineered a fairlv rapid transition from a Soviet-swle command economl.to the free market and integration with M/estern Europe.
By contrast, econornic groilth and progress on human rights and political liberties proved sluggish, or even failed outright, in many other former
Communist nations. Russianper capita GDP fell by 6% per year during
the r99os, while economic inequality (measuredby the GINI coefficient)
roseto the highest level in the region, and the averagelife expectanry declined sharply.Belarusunder PresidentLukashenko experiencedeconomic
stagnationand decline, experiencing a 3"/o fall in per capita GDP fiom
tggo-rggg, together with hyperinflation of consumer prices, and rigged
elections.The countries of the South Caucusesand Central Asia are characterizedby failing economies,repressiveregimesrvith no transition to even
competitive elections, and endemic poverty and hardship. Azerbaijan has
considerablereservoirsof oil and gas,but GDP fell by a massiveg.6o/"annually during the rg9os, and the ruling regime has often been criticized for
extensivecorruption and vote rigging. K)'rgyzstan has experienced flawed
parliamentaryand presidentialelections,the harassmentand imprisonment
of opposition leaders,and the closure of dissident newspapers,as well as
negativeanlual economic gror.rth during the last decade.In this country
nith averageper capitaincome around $z,4zo, the economy has failed: factories remain closed, unemployrnent has soared, and malnutrition is rife.
After the breakdoun of Soviet control, Balkan societieswithin the former
Yugoslaviadescendedinto chaos and the bloody Bosnian war, fueled by
deep-rootedethnic conflict.
In short, post-Communist societieshave shown very diverse rates of
progFesstoward democratizarion and economic development, and the
historical reladonships between church and srate also differed radically.
Johnston suggeststhat public religiosity continues to be relatively high
n8
ll9
GenerationalChangein Religiosity
Becausetime-seriesdata covering a reasonablylong period of time (suchas
the five decadesthat were used to test secularization in Western countries)
arenot availablefrom the ex-Communist countries,we will usegenerational
comparisonsof the nvenw-two post-Communist societiescovered in the
World Values Sun'ey 04"V.S)as a proxy indicator of long-tenn change. We
will compare linear and logged regressionmodels to seewhich provides a
better fit to the data. Our revised version of secularization tieory implies
that we should find a linear relationship between age and religious participation, with religiosity falling through successivebirtl cohorts, in the
economically more developed societies. If, however, we find no significant
age-relateddifferences;or that the young are more religious than the old; or
a cun'ilinear relationship between age and religiosity, it wiil tend to refute
our theory (and we will we need to explore further the causesof any apparent religious revival among the younger generation). We will also compare
patternsof religiosiryin given societies.to seeu-hetherpost-Communist
countriesvary systen-ratically
accordingto their level of human development
andeconomic equaliq', as predicted by the theory of secularizationand existentialsecuriry- or u'hether state regulation of religious institutions and
religiouspluralism provesa more conl'incing explanation,asthe supply-side
thesiscontends.As in previous chapters,our core dependentvariableswill
be religious ualues,measured by the importance of religion, and religious
particiPation,as indicated by frequency of attendance at servicesof worship,
and by frequency of prayer. For comparison with the work of Greeley, we
will also determine rvhether any generational differences exist in a range
of common religious beliefs.Ingeneralwe anticipate that generationaldifferenceswill be sftongestwith religious aalues,although if they exist, these
will also tend to be linked with one's patterns of religious behaaiorThble 5.r presentsthe results of the fitted regressionmodels for age in
vears,using all the pooled surveysin post-Communist Europe from r995
to 2oor. The resultsof the models show that for all the dependentvariables
exceptone (belief in life after death) dre linear models provide a slightly
betterfit than the logged ones.Among all post-Communist societies,across
nearlyallindicators,we find that (r) religiositywas stronger among the older
generationthan among the young; and (z) the age-relateddifferencestend
to be linear, rather than curvilinear.'e This is precisely the pattern that is
predictedby the theory ofsecularization and existentialsecurity.
To illustrate these patterns graphically, and to help examine variadons
acrossthese counries, the trends by birth cohort are shown for religious
il
t20
RELIGIOUSPARTICIPAIION
Religiousparticipation
Frequencyof pr.ryer
VALUES
RELIGIOUS
Importanceof religion
r-^^-+-^^^
ttllPUI
tdttLt
^t
ul
a^:
uuu
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
Believe in God
Believe in life after death
Believe in hell
Believe in heaven
Believe in soul
.006
.0 3 9
Logged,Age Effects
srg.
slg.
.000
.000
.005
.032
gKH""ru
r2l
.000
.000
0,4
.026
.0 1 6
.000
.000
.022
.013
.000
.000
.0 0 8
.0 0 1
.0 0 1
.0 0 1
.0 0 0
.000
.000
.000
.000
N/s
.006
.002
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
N/s
.000
N/s
4.2
0.0
S o u r c e : W o r l d V a l u e s Su r ve v, p o o le d 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 1 .
values(in liizure 5.r) and for religious participation (Figure 5.2). Linear
and logged reqression models fbr the effectsof age on religious valuesand
participation ll'ere also run for each nation. Regardlessof whether we focus on religious values or religious participation, the resultsshow two clear
patterns. First, there is a clear overall decline in all indicators ofreligiosity
acrosssuccessivebirth cohorts; the older generationsare almost alwayssignificandy more religious than the young. Second,there are important differencesin levelsof religiosiq'in post-Communist societiestoday,similar to
tiose we have already observedin Western Europe. Poland, Romania, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, tend to be consistendy more religious
Macedonia
Romania
Russian Federation
ENN
NE NK
Poland
NorEs: The models represent the results of individual-level regression analysis models
where age (in ve.rrs) was regressed as a linear or logged variable on indicators of
r e l i g i o s i t y , w i t h o ut a n y p r io r co n tr o ls, u sin g cu r ve fi t. The coeffi ci ents represent the
a m o u n t o f v a r i . r n ce ( Rr ) in r e lig io sity, a n d th e sig n ificanceof the rel ati onshi p,expl ai ned
R el i gi ous val ues:
b y a g e . N : 1 S ,5 9 5 ; N/s : No t sig n ifica n t; Sig . : 51gn1i 1.ance.
" H o w i m p o r r a n r r s r e ftg lo n L n yo u r life i" Ye r y [4 ) , rather [3). not very (2) or not
at all (t). Religious participation: "Do you attend reliSious selices severol times a
week. once o rpeek, a few times during, the year. onae a year or |ess, or never?" The
percentage that repoiled attending religious services "several times o week" or "once c
raeek." Frequency of prayer: QI99: 'Hour often do yolt pray to God outside of reLigious
s e r u r c e s /t \ / o u l d yo u sa y...Eu e r y d a y ( 7 ) . m o r e th un once a w eek (6). once a w eek
( 5 ) . a t l e a s tt > n c ea m o n th 1 4 ) . se ve r a ltim e s a ye a r ( J), l ess often (2). never (1)." Mean
frequency per type of societl'. Importance of God scale: "How important is God in your
life? Please u.setlzls scole to Lndicate - 10 means uery [mportant ond 1 means not ot aII
important." Mean per nation. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief in
G o d , i n h e a v e n , i n h e ll, in life a fte r d e a th , a n d in wh ether peopl e have a soul .
Lithuania
Ukraine
tttl
h
l\
lrttl\l
2.0 4.0 6,0 8.0
Cohort ol birth
Slovakia
Slovenia
Yuooslavia
|I
ll: : _l
1 -l
2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Cohort of birth
than East German\', Estonia, and Montenegro. For the moment, we will
leaveasidet}re causesof these cross-nationalcontrasts(which could be due
. to such factors as the historical relationship between church and state, or
i
differences
in levelsof human develop*..r} These cross-nationalcontrasts
. areinteresting in themselves: the countries where the older generation is
'most seculargenerally display relatively flat patterns acrosssuccessivebirth
gohorts- while in those countries in which the older generation is relatively religious, we find a more dramatic decline in religiosiry among tlre
younger cohorts. In other words, we find much stronger indications of
il
CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIGION A N D P OLITIC S
t22
n
ti
0 .6
0 .4
I3
o .2
]^:-==l
0 .0
06
c;
0 .4
o .2
0 .0
ffi
l :' l
Lithuania
0 .6
i
vq)
o 02
0 .0
[-l
1\l
r_-l
Romania
0 .6
>t
=9
0 .4
g3
0 .2
0 .0
0 .6
3E 0 .4
g8
0 .2
0 .0
{-----l
l>\
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\-=l
)l
s.e.
3t 4
n
1l
SOCIALBACKGROUND
Age (linearin yearsJ
Malegender(0 women/i men)
Education(4-pointscalelow to high)
Income(l0-pointscalelow to high)
l.-= -l
Macedonia
N---l
l-\
Beta
(io
".o
016
.002
(H D r1ee8)
Esionia
1\
r23
A RELIGIOUS
IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE?
REVIVAL
. 001
. 0r 7
. 0\ 2
. 003
.008
-.04i
.074
- . 023
.050
.000
.000
. 000
. 594
. 010
. 308
. 000
.3t2
.006
. 232
. 000
1. 10
1. 67
.56s
- . 080
. 046
. 025
.023
. 080
.10_s
. 377
. 130
- . 004
.000
. 000
. 000
N/ s
RELIGIOUSVALUESAND BELIEFS
Importance
of religion( -pointscale
Iow to highj
Reiigiousbeliefs(5-pointscale)
I >>l
Russian Federation
. 001
- . 164
. 207
- . 018
Slovakia
Slovenis
1> IN N
[--l
1-=
l:l
'a'J"'.
:ir'';"
:ir'lon'a'J.'^
Figure 5.2. ReligiousParticipationby Cohort of Birth. Note: Religiouspartici
pation fthe proportion that attendedchurch at leastweekly) by cohort of birth,
with the regressionline of the trend. Source:World Values Survey,pooled
I 990-2001.
historical change in some countries than in others. The generationalcontrastsare most marked in Hungary Nloldova, and Romania, and lessevident
in some otier nations rvith a more secularolder generation, such asin East
Germany, Estonia, and Lawia. These trends are strikingly similar whether
the comparisons are based on the importance of religious values, aftendance at servicesof worship, or the frequenry of prayer, which enhances
our confidencethat we are dealing v'it}r a robust and reliable phenomenon.
To control for the many other factors that could affect the relationship
between age and religiosity, we will use multivariate analysisto confirm
TYPEOF RELIGIOUSFAITH
Protestant
Catholic
Orthodox
Muslim
Constant
R2
- ) , . 097
. 453
NorE: Models use ordinary ieast squares regression analysis with religious participation (7-point scale measuring frequency of attendance at services of worshipJ as
the dependent variable measured at individual level in 22 post-Communist societies.
The table lists the unstandardized regression coefficient (BJ, the standard error
(s.e.),the standardi zedregres s tonc oeffi c i ent [B eta), and the s i gni fi c anc e(S i g.1of
the coefficients. N : 32,348. Religious participation: "Dct you attend religious serulces
seueraltimes cLveek, once a veek, a few times dtLing the year, once a year or Less,
or neuerl" The percentage that reported attending religious services "several iimes a
week" or "once a rveek." Importance of religion scale: "Hou' important ls rellglon ln
your Ltfe?' 4-point scale. Religious beliefs: Whether respondents expressed belief in
God, in heaven, in hell, in life after death, and in whether people have a soul. Type
of religious faith: Dummy variables (0/i) for whether the respondent belonged to
each type of major world religion.
Source: World Vaiues Survev. oooled 1990-2001.
124
A RELIGIOUS
REV]VAL
IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE'
I25
il
as the standard Herfindahl indicator for each country, ranging from zero
to one.
StateRegulation of Religion
A related hypothesis developedby Greeley argues rhat state regulation of
religion in the Soviet union restricted the churches, but that a religious
revival occurred after the fall of communism in countries where there is
a srong constitutional division between church and state, protecting religiousfreedom of worship and toleration of different denominations,without hindrance to particular sectsand faiths (which, of course,would tend
to enhancethe degree of religious pluralism). In Communist China, for example,observerssuggestthar the statecontinues to activelvrepress,ban, or
deterreligious practices,exemplified by the prosecutions,killings, torrure,
andarrestspracticed since r999 againstmembers of the Falun Gong cult.,'
To examinethis argument, we need to make a systematiccomparison of
state-churchreladons, and the degree of religious tolerance that now exists.To generatesuch a comparison,the degreeof religious freedorn in the
twenty-sevennation statesin post-communist Europe was classifiedbased
on information for each country contained in the U.S. State Department
report on lTtternatiznal ReligiousFreedom,zoo2, comprehensive compari^
sonof stateregulation and restrictions of all world
faiths.'l As discussedin
Chapter 2,,the Religious Freedom Index that w.edeveloped focusesupon
the relationship of the state and church, including issuessuch aswhether the
constirudon limits freedom of religion, whether the government restricrs
some denominations, cults, or sects,and whether there is an established
church.The index v'as classifiedaccording to the rwenq criteria listed in
AppendixC, with eachitem codedo/r. The zo-poinr scalewas then reversed
so that a higher score representsgreater religious freedom.
ru
.ii
ff
'fi
rf
,l
liff
lf
:;i
ifi
SocietalDevelopment
For comparison, we also examined how far the indicators of reiigiosiry
correlatedwith the Human Development Index and also with change in
per capitaGDP from r99o ro zooo (measuredin Purchasing Power parity
estimatesin u.S. dollars), both of which are regarded as core indicators of
societalmodernization and human security.
The simple correlarions in Table 5.3, without any prior controls, show
that,despitethe legacyof sevendecadesof Soviet repressionof the church,
fie Religious Freedom Index was .,ot4[\..nt1y
relared (at rhe .o5
level)to any of the indicators of religioqity ,rs.d in this srudy,whether of
rif
CASE ST UDIES OF R E LIC ION A N D P OLITIC S
t26
Europe
Table 5.3. ExplainingSocietal-LevelReligiosityin Post-Communist
ReligiousMcrket
Indicators
SocietalDevelopment
lndicotors
Slg.
Slg.
R Slg.
R Sig.
N.
Nctrons
ITELIGIOUS
PARTICIPATION
lieligiousparticipation .011
-.305
I{ow oftenpray?
-.466-.747--
- . 069
- . 060
-.118
-.r23
22
14
I{ELIGIOUSVALUES
irnportanceof religion -.335
-.333
irnportanceof God
-.285
'032
-.467-
-.468-.590..
20
-.62r-.
-.3 1 ,3
-.2 7 5
.0 3 5
-.0 9 1
-.693"
- .102
2l
20
-.3 9 6
-.3 5 6
-.2 2 8
-.0 9 8
-.1 2 9
.3 9 9
-.3 9 9
-.-+ u
-.5 9 5 .-
-.489-.332
-.673--
z0
f1
I{ELIGIOUSBELIEFS
l3elieve in god
llelieve in life
after death
Believe in hell
i3elieve in heaven
iielieve in soul
21
20
NSTE:Macro-level regression models of the impact of the reiigious market and societal
development indicators on the dependent variables in 22 posfCommunist societies,
.Co r r e la tio n is sig n ifica n t ( Sig.) at the 0.05 Ievel [2-tai l ed).
wit hou t a n y p r i o r c o n t ro ls.
**Correlatior.r is significant at the 0.01 level (Z-tailed). Rehgious Freedom Index, 2002:
see the Technical Appendix at the end of Chapter 6, Table A6.1, and text for details.
This is ar-rexpanded and updated version of the Chaves and Cann (1992) scaie. Religiow
plrLralism: The Herfind-altl Ind.ex of religious pluralism or fractionalization, flom Alesina
et al. 2003. See Chapter 4 note 32 for details of its construction. Humon DeveLopment
Index, 1998: Index based on longevity, literacy, and education, and per capita GDP (in
PPP), UNDP Humon Deuelopment Repoft 2002, New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press.
Change in Per Capita Gross Dornestlc Product, i990-2000: world Bank, world Deuelopment
[ndicators. 2002.
Source: World Values Survev, pooied 1990-2001.
participation, values, or beliefs. (Jf course this could be due in part to the
limited number of cases,but even if this conventional testis relaxed,the correlation coefhcients that did emerge rvere usually negatiue,which is in the
opposite direction to that suggestedby religrousmarket theory. The results
suggestthat greater religious lieedom in post-Communist nations is associated with louet., not higher, levels of religiosiqy.Religious pluralism was
A RELIGIOUS
REVI\AL IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE]
t27
I|[
ii
'll
,d
il
tfr
t28
A RELIGIOUS
REVIVALIN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE]
Beta
129
;lt
10
sig.
Aze
5.97
-.602
.008
Geo
RELIGIOUSMARKETS
ReligiousFreedomtnde.x(20 points
from low to high)
Religiouspluralismscale
-1 .4 1 6
Conslant
R2
2 2 .2
.3 3 2
-.022
.024 -.176
.381
Mac
1.86
- .146 .459
i$
Cro
.
Uk.
Pol
a
frung
. tlovk
HUS
sI
34
(\
NorE: Models use ordinary least squares regression analysis with mean religious values
(the lO-point scale measuring importance of God) as the dependent variable measured
at societal level in 19 post-Communist societies. The table lists the unstandardized
regression coefficient (Bl, the standard error (s.e.), the standardized regression
c oef f i c i e n t [ B e t a ) , a n d th e sig n ifica n ce o f th e co e fficie nts (S i g.). The smal l number
of cases (19) created problems of multi-collineanty and instability when the type of
religious culture was introduced (because of the close association between Catholicism
and the societies which were highest in human development and in religiosityl, so this
variable was excluded from the final model. See Figure 5.3. The growth in per capita
GDP was also closely correlated with the Human Development lndex, so this was also
dropped to avoid problems of multi-collineairy. lmportonce of religion scole: "How
important ls God in your lifel" ]0-point scale. Human Deuelopment lndex, 1998'.Index
based on lon8evity, literacy, and education, and per capita GDP (in PPP); UNDP Human
DeveLopment Report 2002. New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press. ReLgious Freedom
Ind.ex'. 2}-point measure explained in the text and in the Technical Appendix, Table
A6.1, at the end of Chapter 6. Relryious pLuroLism: The Herfindahl index of relSious
pLuralism or fractionalizotion, from Alesina et al. 2003. See Chapter 4 note 32 for details
of its c o n s t r u c t i o n .
Religious
culture
Slov
a
Lirh
a
Esl
=J
. Muslim
'
Czech
I
6Z
E
Orthodox
^ Protestant
r RomanCatholic
F1
Rsq= 9.4264
o
./
.,|;
f:
it
rf
ii
HumanDevelopment
Index1998
rlili
ili
i.i
Religiousculture
. Muslim
o
64
' Orthodox
(r^
" Protestant
bJ
o
o
. RomanCatholic
6Z
E
91
Rsq= 0.4040
2000
4000
6000
Sooo
10000
W
;
130
l3l
worship is also expandedaspart of human rights and democratic liberalization. In poorer and lessder.elopedpost-communist societies,by conrasr,
religion remains a vital force in people'slives, and aurhoritarian statesin
the region limit religious liberties, just as they consistentiyresrrict hurnan
rights in other spheres.
Religious
culture
. Muslim
' Orthodox
rn +
^ Protestant
o3
()
-
. BomanCatholic
E,
oo_
R s q= 6 . 1 2 6 1
L'I
50
70
60
80
90
100
Low -- Religious
FreedomIndex-- High
Aze
Rom
Geo
Alb
Mol
Cro'
rArm
w
o
Bc
N4ac
------
Likr
--_
Pol
I
O<
ar
Slov
r
Religious
culture
--------Edlel
. Muslim
Hung
. Slovk
' a But
Rus
' ]-
' Orthodox
LIIN
a
/11
=4
^ Protestant
o
()
c
r RomanCatholic
t:'
czech
t
o
oF^
B s q= 0 . 0 1 3 3
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Low - - R e l i g i o u sp l u ra l i s m-- h i g h
Figure 5.4. ReligiousValues,ReligiousPluralism,and the ReligiousFreedom
Index. NotqiSee the text for details of the 2O-pointReligiousFreedomIndex.
Source:WorlihValuesSurvey,pooled I 981-2001.
Conclusions
There are manv reasonswhv patterns of secularizationin post-Communist
Furope mighr plausiblv be expectedto dil1-erfrom those we have already
found in the west. The role of the statein restricti'g religion under communism is u'ell establishedand rve do not need to documenr its history
here.'4But the kev question for us is whether this repressionactuallv generated the erosion of mass spirirualiw in the soviet bloc, or whether it
may have exacerbated,but not necessarilycaused,a long-term growth of
secularizationin this region which parallelssimilar developmentsin other
countries.The fact that \A/esternEuropean democracieshave a long history of religious tolerance, human rights, and civic liberties during the
twentieth cenrury means that the comparison of these regions provides an
exceptionallvu'ell-designed"narural experiment" to rest the "bottorn-up"
and "top-down" claims in the sociology of religion.
The generational comparisonssuggestthat there has been a rong-term
decline of reiigiosiw across succeeding generations in post-communist
Europe,and rve found no convincing evidenceof a cun ilinear pattern from
the generadonalcomparisons,suggestingthat the younger generarion has
not experienceda significanrrer.ivalof religious r-alues,beliefs,or behanor.
r{oreover, the cross-nationalcomparisonsindicate that the cross-national
differencesthat do remain important today can be satisfactorilyexplained
by levels of human development among post-communist narions, just as
thesefactors explain pafterns elsewhere.The supplv-side tl-resisthat religiousmarkets are crirical, so rhat participadon is determined by reliqious
piuralism and the lack of state regulation of church institutions, is given
no positivesupport from the evidence;instead,the opposite position seems
to be the case.It is the more homogenous religious cultures, exemplified
by the role of catholicism in Poland, which have best-preservedfaith in
God and habirual church aftendance,not rhe most plural. And todav the
post-communisr stareswith the greatesrregulation of the church *.n or.,
to be the most religious, not the least. we argue that this is no accident;
r32
ro
rN sEEKTNG
popular commentators
provocative
and controversial thesis of a "clash of civilizations." This account emphasized that the end of the Cold War brought
argued:
In the nez;;uorld,...the most pervasive,important and dangerous conllicts
u'ill not be berween social classes,rich and poor, or other economically de6ned groups. but berween people belonging to different culrural entities.
Tiibal s'ars and ethnic conflicts u'ill occur within cir,'ilizations . . . And the
most dangerous culrural conflicts are those along the fault lines betqeen
ciriiizations. . . For forty-five years the Iron Curtain was the central dividing
line in Europe. That line has moved severalhundred miles east. It is now
the line separatingpeoples of \Vestern Christianiry',on the one hand, fiorn
Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the otier.'
rj
.;
l:li
For Huntington,
nch and poor nations, have been overshadowed in the tv!'eni)*-first cenrury
by Weberian culrure.
This influential account appeared to offer insights into the causesof
violent ethno-religious conflicts exemplified by Bosnia, the Caucuses,the
Middle East, and Kashmir. It seemed to explain rhe failure of politicai
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