133408

Sir Jomar Cuartero, R43

Research Paper

Marcos and Society

ABSTRACT
Ferdinand Marcos, ex-President of the Philippines, is guilty of a variety of well-documented crimes,
including the embezzlement of public funds, human rights abuses and any number of unknown
illegalities. This paper will seek to examine the social and cultural values and norms held uniquely by the
Filipino people which allowed Marcos to exploit Philippine society. This paper will seek to prove that
certain Filipino values were not only necessary to the success of Marcoss actions, but also acted as an
auxiliary enabler, almost an accessory, to these Marcos-directed crimes. It will also seek to prove that
Marcos deliberately manipulated these values under the complete knowledge of what his policies,
including certain propagandist creations, were capable of doing. The paper will seek to do this by
providing professional analysis by other academics as well as various historical facts as data which will
then be processed and interpreted to formulate an argument. This paper will also attempt to apply certain
theories and models to the actions of both the Filipino people collectively, the condition of democracy and
Marcoss beliefs and actions to further the argument. The first argument will cover Frank Lynchs concept
of social acceptance and the Filipino hiya while the second argument will cover the utang na loob and
the culture of Patronage in the Philippine context, all of which will be in regards to Marcoss actions,
policies and directives. This will include, though will not be limited to, a short history of these Philippine
social values as well as in what setting and sense they were influenced.
After repeated research, consistent revision and constant improvement, this paper has sufficient evidence
and rationale to propose and verify its thesis that Marcos did indeed take advantage of social factors and
that these social factors were, in vice versa, crucial to Marcoss success. Six frequently used words in this

paper will be: the utang which refers to a debt of gratitude, hiya which is shame, manipulation,
social, cultural and values.
INTRODUCTION
On December 30 of 1965, Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralin Marcos became the 10 th President of the
Republic of the Philippines. Though debate remains on the overall effect or even the intention of Marcosera policies, what is undisputed (and which this paper holds to be true) is that during the two decade-long
tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos, there existed a state of infidelity, a national condition wherein a
regime-sanctioned adulterism of the public funds (and by extension, public trust) existed in nearly every
aspect of government service, virtually transforming the democratic Philippine republic into a Marcos-led
kleptocratic police-state . During his 21-uninterrupted years in the office of the Chief Executive, Marcos
was accused of advocating and being directly involved in widespread public corruption, cronyism, the
embezzlement of government funds and human rights repressions [1]. These criminal acts eventually
factored into the peaceful people-backed ouster that led to Marcoss self-exile in 1986 [2].
This paper will be examining some of the individual philosophies of thought, via a socio-analytical
approach, leading to the enactment of various articles of legislation, both tangible and intangible in
design, during the Marcos-era and their effects on prevailing Philippine social orders under the
framework of the New Society, a general term used by this paper to encompass all economic, cultural
and security-related policies as well as singular actions advocated and encouraged by the Marcos
administration in order to encourage communal change and to justify increasing militarization against a
growing insurgency. What was the state of the Philippine liberal democracy under Marcos? How did this
change over time? What particular cultural values were exploited by Marcos and his allies to allow them
to abuse their positions of authority with impunity? What sort of political or social philosophy did Marcos
use to justify his actions? These are some of the questions that this paper seeks to answer by proving that
Marcos manipulated popular Filipino cultural ideals, such as that of nationalism, Filipinism, and the

long-held tradition of utang na loob, among others, on a grand scale by utilizing populist cultural policies
to deliberately mislead the Filipino public and divert attention away from the human rights abuses, policy
misstepping and the large-scale inefficacy of his governance; thus providing a basis from which assorted
intellectuals interested in events crucial to the later development of the modern Philippine political polity
and contemporary society in general, specifically the events leading up to the EDSA Revolution.
Such a study using a uniquely cultural and psychological approach by a neophyte new to the academic
field has not, insofar as known, been undertaken previously; hopefully contributing to the broad expanse
of existing literature and historical analysis on the Marcos regime and the Marcos persona itself.
Propaganda and the Emotional Society
Marcos, throughout his career, has consistently fabricated fictions regarding his life, his work and even
his wife. According to the estimable Sterling Seagrave in his book The Marcos Dynasty, Ferdinand
Marcos has repeatedly lied about his past, providing flattering images of his life to highly-paid
biographers, detailing himself as a superbright child of a poor but honest family as well a WWII war
veteran with an impeccable record, among others. It is later revealed, though not widely-known, that a US
Army investigation found Marcoss WWII claims to be false and even criminal and that his father was
not only a powerful Chinese magistrate but a leading member of one of the six richest and most
powerful clans in the islands. [1] This explains the relative ease with which Marcos rose to Congressional
office as well as his later connections within the wealthy Chinese business community, an interest group
crucial to the success of Marcoss economic banditry.
But how did Marcos manage to persuade millions of Filipinos that such outright falsehoods were actually
undeniable facts? Seagrave mentions that several biographies written about Marcos by high-profile
journalists helped to consolidate the myth, but also notes that such a propagandist endeavor could not
have succeeded without the support of a supremely-powerful group, a group which helped to popularize
the biographies and newspaper articles as realities. This group is the United States government, a nation

with a foreign policy keen on sustaining whatever pro-West regime decided to support them in their Cold
War efforts against Communism. Seagrave, and several other authors acknowledge that Marcoss
administration would never have lasted so long without the public or secret approval of the United States.
However, this paper holds that although foreign influence and external supporters are major contributors
to Marcoss regime and by extension the confabulation of Philippine society; Philippine society itself is
an important factor.
Analysts and academics agree that Philippine society is, by nature, emotional [2]; that is, the heavy
inclination by a collective group towards considering emotional elements as determinants in dealing with
various problems or issues. A crucial aspect of this is the almost-constant sensitivity to the feelings and
thoughts of others that a Filipino has, what Frank Lynch calls social acceptance. Lynch describes this as
the emphasis placed on pleasant interaction () and the means taken to assure it wherein one is taken
by ones fellows for what he is, or believes he is, and is treated in accordance with his status. Lynch
clarifies by differentiating between American social acceptance and the Philippine version by arguing that
while the average American achieves peace () by agreement to disagree; the average Filipino is more
likely to achieve peace by simply blurring the differences between two opposing views or by agreement
not to disagree at least openly. Lynch furthers the idea by saying that the Filipino sees no reason why
conflict should be courted when silence or evasive speech will do; essentially arguing that Filipinos
prefer to avoid conflict rather than confront it. To refuse conformity to this perception of social
acceptance (for example, by being deliberately blunt in slandering another) does have its consequences.
Hiya, as Lynch describes, is a universal social sanction (that) enforces conformity with all aspects of
the social code and is the Filipino equivalent of shame. [3] In essence, it is that uncomfortable feeling
that accompanies awareness of being in a socially unacceptable position.
Though some will counter that Lynchs study is from an age long past, saying that many of the
characteristics of Philippine culture and society mentioned by Lynch have revolted from past

generalizations; one contends that the idea of social acceptance is central to the functioning of Philippine
society and is one of the primary aspects of the aforementioned Filipino emotionality.
Assuming the predominance of this uniquely Filipino character, it is easy to see the inability of the
Philippine political culture and society in general to correctly respond to Marcoss blatant propaganda.
Seagrave says that even the most respected journals in the United States began quoting from one
particularly successful biography [4]; After that, who was to challenge the authenticity of the Marcos
legend? (Seagrave, 4) Given the inherent trust most Filipinos have towards the validity of overseas
written works in contrast to their own local papers [5], Filipinos found their beliefs justified in the
publication of these Marcos biographies. So, to the average Filipino mind, Marcos was something akin to
the Philippiness global ambassador, a physical manifestation of the best and brightest that the Philippine
islands could offer to the international beauty pageant of liberal, pro-West Third World leaders. With
emotions and nationalistic pride forefront in the Filipino mindset, how could anyone possibly criticize
Marcos, another Filipino, after being cited in so many foreign papers and periodicals referring to him as
nothing short of a war hero? Marcos received massive public approval boosts from the publishing of these
printed fantasies, swinging votes in Marcoss direction at a critical stage during the 1965 Presidential
Elections.
And since the Filipino will not insist on an idea or upon a course of action without a modicum of relative
popular support or at least the knowledge that whatever deed the individual undertakes or act he condones
will not place him in a socially-awkward or socially-disadvantaged position with respect to the rest of his
particular social class (the idea of the social class also prevalent in Philippine tradition), any critics,
both in the academic field or in the household, more or less had their opinions quashed; or were simply
ignored by the majority (the latter event occurring to those brave few who did decide to publish their
views in writing). Or, more likely, they may have simply chosen to remain silent. Faultfinders kept their
opinions to themselves out of the subconscious fear of hiya, or because they did not see sufficient
incentive to overcome their natural state of peace by supporting a dissenting view with respect to the

Filipino preference of non-confrontation. Thusly, these detractors could only watch helpless as Marcos
rose to the Office of the President in spite of their reservations in him. In fact, given time, those detractors
most likely ended up altering their opinions of Marcos to conform to the rest of societys version of
Marcos. It was only during the decline in Marcoss popularity that mentions of Marcoss dishonesty
began appearing in discussions within the House of Representatives.
The Establishment and the Etiquette of Bribery
Scholars agree that, since the colonial era, Philippine society (and with independence, the state) has been
dominated by the concept of Patronage - an informal relationship between persons of unequal status and
powers, which imposes reciprocal obligations of a different kind on each of the parties [6]; and this
phenomenon has been carried over into contemporary times, exploited countlessly by any number of
politicians and by opportunistic businesspeople to curry favor, expand their respective power bases, and
to gain wealth (often through unscrupulous, extortive measures). Varying degrees of Patronage exist,
affecting interactions within the political, economic, and social arenas, going so far as to influence the
fine arts and cultural sectors. In a classic political example, a regional governor attempts to solicit the
support of local community leaders during the period before local elections. These local community
leaders will then deliver votes of their respective communities, and the regional governor (upon winning)
will then reward the local leaders with positions of power and influence or via some other method of
payment (the most blatant form being a monetary reward direct bribery). Marcos and his Establishment
(the Marcos-led oligarchy) were not exceptions to this, and, arguably, the success of their actions and
policies can largely be attributed to their expert manipulation of this particular social circumstance.
However, while the idea of Patronage has been well-documented and exhaustibly detailed in various
academic papers transnationally (the phenomena not limited to the Philippine setting) [7], what is not as
well-known is that there exists a distinctively Filipino trait which has specifically fathered Patronage
within the Philippine context, ingraining Patronage into the activity of modern social orders and allowing

it to subsist in nearly every level of society; inevitably shaping person-to-person relationships and altering
political dynamics of power and authority. This cultural trait bears nearly identical features as to that of
Patronage, but is genuine and exceptional in its own manner.
Marshall Sahlins calls this cultural phenomenon, in the general sense, reciprocity [8]. Scholars broadly
describe it as referring to the non-market exchange of goods or labor ranging from direct barter
(immediate exchange) to forms of gift exchange where a return is expected eventually. However, there are
dissenters, some arguing that the idea of reciprocity is so broad and so general, it could mean almost
anything making it meaningless. [9] But this paper holds that reciprocity is a quantifiable if abstract
concept, a valid approach in studying an observable social occurrence. Reciprocity and, by extension, the
gift exchange economy [10] (which relates to a more direct, physical trade of goods) has been
extensively discussed in anthropological circles, with thinkers like John Locke and Adam Smith viewing
it as vital to the function of a free-market economy [11]; while a whole plethora of literature exists on the
subject.
However, in fulfillment of this research papers limitations, we will seek to undertake a more Filipinospecific approach; and thus we refer to Mary Hollnsteiners work on reciprocity and her studies regarding
its utility and function in small-town Filipino environments. Hollnsteiner further details reciprocity in the
overall sense as being that principle of behavior wherein every service received, solicited or not,
demands a return, the nature and proportion of the return determined by the relative statuses of the parties
involved and the kind of exchange at issue [12]. Hollnsteiner classifies reciprocity into three separate
categories: contractual reciprocity, quasi-contractual reciprocity, and the utang na loob (Hollnsteiner, 234). But for the purposes of this paper, the term utang na loob will be used to describe the theory of
reciprocity and the ideas entailed therein as well as its associated political ramifications, with respect to
the Filipino setting.

Utang na loob, literally meaning debt from within, or more colloquially as debt of gratitude,
correspondingly takes off from the provided definition of Filipino reciprocity. The difference lays in the
reasoning that while reciprocity can refer to any non-market exchange of goods where an eventual
return is expected as mentioned, utang na loob is characterized by unequal repayment with no prior
agreement, explicit or implicit, on the form or quantity of the return. This means that no actual physical
discussion occurs between the client and the patron as to when (after the client receives a good or a form
of service from the patron) the client must return a demanded service expected by the patron, though the
patron does not explicitly demand anything. Such a system could only possibly function so extremely in a
highly emotional society, to which the social structure of the Philippines overwhelmingly qualifies. The
client and the patron both recognize their duties towards performing a particular service, and
subconsciously accept their roles in the hierarchy of reciprocity and the utang.
However, the utang by itself is not inherently evil or bad, but its nature gives it the capacity to be
auxiliary to the firm establishment of Patronage in the traditional and civil operation of Philippine society.
This is due to the fact that the component attributes of both Patronage and the utang are nearly
indistinguishable: both cater to a patrimonial relationship between two groups or individuals, both are
common occurrences in day-to-day economic and social cycles, and neither are fundamentally criminal or
immoral, though they can be devised to purpose in such a manner.
But Patronage and the utang are not simply evolved from matters of nothing. The roots of these social
principles are found within Philippine history and its extreme transitions through varying degrees of
statehood, radically transforming from that of an archipelago of scattered communities into that of a
Spanish colony; until becoming an American client-state and then finally achieving independence (though
on a limited basis), but without developing the stable political culture founded on democratic ideals
necessary to progress beyond its imperialist past, in contrast to nations with unwavering ideals of
egalitarianism like the modern United States or the past French Republic. Baluyut notes that reciprocity
was transformed within the context of colonial convention where the land-holding elites, also known as

caciques, greatly diminished the peasantrys bargaining position, paving the way for a national
oligarchy. And, with the advent of American occupation, the patron-client relationship was only
enhanced, granting the native elite with opportunities to expand its power base. (Baluyut, 2-4)
Essentially, the Philippines has lacked a single self-determinant group or event from which to merge farflung regions with vaguely disparate cultures and traditions into a distinct whole (such as a Founding
Father figure); thus preventing the Philippines from becoming a truly joined nation.
And, not unaware of these cultural, social and historical phenomena, Marcos set out to begin performing a
service for the Filipino people, with no less than his controversial wife Imelda leading the cultural
rediscovery. Though veritable mountains of literature have been written about Marcos and his
governance, similar hills of written works have set out to examine and profile the First Lady. To the
interest of many, Imelda has done what Seagrave describes as something no other Filipino First Lady
had ever done; she became active in national affairs. One of her biographers, Kerima Polotan, described
Imeldas later actions in a single sentence She would sow beauty where she could. (Seagrave, 189)
Thusly, in 1966 and at the behest of his wife, Marcos signed Executive Order 30 which officially created
the Cultural Center of the Philippines. Marcos appointed Imelda as chairperson of the CCPs sevenmember Board of Trustees, and, under her, the CCP instituted numerous programs, including the creation
of the National Artists Award. (Baluyut, 11- 6, 26-7) Imelda also assumed other personal social welfare
programs, such as the Save-a-Life-in-Every-Barrio project, Christmas bags, home gardens and disaster
relief (Seagrave, 190).

But these policies were not without criticism and were most certainly not devoid of classic Marcos
misdirection. In February of 1969, Senator Benigno Aquino vociferously attacked Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos, alleging that the CCP was an illegal agency for its lack of Congressional approval since the
creation of a cultural body was a legislative function, something that the Executive was incapable of

doing. Aquino was, of course, duly ignored by the soon-to-be totalitarian Marcos regime which dodged
legal challenges under the constitutional protection of immunity. (Baluyut, 21-3) Jaime Ferrer also
acknowledged that vices and venalities were already present in the first years of the Marcos
administration, noting that during many such Imelda-led drives for the poor, all checks were made out
to Imelda and deposited in her name and were thusly not used for the poor. When word got around of
Imeldas thievery, companies and philanthropic groups sent goods instead, but that Imelda still withheld
food bags for a day or so (even during disasters) until each could be tagged A Gift from the First
Lady. (Seagrave, 190) Even the funding for the CCP and related projects was processed via shady
dealings from questionable sources, with 3.5M dollars of the Philippines veteran education fund
realigned for the CCP with the approval of the American government. Dozens of unvouchered, entirely
discretionary grants were also provided by the Johnson administration to the Marcoses for their continued
support of the United States and its Cold War efforts, hidden under masks of being intended for different
military, social or state projects, eventually totaling 195.4M dollars. Even stranger, very little of this
amount seems to have reached its supposed destination, mysteriously disappearing into governmentcontrolled banks run by personal friends of the Marcoses. (Seagrave, 191-5)
So, as the principal architects of several policies envisioned to instigate a social revolution by
centralizing the idea of the Filipino, the Marcoses (and his allies by extension), in the eyes of the
common man, became the patrons of the arts and protectors of the Filipino heritage. What many failed
to notice was that Marcos had no genuine ambition to transform Philippine society into a legitimate and
genuine democratic state. However, this fact was, arguably, nearly invisible at first. In his writings,
Marcos separately references to egalitarian ideals, saying that to establish such a liberal society, Filipinos
must use their communal, humanist value system to serve the ends of the democratic revolution. He
even speaks of the importance of social institutions, while advocating the incorporation of values
indigenous to the client society in a framework for universal values. [14] This is, in essence, in line with
what Kamrava describes as a viable democracy, a state upheld by a liberal democratic constitution,

and built on an entrenched tradition of societal autonomy. [15] These assorted intellectual texts probably
provided a basis from which a groundswell of Marcos support could legitimately spring, and most likely
did enough to appease Marcoss Western supporters of his continued loyalty to American policy.
But Marcos contradicts his own self-proclaimed dedication to the genuine democratic ideal when he
broadly endorses the Philippine political culture for being populist, personalist, and individualist,
manifesting itself in the politician. He justifies this by describing the relationship between the average
politician and the average Filipino, noting that the Filipino normally sees the politician as the provider
of all things, someone who anyone can approach for any want or need beyond their own ability. [16] This
effectively becomes an ideology contrary to the characteristics of a viable democracy, sponsoring what
Kamrava calls a subject political culture where there is a one-way, downward flow of influence from
the political top to the social base, and society's norms and values toward the larger body politic are at
best passive and at worst nonexistent (Kamrava, 77). Therefore, contrary to creating the Philippines in
the image of a viable democracy as Marcos proposes, Marcos actually wanted to create a delegative
democracy, a type of quasi-democracy where the protection and integrity of democracy are delegated to
one man () where the importance of every other institution of democracy - the parliament, political
parties, electoral procedures, etc. - pales in comparison to that of the presidency." (Kamrava, 98) This is,
without a doubt, the quintessential manifestation of the culture of Patronage and the political avatar of the
social utang.
Thusly, Marcos became the de facto and de jure patron of the people, while the latter devolved into a
mere client in the two-party relationship of patronage. The policies took propaganda-like form through
various mass-information mediums such as education, cultural works and the fine arts. This particular
Marcosian pursuit of social reformation through political action has come to be collectively known as the
Bagong Lipunan (New Society), the collective phrase used to describe all Marcos-era policies used in
justification for a rapid democratization of the Philippines, eventually culminating in human rights
abuses called salvaging, a process in which various secret police arms systematically kidnapped, jailed,

tortured and murdered political opponents of the Marcos regime under direct orders from Marcos and his
subordinates. These human rights abuses were only discovered after the fall of the Marcos regime when
the veil of blanket propaganda was lifted and the widely-rumored abductions were confirmed.
And so, through varying methods of money laundering and the long-term embezzlement of public funds,
Marcos was able to create a grand gift, or some would say a bribe, to the Filipino people in the form of
the CPP and its attached social development programs, altogether fashioning a society that felt
emotionally gratuitous to the Marcos administration, a people who felt they owed an utang towards the
Marcoses in spite of the latters blatant, unabashed and total betrayal of the Filipino public and their trust.
In fulfillment of societys utang, the Filipino people once again elected the Marcoses to the same position
in the next general elections in spite of the governments utter failure in upholding its promises; the
people even widely supporting the declaration of martial law in 1972; a proclamation that threatened the
very democratic principles that the country was supposed to be founded on, fooled by the Marcoses
clever exploitation of existing cultural norms and values in order to enrich themselves and their close
allies. People saw their continued support of Marcos as their duty, and followed through with it as such.
Any criticisms were once against either ignored or shouted down, the hiya of society restricting the
behavior of the anti-Marcos minority against the overwhelming majority of Filipinos, even though
Marcos was murdering the very constituents he was supposed to protect.
CONCLUSION
After more than two decades of some of the worst forms of corruption in the history of the Philippines
and the frequent mockery of the democratic ideal, Marcos fled the country. The millions who were tired
of Marcoss crimes, his inefficiency, and the utter lack of either social or economic progress rose up in a
popular revolution and Marcos, with advice from his foreign supporters, exiled himself to Hawaii.
But this paper holds that Marcos was not solely to blame. Marcos did not threaten the Filipino people
with the sword (at least initially) nor did he formulate his policies against overwhelming opposition.

Instead, Marcos administered his poison by offering a metaphorical fig leaf to the Filipino people,
packaging his sins under wraps of gift paper and ribbons. With the subtle social norms of the utang, hiya,
and social acceptance at the fore, the Filipino people unilaterally chose to support and sustain the crimes
of the Marcos regime, either knowingly or unknowingly providing their assent; or, at least refusing to
oppose the Establishment in any manner meaningful enough to create valid change. Arguably, the
Philippine political and social cultures and its appendages can be said to be accessory to the
mismanagement of domestic, fiscal and foreign policy that characterizes the Marcos administration,
creating the avenue with which the Marcoses could mislead and trick the Filipino people. It acted as the
key exploited to access the secrets of Philippine society, and Marcos turned this key so successfully that
for 21-years, his power went nearly unchallenged by any significant resistance. Social acceptance and
hiya prevented the tiny minority from moving the vast majority, while the long-standing utang and the
different systems of Patronage prevented the majority of the Philippine population from seeing through
Marcoss skillfully laid shroud of lies and half-truths and peer into the regime-sanctioned delinquencies
and felonies that characterized the era under Martial Law.
However, this paper does have its own limitations, which it accepts. This paper does not sufficiently cover
some of the other important aspects of Marcoss rule, such as by providing further scrutiny on things such
as the nature of oligarchical rule in the Philippines, the damaging effects of many of Marcoss economic
and social policies, the political black-ops within the Philippine-American relationship during the Cold
War, and the greater application of the numerous political models (Kamravas 6 different democracies,
etc.) to the state and circumstance of the Philippine democracy, nor does it cover the various other
unmentioned social factors which contributed to Marcoss success (and there are many). Future papers
should take into account that while the Marcos-era is full of possible research topics and thesis arguments,
one should remain specific, narrowly-anchored and consistent lest he fall into inefficient broadness
inherent in certain novice academic writings.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.) For Every Tear A Victory, by Hartzell Spence. Seagrave says that it is Spences biography which
spoke of a heroic Marcos legend, more than anything that began altering public perceptions in
both the Philippines and the United States, lending Marcos a ring of validity; and the book was
widely supported by the United States government, in line with their foreign policy. The book
was published in 1964, nearly around the same time as the run-up to the Presidential elections.
2.) Though many would doubt this, it is clear that many Filipinos are more inclined to respect the
claims and facts of information provided by foreign particulars that agree with their own
opinions (or the opinions theyd like themselves to believe) more than they would the statements
of local papers. This trust probably stems from the Filipinos mistrust in their own government
and their own local media centers; though this conviction may be misplaced given that foreign
publications are just as likely to lie (knowingly or unknowingly) as local publications given just
the right amount of pressure.
3.) Seagrave, Sterling. The Marcos Dynasty. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988. Print, p.3-8
4.) Based on appraisals from Four Readings on Philippine Values, especially the essays Social
Acceptance by Frank Lynch and Reciprocity in Lowland Philippines by Mary R. Hollnsteiner.
5.) Lynch, Frank. Four Readings on Philippine Values. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University
Press, 1968. Print, p. 3, 6, 16
6.) Baluyut, Pearlie Rose S. Institutions and Icons of Patronage. Manila: UST Publishing House,
2012. Print, p.3
7.) For further details, see Comparative Studies in Society and History by Joel-Kahn or Politics,
Patronage, and Class Conflict in Central Luzon by Willem Wolters.
8.) Sahlins, Marshall. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine & Artherton Inc., 1972. Print, p. 185-9
9.) Cheal, David. The Gift Economy. New York: Routledge, 1988. Print, p. 1-19
10.) Graeber, David. Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value : the false coin of our own dreams.
New York: Palgrave, 2001. Print, p. 217
11.) Weiner, Annette. Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While Giving. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992. Print, p. 28-33
12.) Hollnsteiner, Mary. Reciprocity in the Lowland Philippines. Quezon City: 1968. Print, p. 22
13.) Rafael, Vicente. Patronage and Pornography. Durnham: Duke University Press, 2000. Print, p.
296

14.) Marcos, Ferdinand. An Ideology for Filipinos. Manila: Marcos Foundation Inc., 1983. Print, p. 720
15.)Kamrava, Mehran. Cultural Politics in the Third World. London: UCL Press, 1999. Print. p.97
16.)
Marcos, Ferdinand. The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines. Manila: Marcos
Foundation Inc., 1977. Print, p. 51-60