Legal Technique and Logic

1 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC
G.R. No. 134625
August 31, 1999
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788,
dated December 16, 1997, which granted private
respondent's application for a writ of mandatory
injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13,
1998,
denying petitioners'
motion
for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William
Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder
of a Philippine visitor's visa. Sometime in April
1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the University of the
Philippines College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.
After completing the units of course work
required in her doctoral program, private
respondent went on a two-year leave of absence
to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the
Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General
Office Assistant at the International Right to Life
Federation in Rome. She returned to the
Philippines in July 1991 to work on her
dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines."
On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda,
chairperson of the U.P. Department of
Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena
Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate
Program Director, certifying that private
respondent had finished her dissertation and was
ready for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested
that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993
but, in a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr.
Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5,
1993. Named as members of the dissertation
panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin
Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and

Isagani Medina, the last included as the dean's
representative.
After
going over
private respondent's
dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean
Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in
private respondent's dissertation that was lifted,
without proper acknowledgment, from Balfour's
Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern
Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward
Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edye's
article entitled "Description of the Various
Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by
the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel,
Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their
Coasting Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic
Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal,
volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).
Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to
defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993. Four
(4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private
respondent a passing mark for her oral defense
by affixing their signatures on the approval form.
These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason, Skandarajah,
and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following
qualification to his signature:
Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the
suggestions I made during the successful defense
of her P.D. thesis.
Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but
added the following comment:
Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsangayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng
dissertation.
Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his
signature:
Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang
pagbabago at ipakita sa panel and bound copies.5
In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to
her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private respondent
requested a meeting with the panel members,
especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the

amendments suggested by the panel members
during the oral defense. The meeting was held at
the dean's office with Dean Paz, private
respondent, and a majority of the defense panel
present.6 During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked
that a majority vote of the panel members was
sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding
the failure to obtain the consent of the Dean's
representative.
On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty
Assembly approved private respondent's
graduation pending submission of final copies of
her dissertation.
In April 1993, private respondent submitted
copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to
Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who
expressed their assent to the dissertation.
Petitioners maintain, however, that private
respondent did not incorporate the revisions
suggested by the panel members in the final
copies of her dissertation.
Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation
in Dr. Teodoro's office April 15, 1993 and
proceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP
without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr.
Teodoro, relying on Dean Paz's March 5, 1993
statement.
Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while
Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form.7
Dean Paz then accepted private respondent's
dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course
requirements for the doctorate degree in
Anthropology.
In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993,
private respondent expressed concern over
matters related to her dissertation. She sought to
explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not
affixed to the revision approval form. Private
respondent said that since she already had the
approval of a majority of the panel members, she
no longer showed her dissertation to Dr. Medina
nor tried to obtain the latter's signature on the

revision approval form. She likewise expressed
her disappointment over the CSSP administration
and charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with
maliciously working for the disapproval of her
dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against
encouraging perfidious acts against her.
On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to
approve the list of candidates for graduation for
the second semester of school year 1992-1993.
The list, which was endorsed to the Board of
Regents for final approval, included private
respondent's name.
On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr.
Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private
respondent's name from the list of candidates for
graduation, pending clarification of the problems
regarding her dissertation. Her letter reads: 8
Abril 21, 1993
Dr.
Milagros
Ibe
Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Unibersidad
ng
Pilipinas
Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.
Mahal na Dr. Ibe,
Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na huwag munang
isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y]
William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga
bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology)
ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang
bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para sa
oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga
akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya.
Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang
ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms.
Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para
mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas
na degree ng Unibersidad.
(Sgd.)
CONSUELO
Dekano
JOAQUIN-PAZ,
Ph.D.
respondent's thesis which were lifted from

sources without proper or due acknowledgment.
Apparently, however, Dean Paz's letter did not

reach the Board of Regents on time, because the
next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the
University Council's recommendation for the
graduation of qualified students, including
private respondent. Two days later, April 24,
1993, private respondent graduated with the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.
On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly

unanimously approved the recommendation to
withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree
and forwarded its recommendation to the
University Council. The University Council, in
turn, approved and endorsed the same
recommendation to the Board of Regents on
August 16, 1993.
On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter

to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that
she would not be granted an academic clearance
unless she substantiated the accusations
contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993.
On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents

deferred action on the recommendation to study
the legal implications of its approval.
In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private

respondent claimed that Dr. Medina's
unfavorable attitude towards her dissertation was
a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr.
Francisco in the list of panel members; that she
made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and
Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation;
and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment.
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1,
1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private
respondent with plagiarism and recommended
that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.9
On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad
hoc committee, composed of faculty members
from various disciplines and chaired by Eva
Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism
charge against private respondent. Meanwhile,
she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor,
Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree
conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.
In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz
informed private respondent of the charges
against her.
On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee
submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least
ninety (90) instances or portions in private
Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23,

1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman
summoned private respondent to a meeting on
the same day and asked her to submit her written
explanation to the charges against her.
During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed
private respondent of the charges and provided
her a copy of the findings of the investigating
committee. Private respondent, on the other
hand, submitted her written explanation in a
letter dated September 25, 1993.
Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993
between Chancellor Roman and private
respondent to discuss her answer to the charges.
A third meeting was scheduled on October 27,
1993 but private respondent did not attend it,
alleging that the Board of Regents had already
decided her case before she could be fully heard.
On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to
Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging that
some members of the U.P. administration were
playing politics in her case. 14 She sent another
letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand
Fabella, Chairman of the Board of Regents,
complaining that she had not been afforded due
process and claiming that U.P. could no longer
withdraw her degree since her dissertation had
already been accepted by the CSSP.
Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services

justified the position of the University Council in
its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of
Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24,
1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon.
On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter
to the Board of Regents requesting a reinvestigation of her case. She stressed that under
the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary
tribunal which had jurisdiction to decide cases of
dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree
already conferred was not one of the authorized
penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal
could impose.
On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided
to release private respondent's transcript of
grades without annotation although it showed
that private respondent passed her dissertation
with 12 units of credit.
On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas
issued Administrative Order No. 94-94
constituting a special committee composed of
senior faculty members from the U.P. units
outside Diliman to review the University
Council's recommendation to withdraw private
respondent's degree. With the approval of the
Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive
Committee, Posadas created a five-man
committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla,
with members selected from a list of nominees
screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a
member of the Board of Regents. On August 13,
1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee
and private respondent met at U.P. Los Baos.
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P.
Diliman Registrar released to private respondent
a copy of her transcript of grades and certificate
of graduation.
In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated
September 1, 1994, private respondent requested
that the Zafaralla committee be provided with
copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the
U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct

and Discipline, her letter-response to Chancellor
Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as well as all
her other communications.
On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas
obtained the Zafaralla Committee's report, signed
by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal
of private respondent's doctorate degree. The
report stated:
After going through all the pertinent documents
of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy
William, the following facts were established:
1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive
lifting from a published source word for word
and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without
any acknowledgment of the source, even by a
mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such
documented liftings were identified by the
Committee. These form part of the approximately
ninety (90) instances found by the Committee
created by the Dean of the College and
subsequently verified as correct by the Special
Committee. These instances involved the
following forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct
lifting/copying
without
acknowledgment,
full/partial lifting with improper documentation
and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in
place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of
Indianization) from an acknowledged source in
support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy
of the documents for reference); and
2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of
being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact
is, she informed the Special Committee that she
had been admitting having lifted several portions
in her dissertation from various sources since the
beginning.
In view of the overwhelming proof of massive

lifting and also on the admission of Ms.
Arokiaswamy William that she indeed
plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the
recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to
withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret
Celine Arokiaswamy William.
On the basis of the report, the University
Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended
to the Board of Regents that private respondent
be barred in the future from admission to the
University either as a student or as an employee.
On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of
Regents sent private respondent the following
letter:17
4 January 1995
Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William
Department
of
Anthropology
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:
This is to officially inform you about the action
taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and
1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16
December 1994 regarding your case, the excerpts
from the minutes of which are attached herewith.
Please be informed that the members present at
the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994
resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw
your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P.
Diliman University Council and as concurred
with by the External Review Panel composed of
senior faculty from U.P. Los Baos and U.P.
Manila. These faculty members were chosen by
lot from names submitted by the University
Councils of U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila.
In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter
requesting that you be given a good lawyer by
the Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting on
16 December 1994, suggested that you direct
your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College

of Law, U.P. Diliman.
No pronouncement as to costs.
committees, she was deprived of the opportunity

to comment or refute their findings.
SO ORDERED.
Sincerely yours,
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
(Sgd.)
VIVENCIO
R.
Secretary
of
the
and of the Board of Regents
JOSE
University
On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a

letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoez,
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights,
asking the commission's intervention. 18 In a
letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary
Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board of
Regents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her
case. She also sought an audience with the Board
of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which
request was denied by President Javier, in a letter
dated June 2, 1995.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then
filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.19 She
alleged that petitioners had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification and
without affording her procedural due process.
She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore
her degree and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 as
compensation for lost of earnings.
On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227,
rendered a decision dismissing the petition
for mandamus for lack of merit.20 Private
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower
court. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is
hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are
ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of
Ph.D. in Anthropology.
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
WRIT OFMANDAMUS AND
ORDERING
PETITIONERS
TO
RESTORE
RESPONDENT'S DOCTORAL DEGREE.
II
QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT
THE
DOCTORAL
DEGREE
GIVEN
RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE
RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER
RIGHT
TO
ENJOYMENT
OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TO
JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
III
QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING
PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.
Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to
show that she had been unlawfully excluded
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance
of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that
she failed to prove that the restoration of her
degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the
withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the
enjoyment of intellectual property.
On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted
by counsel, argue that petitioners acted arbitrarily
and with grave abuse of discretion in
withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying
the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and
that as her answer to the charges had not been
forwarded to the members of the investigating
In addition, private respondent maintains that

petitioners are estopped from, withdrawing her
doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary
to 9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and
Regulations of Student Conduct and Discipline
of the University, which according to her, does
not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a
penalty for erring students; and that only the
college committee or the student disciplinary
tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose
report must be signed by a majority of its
members.
We find petitioners' contention to be meritorious.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. In University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, this
Court ruled that the writ was not available to
restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic
freedom. In that case, a student who was found
guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for
one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition
for mandamus and obtained from the lower court
a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from
carrying out the order of suspension. In setting
aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to
dismiss the student's petition, this Court said:
[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May
29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based
on the lower court's finding that the
implementation of the disciplinary sanction of
suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the
petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his
course, and consequently, in getting a decent and
good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers

only the situation of Nadal without taking into
account the circumstances, clearly of his own
making, which led him into such a predicament.
More importantly, it has completely disregarded
the overriding issue of academic freedom which
provides more than ample justification for the
imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an
erring student of an institution of higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the
lower court should have restrained itself from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by
Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful
cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on
the part of the petitioner being required. It is of
no avail against an official or government agency
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment.
In this case, the trial court dismissed private
respondent's petition precisely on grounds of
academic freedom but the Court of Appeals
reversed holding that private respondent was
denied due process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the proceedings
taken by the College Assembly culminating in its
recommendation to the University Council for
the withdrawal of petitioner's Ph.D. degree,
petitioner was not given the chance to be heard
until after the withdrawal of the degree was
consummated. Petitioner's subsequent letters to
the U.P. President proved unavailing.
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case
shows, however, various committees had been
formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all
the investigations held, she was heard in her
defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of
the university proceedings before private
respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it
is that there were too many committee and
individual investigations conducted, although all
resulted in a finding that private respondent
committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral
dissertation on the basis of which she was

conferred the Ph.D. degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A party who has availed of the
opportunity to present his position cannot tenably
claim to have been denied due process.
In this case, private respondent was informed in
writing of the charges against her and afforded
opportunities to refute them. She was asked to
submit her written explanation, which she
forwarded on September 25, 1993. Private
respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and
the members of the Zafaralla committee to
discuss her case. In addition, she sent several
letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her
position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue
that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an
administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of
justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
require the attendance of persons whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board of
Regents.
Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be
furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla
committee as part of her right to due process.
In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, we
held:
Respondent students may not use the argument
that since they were not accorded the opportunity
to see and examine the written statements which
became the basis of petitioners' February 14,
1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process. Granting that they were denied such
opportunity, the same may not be said to detract
from the observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross
examination. An administrative proceeding

conducted to investigate students' participation in
a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. . .
In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus,
the Court of Appeals held:
First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a
doctorate degree in Anthropology. After
graduation, the contact between U.P. and
petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within
the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P.
As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and
enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall
the degree, after conferment, is not only arbitrary,
unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but a flagrant
violation of petitioner's right of enjoyment to
intellectual property.
Second. Respondents aver
graduation was a mistake.
that
petitioner's
Unfortunately this "mistake" was arrived at after

almost a year after graduation. Considering that
the members of the thesis panel, the College
Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all
men and women of the highest intellectual
acumen and integrity, as respondents themselves
aver, suspicion is aroused that the alleged
"mistake" might not be the cause of withdrawal
but some other hidden agenda which respondents
do not wish to reveal.
At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight
the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a
consequence of the acts complained of. Justice
and equity demand that this be rectified by
restoring the degree conferred to her after her
compliance with the academic and other related
requirements.
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that
"[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." This is nothing
new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution36 likewise provided for the academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of

higher learning. As pointed out by this Court
in Garcia
vs. Faculty
Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a
freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of the
students." If such institution of higher learning
can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can
confer the honor and distinction of being its
graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an
honor or distinction was obtained through fraud,
a university has the right to revoke or withdraw
the honor or distinction it has thus conferred.
This freedom of a university does not terminate
upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court
of Appeals held. For it is precisely the
"graduation" of such a student that is in question.
It is noteworthy that the investigation of private
respondent's case began before her graduation. If
she was able to join the graduation ceremonies
on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of
Regents finally decided she should not have been
allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to
institutions of higher learning, for the
constitutional grant of academic freedom, to
quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to
be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is
the highest governing body of the University of
the Philippines.38It has the power confer degrees
upon the recommendation of the University
Council. If follows that if the conferment of a
degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of
Regents is also empowered, subject to the
observance of due process, to withdraw what it
has granted without violating a student's rights.
An institution of higher learning cannot be
powerless if it discovers that an academic degree
it has conferred is not rightfully deserved.

Nothing can be more objectionable than
bestowing a university's highest academic degree
upon an individual who has obtained the same
through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic
excellence is the university's concern. It should
be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take
measures to protect itself from serious threats to
its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to
the right to pursue their educaiton, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue
its academic freedom and in the process has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is
not jeopardized.
In the case at bar, the Board of Regents
determined, after due investigation conducted by
a committee composed of faculty members from
different U.P. units, that private respondent
committed no less than ninety (90) instances of
intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The
Board of Regents' decision to withdraw private
respondent's doctorate was based on documents
on record including her admission that she
committed the offense.
On the other hand, private respondent was
afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain
her side but failed to refute the charges of
plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her
responses to the charges against her were not
considered by the Board of Regents before it
rendered its decision. However, this claim was
not proven. Accordingly, we must presume
regularity in the performance of official duties in
the absence of proof to the contrary.
Very much the opposite of the position of the
Court of Appeals that, since private respondent
was no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was
no longer within the "ambit of disciplinary
powers of the U.P.," is private respondent's
contention that it is the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case
because the charge is dishonesty. Private
respondent invoke 5 of the U.P. Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline

which provides:
G.R. No. 187456
June 2, 2014
Jurisdiction. All cases involving discipline of

students under these rules shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal,
except the following cases which shall fall under
the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit;
ALABANG
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. ALABANG HILLS
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
(a) Violation of college or unit rules and

regulations by students of the college, or
PERALTA, J.:
(b) Misconduct committed by students of the

college or unit within its classrooms or premises
or in the course of an official activity;
Before the Court is a petition for review on

certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated March 27, 2009, in CAG.R. CV No. 88864.
Provided, that regional units of the University

shall have original jurisdiction over all cases
involving students of such units.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the

case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of

the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in
relation to one's studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be
punished only with suspension for at least one (1)
year.
As the above-quoted provision of 5 of the Rules
and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of the
student disciplinary tribunal extend only to
disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does not
seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as
the appellate court observed, private respondent
is no longer within "the ambit of disciplinary
powers of the U.P." Private respondent cannot
even be punished since, as she claims, the
penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative
disciplinary proceedings is suspension from the
University for at least one year. What U.P.,
through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to
protect its academic integrity by withdrawing
from private respondent an academic degree she
obtained through fraud.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition
for mandamus is
hereby
DISMISSED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
The case traces its roots to the Complaint for

Injunction and Damages filed [with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City] on
October 19, 2006 by [herein petitioner, Alabang
Development Corporation] ADC against [herein
respondents, Alabang Hills Village Association,
Inc.] AHVAI and Rafael Tinio (Tinio), President
of AHVAI. The Complaint alleged that
[petitioner] is the developer of Alabang Hills
Village and still owns certain parcels of land
therein that are yet to be sold, as well as those
considered open spaces that have not yet been
donated to [the] local government of Muntinlupa
City or the Homeowner's Association. Sometime
in September [2006], ADC learned that AHVAI
started the construction of a multi-purpose hall
and a swimming pool on one of the parcels of
land still owned by ADC without the latter's
consent and approval, and that despite demand,
AHVAI failed to desist from constructing the said
improvements. ADC thus prayed that an
injunction be issued enjoining defendants from
constructing the multi-purpose hall and the
swimming pool at the Alabang Hills Village.
In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,
AHVAI denied ADC's asseverations and claimed
that the latter has no legal capacity to sue since
its existence as a registered corporate entity was
revoked by the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003; that ADC
has no cause of action because by law it is no
longer the absolute owner but is merely holding
the property in question in trust for the benefit of
AHVAI as beneficial owner thereof; and that the
subject lot is part of the open space required by
law to be provided in the subdivision. As
counterclaim, it prayed that an order be issued
divesting ADC of the title of the property and
declaring AHVAI as owner thereof; and that
ADC be made liable for moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees.
Tinio filed his separate Answer With Compulsory
Counterclaim, practically reiterating the defenses
of AHVAI.
On January 4, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 276, rendered judgment dismissing
herein petitioner's complaint on the grounds (1)
that the latter has no personality to file the same;
(2) that the subject property "is a reserved area
for the beneficial use of the homeowners, as
mandated by law;" and (3) that the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the
RTC, has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute
between petitioner and respondents.
Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal of the RTC decision. Herein respondent
AHVAI, on the other hand, moved that it be
allowed
to
prosecute
its
compulsory
counterclaim praying, for this purpose, that the
RTC decision be amended accordingly.
In its Order dated February 20, 2007, the RTC
approved petitioner's notice of appeal but
dismissed respondent AHVAIs counterclaim on
the ground that it is dependent on petitioner's
complaint. Respondent AHVAI then filed an
appeal with the CA.
In its assailed Decision dated March 27, 2009,
the CA dismissed both appeals of petitioner and
respondent, and affirmed the decision of the
RTC. With respect to petitioner, the CA ruled that
the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's
complaint as the same was filed when petitioner

was already defunct and, as such, it no longer
had capacity to file the said complaint. As
regards, respondent AHVAIs counterclaim, the
CA held that "where there is no claim against the
[respondent], because [petitioner] is already in
existent and has no capacity to sue, the
counterclaim is improper and it must be
dismissed, more so where the complaint is
dismissed at the instance of the [respondent]."
Thus, the instant petition based on the following
grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON THE
CASE OF "COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. v.
COURT OF APPEALS" IN RESOLVING
PETITIONER'S LACK OF CAPACITY
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING LACK OF
CAPACITY OFTHE PETITIONER IN FILING
THE CASE CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER
RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RESOLVE THE ISSUE THAT PETITIONER IS
MANDATED TO CEDE PROPERTIES TO
RESPONDENT AHVAI
Anent the first assigned error, the Court does not
agree that the CA erred in relying on the case of
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. The
CA cited the case for the purpose of restating and
distinguishing the jurisprudential definition of
the terms "lack of capacity to sue" and "lack of
personality to sue;" and of applying these
definitions to the present case. Thus, the fact that,
unlike in the instant case, the corporations
involved in the Columbia case were foreign
corporations is of no moment. The definition of
the term "lack of capacity to sue" enunciated in
the said case still applies to the case at bar.
Indeed, as held by this Court and as correctly
cited by the CA in the case of Columbia: "[l]ack
of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is
not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not
have the necessary qualification to appear in the

case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims[;] 'lack of capacity to
sue' refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue,
such as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any
other general disqualifications of a party. ..." In
the instant case, petitioner lacks capacity to sue
because it no longer possesses juridical
personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse
of the three-year grace period provided under
Section 122 of the Corporation Code, as will be
discussed below.
With respect to the second assigned error,
Section 122 of the Corporation Code provides as
follows:
SEC. 122. Corporate liquidation. Every
corporation whose charter expires by its own
limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or
otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other
purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall
nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for
three (3) years after the time when it would have
been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting
and defending suits by or against it and enabling
it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and
convey its property and to distribute its assets,
but not for the purpose of continuing the business
for which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, said
corporation is authorized and empowered to
convey all of its property to trustees for the
benefit of stockholders, members, creditors, and
other persons in interest. From and after any such
conveyance by the corporation of its property in
trust for the benefit of its stockholders, members,
creditors and others in interest, all interest which
the corporation had in the property terminates,
the legal interest vests in the trustees, and the
beneficial interest in the stockholders, members,
creditors or other persons in interest.
Upon winding up of the corporate affairs, any
asset distributable to any creditor or stockholder
or member who is unknown or cannot be found
shall be escheated to the city or municipality

where such assets are located.
Except by decrease of capital stock and as
otherwise allowed by this Code, no corporation
shall distribute any of its assets or property
except upon lawful dissolution and after payment
of all its debts and liabilities.
This Court has held that:
It is to be noted that the time during which the
corporation, through its own officers, may
conduct the liquidation of its assets and sue and
be sued as a corporation is limited to three years
from the time the period of dissolution
commences; but there is no time limit within
which the trustees must complete a liquidation
placed in their hands. It is provided only (Corp.
Law, Sec. 78 now Sec. 122]) that the conveyance
to the trustees must be made within the threeyear period. It may be found impossible to
complete the work of liquidation within the
three-year period or to reduce disputed claims to
judgment. The authorities are to the effect that
suits by or against a corporation abate when it
ceased to be an entity capable of suing or being
sued (7 R.C.L., Corps., par. 750); but trustees to
whom the corporate assets have been conveyed
pursuant to the authority of Sec. 78 [now Sec.
122] may sue and be sued as such in all matters
connected with the liquidation...
In the absence of trustees, this Court ruled, thus:
Still in the absence of a board of directors or
trustees, those having any pecuniary interest in
the assets, including not only the shareholders
but likewise the creditors of the corporation,
acting for and in its behalf, might make proper
representations with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which has primary and sufficiently
broad jurisdiction in matters of this nature, for
working out a final settlement of the corporate
concerns.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that
petitioner's corporate registration was revoked on
May 26, 2003.1wphi1Based on the abovequoted provision of law, it had three years, or
until May 26, 2006, to prosecute or defend any
suit by or against it. The subject complaint,
however, was filed only on October 19, 2006,
more than three years after such revocation. It is
likewise not disputed that the subject complaint
was filed by petitioner corporation and not by its
directors or trustees. In fact, it is even averred,
albeit wrongly, in the first paragraph of the
Complaint that "[p]laintiff is a duly organized
and existing corporation under the laws of the
Philippines, with capacity to sue and be sued. x x
x"
Petitioner, nonetheless, insists that a corporation
may still sue, even after it has been dissolved and
the three-year liquidation period provided under
Section 122 of the Corporation Code has passed.
Petitioner cites the cases of Gelano v. Court of
Appeals, Knecht
v.
United
Cigarette
Corporation, and
Pepsi-Cola
Products
Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, as authority
to support its position. The Court, however,
agrees with the CA that in the abovecited cases,
the corporations involved filed their respective
complaints while they were still in existence. In
other words, they already had pending actions at
the time that their corporate existence was
terminated.
The import of this Court's ruling in the cases

cited by petitioner is that the trustee of a
corporation may continue to prosecute a case
commenced by the corporation within three years
from its dissolution until rendition of the final
judgment, even if such judgment is rendered
beyond the three-year period allowed by Section
122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is
nothing in the said cases which allows an already
defunct corporation to initiate a suit after the
lapse of the said three-year period. On the
contrary, the factual circumstances in the
abovecited cases would show that the
corporations involved therein did not initiate any
complaint after the lapse of the three-year period.
In fact, as stated above, the actions were already
pending at the time that they lost their corporate
existence.
In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint
not only after its corporate existence was
terminated but also beyond the three-year period
allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
Thus, it is clear that at the time of the filing of
the subject complaint petitioner lacks the
capacity to sue as a corporation. To allow
petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and
pursue it until final judgment, on the ground that
such complaint was filed for the sole purpose of
liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the
provisions of Section 122 of the Corporation
Code.
As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal
issue in the instant case is petitioner's capacity to
sue as a corporation and it has already been
settled that petitioner indeed lacks such capacity.
Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart
from the ruling of the CA finding it unnecessary
to delve on the other issues raised by petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180416
June 2, 2014
ADERITO Z. YUJUICO and BONIFACIO C.

SUMBILLA vs. CEZAR T. QUIAMBAO
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari from the Orders dated 4 June 2007 and
5 November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 154, of Pasig City in S.C.A. No.
3047.
The facts:
Background
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation
(STRADEC) is a domestic corporation operating
as a business development and investment
company.
On 1 March 2004, during the annual
stockholder's meeting of STRADEC, petitioner
Aderito Z. Yujuico (Yujuico) was elected as
president and chairman of the company. Yujuico
replaced respondent Cezar T. Quiambao
(Quiambao), who had been the president and
chairman of STRADEC since 1994.
With Yujuico at the helm, STRADEC appointed
petitioner Bonifacio C. Sumbilla (Sumbilla) as
treasurer and one Joselito John G. Blando
(Blando) as corporate secretary. Blando replaced
respondent Eric C. Pilapil (Pilapil), the previous
corporate secretary of STRADEC.
The Criminal Complaint
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88864, sustaining the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 06-138, is
AFFIRMED.
On 12 August 2005, petitioners filed a criminal

complaint against respondents and one Giovanni
T. Casanova (Casanova) before the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City. The
complaint was docketed in the OCP as LS. No.
PSG 05-08-07465.
The complaint accuses respondents and

Casanova of violating Section 74 in relation to
Section 144 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 or the
Corporation Code. The petitioners premise such
accusation on the following factual allegations:
Quiambao pressured Blando to make certain

entries in the stock and transfer books. After
making such entries, Blando again demanded
that he be given possession of the stock and
transfer book. Quiambao refused.
1. During the stockholders' meeting on 1 March

2004, Yujuico-as newly elected president and
chairman of STRADEC-demanded Quiambao for
the turnover of the corporate records of the
company, particularly the accounting files,
ledgers, journals and other records of the
corporation's business. Quiambao refused.
7. On 1 July 2004, Blando received an order

dated 30 June 2004 issued by the RTC, Branch
71, of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70027, which
directed him to cancel the entries he made in the
stock and transfer book. Hence, on even date,
Blando wrote letters to Quiambao and Pilapil
once again demanding for the turnover of the
stock and transfer book. Pilapil replied thru a
letter dated 2 July 2004 where he appeared to
agree to Blando's demand.
2. As it turns out, the corporate records of

STRADEC were in the possession of Casanovathe accountant of STRADEC. Casanova was
keeping custody of the said records on behalf of
Quiambao, who allegedly needed the same as
part of his defense in a pending case in court.
3. After the 1 March 2004 stockholders' meeting,
Quiambao and Casanova caused the removal of
the corporate records of STRADEC from the
company's offices in Pasig City.
4. Upon his appointment as corporate secretary
on 21 June 2004, Blando likewise demanded
Pilapil for the turnover of the stock and transfer
book of STRADEC. Pilapil refused.
5. Instead, on 25 June 2004, Pilapil proposed to
Blando to have the stock and transfer book
deposited in a safety deposit box with Equitable
PCI Bank, Kamias Road, Quezon City. Blando
acceded to the proposal and the stock and
transfer book was deposited in a safety deposit
box with the bank identified. It was agreed that
the safety deposit box may only be opened in the
presence of both Quiambao and Blando.
6. On 30 June 2004, however, Quiambao and
Pilapil withdrew the stock and transfer book
from the safety deposit box and brought it to the
offices
of
the
Stradcom
Corporation
(STRADCOM) in Quezon City. Quiambao
thereafter asked Blando to proceed to the
STRADCOM offices. Upon arriving thereat,
8. However, upon meeting with Pilapil and

Quiambao, the latter still refused to turnover the
stock and transfer book to Blando. Instead,
Blando was once again constrained to agree to a
proposal by Pilapil to have the stock and transfer
book deposited with the RTC, Branch 155, of
Pasig City. The said court, however, refused to
accept such deposit on the ground that it had no
place for safekeeping.
9. Since Quiambao and Pilapil still refused to
turnover the stock and transfer book, Blando
again acceded to have the book deposited in a
safety deposit box, this time, with the Export and
Industry Bank in San Miguel A venue, Pasig
City.
Petitioners theorize that the refusal by the
respondents and Casanova to turnover
STRADEC's corporate records and stock and
transfer book violates their right, as stockholders,
directors and officers of the corporation, to
inspect such records and book under Section 7 4
of the Corporation Code. For such violation,
petitioners conclude, respondents may be held
criminally liable pursuant to Section 144 of the
Corporation Code.
Preliminary investigation thereafter ensued.
Resolution of the OCP and the Informations
After receiving the counter-affidavits of the

respondents and Casanova, as well as the other
documentary submissions9 by the parties, the
OCP issued a Resolution dated 6 January 2006 in
I.S. No. PSG 05-08-07465. In the said resolution,
the OCP absolved Casanova but found probable
cause to hail respondents to court on two (2)
offenses: (1) for removing the stock and transfer
book of STRADEC from its principal office, and
(2) for refusing access to, and examination of, the
corporate records and the stock and transfer book
of STRADEC at its principal office.
Pursuant to the resolution,
two
(2)
informations were filed against the respondents
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Pasig City. The informations were docketed as
Criminal Case No. 89723 and Criminal Case No.
89724 and were raffled to Branch 69.
Criminal Case No. 89723 is for the offense of
removing the stock and transfer book of
STRADEC from its principal office. The
information reads:
On and/or about the period between March 1 and
June 25, 2004, inclusive, in Pasig City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above accused, being then members of the Board
of Directors and/or officers, as the case maybe,
of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation
(STRADEC, for short), conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, remove the stock and
transfer book of the said STRADEC at its
principal office at the 24th Floor, One
Magnificent Mile-CITRA City Bldg., San Miguel
A venue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, where they
should all be kept, in violation of the aforesaid
law, and to the prejudice of the said
complainants.
Criminal Case No. 89724, on the other hand,
covers the offense of refusing access to, and
examination of, the corporate records and the
stock and transfer book of STRADEC at its
principal office. The information reads:
On and/or about the period between March 1 and

June 25, 2004, inclusive, in Pasig City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above accused, being then members of the
Board of Directors and/or officers, as the case
maybe, of Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation (STRADEC, for short), conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping
and aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, refuse to
allow complainants Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and
Aderito Z. Yujuico, being then stockholders
and/or directors of STRADEC, access to, and
examination of, the corporate records, including
the stock and transfer book, of STRADEC at its
principal office at the 24th Floor, One
Magnificent Mile-CITRA Bldg., San Miguel
Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, where they
should all be kept, in violation of the aforesaid
law, and to the prejudice of the said
complainants.
merely removing the stock and transfer book of

STRADEC from its principal office-actually
charges no offense and, therefore, cannot be
sustained.
Urgent Omnibus Motion and the Dismissal of

Criminal Case No. 89723
Certiorari Petition and the Dismissal of Criminal

Case No. 89724 After their motion for partial
reconsideration was denied, respondents filed a
certiorari petition, with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO), before the
RTC of Pasig City on 27 September 2006. The
petition was docketed as S.C.A. No. 3047.
On 18 January 2006, respondents filed before the

MeTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause and To Defer
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest (Urgent Omnibus
Motion).
On 8 May 2006, the MeTC issued an
order partially granting the Urgent Omnibus
Motion. The MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No.
89723 but ordered the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against respondents in Criminal Case No.
89724.
In dismissing Criminal Case No. 89723, the
MeTC held that Section 74, in relation to Section
144, of the Corporation Code only penalizes the
act of "refus[ing] to allow any director, trustee,
stockholder or member of the corporation to
examine and copy excerpts from the records or
minutes of the corporation" and that act is
already the subject matter of Criminal Case No.
89724. Hence, the MeTC opined, Criminal Case
No. 89723-which seeks to try respondents for
Anent directing the issuance of a warrant of

arrest in Criminal Case No. 89724, the MeTC
found probable cause to do so; given the failure
of the respondents to present any evidence during
the preliminary investigation showing that they
do not have possession of the corporate records
of STRADEC or that they allowed petitioners to
inspect the corporate records and the stock and
transfer book of STRADEC.
Unsatisfied, the respondents filed a motion for
partial Reconsideration of the 8 May 2006 order
of the MeTC insofar as the disposition in
Criminal Case No. 89724 is concerned. The
MeTC, however, denied such motion on 16
August 2006.
On 16 November 2006, the RTC issued a TRO

enjoining the MeTC from conducting further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 89724 for
twenty (20) days.
On 4 June 2007, the R TC issued an
Order granting respondents' certiorari petition
and directing the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
89724. According to the RTC, the MeTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a
warrant of arrest against respondents in Criminal
Case No. 89724.
The RTC found that the finding of probable
cause against the respondents in Criminal Case
No. 89724 was not supported by the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation
but was, in fact, contradicted by them:
1. The R TC noted that, aside from the complaint

itself, no evidence was ever submitted by
petitioners to prove that they demanded and was
refused access to the corporate records of
STRADEC between 1 March to 25 June 2004.
What petitioners merely submitted is their letter
dated 6 September 2004 demanding from
respondents access to the corporate records of
STRADEC.
2. The allegations of petitioners in their
complaint, as well as 6 September 2004 letter
above-mentioned, however, are contradicted by
the sworn statement dated 1 July 2004 of
Blando wherein he attested that as early as 25
June 2004, Pilapil already turned over to him
"two binders containing the minutes, board
resolutions, articles of incorporation, copies of
contracts, correspondences and other papers of
the corporation, except the stock certificate book
and the stock and transfer book."
3. The RTC also took exception to the reason
provided by the MeTC in supporting its finding
of probable cause against the respondents. The R
TC held that it was not incumbent upon the
respondents to provide evidence proving their
innocence. Hence, the failure of the respondents
to submit evidence showing that they do not have
possession of the corporate records of
STRADEC or that they have allowed inspection
of the same cannot be taken against them much
less support a finding of probable cause against
them.
The RTC further pointed out that, at most, the
evidence on record only supports probable cause
that the respondents were withholding the stock
and transfer book of STRADEC. The RTC,
however, opined that refusing to allow inspection
of the stock and transfer book, as opposed to
refusing examination of other corporate records,
is not punishable as an offense under the
Corporation Code. Hence, the directive of the
RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 89724.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but
the R TC remained steadfast.
Hence, this petition by petitioners.

The Instant Petition
In their petition, petitioners claim that Criminal
Case No. 89724 may still be sustained against the
respondents insofar as the charge of refusing to
allow access to the stock and transfer book of
STRADEC is concerned. They argue that the R
TC made a legal blunder when it held that the
refusal to allow inspection of the stock and
transfer book of a corporation is not a punishable
offense under the Corporation Code. Petitioners
contend that such a refusal still amounts to a
violation of Section 74 of the Corporation Code,
for which Section 144 of the same code
prescribes a penalty.
OUR RULING
The RTC indeed made an inaccurate
pronouncement when it held that the act of
refusing to allow inspection of the stock and
transfer book of a corporation is not a punishable
offense under the Corporation Code. Such
refusal, when done in violation of Section 74(4)
of the Corporation Code, properly falls within the
purview of Section 144 of the same code and
thus may be penalized as an offense.
The foregoing gaffe nonetheless, We still sustain
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724 as
against the respondents.
A criminal action based on the violation of a
stockholder's right to examine or inspect the
corporate records and the stock and transfer book
of a corporation under the second and fourth
paragraphs of Section 74 of the Corporation
Code-such as Criminal Case No. 89724--can
only be maintained against corporate officers or
any other persons acting on behalf of such
corporation. The submissions of the petitioners
during the preliminary investigation, however,
clearly suggest that respondents are neither in
relation to STRADEC.
Hence, we deny the petition.
The act of ref using to allow inspection of the

stock and transfer book of a corporation,
when done in violation of Section 74(4) of
the Corporation Code, is punishable as an
offense under Section 144 of the same code.
We first address the inaccurate pronouncement of
the RTC.
Section 74 is the provision of the Corporation
Code that deals with the books a corporation is
required to keep. It reads:
Section 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer
agent. - Every corporation shall keep and
carefully preserve at its principal office a record
of all business transactions and minutes of all
meetings of stockholders or members, or of the
board of directors or trustees, in which shall be
set forth in detail the time and place of holding
the meeting, how authorized, the notice given,
whether the meeting was regular or special, if
special its object, those present and absent, and
every act done or ordered done at the meeting.
Upon the demand of any director, trustee,
stockholder or member, the time when any
director, trustee, stockholder or member entered
or left the meeting must be noted in the minutes;
and on a similar demand, the yeas and nays must
be taken on any motion or proposition, and a
record thereof carefully made. The protest of any
director, trustee, stockholder or member on any
action or proposed action must be recorded in
full on his demand.
The records of all business transactions of the
corporation and the minutes of any meetings
shall be open to inspection by any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation
at reasonable hours on business days and he may
demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from
said records or minutes, at his expense.
Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall
refuse to allow any director, trustees, stockholder
or member of the corporation to examine and
copy excerpts from its records or minutes, in
accordance with the provisions of this Code,
shall be liable to such director, trustee,

stockholder or member for damages, and in
addition, shall be guilty of an offense which shall
be punishable under Section 144 of this Code:
Provided, That if such refusal is made pursuant to
a resolution or order of the board of directors or
trustees, the liability under this section for such
action shall be imposed upon the directors or
trustees who voted for such refusal: and
Provided, further, That it shall be a defense to
any action under this section that the person
demanding to examine and copy excerpts from
the corporation's records and minutes has
improperly used any information secured through
any prior examination of the records or minutes
of such corporation or of any other corporation,
or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate
purpose in making his demand.
Stock corporations must also keep a book to be
known as the "stock and transfer book'', in which
must be kept a record of all stocks in the names
of the stockholders alphabetically arranged; the
installments paid and unpaid on all stock for
which subscription has been made, and the date
of payment of any installment; a statement of
every alienation, sale or transfer of stock made,
the date thereof, and by and to whom made; and
such other entries as the by-laws may prescribe.
The stock and transfer book shall be kept in the
principal office of the corporation or in the office
of its stock transfer agent and shall be open for
inspection by any director or stockholder of the
corporation at reasonable hours on business days.
No stock transfer agent or one engaged
principally in the business of registering transfers
of stocks in behalf of a stock corporation shall be
allowed to operate in the Philippines unless he
secures a license from the Securities and
Exchange Commission and pays a fee as may be
fixed by the Commission, which shall be
renewable annually: Provided, That a stock
corporation is not precluded from performing or
making transfer of its own stocks, in which case
all the rules and regulations imposed on stock
transfer agents, except the payment of a license
fee herein provided, shall be applicable. (5 la and

32a; P.B. No. 268.) (Emphasis supplied)
Section 144 of the Corporation Code, on the
other hand, is the general penal provision of the
Corporation Code. It reads:
Section 144. Violations of the Code. - Violations
of any of the provisions of this Code or its
amendments not otherwise specifically penalized
therein shall be punished by a fine of not less
than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not
more than ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos or by
imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the
discretion of the court. If the violation is
committed by a corporation, the same may, after
notice and hearing, be dissolved in appropriate
proceedings before the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Provided, That such dissolution
shall not preclude the institution of appropriate
action against the director, trustee or officer of
the corporation responsible for said violation:
Provided, further, That nothing in this section
shall be construed to repeal the other causes for
dissolution of a corporation provided in this
Code. (190 112 a) (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Orders, the RTC expressed its
opinion that the act of refusing to allow
inspection of the stock and transfer book, even
though it may be a violation of Section 74(4), is
not punishable as an offense under the
Corporation Code. In justifying this conclusion,
the RTC seemingly relied on the fact that, under
Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code, the
application of Section 144 is expressly
mentioned only in relation to the act of
"refus[ing] to allow any director, trustees,
stockholder or member of the corporation to
examine and copy excerpts from [the
corporation's] records or minutes" that excludes
its stock and transfer book.
We do not agree.
While Section 74 of the Corporation Code
expressly mentions the application of Section
144 only in relation to the act of "refus[ing] to

allow any director, trustees, stockholder or
member of the corporation to examine and copy
excerpts from [the corporation's] records or
minutes," the same does not mean that the latter
section no longer applies to any other possible
violations of the former section.
It must be emphasized that Section 144 already
purports to penalize "[v]iolations" of "any
provision" of the Corporation Code "not
otherwise specifically penalized therein." Hence,
we find inconsequential the fact that that Section
74 expressly mentions the application of Section
144 only to a specific act, but not with respect to
the other possible violations of the former
section.
Indeed, we find no cogent reason why Section
144 of the Corporation Code cannot be made to
apply to violations of the right of a stockholder to
inspect the stock and transfer book of a
corporation under Section 74(4) given the
already unequivocal intent of the legislature to
penalize violations of a parallel right, i.e., the
right of a stockholder or member to examine the
other records and minutes of a corporation under
Section 74(2). Certainly, all the rights guaranteed
to corporators under Section 7 4 of the
Corporation Code are mandatory for the
corporation to respect. All such rights are just the
same underpinned by the same policy
consideration of keeping public confidence in the
corporate vehicle thru an assurance of
transparency in the corporation's operations.
Verily, we find inaccurate the pronouncement of
the RTC that the act of refusing to allow
inspection of the stock and transfer book is not a
punishable offense under the Corporation Code.
Such refusal, when done in violation of Section
74(4) of the Corporation Code, properly falls
within the purview of Section 144 of the same
code and thus may be penalized as an offense.
A criminal action based on the violation of a
stockholder's right to examine or inspect the
corporate records and the stock and transfer
book of a corporation under the second and

fourth paragraphs of Section 74 of the
Corporation Code can only be maintained
against corporate officers or any other persons
acting on behalf of such corporation.
The
foregoing
notwithstanding,
and
independently of the reasons provided therefor
by the RTC, we sustain the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 89724.
Criminal Case No. 89724 accuses respondents of
denying petitioners' right to examine or inspect
the corporate records and the stock and transfer
book of STRADEC. It is thus a criminal action
that is based on the violation of the second and
fourth paragraphs of Section 7 4 of the
Corporation Code.
A perusal of the second and fourth paragraphs of
Section 74, as well as the first paragraph of the
same section, reveal that they are provisions that
obligates a corporation: they prescribe what
books or records a corporation is required to
keep; where the corporation shall keep them;
and what are the other obligations of the
corporation to its stockholders or members in
relation
to
such
books
and
records.1wphi1 Hence, by parity of reasoning,
the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74,
including the first paragraph of the same section,
can only be violated by a corporation.
It is clear then that a criminal action based on the
violation of the second or fourth paragraphs of
Section 74 can only be maintained against
corporate officers or such other persons that are
acting on behalf of the corporation. Violations of
the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74
contemplates a situation wherein a corporation,
acting thru one of its officers or agents, denies
the right of any of its stockholders to inspect the
records, minutes and the stock and transfer book
of such corporation.
The problem with the petitioners' complaint and
the evidence that they submitted during
preliminary investigation is that they do not

establish that respondents were acting on behalf
of STRADEC. Quite the contrary, the scenario
painted by the complaint is that the respondents
are merely outgoing officers of STRADEC who,
for some reason, withheld and refused to turnover the company records of STRADEC; that it
is the petitioners who are actually acting on
behalf of STRADEC; and that STRADEC is
actually merely trying to recover custody of the
withheld records.
In other words, petitioners are not actually
invoking their right to inspect the records and the
stock and transfer book of STRADEC under the
second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74.
What they seek to enforce is the proprietary right
of STRADEC to be in possession of such records
and book. Such right, though certainly legally
enforceable by other means, cannot be enforced
by a criminal prosecution based on a violation of
the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74.
That is simply not the situation contemplated by
the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74
of the Corporation Code.
For this reason, we affirm the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 89724 for lack of probable
cause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petlt10n is hereby DENIED. The Orders dated 4
June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 154, of Pasig City in S.C.A.
No. 3047, insofar as said orders effectively
dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724 pending
before Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, of
Pasig City, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 142509
March 24, 2006
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. vs THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY.
JOSE J. PIERAZ
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr.
(petitioner) seeking
to
set
aside
the
Decision dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him
of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the
appellate courts Resolution dated March 13,
2000
denying
petitioners Motion
for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the
appellate court, are as follows:
On August 18, 1995, the wife of privatecomplainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz),
retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to
her husband. The letter was open, not contained
in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on
her husbands desk. On that same day, Atty.
Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its
content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES
ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig
City,
Metro Manila
August 18, 1995
ATTY.
JOSE
J.
PIERAZ
Counsel
for
Benjamin
A.
Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila
Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile
threatening letter dated August 18, 1995,
addressed to our client; using carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your

part to continue harassing the person of Mrs.
Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila--undersigned much to his regrets shall be
constrained/compelled to file the necessary
complaint for disbarment against you.
You may proceed then with your stupidity and
suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless
for you to cite specific provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the
present case. As a matter of fact, the same shall
be used by no other than the person of Mrs.
Quingco in filing administrative charge against
you and all persons behind these nefarious
activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the
undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of
justice, so as we can prove "who is who" once
and for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic)
regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;
(Signed)
JOSE
ALEMANIA
BUATIS,
JR.
Atty-inFact
of
the
present
Court
Administrator
of
the
entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy
All concerned.
furnished:
Not personally knowing who the sender was,

Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a
communication by registered mail to said Buatis,
Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr.
dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995
to Atty. Pieraz.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis,
Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish
carabao," Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel

against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its
contents came to the knowledge not only of his
wife but of his children as well and they all
chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago
dito."
party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of

compensatory
damages;
the
amount
of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and
another amount ofP10,000.00, for exemplary
damages; to suffer all accessory penalties
provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. 5
Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as

a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty
Pieraz frail health was likewise affected and
aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.
The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer

"inutil", stupid and capable of using only carabao
English, is intended not only for the consumption
of respondent but similarly for others as a copy
of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned;
the letter was prejudicial to the good name of
respondent and an affront to his standing as a
lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed
to him, was representing a client in whose favor
he sent a demand letter to the person represented
by petitioner; the letter is libelous per se since a
defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as
set against the entire message sought to be
conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the
presumption of malice from the defamatory
imputation contained in the letter; the letter could
have been couched in a civil and respectful
manner, as the intention of petitioner was only to
advice respondent that demand was not proper
and legal but instead petitioner was seething with
hate and contempt and even influenced by
satanic intention.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant

Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at
the behest of the president of the organization
"Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga
Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a member,
Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of
his secretaries, a comment to the letter of privatecomplainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could
not recall whether he had signed that lettercomment or if it was even addressed to Atty.
Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had
made and sent another letter, this time dated
August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in
court with the counter-affidavit which he filed
before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office,
however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents,
among which was his admission that indeed, he
had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter
dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its
Decision dated April 30, 1997 finding petitioner
guilty of the crime of libel, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr.
GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art.
353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four
(4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to
Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10)
Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended
The RTC also found that since the letter was

made known or brought to the attention and
notice of other persons other than the offended
party, there was publication; and that the element
of identity was also established since the letter
was intended for respondent. It rejected
petitioners stance that the libelous letter resulted
from mistake or negligence since petitioner
boldly admitted that he had to reply to
respondents letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his
duty to do as the latter is a member of
petitioners association.
The RTC found respondent entitled to recover
compensatory damages as the immediate
tendency of the defamatory imputation was to
impair respondents reputation although no actual
pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also
awarded moral damages as well as exemplary

damages since the publication of the libelous
letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or
in a reckless disregard for the rights of
respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTCs
decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated
January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the
decision of the trial court.
The CA found that the words used in the letter
are uncalled for and defamatory in character as
they impeached the good reputation of
respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It
rejected petitioners claim that the letter is a
privileged
communication
which
would
exculpate him from liability since he failed to
come up with a valid explanation as to why he
had to resort to name calling and downgrading a
lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he
could have discharged his so called "duty" in a
more toned down fashion. It found also that there
was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be
classified as privileged.
The CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13,
2000.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari
filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:
A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS
ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL,
ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN
POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL,
DEFENDING
A
MEMBER
OF
AN
ASSOCIATION
UNDER
THREAT
OF
EJECTMENT FROM HER DWELLING
PLACE?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF
THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF
PRIVILEGE (sic) COMMUNICATION?
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE

COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT:
THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO
ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT
WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME?
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment in behalf of the People and respondent
filed his own Comment praying for the
affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us,
the
parties
submitted
their
respective
memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is whether or
not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the
CA failed to apply the ruling in People v.
Velasco that "if the act/matter charged as libelous
is only an incident in [an] act which has another
objective, the crime is not libel;" when he made
his reply to respondents letter to Mrs. Quingco
making a demand for her to vacate the premises,
his objective was to inform respondent that Mrs.
Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the
Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership
over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,
and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the
administrator of the Rodriquez estate;
communication in whatever language, either
verbal or written of a lawyer under obligation to
defend a clients cause is but a privileged
communication; the instant case is a qualified
privileged communication which is lost only by
proof of malice, however, respondent failed to
present actual proof of malice; the existence of
malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic
evidence that petitioner bore a grudge against the
offended party, or there was ill will or ill feeling
between them which existed at the time of the
publication of the defamatory imputation which
were not at all indicated by respondent in his
complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA,
there was justifiable motive in sending such a
letter which was to defend the vested interest of
the estate and to abate any move of respondent to
eject Mrs. Quingco.
Petitioner further argues that if the words used in

the libelous letter-reply would be fully
scrutinized, there is justification for the use of
those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening
letterusing carabao English" was due to the
fact that the demand letter was indeed a
threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose
as respondents client has no legal right over the
property and respondent did not file the
ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a
mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid;
that the words "Yours in Satan name" is only a
complementary greeting used in an ordinary
communication letter, which is reflected to the
sender but not to the person being communicated
and which is just the reverse of saying "Yours in
Christ".
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines
libel as a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must concur: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must
be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established
by the prosecution. There is publication in this
case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to
someone other than the person against whom it
has been written.9 Petitioners subject letter-reply
itself states that the same was copy furnished to
all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author
of the libel complained of has communicated it to
a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when
found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in
an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable

as the subject letter-reply was addressed to
respondent himself.
We shall then resolve the issues raised by
petitioner as to whether the imputation is
defamatory and malicious.
In
determining
whether
a
statement
is defamatory, the words used are to be construed
in their entirety and should be taken in their
plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons
reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of
any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid
down the rule inJimenez v. Reyes, to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley
Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following
to say on this point: "In determining whether the
specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of
construction are conspicuously applicable: (1)
That construction must be adopted which will
give to the matter such a meaning as is natural
and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand
what was uttered. (2) The published matter
alleged to be libelous must be construed as a
whole."
In applying these rules to the language of an
alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle
or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher
on being called to account. The whole question
being the effect the publication had upon the
minds of the readers, and they not having been
assisted by the offered explanation in reading the
article, it comes too late to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be, from the
words used in the publication.
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the
words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995
sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In
using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao
English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it

was written, casts aspersion on the character,
integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer
which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As
the CA said, these very words of petitioner have
caused respondent to public ridicule as even his
own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang
gago dito."
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is
defamatory; and, under the general rule laid
down in Article 354, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the
imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need
not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice
in fact), for the law already presumes that
petitioners imputation is malicious (malice in
law). A reading of petitioners subject letter-reply
showed that he malevolently castigated
respondent for writing such a demand letter to
Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said
letter which showed petitioners good intention
and justifiable motive for writing the same in
order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a
private communication made in the performance
of his moral and social duty as the attorney-infact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate
where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and
to whom respondent had written the demand
letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a privileged
communication and not libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person

to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away
with when the defamatory imputation is a
qualified privileged communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the
purview of a qualified privileged communication
under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by
petitioner, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the person who made the communication had
a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to
protect, which interest may either be his own or
of the one to whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a
board, or superior, having some interest or duty
in the matter, and who has the power to furnish
the protection sought; and (3) the statements in
the communication are made in good faith and
without malice.
While it would appear that the letter was written
by petitioner out of his social duty to a member
of the association which he heads, and was
written to respondent as a reply to the latters
demand letter sent to a member, however, a
reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to
respondent does not show any explanation
concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why
she is entitled to the premises as against the
claim of respondents client. The letter merely
contained insulting words, i.e, "lousy" and
"inutile letter using carabao English", "stupidity",
and "satan", which are totally irrelevant to his
defense of Mrs. Quingcos right over the
premises. The words as written had only the
effect of maligning respondents integrity as a
lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer

in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for so many years until his retirement
and afterwards as consultant of the same agency
and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in
an injurious way than what is necessary in
answering a demand letter which exposed
respondent to public ridicule thus negating good
faith and showing malicious intent on petitioners
part.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory
imputation made out of a legal, moral or social
duty to be privileged, such statement must be
communicated only to the person or persons who
have some interest or duty in the matter alleged,
and who have the power to furnish the protection
sought by the author of the statement. A written
letter containing libelous matter cannot be
classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated among the public. In this case,
petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to
one of her secretaries who typed the same and
made a print out of the computer. While
petitioner addressed the reply-letter to
respondent, the same letter showed that it was
copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of
selectivity is indicative of malice and is
anathema to his claim of privileged
communication. Such publication had already
created upon the minds of the readers a
circumstance which brought discredit and shame
to respondents reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged
communication, malice is presumed under
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The
presumption was not successfully rebutted by
petitioner as discussed above.
Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any
error in affirming the findings of the trial court
that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire
case for review and it becomes our duty to
correct any error, as may be found in the
appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error
or not. We find that the award of P20,000.00 as

compensatory damages should be deleted for
lack of factual basis. To be entitled to actual and
compensatory damages, there must be competent
proof constituting evidence of the actual amount
thereof. Respondent had not presented evidence
in support thereof.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes
libel by means of writings or similar means
with prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to
6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil
action which may be brought by the offended
party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose
whether to impose a single penalty or
conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose
a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment
only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, where petitioners
therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides
for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment
or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted the
prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and
instead ordered them only to pay a fine
equivalent to double the amount of the check. We
held:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are
Filipino
entrepreneurs
who
presumably
contribute to the national economy. Apparently,
they brought this appeal, believing in all good
faith, although mistakenly, that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise,
they could simply have accepted the judgment of
the trial court and applied for probation to evade
prison term. It would best serve the ends of
criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the
range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the
same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of
redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard
to the protection of the social order.
In the subsequent case of Lim v. People, we did

the same and deleted the penalty of
imprisonment and merely imposed a fine for
violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would
best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14, 2001, we
issued Administrative Circular 13-2001 which
modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by
stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay
down a rule of preference in the application of
the penalties provided for in B.P. 22.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we
find the reasons behind the imposition of fine
instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioners
case of libel. We note that this is petitioners first
offense of this nature. He never knew respondent
prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to
Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance
thereto. He appealed from the decision of the
RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely
exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the
letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner
could have applied for probation to evade prison
term but he did not do so believing that he did
not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case.
We believe that the State is concerned not only in
the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of
destructive individuals but also in redeeming the
individual for economic usefulness and other
social ends. Consequently, we delete the prison
sentence imposed on petitioner and instead
impose a fine of six thousand pesos.
This is not the first time that we removed the
penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine
instead in the crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of
Appeals, petitioner was convicted of libel and
was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine;
and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the
findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed
to a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of

Appeals
is
hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that,
in
lieu
of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon
the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand
(P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. The award of
compensatory damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-13-3132
June 4, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)
OFFICE
OF
THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR vs SARAH P. AMPONG
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from the
letter dated March 15, 2011 of Executive Judge
Jaime L. Infante (Judge Infante) of the Regional
Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province,
"Branch 38. (RTC), addressed to complainant the
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator
(OCA), inquiring about the employment status of
respondent Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court
Interpreter III of the said RTC since August 3,
1993. In the aforementioned letter, Judge Infante
informed the OCA that despite Ampong's
dismissal from service by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which dismissal was
affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received
any official information or directive from the
OCA on the matter. As such, Ampong remains
employed in the RTC and has been continuously
receiving all her monthly salary, benefits,
allowances, and the like.
The Facts
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an
administrative case against Ampong for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for
having impersonated or taken the November
1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir

(Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong
herself admitted to having committed the charges
against
her,
the
CSC
rendered
a
resolution dismissing her from service, imposing
all accessory penalties attendant to such
dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board
Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating.
Ampong moved for reconsideration on the
ground that when the said administrative case
was filed, she was already appointed to the
judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no
longer had any jurisdiction over her. Ampongs
motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to
file a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
On November 30, 2004, the CA denied

Ampongs petition and affirmed her dismissal
from service on the ground that she never raised
the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled
against her and, thus, she is estopped from
assailing the same. Similarly, on August 26,
2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for
review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her
dismissal from service in G.R. No. 167916,
entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service
Commission,
CSC-Regional
Office
No.
11" (August 26, 2008 Decision).
The OCA found that Ampongs act of

impersonating and taking the November 1991
Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers for and on behalf of another person
indeed constitutes dishonesty, a grave offense
which carries the corresponding penalty of
dismissal from service. It added that the fact that
the offense was not connected with her office or
was committed prior to her appointment in the
judiciary does not in any way exonerate her from
administrative liability as an employee of the
court.
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial

Management Office (FMO) of the OCA, which
did not receive any official directive regarding
Ampongs dismissal, continued to release her
salaries and allowances. However, in view of
Judge Infantes letter notifying the OCA of such
situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum 7 dated
September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that
starting June 2011, it had started to withhold
Ampongs salaries and allowances.
Further, the OCA found that Ampongs

appointment as Court Interpreter III did not
divest the CSC of its inherent power to discipline
employees from all branches and agencies of the
government in order to protect the integrity of the
civil service. Consequently, the CSC could
validly impose the administrative penalty of
dismissal against her, which carries with it that of
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture
of
retirement
benefits,
and
perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided.
In this relation, the OCA emphasized that the
CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong of her
civil service eligibility and, hence, could no
longer hold the position of Court Interpreter III.
In her Comment dated September 25, 2012,

Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in
G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality because it
might lead to unwarranted complications in its
enforcement. Moreover, Ampong reiterated her
argument that the CSC did not have any
jurisdiction over the case against her.
In a Memorandum dated March 27, 2013,the

OCA recommended that Ampong be found guilty
of Dishonesty for impersonating and taking the
November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers in behalf of Decir and,
thus, be dismissed from the service on the ground
that she no longer possesses the appropriate
eligibility required for her position, with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits except
accrued leave credits and with perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including
any
government-owned
and
controlled
corporation or government financial institution.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Courts resolution is

whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from
her employment as Court Interpreter III of the
RTC.
The Courts Ruling
The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.
As the records show, in the August 26, 2008
Decision, the Court had already held Ampong
administratively liable for dishonesty in
impersonating and taking the November 1991
Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers on behalf of Decir, viz.:
The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty.
It is categorized as "an act which includes the
procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil
service eligibility, the giving of assistance to
ensure the commission or procurement of the
same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any
other anomalous act which amounts to any
violation of the Civil Service examination."
[Ampong] impersonated Decir in the PBET
exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a
passing mark. By intentionally practicing a
deception to secure a passing mark, their acts
undeniably involve dishonesty.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the
"(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray." [Ampongs]
dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit
to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note
that [Ampong] should not have been appointed
as a judicial employee had this Court been made
aware of the cheating that she committed in the
civil service examinations. Be that as it may,
[Ampongs] present status as a judicial employee
is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she
deserves. (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Notably, the Court also addressed Ampongs

misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the
same case, viz.:
It is true that the CSC has administrative
jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined
under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code, the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government,
and
government-owned
or
controlled corporations. Pursuant to its
administrative authority, the CSC is granted the
power to "control, supervise, and coordinate the
Civil Service examinations." This authority
grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of
any irregularity or anomaly connected with the
examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and judicial
personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and
court personnels compliance with all laws, rules
and regulations. It may take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit
any violation. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman
cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. It
violates the specific mandate of the Constitution
granting to the Supreme Court supervisory
powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this
Court held that impersonating an examinee of a
civil service examination is an act of dishonesty.
But because the offender involved a judicial
employee under the administrative supervision of
the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary
charges before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this
Court validated.
A similar fate befell judicial personnel in

Bartolata v. Julaton, involving judicial employees
who
also
impersonated
civil
service
examinees.1wphi1 As in Sta. Ana, the CSC
likewise filed the necessary charges before the
OCA because respondents were judicial
employees. Finding respondents guilty of
dishonesty and meting the penalty of dismissal,
this Court held that "respondents machinations
reflect their dishonesty and lack of integrity,
rendering them unfit to maintain their positions
as public servants and employees of the
judiciary."
Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present
case involves a similar violation of the Civil
Service Law by a judicial employee. But this
case is slightly different in that petitioner
committed the offense before her appointment to
the judicial branch. At the time of commission,
petitioner was a public school teacher under the
administrative supervision of the DECS and, in
taking the civil service examinations, under the
CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSCsupervised PBET exam in place of another
person. When she did that, she became a party to
cheating or dishonesty in a civil servicesupervised examination.
That she committed the dishonest act before she
joined the RTC does not take her case out of the
administrative reach of the Supreme Court.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction
over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the
judiciary. (Emphases in the original; citations
omitted)
Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, which states that "a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law," Ampong could no longer seek the August
26, 2008 Decisions modification and reversal.
Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from

service on account of Ampongs Dishonesty
should be enforced in its full course. In line with
Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with
it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b)
forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c)
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
any government agency or instrumentality,
including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution.
Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the
same.
employee and does not, therefore, deserve to

remain with the Judiciary.
To clarify, however, despite Ampongs dismissal

on the ground of dishonesty, she should
nevertheless been titled to receive her accrued
leave credits, if any, pursuant to the
aforementioned provision of the URACCS,
which does not include the forfeiture of the same.
It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal
from the service, government employees are
entitled to the leave credits that they have earned
during the period of their employment. As a
matter of fairness and law, they may not be
deprived of such remuneration, which they have
earned prior to their dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
It must be stressed that every employee of the

Judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty. Like any public
servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of
honesty and integrity not only in the performance
of her official duties but also in her personal and
private dealings with other people, to preserve
the courts good name and standing. The image
of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who
work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in their professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity
of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to
meet these stringent standards set for a judicial
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the

dismissal of respondent Sarah P. Ampong, Court
Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of
Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38, on the
ground of Dishonesty. Accordingly, her
retirement and other benefits are forfeited except
accrued leave credits, and she is perpetually
disqualified from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including
any
government-owned
and
controlled
corporation or government financial institution,
effective immediately.
A.C. No. 9317

June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3615)
ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH
ADORA. RAMOS
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V.
Quiachon (complainant), against her lawyer,
Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos (respondent). The
latter represented complainant, who was then the
plaintiff in a labor case filed before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a
special proceeding case filed before the Regional
Trial Court (R TC). Complainant charges
respondent with gross negligence and deceit in
violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a
favorable decision on 26 November 2007. Upon
appeal, it was reversed and set aside by the
NLRC in its Decision dated 25 July 2008. On 24
October 2008, the NLRC also denied the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by respondent on
complainant's behalf. A Petition for Certiorari
was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it
affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the LA's
Decision. The Notice of the CA Decision was

received by respondent on 23 November 2010.
After the Petition was filed before the CA,
complainant would always ask respondent about
the status of her case. The latter always told her
that there was no decision yet.
Sometime in August 2011, while complainant
was in respondents office waiting for him to
arrive, she noticed a mailman delivering an
envelope with the title of her labor case printed
thereon.
Complainant asked the secretary of respondent to
open the envelope and was surprised to discover
that it contained the Entry of Judgment of the
CAs Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried
repeatedly to contact respondent, but to no avail.
When she finally got to talk to him, respondent
assured her that "it was alright" as they still had
six months to appeal the case to the Supreme
Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the
labor case were ever communicated to
complainant.
With respect to the special proceeding case, the
RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was
filed, but it was also denied. Once again,
respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC
Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment
was received on 28 October 2008.
On 28 November 2011, complainant filed the
instant disbarment Complaint against respondent.
In his Comment, respondent averred that
complainant was informed of the status of the
case. He claimed that he had told complainant
that he "cannot cite any error of law or abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals
decision that necessitates a Petition for Review
with the Supreme Court;" thus, he supposedly
advised her to "respect the decision of the Court
of Appeals." Respondent prayed that a Decision
be rendered dismissing the instant disbarment
Complaint for lack of merit.
In a Resolution dated 13 June 2012, the Court

referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
During the pendency of the proceedings,
specifically on 5 February 2013, complainant
filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 23
April 2013, IBP Commissioner Hector B.
Almeyda (Almeyda) declared:
True enough, it seems clear that respondent had
been remiss in failing to update complainant in
what had happened to the cases being handled by
respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a
failure to inform complainant (the client) of the
status of the cases that thereafter prevented the
client from exercising her options. There was
neglect in that regard.
However, in spite of finding neglect on
respondents part, he recommended the dismissal
of the case against him, stating that "with the
decision to withdraw the complaint, there does
not appear basis to go ahead with the proceedings
since without the complaint, there will be no
basis to make any finding of liability."
On 11 May 2013, a Resolution was passed by the
Board of Governors of the IBP resolving to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of
investigation commissioner Almeyda. The case
against respondent was dismissed with a warning
that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt
with more severely.
This Court finds this to be an opportune time to
remind the investigating commissioners and the
members of the Board of Governors of the IBP
that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against
a lawyer does not terminate or abate the
jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to
continue an administrative proceeding against a
lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine
Bar.
In the present case, Almeyda recommended the

dismissal of the case against respondent, even
after finding that the latter had been negligent.
On the basis of this finding, the latter was
declared to have "been remiss in failing to update
complainant in what had happened to the cases
being handled by him in behalf of
complainant." Still, Almeyda recommended the
dismissal of the case, because "without the
complaint, there will be no basis to make any
finding of liability."
The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the
recommendation.
The IBP Board of Governors should not have
supported Almeydas stance.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a
direct party to the case, but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the
Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in
these proceedings is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of
a member of the bar. Public interest is the
primary objective. We explained why in RayosOmbac v. Rayos, viz.:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment
case allegedly executed by complainant does not,
in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x
x x. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence
on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges x x
x.
In this case, the IBP found that respondent

violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.1wphi1 Thus, it should have
imposed the appropriate penalty despite the
desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of
the charges.
The failure of respondent to file an appeal from
the CA Decision without any justifiable reason
deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with
the pursuit of an appeal should properly
withdraw their appearance and allow their client
to retain another counsel.
In Abay v. Montesino, the respondent-lawyer and
his client disagreed on the legal course to be
taken regarding the appealed case. The lawyer
therein strongly advised the client to abandon the
appeal and to consider the other available
remedies. The client, on the other hand, wanted
to pursue it. Without obtaining the assent of his
client, the respondent-lawyer deemed it wise to
abandon the appeal without informing the
former. In finding the respondent-lawyer guilty
of negligence, the Court explained:
Not filing an appellant's brief is prejudicial
because, as happened in this case, such failure
could result in the dismissal of the appeal. The
conduct of respondent shows that he failed to
exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier
attitude towards the cause of his client. The
abandonment by the former of the latter's cause
made him unworthy of the trust that his client
reposed in him. Even if respondent was "honestly
and sincerely" protecting the interests of
complainant, the former still had no right to
waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge
and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or
unwilling to continue his retainership, he should
have properly withdrawn his appearance and
allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.
In the present case, respondent failed not only to
keep the client informed of the status of the case,
but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that
would promote the client's cause. It is clear that

respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's

cause. Regardless of their personal views, they
must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law in support of that cause.
Whenever lawyers take on their clients' cause/s,
they covenant that they will exercise due
diligence in protecting the client's rights; their
failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family
makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in
them by their client/s and make them answerable
to the client, the courts and society.
In Pilapil v. Carillo, this Court upheld the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend a lawyer
from the practice of law for six months after
finding that he had failed to file a petition for
certiorari of the adverse decision rendered in the
case of his client despite the latter's repeated
follow-ups.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos is
found GUILTY of negligence and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
months, effective upon receipt of this Decision.
He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
record of respondent as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Decision be served on the IBP as
well as on the court administrator, who is
directed to circulate these copies to all the courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9881
(Formerly CBD 10-2607)
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA
MANUEL T. MOLINA
June 4, 2014
vs.
ATTY.
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board
of Governors of the administrative Complaint for
DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty. Manuel
Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his
clients to enforce a contract on the complainant's
client who had never been a party to the
agreement.
The facts are as follows:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors
in a four-unit compound named "Times Square"
at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are
the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M.
Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs.
Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr.
and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.
The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a
contract with the other unit owners save for Mr.
Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document
titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set
of internal rules for the neighbors on matters
such as the use of the common right of way to
the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and
security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant,
Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since
the former did not agree with the terms
concerning the parking arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a
Complaint for Dishonesty1 with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty.
Molina for allegedly giving legal advice to the
latters clients to the effect that the Times Square
Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was
never a party to the contract.
In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case
as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He
maintained that the Times Square Preamble was
entered into for purposes of maintaining order in
the residential compound. All homeowners,
except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.
Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr.

and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases against
his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the
belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times
Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), which was an action to declare the
Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit
was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases,
according to respondent, were dismissed.
Respondent further claimed that another case had
been filed in court, this time by his client, the
Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr.
Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own
hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of
the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latters
egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled
with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-08-63579. According to respondent, the
RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order
dated 12 December 2008.
Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts
sufficiently served as his answer to the
Complaint.
On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and
Recommendation. He recommended dismissal
for lack of merit, based on the following
grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare
allegations; and 2) even assuming that
respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal
advice, he could not be held accountable in the
absence of proof of malice or bad faith.
On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210, adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors on 29 December

2012. Notices of the denial were received by the
parties on 21 March 2013.
No petition for review has been filed with this
Court.
It is worth noting that a case is deemed
terminated if the complainant does not file a
petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the Boards resolution.
This rule is derived from Section 12(c) of Rule
139-B, which states:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board
or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as
admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a
decision exonerating respondent or imposing
such sanction. The case shall be deemed
terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with
the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme
Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)
In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the
Boards resolution on 21 March 2013, as
evidenced by a registry return receipt. To this
date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for
review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to
file a petition for review with the Court within 15
days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to
the above mentioned Section 12(c).
Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but
we have no reason to deviate from the findings of
the IBP Board of Governors.
When it comes to administrative cases against
lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly
preponderant evidence; and burden of proof,
which is on the complainant.
In the present case, we find that the Complaint is
without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia
charges Atty. Molina with providing legal advice
to the latters clients to the effect that the Times
Square Preamble is binding on complainants

client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the
agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice,
however, was not substantiated in this case,
either in the complaint or in the corresponding
hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty.
Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to
the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not
proof.
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide
his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that
his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The
rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the
exercise of their profession is as follows:
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all
the law. For an honest mistake or error, an
attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said
that, no attorney is bound to know all the law;
God forbid that it should be imagined that an
attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound
to know all the law. x x x.
The default rule is presumption of good faith. On
the other hand, bad faith is never
presumed.1wphi1 It is a conclusion to be drawn
from facts. Its determination is thus a question of
fact and is evidentiary. There is no evidence,
though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it
was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith,
malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good
faith, therefore, stands in this case.
The foregoing considered, complainant failed to
prove his case by clear preponderance of
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors adopting and approving the
Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that

the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is
whether a person who has thrice failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is
entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its
rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3)
chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed
to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on
constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the
University of the East with a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that
he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as
many times. When he applied to take it again,
the petitioner rejected his application on the basis
of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first
invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education. By agreement of
the parties, the private respondent was allowed to
take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989,
subject to the outcome of his petition. In an
amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarely challenged the constitutionality of
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing
the above-cited rule. The additional grounds
raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a
decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her

decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved
their competence and preparation for a medical
education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the
NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as
valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly,
the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession,
has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise
of the regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely
related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted
earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of
this type: the improvement of the professional
and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those

admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity
in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required
degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general,
and medical schools in particular, in the current
state of our social and economic development,
are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality
of medical education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission tests in,
for instance, medical schools in the United States
of America (the Medical College Admission Test
[MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries
with far more developed educational resources
than our own, and taking into account the failure
or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the
NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of
the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the
petitioner that the said case was not applicable.
Her reason was that it upheld only the
requirement for the admission test and said
nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the
Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The
issue raised in both cases is the academic
preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged
at least initially by the admission test and, indeed
with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The
latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the

former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police
power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the
power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of
the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police
power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of the police power. It
is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The threeflunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a
doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to
be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in
which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's
ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that
they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used
at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good
while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he
will be a menace to his patients. If one who
wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a

plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of
course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but
on the other hand he may not force his entry into
the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be
shunted aside to take a course in nursing,
however appropriate this career may be for
others.
The right to quality education invoked by the
private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has
the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.
The private respondent must yield to the
challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified
may still not be accommodated in our already
crowded medical schools, there is all the more
reason to bar those who, like him, have been
tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates
the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A
law does not have to operate with equal force on
all persons or things to be conformable to Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial
distinction exists between medical students and
other students who are not subjected to the
NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the
people, unlike other careers which, for this
reason, do not require more vigilant regulation.
The accountant, for example, while belonging to
an equally respectable profession, does not hold
the same delicate responsibility as that of the
physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted
and others who have also qualified are denied
entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply

invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show
that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. The private respondent has failed
the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the
private respondent. It is stressed that a person
who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an
absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is a
probably better, not for the medical profession,
but for another calling that has not excited his
interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least
lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to
succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for
the appropriate calling that he is entitled to
quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents
toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round
holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied
banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps
to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is
best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped
with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes,
not because we are lacking in intelligence but
because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent court dated January
13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the
private respondent. It is so ordered.
A.M. No. P-13-3123
June 10, 2014
ALBERTO
VALDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter refers to the failure of
respondent Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk, Kalinga,
Branch 25, to act on a writ of execution issued by
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Tabuk, Kalinga on 3 December 2003 in Criminal
Case No. 4050, entitled "People v. Jorge Macusi
y Wayet," for reckless imprudence and
negligence resulting in homicide. Sheriff Macusi
was charged with misfeasance, nonfeasance or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
In a letter-complaint dated 12 May 2009 sent to
Judge Victor Dalanao (Judge Dalanao), presiding
judge of the MTCC of Tabuk, Kalinga,
complainant Alberto Valdez (Valdez) alleged that
Sheriff Macusi failed to act on the writ of
execution issued by the MTCC in violation of
Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In his Comment dated 14 July 2009, Sheriff
Macusi stated that he was appointed as Sheriff IV
in the Province of Kalinga on 24 May 2004.
Sheriff Macusi explained that in a Report dated 6
January 2004, his predecessor, Francisco C.
Mabazza, served on accused Jorge Macusi the
writ of execution issued by the MTCC on 5
December 2003. However, the accused replied
that he had no money to pay for the execution.
Thus, the notation in the writ of execution was
"unsatisfactory (sic) served. "Thereafter, Sheriff
Macusi stated that he tried to serve the order
again by entering the residence of defendant
looking for personal properties that could be
confiscated on account of the writ but to no avail.
Sheriff Macusi then asked accused to voluntarily
comply with his legal obligation but found out

that accused had suffered a stroke and could no
longer fend for himself and his family and
resorted to accepting charity from his sister.
In a Partial Report dated 3 May 2006, Sheriff
Macusi filed a return of the writ of execution
stating that it was still unserved. The relevant
portions of the Report state:
1. That the accused because of the incident
suffered a stroke and therefrom could no longer
find a livelihood for himself and his children and
as stated in the order of the Honorable Court is
now living on the charity of his sister. His sister
is also tending to the needs of their mother who
also suffered the same fate because of illness that
befell her son;
xxxx
3. That the court battle begun armed with the
hope that the accused was never given his day in
court (in fact an ocular inspection was done to
determine the seriousness of the illness of the
accused and at that time he could hardly speak
and walk yet the court continued hearing his
case; thus, his right to be present in all the stages
of the court proceedings of his case was denied)
will be imprisoned should the decision of the
Hon. Court will (sic) be against him;
xxxx
Sheriff Macusi averred that he could not be held
liable for misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service since
he carried out all the possible legal remedies on
execution and satisfaction of judgment under the
rules.
On 19 June 2006, Judge Dalanao issued an
Order stating that the Partial Report dated 3 May
2006 of Sheriff Macusi was an improper and
inadequate report as required under the Rules.
The relevant portions of the Order state:
It appears therefrom that the said report is not the
report contemplated by law, which should be
submitted monthly to the Court (Section 14, Rule

39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Instead, the Sheriff appears to be lawyering for
accused, even going to the extent of accusing the
Court of having denied the accused his day in
Court. Certainly, this comment, from a
responsible officer of the Court is unwarranted or
without any justification at all. Not only that, it
will certainly diminish the good image of the
Court, and worst, tarnish the faith and confidence
of the litigants in our judicial processes.
The Court just came to know that the accused in
this case is the brother of Sheriff Desiderio
Macusi. The least that he should have done was
to inhibit himself from handling this case.
Furnish a copy of this Order to the Executive
Judge for his information and/or appropriate
action without prejudice for this Court to take
measures appropriate under the premises, where
warranted.
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. In

a Resolution dated 4 July 2012, this Court
referred the Investigation Report to the OCA.
In its Report dated 23 April 2013, the OCA
disagreed with the recommendation of Judge
Wacas and found Sheriff Macusi liable for (1)
simple neglect of duty for his failure to submit
the proper returns, and (2) violation of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel for his failure to
disclose that the accused in "People v. Jorge
Macusi y Wayet"is his brother. The OCA
recommended that Sheriff Macusi be suspended
from office for two months without pay. The
recommendation of the OCA states:
1. The instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Branch
25, Regional Trial Court, Tabuk, Kalinga, be held
LIABLE for Simple Neglect of Duty and
Violation of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel; and
SO ORDERED.
Valdez, in the letter-complaint, added that Sheriff
Macusi did not submit another report to the court
since the time the MTCC issued the Order dated
19 June 2006. Acting on the letter-complaint,
Judge Dalanao issued an Order dated 13 May
2009 endorsing the letter-complaint to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate
action.
In a Report dated 1 June 2010,the OCA
recommended that the administrative complaint
be referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, Branch 25, for
investigation, report and recommendation within
60 days from receipt of notice. In a
Resolution dated 28 July 2010, this Court
adopted the recommendation of the OCA and
referred the matter to Executive Judge Marcelino
K. Wacas (Judge Wacas).
In an Investigation Report dated 20 April 2012,
Judge Wacas found no substantial evidence to
hold Sheriff Macusi for the offense charged and
3. Sheriff Macusi be SUSPENDED from office

for two (2) months without pay, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
We adopt the findings of the OCA but modify its
recommendation on the penalty.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states:
Section 14. Return of writ of execution. The
writ of execution shall be returnable to the court
issuing it immediately after the judgment has
been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days
after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefor.
Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a
report to the court every thirty (30) days on the
proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is
satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The
returns or periodic reports shall set forth the

whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed
with the court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties.
The 30-day period imposed for the execution of
the writ after the judgment has been received by
the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30
days, is mandatory under the rule. In Aquino v.
Martin, we held that it is mandatory for the
sheriff to execute the judgment and make a return
on the writ of execution within the period
provided by the Rules of Court. Also, the sheriff
must make periodic reports on partially satisfied
or unsatisfied writs in accordance with the rule in
order that the court and the litigants are apprised
of the proceedings undertaken. Such periodic
reporting on the status of the writs must be done
by the sheriff regularly and consistently every 30
days until they are returned fully satisfied.
In the present case, the records show that Sheriff
Macusi submitted only one return of writ of
execution in his Partial Report dated 3 May 2006
and did not file any other report to the court.
Sheriff Macusi failed to implement the court
order and failed to submit periodic reports of the
actions he had taken on the writ "every 30 days
until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its
effectivity expires," as required by the Rules. In
Dilan v. Dulfo, we held that sheriffs play an
important part in the administration of justice
because they are tasked to execute the final
judgment of courts. If not enforced, such
decisions are empty victories on the part of the
prevailing parties. Clearly, Sheriff Macusi was
remiss in his duties and is thus liable for simple
neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give
attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due
to carelessness or indifference. Under the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a
less grave offense punishable with suspension of
one month and one day to six months for the first
offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Further, aside from Sheriff Macusis long delay

in the enforcement of the writ, it has also been
verified by the OCA that Sheriff Macusi is the
brother of the accused Jorge Macusi in Criminal
Case No. 4050. Section 1(a)(i) of Canon III of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
provides:
Section 1. Court personnel shall avoid conflicts
of
interest
in
performing
official
duties.1wphi1 Every court personnel is required
to exercise utmost diligence in being aware of
conflicts of interest, disclosing conflicts of
interest to the designated authority, and
terminating them as they arise.
(a) A conflict of interest exists when:
(i) The court personnels objective ability or
independence of judgment in performing official
duties is impaired or may reasonably appear to be
impaired; x x x
As an officer of the court, Sheriff Macusi should
have informed the court and inhibited himself
from enforcing the writ knowing fully well that
there is a conflict of interest since the accused is
his brother. It is incumbent upon him, as an agent
of the law, to adhere to high ethical standards in
order to preserve the good name and standing of
the court. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Sheriff IV Cabe, we emphasized the heavy
burden and responsibility which court personnel
bear in view of their exalted positions as keepers
of public faith. They must be constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety,
misdeed or negligence in the performance of
official functions must be avoided. We agree with
the OCA that Sheriff Macusi violated the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel for his failure to
disclose that the accused in "People v. Jorge
Macusi y Wayet"is his brother. The Rules classify
this violation of existing Civil Service Law and
rules a serious offense punishable with
suspension of one month and one day to six
months for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense.
We disagree with the penalty of suspension for

two months without pay as recommended by the
OCA. This is the second time that Sheriff Macusi
was found guilty of simple neglect of duty. In the
2013 case of Office of the Court Administrator v.
Macusi, Jr., this Court found Sheriff Macusi
liable for simple neglect of duty for his "failure
to file periodic reports on the Writ of Execution
dated 10 September 2008 in Civil Case No. 42906, as well as on the writs of execution in the
other cases in Judge Dalanaos inventory."
However, instead of imposing on him the penalty
of suspension from service in accordance with
the Rules, the Court imposed on him the penalty
of fine ofP4,000 since he was deemed resigned
from government service after filing his
certificate of candidacy for the 2010 local
elections.
Here, respondent is found guilty of committing
two offenses: (1) simple neglect of duty (second
offense), and (2) violation of civil service law
and rules of a serious nature (first offense). Thus,
the penalty for the more serious offense must be
imposed. This is expressly laid down under
Section 55, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service which states:
Section 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense.
If the respondent is found guilty of two or more
charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed
should be that corresponding to the most serious
charge or count and the rest shall be considered
as aggravating circumstances.
In view of the circumstances, the penalty that
should be imposed is dismissal from the
government service. However, considering that
Sheriff Macusi was deemed resigned after filing
his certificate of candidacy making the penalty of
dismissal no longer feasible, we impose on him
the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government owned
and controlled corporations, since he had been
previously warned that a repetition of the same or

similar act would be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Desiderio W.
Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of
Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, GUILTY of SIMPLE
NEGLECT OF DUTY and VIOLATION OF
THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT
PERSONNEL and impose on him the penalty of
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841
June 2, 2014
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2388-MTJ)
GERSHON N. DULANG vs. JUDGE MARY
JOCYLEN G. REGENCIA
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case for gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the. law, gross
incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious
dereliction of duty against respondent Judge
Mary Jocylen G. Regencia (Judge Regencia) of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of AsturiasBalamban, Cebu (MCTC), commenced thru a
Verified Complaint dated May 28, 2011 filed by
complainant Gershon N. Dulang (Dulang) before
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an ejectment
complaint with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. 212-B, entitled "Spouses Gershon Dulang
and Luzviminda Dulang, represented by
Reynaldo Moldez v. Emmanuel Flores," which
was filed before the MCTC on Februrary 2, 2000
(ejectment case).
In the Verified Complaint, Dulang alleged that on

May 4, 2009, he moved for the resolution of the
above-mentioned ejectment case, given that the
same had been filed as early as year 2000 and
had already been submitted for resolution.
Notwithstanding the summary nature of the
ejectment proceedings, Judge Regencia rendered
a Judgment dismissing the ejectment case only
on February 18, 2011(February 18, 2011
Judgment), or more than 11 years since its filing.
Consequently, the Notice of Judgment was issued
only on March 7, 2011 and mailed on March 15,
2011.
Dulang likewise noted that Judge Regencia was
previously found administratively liable for gross
inefficiency in Tam v. Judge Regencia and was
thereby ordered to pay a fine of 5,000.00 and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
On September 1, 2011, Dulang filed a Verified
Supplemental Complaint to the Verified
Complaint dated May 28, 2011 (supplemental
complaint) before the OCA, alleging that despite
the filing of a notice of appeal from Judge
Regencias February 18, 2011 Judgment, the
latter nevertheless issued an Order dated August
1, 2011 (August 1, 2011 Order) directing the
postmaster and postal carrier of the Cebu Central
Post Office, Cebu City to certify Dulangs receipt
of a copy of the said Judgment. In this regard,
Dulang accused Judge Regencia ofgross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious
misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty,
contending that by filing his appeal, the latter
was already stripped of her (Judge Regencia)
jurisdiction over the case and should not have
issued the said order. Dulang claimed that this
effectively stalled the administration of justice,
much to his prejudice.
In
her
Comments
(to
the
Verified
Complaint) dated August 7, 2011, Judge
Regencia maintained that no trial was held in
Civil Case No. 212-B as the parties merely filed
their respective position papers and that she
could have easily resolved the said case if not for
another case pending before the Regional Trial

Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (Toledo City
RTC), i.e., Civil Case No. T-862, entitled
"Spouses Emmanuel Flores and Daisy Flores v.
Spouses Jose G. Paulin and Eleodora Ganhinhin,
et al.," which was closely intertwined with the
former.
As such, she found it prudent to defer the
resolution of Civil Case No. 212-B until Civil
Case No. T-862 was decided. She also averred
that she should not be faulted for the long delay
in resolving the ejectment case as she assumed
her post as MCTC judge only in November 2002
and, thereafter, began presiding over the same
starting on November 15, 2007.
In opposition to the accusations contained in the
supplemental complaint, Judge Regencia
commented that she issued the August 1, 2011
Order because the defendant in the ejectment
case, Emmanuel Flores (Flores), opposed
Dulangs notice of appeal. She explained that this
order was merely intended to determine whether
or not Dulang filed his appeal within the
reglementary period.
Pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated July 30,
2012, the administrative case was referred to the
Executive Judge of the Toledo City RTC for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
Consequently,
in
his
Report
and
Recommendation dated December 20, 2012,
Executive Judge Hermes B. Montero (Judge
Montero) found Judge Regencia administratively
liable for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of
the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct,
and serious dereliction of duty in handling the
ejectment case, and thereby recommended that
she be dismissed from service. Judge Montero
opined that Judge Regencia failed to observe the
Rules on Summary Procedure as she did not
resolve said case with dispatch; despite the case
having been submitted for resolution on October
17, 2008, she only rendered judgment on
February18, 2011, or after more than 11 years
since the case was filed. Judge Montero also
pointed out that contrary to Judge Regencias
contentions, there was no suspension of the

proceedings that was agreed upon by the parties
and that no prejudicial question ever existed to
warrant a discontinuance of the same.
afforded due process, said charges shall no

longer be tackled herein.
Meanwhile, Judge Regencia filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Courts Resolution dated
July 30, 2012 referring her administrative case to
Judge Montero for investigation, report, and
recommendation. She argued that Judge Montero
cannot be expected to make an impartial
investigation of her case as he is the "compadre"
of Dulangs lawyer and that he had constantly
shown a hostile attitude towards her. Judge
Regencia also sent two (2) letters, both dated
April 10, 2013, informing the Court that Dulang
was reportedly killed and that she had verified
this information with Flores. In view of Dulangs
death, Judge Regencia prayed that the
administrative case against her be dismissed.
The sole issue raised for the Courts resolution is

whether or not Judge Regencia may be held
administratively liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Memorandum dated November 22, 2013, the
OCA recommended that Judge Regencia be held
rendering a decision, and thereby fined her in the
amount of 20,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. It agreed with the
findings of Judge Montero that there is no
justifiable excuse for Judge Regencia not to
render judgment in the ejectment case within the
30-day reglementary period mandated by the
Rules on Summary Procedure. In this relation,
the OCA brushed aside Judge Regencias charge
of partiality against Judge Montero for lack of
factual support and equally disregarded the fact
of Dulangs death, holding that such
circumstance does not automatically result in the
dismissal of his administrative complaint.24
However, the OCA no longer determined Judge
Regencias administrative liability with respect to
the charges of gross inefficiency, gross ignorance
of the law, gross incompetence, serious
misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty.
Hence, in due deference to her right to be
The Issue Before the Court
The Courts Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings and
conclusions of the OCA, with the modification,
however, as to the penalty imposed on Judge
Regencia.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically
through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits,
delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to
the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges
should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation
to administer justice promptly. This is embodied
in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which states that "[a] judge shall
dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods" and
echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial
Conduct
for
the
Philippine
Judiciary which provides that "[j]udges shall
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery
of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness."
Here, it is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B
was already submitted for resolution on October
17, 2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed
by the Rules of Summary Procedure which
clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the
submission of the last affidavit or position paper
within which a decision thereon must be issued.
Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment
only about two (2) years and four (4) months
later, or on February 18,2011. While rules
prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy

disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded
as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been
mindful of the plight of judges and has been
understanding of circumstances that may hinder
them from promptly disposing of their businesses
and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due
to justifiable reasons.
However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any
acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of
the ejectment case, thus, making her
rendering a decision.
Further, as adverted to earlier, Judge Regencia
tried to justify the delay in resolving Civil Case
No. 212-B by claiming, inter alia, that there
exists a prejudicial question brought about by the
existence of a pending case in the Toledo RTC
and that the parties agreed on the suspension of
the proceedings. However, Judge Montero found
that there was neither a prejudicial question nor
an agreement between the litigants that would
warrant substantial delays in the proceedings a
finding which is subscribed to by the
OCA. Verily, Judge Regencias clear and blatant
attempt to mislead the Court is deplorable and
should never be countenanced.1wphi1
Undue delay in rendering a decision is classified
as a less serious charge, punishable either by: (a)
suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or ( b) a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00. In imposing the
proper sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court
notes that aside from her aforementioned
misrepresentation, she was also previously found
administratively liable for gross inefficiency
where she was ordered to pay a fine of PS,000.00
and warned that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. Moreover, as correctly observed by
Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations
of this case, her length of service of more .than
17 years should be taken against her instead of
being considered a mitigating factor as she
should have already known that Civil Case No.

212-B, being an ejectment case, is a summary
proceeding and, thus, ought to be expeditiously
resolved. Hence, a fine of P40,000.00, instead of
suspension, should be the appropriate penalty for
Judge Regencia' s misconduct.
Circuit Trial Court of Asturias-Balamban, Cebu,

GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision.
Accordingly, she is ordered to pay a fine
of P40,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge

Mary Jocylen G. Regencia of the Municipal
SO ORDERED.

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1 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

G.R. No. 134625

August 31, 1999

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and

especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the

nor tried to obtain the latter's signature on the

2 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

respondent's thesis which were lifted from

Apparently, however, Dean Paz's letter did not

On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly

On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter

On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents

In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private

Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23,

Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services

U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct

3 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

In view of the overwhelming proof of massive

your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College

committees, she was deprived of the opportunity

On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a

In addition, private respondent maintains that

4 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers

dissertation on the basis of which she was

examination. An administrative proceeding

Unfortunately this "mistake" was arrived at after

autonomy of universities and institutions of

5 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

it has conferred is not rightfully deserved.

Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline

Jurisdiction. All cases involving discipline of

(a) Violation of college or unit rules and

(b) Misconduct committed by students of the

Before the Court is a petition for review on

Provided, that regional units of the University

The factual and procedural antecedents of the

Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of

The case traces its roots to the Complaint for

revoked by the Securities and Exchange

6 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

complaint as the same was filed when petitioner

have the necessary qualification to appear in the

shall be escheated to the city or municipality

7 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

The import of this Court's ruling in the cases

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO and BONIFACIO C.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

On 12 August 2005, petitioners filed a criminal

The complaint accuses respondents and

Quiambao pressured Blando to make certain

1. During the stockholders' meeting on 1 March

7. On 1 July 2004, Blando received an order

2. As it turns out, the corporate records of

8. However, upon meeting with Pilapil and

8 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

After receiving the counter-affidavits of the

On and/or about the period between March 1 and

merely removing the stock and transfer book of

Urgent Omnibus Motion and the Dismissal of

Certiorari Petition and the Dismissal of Criminal

On 18 January 2006, respondents filed before the

Anent directing the issuance of a warrant of