Legal Ethics

1 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)
A.C. No. 4807
March 22, 2000
MANUEL N. CAMACHO vs. ATTYS. LUIS

MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation
of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically
Canon 9 thereof,viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate
upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should only deal with his counsel.
It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly
to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a
party not represented by counsel and he should
not undertake to advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint
against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan
and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys
Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D.
Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert
Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired
counsel of some expelled students from the AMA
Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that
respondents, then counsel for the defendants,
procured and effected on separate occasions,
without his knowledge, compromise agreements
("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his
clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in
effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims
they might have had against AMACC, the
principal defendant, and to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings filed
against it. Complainant averred that such an act
of respondents was unbecoming of any member
of the legal profession warranting either
disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan

acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents
had taken part in the negotiation, discussion,
formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission Agreements complained of and were,
in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The ReAdmission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing
to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-9730549 and were executed for the sole purpose of
effecting the settlement of an administrative case
involving nine students of AMACC who were
expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students,
namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo,
Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon,
Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli
A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B.
Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial
Board of DATALINE, who apparently had
caused to be published some objectionable
features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately
convened, and after a series of hearings, it found
the students guilty of the use of indecent
language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the
penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to
Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President,
gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City.
While the civil case was still pending, letters of
apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
separately executed by and/or in behalf of some
of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of
Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason
Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and ReAdmission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the
AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31
March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for
her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and ReAdmission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the
AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22
May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her
mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May
1997 with the AMACC President; letter or

apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo
Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10
October 1997 with the AMACC President; and
letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of
Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and ReAdmission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with
the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology
and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation,
dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court
where the civil case was pending by Attorney
Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC.
A copy of the manifestation was furnished
complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June
1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed
Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, with an amendment
Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for
being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the
case against the other Respondents for they did
not take part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters
of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
formalized, complainant was by then already the
retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil
case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge
of this fact. Although aware that the students
were represented by counsel, respondent attorney
proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them
and their parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein

complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil
Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent,
whether by design or because of oversight, is an
inexcusable violation of the canons of
professional ethics and in utter disregard of a
duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short
of the demands required of him as a lawyer and
as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the ReAdmission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied
by the Manifestation1 which, among other things,
explicitly contained the following stipulation;viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the
complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a ReAdmission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt
for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE
MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and
agreed among others to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings which
they may have against the AMACC arising from
their previous dismissal.
xxx
xxx
xxx
3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent

Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-9730549 will by filed them.1wphi1
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP
Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of
Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the
recommended six-month suspension would
appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given
the circumstances and the explanation of
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado
C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt
of this decision. The case against the other
respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence. Let a copy of this decision be entered

in the personal record of respondent as an
attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the
country.1wphi1.nt
his oath of office as well as the above-quoted

Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,
[r]espondent
is
hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years."
Respondent claimed he would suggest to his

client to drop the civil case, if complainant would
move for the dismissal of the estafa case.
However, the two lawyers failed to reach a
settlement.
had filed against respondents client. In his

Comment, respondent himself claimed that "the
reason x x x was x x x the irregularities of the
criminal
investigation/connivance
and
consequent damages."
The Facts
SO ORDERED.
In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that

sometime in January 1998, his services were
engaged by one Zonggi Xu, a ChineseTaiwanese, in a business venture that went awry.
Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball,
tempura and seafood products factory being set
up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another ChineseTaiwanese residing in Zamboanga City.
Eventually, the former discovered that the latter
had not established a fishball factory. When Xu
asked for his money back, Pan became hostile,
making it necessary for the former to seek legal
assistance.
In his Comment8 dated January 27, 2000,

respondent argued that he had shown no
disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as codefendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed
that there was no basis to conclude that the suit
was groundless, and that it had been instituted
only to exact vengeance. He alleged that
Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an
additional defendant because of the irregularities
the latter had committed in conducting the
criminal investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor
Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case
despite the pendency of Pans Motion for an
Opportunity to Submit Counter-Affidavits and
Evidence, of the appeal to the justice secretary,
and of the Motion to Defer/Suspend Proceedings.
Commissioner San Juan maintained that the

collection suit with damages had been filed
purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa
case, in which respondents client was the
defendant. There was no need to implead
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they
had never participated in the business
transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and
highly questionable was the inclusion of the
prosecutor and complainant in the civil case
instituted by respondent on the alleged prodding
of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
A.C. No. 5148
July 1, 2003
ATTY.
RAMON
P.
REYES
ATTY. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG JR.
vs.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy,
dignity and civility. The bickering and the
hostility of their clients should not affect their
conduct and rapport with each other as
professionals and members of the bar.
The Case
Before us is a Sworn Complaint1 filed by Atty.
Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar
Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment
of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of
his lawyers oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. After the Third
Division of this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to
suspend him as follows:
"x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by
his oath which binds him to the obligation that he
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. In addition, Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel. In impleading
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil
Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there
was no legal ground to do so, respondent violated
Xu, through herein complainant, filed a

Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was
represented by respondent. The Complaint,
docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to
Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B.
Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to
appear for preliminary investigation on October
27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on
the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his
counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga
filed a Criminal Complaint4 for estafa against
him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued
a Warrant of Arrest6 against Pan.
Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash the Warrant of Arrest.7 He also filed with
the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint
for the collection of a sum of money and
damages as well as for the dissolution of a
business venture against complainant, Xu and
Prosecutor Salanga.
When confronted by complainant, respondent
explained that it was Pan who had decided to
institute the civil action against Atty. Reyes.
On the other hand, complainant was impleaded,

because he allegedly connived with his client
(Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the former
knew fully well was baseless. According to
respondent, the irregularities committed by
Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation
and complainants connivance therein were
discovered only after the institution of the
collection suit.
The Third Division of this Court referred the case
to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.12Thereafter, the Board of
Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002
Resolution.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In
her
Report
and
Recommendation, Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the
IBP for investigation and report, averred that
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been
impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole
basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they
Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had

no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and
complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing,
respondent violated his oath of office and Canon
8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
IBP adopted the investigating commissioners
recommendation for his suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs recommendation.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who
are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend;
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes
upon them certain obligations. Mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they
must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel."
Respondents actions do not measure up to this

Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the
"collection of a sum of money, damages and
dissolution of an unregistered business venture."
It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu,
but was later modified to include complainant
and Prosecutor Salanga.
The
Amended
and
Supplemental
Complaints16 alleged the following:
"27. The investigating prosecutor defendant
Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately
refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined
by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff
Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating his
rights under the Rules on preliminary
investigations; he also falsely made a
Certification under oath that preliminary
investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff
[was] duly informed of the charges against him
but did not answer; he maliciously and x x x
partially ruled that there was probable cause and
filed a Criminal Information for estafa against
plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well]
that the proceedings were fatally defective and
null and void; x x x;
"28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that
plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and
motion to defer for the valid grounds stated
therein deliberately refused to correct his errors
and consented to the arrest of said plaintiff under
an invalid information and warrant of arrest.
"29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that
the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless
connived with the latter to harass and extort
money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said
criminal prosecution in the manner contrary to
law, morals and public policy, resulting to the
arrest of said plaintiff and causing plaintiffs
grave irreparable damages[.]"17
We concur with the IBP that the amendment of
the Complaint and the failure to resort to the
proper remedies strengthen complainants
allegation that the civil action was intended to
gain leverage against the estafa case. If

respondent or his client did not agree with
Prosecutor Salangas resolution, they should have
used the proper procedural and administrative
remedies. Respondent could have gone to the
justice secretary and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation
of Prosecutor Salangas decision to file an
information for estafa.
In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was
available to him if he could show that the estafa
case was filed without basis. Moreover, he could
have instituted disbarment proceedings against
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he
believed that the two had conspired to act
illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have
advised his client of the availability of these
remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no
justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction
subject of the collection suit shows that there was
no reason for their inclusion in that case. It
appears that respondent took the estafa case as a
personal affront and used the civil case as a tool
to return the inconvenience suffered by his client.
His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal
process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to
render justice to the parties according to law, not
to harass them.18
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and
other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility.
A great part of their comfort, as well as of their
success at the bar, depends upon their relations
with their professional brethren. Since they deal
constantly with each other, they must treat one
another with trust and respect. Any undue ill
feeling between clients should not influence
counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward
each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations and offensive behavior among
lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the
legal profession,19 but also constitute highly
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary
action.
Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law

practitioners not to "wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."
Respondent claims that it was his client who
insisted in impleading complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and
unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion
to the interests of their clients, their office does
not permit violation of the law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery.20 Their rendition of improper
service invites stern and just condemnation.
Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their
profession and the best interests of their clients
when they render service or give advice that
meets the strictest principles of moral law.21
The highest reward that can be bestowed on
lawyers is the esteem of their professional
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,
perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or
contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and
thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and skill
in the honorable performance of professional
duty.22
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as
charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2)
years from the practice of law, effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 219
September 29, 1962
CASIANO
U.
LAPUT
vs.
FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE
ATTY.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an original complaint filed with this Court
charging respondents with unprofessional and
unethical conduct in soliciting cases and
intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying
that respondents be dealt with accordingly.
The facts which led to the filing of this complaint

are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was
retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to
handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate
of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner
had contemplated the closing of the said
administration proceedings and prepared two
pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and
declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as
universal heir and order the delivery to her of the
residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the
rendition of final accounting and partition of
estate. At this point, however, the administratrix
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to
countersign these two pleadings and instead
advised petitioner not to file them. Some weeks
later, petitioner found in the records of said
proceedings that respondent Atty. Fortunato
Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a
written appearance as the new counsel for Nieves
Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955
petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be
relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On
February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty.
Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his
appearance, dated February 5, 1955.
Complainant here alleges that the appearances of
respondents were unethical and improper for the
reason that they had nursed the desire to replace
the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the
administratrix and, taking advantage of her
goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the
final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs.
Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to
close the administration proceedings; that before
their appearance, they brought petitioner's client
to their law office and there made her sign four
documents captioned "Revocation of Power of
Attorney" and sent the same by mail to several
corporations and establishments where the Estate
of Macario Barrera is owner of certificates of
stocks and which documents purported to
disauthorize the petitioner from further collecting
and receiving the dividends of the estate from
said corporations, when in fact and in truth the
respondents fully knew that no power of attorney
or authority was given to the petitioner by his

client, the respondents motive being to embarrass
petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees
of said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest
lawyer and no longer trusted by his client all
with the purpose of straining the relationship of
the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas Vda.
de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his
appearance without notice to petitioner.
In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated
that when he entered his appearance on January
11, 1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de
Barrera had already lost confidence in her
lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had in fact
already with her a pleading dated January 11,
1955, entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the
Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano
Laput", which she herself had filed with the
court.1awphl.nt
In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that
when he filed his appearance on February 7,
1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as
counsel.
After separate answers were filed by the
respondents, the Supreme Court referred the case
to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. The Solicitor General
recommended the complete exoneration of
respondents.
It appears and it was found by the Solicitor
General that before respondent Atty. Fortunato
Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow
administratrix had already filed with the court a
pleading discharging the petitioner Atty. Casiano
Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a
copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of
Atty. Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It
appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera
dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she
did not trust him any longer, for one time she
found out that some dividend checks which
should have been sent to her were sent instead to
petitioner, making her feel that she was being
cheated by petitioner. Moreover, she found that
withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank

and Bank of the Philippine Islands have been
made by petitioner without her prior authority.
We see no irregularity in the appearance of
respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as
counsel for the widow; much less can we
consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from
petitioner. The evidence as found by the Solicitor
General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's
professional services were contracted by the
widow, a written contract having been made as to
the amount to be given him for his professional
services.
Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5,
1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty.
Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his
(petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a
motion for the payment of his attorney's fees,
amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance
of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for
the widow. This should estop petitioner from
now complaining that the appearance of Atty.
Patalinghug was unprofessional.
Much less could we hold respondent Atty.
Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct
inasmuch as he entered his appearance, dated
February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year,
after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's
professional services on January 11, 1955, and
after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his
appearance on February 5, 1955.
With respect to the preparation by Atty.
Patalinghug of the revocations of power of
attorney as complained of by petitioner, the
Solicitor General found that the same does not
appear to be prompted by malice or intended to
hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard
the interest of the administratrix. Evidently,
petitioner's pride was hurt by the issuance of
these documents, and felt that he had been
pictured as a dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case
before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty.
Patalinghug and the widow for libel and
falsification. It was shown, however, that the case

was dismissed.
No sufficient evidence having been submitted to
sustain the charges, these are hereby dismissed
and the case closed.
B. M. No. 1036
June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L.

RANA
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he
must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession
of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law
is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A
bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was
among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled
mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed
against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law,
grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as
a member of the Bar during the scheduled oathtaking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the

charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not
signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant
charges
respondent
for
unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct.
Complainant
alleges
that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed
with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as "counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant
claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative
body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation,
complainant
accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan")
without the latter engaging respondents services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of
the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution
allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the
complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan

sought his "specific assistance" to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or
represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he
submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which
was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt
of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox.
Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically
motivated
considering
that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to
respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC
was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily
Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition
for proclamation as the winning candidate for
mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as
a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the
government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to
Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim
that the instant administrative case is "motivated
mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to

the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared
before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the
May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the
lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a
ground to deny his admission to the practice of
law. The OBC therefore recommends that
respondent be denied admission to the Philippine
Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that
complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared
as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and
his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent
him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of
the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May
2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May
2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath.
In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19
May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for
George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the
same pleading respondent stated that he was the

"(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on
14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin
L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before
the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D.
Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LMPPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party." Respondent himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for
Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and
for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took
the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in
the practice of law without being a member of
the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 1 the
Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency
proceedings,
and
conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and

drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that
"practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of
the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is
to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of
law when he appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing
fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing
that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer
is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one
who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.
The regulation of the practice of law is
unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had
not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for

practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is

DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar

Examinations
and
took
the
lawyers
oath.1wphi1 However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a fullfledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
OFFICE
OF
THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk
of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133,
Makati City, respondent.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant

contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court
or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized
practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective
upon your acceptance." Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11
May 2001. Thus, the evidence does not support
the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan
indeed authorized respondent to represent him as
his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to
practice law.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1287
January 26, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent
Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear
as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885,
entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for
Falsification of Public Document pending before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was
pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a
letter to the Court Administrator, dated
September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification
with regard to respondent's authority to appear as
counsel for the accused in the said criminal
case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the
Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998,
respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior
authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case
compelled him to handle the defense of his
cousin who did not have enough resources to hire
the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the
other hand, private complainant was a member of
a powerful family who was out to get even with
his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his
appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice

his office nor the interest of the public since he
did not take advantage of his position. In any
case, his appearances in court were covered by
leave applications approved by the presiding
judge.1wphi1.nt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a
Resolution denying respondent's request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing
the Office of the Court Administrator to file
formal charges against him for appearing in court
without the required authorization from the
Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec.
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"
which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
x
(b) Outside employment and other activities

related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their

profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, Provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we
required respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he
and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who
belong to a "powerless family" from the

impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del
Norte. From childhood until he finished his law
degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and
guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor
and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's
help and advice when she was charged in
Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the
private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose
only purpose in filing the said criminal case was
to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained
that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started
when the latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres,
left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms.
Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair,
SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3)
children. The birth certificate of their eldest child
is the subject of the falsification charge against
Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is
the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his
duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her
counsel since she not have enough funds to pay
for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also
pointed out that in his seven (7) years of
untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the
judiciary, he had performed his duties with
honesty and integrity and that it was only in this
particular case that he had been administratively
charged for extending a helping hand to a close
relative by giving a free legal assistance for
"humanitarian purpose." He never took
advantage of his position as branch clerk of court
since the questioned appearances were made in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and
not in Makati where he is holding office. He
stressed that during the hearings of the criminal
case, he was on leave as shown by his approved
leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted
respondent's comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge
Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge

Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with

a stern warning that any repetition of such act
would be dealt with more severely.6
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga

appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his
cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of
Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon
City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court.
We agree with the recommendation of the

investigating judge.
An examination of the records shows that during

the occasions that the respondent appeared as
such counsel before the METC of Quezon City,
he was on official leave of absence. Moreover,
his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan
was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared aspro bono counsel likewise
cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being
the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to
represent her out of his compassion and high
regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first
time that respondent ever handled a case for a
member of his family who is like a big sister to
him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his
Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as
counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all
the years that he has been in government service,
he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the
respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin
without first securing permission from the Court,
and considering that this is his first time to do it
coupled with the fact that said appearance was
not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits
civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar prohibition
is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys
from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No
judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to
clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private
practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does
not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we
explained the meaning of the term "private
practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City
Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98

N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on
one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative
of engagement in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as
a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who
is a relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the
isolated instances when respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal
Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private
practice" of the law profession contemplated by
law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court
appearances did not amount to a private practice
of law, he failed to obtain a written permission
therefor from the head of the Department, which
is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation,
or professionor be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at
the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the agency to the end that it will not

impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors.
Respondent entered his appearance and attended
court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e.,
May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998
and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own
admission. It is true that he filed leave
applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a
prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to
which respondent is assigned is not the head of
the Department contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning
that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 138, SECTION 34

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In
the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose,
or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar.
G.R. No. L-8320
December 20, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. SIM BEN
PADILLA, J.:
Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of
violating paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic
films of indecent or immoral scenes inside his
establishment, a restaurant which is a place open
to public view in the City of Cebu, on the sole
ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the
information without the aid of counsel.
The minutes of the session of the Court on 31
January 1953 disclose that when the case was
called for trial, the appellant was informed by the
Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he
desired the aid of one. He replied that he did not.
Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have
the information read to him even without the
assistance of counsel. His answer was in the
affirmative. The court interpreter translated the
information to him in the local dialect and after
the translation he entered a plea of guilty. He was
asked whether he knew that because of the plea
of guilty the punishment as provided for by law
would be imposed upon him and he answered
"Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on
his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At
this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine
of P200 be imposed upon the defendant.
Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6
months and 1 day of prision correccional and to

pay the costs.lawphi1.net
What transpired when the appellant was
arraigned shows that his rights were fully
protected and safeguarded. The Court complied
with its duly when it informed the appellant that
it was his right to have the aid of counse. And
before pronouncing the sentence the Court took
pains to ascertain whether he was aware of the
consequences of the plea he had entered.
Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he
waived his right to have the aid of counsel and
entered a plea of guilty to the information.
Appellant claims that he entered the plea of
guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a
fine would be imposed. The recommendation of
the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the
appellant seems to bear out his claim; but such
recommendation or one of leniency does not
mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime
charged against him. A promise to recommend a
specific penalty such as fine does not render the
sentence void if the Court ignores the
recommendation and metes out to the defendant
a penalty which is provided by law.
The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with
cost against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA vs. THE HON. EDUARDO
P. CAGUIOA
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order
of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying
his Petition for Relief from Judgment and
allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil
Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as
follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle

which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an
accident resulting to injuries sustained by private
respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a
consequence thereof, a complaint for damages
was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII),
docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer
thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo
W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez,
Mercado & Associates.
G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration

was filed by petitioner, through a different
counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However
the same was denied and the decision became
final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to
the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge
for execution.
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at

the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite
due notice, petitioner was treated as in default
and private respondent was allowed to present
his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter
rendered by the trial court in favor of private
respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for
Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner
seeking the lifting of the order of default, the
reopening of the case for the presentation of his
evidence and the setting aside of the decision.
Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by
Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law
firm. The same was denied by the lower Court
and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo

V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W.
Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the
Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar
and that consequently, his rights had not been
adequately protected and his properties are in
danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon
without due process of law.
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying

defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by
declaring him in default, it being contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more
particularly award of moral damages is contrary
to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable
defenses.
The appealed case was handled by Atty.
Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law
firm. The decision appealed from was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by

private respondent with the lower Court which
was granted by respondent Judge.
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent

Judge denied the Petition and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons
that said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory
tactic on the part of counsel for defendantappellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the
grounds relied upon ". . . could have been
ventilated in the appeal before the Court of
Appeals ... "
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff
Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of
execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on
three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the
Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory
maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be
denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the
person who represented petitioner at the initial
stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an
Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out
to be not a member of the Bar did not amount to
a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be

noted that in the subsequent stages of the
proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment
by default, petitioner was duly represented
by bona fidemembers of the Bar in seeking a
reversal of the judgment for being contrary to
law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid,
legal and justifiable defenses. In other words,
petitioner's rights had been amply protected in
the proceedings before the trial and appellate
courts as he was subsequently assisted by
counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault
as the order of treatment as in default was
predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's
failure to attend the pretrial conference on April
6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend
the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this
petition due course is to countenance further
delay in a proceeding which has already taken
well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for
certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby
dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez,
Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita
Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to
explain, within ten (10) days from notice this
Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted
to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of
CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the
Bar.
G.R. No. L-16731
March 30, 1960
FFLIPE ECO vs. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ,

ET AL.
BARRERA, J.:
In a petition for certiorari filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 33674)
on September 11, 1957, Felipe Eco sought
annulment of the proceeding, orders, and
decisions rendered by the respondents Secretary
of Agriculture & Natural Resources and Director
of Forestry, claiming that the latter committed an
abuse of discretion in suspending his certificate
of Private Wood-land Registration No. 1329,
covering a tract of land with an area of 700

hectares, 290 hectares of which were forestal,
and the former, in dismissing petitioner's appeal.
After the respondents had duty filed their answer
justifying the controverted act, the case was
heard.
On April 30, 1958, the court rendered judgment
finding, inter alia that on January 17, 1956,
petitioner Eco obtained from the Bureau of
Forestry a certificate of private wood-land
registration under Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code, on the strength of a
possessory information title covering 700
hectares but which was made to appear later on a
sketch to contain 290 hectares of forest land, 99
hectares of are logged area and 811 hectares
cultivated area; TigMan Lumber Co., another
timber licensee, protested against this registration
and filed a petition for reconsideration which was
apparently granted because the Director of
Forestry suspended the operation of Eco's
certificate; that likewise, it was found that
portions of the area released from the forest zone
were under occupancy by some 80 oppositors;
that after a series of protests and counter-protests,
objections and counter-objections between the
parties, the Director of Forestry recommended
cancellation of Eco's certificate of private
woodland and the Secretary of Agriculture &
Natural
Resources
approved
the
recommendation; that upon the appeal of Eco,
the Secretary reopened the case and ordered a
formal investigation of the whole controversy to
give the parties "ample opportunity to formally
present their respective sides of the controversy
and (be) given their 'day in court'"; that petitioner
Eco refused to submit to this, reinvestigation,
insisting that it was not necessary; that in the face
of this attitude of Eco, the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources issued a
decision, the pertinent part of which reads:
In the light of the above findings and
circumstances, this Office is of opinion, and so
holds that the dismissal of the appeal of Felipe
Eco is perfectly in order. This is because of his
adamant stand (not) to submit to the formal

investigation duly ordered by this Office. A clear
indication of this attitude is shown by his failure
to appear at the investigation on May 2, 1957,
when he was duly notified thereof thru his
counsel.
WHEREFORE, and as the forested portion of the
land in controversy is actually occupied by the
TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd., the appellee herein,
and the remaining area which was released from
the forest zone is under actual occupation and
cultivation by public land applicants who had
duly filed their respective public land
applications therefore, the instant appeal of
Felipe Eco should be, as hereby it is,
DISMISSED. Conformably herewith, the
TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd., is hereby authorized
to resume its operation inside the land in
question.
HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land
in dispute once and for all, the appellant herein is
hereby given a period of ninety(90) days from
the date hereof within which to institute
voluntaryregistration proceedings covering the
land; otherwise, this Office will take the
necessary steps to bring the land under the
operation of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law
(Commonwealth Act 141) in conjunction, with
Act No. 496. For this purpose, steps shall be
taken by this Office to gather evidence for the
Government with a view to supporting its
opposition to the voluntary registration
proceedings that the appellant herein may
institute, or to sustain the move of the
Government in the event that it will be compelled
to institute compulsory registration proceedings
pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law in
conjunction with Act 496.
So Ordered.
On the basis of the foregoing findings, the trial
court, Judge Magno S. Gatmaitan presiding,
dismissed the petition for certiorari, stating:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Court believes and so holds that there was

nothing inherently wrong in the actuations of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and of the Director of the Bureau of Foresty; the
Court concurs with their opinion that in order to
terminate the litigation between all the parties
here, the most proper procedure was for
petitioners to institute voluntary registration
proceedings; nor can petitioners claim that equity
is with him in the meantime since as already
stated above, much can be said about the excess
in his area. The result will be dismissal. . . .
Copy of this decision was actually received by
counsel for the petitioner on May 5, 1958.
On June 3, 1958 or 28 days thereafter, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision,
which was denied on June 14, 1958, for lack of
merit. On June 21, 1958, petitioner filed a notice
of appeal and appeal bond. Respondents
registered opposition thereto for the reason that
the filing of said notice of appeal and appeal
bond was made out of time. Sustaining this
allegation, the court, by order of July 5, 1950,
disapproved petitioner's appeal bond and notice
of appeal.
On September 6 of the same year, petitioner filed
a motion for relief under Rule 38, praying for the
setting aside of the decision on the ground of
excusable negligence. The alleged negligence
consisted of the erroneous computation by
counsel's clerk of the period within which an
appeal may be made, said clerk being of the
impression that the prescriptive period to appeal
in certiorari cases is also 30 days like in ordinary
civil actions instead of 15 days as provided in
Section 17 of Rule 41. The motion for relief was
denied for lack of merit. Petitioner interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals but this court
certified the case to us, the question involved
herein being one of law.
In support of his view, petitioner-appellant cites
our ruling in the cases of Coombs vs. Santos, 24
Phil., 446,1 and Herrera vs. Far Eastern Air
Transport, Inc., G. R. No. L-2587, promulgated
on September 19, 1950.2 The aforecited ruling

has no application to the one at bar. The delay in
the filing of the pleadings in those cases was
brought about by the inability to file the same
due to the illness either of the clerk or of the
attorney. It is quite different in the instant case.
Evidently, what was delegated by petitioner's
counsel to his clerk was the computation itself of
the period within which the appropriate pleading
may be filed. This act is hardly prudent or
wise.As the lower court aptly said: "the duty to
compute theperiod to appeal is a duty that
devolves upon the attorney which he can not and
should not delegate unto an employee because it
concerns a question of study of the law and its
application, and this Court considers this to be a
delicate matter that should not be delegated." The
negligence here cannot, therefore, be considered
excusable.
herein is hereby given a period of ninety (90)

days from the date hereof within which to
institute voluntary registration proceedings
covering the said land; otherwise, this Office will
take the necessary steps to bring the land under
operation of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law
(Commonwealth Act 141) in conjunction with
Act No. 496. For this purpose, steps shall be
taken by this Office to gather evidence for the
Government with a view to supporting its
opposition to the voluntary registration
proceedings that the appellant herein may
institute, or to sustain the move of the
Government in the event that it will be compelled
to institute compulsory registration proceedings
pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law in
conjunction with Act 496.
Even considering it on the merits, appellant's

cause must also fail. The petition for relief was
predicated principally on the ground that the
court a quo erred in not holding that the ruling of
the respondent Director of Forestry, affirmed by
the respondent Secretary of Agriculture &
Natural Resources, suspending his Private
Woodland Registration certificate was made in
abuse of discretion, because said officials
allegedly deprived him of his day in court. It is
noteworthy to mention, however, that it is
precisely for this reason that the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources ordered a
formal investigation of the matter to enable the
parties to present their respective evidence. Yet,
appellant Eco refused to submit to such
investigation. Naturally, the ruling of the
respondent Director was affirmed. How can it be
claimed then that the Secretary of Agriculture &
Natural Resources gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing Eco's appeal?
Apparently, instead of taking this course and thus

proving his alleged right over the property,
appellant
elected
to
institute certiorari proceedings
against
the
abovementioned officials in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Underthe circumstances, it is
evident that appellant's action has no foundation
at all.
Furthermore, in his questioned order of June 11,

1957, the respondent Secretary of Agriculture &
Natural Resources provides:
HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land
in dispute once and for all, the appellant (Eco)
SO ORDERED.
Wherefore, finding no error in the appealed order

denying petitioner's motion for relief, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitionerappellant. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-5346
January 3, 1911
W. W. ROBINSON vs. MARCELINO

VILLAFUERTE Y RAOLA
TORRES, J.:
On April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit
in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against
Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, alleging as a first
cause of action: That the plaintiff was engaged,
in the city of Manila and at the time specified
further on, in the importation and sale of flour
and other products from abroad, with an office in
the city of Manila, a business which he still
continued, through the agency of Castle Brothers,

Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the
defendant, a resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an
instrument duly executed on October 19, 1906,
by his attorney in fact and legal representative,
Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully
empowered and authorized for the purpose, and
ratified on the same date before the notary public
of Manila, D. R. Williams, acknowledged and
confessed that he owed the plaintiff the net sum
of P3,852.50; that by the said instrument duly
executed the defendant bound and pledged
himself to pay to the plaintiff the said sum of
P3,852.50 in four monthly installments from that
date, at the rate of P1,000 for each of the first
three installments and P852.50 for the last one,
and likewise the interest thereon at the rate of 8
per cent per annum, to be adjusted and paid at the
time of paying each of the installments fixed; that
in the said instrument the defendant moreover
bound himself to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P500 for costs and expenses, in case the latter
should recur to judicial process for the collection
of the aforementioned debt; and that, as security
for the payment of the said debt, of the interest
thereon and of the amount for costs and
expenses, the defendant voluntarily executed, by
means of the said instrument and in favor of the
plaintiff, a special mortgage upon the properties
of his absolute ownership and control, which are:
A., p. 72, back. A rural estate, No. 433,
consisting of land planted in coconut trees, in the
barrio of Dumacaa of the municipality of Lucena,
and containing an area of 2 hectares, 57 ares, and
73 centares.
B., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 434, consisting of
coconut land in the barrio of Canlorang Mayao,
Lucena, 2 hectare, 4 ares, and 78 centares in area.
C., p. 73. A rural estate, No 435, consisting of
unirrigated land containing 1,200 coconut trees,
in the same barrio of Lucena, and with and are of
7 hectares, 81 ares, and 4 centares.
D., p. 74. A rural estate, No 436, consisting of
coconut land containing 700 coconut trees, in the
barrio of Silangan Mayao, Lucena, and with and

area of 1 hectare and 84 centares.
E., p. 74. back. A rural estate, No 438, consisting
of land planted with 300 coconut trees, in the
barrio of Cotta, Lucena, and measuring 52 ares
and 66 centares in area.
F., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 439, consisting of
coconut land containing 500 coconut trees, in the
same barrio and pueblo, with an area of 98 ares
and 66 centares.
G., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 440,
consisting of coconut land containing 800
coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo,
with an area of 36 ares and 5 centares.
H., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 441,
consisting of coconut land containing 300
coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo,
measuring 50 ares and 73 centares.
I., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 914, consisting of
improved land, planted with 1,000 coconut trees
situated in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, of 7
hectares, 12 ares, and 60 centares in area.
J., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 915, consisting of
improved land, planted with 100 coconut trees
and situated in the barrio Cotta, Lucena, of 93
ares and 22 centares in area.
K., p. 79. A rural estate, No. 916, consisting of
improved land, planted with 200 coconut trees
and situated in the same barrio and pueblo, of 13
ares and 4 centares in area.
The respective bounderies of each one of the
estates above enumerated were set fourth in the
said instrument of mortgage, which was duly
inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas.
This deed does not appear to have been canceled,
and constitutes an encumbrance on the properties
described in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated in
the instrument referred to, that the liability of the
property mortgaged was distributed in the
following manner:
The estate described under letter A responded for

P800 of the
debt and for the sum of P75
costs ..........................................................
875.00
as
P
Estate
P40
240.00
letter B, liability P200, costs

...............................................................
Estate
P40
200.00
letter C, liability P160, costs

...............................................................
Estate
P40
170.00
letter D, liability P130, costs

...............................................................
Estate letter E, liability P92.50, costs

P30
.............................................................
122.50
Estate
P40
190.00
letter F, liability P150, costs

................................................................
Estate
P40
320.00
letter G, liability P280, costs

...............................................................
Estate
P40
290.00
letter H, liability P250, costs

...............................................................
Estate letter I, liability P1,400, costs

P75
..............................................................
1,475.00
Estate letter J, liability P260, costs
P40
.................................................................
300.00
Estate letter K, liability P130, costs
P40 ............................................................... 170.
00 Total .................................................................
......................................... 4,352.50
It was stated further, as an express condition, that

default of payment of any of the installments
specified in the fourth preceding paragraph
would cause the entire obligation to mature and
would entitle the plaintiff (it says "defendant") to
require the payment of the same in its totality and
forthwith to institute foreclosure proceedings
against any and all of the mortgage properties.
The complaint further alleged, as a first cause of
action, that, notwithstanding the repeated
demands made upon the defendant, the latter had
not paid his debt nor the interest thereon,
excepting the sum of P550, paid on different
dates on account of the debt and interest due,
wherefore the defendant owed the plaintiff the
sum of P3,302.50, the remainder of his debt and
besides P385.57 as interest due from December
6, 1906, to the date of the filling of the
complaint; that the plaintiff was then the legal
owner of the mortgage, and that he had not been
paid the whole nor any part of the sum expressed
in the preceding paragraph.
As a second cause of action against the
defendant, the complaint alleged, among other
things: That the defendant, by means of an
instrument duly executed on December 21, 1906,
by his attorney in fact and legal representative,
Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully
empowered and authorized an instrument
ratified on the same date before the notary Daniel
R. Williams and in consideration of the credit
which the plaintiff agreed to allow the said
defendant up to the sum of P3,560, executed a
special voluntary mortgage of the properties of
his absolute ownership and control which are
described as follows:
No. 1, p. 72. Estate No. 432, first inscription,
volume 28, general register; coconut land
containing 1,000 coconut trees, 26 hectares, 56
ares, and 87 centares in area, situated in the
barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena. A part of this land is
planted with coconut and nipa palm trees and the
rest is arable.
No. 2, p. 72, back. Estate No. 433, first

inscription of the same volume; coconut land
ares, and 73 centares in area, situated in the same
barrio and pueblo.
barrio and pueblo.
ares, and 78 centares in area, situated in the
barrio of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena.
barrio and pueblo.
No. 6, p. 74. Estate No. 436, first inscription of
the same volume; coconut land containing 7,000
coconut trees, 1 hectare, 88 ares, and 54 centares
in area, situated in the barrio of Silangan Mayao,
Lucena.
No. 7 p. 74, back. Estate No. 438, first
inscription of the volume aforesaid; coconut
land, 52 ares and 66 centares in area, containing
300 coconut trees and situated in the barrio of
Cotta, Lucena.
No. 8, p. 75. Estate No. 439, first inscription of
the same volume; coconut land, 98 ares and 66
centares in area, containing 500 coconut trees
and situated in the same barrio and pueblo.
inscription of the volume mentioned; coconut
land, 36 ares and 5 centares are, containing 500
coconut trees and also located in the same barrio
and pueblo.
inscription of the said volume; coconut land, 50
ares and 73 centares in are, containing 300

coconut trees and located in the same barrio and
pueblo.
No. 11, p. 73. Estate No. 914, consisting of
improved land planted with 1,000 coconut trees,
located in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, with
an area of 7 hectares, 12 ares, and 60 centares.
No. 12, p. 76. Estate No. 915, volume 106
general register; an improved piece of land, 93
ares and 22 centares in area, containing 800
coconut trees and situated in the barrio of Cotta,
Lucena.
general register; an improved piece of land, 13
ares and 4 centares in area, containing 200
coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and
pueblo.
general register; an improved piece of coconut
land, 2 hectares, 79 ares, and 49 centares in area,
containing 2,000 coconut trees and located in the
barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena.
The respective boundaries of each of the estates
above enumerate were set forth in the said
instrument of mortgage, which was duly
inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas, and
does not appear to have been cancelled, and
constitutes an encumbrance on the properties
described, in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated,
in the instrument referred to, that the liability of
the property mortgaged was distributed in the
following manner:
That the aforementioned mortgage was executed
as security for the payment to the plaintiff of the
sum or sums which the defendant might owe him
by reason of the said credit, which was granted
under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the said credit should not exceed the sum
of P3,560 and was granted for the period of six
months from the 20th of November, 1906, and
defendant was to make use of it in taking flour
from the plaintiff's warehouse, at current prices,
by means of written duebills or orders signed by

the defendant or by his attorney in fact.
2. That the said written duebills or orders should
be paid within thirty days from their date, and it
was stipulated that the amount or value of each
one of them should bear an annual interest of 8
per cent from the date of their maturity, if not
paid before.
3. That total amount of what the defendant might
be owing, by reason of the said credit, should be
settled and entirely paid, together with the
interest thereon, by the 20th of May, 1907, on
which date all the orders or duebills issued by the
defendant against the said credit should be
considered as matured, even though the
extension above mentioned should not have
expired.
4. That it should be optional be optical on the
part of the plaintiff to honor the duebills or orders
which the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte might
issue against the said credit, in the event that the
latter should fail to pay the amount of his
previous duebills or orders at the time they
should respectively fall due, or should fail to
comply with and observe any of the conditions
and stipulations contained in the said instrument
of October 19, 1906, ratified before notary
Williams; that the defendant should be bound to
pay to the plaintiff P600, in case of litigation, and
also to pay all the expenses that might be
occasioned by the execution of the said
instrument of December 21, 1906, those of its
inscription in the registry, cancellation, and
release, as well as the expenses incurred by the
plaintiff on account of the instrument of October
19, 1906, referred to in the first cause of action,
together with those of its inscription in the
registry; provided,
moreover, that
the
aforementioned instrument of December 21,
1906, should be retroactive in its effect from the
20th of November of the same year, and that the
flour which the said defendant, through his
attorney in fact, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion,
had withdrawn from the plaintiff's warehouses
since the 20th of November, 1906, should be
include in the credit opened; that the estates

described under the Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, and 13, bore a first mortgage in favor of the
plaintiff executed as security for the obligation,
the fulfillment of which is demanded in the first
cause of action; that, by clause 14 of the said
instrument of December 21, 1906, it was
stipulated that in case W. W. Robinson, the
plaintiff, should have to institute foreclosure
proceedings against the property above
described, either by reason of the mortgage
hereby placed on the same, or of the obligation
affecting the said property, in his favor, by virtue
of the said instrument of October 19 of the
present year, Robinson should be entitled to take
charge of the management of all or any of the
said realities until they should be sold, and to
collect their revenues, rentals, fruits, and
products for the purpose of applying the same to
the payment of the judgment; that, by clause 15
of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, it
was also stipulated that it was expressly
covenanted that, in case Robinson should have to
proceed judicial against the property therein
mentioned in order to collect any amount to the
payment of which they were subject, all the
orders or duebills issued on account of the credit
granted in the said instrument should be
considered as matured and payable, and
Robinson should be entitled forthwith to demand
the payment of any balance found to be due him
by Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, with the
privilege of levying upon all or any of the
realities comprised with the mortgage mentioned
in the said instrument; that the amount credited
for the expenses referred to in No. 7 of the fifth
paragraph of this cause of action reached
P174.95; that the defendant, availing himself of
the credit granted in the aforementioned
instrument of December 21, 1906, took and
withdrew from the plaintiff's warehouses, on
different dates between the 20th of November
and the 19th of December, 1906, inclusive,
various quantities of flour, the total value of
which amounted to P5,588.15; that the defendant
had not paid any part of this amount, except the
sum of P375.00, and was owing a balance of
P5,213.15; that at the time of the complaint the
said defendant owed the plaintiff the sums of

P174.95 and P5,213.15, in addition to P503.79 as
interest due up to the date of the complaint; that
the plaintiff was then the legal owner of the
mortgage above referred to, and that none of the
sums mentioned nor any part thereof had been
paid to him: wherefore the plaintiff asked that
judgement be rendered in his favor against the
defendant, for the following amounts: (1) For the
sum of P3,302.50, the principal demanded in the
first course of action, and interest thereon at 8 per
cent per annum from date until its payment; (2)
for the sum of P385.57, as interest due on the
principal mentioned in the preceding paragraph
and remaining unpaid, and, in addition, the
interest on this sum at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the complaint until paid;
(3) for the sum of P5,213.15, the amount of the
debt claimed in the second cause of action,
together with the interest thereon at the rate of 8
per cent per annum from date until it's payment;
(4) for the sum of P503.79, the interest due on
the principal mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per
annum from date until payment; (5) for the sum
of P174.95, claimed in paragraph 9 of the second
cause of action, with interest thereon at 6 per cent
per annum from the date of the complaint until
payment; and, (6) for the sum of 1,000 for costs
and attorney's fees.
The plaintiff further prayed that an order be
issued directing the delivery to the plaintiff of the
properties described in the complaint, in order
that he might administer them during the course
of this suit and until they should ultimately be
sold, and authorizing him to collect and receive
the revenues, rentals, fruits, and other products of
the said estates and to retain them in his
possession in order to satisfy the judgment that
would be rendered in this case, and that in case
the said judgment be not satisfied thereby, the
sale of the said properties be ordered and the
proceeds thereof be applied to the purpose.
The defendant, in his answer, made a general and
specific denial of each and all of the allegations
of the plaintiff for each and all of the actions
instituted by him in each and all of the

paragraphs of the complaint, and as a special
defense, and in his crosscomplaint, alleged: That
the defendant did not execute, consent to, nor
authorize the execution of a power of attorney of
any kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion, empowering the latter to mortgage,
pledge, or otherwise dispose of, to the plaintiff or
to any person whatever, any of the properties
mentioned in the complaint, nor to accept from
and open with the plaintiff any credit nor
establish with him any business in flour; nor
execute any power of attorney nor grant any
authority whatever in favor of the said
Concepcion so that the latter might represent him
and accept in his name credit, or moneys
whatsoever from any person; nor dispose of,
mortgage, or encumber any of the properties
described in the complaint; that the defendant
received no sum whatever from the plaintiff nor
was he in the latter's debt for the amount claimed
in the complaint, nor for any other sum of
money; that he did not give his consent to all of
to any one of the mortgages alleged in the
complaint, and that all the said mortgages on the
properties therein mentioned were founded on a
supposed power of attorney said to have been
executed by the defendant in favor of Vicente
Marcelo Concepcion, which power of attorney
was fictitious, false, fraudulent, null and void,
that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did
the latter intervene therein and that the said
power of attorney had no true reason for
existence; wherefore the defendant asked that
judgment be rendered absolving him from the
complaint with the costs against the plaintiff, by
annulling each and all of the mortgages alleged
in the complaint and the inscription of each of
them in the office of the register of property of
Tayabas, and by ordering the cancellation of all
the inscriptions of the said mortgages and
encumbrances of the aforementioned properties.
The plaintiff, in answering to the counter
complaint, set up a general and specific denial of
each and all of the allegations of the defendant
with respect to each and all of the actions
brought by him in each and all of the paragraphs
of the counter complaint, and prayed that

judgment be pronounced in his favor, and against
the defendant, in conformity with the petitions
made in his complaint.
The case came up for hearing on November 30,
1908, and after the presentation of oral evidence
by both parties, the documentary evidence being
attached to the record, the court, on December 15
of the same year, rendered judgment whereby it
directed that the plaintiff should recover from the
defendant the sum specified in the first
instrument of mortgage, P3,302.50, as principal,
the additional sum of P385.57 as interest up to
April 30, 1908, besides the interest on the said
principal, at the rate of 8 percent per annum from
the date just above mentioned until its complete
payment, also the P500 stipulated in the said
instrument as payable by the defendant as costs
and expenses in case of litigation; and the sum
mentioned in the second instrument of mortgage,
P5,213.15 as principal, besides P503.79, as
interest up to the 30th day of April, 1908, in
addition to the interest on the said principal at the
rate of 8 per cent per annum, form the date just of
P174.95, as expenses for the execution of the
instrument, for its inscription, cancellation, and
acquaintance, as provided for in clause 17 of the
said instrument, and the additional sum of P600,
which it was stipulated in the second instrument
the defendant should pay for costs and expenses
in case of litigation. The judgment further
ordered that the defendant should pay the several
amounts above mentioned, with the interest and
costs, on or before the first day of the sitting of
the court in April, 1909, and that, in case such
order should not be compiled with, the mortgages
should be foreclosed and a final writ should be
issued directing that all the properties before
described the sold, the proceeds of the sale to pay
the principal, interest, and costs. The defendant,
when notified of this judgement, took exception
thereto, announced that he would file a bill of
exceptions, and moved for a new trial on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter
was contrary to law. This motion was denied and
exception was taken by the appellant, who filed
the proper bill of exceptions, which was certified

to, approved, and forwarded to the clerk of this
court. By an order of March 1, 1909, it was
provided that the execution of the aforesaid
judgment should not be suspended pending the
appeal, unless the defendant, for the reasons
stated in the said order, should give a bond for
P10,000.
The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W.
W. Robinson, is the collection of various sums
owed by the defendant, Marcelino Villafuerte y
Raola, the payment of which is secured by a
mortgage on the real properties set out in the two
notarial documents evidencing the debt,
exhibited under letter A and B, and inscribed in
the property registry of the Province of Tayabas.
The mortgage action brought by the creditor,
based upon the two aforementioned notarial
documents is proper, inasmuch as it is sought to
collect certain sums specified in the said
instruments on account of their not having been
paid within the periods therein stipulated, and
consequently the real properties offered as
security for the solvency of the debts contracted
by the debtor are duly liable for the satisfaction
of the same; and although the credit of
P3,852.50, the value of the flour furnished to
Camilio C. Gomez, in account with the
defendant, and referred to in the instrument
lettered A, was to have been paid in four
installments from October 19, 1906, at the rate of
P1,000 in each one of the three first months and
P852.50 in the fourth and last month, yet since
the debtor, notwithstanding the demands made
upon him, did not comply with his obligation nor
pay his debt in conformity with the tenor of the
said instrument, letter A, for he only paid the
creditor the sum of P550 delivered partially on
different dates, the default of payment of any of
the installments agreed upon produces the effect
that all of these must be deemed to have matured
and entitles the creditor to demand the payment
of his entire credit and to proceed against the
mortgaged properties for the purpose of
collecting his credit, which amounts to
P3,302.50, after the deduction of the said P550
from the principal, with the interest due from the

6th of December, 1906, amounting to P385.57.
With respect to the credit mentioned in the
instrument, Exhibit B, and granted by the
plaintiff to the defendant Villafuerte under
agreement that the latter should make use of the
said credit by taking flour from the creditor's
warehouse by means of written duebills or orders
signed by the debtor, or his attorney in fact,
under condition that the value or amount of the
said duebills should be paid within thirty days
from their date and that these acknowledgments
of debts should bear interest of 8 per cent per
annum from the date of their maturity, it was also
a condition that the aforesaid instrument should
be deemed to be retroactive in its effect, from
November 20, 1906, that the quantities of flour
which were taken from the plaintiff's warehouse
since the said November 20, 1906, should be
considered as included, and that the total amount
of whatever the defendant might owe, by reason
of the credit mentioned together with the interest
thereon, should be settled and entirely paid on
May 20, 1907, on which date all the orders or
duebills issued against the said credit should be
deemed to have matured, even though the thirty
days' delay stipulated should not have expired.
In view of the fact that the defendant succeeded
in withdrawing flour to the value of P5,078.15,
without his having paid the amount due therefor,
except P375, it can not be denied that there still
remains a balance to be paid of P4,703.15 (pp. 5
and 88 of the record).
In the account, Exhibit E, there appears a
statement of the sacks of flour which were taken
on account of the said credit by means of the nine
duebills,
Exhibit F, attached
to the
aforementioned account, in which it also appears
that the value of the said sacks of flour was
P4,703.15, after the deduction of P375.
The complaint which gave rise to the present suit
is in accordance with the provisions of section
255 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
mortgages constituted in the two instruments
aforementioned fulfill the conditions and

requirements prescribed in articles 1857, 1874,
and 1875 of the Civil Code; wherefore judgment
should be rendered favorable to the mortgage
creditor, in accordance with section 256, and
following, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The defendant debtor denied the existence of the
obligations contained in the said instruments; he
asserted that the latter, and the powers of attorney
executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion were false, and likewise denied that
he owed the plaintiff any of the amounts claimed
in the complaint, or that he had authorized the
said Concepcion to mortgage the realties
described in the said complaint, and in asking for
his release, he prayed that the aforementioned
mortgages and the inscriptions of the same in the
property registry be declared null and void.
If it is true, as it appears to be, that the defendant
Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola executed, on July
11 and October 29, 1906, in this city, the powers
of attorney, Exhibits C and D, in favor of Vicente
Marcelo Concepcion, before the notaries Eugenio
de Lara and Daniel R. Williams, respectively, it
not having been proved at trial that the said
powers of attorney were false or null and void,
the mortgages upon the real properties, executed
by the attorney in fact, duly authorized for the
purpose, in the instruments designated under
letter A and B, the first of them ratified in the
notarial record, letter G, by the debtor before the
same notary, Williams, must be accepted as valid
and in force, inasmuch as the said mortgage
deeds appear to have been ratified in due form by
contracting or interested parties before the said
notary in Manila, it not having been proven at
trial that they contained any flaw or defect which
might operate to annul them.
The evidence adduced by the defendant in his
attempt to prove that, on the two dates before
mentioned, when the said two powers of attorney
appear to have been executed, he was in Lucena,
Tayabas, and not in this city of Manila, has not
resulted in defeating the validity, authenticity,
and force of the said powers of attorney, for the
truth of their contents as well as their ratification

by the person executing them was certified to by
notaries before whom they were exhibited
respectively in the presence of two witnesses; the
oral testimony presented by the defendant was
insufficient to prove that the notaries Lara and
Williams untruthfully certified that Marcelino
Villafuerte, whom they attested under oath that
they knew, personally appeared before them and
ratified in its totality the contents of the
aforementioned document, declaring that he had
executed it freely and voluntarily and exhibited
for the purpose his cedula, No. 453963, issued in
Lucena, Tayabas, on January 15, 1906.
In order to establish the conclusion, as the logical
result of the evidence, that the said two notaries,
falsely, and entirely irrespective of the truth,
issued the certificates which appear under their
respective signatures and seals at the foot of the
powers of attorney, letters C and D, it is not
sufficient to prove, by means of the testimony of
witnesses,
(mostly
relatives)
and
by
unauthenticated documents, that on the dates of
the execution of the powers of attorney the
persons executing them was not here in Manila,
where the instruments were certified to, but in
Lucena, Tayabas; clear, strong, and irrefutable
proof must be adduced to prove that the said
notaries could not have averred that the said
person was actually in their presence, that they
heard him ratify the contents of the respective
documents, and could have certified to the
number of his cedula, the only one exhibited to
both notaries, without having ostensibly
perverted the truth. The defendant himself, who
averred that he was in Lucena on July 11, 1906,
the date of the first power of attorney, said that he
was not sure whether on October 29 of the same
year, the date of the second, he was in the said
pueblo or in this city of Manila.
Public instruments authenticated by a notary or
by a competent public official, with the
formalities required by law, are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gives rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter.
They shall also be evidence against the
contracting parties and their legal representatives

with regard to the declarations the former may
have therein. (Arts. 1216 and 1218, Civil Code.)
The force of proof of depositions of witnesses
shall be weighed by the courts in accordance
with the provisions of the law of civil procedure,
taking care to avoid that, by the simple
coincidence of some depositions, unless their
truthfulness be evident, the affairs may be finally
decided in which instruments, private documents,
or any basis of written evidence are usually made
use of. (Art. 1248, Civil Code.)
The defendant debtor having been requested by
letter, in the beginning of the year 1907, to pay
his debt, were it true that he had not contracted
the obligations contained in the instruments
lettered A and B, nor executed in favor of Vicente
Marcelo the powers of attorney lettered C and D,
would have at that time made the proper
investigations and taken the necessary steps for
the annulment or invalidation of the said
instruments. The defendant did not even attempt
to do anything of the kind, and we do not find
any just reason nor any legal ground whatever to
warrant a discussion of the conclusion arrived at
by the evidence presented in this suit.
Were it true that on the dates of the 11th of July
and the 29th of October, 1906, the defendant
Villafuerte was in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in
Manila, it is not understood how two notaries
who attested that they personally knew him could
have certified that, on the respective dates
aforementioned, the said defendant appeared in
person before them, ratified the instrument of
power of attorney which he had executed, and, to
identify his personality, exhibited to the said
notaries his certificate of registration, the only
one and the same one which he presented at each
of his appearances on the said dates. Without
proof, nor rational, acceptable explanation, it is
impossible to believe that the personal certificate
of registration, which identifies a citizen, was for
some four months in the possession of another
person residing in a distant place. It was not
proved in a satisfactory manner at the trial how
or why the said cedula, or registration certificate,

came to remain for so long a time in the
possession of the Chinaman Sy Chuy Chim or of
Vicente Marcelo, as averred by the defendant or
his counsel, and under this supposition, so
strange, anomalous, and out of the ordinary rule
that every citizen should necessarily keep his
certificate of identification in his possession, no
explanation whatever was given by the
defendant's counsel as to the purpose for which
the defendant parted with his cedula and sent it to
either the said Chinaman or Marcelo. The
Chinaman was not examined in this litigation and
the attorney in fact, Marcelo, denied that he had
received the said cedula sent by his constituent.
So that for the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is
evident that the defendant Villafuerte personally
exhibited the said cedula to the two
aforementioned notaries, on his ratification of the
respective instrument of power of attorney before
each one of them, and it is not permissible to
conclude that the instruments of power of
attorney executed by the defendant, as well as the
certifications subscribed by the notaries Lara and
Williams, are false, because of the absolute
absence of proof as a foundation for such a
charge; for a notarial document, guaranteed by
public attestation in accordance with the law,
must be sustained in full force and affect so long
as he who impugns it shall not have presented
strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or
detect provided against by law.
Although the documents exhibited by the
defendant's counsel could not, for lack of proof
of their authenticity, destroy or impair the value
and force of the notarial documents or
instruments on which the plaintiff's claim is
based, it is, however, to be noted that Pedro
Cantero, whose signature appears attached to the
papers found on pages 159, 162, and 170, of the
record, was not examined either, even for the
purpose of identifying his signature, he being a
Spaniard and an attorney it is not possible to
believe that he wrote the aforementioned
documents in the form and style in which they
appear to have been drawn up; wherefore, on
account of these circumstances, it is reasonable

to presume that the documents of pages 159 and
170, and the note of page 162, of the record,
were not authentic.
It is also to be observed, in the document or letter
found on page 136 of the record, and which also
was unauthenticated, that the aforementioned
dates of the 11th of July, 1906, appear therein
with a correction, made in the proper place, of
the figures 11 and 6 of the first date, a repetition
and details which induce the presumption that the
said letter was written on a different date.
By the foregoing it has been duly shown that the
fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh errors attributed
to the judgment are devoid of reason and legal
foundation. With respect to the third error alleged
we hold that the admission of the documents
designated by the letters L and M was proper for
the purpose for which they were presented,
because that of letter L is an original and one of
the triplicates drawn up for a single purpose, as
stated therein, and that of letter M is also an
original ratified before a notary, in the certificate
of which, dated July 13, 1906, there certainly
appears an annotation of the dame number
453963 of the cedula of the defendant Villafuerte
which he exhibited to the notaries who
authenticated the powers of attorney Exhibits C
and D.
With regard to the first two alleged errors,
relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle being permitted
to address questions to some of the witnesses
during the hearing of the case, notwithstanding
the presence of Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who
represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that
the intervention of the said law clerk and
employee of Messrs. Haussermann, Cohn &
Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, was
improperly admitted; it was not authorized by
any law, for the reason that the said Lacalle did
not have the capacity and qualifications of a
lawyer admitted under oath to practice his
profession before the courts of these Islands, and
therefore, on objection being made to his present
at the hearing of the case, the judge should have
sustained such objection and should have

excluded Lacalle and not permitted him to
address questions to the plaintiff's witnesses,
notwithstanding the fact that Attorney Agustin
Alvares, designated in substitution of the said
Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff's
representative in the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, was present.
Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the
course of some of the proceedings under the
direction of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not subject
to annulment, as no positive detriment was
caused to the defendant, although such
intervention is in no manner permitted by the law
of procedure.
However, even though the questions addressed
by Lacalle to the plaintiff's witnesses and the
presentation of documents of various kinds
exhibited at the trial be stricken out for the
reason that they were made by a person who was
neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the
plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason, based
upon any positive prohibition of the law, to
authorize the striking out to the answers given by
the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even
though the said answers may have been evoked
by questions addressed by a person not
authorized by law, and there is much less reason
for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the
same witnesses by the defendant's attorney, and
the answers thereto.
Although the presentation of the documents
which support the claims of the plaintiff party be
deemed to be improper, on account of their
having been made by a person who had not the
qualifications of a practicing attorney it is
nevertheless true that their presentation was
authorized by the attorney Alvarez and the
documents exhibited continued to be united to
the record and were not stricken out therefrom on
motion by the other side, but, on the contrary, the
attorney for the defendant or his counsel
discussed the authenticity and validity of the said
documents, made allegations against the same
and concluded by asking that these documents,
and also the inscription of those designated under

letters A and B, be declared null and void.
From the preceding statements it is concluded
that the intervention of Jose Moreno Lacalle in
the present suit has in no manner prejudiced the
rights and interests of the defendant and that, if
judgment was rendered against him and in favor
of the plaintiff, it was in consequence of the
merits of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff
and of the inefficacy and worthlessness of the
testimony given by the defendant.
If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had
presented substantial, strong and convincing
evidence of the falsity of the two powers of
attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence
would have been totally invalidated and
annulled, and this suit would have had a different
ending.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our
opinion, to affirm the judgment appealed from, as
we hereby do, with the costs against the
appellant, and in consequence thereof we acquit
the plaintiff from the cross complaint relative to
the declaration of nullity of the mortgages and
inscriptions, as requested by the defendant. The
first day of the term of court immediately
following the date on which the fulfillment of
this judgment is ordered shall be set for the
payment of the amounts due and the foreclosure
of the said mortgages. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-23467
March 27, 1968
AMALGAMATED
ASSOCIATION vs. HON.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
LABORERS'
COURT OF
SANCHEZ, J.:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal
services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULPCebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47

others together with their union, Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier,
general president of said union, lodged a
complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in Sec.
4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act.
Made respondents were their former employer,
Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc.
(Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and
general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its chief
engineer and general factory superintendent; and
Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto
Poli, its president.
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the
complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30,
1956 and July 6, 1956), respondents Biscom,
Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957,
answered and counterclaimed. Respondents
Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their
answer dated July 12, 1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the
merits was heard before a trial commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight
complainant laborers appeared and testified. Two
of these ten were permanent (regular) employees
of respondent company; the remaining eight were
seasonal workers. The regular employees were
Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal
workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez,
Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag,
Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and
Brigido Casas.
On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru
Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered
judgment, which provides,inter alia, that the two
regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be
reinstated "to their former positions, without loss
of seniority and other benefits which should have
accrued to them had they not been illegally
dismissed, with full back wages from the time of
their said dismissals up to the time of their actual
reinstatements, minus what they have earned
elsewhere in the meantime" and that the eight
seasonal workers "be readmitted to their

positions as seasonal workers of respondent
company (Biscom), with back wages as seasonal
workers from the time they were not rehired at
the start of the 1955-1956 milling season on
October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually
reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere
during the period of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and
Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On March
28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal,
without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not
seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of
November 13, 1962. The judgment became final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to
name an official computer to determine the actual
money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed
the Chief Examiner of its Examining Division to
go to the premises of Biscom and compute the
back wages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner
reported that the total net back wages due the ten
complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the
complainants moved for reconsideration: Biscom
on August 17, 1963; complainants on September
24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15,
1963 in the same case CIR Case No. 70-ULPCebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He
alleged therein that he had been the attorney of
record for the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULPCebu "since the inception of the preliminary
hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on
appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he "had
actually rendered legal services to the laborers
who are subject of this present litigation [CIR
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956,
more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily
agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's
fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent
to 25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by
a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so
contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into
consideration the length of services he rendered

and the nature of the work actually performed by
him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez
filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien,"
which in part reads:
3. That the laborers, subject of this present
litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956, had
initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned
Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's fees
on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent
to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever money
claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable
Court, copy of said Agreement, in the local
Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in
the English language are hereto attached as
annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the aboveentitled Case was already decided in their favor,
Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who
are also Complainants in this Case begged from
the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce
his attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent
(25%) only for the reason that they have to share
and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the
equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)
although the latter's actual services rendered was
so insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio
Reyes, who is the President of said Union, the
Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and
consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to
only Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of
Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon
in 1956.
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur.
Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a
document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of
the discharge, release and dismissal thru a
union board resolution (attached thereto as
Annex A thereof) of Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the
complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu,

effective February 28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez
replied. He averred that the grounds for his
discharge specified in the board resolution were
"malicious and motivated by greed and
ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable
discharge did not affect the already stipulated
contract for attorneys' fees.
On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants'
motions for resonsideration objecting to the
Chief Examiner's Report and also respondent
Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien.
Judge Martinez' order reads in part:
(b) Respondent company is further
directed to deposit the amount representing 25%
of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as
attorney's fees;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d) The amount representing attorney's fees

to be deposited by the respondent company is
hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the
Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this
order, subject to existing auditing procedures; ....
Biscom complied with the order of
deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved
to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with
respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst
his grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to
determine the matter in question, and that the
award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty.
Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This
motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en
banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for
reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution
was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified
by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened:

First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June 11,
1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge
Martinez authorized the Cashier of the court to
disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81
representing attorneys' fees and deducting
therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell,
Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten
employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964
resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the
view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate
contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their
reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for
attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not
one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's
authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be
a mere incident to a case over which CIR may
validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's
jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys'
fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the
main case, CIR No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which
undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it
has been held that "once the Court of Industrial
Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case
under the law of its creation, it retains that
jurisdiction until the case is completely
decided, including all the incidents related
thereto." 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is
this
4. It is well settled that:
A grant of jurisdiction implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers essential
to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted
court has power to do all things reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the
enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even
though the court may thus be called upon to

decide matters which would not be within its
cognizance as original causes of action.
While a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence
of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it (In re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693),
and, subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the
enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So
demands, matters, or questions ancillary or
incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority
over the principal matter, even though the Court
may thus be, called on to consider and decide
matters, which as original causes of action,
would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew
vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines
Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958,
and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562, May 23,
1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction
over the main cause of action, may grant the
relief incidental thereto, even if they would
otherwise, be outside its competence. 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged
in another court as petitioners advocate would
only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation
abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually the
application to fix the attorneys' fees is made
before the court which renders the
judgment. 8 And, it has been observed that "[a]n
approved procedure, where a charging lien has
attached to a judgment or where money has been
paid into court, is for the attorney to file an
intervening petition and have the amount and
extent
of
his
lien
judicially
determined." 9Appropriately to be recalled at this

point, is the recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union
de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January
30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was
made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion
that since the Court of Industrial Relations
obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, ...
it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and
decide all matters collateral thereto, such as
claims for attorney's fees made by the members
of the bar who appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one
point - the ten (10) successful complainants in
C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as
attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by
the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split
the fees.
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims
twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys'
fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio
Reyes, union president and one of the 10
successful complainants, he had to reduce his
fees to 25% since "they have to share and satisfy
also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent
amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez
exhibited a contract purportedly dated February
3, 1956 before the 48 employees have even
filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is
30% of whatever amount the ten might recover.
Strange enough, this contract was signed only by
8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to
the others? Why did not the union intervene in
the signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute
said contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez
required the ten to sign the contract only after the
receipt of the decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that
the verbal agreement entered into by the union
and its officers thru its President Javier and said
two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty.
Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall
be divided equally ("share and share alike")
amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and

Felisberto Javier, the union president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees
to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that
"the active conduct and prosecution of the aboveentitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to
the appeal in the Supreme Court," and that
petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty.
Leonardo C. Fernandez was the counsel mainly
responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted,
too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file
any notice of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral
agreement that the union president should share
in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics
condemns this arrangement in terms clear and
explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal
services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service or
responsibility." The union president is not the
attorney for the laborers. He may seek
compensation only as such president. An
agreement whereby a union president is allowed
to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a
contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be
justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the
percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive
in a suit "should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case, including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as
to its reasonableness."
Lately, we said:
The principle that courts should reduce
stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found
under the circumstances of the case that the same
is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this
jurisdiction....
xxx
xxx
xxx
Since then this Court has invariably fixed

counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis whenever
the
fees
stipulated
appear
excessive,
unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a
lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with
the duty of assisting the court in administering
impartial justice between the parties, and hence,
the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor
should it be ignored that sound public policy
demands that courts disregard stipulations for
counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a
source of speculative profit at the expense of the
debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v.
Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it
is not material that the present action is between
the debtor and the creditor, and not between
attorney and client. As courts have power to fix
the fee as between attorney and client, it must
necessarily have the right to say whether a
stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage
contract, is valid.Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil.
138.
In the instant case, the stipulated 30%
attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable.
With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who
receives a monthly salary of P175, the other
successful complainants were mere wage earners
paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering
the long period of time that they were illegally
and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these
laborers looked up to the favorable money
judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic
malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom
immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this
judicial antidote.
The ten complainants involved herein are
mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume that
they have not reached an educational attainment
comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or
respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand,
are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the
situation between laborers and lawyers, courts
should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of
attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14 For, as
in the present case, the real objective of the CIR
judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to
benefit the complaint laborers who were

unjustifiedly dismissed from the service. While it
is true that laborers should not be allowed to
develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands
that fed them, still lawyers should not be
permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due
by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid
to the laborers is not windfall but a product of the
sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal services
between laborer and attorney should then be
zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share
of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of the case
will readily show that an award of twenty-five
per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably
compensates the whole of the legal services
rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This
fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell
and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all,
they are the counsel of record of the
complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez
cannot deny this fact. The pleadings filed even at
the early stages of the proceedings reveal the
existence of an association between said
attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the
name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports
a common effort of the two. It cannot be denied
though that most of those pleadings up to
judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell
by respondent Fernandez.
We note that a break-up in the professional
tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and
Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell,
on November 26, 1962, complained to CIR that
respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to
communicate with him nor to inform him about
the incidents of this case." He there requested
that he be furnished "separately copies of the
decision of the court and other pleadings and
subsequent orders as well as motions in
connection with the case."
Subsequent pleadings filed in the case
unmistakably show the widening rift in their
professional relationship. Thus, on May 23,
1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official
Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day,

a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was also
registered in the same court. Although filed under
the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez," these
pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell.
conduct a hearing on, and determine, the

respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C.
Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the
amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as
attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.
A.C. No. 1261
On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to

respondent
Biscom's
Motion
for
Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a
"Motion for Clarification" of the November 13,
1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of
Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On
September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to
Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These,
and other pleadings that were filed later were
signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in
the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it
was correctly observed by CIR that a good
portion of the court battle was fought by
respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close
its eyes to the legal services also rendered by
Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous,
too, were his services. And, they are not
negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that
petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in
the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees
awarded herein. As to how much, this is a
function pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was
authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty.
Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81
which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the
event payment actually was made, he should be
required to return whatever is in excess of the
amount to which he is entitled in line with the
opinion expressed herein. 15
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
award of twenty five per cent (25%) attorneys'
fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez
contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and
affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of
April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set
aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the
Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to
December 29, 1983
TAN TEK BENG vs. TIMOTEO A. DAVID

DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary
action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A.
David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not
giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged
missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), onehalf of the attorneys fees received by David
from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their
agreement reads:
3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as

well as advances for expenses for the cases
referred to us by our clients and careful in
safeguarding our interest.
4. It is understood that legal expenses that we
shall recover from the debtors shall be turned
over to our clients. Other clients who directly or
indirectly have been approached or related (sic)
to you as a result of your labor are your clients.
I hereby pledge in the name of God, our
Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest
and fair with you in connection with our
transactions with our clients. Likewise you must
be sincere, honest and fair with me.
Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Illegible
December 3, 1970
TIMOTEO A. DAVID
Mr. Tan Tek Beng
P.S.
Manila
I will be responsible for all documents entrusted

me by our clients.
Dear Mr. Tan:

(Sgd.) Initial
In compliance with your request, I am now
putting into writing our agreement which must be
followed in connection with the accounts that
you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms
and conditions shall be as follows:
CONFORME to the above and likewise will

reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated
in the last paragraph of this letter.
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng
1. On all commission or attorneys fees that we

shall receive from our clients by virtue of the
collection that we shall be able to effect on their
accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise
you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from
domestic, inheritance and commercial from our
said clients or in any criminal cases where they
are involved.
2. I shall not deal directly with our clients
without your consent.
The business relationship between David and Tan

Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual
accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not
living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973
denounced David to Presidential Assistant
Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil
Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He
did not file any civil action to enforce the
agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the
partnership was composed of himself as
manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and
lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier.
When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office
maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan
Tek Beng should also invest some money or
shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan
Tek Beng refused.
This case was referred to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It
was proposed that respondent should submit a
stipulation of facts but that did not materialize
because the scheduled hearings were not held
due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and
his counsel.
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the
Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa,
Caloocan City but it was only in the
manifestation of his counsel dated August 10,
1981 that the Solicitor Generals Office was
informed of that fact. A report on this case dated
March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor
General to this Court.
MR. TAN TEK BENG

The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement
dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give
one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also
bound himself not to deal directly with the
clients.
We hold that the said agreement is void because

it was tantamount to malpractice which is the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance
or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning
to the term malpractice (Act No. 2828,
amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).
That meaning is in consonance with the

elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through
others for to do so would be unprofessional (2
R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37,
42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422;
Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569).
The commercialization of law practice is
condemned in certain canons of professional
ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:
WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for

being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this
decision should be attached to his record in the
Bar Confidants office.
34. Division of Fees. No division of fees for

legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
35. Intermediaries. The professional services

of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any law agency, personal or corporate, which
intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyers
responsibilities and qualifications are individual.
He should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties by or in the interest of
such intermediary. A lawyers relation to his
client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. . . .
38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates.
A lawyer should accept no compensation,
commissions, rebates or other advantages from
others without the knowledge and consent of his
client after full disclosure. (Appendix, Malcolm,
Legal Ethics).
We censure lawyer David for having entered and
acted upon such void and unethical agreement.
We discountenance his conduct, not because of
the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not
know legal ethics) but because David should
have known better.
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that
which violates the rules or ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of
that profession (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-20282
May 19, 1965
FORTUNATO F. HALILI vs. EUSEBIO

DAPLAS
Eusebio Daplas filed before the Public Service

Commission an application for a certificate of
public convenience to operate a bus service for
the transportation of passengers and freight on
the line comprising Amparo Subdivision in
Caloocan City to Divisoria (Manila) and viceversa employing 20 buses for that purpose. To
the application Fortunato F. Halili filed an
opposition alleging, among others, that the
service he is rendering on the line covered by the
application is more than sufficient to meet the
demands of the traveling public.
Both parties presented testimonial as well as
documentary evidence, and after carefully
considering the same, the Public Service
Commission decided to authorize the applicant to
operate at least 12 of the 20 units applied for
believing it to be sufficient to serve the needs of
the traveling public along the line covered by the
application subject to certain conditions therein
specified. The oppositor interposed the present
appeal.
The evidence submitted by the applicant tends to
show that in Amparo Subdivision there are many
people living, most of whom are employees
working in the City of Manila and students
attending classes in the different colleges and
universities established in Manila; that these
employees and students leave in the morning and
come back at noon and in the afternoon; that
along the way from Amparo Subdivision to
Divisoria there are many passengers bringing
their agricultural products to Divisoria and some
to Blumentritt who later return along the same

line with whatever purchases they had made; that
the buses or trucks of the oppositor make
irregular trips most of which are already full to
capacity upon passing Amparo Subdivision so
that the residents in the area are having difficulty
in securing means of transportation; and that this
difficulty is also being experienced by the
passengers waiting along the way from Amparo
Subdivision to Manila.
On the other hand, the evidence of the oppositor
tends to show that his service along the IpoDivisoria line is sufficient to take care of the
passengers traveling on said line, and that he has
buses entering Amparo Subdivision to serve the
people residing therein who were relatively few,
He submitted the reports of the checkers who
were posted in two different checking points to
observe the flow of the passengers along the line
applied for which point out that there is no public
necessity for the additional bus service desired
by the applicant. On this point, applicant also,
presented as rebuttal evidence the report made by
another inspector on the checking he underwent
at barrio Baesa wherein it is shown that
oppositor's buses, whether coming or going to
Manila, were loaded to capacity with instances of
overloading.1wph1.t
We note that the applicant has submitted quite a
substantial evidence in support of his application.
Thus, the testimonial evidence consisted in the
testimonies of applicant himself, of Benjamin
Salazar, a resident of Novaliches, Quezon City,
Leopoldo Garcia, another resident of Quezon
City, and Corona B. Venal, a practicing lawyer
and a resident of Amparo Subdivision. In
addition, applicant also submitted documentary
evidence consisting of a petition submitted by the
people affected in the line applied for and the
reports of two checkers prepared by duly
authorized agents of the Public Service
Commission. Of course, oppositor likewise
presented testimonial and documentary evidence
to show that there was no public necessity for the
approval of the instant application, among which
we notice two employees of Halili Transit, which
is owned by oppositor, like Antonio Santiago, an

inspector and Alfredo de la Cruz, its operations
manager. He also submitted the reports of two
checkers who made a similar observation
regarding the flow of passengers on the line
applied for.
The Public Service Commission, after weighing
carefully the evidence of both petitioner and
oppositor, reached the conclusion that there is
still room for an increase in the bus service that
was then in operation on the line applied for, for
which reason it authorized the applicant to
operate at least 12 of the 20 units applied for. In
reaching this conclusion, the Commission made
the following comment:
... . Even the testimony of Inspector Antonio
Santiago of oppositor, reveals that oppositor is
operating only three buses making only nine
round trips during the day which is clearly
inadequate for the residents of Amparo
Subdivision. And even Isabel Dikit, another
witness for oppositor, testified that buses of the
oppositor coming from the direction of Ipo upon
passing the Amparo Subdivision Gate, have
already seating capacity, resulting in the
difficulty of residents of the Subdivision, who
have to wait at the Gate, to secure
accommodation in said buses. This clearly
corroborates the testimonies of the witness of
applicant to the effect that people residing in the
Amparo Subdivision are having difficulty in
riding on the buses of oppositor passing on the
national road in front of Amparo Subdivision.
There being evidence that applicant is a Filipino
citizen and financially qualified to maintain and
operate the proposed service, the opposition filed
herein is hereby overruled, ... .
It appearing that the Commission has found
enough substantial evidence to support its
conclusion that there is further room for
authorizing the operation of additional bus
service on the line applied for, which evidence is
not only testimonial but documentary, we have
no other alternative than to affirm the same since
we are not authorized to substitute our
conclusion for that of the Commission. The rule

is that the Commission's findings of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive
upon this Court. We are only authorized to
modify or ignore them when it clearly appears
that
there
is
no
evidence
to
support reasonably such
conclusion. 1 More
specifically, this Court sad: "Whether public
necessity and convenience warrant the putting up
of additional service on the part of the appellee,
is a question of fact which the Public Service
Commission has found in the affirmative. This
finding, being supported by sufficient evidence,
should not be disturbed." (Raymundo
Transportation Company v. Cervo, L-3899, May
21, 1952)
With regard to the claim that the service
proposed by applicant, far from promoting public
interest, would only result in ruinous competition
with the established transportation service of
oppositor, suffice it to quote what we said in a
similar case:
... . In order that the opposition based on ruinous
competition may prosper, it must be shown that
the opponent would be deprived of fair profits on
the capital invested in its business. The mere
possibility of reduction in the earnings of a
business is not sufficient to prove ruinous
competition. It must be shown that the business
would not have sufficient gains to pay a fair rate
of interest on its capital investment.' (Manila
Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 66
Phil. 36, 6 L.J. 1117) Mere allegations by the
oppositor that its business would be ruined by the
establishment of the ice plants proposed by the
applicants are not sufficient to warrant this court
to revoke the order of the Public Service
Commission. (Teodora Santos Vda. de Pilares vs.
Consuelo Arranze, G.R. No. L-45462, July 28,
1938) (Ice & Cold Storage Industries of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Valero, 85 Phil. 7)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento
filed this special civil action for certiorari to
annul the decision 1of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their
accumulated deposits and car wash payments,
plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date of promulgation of judgment to the date of
actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as
and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for,
while to the cynical the de minimis amounts
involved should not impose upon the valuable
time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are
important to small wage earners such as taxicab
drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly
demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for
the rich or the powerful, with their reputed
monumental cases of national impact. It is also
the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with
the actual quotidian problems that beset their
individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and
Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners
as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4
days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule.
Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for
air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-airconditioned taxi, they were also required to pay
P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a
P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in
their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as
an extra driver by the petitioners, he already
failed to report for work for unknown reasons.

Later, petitioners learned that he was working for
"Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to
Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners
on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his
armed passenger who took all his money and
thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and
after his discharge, he went to his home province
to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by
petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms
and conditions as when he was first employed,
but his working schedule was made on an
"alternative basis," that is, he drove only every
other day. However, on several occasions, he
failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit
his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day.
Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without
fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work,
he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed
that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak
Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested
petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily
cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners
told him that not a single centavo was left of his
deposits as these were not even enough to cover
the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he
was driving. This was allegedly the practice
adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses
incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When
Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit,
petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on
his part, claimed that his termination from
employment was effected when he refused to pay
for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed
a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of
the National Labor Relations Commission
charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and
illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed,
the labor arbiter holding that it took private
respondents two years to file the same and such

unreasonable delay was not consistent with the
natural reaction of a person who claimed to be
unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case
could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings,
with the observation that private respondents
failed to controvert the evidence showing that
Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company from February 10, 1987 to December
10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on
September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left
their jobs for similar employment with other taxi
operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of
the labor arbiter that private respondents' services
were not illegally terminated. It, however,
modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
ordering petitioners to pay private respondents
the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now
before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like
the NLRC, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect
but, at times, finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where,
however, such conclusions are not supported by
the evidence, they must be struck down for being
whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived
at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily
deposits made by respondents to defray any
shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the
general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor
Code against requiring employees to make
deposits, and that there is no showing that the
Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a
"practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the
deposits made were illegal and the respondents

must be refunded therefor.
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
driver as illegal deduction in the context of the

law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as
follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. No
employer shall require his worker to make
deposits from which deductions shall be made
for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to
tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the
employer, except when the employer is engaged
in such trades, occupations or business where the
practice of making deposits is a recognized one,
or is necessary or desirable as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and
regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article
provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage
to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the
employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or
permit deposits to defray any deficiency which
the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his
"boundary." Also, when private respondents
stopped working for petitioners, the alleged
purpose for which petitioners required such
unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other
case, any balance due to private respondents after
proper accounting must be returned to them with
legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to
the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1990 605.00 570.00

1991 165.00 2,300.00

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 19871991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits
through valesor he incurred shortages, such that
he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount
of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's
deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the
same even in the present petition. We accordingly
agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that since the evidence shows that he had
not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed
the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the
labor arbiter had this to say in his decision:
"Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no
dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi
industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon
the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the
same clean condition when he took it out, and as
claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the
present
case),
complainant(s)
(private
respondents herein) were made to shoulder the
expenses for washing, the amount doled out was
paid directly to the person who washed the unit,
thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much
more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the
Consequently, private respondents are not

entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash
payments they made. It will be noted that there
was nothing to prevent private respondents from
cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted
to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor
General correctly noted, car washing after a tour
of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in
fact, dictated by fair play.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of

respondent
National
Labor
Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting
the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney's fees and directing said
public respondent to order and effect the
computation and payment by petitioners of the
refund for private respondent Domingo
Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon
from the date of finality of this resolution up to
the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees

for
private
respondents'
authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before
the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they
represent themselves, or (2) if they represent
their organization or the members thereof. While
it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the
authorized representative of private respondents,
he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of
the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear
mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's
fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client a reasonable compensation for his
services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship
cannot exist unless the client's representative is a
lawyer. 8

Legal Ethics

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Legal Ethics

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

1 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

A.C. No. 4807

March 22, 2000

MANUEL N. CAMACHO vs. ATTYS. LUIS

In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan

1997 with the AMACC President; letter or

communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein

3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent

2 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

evidence. Let a copy of this decision be entered

his oath of office as well as the above-quoted

Respondent claimed he would suggest to his

had filed against respondents client. In his

In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that

In his Comment8 dated January 27, 2000,

Commissioner San Juan maintained that the

A.C. No. 5148

Xu, through herein complainant, filed a

On the other hand, complainant was impleaded,

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had

3 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

Respondents actions do not measure up to this

gain leverage against the estafa case. If

Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law

September 29, 1962

The facts which led to the filing of this complaint

4 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

or authority was given to the petitioner by his

withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank

falsification. It was shown, however, that the case

June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L.

Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the

5 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to

same pleading respondent stated that he was the

constitute law practice, as do the preparation and

6 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar

On the charge of violation of law, complainant

January 26, 2001

appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice

(b) Outside employment and other activities

(2) Engage in the private practice of their

belong to a "powerless family" from the

7 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge

recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga

We agree with the recommendation of the

An examination of the records shows that during

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the

for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98

fixed by the agency to the end that it will not

8 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

RULE 138, SECTION 34

December 20, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

months and 1 day of prision correccional and to

Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle