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Author(s): A. L. MacFie
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 165-177
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283987
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166
So far ... unfortunately... with all the machineryat our disposal ... we have
been unable to discover.'3
Thus inspired by Cleveland's words, in 1913 Bray, fully convinced of
the urgent need to discover the sources of sedition in Asia, and the identity
of the 'one great intellect', supposedly controlling events there, obtained a
year's leave of absence from the Indianarmy,in which he was serving at the
time, and made for Syria, where he had been led to believe German
influence was spreading rapidly. There he found abundantevidence of the
spread of German influence, and also of the rise of Arab nationalism. But
he failed to discover the identity of the 'one great intellect' supposedly
controlling events. Nevertheless, as his later accounts of the causes of unrest
in Mesopotamia show, he did not abandonthe quest.
In the first of his reports,entitled 'Mesopotamia. PreliminaryReport on
Causes of Unrest', drawn up on the instructions of the Secretary to the
Political Department, India Office, in September 1920, Bray fully
acknowledged the important part played in the recent uprising in
Mesopotamia by local elements, including in particular pan-Arabs,
nationalists, 'disgruntled Effendi', tribesmen, 'impatient of their forced
inaction', 'fanatical' priests, and the educated classes, many of whom,
'prolific students of history', had adopted the nationalist cause. Left to
themselves, Bray argued, none of these groups and classes, bitterly hostile
to one another and saturatedwith intrigue, would have proved capable of
generatinga concerted action. Thatwas made possible only by the existence
of an 'outside influence', exercised through the medium of Berlin and
Moscow.4
The objectives of this 'outside influence', exercised throughthe medium
of Berlin and Moscow, were clear:
(a) By every possible means to discreditthe Ententeand sow dissension in
its ranks.
(b) To organize national forces in Anatolia and Thrace, obtaining men,
arms and money from the Bolsheviks or Berlin.
(c) To preparerebellion on a large scale in Syria and Mesopotamia.
(d) To organize all the parties concerned so as to produce simultaneous
action.
Unfortunately, owing to the impatience of the tribes, the uprising in
Mesopotamia had proved premature;but efforts were evidently continuing
to keep the agitation going and frustrateall attemptsat conciliation.5
Much evidence was adduced by Bray in supportof his contention that a
wide-ranging conspiracy existed, aimed at the Entente Powers in Asia and
channelled through the medium of Berlin and Moscow. On or about 15
November 1919, he asserts, a 'very important' meeting was held at
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had provided the means for these arrangementsto be made, and a certain
degree of co-operation had been attained; but the combined action
contemplated had not yet taken place. Success in the future would depend
largely on the strength of the pan-Islamist movement. But it should not be
doubted that both the pan-Islamist movement and the various national
movements concerned derived their inspiration from Berlin - through
Switzerland and Moscow. Though quite where the ultimate controlling
forces of the movement lay remained in doubt: 'These we have yet to find.
Because we find the threads leading to Berlin and Moscow it by no means
proves that we have reached the end of our investigations, we have only
commenced them.'8
In the second of his reports on the causes of unrest in Mesopotamia,
entitled 'Mesopotamia:Causes of Unrest - Report No.11', composed about
the same time as the first, Bray concentrateshis attentionon the Soviet and
German aspects of the affair. In his view, the Soviets, intent on promoting
revolution throughout the world, were at that time concentrating their
efforts on the Middle East, with the avowed intent of 'crushing the British
Empire'.' Their methods of procedure, which included the training of
emissaries in communist principles, their despatch to the various countries
concerned, the organization of secret societies, and the organization of
revolution 'from within', were designed to secure the maximum result with
the minimum forces. In Anatolia, in particular, a coup d'etat might be
attempted, establishing a Soviet regime; and in northernPersia a military
occupation. In this way the Soviet Government would be enabled to
consolidate and organize its position, and from the nuclei thus established
'throw out her sinister tentacles which, groping about in every direction,
seek to fasten themselves on local soil, into which their roots will strike,
giving her a fresh grip of organised conspiracy'."
The Germans, in Bray's view, like the Soviets, saw substantial
advantage to be gained from the spread of unrest and revolution in the
Middle East; and they too actively supportedthe easternmovement in every
way possible, short of direct military involvement. In particular, they
supportedEnver, Talaatand the other CUP leaders and their associates, in
their efforts to create an 'Asiatic Islamic Federation', uniting the various
national movements in the east.
The steps which it was believed Enver, Talaatand the other CUP leaders
and their associates had taken to create an 'Asiatic Islamic Federation' and
spread opposition to the Entente Powers throughoutthe east were recorded
by Bray in his second report in some detail. In January-February1920, so
it was reported, large sums of money had been deposited by associates of
Enver and Talaat, resident in Berlin, in Swiss banks; and in March
T?A100,000had been sent to Istanbulto help the nationalists.' In April-May,
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Empire as soon as it was clear that (d) The terms of the TurkishTreatywere such as to restorethe Turkish
Nationalists to the Committee of Union and Progress control.
In these circumstances it would be idle to search for local causes
otherwise than to learn how to avoid presenting the enemy with
material for propagandaor disproportionateevaporationof prestige.20
The conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis of events taking
place in Europe and the Middle East were evident:
As long as the Moscow Direction survives to absorb into its
organization, thrive on and exploit agencies of local discontent,
Nationalism will be the instrumentof Internationalism,and until the
InternationalMonster has been starved, or severed at the neck, its
various heads will have to be dealt with in detail when and where they
rise.21
How far, it might be enquired,was the information,collected by British
intelligence, contained in the three studies of the causes of unrest in
Mesopotamia, accurate;and how far were the conclusions drawnvalid? The
materialcollected by Masayuki Yamauchiand other students of the subject
would suggest that, while the information collected was for the most part
accurate enough, the conclusions drawn were dangerously misleading.
There is no doubt that, in the period of their exile, Enver, Talaat,Djemal and
the other CUP leaders and their associates in Europe had, from the
beginning engaged, in conjunction with elements within the German and
Soviet governments, in organizing a wide-ranging conspiracy, aimed at the
destruction of the British Empire in Asia. But their efforts had proved
almost entirely ineffective. For the movements, groups and factions they
were attempting to unite proved to be riddled with mutual suspicion,
hostility and distrust.
The facts, as collected by Masayuki Yamauchi,drawn for the most part
from letters written by the main participantsat the time, tend to confirm the
information collected by British intelligence, used by Bray and the War
Office authorin their three reports,though not in all cases. In Berlin, where
he arrivedin the early partof 1919, following an abortiveattemptto join the
Army of Islam in the Caucasus made following his flight to the Crimea in
November 1918, Enver, according to Masayuki Yamauchi, quickly made
contact with Karl Radek, the noted communist agitator and publicist, then
confined in Moabit prison. Persuadedby him of the advantagesto be gained
from the formation of a Bolshevik-Islamic alliance, with the support and
approval of Hans von Seeckt, a Germangeneral, who had held the post of
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Chief of the Ottoman General Staff in the First World War,he then set out
to travel by plane to Moscow, where after an incredible series of delays,
involving air crashes, emergency landings and periods of imprisonment,he
arrived in August 1920. There (where it is evident he could not have
attended the meeting of the Third Internationalheld in May) Enver made
immediate contact with a number of Bolshevik leaders, including Trotsky,
Chicherin, Karakhanand Zinoviev, who appeared willing at the time to
support his plans for the formation of a Turkish-German-Bolshevik
alliance. Following his attendance at the Congress of the Peoples of the
East, held in Baku in September, at which he was not well received, he
returnedto Moscow, and thence to Berlin, where he set about organizingthe
Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies, which he and his colleagues had
alreadyagreed to set up. Representativesof various overseas brancheswere
then appointed, including Dr Fuad Bey for Egypt, Emir Shakib Arslan for
Syria, Djemal and BarakatullahEffendi for India, and Talaat for Berlin.
Meanwhile in Anatolia Mustafa Kemal would be expected to organize a
'centre', as would Halil Pasha, Enver's uncle, in east Turkestan(Kashgar)
and Djemal in Afghanistan.22
Whilst in Moscow in the summerof 1920 Enver, accordingto Masayuki
Yamauchi, claimed that he had facilitated an agreement between the
Bolsheviks and Mustafa Kemal. He also claimed that Trotskyhad promised
to supportthe despatch of one or two cavalry divisions, recruitedin Muslim
lands, for service in Anatolia.23
Meanwhile, in Berlin and other Europeantowns and cities, Talaatwho,
unlike Enver, had made straightfor the Germancapital, following his flight
from the Ottoman Empire, worked assiduously to encourage and unite the
various Islamic groups, opposed to the imperial powers, publishing
periodicals in Turkish and Arabic, and despatching Teshkilati Mahsusa
(Special Organization)agents to Iran, India, Afghanistan and the Caucasus
to promote revolution there. Surprisingly,no mention is made in Masayuki
Yamauchi'saccount of the Montreuxconference, and little or no mention of
the Lugano and Munich conferences. Though it is noted that Talaatmade
contact with members of the Egyptian national movement in Constance in
July 1920, and with MuhammedAli, the leader of the Caliphatemovement,
in Rome in August.24
Djemal, according to Masayuki Yamauchi, like Talaat, made
immediately for Berlin, following his flight from the Ottoman Empire. In
January 1919 he informed Djavid that it was his intention to leave in the
very near future for Afghanistan, where he hoped to set up an anti-British
front. But he did not in fact do so. Instead, in July he moved to Klosters
Platz in Switzerland where, apart from a brief visit to Munich, he stayed
until November.25Only then did he set out for Afghanistan, travelling
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The extent of the mutual suspicion, hostility and distrust that divided
many of the members of the Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies is
best illustratedby the struggle for power that took place between Enver and
his supporters, and Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish national
movement in Anatolia. As Masayuki Yamauchimakes clear, from Enver's
point of view the Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies was intended
merely as a 'foreign policy tool of the Young Turks in exile', a means by
which they might retrieve the position of leadership, supposedly 'usurped'
by Mustafa Kemal, they had lost as a result of the defeat inflicted on the
Ottoman Empire by the Entente Powers in the First World War.32To this
end, in 1920-21, Enver had repeatedly requested the Bolshevik leaders to
set up, finance and support a Muslim Army in Transcaucasawhich, with
himself at its head, might at the appropriatemoment enter Anatolia and reestablish CUP control there; and in the autumn of 1920 he had actually
dispatcheda numberof agents to easternAnatolia, to preparethe groundfor
his return. But Mustafa Kemal, well aware of his rival's intentions, had
taken immediate steps to block any move he might make. In April 1921 he
had had several of Enver's agents arrestedor otherwise dealt with, and in
May he had issued strict instructions that should Enver appear in eastern
Anatolia he should be at once arrested and sent, under armed guard, to
Ankara.Officers and troops loyal to Enver should be dismissed or posted to
the western front. As a result Enver's plans for an imminent return to
Anatolia, and by extension his plans for the creation of a Bolshevik-panTurkish-pan-Islamistfront, were frustrated.33
The conclusions drawn by Bray in the three reports on the causes of
unrest in Mesopotamia show all too clearly the dangers involved in
interpretinginformationcollected by the intelligence services. For if acted
upon, without further consideration, they may well have led British
officials, involved in policy making in the Middle East, to make a series of
false moves. But fortunately, from the point of view of future British
influence in the area, many British officials, such as Sir Horace Rumbold,
High Commissioner in Istanbul,and Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner in
Baghdad, remained generally persuaded of the primacy of local factors in
the determination of events.34 As a result fears of a Bolshevik-panTurkish-pan-Islamistalliance, originating in Berlin and Moscow, were not
allowed to dominate British policy-making in the Middle East, and a series
of local settlements were arrived at, negotiated for the most part on a case
by case basis. Yet until at least the end of the Turkishwar of independence
the British intelligence services, heavily influenced by Bray's analysis of
events, remained generally convinced of the existence and importance of
some such all embracing conspiracy.35
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NOTES
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March 1921, the contents of which had been largely agreed in the autumnof 1920.
24. Ibid., p.38.
25. Ibid., pp.l1-12, 28, 30.
26. Azade-AyaeRorlich, 'Fellow Travellers:EnverPasha and the Soviet Govemment, 1918-20',
p.291. Djemal was reportedby British intelligence to have lived in Berlin, Geneva and
Milan, and even to have travelledto Moscow and Istanbul.His plans to promoterevolution
in Indiawere, it seems, highly ambitious,involving the creationof a great state or federation
of states in CentralAsia which, acting in conjunctionwith the Soviets, might provide the
jumping off groundfor an assaulton the British Empire in Asia.
27. Ali FuatCebesoy,MustafaKemal'sambassadorin Moscow, wrote thatthe League of Islamic
RevolutionarySocieties was simply anothertitle for the exiled remnantsof the CUP. See
MasayukiYamauchi,The GreenCrescentunder the Red Star: EnverPasha in Soviet Russia,
1919-22, p.35.
28. Ibid.,,pp.35-6, 61-2.
29. On Enver's partin the Basmachirevolt see Salahi R. Sonyel, 'Enver Pasha and the Basmaji
Movement in CentralAsia', and MarthaB. Olcott, 'The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in
Turkestan,1918-24', Soviet Studies, Vol.33 (July 1981).
30. For an account of Mustafa Kemal's dealings with the Soviets see Hikmet Bayur, 'Genel
Savaatan Sonra Antlaamalarimiz',Belleten, Vol.30 (1966); and A.L. Macfie, The Straits
Question (Institutefor Balkan Studies, Salonica, 1993), pp.122-4.
31. It is evident of course that the ideologies of Marxism,socialism and anti-imperialismwould
in due course pose a serious threatto the survival of the British Empire in Asia.
32. MasayukiYamauchi,The GreenCrescentunderthe Red Star: EnverPasha in Soviet Russia.
1919-1922, p.46.
33. Ibid., pp.46-60.
34. In October 1922, for example, Sir Horace Rumbold,in a letter despatchedto Lord Curzon,
the British foreign secretary,wTote:'I have always maintainedthat MustafaKemal adjusted
the closeness of his relationswith Russia to the necessities of his immediatesituation,never
going furtherin that directionthan it was absolutely necessary to do, and that Russia has at
no time acquiredsuch influence as to be able to dictate the foreign policy of Angora.' See
FO 371 7906 6468 Rumboldto Curzon, 17 October 1922.
35. See B.N. $im?ir (ed.), BritishDocumentson Atatairk(Ankara,TurkTarihKurumu),Vol.IV,
No.12, Enclosure.
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