British Views in Turkish National Movement 1919-22

British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22
Author(s): A. L. MacFie
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 27-46
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284241
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British Views of the TurkishNational

Movementin Anatolia, 1919-22
A.L. MACFIE
British views of the Turkish national movement in Anatolia differed

according to the point of view adopted. Whereas British officials on the
spot, in Constantinople (Istanbul,occupied by the Entente Powers, Britain,
France and Italy, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First
World War) and Anatolia tended to view the movement as the product of a
conspiracy, organized by elements within the Ottoman government, in
particularthe Ministry of War, the intelligence services, particularlythose
operating in Europe, CentralAsia and the Middle East, tended to view it as
pa t of an internationalconspiracy, organized by outside forces (CUP in
exile, German right wing, Bolshevik), centred in Berlin and Moscow. This
discrepancy was never fully resolved, but as events developed in Anatolia,
in the period of Turkishnational struggle, the view put forwardby the men
on the spot gained increasing acceptance.
The view expressed by most of the British officials serving in
Constantinople and Anatolia (General Milne, Commanderof the Army of
the Black Sea, Admiral Calthorpe, British High Commissioner in
Constantinople, Admiral de Robeck, also a British High Commissioner,
Commander Heathcote-Smith, RNVR, Captain Hurst, an officer in the
Levant Consular Service, CaptainPerring,a relief officer, and many others)
found its clearest expression in a History of the National Movement, printed
by the WarOffice in the autumnof 1919. Until the end of May, the History
of the National Movement noted, all the Turkish corps commanders
continued to dispatch armamentsto Constantinople, as they were required
to do by the Armistice of Mudros (30 October 1918). But the occupation of
south-western Anatolia by the Italians, in March 1919, and the occupation
of Smyrna (Izmir) by the Greeks in May entirely changed the situation. By
the end of May the country was flooded with accounts of what had occurred.
These accounts, which 'naturally'were exaggerated, came as a great shock
to the Turks,and had a unifying effect on the various factions into which the
country at that time was divided.
Middle EasternStudies, Vol.38, No.3, July 2002, pp.27-46
PUBLISHED
BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
28
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
About that time - so the History continues - the surrenderof armaments

from central and eastern Anatolia ceased. During June the creation of two
different organizationswas reported:
a) The first was an unofficial organization,kept very secret, and headed by
Raouf Bey, a sailor, lately Minister of Marine. This organization was
engaged in sending men and money into the area near Smyrna.
b) The second organization was the creation of General Shevket Turgut
Pasha, Minister of War,in consultation with the Minister of the Interior.
He mapped out Asia Minor into Northern and Southern Inspectorates,
and allotted to each a distinguished General Staff. The first two
appointmentswere General Mustafa Kemal to the NorthernInspectorate
and General 'Kutchuk' Djemal to the Southern Inspectorate. So far as
one can ascertainthis official organizationat its inception seems to have
been intended to ensure the peace of TurkishAnatolia during a period of
intense strain.
Unfortunately the method adopted by Mustafa Kemal had the opposite
effect. He and his officers did everything in their power to stir up the people,
by condemning the action of the Allies with regardto the events occurring
in the Smyrna district. This agitation became so serious that it was
necessary to order the return of Mustafa Kemal to Constantinople, but he
refused to obey. Instead, early in July he went to Erzerum, and about the
same time was joined there by Raouf Bey from Aydin. The first step taken
was the summoning of the Congress of Erzerum,with delegates from what
were known as the six eastern provinces. This was the first important
meeting at which the nationalistprogrammewas discussed. There appeared
to have been a good deal of disagreement at the congress, but in the end a
declaration was agreed on. The underlying principle of the declarationwas
the 'defence of national rights'. As a result of the defeat of the Ottoman
army by the British forces the leaders of the movement were preparedto
accept the loss of Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine and Syria, but they were
determined to defend, if need be by force, the remainderof Turkey,which
'representedthe home of the race'. On no account would they accept the
division of partsof Anatolia between the Greeks and Armenians.Nor would
they accept the grantingof any form of mandate,which would 'result in the
Ottoman Empire losing its independence to the Powers'. The 'real'
programmeof the nationalists was, therefore, the reportconcluded:
a) To organize the villages as best they could without taking men from their
homes;
b) To maintain complete order in Anatolia, and to refrain from any
aggression across the pre-war frontier;
BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT
29
c) To get rid of the government of Ferid Pasha, and to substitute a

government which would furnish a delegation to the Peace Conference
capable of making a dignified protest upon the basis of President
Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points;
To
avoid any immediate clash with the Allies, and reserve to their party
d)
such powers of compromise, as would put them in a position of being at
once the saviour of their country, and able to come to a settlement with
the Entente.
Following this programme,Mustafa Kemal and his associates continued to
organize the country.As a preliminarystep to the overthrowof Damad Ferid
Pasha, they summoned a congress at Sivas. The Sivas Congress differed
from the Erzerum Congress in that its delegates came from the whole of
Turkey. It was at the Sivas Congress that the delegates decided on the
seizure of the telegraphoffices in Anatolia, thereby securing the isolation of
the government in Constantinople.
A second account, dispatched on 30 June 1919, from General Milne,
Commanderof the Army of the Black Sea, to Admiral Calthorpe,the British
High Commissioner, may also be taken as representative of the views
frequently expressed at the time by the men on the spot. In his account,
Milne informed Calthorpethat he had just received a series of reportsfrom
the interior suggesting that a 'serious movement' was developing in the
districts of Sivas and Konia, and that armed bands were being assembled
there. This movement, which had, it was reported,been set up by Mustafa
Kemal Pasha at Sivas, and Djemal Pasha at Konia, aimed at 'action
independentof the Ottoman Government'.
A third account, entitled History of the Movement, composed by
Commander Heathcote-Smith, and dispatched to London on or about 24
July 1919, may also be taken as typical. In his reportHeathcote-Smithtraces
the events leading up to the declarations,issued on 8 July 1919 by Mustafa
Kemal (on the occasion of his resignation from the army), and on 9 July by
Raouf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine. In recent months, Heathcote-Smith
reports, members of the CUP, left at liberty in Anatolia, had made much
propaganda, promoting the idea that President Wilson's 14 Points
guaranteed the territorial integrity of Turkey. But hampered by their
'inveterate instinct for intrigue' they had made little headway. Then came
the Greek occupation of Smyrna (15 May 1919) and the 'Greek bungling'
that accompanied it. From that date the resistance movement began to
thrive, and the national defence organization,set up by Mustafa Kemal and
his colleagues, became 'practically Turkey'. The organization, HeathcoteSmith was informed, was backed by the Ottoman government, or at least
elements within it. Members of a congress, shortly to be assembled in
30
Erzerum, would act as political advisors to the movement. Methods to be

employed would include the threatof massacre.'
The view frequently expressed by the various intelligence agencies, on
the other hand, found its clearest expression in three reports on the Causes
of Unrest in Mesopotamia, drawn up by the India Office and the WarOffice
in the autumn of 1920.2 According to Major N.N.E. Bray, a special
intelligence officer, attached to the Political Department,India Office, and
author of two of the reports, the Turkish national movement, like other
national movements active in the area (Arab, Syrian, Mesopotamian) was
merely a 'compliment of a far wider conspiracy', organized in Berlin and
Moscow. The aims of that conspiracy were:
a) By every possible means to discredit the Entente;
b) To organize national forces in Anatolia and Thrace, if possible with the
assistance of men and money from the Bolsheviks and Berlin;
c) To preparerebellion on a large scale in Syria and Mesopotamia;
d) To organize all the parties concerned so as to produce a simultaneous
action.
These plans could not be carried out until arrangementshad been made for
the organizationof the nationalelements in Turkey,Syria and Mesopotamia,
the alliance of the pan-Arab movement with the Turkish national
movement, the co-operationof the tribes and the unification of the whole on
a pan-Islamistbasis. When unification was completed and all the plans were
ready, a signal would be given and a simultaneous action undertaken.This
action would, it was hoped, be of so widespread a nature as to force the
withdrawalof the Entente Powers from the Middle East, and possibly even
from Asia.
Much evidence was adduced by the British intelligence services in
supportof the contention that the Turkishnational movement was part of a
wide-ranging conspiracy, aimed at the expulsion of the British and French
from the Middle East. In November 1919, so it was reported, a 'very
important' meeting was held at Montreux, presided over by Talaat Pasha,
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) leader and former Ottoman
Grand Vizier. At this meeting, which was also attended by Amir Shakib
Arslan, a 'delegate of the Damascus extremists' and representative of
Feisal, the leader of the Arab national forces in Syria, proposals were
discussed for the formation of a defensive alliance between the Syrian
nationalists, the Turkish nationalists and the Arab sheikhs of Arabia. The
Arab sheikhs, in particular,might be united under the leadership of Emir
Husein, Feisal's father, the so-called 'King of the Hedjaz'. In December, at
a similar meeting, held at St Moritz, again attendedby Amir Shakib Arslan
BRITISH
VIEWS
OF TURKISH
NATIONAL
MOVEMENT
31
(who had it seems in the meantime been instructedby Feisal to agree to the
proposals put forward by Talaat at Montreux), a proposal - so it was
reported - was discussed for the formation of an alliance between Enver
Pasha, the exiled CUP leader and Ottoman Minister of War in the First
World War, Mustafa Kemal, the Arab sheikhs and the Bolsheviks. At the
meeting, Amir Shakib Arslan was instructed to go to Moscow, to make
contact with the Soviet government;but in the event it seems he did not do
so. Rather he sent a letter to Litvinoff, the Soviet representative in
Copenhagen, asking him to inform Moscow of the conference proposal. In
the meantime letters and telegrams, dispatched by the OttomanMinister of
Warand other officials in Constantinople,to Ottomanarmy commandersin
Anatolia, intercepted by British intelligence or otherwise obtained,
indicated that the Turkish nationalist army commanders concerned, in
particularthe commander of the XIII Army Corps, stationed at Diarbekir,
were being instructed to make contact with leading sheikhs in Syria and
Mesopotamia, and where possible promote resistance to the forces of the
Entente Powers stationed there. Thus on 8 December 1919 it was reported
that the Under-Secretaryof War, Constantinople, had instructed the GOC
XIII Army Corps, Diarbekir,to maintain contact with the Arab sheikhs in
Mesopotamia; and on 29 December that he had instructed the GOC XV
Army Corps to instruct one Ajaimi, the 'Chief Sheikh of Iraq', to keep in
touch and patiently await events. On 31 December it was reported that
Djevad, Chief of the Ottoman General Staff, and Djemal, Minister of War,
had orderedthat contact be maintainedwith Ibn Saud, the rulerof Nejd, and
Sheikh Rashid, the ruler of Ha'il; and on 21 February 1920 that various
Arab tribes had made it clear that they were ready to take action as soon as
they received orders.
Otherreportsreceived about this time appearedto confirm the existence
of a wide-ranging conspiracy. In November 1919 MI ic reported that the
Turkishnationalists intended to convene a pan-Islamic conference at Sivas,
and that delegations were expected to attend from Azerbaijan, Kurdistan,
Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan. Efforts were also being made to make
contact with pan-Islamic elements in the neighbourhood of Kashgar.3In
December the Director of Military Intelligence, Constantinople,dispatched
a copy of a report, drawn up by Major Hay, on Possible Relations between
the Nationalist Leaders in Anatolia and Agents of the Soviet Government,
based in the Ottoman capital. Soviet agents based in the Ottoman capital
had, it was believed, made contact with the Turkish nationalists in
September; and in October they had dispatched an emissary (actually a
British agent), supposedly a member of the 'Council of the Representatives
of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Constantinople', to
the interior.4In January1920 it was reportedthat a pan-Islamicorganization
32
in Constantinoplehad received funds from Germany and Switzerland; and

that the Ottoman Minister of War was engaged in the direction of panIslamic intrigue in India, Afghanistan, Azerbaijanand Arabia.'In July 1920
it was reported that Bolshevik influence was becoming increasingly
apparent in nationalist circles;6 and in August that Mustafa Kemal had
arrived at an understandingwith Feisal.7
Particularattention was paid by the British intelligence services to the
activities of secret societies operating in the Near and Middle East, in
particular al-Nadi-al-Arabi, an extreme pan-Islamic society set up in
Damascus, al-Ahd, a secret society, set up by ex-Ottoman Army Arab
officers and others, in Mesopotamia, and Mouvahiddin, a pan-Islamic
society, set up in Sivas in November 1919.8These secret societies, British
intelligence concluded, were directly linked with Constantinople and
Switzerland,and from there with the GermanForeign Office in Berlin. They
were, it was believed, generally formed for some specific political purpose,
to tap a 'new source of activity' (Islam) in the struggle with the Western
imperial powers.9Mouvahiddin, in particular,had been set up by the CUP
and Turkish nationalists, with the object of 'enlisting the support and coordinatingthe efforts of all anti-foreign and disaffected elements in Islamic
countries'.'?Acting in conjunction with the Bolsheviks, they were capable
of causing much trouble, more particularlyif, as appearedlikely, they were
'able to dispose of the large funds in the possession of the CUP'."
In the second of the three reports on the Causes of Unrest in
Mesopotamia, Bray described in some detail the part played in the antiimperialist movement by Moscow and Berlin. Soviet efforts to create world
unrest, Bray declared, were 'ceaseless and effective'.l Opportunism as
regards means was absolute, and it did not exclude an 'alliance with
opposites'.'3Lenin and his Commissariatof Military Affairs were aiming to
'bring the whole world under the communist system', and secure the
downfall of the British Empire in Asia.'4 Their main centre of endeavour
was the Middle East where they were busy underminingstable government,
organizing secret societies and spreading revolutionary propaganda. In
Anatolia, in particular,they were hoping to have Mustafa Kemal replaced
by Enver, and a Soviet regime established.
German reactionaries were similarly seeking to create unrest and
revolution in the Middle East. To this end they were 'undoubtedly'
providing Enver, and possibly also Mustafa Kemal, with capable German
officers. In December 1919 Enver, it was reported, had been in Berlin,
working hard to establish an alliance between the Germans and the
Bolsheviks, and unify the Arab, Turkishand Egyptian national movements.
About the same time a number of CUP, nationalist and pan-Arab leaders
(Talaat,Shakib Arslan, Fuad Selim, Nedjmeddin Molla) had come together
33
to discuss the possibility; and shortly thereafter Enver, with German and
Bolshevik support,had formed an Asiatic Islamic Federationthroughwhose
medium all the various movements and societies would be co-ordinated.
Enver and Talaatwould provide substantialfunds, from CUP accounts held
in Berlin. Large scale operations, from Mesopotamia to India, might be
expected to begin in the autumnof 1920.'5
Not that the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia were necessarily entirely
committed to the Bolshevik cause. Opinion in Anatolia, according to
various accounts, was divided on the issue. A numberof army commanders
were sceptical. But Bolshevik propagandawas rampant,and several towns
had highly organized revolutionary organizations. In the Grand National
Assembly 105 members were committed to the Bolshevik programmeand
direct contact had been made with the Bolsheviks by way of Nakhichevan.'6
Furthersupportfor the view that the Turkishnational movement should
be seen as part of a world-wide conspiracy, aimed at the destructionof the
British Empire in Asia, was provided by Commander Luke, a political
officer, attachedto the Commander-in-Chiefof the British fleet, stationedin
Constantinople, and Andrew Ryan, a member of the British High
Commission staff. In a report on the Effects of Bolshevism on the British
Empire, composed in December 1919, Commander Luke argued that in
order to inflict injury on the British Empire, the Bolsheviks were prepared
to disavow their own principles and seek allies in their struggle in all parts
of the Muslim world, including Turkey,Transcaucasia,Persia, Afghanistan,
India, Arabia and Egypt. Skilfully making use of every circumstance
lending itself to misinterpretation or distortion, they had succeeded in
making large numbers of Muslims throughout the Near and Middle East
honestly believe that Great Britain was the enemy of Islam. The dispatch of
a Greek Army of Occupation to the Muslim province of Aydin, with its
'deplorable' results, had been a useful and much used argument.The delay
in concluding peace, resulting in the rise of the national movement and the
resurrectionof the CUP, had provided 'valuable allies', or more correctly
'tools'. Another successful argumentused had been the 'injudicious' policy
of Britain's ally, Denikin, towards Muslim Daghistan and Azerbaijan.'7
Very skilfully, Luke continued, the Bolsheviks were contriving to turn
the 'somewhat vague and unframed' aims of the pan-Islamic movement,
such as it was, into anti-British channels; while Mustafa Kemal was
reported to be summoning a pan-Islamic conference in Sivas, attended by
delegations from Persia, India and Afghanistan.'"
Andrew Ryan, in a memorandumattachedto the above report,expressed
more or less complete agreement with Luke. The principal object of the
Bolsheviks, he wrote, was to wield all Muslims into one whole, to be used
as an instrument against the West, especially the British. Constantinople
34
was the naturalpivot of this movement on the Muslim side. How far all the
converging activities had a common instigation in Germany remained in
doubt;but there was no doubt that Constantinopleand Turkeywere now the
'creatures' and 'instruments' of the CUP and the nationalists. While some
of the forces in play, such as Bolshevism, an essentially anarchical
movement, might exhaust themselves or be crushed, others, such as Islam,
especially dangerous for the British, might continue to grow.'9
The view put forward by the British intelligence services, that the
Turkish national movement was part of an international conspiracy,
organized in Berlin and Moscow, found supportin the assumption, held by
virtually all of the British officials involved, at least in the early stages, that
the national movement was organized by the CUP, in particularthe CUP
leaders in exile. In a note on Local Opposition to Mustafa Kemal Pasha,
written in October 1919, a British naval intelligence officer remarkedthat
the national movement was merely a 'recrudescence of the Committee of
Union and Progress', presented under a 'new, high sounding name'. In a
report presented to de Robeck in the same month, Captain Perring, the
British representative in Samsun, remarked that in his view the whole
national movement originated with Enver, whose presence in the Caucasus
was not to be doubted.2' In a petition presented to the British High
Commissioner by the notables of 27 villages in the Bozgir region, it was
assertedthat the nationalforces in the area had been set up by the Union and
Progress Committee.22In November Captain Hadkinson, who had just
completed a two-month tour of the province of Bursa, reportedthatin recent
weeks the western national movement, which originated with the Greek
occupation of Smyrna,had now amalgamatedwith Mustafa Kemal's eastern
movement and Ali Fuad's central movement. The movement was spreading
all over the country, though not as fast as the ringleaders had expected.
Having had the opportunity of watching the proceedings of the late
congress, held at Balikessir, he, Hadkinson, was more than ever convinced
that the CUP was 'at the bottom of all this national movement', whatever
As de Robeck remarked,in a telegram to Lord
may be said to the contrary.23
Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary,dispatched in October:
Whether the organizers of the national movement can properly be
called Committeemen or not is a question of labels. They may differ
from the Committee to some extent in personality. Indeed, they are
just now at pains to advertise their past differences with, and present
horror of, people like Enver and Talaat. They may differ in minor
points of sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their
fundamentalcharacteris, however, the same. They want Turkey for
the Turks. They want no foreign interference or foreign protection.
35
OttomanChristiansare their cattle and they want to do with their own

what they will. They want to fight Europe, and above all, England,
with the weapons of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism.They aspire
to sign, not the death warrantof the Empire, but a lease of new life.24
Recognition of the importantpartplayed by the CUP in the organization
of the national movement did not lead British officials to ignore the part
played by the military,generally seen as decisive. As Calthorperemarkedin
a letter to Curzon in August 1919, the Congress of Erzerumappearedto be
dominated by dashing young soldiers, who are willing 'to stake everything
on a gambler's throw'.25 And as Captain Perring remarkedin a note on the
Nationalist Movement in the Samsun Area, where the Central Government
pinned its hopes on the goodwill of the Allies and the influence of the 'mass
of the Muslin world', the Military Party (most of whom were in any case
CUP) hoped to save Turkey by its own activities: 'The Turkswere excited.
They had been caught napping at Smyrna. There was good reason for
believing that an Armenian state was to be formed, and many talked of a
Greek Pontus state. The military were preparedto prevent anothercoup.'26
In other words, as de Robeck remarkedin a telegram to Curzon dispatched
in December, the movement was not so much a 'national' as a 'military
political' organization.27
To the British officials on the spot, Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the
Turkish national movement, remained for some time an enigma. He was
known as a leading memberof the CUP (ordershad been issued in February
1919 for his dismissal) and a hero of the Gallipoli campaign, but otherwise
little was known about him. According to GHQ Constantinople, which in
January 1921 compiled a character sketch of Mustafa Kemal, based on
informationprovided by his formercommanding officer, school and college
companions, the nationalistagent in Constantinopleand others, he had been
born in humble circumstances in Salonika, and educated at the military
college, Salonika, the cadet school, Monastir, and the War College,
Constantinople. At an early age, it was said, he had become a passionate
nationalist. After graduating from the General Staff College, as a Staff
Captain, he had been posted in 1905 to Syria, and in 1907 to the General
Staff, Salonika. In 1913 he had been appointedTurkishMilitary Attache at
Sofia, where he is said to have indulged in 'dissipation' and contracted
'venereal'. This had imbued him with a 'contempt and disgust for life',
prohibited marriage and driven him to 'homosexual vice'. Careless of his
life in action, he had deliberatelydisobeyed Liman von Sandersat Gallipoli,
and quarrelledwith Enver. In the fighting he had 'lost an eye'.28
Mustafa Kemal's quarrelswith Enver and the German commander had
induced the present Sultan (then Prince Vahideddin)on the occasion of the
36
coronation of Karl of Austria-Hungary to invite Mustafa Kemal to

accompany him to Vienna, with the intention of using him as a counterpoise
to Enver and the CUP. It was the present Sultan, Vahideddin,who had sent
Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia in May 1919, with instructionsto thwartGreek
aspirationsto a Pontus republic. In spite of the fact that Mustafa Kemal was
probably a comparatively wealthy man there was no reason to suppose that
he had resorted to dishonest methods. On the contrary,almost alone among
unionist leaders, he had never been accused of peculation. Finally, he was
known as a fluent speaker, but he was probably too egotistical to envisage
wider issues and ultimate consequences.29
The discrepancy between the two explanations offered by British
officials on the spot and the intelligence services was never fully resolved.
But as British Foreign Office and other comments on a secret intelligence
report, received in August 1920, from a 'well educated and intelligent
Turkish gentleman', recently returnedfrom Ankara, show, they eventually
concluded that there must in fact be two parties at work in Anatolia, one that
of Mustafa Kemal and the nationalists and the other that of Enver, Talaat
and the CUP.3"As D.G. Osborne, a Foreign Office official, remarked:
This shows that there are two parties in Anatolia and not only one.
The weaker is that of Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists, who,
induced by patriotic and religious motives, have been, and are,
endeavouring to resist the Peace terms and the resultant
dismemberment of Turkey and the reduction of the prestige of the
OttomanKhalifate.They have failed: their adherentsare going over to
the other and far more dangerous party, that of Enver and Talaatand
the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination. The latter are not
concerned with the defence of Turkey but with the Pan-Islamic
offensive of Bolshevism throughout the East, primarily directed
against Great Britain. The plans for this offensive have recently been
discussed at Baku. Enver and his associates have sacrificed Turkeyto
the Bolshevik conception of Pan-Islam, have accepted the principles
of Lenin and are disseminating them by means of the Green
propagandist Army. Mustafa Kemal on the other hand has rejected
Lenin's principles and is consequently about to be discardedin favour
of Enver and Talaat.3
In his report the 'well educated and intelligent Turkish gentlemen',
recently returnedfrom Ankara, pointed out that opinion in the nationalist
camp regarding relations with the Bolsheviks was divided. Where the
'Unionist' wing, led by Eyub Sabri, argued that in order to secure effective
Bolshevik support it was necessary to adopt the Bolshevik system with all
its consequences, the 'genuine' nationalists who were devoted to Mustafa
37
Kemal argued that, whilst Bolshevik support might be accepted, their

system should not be introduced. In the national assembly, about 100
deputies had been won over to the Bolshevik cause, and their party, which
was in a constant touch with Talaat Pasha, the 'principal protagonist of
Islamic Bolshevism in Europe', was steadily gaining strength. Recently
they had formed the Green Army organization, 'a vehicle for the fulfilment
of the Soviet Government's campaign to arouse the whole Islamic world
against Europe in general and GreatBritain in particular'.Supportersof the
Green Army argued that the principal tenets of Islam could easily be
reconciled with Bolshevik doctrine. Differences between the Unionists and
the 'genuine' nationalists were exacerbated by the personal rivalry that
existed between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.32
In an introductionto the above report,the British intelligence service in
Constantinople concluded that the development of Bolshevism in Anatolia
should be seen as a product,not of nationalist,but of Unionist co-operation:
It is scarcely open to doubt that the introductionof Bolshevism into
Turkey, as the foremost of the Eastern Muslim countries, was in
accordance with the plan of campaign formulated by the Unionist
leaders, when the defeat of Germany ruined their former schemes.
The rise of the Nationalist movement in Turkey merely provided a
practical vehicle for the progress of this later Unionist programme,
which included the spread of Bolshevism. The Soviet Government
had directed its attentionto the possibilities of Islam as early as 1917.
But, in spite of constant efforts, no progress has been made, in Turkey
at least. After the Armistice we saw from reportsfrom Geneva, Rome
and London, the development of Unionist activities working in
Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Russia. These same Germans and
Turks who had been working together during the war again came to
notice in association, and as early as February1919 it became evident
that the Unionist chiefs were actively preparing a Pan-Islamic
movement in connection with Bolshevism and with the assistance of
the very efficient, but so far unsuccessful, Germanorganizationwhich
had been co-operating for five years against British prestige in the
East. After the Armistice, too, the purely Russian efforts of the
Bolsheviks to develop Bolshevism as an Eastern world movement
were assisted by many Indians and other Pan-Islamists, who had
gravitated to Berlin and Moscow on the final defeat of Turkey. As
soon as the Nationalist movement underMustafa Kemal showed signs
of reaching serious proportions, the Unionist made an immediate
attempt to gain control of so potentially powerful an instrument. In
spite, however, of the expenditure of a certain amount of money, the
38
attempt then failed, partly owing to personal jealousies, as for

example that between Mustapha Kemal and Enver, and partly owing
to the Nationalist dislike of the Jewish Free-Masonic elements
dominating the Unionists. More oblique methods were then adopted
and advantage was taken of the circumstance that Mustapha Kemal,
having realised the impracticabilityof rousing the Muslim world by
such poor instrumentsas the MouvahiddinSociety and ordinaryPanIslamic propaganda,was turningin despair to the Soviet Government.
The reluctance to accept Bolshevism in principle may be seen from
the little we know of the earlier stages of MustaphaKemal's dealings
with the Soviet Government.In the first proposals for an agreementit
was stipulated that the Nationalists should place no obstacle in the
way of Bolshevik propagandain Anatolia, but only in so far as it was
not in conflict with the tenets of Islam. This agreement was reported
to have been concluded in the autumn of 1919 and it was shortly
afterwardsthat the activities of Bolshevik propagandistsin Anatolia
were first reported. It has since become evident that an energetic
campaign has been in progress in Anatolia assisted in some cases, as
at Eski Shehir, by the Nationalist authorities but we cannot be sure,
and it still seems unlikely that Mustapha Kemal had any cordial
sympathy with that campaign. It is to be observed that the National
Assembly has never officially declared its adherence to Bolshevism
and it has never been very clear by what means or underwhat auspices
the movement was gaining ground.33
Thereafterthe assumption that two parties existed in Turkey,a Unionist
party headed by Enver and Talaat, and a nationalist party, headed by
Mustafa Kemal, became a regularcomponent of British reportson the issue.
In a set of notes on Relations between the Bolsheviks and the Turkish
Nationalists, drawn up by D.G. Osborne, a Foreign Office official, in
November 1920, for instance, a clear distinction was drawnbetween the two
parties."4And in a War Office Report on the Situation in Mesopotamia,
drawn up about the same time, it was pointed out that two militant parties
existed in Anatolia, the CUP led by Enver and Talaat,which had decided to
throw in its lot with the Bolsheviks, and the nationalistparty,led by Mustafa
Kemal, which, while anxious to secure Russian arms and ammunition and
the recovery of the western provinces, had decided to oppose a Bolshevik
penetration of Anatolia. In dealing with the Turks it would be well to
remember that Mustafa Kemal and Enver were rivals. Enver's influence
was greatest with the Russians, but in the West he was discredited. Any
arrangement made with the Turks would have to be made with a
'representativegovernment', and this would of necessity have to include
39
both 'Old Turks' and 'Young Turks'. Any such 'representativegovernment'

would require a leader and it seemed probable that Mustafa Kemal would
emerge as the most suitable condidate. His recognition should have the
effect of driving Enver and Djemal into obscurity.35
British intelligence in this period appeared well informed about the
nature of the struggle taking place between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.
According to a note on the Soviet Government's Intrigues with Mustafa
Kemal and Enver Pasha, composed in June 1922, Enver had initially been
preparedto co-operate with Mustafa Kemal. But Mustafa Kemal, driven by
'indescribablemegalomania and lust for power', had brusquelyrejected the
offer. As a result Enver, with Soviet backing - the Soviets feared that
Mustafa Kemal would open the way to capitalist and imperialist intrigue in
the area - had attemptedto build up his position in Anatolia, preparatoryto
a take-over of power. To this end he had attemptedto win over the Defence
of Rights associations in the eastern provinces, the labour guilds (artisans,
porters, lightermen) and the officer corps of a number of regiments,
stationed in the area. Mustafa Kemal had then taken fright and reached a
secret agreement with the Bolsheviks, promising them support, with the
result that the Soviets had taken steps to undermine Enver's position,
leaving him thoroughly puzzled and unable to cope. Meanwhile Mustafa
Kemal had taken steps to secure his hold on the Defence of Rights
associations; and he had had Yahya Kahya, the Unionist strong man in
Trabzon, arrested, and untrustworthyofficers posted or otherwise dealt
with. It was at this point that Enver, discovering the true nature and extent
of Soviet duplicity, had decided to withdraw to Turkestan and join the
Basmachi insurgents.36
The different appreciationsof the natureand significance of the national
movement in Anatolia, offered by British officials and the intelligence
services were not merely of academic interest, for it can be arguedthat they
implied differentpolicy responses. Policy responses to an essentially locally
based national movement, seeking to achieve limited aims and objectives,
might include Allied supportfor the sultan's government in Constantinople
(the policy adopted by the Entente Powers in November 1918), the use of
the Greek forces in western Anatolia to bolster the Allied position on the
Straits, supportfor the sultan's efforts to suppressthe national movement by
force (attempted in 1920), and when these efforts failed, as they did,
attempts at conciliation and the conclusion of a negotiated settlement,
satisfying some but by no means all of the aims of the national movement,
as set out in the National Pact of January 1920 (the policy later pursued).
Policy responses to an internationallyorganized national movement, aimed
at the destructionof the British Empire in Asia, might include the dispatch
of British forces to secure the defeat of the movement (never attempted),the
40
exploitation of the full potential of the Greek expeditionary force, stationed

in western Anatolia (never fully attempted),the expulsion of the Turksfrom
their capital city (considered by the Allies in December 1919 and January
1920 but never implemented), vigorous support for the minorities, a
determinationto secure the neutralisationand demilitarisationof the Straits
(secured in the treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923) and vigorous steps to
secure the defeat of the forces of revolution in other parts of the world, in
particularRussia and Germany.
One of the strongestcases put forwardin favour of a policy based on the
assumption that the national movement was essentially a locally based
movement with limited aims and objectives, was surprisingly that put
forward by CommanderLuke, in a note on the Future Peace with Turkey,
composed in March 1920.37In his paper CommanderLuke suggested that,
as the policy of suppression so far pursuedby the Entente Powers appeared
likely to fail, they might now consider a substantial modification of the
proposed peace treaty, involving the possible return of Izmir, western
Thrace and the so-called Armenian provinces to Turkishrule. The Entente
Powers might then seek to rallier the Turksby giving them a peace, which,
while conforming to the principle of self-determination and sufficiently
severe to satisfy the claims of justice, would not be vindictive:
The Turk,and indeed, the Muslim in general, is by instinct opposed to
the theory of Bolshevism, which is wholly incompatible with the
principles of Islam. Only necessity, as he understandsit, will drive
him to this unnatural alliance. Cannot the necessity be avoided? I
submit that it is worth avoiding, even if the avoiding involves the nonacquisition by Greece of Smyrna and Thrace and the reductionof the
area to be ceded by Turkey to Armenia. A stolid conservative people
such as the Turks should prove a valuable buffer against the ferment
of Bolshevism in the Middle East.38
One of the strongestcases put forwardin favour of a policy based on the
assumption that the national movement was essentially part of an
internationalconspiracy, organized in Berlin and Moscow, and aimed at the
destructionof the British Empirein Asia, was that put forwardby the author
of the War Office memorandumon the Cause of Unrest in Mesopotamia,
composed, in October 1920.39At an importantmeeting of representativesof
the Third Internationalheld at the Foreign Office in Moscow, the author
declared, Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, had personally expounded his design
for attackingBritish imperialismin the East, strikinghardestat India, where
the national movement was to be encouraged and assisted. A secret treaty
had then been signed between Soviet Russia and the Islamic countries,
including the government of Mustafa Kemal; and the Bolshevik advance on
41
Enzeli (on the Caspian Sea), the Arab outbreakin Mesopotamia, the Turkish
advance on the Armenian provinces, and the Arab uprising in Syria had
followed. These developments indicatedthe inception of a 'general strategic
plan', directed ostensibly from Moscow, against France and England, more
particularly the latter. The Moscow Direction had a gap in their line of
attack against the British Empire, which they were preparedto fill with a
combined movement of Turks,Arabs, and Kurds.Enver, it may be assumed,
controlled the 'connecting lever'. This he would pull as soon as, but not
before, British policy towards Turkey was definitely determined.
The sinister influence of Moscow, in other words, could be discovered
behind every form of political unrest in the Middle East. There could be no
doubt what the British response should be:
As long as the Moscow Direction survives to absorb into its
organization, thrive on and exploit agencies of local discontent,
Nationalism will be the instrumentof Internationalism,and until the
InternationalMonster has been starved, or severed at the neck, its
various heads will have to be dealt with in detail when and where they
arise.4"
Paradoxically the War Office, which in the above memorandum at least
appeared to advocate a vigorous response to the problem of international
conspiracy, opposed the expulsion of the Sultan from Constantinople.In a
reporton the Strategic Position on the Straits,composed in December 1919,
they argued that, if the sultan were removed from his capital the whole
military position in the area would be altered to Britain's disadvantage. In
peacetime she would lose both knowledge of the Sultan's plans and power
to check his preparations.The powerful deterrentof having the sultan and
the whole of his government under her guns would have disappeared.If the
sultan were removed a much larger garrisonwould be required,and a more
elaborate system of defence, especially on the Asia Minor side, where a
'veritable frontier' with 'all its disadvantages and bickerings and constant
aggravations', would have to be set up.41
The case for the expulsion of the sultan from Constantinople was put
forward most effectively by Curzon. In a memorandumon the Future of
Constantinople, presented in January 1920, he argued that, if they had to
face, as he thoughtthey probablywould, a new form of Turkishnationalism,
founded on either religion or race, and exploiting pan-Islamism or panTuranism,would it not be a more formidablefactor if its 'rallying point' and
'inspiration'were the sultan at Constantinopleratherthan a sultan at Bursa?
Would not the retention of the old capital give a prestige and an impetus to
the movement, which would add immensely to its potentiality for harm. A
nationalist party in Anatolia under Mustafa Kemal may be a 'hard nut to
42
crack'. But a nationalistparty with its sovereign in Constantinoplewould be

a 'much more anxious problem'. Were the sultan to remainin his capital, the
Turk would be ideally placed to 'set the Powers by the ears, to embroil
Governmentsand nations, and to inoculate the West with the worst vices of
Eastern intrigue'.42
Ryan and Forbes Adam, a member of the Eastern Department at the

Foreign Office, supported Curzon, emphasising the dangers to Britain
inherentin the forces of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism,forces, according
to Forbes Adam, dependent on the maintenanceof the prestige of Turkey,a
thing itself dependent on the retention of the Sultan-Caliph at
Constantinople.43
The problems caused to British policy makers by what they perceived,
rightly or wrongly, to be the existence of a divided leadership in Anatolia
were for the most part resolved in the autumnof 1921 when, following the
battle of Sakarya(August-September 1921), Mustafa Kemal emerged as the
supreme leader of the Turkish people. As a British General Staff
memorandumon the Position in Anatolia, composed following the victory
put it:
There is no doubt that the prestige of Mustapha Kemal himself has

been greatly enhanced as a result of these operations. Formerly in the
position of a Prime Minister answerable to a Government, he now
appears to be almost in the position of a Dictator. We may, therefore,
assume that the ModerateParty in the Angora Governmentis, for the
time being, firmly in power, and this assumption, if correct, would
seem to remove any immediate danger of the returnof Enver Pasha,
or of a military alliance between the nationalists and Bolshevik
Russia, especially as the Nationalists will shortly be no longer wholly
dependent upon Russia for the supply of war material. At the same
time, MustaphaKemal is in such a strong military position, that there
appears to be no reason why he should moderate his political
demands, in the event of peace negotiations being re-opened.4
But in the period following the battle of Sakarya British concern
regarding the true nature of the Turkish national movement remained. As
Sir Horace Rumbold, who replaced de Robeck as British High
Commissioner in Constantinople in November 1920, remarked, in a
telegram to Curzon, dispatched following the expulsion of the Greek
expeditionaryforce from Anatolia, in October 1922, it was possible that for
the Kemalists the realisation of the National Pact, now virtually assured,
was merely an 'immediate objective', a 'first step':
It is a step at which they will pause, and there will not be the same
union afterwardsregardinga completely revolutionarypolicy at home
43
and a policy of expansion abroad. Many of the leaders and the

majority of ordinary Turks will wish them to preserve traditional
institutions and 'cultivate their garden' in peaceful conditions. It
would, however, be folly to forget that others among the leaders
cherish the dream of reconstructingthe TurkishEmpire, if only on a
federal basis and establishing Turkey in a position of hegemony in a
grand Islamic combine. For these Great Britain not only is but also
will remain the enemy. They desire nothing less than the collapse of
our position, first in Mesopotamia, then in the East generally. The real
vital issue at the Peace Conference will not be any of the questions
enumeratedabove, importantas they are [Smyrna,the Straits,Thrace,
the Caucasus, the capitulations],but whetherTurkeyis to be placed in
such a position as to enable these men to dominate her internally and
so carry forwardtheir plan.45
Thus to the end of the period of Turkish national struggle the British
remained uncertain how far the Turkish nationalists intended to 'cultivate
their garden' in Anatolia, and how far they intended to become embroiled
in some kind of great pan-Islamist conspiracy, aimed at the destruction of
the British Empire in Asia.
Just how far the different views of the Turkish national movement, put
forward by British officials, the 'men on the spot', and the various
intelligence services, actually affected the formulation of British policy in
the period of Turkish national struggle must remain a subject for future
investigation. It has been the intention of this article merely to draw
attention to what may be considered real or apparentdifferences in British
views of the Turkish national movement in Anatolia, and to point to some
of the possible consequences. Incidentally, in the process, much evidence
has been adduced, which would seem to support the view, put forward by
E.J. Zurcher and others, that the national movement, in its early stages at
least, was organized by elements within the Ottoman government, in
particular the Ministry of War; that CUP leaders in exile, acting in
conjunction with German right wing elements in Berlin and the Bolshevik
leadership in Moscow, struggled to gain, or keep, control of the movement;
and that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the 'man-on-the-spot' in Anatolia,
eventually succeeded in undermining their influence and taking over the
leadership of the movement. This he succeeded in doing because the
national movement, as it emerged, particularly following the Allied
occupation of Constantinople in March 1920, was despite all its numerous
internationalconnections, essentially a 'locally based' movement, seeking
for the most part to achieve merely local aims and objectives.
44
NOTES
1. British Public Record Office, WO 32/5733 History of the National Movement in Turkey,
Nov. 1919. See also FO 371/4158/105780 Milne to Calthorpe,Constantinople,30 June 1919;
FO 406/41 No.126 de Robeck to Curzon, 10 Oct. 1919; FO 371/4158/118411 Calthorpeto
Curzon, 30 July 1919, enclosure; FO 371/4158/96979 Calthorpeto Curzon, 21 June 1919,
enclosure; K. Bourne, D. Cameron Watt (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs
(BDFA) (University Publications of America), Part II, Series B, Vol.1, Doc.68, enclosure.
The histories and accounts drawn up by Milne, Calthorpe, Heathcote-Smith and their
colleagues, the 'men on the spot', appearin retrospectremarkablyaccurate.That is because
they were, for the most part, based on informationprovided by British control officers,
posted to strategicpoints in Anatolia (until their arrestor expulsion in the spring of 1920),
membersof the Levant ConsularService, membersof the Ottomangovernment,loyal to the
Sultan, membersof the Greek Orthodoxchurch,residentin Anatolia, and even membersof
the Turkishnationalmovement itself. Surprisinglythe Historyof the National Movement in
Turkeymakes no mention of the declaration,issued by the leadersof the nationalmovement
at Amasya in June 1919, seen by some as the foundingdocumentof the nationalmovement.
The Congress of Erzerumwas organized,not by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, but by the Society
for the Defence of the National Rights of the EasternProvinces.
2. FO 371/5230/E 12339 Mesopotamia, PreliminaryReport on Causes of Unrest, by Major
N.N.E. Bray, 14 Sept. 1920; FO 371/5231/7765 Mesopotamia,Causes of Unrest - Report
No.2, by MajorN.N.E. Bray,Oct. 1920; WO 33/969 Cause of the Outbreakin Mesopotamia,
General Staff, WarOffice, Oct. 1920. The materialused by the Political Department,India
Office, and the WarOffice, in the above reports,was assembledfrom informationsent in by
the various British intelligence services in Europe, the GOC, Army of the Black Sea,
Constantinople, British Military Intelligence, Cairo, the Arab Bureau, the GOC,
Mesopotamia,Embassy and legation staff throughoutEurope and Asia, Russian and other
governmentpublicationsand broadcasts,and German,French,Italian,Russian and Turkish
telegraphand wireless intercepts.Turkishtelegraphand wireless signals were interceptedby
Cable and Wireless, from 1919. They were decrypted, where necessary, by the Admiralty
(Room 40 OB) and by MI. For an account of this work, see Robin Denniston, Churchills
Secret War (Stroud: Sutton, 1997).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Evidence available elsewhere would suggest that the information provided in the
above reportswas, with one or two exceptions, not referredto in this article,factuallycorrect.
But it can be argued that the interpretationplaced on the evidence was to some extent
misconceived. For an analysis of this aspect of the question, see A.L. Macfie, 'British
Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919-21', Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol.35, No.1 (1999).
In their various reports the British recognized that Emir Feisal, though apparently
duplicitous,may have been forced by the extremiststo 'acquiesce in action distastefulto him
personally'. In the first of his reportson the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia,Bray noted
that the Mouvahiddin Society, which had representatives in Moscow, had definitely
proclaimed itself pro-Bolshevik, and that it had converted 105 members of the Grand
NationalAssembly in Ankarato Bolshevik principles.Enver,Talaatand Djemal Pashas,who
fled the Ottoman Empire in the last days of the First World War, all remainedpolitically
active for some years, Enver mainly in Russia and Central Asia, Talaat in Germany and
Djemal in Afghanistan.
B.N. $imrnir(ed.), British Documents on Atatuirk(BDA) (Ankara:Turk Tarih Kurumu,
1973-84), Vol.1, No.96, enclosure.
Ibid., No.101, enclosures.
Ibid., No.112, enclosure.
Ibid., Vol.2, No.73, enclosure.
Ibid., No.96, enclosure.
Mesopotamia,PreliminaryReporton Causes of Unrest, pp.6-7.
Ibid., p.6.
Ibid.
45
11. E.L. Woodwardand R. Butler (eds.), Documentson BritishForeign Policy (London:HMSO)

First Series, Vol.4, No.660.
12. Mesopotamia,Causes of Unrest - Report No.2, p.3. The War Office reportconcluded that
the Soviet connection with the Arab situation was by way of the channel
'Arslan-Talaat-Enver'.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p.4.
15. Ibid., p.6. According to Mesopotamia,Causes of Unrest - ReportNo.2, TalaatPasha would
be charged with the direction of the revolutionarymovement in Syria, Egypt and Arabia;
Djavid with the direction in Greece, Italy and France; Enver with the direction in the
Caucasus, Djemal with the direction in Afghanistan,and Khalil [sic] with the direction in
Persia.
16. Ibid., p.14. In August 1920 British intelligence acquired a copy of a proclamation,
supposedly issued by MustafaKemal, as 'Presidentof the TurkishRepublic'. In Bray's view
this designation signified a Turkish national acceptance of Bolshevik policy and an
abandonmentof the Sultan as Caliph. It signified in other words the detachmentof the
nationalmovementfrom the body of Islam.
17. BDA, Vol.l, No.109, enclosure 1.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., enclosure 2.
20. BDFA, PartII, Series B, Vol.1, Doc.96.
21. Ibid., Doc.69.
22. FO 406/41 No.186, 1, de Robeck to Curzon, 2 Dec. 1919.
23. BDA, Vol.1,No.86, enclosure.
24. FO 406/41 No.126, de Robeck to Curzon, 10 Oct. 1919.
25. BDFA, PartII, Series B, Vol.1, Doc.40.
26. Ibid., Doc.75.
27. Ibid., Doc.95.
28. BDA, Vol.3, No.35. In a later accountof MustafaKemal's life, writtenin April 1921, it was
asserted that in the pre-waryears he had been an ardentexponent of Unionist ideas and a
freemason. In 1919 he had been active in the organization of a military society in
Constantinople,one of the 'germs' of the national movement. Though 'spectacularand
domineering', there was no reason to accuse him of lack of patriotism (see FO
371/6469/E5233). In June 1921 Refet Pasha, the nationalist leader, told Major Henry, a
British businessman, that Mustafa Kemal was not a Jew. By extraction he was a 'nomad'
Turk(see FO 371/6472/E7936). There is of course no reasonto suppose thatMustafaKemal
lost an eye in the First WorldWar.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., Vol.2, No.92.
31. Ibid., minute of 23 Sept. 1920.
32. Ibid., Vol.2, No.92.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., No.175.
35. FO 371/5232 The Situation in Mesopotamia, Memorandumby the Secretary of State for
War, 10 Dec. 1920.
36. BDA, Vol.4, No.115, appendix.
37. FO 406/43 No. 190, 1, de Robeck to Curzon, 7 April 1920, enclosure.
38. Ibid.
39. Cause of Unrest in Mesopotamia.
40. Ibid., p.12.
41. CAB 23/20 Cabinetmeeting, 6 Jan. 1920, appendix3.
42. FO 371/4239 The Futureof Constantinople,memorandumby Curzon,4 Jan. 1920.
43. FO 800/240 Ryan to Forbes Adam, 26 Nov. 1919; FO 371/4239, Constantinopleand the
Straits, memorandumby Forbes Adam, 10 Jan. 1920. For a more complete account of the
British debate about Constantinople,see A.L. Macfie 'The British Decision regardingthe
Futureof Constantinople,November 1918-January1920', Historical Journal, Vol.18, No.2
(1975).
46
44. BDA, Vol.4, No.9. Opposition to the Kemalist regime continued. In March 1922 British
intelligence identified a numberof groups or parties in the national assembly, opposed to
Mustafa Kemal, in particulara clerical party,consisting of 20-25 deputies, and an eastern
provinces party, consisting of 45-50 deputies. It was the eastern provinces party, which
accordingto British intelligence first openly drew the attentionof the assembly to Mustafa
Kemal's 'privateexcesses' (see BDA, Vol.4, No.52).
45. FO 371/7906 6468 Rumboldto Curzon, 17 Oct. 1922.

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British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22

British Views of the TurkishNational

British views of the Turkish national movement in Anatolia differed

BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

About that time - so the History continues - the surrenderof armaments

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

c) To get rid of the government of Ferid Pasha, and to substitute a

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Erzerum, would act as political advisors to the movement. Methods to be

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

in Constantinoplehad received funds from Germany and Switzerland; and

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

OttomanChristiansare their cattle and they want to do with their own

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coronation of Karl of Austria-Hungary to invite Mustafa Kemal to

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Kemal argued that, whilst Bolshevik support might be accepted, their

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

attempt then failed, partly owing to personal jealousies, as for

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

both 'Old Turks' and 'Young Turks'. Any such 'representativegovernment'

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exploitation of the full potential of the Greek expeditionary force, stationed

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

crack'. But a nationalistparty with its sovereign in Constantinoplewould be

Ryan and Forbes Adam, a member of the Eastern Department at the

There is no doubt that the prestige of Mustapha Kemal himself has

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

and a policy of expansion abroad. Many of the leaders and the

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

11. E.L. Woodwardand R. Butler (eds.), Documentson BritishForeign Policy (London:HMSO)

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