Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Annals of Science
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tasc20
To cite this article: John Henry (1979) Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's concept of space and its later
influence, Annals of Science, 36:6, 549-573
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00033797900200381
R e c e i v e d 19 M a r c h 1979
Summary
This study considers the contribution of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529-1597)
to the development of the concepts of void space and an infinite universe. Patrizi
plays a greater role in the development of these concepts than any other single
figure in the sixteenth century, and yet his work has been almost totally
overlooked. I have outlined his views on space in terms of two major aspects of his
philosophical attitude: on the one hand, he was a devoted Platonist and sought
always to establish Platonism, albeit his own version of it, as the only eurreet
philosophy; and on the other hand; he was more determinedly anti-Aristotelian
than any other philosopher at that time. Patrizi's concept of space has its
beginnings in Platonic notions, but is extended and refined in the light of a
vigorous critique of Aristotle's position. Finally, I consider the influence of
Patrizi's ideas in the seventeenth century, when various thinkers are seeking to
overthrow the Aristotelian concept of place and the equivalence of dimensionality with corporeality. Pierre Gassendi (1592=1652), for example, needed a
coherent concept of void space in which his atoms could move, while Henry More
( 1614-1687) sought to demonstrate the reality of incorporeal entities by reference
to an incorporeal space. Both men could find the arguments they needed in
Patrizi's comprehensive treatment of the subject.
Contents
1.
2.
3,
4.
5.
Introduction ........................................................................................
Patrizi's Platonism and his ideas on space ...........................................
Patrizi's anti-Aristotelianism and his concept of space ........................
The influence of Patrizi's ideas about space .........................................
Conclusion ............................................................................................
549
552
559
566
571
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
F r a n c e s c o P a t r i z i d a C h e r s o ' s role in t h e h i s t o r y o f science has n o t been
a d e q u a t e l y e v a l u a t e d , a n d y e t t h a n k s to t h e m u l t i f a r i o u s f a c e t s of his w o r k
h i s t o r i a n s h a v e t b u n d it difficult to ignore h i m c o m p l e t e l y . H e holds a p e r m a n e n t
place a m o n g t h e r a n k s o f t h o s e h u m a n i s t scholars who m a d e G r e e k works a v a i l a b l e
in L a t i n . H e t r a n s l a t e d w o r k s by Proclus,1 J o h n P h i l o p h o n u s z a n d A r i s t o t l e , 3 a n d
m a d e a new t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e H e r m e t i c Corpus a n d t h e C h a l d e a n Oracles of
1Proelus, Elementa theologica et physiea fecit Iatine Y. Patricius (1583, Ferrara),
2John Philoponus, Expositiones in omnes X l l 1 A ristoteleos libros, eos q'ui vocantur metaphysiei, quas F.
Patricius de graeeis latinas fecerat (1583, Ferrara).
3Aristotle, De iis quae sub auditum cadunt interprete F. Patricio. This was included in the Discus'siones
peripateticae (1581, Basle), vol. 1,90-94, and has since reappeared in A ristotle's works edited by I. Bekker
(1831, Berlin), vol. 4,388-391. Patrizi also published, as an appendix to his Nova philosophia, a neoPlatonic work based on Plotinus's Enneads IV-VI known as the Theology of Aristotle. Patrizi gives it the
title: Mystiea Ae~jyptiorum a Platone dictata, ab Aristotele excel)ta, et perseripta philosophia.
00(}3 3790/7936060549S02'O09 1979Taylor&Francislad
2L2
550
John Henry
Zoroaster. 4 He wrote poetry himself and became embroiled with no less a poet than
Torquato Tasso in a dispute about poetic theory. 5 He wrote works on rhetoric and
military history, and a treatise on love. 6 One of his earliest works was a series of
dialogues on historiography and the philosophy of history which has been described
by a modern scholar as 'the first manifesto' of a 'truly Copernican revolution ... in
the field of historical theory'.7 His two most substantial works, however, are
philosophical and they neatly illustrate two distinct but closely related features of
Patrizi's philosophical outlook. The Discussiones peripateticae is a monumental work
in which he sets out to undermine if not dismantle the vast super-structure of
Aristotelianism which had been erected over the centuries before his time; s while the
Nova de univemis philosophia is Patrizi's own would-be replacement system which is
clearly heavily influenced by Platonic thinking. 9 It is this combination of Platonism
and vehement anti-Aristotelianism which led to his most original contribution to
philosophy.
Since it offered itself as a new system of philosophy, many historians of science
have dipped into the Nova philosophia in order to glean some of Patrizi's thinking on
particular topics; but there has been no detailed examination of his natural
philosophy. 10 Patrizi is the least studied of the four late Italian Renaissance nature
philosophers with whom he is consistently grouped. 11 Giordano Bruno and
Tommaso Campanella have been very well served by historians, and even
Bernardino Telesio has had three new editions of his major work published since
1910.12 The latest edition of Patrizi's Nova philosophia appeared in 1640, and even
this did not bear his name on the title page. 13 It would, no doubt, take many pages to
4 Francesco Patrizi, Magia philosophia ... Zoroaster et eius C C C X X oracula chaldaica. Asclepii
dial@us et philosophia magna. Hermetis Trismegisti Poemander. Sermo sacer. Clavis. Sermo ad fdium.
Sermo ad Asclepium. Minerva mundi et alia miscellanea ( 1593, Hamburg); also published as appendices to
the Nova pholosophia.
5 L'Eridano in nuovo verso heroico (1587, Ferrara) was an attempt, by poetic flattery, to gain the
patronage of the Este family. The polemic with Tasso began with Patrizi's Parere in difesa dell' Ariosto
(1585, Ferrara) and Tasso's Discorso sopra il Parere fatta dal Sit, F. Patricio (1585, Ferrara); it continued
in Patrizi's I1 Trimerone ... in risposta alle oppositioni fatte dal Siq. T. Tasso . . . (1586, Ferrara). See
Bernard Weinberg, A history of literary criticism in the Italian Renaissance (1961, Chicago), 600~603.
6 Della retorica dieci dialoghi (1562. Ferrara); La militia romana di Polibio, di Tito Livio e di Dionigi
Alirar~asseo (1583, Ferrara): and Paralleli militari (1594, Rome). The L'amorosafilosofia was unpublished
in Patl'izi's lifetime but has no~ bee~l edited by Jolm ('. Nel~(m (1963. Florence). See also J. C. Nelson,
'L'amoro~a ,filosofta di Francesco Patrizi', Rina,scime~do. 2 (1962). S9 106.
Della historia dieci dialoghi (1560, Venice). See Giorgio Spi,fi, 'ttistoriography, the art of history in
the Italian Counter-Ref'ormation'. in E. (Iocln'ane (ed.), The late ltaliatt Remti,~sam'e (1525-1630) (1970.
London), 91-133.
s The first volume was printed in 1571 at Venice but the complete work appeared as Discussionttm
peripateticart~m tomi I V (1581, Basle).
9 First published at Ferrara in 1591 and then, after condemnation by the Congregation of the Index, in
a second edition from Venice in 1593. See L. Firpo, 'Filosofia italiana e eontroriforma', Rivista difdosofia,
41(1950), 150-173.
lo For a very full bibliography of works which often only mention Patrizi in passing, see Vladimir
Premec, Franciskus l>atricijus (1968, Beograd). The fullest treatment of Patrizi's Nova philosophia
concentrates on his metaphysics rather than his physics: Benjamin Brickman, A n introduction to
Francesco Patrizi's 'Nova de universis philosophia' (1941, New York).
11 See, for example, P. O. Kristeller, Eight philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (1964, Stanford); B.
Brickman, 'Francesco patrizi on physical space', Journal of the history of ideas, 4 (1943), 224-245; and J. O.
Riedl (ed.), A catalogue of Renais~sance philosphers (1940, Milwaukee).
12 Bernardino Telesio, De rerum natura iuxta propria principia (ed. V. Spampanato), (3 vols., 19101923, Modena); with an Italian translatinn by Luigi de Franco (3 vols., 1969, Cosenza); and: a facsimile of
the 1581 edition (1971, Hildesheim).
13 This'edition is carefully described by Paola Zambelli, 'Aneddoti Patriziani', Rinascimento, 7 (1967),
309-318.
551
14For an indication of the range of material on Bruno see V. Salvestrini (revised by L. Firpo),
Bibliografia Bruniana (1958, Florence). For Campanella see L. Firpo, 'Cinquant'anni di studi sut
Uampanella, 1901-1950', Rinasrimento, 6 (1965), 209-348.
15De principiis atque originibus secundam fabulas Cupidinis et Coeli: sive Parmenidis et Telesii el
praecipue Democritiphilosophia, tractata infabuli de Cupidine. This can be consulted in J. Spedding, R. L.
Ellis and D. D. Heath (eds.), The works of Francis Bacon (14 vols., 1877 1887, London), vol. 5,461-500.
16Kepler found this aspect of Patrizi's work useful when t1~dng to establish his mechanism for
planetary motions. He examined all earlier theories on the causes of the tides which were set out by Patrizi
in book 29 of the Pancosmia (see Johannes Kepler Gesammelte Werke (ed. Max Caspar: 1951, Munich)vol.
15,387 ) Bruno, on the other hand, found Patrizi's work rather exasperating, in fact he described Patrizi as
'a truer excrement of pedantry who has soiled many pages with his "Discussiones peripateticae" ' (Sidney
Greenberg, The infinite in Giordano Bruno (1950, New"York), 127).
17The word appears in section 31. See Works, translated by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (1929,
London), vol. l, 24~5.
18See in particular book l0 of Panaugia: De fonte ac patre luminum, 22 23. Here Patrizi quotes a
number of authorities for this view including Zoroaster, Proclus and, of course, the Bible.
19For a fuller account see Brickman's Introduction (footnote 10). There is a very useful examination of
Patrizi's light metaphysics in E. E. Maechling, 'Light metaphysics in the natural philosophy of Francesco
Patrizi da Cherso' (1977, University of London: M. Phil. thesis).
552
John Henry
P a t r i z i ' s C o n c e p t o f S p a c e a n d its L a t e r I n f l u e n c e
553
2s Ibid. Patrizi is referring here to the first book in his own collection of the Corpus hermetieum. Patrizi
arranged the different parts of the Corpus into what he considered to be their correct order. In so doing he
placed one of the Hermetic fragments recorded by Stobaeus (I.41.[) before the Poe~xtnder and gave it the
title De pietate et philosophia. See W. Scott (ed.), Hermetica, The ancient Greek and Latin writings which
contain religious or philosophic teachings ase,~ibedto Hermes Trismegistus (4 vols., 1924, Oxford), vol. I, 40,
and vol. 3,321.
26So said Pier Francesco di Nores of Patrizi in a letter of May 1592 (see Tullio GregoiTr 'L'Apologia e la
Declarationes di Francesco Patrizi', in Medioevo e rinascimento." studi in onore di Bruno Nardi (1955.
Florence), 387-424 (p. 388)).
z7The history of Patrizi's fight against the Congregation of the Index has been very well documented
in Gregory ibid., and L. Firpo, 'Filosofia italiana e controriforma' (footnote 9). See also Francesco Patrizi
(ed. P. O. Kristeller), 'Emendatio in libros suos novae philosophiae', Rinascimento, 10 (1970), 215-218.
28L. Firpo ibid., 165-166.
29As can be clearly seen in the title of one of his major works: In universam Platonis et Aristotelis
philosophiam praeludia, sive de comparatione Platonis et Aristotelis (1597, Venice). There is an excellent
study of Mazzoni and the 'Comparatio' tradition in F. Purnell Jnr., 'Jaeopo Mazzoni and his comparison
of Plato and Aristotle' (1971, Columbia University: Ph.D. thesis).
3oSee the Diseussiones Peripateticae (footnote 8), vol. 3,292-293, where Patrizi traces the origin of the
sciences b~'k to Noah, and Zoroaster is said to be a grandson of Noah. For further discussions of Patrizi's
contributionsto the prisca .sapientia tradition, see K. H. DannenfMdt's articles: 'Hermet.iea philosophiea'
and 'Oraeula chaldaica', Catalogus translationum et commentariorum, 1 (1960), 137-164; and F. Purnell
Jnr., 'Francesco Patrizi and the critics of Hermes Trismegistus', Journal of medieval and Renaissance
studies, 6 (1976), 155 178. More general treatments of the tradition are: E N. Tigerstedt, The decline and
fall of the neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato (1971, Helsinki); and D. P. Walker, The ancient theology,
Studies in Christian Platonism from the 15th. to the 17th. Century (1972, London).
554
John Henry
F i c i n o ' s g e n e a l o g y of t h e o l o g y is w e l l - k n o w n : b e g i n n i n g w i t h H e r m e s
T r i s m e g i s t u s or Z o r o a s t e r t h e m y s t e r i e s were p a s s e d on t o Orpheus, A g l a o p h e m u s ,
P y t h a g o r a s , P h i l o l a u s a n d t h e n to P l a t o . 31 S i m i l a r l y , P a t r i z i a r g u e s t h a t 'all t h e
G r e e k p h i l o s o p h i e s , t h e P y t h a g o r e a n , t h e P l a t o n i c on d i v i n e things, a n d also t h e
A r i s t o t e l i a n on t h e d o g m a s o f morals, a n d t h e Stoics on p h y s i c s a n d e v e n t h e first
p r i n c i p l e s o f medicine, these p h i l o s o p h i e s were t a k e n f r o m t h e i r [ H e r m e s ' s a n d
A s e l e p i u s ' s ] b o o k s a n d from o t h e r s which a r e lost'. 32 On a m o r e specific p o i n t we are
t o l d t h a t ' P l a t o was n o t t h e first t e a c h e r of " I d e a s " . F o r before h i m P a r m e n i d e s a n d
his E l e a t i c school, t h e P y t h a g o r e a n s a n d P y t h a g o r a s , w h o p e r h a p s [learnt] it f r o m
A g l a o p h e m u s , a n O r p h i c p h i l o s o p h e r , held t h i s d o c t r i n e . F o r in m a n y places P r o c l u s
a n d D a m a s e i u s i n t e r p r e t c e r t a i n O r p h i c songs s p o k e n b y h i m as being a b o u t " I d e a s "
. . . C e r t a i n l y t h e whole d o c t r i n e comes f r o m t h e C h a l d e a n s a n d Z o r o a s t e r ' . 3a
P a t r i z i ' s t h o u g h t , therefore, is s t e e p e d in t h e w r i t i n g s n o t o n l y o f P l a t o b u t also of
t h e l a t e r n e o - P l a t o n i s t s : P l o t i n u s , P r o e l u s , I a m b l i c h u s a n d P o r p h y r y as well as t h e
H e r m e t i c a n d Z o r o a s t r i a n t e x t s . I n t h e s e w r i t i n g s we c a n often see t h e origins of
P a t r i z i ' s view o f s p a c e even if t h e y are n e v e r t a k e n as f a r as P a t r i z i was t o do. P l a t o ' s
own a c c o u n t in t h e T i m a e u s , for e x a m p l e , is v e r y close to P a t r i z i ' s n o t i o n . S p a c e is
r e c o g n i s e d as one o f t h e p r i m a r y f a c t o r s r e q u i r e d for a full d e s c r i p t i o n a n d
classification of t h e W o r l d . I d e a s , F o r m s a n d S p a c e a r e t h e first r e c o g n i s a b l e f e a t u r e s
in t h e Chaos. a4 S p a c e is d e s c r i b e d as being ' e v e r l a s t i n g , n o t a d m i t t i n g d e s t r u c t i o n ;
p r o v i d i n g a s i t u a t i o n for all t h i n g s t h a t c o m e i n t o b e i n g ' , a5 So space is ' t h e
r e c e p t a b l e , as i t were t h e nurse, o f all b e c o m i n g ' , a6 I n o t h e r w o r d s , s p a c e is
recognised as b e i n g p r i o r to all things, a n e c e s s i t y in o r d e r for a n y t h i n g else to
exist. P a t r i z i p u t s it this way: 'this m u s t be p r i o r t o all else; w h e n it is p r e s e n t all
o t h e r t h i n g s can be p l a c e d in it, w h e n a b s e n t all o t h e r s a r e d e s t r o y e d . 'av
F u r t h e r m o r e , i f a p h y s i c a l e n t i t y is n o t in s p a c e t h e n it is considered n o t to exist.
As P l a t o says, 'This, indeed, is t h a t which we look u p o n as in a d r e a m a n d s a y t h a t
a n y t h i n g t h a t is m u s t needs be in some place [r6=o~] a n d o c c u p y some r o o m [){&p~],
a n d t h a t w h a t is n o t s o m e w h e r e in e a r t h or h e a v e n is n o t h i n g . ' a s Or, as P a t r i z i w o u l d
say, 'if t h e y e x i s t t h e y c a n n o t e x i s t nowhere. H e n c e t h e y e x i s t s o m e w h e r e a n d so in
s o m e place, a n d so in space', a9
31 See his Opera omnia (1576, Basle; repr. 1962, Turin) vol. 1, 1736 (in the preface to his translation of
the Corpus Hermeticum), and 386 (in his Platonic Theology).
32This is taken from the historical preface to Patrizi's edition of the Hermetic works, 3r.
33 Book 12 of Panarehia: De divinis unitatibus, 25r.
34The most convenient translation of the Timaens is probably F. M. Cornford, Plato's cosmology (1937,
London).
35 Timaeus, 52B; ed. tit., 192.
36 49A; 177.
~v Pancosmia, 61a. From now on I will designate all citations from Patrizi's Nova philosophia as N.p.'.
The sheets are printed in double columns, which I will label as 'a' and 'b' on the recto side and 'c' and 'd' on
the vet,so.
3s l'imaeus, 52C; 192.
39 N.p. 61a.
555
40Compare Timaeus 50B-C, 182, with 50D-E, 186. For a fuller account of Plato's concept of space
Cornford's commentaIs~ should be consulted.
41 See for example G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The pre-Socratic philosophers (1971, Cambridge), 247
and 249.
a2See Physics, IV, 2 (209b ll) and IV, 7 (214a l0 15).
43 On the Stoic natural philosophy see S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (1971, London); Emile
Brehier, La th~orie des incorporels dans l'aneien stoieisme (1963, Paris)i and Josiah B. Gould, The
philosophy of Chrysippus (1970, Leyden).
44 Syrianus In metaphysicam commentaria (ed. Guilelmus Kroll: 1902, Berlin), 84-86.
556
John Henry
45 Libellus II of the Corpus Hermeticum can be seen in W. Scott. (footnote 25), vol. l, 134-145; the
quotation is from page 141. (Incidentally, in Patrizi's edition of the Corpus this becomes Liber I X and is
given the title Sermo univer,salis.) The quotation from the Asclepius is taken from page 319. I have used
Scott's translation in spite of its idiosyncracies, but there is a more reliable translat~ion into French: A. D.
Nock and A.-J. Festugibre (eds.), Corpus Hermeticum (2 vols., 1945-1954. Paris).
46See A. H. Armstrong, The architecture of the intelligible universe in the philosophy of Plotinus (1940,
Cambridge), 54-55. Plotinus's pronouncement may be seen in Enneads 1.6.3.
*7N.p. 74b.
as N.p. 68h.
49N.p. 68c.
5~
views are related in Simplieius, In Aristotelis physicorum libra,s quattuor priores
commentaria (ed. H. Diels: 1882, Berlin), 612. See P. Duhem, Le syst}me du monde (7 vols., 1913-56, Paris),
vol. l, 339.
51On l)amascius see P. Duhem ibid., vol. I. 342-344.
52John Philoponus, In Aristotelis physicorum libros quattttor priores commentaria (ed. H. Vitelli: 1888,
Berlin), 567. Compare Max Jammer, Concepts of space (1960, New York), 54.
557
53Although there is no index to the Nova philosophia there is a 'Catalogus autorum qui hoc novae
philosophiae opere citantur'.
54We know this because there are seventy-five Greek manuscripts in the library of the Escorial which
used to belong to Patrizi. He had to sell them during a period of insolvency. The list includes a number of
Platonic works. See B. E. C. Miller, Catalogue des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothbque de l'Escurial (1848,
Paris: repr. 1966, Amsterdam); and E. Jacobs, 'Francesco Patrizi und seine Sammlung griechischer
Handschriften in der Bibliothek des Escorial', Zentralblatt Fir Bibliothekswesen, 25 (1908), 19-47.
55See footnote 2 for reference to Patrizi's translation. There' were two translations of Philoponus's
commentary on the Physics; one by G. Dorotheus printed in 1539, 1546, 1550 and 1554, and the other by J.
B. Rasarius printed in 1558, 1559, 1569 and 1581, all at Venice. For full references see CI B. Schmitt, 'A
fresh look at mechanics in 16th century Italy', Studies in history and philosophy of science, 1 (1970), 161175.
56Jacopo Mazzoni (footnote 29), 187.
s7 See footnote 18.
5s N.p. 68b.
59The two most well-known proponents of this view are E. A. Burtt, The metaphysical foundations of
modern science (1924, London); and Alexander Koyr4, 'Galileo and Plato', Journal of the history of ideas, 4
(1943), 400428. But see also E. Cassirer, 'Galileo's Platonism', in M. A. Montague (ed.), Studies and essay~
in the history of science (1946, New York), 277 297.
558
,John Henry
559
63 F o r an example of light m e t a p h y s i c s in Ficino see his Liber de sole in vol. 1 of his Opera omnia
(footnote 31). Palingenius wrote a philosophical poem called Zodiaeus vitae which has appeared in m a n y
editions. A convenient reprint is: Marcellus Palingenius, The zodiake of life ... translated by Barnabe Googe
(t947, New York). See also F. W. Watson, The 'Zodiacus vitae' of Marcellus Palingenius Stellatus: an old
school book (1908, London).
64 Compare Francesco de'Vieri, Vere conelusioni di Platone, eonformi alla dottrina christiana eta quella
d'Aristotile (1590, Florence).
65 This appears on the first page (un-numbered) of the last appendix to the Nova philosophia ealled
Veritatis studiosis. This is an apologia for Patrizi's anti-Aristotelianism and is partly a reproduction of the
opening chapter o f tome 3 of t h e Discussiones peripateticae.
66 Hermes Trismegist~s, 3r-v.
6 ~ Veritatis studiosis.
560
John Henry
68 Dedicatory Epistle, verso of first sheet. In fact there is actually a recorded instance of this saying
used specifically--if unfairly--against Patrizi. in Giordano Bruno's trial proceedings Zuan Mocenigo
reported that Bruno had said: 'I know that Patrizi is a philosopher and believes nothing' (see F. A. Yates,
Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic tradition (1964, London), 345),
69 Veritatis studiosis, recto of first sheet.
70N.p. 67b.
71N.p. 66d.
72 That is was a gradual overthrow must now he recognised. See, for example, C. B. Scbmitt, 'Towards
a reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism',History of science, 11 (1973), 159 193; or, taken from
another point of view, Edward Grant, 'Aristotelianism and the longevity of the medieval world view'.
History of science, 16 (1978), 93-106.
73I briefly mention just a few of these below in section 4.
74 Aristotle's concept of place and rejection of the notion of space can be found in the Physics, 4,
chapters 1 9,208a, 27-217b, 28; and in De caelo, 1, chapters 5-9, 271b 279b, 3.
7s Physics, 4, 4,212a, 5-10. I have used the Loeb edition translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F, M.
Cornford (1970, London), 313. In future I will give the page reference in brackets.
561
demands, 'other than space, with length and breadth, even if in locus he himself
foolishly overlooked depth, which is more properly locus'. 76 Patrizi has made two
points here. Firstly, Aristotle's place is only a particular sort of space. He expands
the argument for us: 'When the same space contains a body it is called locus; but if it
contains no body it is called a vact~.~m. But really these things are the same thing:
vacuum, spacium, plenum, and locus... And on this account vacuum like locus, must
consist of the three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. And this very vacuum is
nothing other than three dimensional space'. ~
His second point is t h a t the Aristotelian definition is inadequate because a threedimensional object is said to be contained in only two dimensions. Aristotle is even
accused of inconsistency here first attributing three dimensions to place and then
denying it: ' F o r he does deny it when he says: "locus must be the boundary of the
enclosing body, with which it touches the body enclosed". On this account he defines
locus as the surface of the surrounding body'. 7s
Within the terms of his own paradigm Patrizi is making a good point when he
asks how the depths of a body can be meaningfully said to occupy a surface rather
than a space. But it is hardly a fair criticism of Aristotle, whose concept of place is
primarily concerned to locate a body, describing where it is in relation to other
objects; in which case consideration of a closed surface is entirely adequate.
However, it will not do to characterise these arguments in terms of the incompatability of paradigms, because Aristotle actually considers what is very much like the
Patrizian concept and rejects it:
W h a t makes 'place' appear so mysterious and hard to grasp is its illusive
suggestion now of m a t t e r and now of form, and the fact t h a t while the
continent is at rest the transferable content may change, for this suggests that
there may be a dimensional something that stays there other than the entering
and vacating o b j e c t s - - a i r too contributing to this last illusion since it looks as
if it were incorporeal--so t h a t the 'place' instead of being recognised as being
constituted solely by the adjacent surface of the vessel, is held to be the
dimensional interval within the surface, conceived as 'vacancy'. 79
The problem here is t h a t proposed by the perennial confusion between corporeal
and incorporeal. This is clearly shown when Aristotle argues t h a t because a void is
non-material an encroaching object like a cube of wood cannot displace it, as it could
displace water and so has to interpenetrate with the void. This is held to be
impossible, for it means two objects are occupying the same place at the same time.
The fact that the void is incorporeal ought to make a difference to the argument, but
Aristotle fails to see this. He seems to be objecting t h a t the void is not material
enough to be displaced by the wood but too material to exist in the same place at the
same time as the wood. s~ Any 'dimensional entity' for Aristotle is corporeal: he
cannot accept the incorporeal three-dimensional space of the atomists, sl
v6N.p. 61a.
v~N.p. 62d. Aristotle had anticipated this point: 'Thus "place" and the "filled" and the "vacant"
would all be one identical entity under varying aspects or conditionsof existence' (Physics, 213a, 15-20(p.
329)).
7s N.p. 62a.
~9Physics, IV; 4, 212a, 7-15 (p. 313).
s~
IV, 8,216a, 35-216b, 4 (p. 359).
slPhysics, IV, 6, 213a, 30 sq. (p. 331).
562
John Henry
C o n s i d e r b y w a y o f c o n t r a s t P a t r i z i ' s v e r s i o n o f d i s p l a c e m e n t : ' T h e r e f o r e , in
o r d e r t h a t t h e l o c a t i n g b o d y m a y now receive t h e l o c a t e d b o d y , it is n e c e s s a r y for i t
to w i t h d r a w c o m p l e t e l y f r o m t h i s place l e a v i n g t h e space, which is i m m o b i l e there,
e m p t y so t h a t it m a y be filled w i t h the e n c r o a c h i n g b o d y . A n d w h e n t h i s [body] in
t u r n w i t h d r a w s c o m p l e t e l y , t h a t s a m e s p a c e which is t h e r e i m m o b i l e , m a y receive
a n o t h e r e n t e r i n g b o d y ' , s2 H a v i n g said this, P a t r i z i now reveals, in c o m p l e t e
c o n t r a d i c t i o n to A r i s t o t l e , t h a t he believes this is t h e o n l y w a y to a v o i d i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of bodies: ' S p a c e a l w a y s t h e same, a n d a l w a y s i m m o b i l e m u s t r e m a i n long,
wide, a n d d e e p in o r d e r to release all l e a v i n g b o d i e s a n d to receive all e n t e r i n g bodies.
Or else p e n e t r a t i o n of bodies occurs a n d t h i s is i m p o s s i b l e ' . 83
I t is t h a n k s to his P l a t o n i c c o n c e p t o f a n i n c o r p o r e a l c o r p o r e a l , t h e n , t h a t P a t r i z i
a v o i d s g e t t i n g i n t o confusion a b o u t w h a t is a m a t e r i a l e n t i t y a n d w h a t is not.
H o w e v e r , as an e x t e n d e d e n t i t y c a n be e i t h e r m a t e r i a l o r i m m a t e r i a l , P a t r i z i has to
e h a r a c t e r i s e a c o r p o r e a l b o d y b y reference to s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its e x t e n s i o n .
P a t r i z i ' s a n s w e r is t h e o b v i o u s one for t h e m o d e r n m i n d : ' I t is a n t i t y p i a w h i c h t h e y
also call anteresis w h i c h is p r o p e r to a b o d y , in so f a r as it is a n a t u r a l b o d y . T h i s is
resistance. This r e s i s t a n c e needs t h a t t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l space for its e x i s t e n c e ' , s4
P a t r i z i ' s o p i n i o n was to be r e - e m p h a s i s e d in t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y in a r g u m e n t s
a g a i n s t t h e C a r t e s i a n definition o f m a t t e r as res extensa. Descartes, like A r i s t o t l e ,
could n o t conceive o f d i m e n s i o n a l i t y w i t h o u t c o r p o r e a l i t y , s5
A f u r t h e r p r o b l e m a r i s i n g from this p h i l o s o p h i c a l confusion was t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
v o i d space. A r i s t o t l e , as is well k n o w n , was forced into d e n y i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of v o i d
s p a c e e v e n in principle. A f t e r all, place is a n a t t r i b u t e of b o d y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , even
s c h o l a s t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s u s e d to a r g u e a g a i n s t A r i s t o t l e on this one, t h o u g h o n l y
s e c u n d u m i m a g i n a t i o n e m , a l m o s t as a m e n t a l exercise, s6 U l t i m a t e l y t h e y w o u l d
u s u a l l y r e t u r n t o t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n f o l d - - t h e y were n o t d r i v e n to o v e r t h r o w A r i s t o t l e
b e c a u s e o f a love for P l a t o , like P a t r i z i , or b e c a u s e of a need to a c c o u n t for t h e
u n i v e r s e in m e c h a n i c a l t e r m s , like G a s s e n d i , B o y l e a n d N e w t o n .
u2 N.p. 62c.
s3 Ibid.
s4 N.p. 62e-d.
s5 Indee~t, one could almost say Descartes was more Aristotelian than Aristotle on this point. See
Principles 4-22 in Descartes's Principles of philosophy, which is conveniently presented in E. S. Haldane
and G. R. T. Ross (eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (2 vols., 1967, Cambridge), vol. l, 255-265.
s6 There is an excellent series of articles by Edward Grant on the concept of void space in the Middle
Ages. It comprises: 'Motion in the void and the principle of inertia in the middle ages', Isis, 55 (1964), 265292; 'Medieval and seventeenth century conceptions of an infinite void space beyond the cosmos', Isis, 60
(1969), 39-60; 'Medieval explanations and interpretations of the dictum that "Nature abhors a
Vacuum" ', Traditio, 29 (1973), 327-355; 'Place and space in medieval physical thought', in P. K.
Machamer and R. G. Turnbull (eds.), Motion and time, space and matter: interrelations in the history of
philosophy and science (1976. Columbus, Ohio), 137-167; and 'The principle of the impenetrability of
bodies in the histol)" of concepts of separate space from the middle ages to the seventeenth centu .ry', 1sis,
69 (1978), 551-57l. See also A. Koyr~, 'Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVe smele', Archives d'histoire
doctrinale et litteraire dn mbyen-af]e, 24 (1949), 45-91.
563
In his own discussion Aristotle distinguished three species of void: the intramundane void, the inter-particulate void, and the extra-cosmic void. Following suit,
Patrizi considers each of these in turn. The intra-mundane void refers to large-scale
vacua t h a t might be formed inside blocked bellows, clepsydrae or water clocks,
sealed bludders or other containers, and even much larger voids which could be left
behind if God destroyed everything beneath the sphere of the moon but kept t h a t
sphere supported, s7 Now, even Patrizi admits t h a t this sort of void is not found
natur~lly, but he believes t h a t such could be produced artificiMly. Unfortunately,
albeit interestingly, Patrizi lets the whole burden of his a r g u m e n t rest on certain
'experiments' (experientiae) which he describes, with no consideration of the
theoretical objections proposed by Aristotle. This is particularly disappointing
because Aristotle's most strenuous objections rely on his assumption t h a t motion
would be impossible in a vacuum, and it would have been interesting to see how
Patrizi surmounted these obstacles. However it was left to other thinkers to argue for
a new dynamic theory and this is one of the m a j o r failings of his otherwise
comprehensive critique, ss
The possibility of motion in a void only becomes an issue for Patrizi when he is
arguing for the second sort of void: the interparticulate or interstitial void said to
exist between the particles of matter. Following the arguments of Lucretius in De
return natura s9 Patrizi insists t h a t only on this assumption can motion and
condensation and rarefaction take place:
The air, likewise, yields to my body when I change m y position in it. As it
gives way it is either destroyed or else withdrawn into its other neighbouring
particles and thus, either one part penetrates into another, or else it withdraws
into the e m p t y spaces interspersed within it. B u t we m u s t not say t h a t it was
destroyed without a n y previous transformation. Nor is the inter-penetration of
one part of the air with another ~dmissable. Therefore, we m u s t a d m i t t h a t it
betook itself into the e m p t y spaces of the nearby air. And it is in this sense t h a t
certain of the wisest of the ancients, well informed on the nature of things found
in the v a c u u m the reason for density and rarity; and also maintained t h a t the
motion of bodies took place through the void, the object m e t giving way and
withdrawing into the nearest e m p t y little spaces. 9~
Of course, all this had been vigorously denied by Aristotle, but as far as Patrizi
was concerned his carefully thought out arguments were merely a 'dross of
sophisms'. Meanwhile, he is so carried away by his own speculations t h a t he asks:
' W h y can we not maintain t h a t there is as much v a c u u m in the world as there is
87 Patrizi does not discuss the last example, but it does appear in the scholastic literature and even in
Walter Charleton's Physiologia Epicuro Gassendo-Charletoniana (1654, London), 63. For a medieval
example see E. Grant (tbotnote 61), 325, where Albert of Saxony's Questions or~ the Physics of Aristotle is
considered.
8s F o r an excellent discussion of these experiments see C. B. Schmitt. 'Experimental evidence for and
against a void: the sixteenth century arguments', isis, 58 (1968), 352 366. For Patrizi's discussion see
N.p. 63b-c. On the relationship between dynamical theories and the concept of void, see E. Grant., 'Motion
in the void (fnotnote 86). See also M. ('.lagett, The s~:ieneeof mechanics in the Middle Ages (1959, Madison,
Wis.), 509-512. Philoponus also deserves recognition on this score: so far his work has to be properly
~ssessed, but see C. B. Schmitt (fontnote 55).
s9 Lucretius, On the "~mtureof the univer.se (1951, Harmondsworth), Book I, l l . 32,%417.
9~N.p. 63a.
9~.s.
2M
564
John Henry
Opticks. 93
T h e final t y p e of v o i d is t h e e x t r a - c o s m i c v o i d b e y o n d t h e o u t e r m o s t s p h e r e of t h e
h e a v e n s . A r g u m e n t s h a d been p u t f o r w a r d on its b e h a l f v i r t u a l l y c o n t i n u o u s l y f r o m
t h e p r e - S o c r a t i c s to t h e R e n a i s s a n c e in s p i t e of A r i s t o t l e ' s b e s t efforts. T h e f a m o u s ,
a n d t r u l y u b i q u i t o u s , a r g u m e n t runs s o m e t h i n g like this:
let it be a s s u m e d t h a t s o m e o n e s t a n d i n g m o t i o n l e s s a t t h e e x t r e m i t y [of t h e
world] e x t e n d s his h a n d upward 9 N o w if his h a n d does e x t e n d t h e y t a k e it t h a t
t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g t h e r e b e y o n d t h e s k y to w h i c h t h e h a n d extends 9 B u t if t h e
a r m could n o t be e x t e n d e d t h e n s o m e t h i n g will e x i s t o u t s i d e t h a t p r e v e n t s t h e
e x t e n s i o n of t h e h a n d ; b u t if he t h e n s t a n d s a t t h e e x t r e m i t y of this a n d e x t e n d s
his h a n d t h e s a m e question as before [is asked] since n o t h i n g could be shown to
exist b e y o n d t h a t being: 94
P a t r i z i ' s own v e r s i o n is s o m e w h a t m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d b u t t h e s a m e p o i n t is m a d e ,
n a m e l y t h a t t h e w o r l d m u s t h a v e an o u t e r surface which m u s t p r e s e n t itself to a n
e x t e r n a l s u r r o u n d i n g space. His s t r a t a g e m is to consider one of t h e signs of t h e zodiac
(he t a k e s Aries) which covers a n a r e a d e l i n e a t e d b y arcs of 30 ~ a n d 12 ~ on t h e
i n n e r m o s t surface of t h e heaven. Now, t h e s e b o u n d i n g lines can be e x t e n d e d t h r o u g h
to t h e o u t s i d e surface, which m u s t exist, o t h e r w i s e t h e h e a v e n w o u l d be a b o d y w i t h
no surface or n o t a b o d y a t all. I f we c o n s i d e r all t h e signs of t h e zodiac in s i m i l a r
fashion, t h e n we h a v e to conceive a b a n d 12 ~ w i d e r u n n i n g r i g h t a r o u n d t h e world.
F u r t h e r , we c a n e x t e n d t h e lines d i v i d i n g one sign f r o m t h e n e x t u p w a r d a n d
d o w n w a r d to each pole, so t h a t t h e w o r l d is d i v i d e d i n t o t w e l v e e q u a l p a r t s like a
melon. P a t r i z i is t r y i n g to give t h e r e a d e r a m e n t a l p i c t u r e of w h a t t h e w o r l d m u s t
l o o k like if it could be seen f r o m o u t s i d e t h e s p h e r e of t h e fixed stars. T h e o u t e r
surface m u s t be c o n t i g u o u s w i t h an a m b i e n t space a n d the w o r l d as a whole m u s t
exist, like e v e r y t h i n g else (including melons), in a n e n c o m p a s s i n g space. 9s
F u r t h e r m o r e , this s p a c e m u s t be infinite in e x t e n t . P a t r i z i is q u i t e i n s i s t e n t a b o u t
t h i s - - t h e v o i d is n o t m e r e l y indefinite b u t infinite, a n d infinite in a c t u a l i t y n o t
s i m p l y i n p o t e n t i a . A f t e r all, space c a n n o t be b o u n d e d b y itself n o r b y a n y o t h e r
c o r p o r e a l i n c o r p o r e a l , which w o u l d be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m space, so it m u s t be
b o u n d e d b y an i n c o r p o r e a l or a b o d y . An i n c o r p o r e a l , h o w e v e r , w o u l d h a v e to h a v e a
surface in o r d e r to b o u n d space a n d so could n o t be i n c o r p o r e a l a n d a b o d y h a s to
e x i s t i n s p a c e a n d so could n o t b o u n d space. So, s p a c e is infinite. 96 A n d it c a n n o t be
9
9 91 N.p. 63b.
92 N.p. 64c.
93 See A. Thackray, '"Matter in a nut-shell': Newton's Opti<'ks and eighteenth century chemistry',
Ambix, 15 (1968), 29~3.
94 Simplicii . .. commentaria in qtr
libros de eaelo Aristotelis ... (1540, Venice), 44v. I have taken
this from E. Grant, 'Medieval and seventeenth century concepts' (footnote 86). At this point in the
commentary, Simplieius is quoting t)'om Eudemus, who states that Arehytas, a Pythagorean con
temporary of Plat(), used to ask this question. See Sir Thomas Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle (1949,
Oxford), 104.
95 N.p. 63d.
96N.p. 64a b.
565
said to be infinite only in potential while actually finite, for that would mean it is
actually bounded, which is impossible by the same reasoning we have just been
through, so space is actually infinite. 97 Patrizi is now in a position to summarily
dispose of one awkward scholastic problem: can the world as a whole be moved?
Certainly it can, and it does indeed leave a void behind it as it moves into another
part of the infinite space. 9s
A related Aristotelian problem concerns the place of the world as a whole.
Aristotle led himself into a tight corner on this issue when he said t h a t 'if a body is
encompassed by another body external to it, it is "in a place", but if not, it is n o t ' . 99
The outermost sphere or the world as a whole could not be said to be surrounded by
an external containing body, so the commentators had to make a special case and
define this place in terms o f the surrounded limit. 1~176
The place of the outermost
sphere was, therefore, the external surface of the penultimate sphere. Strictly
speaking, Patrizi is once again perfectly free to dispose of this argument; but his
Platonism leads him to agree with Aristotle for once, and he feels it incumbent upon
himself to establish that the earth, which is the centre of the world (he was no
Copernican1~
is in the centre of the universum spacium. Of course, as an infinite
extension, the universum spacium should have no definable centre, and Patrizi begs
the question completely by saying that if we draw imaginary lines out in all
directions from the centre of the earth as far as the boundary of the world, they will
be equal but finite in length. I f we extend them further they remain equal even to
infinity and so the world is in the centre of the universal space. 1~
From one point of view this is a weakness which prevents Patrizi from being
hailed as a truly modern thinker, 1~ but as a Ptatonist he was bound to believe in a
hierarchy, the great chain of being from matter to spirit and up to God. The rational
soul of man was another corporeal incorporeal for Patrizi, a mid-point between the
world of nature and the world of spirit, and so it seemed fitting t h a t man's place on
earth should be central, with the base m a t t e r of earth below him and the heavens
above him. 104 So everything is ordered: 'the principal bodies of the world have the
power of being fixed each in its own place and rank and of not being dislodged
97 Ibid.
9s N.p. 63d. This a r g u m e n t a b o u t the world moving was raised by t h e Aristotelian Alexander
Aphrodisiensis as an objection to t h e Stoic concept of an ambientvoid. His objection was simply t h a t this
sort of motion is meaningless and y e t is allowed for by the Stoic concept, therefore their concept is in error.
The Aristotelian, however, has overlooked the principle of sufiqcient reason which can be invoked by the
Stoics to account for the immovability of the world: for why should it move one way rather t h a n another?
See S. S a m b u r s k y (footnote 43), 113. This a r g m n e n t was still going strong in the seventeenth century
between Leibniz and the Newtonian Samuel Clarke. This debate m a y be conveniently followed in H. G.
Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-('larke correspondence (1956. Manchester): see Leibniz's 3rd paper a n d
Clarke's 3rd reply, for example.
99physic~s, IV, 5, 212a, 32- 5 (p. 321).
too For a brief discussion of this problem see, H. A. Wolfson, Crescas' critique of Aristotle (1929,
Cambridge, Mass.), 45-46 and Note 54 on Proposition 1, part. 2, 4 3 2 4 4 1 .
~0~ Although he did, like so m a n y others, accept the rotation of the earth a b o u t its own axis (compare
N.p. 104d).
102 N.p. 64c.
103 E. E. Maechling (footnote 19) considers this to be the reason w h y A. Koyr6 o m i t t e d Patrizi from his
From the closed world to the infinite universe (1957, Baltimore). For Patrizi believed in a closed world in an
infinite universe. Koyr~'s omission is, nevertheless, unfortunate in view of Patrizi's great importance.
lo4 For hierarchies in Patrizi's Nova philosophia see B. Briekman (footnote 10), 32-39.
2M2
566
,John H e n r y
t h e r e f r o m . A n d so it h a p p e n s t h a t t h e c e n t r e of t h e w o r l d is a l w a y s in t h e c e n t r e o f
space, t h e e a r t h r e m a i n s i m m o v a b l e in t h e s a m e s p a c e a r o u n d t h e centre, a n d
likewise w a t e r , air, a n d t h e e n t i r e h e a v e n ' . 1~
I n t h e closing lines of his b o o k on p h y s i c a l space, t h e n , P a t r i z i i r o n i c a l l y comes
close to an a c c e p t a n c e of A r i s t o t e l i a n n a t u r a l places a n d t h e n o n - i s o t r o p i e s p a c e t h a t
it implies. H e continues: ' B u t if this is so, t h e bodies of t h e world, t h e h e a v e n a n d t h e
e l e m e n t s , o c c u p i e d f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g t h e p a r t s o f s p a c e a p p r o p r i a t e to each, in
w h i c h t h e y m i g h t r e m a i n forever. J u s t as t h e s e b o d i e s differ in n a t u r e f r o m one
a n o t h e r so can t h e p a r t s of space t h a t u n d e r l i e each o f t h e m seem to differ f r o m each
o t h e r ' . 106
P a t r i z i h a s a l r e a d y said t h a t t h e differences in p a r t s of space arising f r o m
different l o c a t e d b o d i e s are m e r e l y a c c i d e n t a l to it a n d n o t p a r t of its p r o p e r
a t t r i b u t e s , a n d y e t now he a d m i t s t h a t s p a c e could be g i v e n speeiM p r o p e r t i e s like
t h o s e i m p l i e d b y t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n d o c t r i n e o f n a t u r a l plaees. Thus, i n s t e a d of a r g u i n g
against. A r i s t o t l e he d e c l a r e s t h a t if 'it s h o u l d be p r o v e d t h a t t h o s e p a r t s of s p a c e
were so a r r a n g e d f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g t h a t t h e one h o l d i n g t h e e a r t h is i n c a p a b l e of
h o l d i n g t h e air, a n d t h e one h o l d i n g t h e w a t e r is u n a b l e to hold t h e h e a v e n , a i r or
e a r t h , a n d t h a t each p a r t r e c e i v e d bodies p e e u l i a r t o itself', t h e n it follows t h a t 'this
p r o p e r t y m u s t h a v e been g i v e n each one of t h e p a r t s o f s p a c e b y some o t h e r s u p e r i o r
power. B u t whose p o w e r t h a t is, a n d w h a t s o r t of p o w e r it is, will be l o o k e d i n t o
t h o r o u g h l y in its own p l a c e ' . l ~
E v e n if P a t r i z i ' s t r e a t m e n t of p h y s i c a l s p a c e ends on t h i s q u a s i - A r i s t o t e l i a n note,
t h e m a j o r i t y of his a r g u m e n t s h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n sutEeient to u n d e r l i n e t h e
i n a d e q u a c y of t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n a c c o u n t . 1~ D r i v e n b y his love of t h e P l a t o n i c
p h i l o s o p h y a n d his a d h e r e n c e to its m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , he has set o u t to show
t h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s r e j e c t i o n of t h e p o p u l a r o p i n i o n t h a t t h e r e is a ' k i n d of d i m e n s i o n a l
e n t i t y ' w h i c h is ' d i s t i n c t f r o m b o d y ' is m i s c o n c e i v e d , 1~ a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e to
e s t a b l i s h t h i s p o p u l a r o p i n i o n as t h e c o r r e e t one b y careful p h i l o s o p h i e a l a n a l y s i s .
T h e s t r i c t l y r e l a t i o n a l c o n c e p t which for A r i s t o t l e was m e r e l y one of t h e ten
c a t e g o r i e s of t h e o b j e c t s of t h o u g h t 1lO b e c a m e for P a t r i z i a real s e l f - e x i s t e n t e n t i t y .
4. T h e i n f l u e n c e of P a t r i z i ' s i d e a s a b o u t s p a c e
I n t h e l a t e s i x t e e n t h a n d e a r l y s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s P a t r i z i was g e n e r a l l y
r e g a r d e d as one of t h e w o r l d ' s l e a d i n g p h i l o s o p h e r s . T h e r e are n u m e r o u s p a s s i n g
references to him, as well as a n u m b e r of l o n g e r d i s c u s s i o n s b y w r i t e r s all o v e r
E u r o p e . One of his e a r l y w o r k s was even a b r i d g e d a n d a d a p t e d in a n E n g l i s h w o r k o f
10s N.p. 65d.
t06 Ibid.
~o~ Ibid.
lo8 Besides. Patrizi goes <m. ill tilt' iMImtins book (Dr .~l,acb, matbem~ltico), to attack Aristotle even
more. 1 Impe to deal ~ith these critici~,ms in a scp~.ratc paper.
l~
IV. 4.21lb. 15 20 (309).
110 See the ('alefjorie~, chapter 4.
111 Thomas Bhmdeville, The lr~e ordez' a'~d method of writint. I and readi~uj historie,s according to the
precepts of Francisco Patricio and Acconcio Tridenti~o (1574. London). In the dedication to the Earl of
Leicester. Blundeville admits that he collected his precepts 'out of the tenne dialogues of FranciSco
Patrieio...', and indeed the first part of this short work is all adaption and abridgement of Patrizi's work.
Hugh G. Dick has published an annotated version of The tr~e order and melhode in The Hltztlin(tton Library
qllarterly, 3 (1940), 149 17(i.
P a t r i z i ' s C o n c e p t o f S p a c e a n d its L a t e r I n f l u e n c e
567
ll2He mentions Patrizi once or twice in his De mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova (1651,
Amsterdam), 127-128 and 139.
~13 In a letter to an Italian priest, Re<lemt)tus Baranzanus. written in 1622. Bacon says: 'I have read
the innovators whom you name, Patricius and Telcsius..." II'ork,~(tootnote 15), vol. 14,276-378; see also
vol. 6,360). For a further consideration see Virgil K. Whitaker, 'Francesco Patrizi and Francis Bacon',
Studies in the titeramj imagination, 4 (197t), 107-120.
114 See footnote 16.
llSRobert Fludd, Sophiae cure moria eertamen... (1629, Frankfurt) includes Patrizi in a list of
'illustrious' Christian philosophers.
116 Marin Mersenne, Quaestiones celeberrimae in Genesim e~m accurate textus explicatione (1623,
Paris), columns 739-741.
117l. A. (~omcnius. ['~oJtt ~e:'e,~,~leit~t~.~t'ire q,id *ibi *it t~eee.~.~aritqmin ~,ita et morte et post mortem
(1658, Amsterdam), cbapter 1, section 11: see A. Hcybcrger, Jea~ Amos ('omeni~ts. sa vie et son oet~ree
d'educate~r (1920, Paris). ('omenius also used the prefix 'Pan " in the title words of the parts of his
Consultatio and this has been linked with Patrizi before: by Klaus Schaller in Pan: Untersuchungen zur
Comenius-Terminologie (1958, 's-Gravenage), and D. Tschizewskij in his introduction to Comenius's
Panaugia (1970, Munich). Comenius is well known as a thinker who wished to bring about educational
reform, and he may well have been sympathetic to Patri.zi's own ideas on educational reform.
xis See A. Pacchi, 'Una biblioteca ideale di Thomas Hobbes: il Ms. Ez. Dell'Archivio di Chatsworth',
ACME. Annali della facolta di lettere e filosofia deU'universita degli studi di Milano, 21 (1968), 5~1~2.
Patrizi's Della nuova geometria (1587, Ferrara). Nova philosophia (1592. Venice), and his translation of
Proelus's Etementa theologiea (1583, Ferr~ra) are included in the list.
119 George Digby, Bibliotheca Digbeiana sire eatalogus librorum in variis 1Dzquis editorum quos post
Kenelmum Digbeium eruditissim~m vir~m poss:dit (1680. London).
i20 Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherhury, De religione gentilium errorlr
spud cos ca~sis (1663,
Amsterdam: repr. 1967, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt), 21,54, 55,159. See also J. M. Shuttleworth (ed.), The
life of Edward, First Lord Herbert of Cherbury, written by himself (1976, London), 20.
izl Joseph Glanvill, Scire/i tuum nihil est: or the Author's defence of the vanity of dogmatising (1665,
London), 53, 58.
i:z Glanvill's letter is appended to the work cited in the previous footnote. See p. 84 for an example of
paraphrase, and compare the verso of the first sheet of Veritatis studiosis.
123 See Markus Fierz, 'L'ber den Ursprung und Bedeutung der Lehre Newtons vom absolutem Raum',
Gesnerus, 11 (1954), 62-106.
124 Pierre Gassendi, Exereitationes paradoxicae adversus aristoteleos (ed. B. Rochot: 1959, Paris), 519.
568
John Henry
G a s s e n d i t h e r e f o r e d e v o t e s t h e second b o o k o f his m o n u m e n t a l S y n t a g m a
p h i l o s o p h i c u m to a discussion o f s p a c e a n d time. 115 S t r a i g h t a w a y s i m i l a r i t i e s o f
approach become apparent. Like Patrizi, Gassendi wants to assert that 'Place and
t i m e are n o t i n c l u d e d in t h e d i v i s i o n of t h i n g s o r beings i n t o s u b s t a n c e a n d
accident'.126 A f t e r all, he suggests, place a n d t i m e ' t r a n s c e n d t h e u n i v e r s e in s o m e
f a s h i o n a n d e n c o m p a s s it'. 127 T h e y a r e n o t s i m p l y a c c i d e n t a l q u a l i t i e s of b o d y
w h i c h d i s a p p e a r if t h e bodies do: 'Since it a p p e a r s to us t h a t e v e n if t h e r e were no
bodies, t h e r e w o u l d still r e m a i n b o t h a n u n c h a n g i n g p l a c e a n d an e v o l v i n g t i m e , it is
t h e r e f o r e a p p a r e n t t h a t place a n d t i m e do n o t d e p e n d on b o d i e s a n d a r e n o t c o r p o r e a l
accidents. A n d t h e y are not therefore incorporeal a c c i d e n t s . . , b u t t h e y are c e r t a i n
i n c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e s of a different k i n d f r o m t h o s e o r d i n a r i l y called s u b s t a n c e s a n d
a c c i d e n t s ' . 128
P a t r i z i p u t s it this way:
. . . if i t [space] is s o m e t h i n g , it is e i t h e r s u b s t a n c e or a c c i d e n t . A n d if it is
s u b s t a n c e it is e i t h e r s o m e t h i n g i n c o r p o r e a l or a b o d y . B u t if i t is a n a c c i d e n s it
is e i t h e r a q u a n t i t y , a q u a l i t y , or some such t h i n g . B u t we s a y t h a t space itself
p e r se, since i t p r e c e d e s t h e w o r l d a n d is o u t s i d e t h e world, is n o t one of t h e
t h i n g s in t h e w o r l d , i. F o r t h e w o r l d is a b o d y , b u t space is n o t in t h e l e a s t a
b o d y , t h e r e f o r e s p a c e is n o t e m b r a c e d b y a n y o f t h e categories, it is before t h e m
all, a n d o u t s i d e t h e m all. i29
L a t e r he a d d s t h a t space 'is a c c i d e n t a l t o no w o r l d l y t h i n g , be it e i t h e r b o d y or
n o n - b o d y , s u b s t a n c e or a c c i d e n t , it is p r i o r to all t h e s e ' . 13~ SPace is a s u b s t a n c e , he
a d m i t s , b u t a 'different sort of s u b s t a n c e o u t s i d e t h e c a t e g o r i e s ' . l 3 i A n d e v e r y t h i n g
is a c c i d e n t a l to space: 'As all t h i n g s come to be in it, so t h e y are a c c i d e n t a l to it; so
t h a t n o t o n l y t h o s e t h i n g s called a c c i d e n t s in t h e Categories, b u t even t h o s e which a r e
s u b s t a n c e s there, a r e a c c i d e n t a l to it [space]'.132
P a t r i z i ' s space is, therefore, s u b s t a n t i a l e x t e n s i o n . G a s s e n d i follows on: ' A n d we
m u s t a d m i t t h a t s p a c e is a q u a n t i t y , or some s o r t of e x t e n s i o n , n a m e l y t h e space or
i n t e r v a l m a d e u p o f t h e t h r e e dimensions, length, b r e a d t h , a n d d e p t h , in which it is
possible to h o l d a b o d y , or t h r o u g h which a b o d y m a y t r a v e l . B u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e it
m u s t be s a i d t h a t its d i m e n s i o n s a r e in60rporeal, so t h a t place is an i n t e r v a l , or
i n c o r p o r e a l space, or i n c o r p o r e a l q u a n t i t y ' . 133
W e need n o t p u r s u e G a s s e n d i ' s a r g u m e n t s a n y f u r t h e r , b u t it should be r e m a r k e d
t h a t t h e s i m i l a r i t y of ideas c a n n o t be a t t r i b u t e d to coincidence. A f t e r his discussion
G a s s e n d i gives a b r i e f a c c o u n t of e a r l i e r ideas a n d w h e n he gets to P a t r i z i he s a y s t h a t
' a b o u t this s p a c e or place, whose t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s l e n g t h , b r e a d t h , a n d d e p t h
coincide, be p r o p o u n d s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h a t w h a t we ourselves h a v e a r g u e d
a b o u t it a b o v e ' . 134 C e r t a i n l y he was well a c q u a i n t e d w i t h P a t r i z i ' s N o v a p h i l o s o p h i a .
125Pierre Gassendi, Syntag~t~ztis philosophicum pars seeunda, quae est Physiea, liber I1, 17~228, in
Opera omnia (1658, Lyon: repr. 1964, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt) voh 1.
126 Ibid., 179.
1271 have taken the translations, where possible, from Craig B. Brush (ed.), The selected works of Pierre
Gassendi (1972, New York); this line is from page 383. Hereafter this will be cited as Selected works.
12s Selected works, 384.
129 N.p. 65a.
13~N.p. 65b.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133Selected works, 385.
134 Syntagma philosophicl~m, 246a.
Patrizis
( ' o n c e p t o f S p a c e a n d it,~' L a t e r h ~ f l u e n e e
569
135 Ibid.: For he maintains that the first thing which the supreme Artificer produced apart from
Himself was space, as other things could not exist without it, yet it could itself exist without other things'.
136N.p. 61a. : 'What, then. was it that the supreme Artificer"produced first of all, apart from Himself?
What ought to be produced or what is more fitting to be produced first than that which all things needed
that they might exist? and without which they could not exist, yet it could itself exist without other
things?'.
137j. E. McGuire, 'Existence. actuality and necessity: Newt<m on space and time', Annals ofscien<'e,
35 (1978), 463-508.
13s F. M. A. de Voltaire', Elemen~ de la philosophic de Newton. First published in 1738, the quotation is
the closing sentence of chapter 2. [ have taken it from Oeuvres completes de Voltaire, vol. 3 l, (1784, Paris)
37.
139The main proponent <)fthis line is Koyr6 in his (footnote 103), especially chapters 5, 6 and 7. But see
also E. A. Burtt (footnote 59), 127-144; Max Jammer (f<)otnote 52), 39~46; Markus Fierz, (footnote 123);
and John Tull Baker, A n historical and <:ritiral examination of English space and time theories from Henry
More to Bishop Berkeley ( 193(I. Bronxvilte. New York). For a more general treatment of More's philosophy
see S. ttutin, ffem'y More: e.~.sai *,r le.~ d,ctrines th~osophiq,es chez le,~"plato~dcien,s de Cambridge (1966,
Hildesheim/.
la0 Henry Mol'e. 7'he immortality of ll., .~.M. .s..]?trc~:ft.'/l, .,~ it i,~ dvm~m,~lc(tble from lhe k~towledge of
nature and the light of reason (1669, London), 3. See also p. 22, where More diseusses 'whether there be any
substance of a mixt nature betwixt body and spirit'. For More the answer is in the negative- wherever
there is a 'substance distinct from Body or Matter... it is in the most full and proper seo~e incorporeal'.
570
John Henry
571
As is welt known, More goes on from here virtually to identify space and God. 146
Patrizi, living in counter-reformation Italy, could never have gone so far even if he so
wished. I t should be remembered, however, that God was an incorporeal in Patrizi's
hierarchy and so could not be identified with a corporeal incorporeal. This difficulty
does not arise for More, who has done away with the concept of the purely
incorporeal, as far as Patrizi would have understood the term. Nevertheless, Patrizi
does say that 'in the universe e m p t y space is the physical entity closest to God'. 147
Furthermore, when More gives a checklist of divine attributes which he believes are
also proper to space, most of them are exactly consonant with Patrizi's ideas. The
attributes are these: 'One, Simple, Immobile, Eternal, Complete, Independent, Selfexistent, Self-subsisting, Incorruptible, Necessary, Immense, Uncreated.
Uneircumseribed, Incomprehensible, Omnipresent, Incorporeal, Permeating and
Surrounding all Things, Ens per Essentiam, Ens actu, Purus Actus') 4s
So, in spite of differences in philosophical v o c a b u l a r y ' a n d in prevailing
theological ideas, More's attitudes arc, in general, strikingly reminiscent of Patrizi's.
J u s t as Patrizi insists that God must create space first, so More says: 'we must either
acknowledge that there is a certain extended entity besides matter, or that God
could not create finite matter'. 149 Patrizi quotes Hermes as saying t h a t 'a body that
is moved is moved through an immovable medium', 15~ and More in his Divine
dialogues declares that space forms an immovable medium for the motion of
matter. T M Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that while both men formed their
initial conceptions of space in Platonist terms as an emanation from God, the details
were worked out in a critical response to the prevailing philosophical notions:
Aristotelian for Patrizi, and Cartesian for More.
5. C o n c l u s i o n
The Aristotelian concept of space has always been one of the most problematic
areas in the Stagirite's total output, drawing critical responses from all the wellknown commentators among the later Greeks, Arabs and medieval scholastics. One
of the major reasons for this prolonged critical interest must lie in the fact that
Aristotle rejected the common-sense view of space as a dimensional entity which is
co-extensive with but distinct from body. This was no doubt exacerbated by the fact
t h a t in the Categories Aristotle seemed to s
just this view: 'Space is a continuous
quantity: for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common
boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of
the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid'. 152 The
146 This identification is implicit in the Divine dialogues (2 vols., 1668, London), vol. 1, 106, where
space is considered to be 'a more general and confused apprehension of the divine amplitude,' and it is
space in which all things are 'necessarily apprehended to live and move and have their being' (p. 107).
More's influence on Newton is strongly suggested by this identification which is very like Newton's
conception of space 'as it w e r e . . . His [God's] senso~" (Optiek,s, Query 28). See H. G. Alexander (footnote
98); and F. E. L. Priestley, 'The Clarke-Leibniz controversy', in R. E. B u t t s and J. W. Davis (eds.), The
methodological heritage of Newton (1970, Toronto), 3 ~ 5 6 .
147 N.p. 122a.
14s H e n r v More. Enchiridium metap;~ysic~.m (1671, London), 8, 8.
1,,9 Ibid., 6, 5.
150 N.p. 65d. The Hermetic reterence is from Libellus I I (Liber I X in Patrizi's edition); see W. Scott
(footnote 25), 137.
15l Divine dialogues, vol. 1, 101 104.
~52 Aristotle, Categoriae, 6, 5a, 5-14.
572
,John H e n r y
153It should, i)erhaps, be remarked that although Aristotle uses the word 'z6no~' in the Categoriae it
cannot be translated as place in this context. According to Grant, on whom I am relying here, in the
middle ages this passage wa,~generally taken as attributing three dimensionality to place (see E. Grant,
"Space and place' (footnote 86), 138).
154 Divine Dialoq~es, vol. I, 104.
15s Nicole Oresme Le liw'e du eiel et du monde (eds. A. D. Menut and A. J. Denomy: 1968, Madison,
\Vis.), 177. As a matter of fact even Oresme seems to have identified space with God: 'Now this space of
which we are talking is infinite and indivisble and is the immensity of God and God himself' (ibid.).
156On Stoicism in the Renaissance see d. L. Saunders. Justus Lipsitr the philosophy of Renaissance
Stoicism (1955, New York); and L. Zanta, Le renaissance du stoieisme a~( X I Ve si~cle (1914, Paris). On the
impact of Lueretius's poem see G. D. Hadzsits. Lucretius and his influence (1935, London); W. B.
Fleisehmann, 'Lucretius Cams', Catalogus translationum et eommentariorum, 2 (1971), 349-365; and C. T.
Harrison, 'Bacon, Hobbes, Boyle and the ancient atomists'. Harvard studies and notes in philology, and
literat~r 15 (1933), 191-218.
1s7Grant describes an extremely good example from the w<>rkof a Jesuit. Franciscus Toletus, in his
"Space and plaee" (footnote 86).
158 Pat rizi believed himselfto be the first: '... h isce lihris a nobis omnium primis exaratam' (N.p. 68d).
573
Isaac Newton, therefore, took the concept of an incorporeal yet extended entity
in his stride. He did not feel any need to defend this position either against
Aristotelians or Cartesians but accepted it as obvious and unproblematic. 16~ So
when, in the Seholium to his Principia mathematica, Newton could say, 'I do not
define space and p l a c e . . , as being well known to all', 161 his philosophical confidence
was only possible as a result of the pioneering work carried out by Francesco Patrizi.
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this p a p e r was read at the History of Science seminar at the
University of Leeds on 29 N o v e m b e r 1978, and I would like to t h a n k all those present
on t h a t occasion for their help and encouragement. I also wish to thank, for their
generous help at different stages of my research, Dr. A. G. Molland, Dr. David Grylls,
Mr. Richard Wilson and, a b o v e all, Dr. C. B. Schmitt.