The Southern Journal of Phibsophy (1986) Vol. XXIV, No.

SOCRATES AND THE DUTY

TO PHILOSOPHIZE
Mark L. McPherran
University of Maine at Farmington
The Socrates of the Apology claims to philosophize in accordance
with a duty so overriding that he will accept even death, rather than
cease from philosophizing (29cSd5; 30a-b). As he characterizes it, the
source of this obligation appears straightforward: Socrates has been
ordered to do philosophy by a god (23b, 29a3,30a, 37e-38a), and since
one ought to obey the command of a god at all costs (it would be
impious [and so unjust] to refuse), Socrates is obligated to philosophize
regardless of any bodily danger (28d; cf. Rep.368b-c).
Socrates also believes that he ought to urge others to philosophize
(29d-e, 30a-b, 38a; G.526e),2 and that theunexamined life is not worth
living, (38a5-6). Thus, it would appear (at least) that Socrates believes
that people other than himself are under some sort of an obligation to
philosophize. However, the existence of a Socratic duty to urge others
to do philosophy does not allow a direct inference to the claim that
Socrates believed that all others-like himself-have a duty to d o
philosophy.3 After all, in his concern for everyones welfare (31a), the
god may have ordered Socrates to go to great lengths to urge others to
philosophize precisely because others d o not actually have his sort of
duty-or inclination-to engage in it (see n. 1).
For their own good people might require the special prodding to
philosophize (in a limited and prudential fashion) which Socrates
provides in obedience to the god: just as a parent might have a
paternalistic duty of assistance to urge his children to d o x, where they
themselves d o not possess the same duty to d o x possessed by the
parent.4 Hence, the ascription to Socrates of a belief in a general
obligation to philosophize is in need ofjustification. It is also in need of
clarification. We need to ask, for instance, about the nature, extent, and
limits of such an obligation. Does the obligation to d o philosophy
require, for example, that a half-wit give up his menial occupation-

Mark McPherran is an assistantprofessor ofphilosophy at the University of Maine at

Farmington. He has published papers on Socrates and Plat0 in Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, Phronesis, Journal of the History of Philosophy, andelsewhere, and has a
paper forthcoming in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie.

54 1

adopting the poverty of a Socrates-in order to employ the elenchus in

a n ineffective and/ or counter-productive fashion? Or perhaps the sort
of philosophizing Socrates urges on others differs in kind from the
elenctically-based sort Socrates himself practices: a less intellectually
demanding type of rational reflection perhaps.5
This paper is a n attempt t o respond t o these needs and questions by
first providing a n interpretation that connects Socrates particular godordered mission to d o philosophy with the more general demands of
piety as Socrates conceived them. On that basis I then argue for a n
account according t o which others besides Socrates possess a prima
facie duty t o d o philosophy founded on the obligation t o d o that which
is pious. In the second section I establish a second secular Socratic
imperative to philosophize. 1 contend that both imperatives are
qualified by a distinction concerning the sort of philosophizing one
might undertake, as well as by the individual talents and moral
deficiencies present in those who must philosophize.

I Piety and the Duty to Philosophize

Socrates connects his own obligation to pursue a life of philosophy
with the Delphic oracle. Chaerophon asked the oracle if anyone was
wiser than Socrates, and the response was no one is wiser (21a5-7).
Socrates thereupon set out to refute (elegxzn; 21cl) the apparent
meaning of the oracle, and so began his mission to the Athenians. None
the less, it would seem that Socrates had already for some time been
pursuing a life of philosophy, believing it to be something beneficial that
he ought to do, and so the command of the oracle is not what initiated
his philosophical career.6 Rather, I will contend, it initiated his
obligation to pursue it even at the cost of his life. Several scholars have
noticed the glaring problem here, however. How is it that Socrates
derived a command t o d o anything, let alone philosophy, from the
claim that no one is wiserthan he? Since the primary purpose of this
paper is the investigation of the source and scope of the duty for those
other than Socrates to pursue philosophy, I shall be brief in my answer
to this question. Let me simply propose the following account, a portion
of which has been argued for elsewhere, with the remainder resting on a
plausible interpretation of the text.
On my view, Socrates was firmly committed to a number of beliefs
concerning the nature of piety even prior to the pronouncement of the
oracle.8 In support of this, I have argued elsewhere that the following
claim can be ascribed t o Socrates:
P Piety is that part ofjustice which is a service (hyperetik2)of men to
the gods, assisting the gods in their work (ergon), a work which
produces some good result (on the analogy of a slaves assisting his
ma~ter).~

542

Given that Socrates believed P, we may then view the origin of

Socratesobligation to do philosophy in this way: the claim of the god
that no one is wiser than Socrates is initially a claim Socrates finds
mysterious and paradoxical, for he is not conscious of being wise
(Ap.2lb). None the less, the gods claim cannot be false (21b5-7). But
since anything a superior might say to an inferior under his command
could conceal a demand for some sort of service on the inferiors part,
and since (according to P) piety requires that we serve the gods,
Socrates conceives it to be part of his pious obligation-a religious
duty-to discover the meaning of the gods claim. Socrates then
proceeds to elicit the true meaning of the oracular assertion by the
constant elenctic interrogation of those whose claims to wisdom would
falsify the oracle: namely, that he is the wisest in comparison to such
Athenians by knowing that he is in truth worth nothing with respect to
wisdom(23a-b).10 But the message of the oracle, that the Athenians are
thus not only lacking in the knowledge ofvirtue but also inan awareness
of their lack, places in turn a new demand on Socrates, derived (again)
from P. Since it is probably at least an ergon of the gods to promote the
establishment of goodness in the world, and since one ought to be pious,
P demands that Socrates serve the gods by doing that which-in the
present situation-best promotes the development of goodness (i.e.,
proper humility, virtue, and happiness) in his fellow Athenians:
philosophy.II
In addition to the previous derivation of the Socratic duty to
philosophize, there is an additional argument made plain in the text:
Socrates claims that he continues to philosophize because he is being
used by the god as a paradigm to deliver the message that
that one of you ...is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant
that in truth he is worth nothing in respect of wisdom (23b).I*
Socrates argument at this point seems predicated on the view
expressed, again, by P, that Socrates is obligated to serve the gods. Here
the service seems two-fold: one service to the gods is to uphold the pious
view that they never utter falsehoods (21b5-7). Since the god has said of
Socrates something that would be falsified by anyones turning out to
have more wisdom than the minuscule portion Socrates possesses,
whenever anyone claims to know something, it is then Socratesduty to
undermine their claim elenctically. Secondly, since it is the gods wish to
use Socrates as the paradigmatic vehicle for the delivery of his message
by claiming that Socrates is the wisest of men, then it would seem that
part of Socrates pious service is to aid him in this task. However, the
message that we-like Socrates-are ignorant would be rejected by
those who believe they have knowledge, if that message were directly
asserted. Hence, the delivery must take the form of a demonstration;
specifically, through a refutation of the relevant knowledge claim.
Thus, when Socrates finds a person who claims to know, he come[s] to
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the gods aid (23b): that is, he serves the god in accord with the
demands of piety implicit in P by delivering the message of the god
concerning our ignorance per demonstrandum.
The preceding interpretation of the oracles claim as a demand to do
philosophy is given final confirmation for Socrates by gods commands given in oracles and dreams and in every other way that any
divine allotment has ever impressed a duty upon man(33c). Socrates
must then ceaselessly philosophize, since the claim of pious service upon
us is substantial: our aid to the gods, for instance, is more important
than what the many think of us (21e).
One might suppose after all this that Socrates sees the practice of
philosophy as a special, and not a general, obligation imposed in his
particular case by an order of the god. But although he does, as I shall
argue, see himself under orders which set him apart from the mass of
men by the extent of his duty, he clearly views philosophy as a task
everyone ought to undertake to some extent and in some form, for it
improves us and makes life worth living (29e-30b, 36c, 38a, 39cd,
41e42a). Thus, I am not inclined to think that Socrates understands
philosophy to satisfy the demands of piety only for himself.
Moreover, 1 think this for reasons other than those which are
commonly derived from the Euthyphros discussion of piety to show
that philosophy is a n obligation of piety. Such arguments usually
postulate as the sole ergon of the gods the attempt to instantiate
goodness in the world, then hypothesize that philosophy is the service
that helps to accomplish this task, and then conclude in uniformity to P
that piety is nothing other than the practice of philosophy.13 I d o think
Socrates would agree that one primary ergon of the gods (i.e., perfectly
moral gods) is to promote the establishment of goodness in the world
and that philosophy is thus pious by its aid to this work. None the less,
he would object to those arguments that presuppose it to be known that
the establishment of goodness in the world is the sole or primary ergon
of the gods.14 Thus, he would object to the claim that no nonphilosophical activities (e.g., sacrifices) can be pious, since such a claim
requires a clear understanding of the identity and scope of the gods
work. Again, Socrates would find it presumptuous to identify with
certainty the precise nature of the godsergon.15 T o d o so would be to
lay claim to a wisdom that is more than human(Ap.20e), whereas all
we can reasonably hope for in this life is human wisdom(Ap.20d).16
Given the above, then, it seems to me that Socrates may well have
held philosophical activity to be a n important form of pious activity for
reasons additional to those which involve an identification of the gods
ergon. One reason of this sort might be that since the gods (for Socrates)
are wholly good,l7 it is a compelling hypothesis that they desire our
happiness.* Since philosophical activity in both its constructive and
destructive modes19 aims at the production of this, and since our service
to the gods would seem to call for us to satisfy their desires,
philosophical practice is thus pious.
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Additionally, we may only have pious characters by possessing a

human understanding of piety; that is, a non-dogmatically held claim t o
a knowledge (or set of true beliefs) that we recognize to be fallible and
that we would be willing to submit to the elenctic challenge. This
understanding of piety involves the belief that P is true and
incompleteable in this mortal life, a tentative claim as to why that is so,
and elenctically-tested beliefs as to what actions ought to be adjudged
pious.20 Now given that we understand P to be incompleteable in this
mortal life, the practice that is necessary t o know this is itself pious on
derivative grounds. This practice is the elimination by means of
philosophy in its destructive mode (elenctic testing of oneself and
others) of the epistemological conceit most men have that they possess
(or might come to possess) the complete and certain knowledge of
divine things (i.e., the gods ergon) that would complete P. Effective
philosophical activity substitutes for that conceit the recognition that
a n incomplete and uncertain understanding is the best we can humanly
hope for (Ch.166b-e).
Philosophical practice in its constructive mode is in turn the
justification by elenctic means of those beliefs constitutive of human
wisdom.2 This activity is pious because it is productive of the happiness
that the gods desire for us. Because it is presumably a matter of concern
t o the gods that we possess such happiness, the constructive aspect of
pious philosophical practice requires that we only affirm with
confidence those moral and religious beliefs that have been rigorously
tested by means of the elenchus. These beliefs should in turn be held
with a humility and caution that is conditioned by a willingness to their
being re-tested by elenctic procedures.22 This is so, since as the Socratic
practice of the destructive mode of the elenchus has repeatedly
demonstrated (Ap.21b-23b), men are constantly in danger of confidently believing that they possess certain knowledge of both human
and divine matters, and that they are thus in no need of improvement.
Euthyphro is a prime case of this sort of blind arrogance. Such
arrogance is impious because it represents and reinforces a lack of
knowledge of piety (including, e.g., knowledge that P i s incompleteable
by mortals) that consequently impedes men from serving the likely
desire of the gods that we improve our souls.

I1 The Extent of the Duty t o Philosophize

In the preceding arguments I have sought t o establish that as Socrates
conceived of it, philosophical activity is a pious obligation for
humanity, as well as for himself, insofar as it is a service that aids the
gods in at least some portion of their work. In addition t o those religious
considerations, the following argument (A) for a secular obligation to
d o philosophy can be constructed from explicitly Socratic principles:
545

A ( I ) Anyone ought to d o what is right and never what is wrong(e.g.,

Ap.29b; Cr.49b).
(2) To d o right consistently requires knowledge (or elencticallytested beliefs) concerning what is right ( A ~ . 2 9 d - 3 0 a ) . ~ J
(3) Knowledge (or elenctically-tested beliefs) concerning what is
right is obtainable primarily by means of the practice of
philosophy (Ap.29d-30b; Cr.46c-48d; Ch. 157a-b; G.457~458b, 506c ff., 527b-e).24

(4) Therefore, anyone (prima facie) ought to practice philosophy.

This argument has logical force.25 There is also ample evidence that
Socrates believed its conclusion as well its premises, and found
that conclusion to be additionally warranted by secularconsiderations
connected with our general well-being. For instance, Socrates claims
that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being,
(Ap.38a5-6; my italics). The italicized phrase here stresses the fact that
human beings can profit from engaging in moral inquiry in some way or
other, if only by coming to see how deficient they are in respect of true
wisdom.26 Apology 39d in turn asserts that those many Athenians
deserving moral criticism will not escape such examination by putting
Socrates to death:
this way of escape is neither possible nor creditable The best a n d easiest way is not to
stop the mouths of others, but to make yourselves as good men as you can.

Again, at both 29e-30b and 36c we are told that Socrates urges everyone
t o care above all for the well-being of their souls. Given the implication
here that one ought t o escape being a justifiable target for moral
criticism by making ones soul as good as possible, we are allowed t o
infer that the moral improvement philosophical activity makes possible
renders that activity an obligation for all of us, who are morally
imperfect. Again, in the Gorgius we find that Socrates exhorts all other
human beings t o perfect their souls by pursuing the truth by means of
philosophy (507d-e, 526d-e, 527b-c), and that if anyone proves evil in
any way, he should be chastised (527b): presumably by means of
Socratic interrogation (at least), and by others besides Socrates who are
qualified to d o so, should there prove to be any.*
This last qualification raises a n important question: thus far I have
been operating on the unargued assumption that the philosophizing
Socrates is urging on his fellow Athenians is t o be conducted after the
Socratic model; i.e., through the relatively autonomous use of the
elenchus. Is there anyjustification for this assumption, or does Socrates
believe that our philosophical practice-as distinct from his-should
consist primarily in submitting ourselves to Socrates (the sole master of
the elenchus) for belief-testing, a testing requiring only the exercise of a
546

less intellectually demanding sort of rational reflection on our parts

(see n. 5)? I think there is both conceptual and textual evidence against
this latter possibility and in favor of my own presupposition, although
there is not as much-nor is it as explicit-as 1 would like:
1. There is no clear textual evidence in favor of attributing a clear
distinction between elenchus-wielding and rational reflection to
Socrates. Moreover, it seems that much serious rational reflection often
involves a n elenctic style of inference and the sort of one-step elenchoi
produced by the use of counter-examples.
2. Socrates may be a genius of the first order, but he would be foolishly
arrogant to think that he alone possesses the necessary intellectual
requirements for utilizing elenctic procedures with at least some
measure of success; e.g., some noted Sophists could successfully employ
it. It would also be very odd indeed for someone with Platos dialectical
skills to credit his teacher-in the very act of reconstructing that
teachers many elenchoi-with the belief that no one else possesses the
intelligence demanded for producing successful elenctic encounters.

In reply to these first points, it might be said that intellecfual skill-in

our contemporary sense of, say, a n ability in logic-is not what Socrates
would appeal to in order t o justify a limitation on our use of the
elenchus. Rather, it might be our comparative moral inferiority that
would lead him t o exclude us from the use of the elenchus, which, as
Socratesown life illustrates, is a tool fraught with danger even for the
wisest of Athenians. However plausible this line of thought might be,
though, I d o not think it is a Socratic line, as the following textual
considerations will now show.
3. At Gorgias 487e-488a (passim) Socrates says that we should all
inquire how to live. So here and elsewhere 1 should think that Socrates
would be guilty of misleading us if he firmly believes-but does not
make clear to us (as he does not)-that we are not supposed to attempt
the inquiry he urges on us in the same manner in which he inquires.
4. At Corgias 458a Socrates certainly imagines himself being elenctically examined by another.
5. At Apology 23c-d Socrates clearly states that the young who follow
him imitate him by exarnining(elenctica1ly;exetadzein) others, and the
implication is that they succeed in some measure to refute elenctically
(cf. Rep.539 which suggests that Socrates pupils did manage to refute
others).
6. As Vlastos has claimed, in search nor phi1osophizeat Apology 29c
the nor is epexegetic, and at 41b to philosophize is to examine (and
examine is a common reference to the elenchus).28 Thus, since we
should all be contentiously eager to know the things the aforementioned
search promises (G.505e), it seems to follow that we must all try to
philosophize and so all try to wield the elenchus.
547

7 . At Apology 31b2-5, Socrates claims that I always d o your business

[i.e.. what you should be doing] ...persuading youroften by means of the
elenchus] to care for virtue, (my italics and brackets).
8. At Apology 38a we find Socrates contrasting his god-ordered
obligation to philosophize with another consideration in favor of a
general obligation to philosophize:
For if I say that this [to cease to philosophize in Athens] is to disobey the god and that
because of this i t is impossible to keep quiet, you will not be persuaded by me, oil the
ground that I a m being ironic. And on the other hand, ...this even happens to be a very
great goodfora human being[i.e., for lots of people]-to make speeches every day about
virtue and all the other things about which you hear me conversing and examining both
myself and others (my italics and brackets).

In other words, doing what Socrates does-exhorting and elenctically

examining himself and others (making speeches)-is a very great good
(i.e., it should be preferred to many other sorts of activities) for a great
number of people. Since we all ought to pursue the good, we all ought t o
examine ourselves and others elenctically.
9. At Apology 39d it is forcast that people other than Socrates will soon
refute his prosecutors (i.e., elenctically examine; elegchonres).
10. At Eurhydernus 282a Socrates declares that every man shall in
every way [i.e., including the use of the elenchus] try to become a s wise
as possible, insofar as he desires happiness (my italics and brackets).
1 1. At Charmides 166c-d (passim) Socrates claims that by wielding the
elenchus he tests his own beliefs; thus, when he enjoins us to test ours, it
is natural t o suppose that he is recommending that we perform a similar
testing (of ourselves and others).
12. Socrates even advises the jurors who voted to condemn him to
trouble his own sons in the very same same way I pained you I[i.e.,
elenctically],(4 le; my italics and brackets) should they prove uncaring
of virtue, and that such a troublingwould be just treatment (42a1).*9
Given all this, it looks as though Socrates believes that everyone
ought to examine both themselves and others, and that they ought to d o
so in the way in which Socrates examines; that is, everyone ought t o
philosophize in the elenctic fashion, both through interior dialogue and
through the examination of others.
So Socrates was committed to a general obligation t o engage in
elenctic philosophical investigation on both pious and secular grounds.
But to what extent did he think that he and others ought to practice
philosophy: what goods, in other words, ought to be sacrificed in
preference t o philosophical activity? Should one, for instance, pursue
philosophy at great personal sacrifice even if one is a n inept
philosopher? If one does not pursue philosophy, does that render one
impious by virtue of a violation of principle P? What if one is already
willing to concede the principles that the elenchus leads to: is such a one
still obligated t o d o philosophy? Finally, if one has received n o oracular
548

command to d o philosophy, is ones duty t o pursue it of the same

extent as Socrates reputed duty?
Surely Socrates would not advise literally every human being (and so,
e.g., children and idiots) and regardless of probable outcomes to engage
in philosophy in what I will term the active mode: the manner of
philosophizing that Socrates most commonly exemplifies, where one
submits others to elenctic interrogation (this, in contrast to the passive
mode, where one engages in philosophy by serving as the interlocutor to
a n elenchus-wielder).30 More than anything else Socrates desires t o
promote virtuous action and happiness,31 and if philosophizingnormally the means to those ends-were to undermine this somehow,
then the obligation t o engage in it would be to that degree vitiated.
Socrates, for instance, does not advise everyone t o despise financial
gain or to ignore it completely in favor of elenctic dispute. Rather, he
only advises people not to think more of financial gain than of wellbeing (Ap.36c, 29e-30a) and the knowledge that is needed for the
virtuous use of such material goods (Ap.30b; Eud.282a). Socrates may
hold that the wisdom secured by philosophy ensures our happiness
(Eud.28 le-282d), but this does not entail that philosophical practice
guarantees the acquisition of wisdom or that certain external goods are
not necessary for the happiness of a t least some sorts of people. In the
Crito (47d-e) and the Gorgias (505a), for example, Socrates argues in
such a way as to suggest that the possession of a healthy body is a
necessary condition for anyones leading a truly satisfactory life.32
Hence, at the point that ones philosophical practice seriously
threatened the loss of such a good without promising a net gain in good
for oneself and others, one could justly neglect philosophy.
Next, Socrates insists (Ap.33a, 36c) that his own philosophical
activity is to be construed as being in some sense a privatemission, and
that if some of Socrates students imitate him by elenctically examining
others, they d o so of their own volition (automatoi; A p . 2 3 ~ 3 - 5 )1. take
~~
this to mean that when Socrates admonishes others to d o philosophy
(Ap.29d, 30a-b, 38a) he is not thereby setting himself as a standard for
us whereby if we fail to pursue philosophy in the active mode regardless
of other normally prudential factors (e.g., bodily danger) we are
morally culpable.34Given this and the above, then, I want tentatively a t
least to credit Socrates with a n instrumentalist qualification of both our
pious and secular obligations to d o philosophy; that is:

IP Philosophy ought t o be practiced t o the extent to which that

practice may be supposed to result in moral improvement for
everyone concerned.
This attribution is additionally warranted by the fact that both the
pious and secular obligations established by P and A for engaging in
elenctic activity were themselves established by appeals to instrumentalist considerations. What renders philosophical activity pious is
549

its performance with the intent to serve the gods by furthering mans
well-being.35 and what renders philosophical practice a n obligatory
practice without reference to the gods is that it-once again-aims a t
that same end.
In the Apology (3 lc-32a. 36b-c) we find that Socrates himself limits
the scope of his philosophical activity for consequentialistic reasons.
There he justifies his failure to engage in public political activity-an
activity that in his case would involve philosophical practice, and in a n
area that might reasonably be supposed to be ideal for his god-ordered
work-on thegrounds that doing so would leave him prematurely dead,
and so unable to accomplish the good that he might otherwise
accomplish in a private practice. As he says a t 36c, he did not enter into
matters where he stood to be of n o benefir to anyone, either himself o r
others. Indeed, it would seem that to engage in the elenchus without due
regard for whether or not the consequences would be benefical would be
to act intemperantly, but intemperance is not a good (Ch.175e). Thus,
the examination philosophy provides is not to be conducted without a n
eye t o consequences; rather, since such examination is worthwhile only
insofar as it is productive of correct moral beliefs and happiness (or a t
least useful perplexity),36 one ought to philosophize (or not) only when
doing so maximizes these outcomes.
The Theaetetus, finally, contains what may be plausibly thought to be
the record of a genuine Socratic practice that supports the view that
Socrates did not understand the obligation to philosophize t o be a
perfect (unqualifiable) duty. In the course of comparing himself to a
midwife ( 148e-15 Id), Socrates observes that a number of students have
left him sooner than they should have, and that t o some of thosepresumably because of their intemperant nature and lack of understanding-he
has refused further philosophical intercourse with
himself (on the advice of the divine voice; 150d-151a). Here it looks as
though such students ought not to philosophize, even with the
assistance of the paradigm practioner of philosophy, because it has been
estimated that there will be n o profit in it for anyone (cf. 15lb).
Again, those whose minds are (in contrast to the previous pupils)
unable to have even a few conceptions of their own have n o need of
Socrates, and so he finds them intellectual partners who will better
profit them ( 1 5 1 b). But here, one of the alternative partners Socrates
has in mind-Prodicus-will
surely not engage the pupil in Socratic
elenchus and self-discovery. Rather, the implication a t this point seems
t o be that, as Miles Burnyeat has so aptly put it, an empty mind which
has n o conceptions of its own (cf. 148e) is fitted only to be sown with
anothers seed.37 But this is non-philosophical instruction of the sort
that Socrates explicitly disavows, and which is to be distinguished from
philosophical examination. For instance, a t Apology 19d-20a, Socrates
denies that he provided the sort of education men such as Prodicus
offer, and that he has been no ones teacher (Ap.33a-c; i.e., he has

550

practiced elenctic philosophy with them, but he has not provided set
doctrines). Thus, this makes it appear as though Socrates believed that
some individuals are better off if they d o not philosophize, and are
thus-by virtue of the consequences-excused from the duty to d o so.
The attribution of this consequentialistic principle (1P) to the
historical Socrates also has corroboration independent of the Platonic
corpus. In Xenophons Memorabilia, for instance, Socrates praises men
who possess enough self-knowledge to know that
by refraining from attempting what they d o not understand they make no mistake and
avoid failure (4.2.25-26).*

This would seem to apply equally to all activities, even t o engaging

actively in the elenctic search after self-knowledge. Again. Memorabilia
4.7.1 ff. claims that Socrates took pains to make his students
independent in doing the work that they werefitted for, (my italics)
and urged prudence in intellectual work; e.g., he limited the study of
mathematics to what was useful (4.7.8).
Given all the above, I think we can confidently ascribe t o Socrates the
principle (IP) that although philosophical activity is, in the main, an
obligation of piety and moral development, since such obligations are
warranted by a system of ends, the obligation t o philosophize may be
instrumentally overridden. This principle, then, in conjunction with my
previous observations concerning the nature of Socratic piety and its
connection with philosophy, allows us to derive the following account
of the differing obligations to d o philosophy. These obligations will be
borne by differing sorts of individuals on the basis of their moral need
and philosophical talents, as those factors bear on their potential for
producing eudaimoniu through philosophical activity. Unfortunately,
my account must remain somewhat speculative in its details because of
the lack of corroborating text and a clear Socratic specification of the
nature of eudaimonia.
1. Most individuals (of the age of reason), ranging from those
possessing very limited intellectual gifts t o those who are masters of
elenctic dispute-and
regardless of moral development-will be
obligated to pursue philosophy in the passive mode by serving as
interlocutors in elenctic discussion whenever (within reason) so engaged
by a n effective wielder of the elenchus. Indeed, it would seem obligatory
t o seek out an expert craftsman in moral training-or at least a n
effective elenchus-wielder (e.g., Socrates)-if one stands t o gain in
well-being from such a n encounter (Cr.47c-48a; La.184e-l85e, 201ab).39 Since Socrates is the wisestof the Athenians, and is yet ignorant of
what virtue is (Ap.22c-d), this will mean that virtually all men are
obligated to seek elenctic treatment (and take any resulting refutations
to heart). Moreover, the experience of being so refuted by the elenchus
is even of greater benefit t o oneself than actively refuting another
(G.458a).
55 1

The elenchus-wielder himself must, in addition, be honest in the sense

that his intention must be to establish truth, belief-consistency, or moral
improvement: there is n o obligation t o undergo the elenctic examination of a n ill-intentioned Sophist unless (oddly enough) there
promises to be a net gain in virtue for all. Given IP, exceptions to the
obligation to undergo elenctic examination will exist for those who are
unable to profit from such examination because they lack sufficient
intellectual powers (e.g., the power to recognize contradictions), a n d
especially for those who, in addition to this, modestly admit their own
lack of moral knowledge and none the less both concede Socratic
principles of virtue and consistently act (fortuitously) in accord with
those prin~iples.~O
Socrates does not himself, for instance, relentlessly
impose the elenchus on those who d o not make illegitimate inferences
from particular knowledge claims to general knowledge claims
concerning the moral virtues (the 'greatest things'; 4 . 2 2 ~ - e ) Elenctic
.
examination is generally reserved by Socrates (in his own case) for those
who implicitly contradict the oracle by asserting confident knowledge
claims (e.g., the craftsmen of Ap.22c-d), which, if true, would be
constitutive of wisdom. Since he does not seem to demand of himself
that he impose the elenchus on others of the above sort, then he would
not seem to demand of us that we d o so (cf. Mern.4.2.25 ff.),4J or that
such subjects themselves must undergo it.
Individuals of the above sort may a t least satisfy the demands of piety
connected t o P by performing self-effacing acts of piety such as those
which constitute correct sacrifice.4* Aside from such rare exceptions,
submilring t o effective elenchus-engaging in philosophy in the passive
mode-is pious in accord with P and is a n obligation for virtually
everyone because doing so will lead to moral improvement in those who
require it (virtually everyone). As for those rare individuals who d o not
require improvement o r who a t least concede Socratic principles of
virtue and their own ignorance-should there even be any-doing
philosophy passively serves as a check on the development of
unjustifiable confidence in one's epistemic state and on the reliability of
previously accepted beliefs.
On the other hand, those who lack a n epistemic humility proportionate to the actual state of their knowledge (e.g., Euthyphro), a n d
who stand in the greatest need of moral development, would be those
most obligated to serve as interlocutors to effective elenchus-wielders.
After all, if all evil is the result of ignorance, the greater one's ignorance
the more likely it is that one will be (and do) e ~ i 1 . ~ 3
As for third parties to a n elenctic discussion, it would seem as though
they are free to listen in o r not, depending solely on interest (Ap.33a).
The actual practice of philosophy (active o r passive) involves for
Socrates a degree of intellectual engagement that does not seem
ordinarily possible for third parties: they are not, for instance, required
to state honestly what they believe.44 None the less, it seems clear that
552

Socrates believes that everyone ought to be interested in the subject he

examines people on-moral improvement-and our texts show some
support for the view that bystanders to a n elenctic discussion are
obligated to listen in, since they will be helped merely by paying
attention to such discussions. For instance, Socrates claims that you
burors] will even be helped by listening [to Socrates apologia],
(Ap.30~4;my brackets), and in the Gorgias he is willing t o give a speech
on virtue rather than abandon the audience (505e-509e).45
2. The obligation to engage actively in elenchus-wielding would seem
to be in direct proportion to the likelihood of moral development for
interlocutor, audience, and elenchus-wielder, which must in turn be
calculated on the basis of a number of interrelated factors, primarily: (a)
the intellectual ability of the elenchus-wielder in question to employ the
elenchus effectively (i.e., demonstrate the inconsistency of inconsistent
moral beliefs and the logical failure of false knowledge claims), and (b)
the moral status of the elenchus-wielder. This first factor (a) is relevant
since false moral beliefs will only be encouraged in everyone by failures
of the elenchus t o reveal the falsity of such beliefs ( P h .1 15e; G.458a). T o
instill false beliefs is t o harm others, and this must never be done
(Cr.47e-48a, 49b-c). Hence, a person who is unable t o wield the elenchus
effectively is excused, say, from attempting the public examination of a
clever Sophist advocating immorality; indeed, he or she positively
ought to avoid doing so. However, when the danger is less grave, it
would seem permissible-though not obligatory-for those less skilled
in the elenchus to employ it.4h O n the other hand, one skilled in the
elenchus ought t o examine himself and others as much as is consistent
with an overall increase in moral virtue, even if death is a risk (Ap.28b).
Because of the stiff intellectual requirements involved in the successful
employment of the elenchus and the standard distribution of such skills
across human communities, those obliged t o wield it will be of fewer
numbers, it would seem, than those obligated to suffer it.4
Another important factor bearing on our obligation to philosophize
actively is (b) the moral status of the elenchus-wielder. A Sophist of the
immoralist variety, for instance, ought not to wield the elenchus in a n
attempt to convince others of what is patently an immoralist thesis (e.g.,
that it is morally acceptable t o d o what is unjust), for this poses the real
danger of moral harm to others. In a case like this, in fact, Socrates
would probably deny that such a n attempt would be a n instance of
philosophical practice as he understands it, since this would not be a
search for either truth or moral virtue. On the other hand, a virtuous
man with elenctic skill ought t o examine himself and others in
preference t o all other (external) goods.
Two objections founded on passages from the Republic might to
adduced here against my view that not everyone is required t o
philosophize actively:

553

a. At 368b-c Socrates suggests that he-and seemingly anyone else-must undertake to defend justice so long as one has breath and can
utter his voice, and that to fail to d o so would be to act impiously.
b. At 335e Socrates invites Polemarchus to take up arms as his partner
in a battle against the view that wise men might say what is false (e.g.,
that the just man harms his enemies), even though Polemarchus is
clearly not his intellectual ~ e e r . ~ g
In respect of (a), I want immediately to agree that Socrates is
asserting what he takes to be a general obligation of piety: to rationally
defend justice so long a s one has breath ...whenjustice is reviled ....The
best thing ...is t o a i d her as best 1 [and anyone else] can,(my italicsand
brackets). Here I would also claim in agreement that many of us-and
not just Socrates-must d o o u r philosophical best when the virtues and
various moral truths are actively attacked, and that against such a n
attack every man must come to the defense in some fashion. However,
that need not mean that we must every one of us actively seek out those
who are attacking justice in order to engage them in elenctic comhat:
against immoral Sophists who possess great eristic skill, for instance, we
may need to call out for our intellectual Heracles (cf. Ph.89b-c) (or
simply shun them a n d / or greet them with laughter and abuse). So we
are obligated to defend justice as best we can, and for some of us, the
best thing is to be quiet, allow the experts to get on with their work
without our interference, and d o that work of our own which will best
aid the cause of justice.
Although in (b) it is true that Polemarchus is taken on as a partner
and that he is no great philosophical talent, it clearly does not follow
from that that everyone must always actively philosophize. My view
also does not demand that philosophical talents less distinguished than
Socrates must always and only philosophize passively. After all, if
Polemarchus actively philosophizes in this situation, he has Socrates on
hand should some dangerously false view remain resistant to his
amateur elenchus. Again, on my thesis, everyone is obligated t o pursue
philosophy, but it must be remembered that this obligation is qualified
by considerations having t o d o with what it is that justifies doing
philosophy in the first place: the progress of human happiness and
virtue. For many people-but not for Socrates, his peers, a n d his true
pupils-this
will place significant limits on their obligation to
philosophize: not so many, however, as completely t o absolve the sort
of people that flee from Socratic examination from the moral
condemnation of having failed in their duty.
In light of the preceding discussion, I want now to reconsider the case
of Socrates. On my account of philosophical obligation, any individual
possessed of inordinate intellectual abilities and moral integrity will be
inordinately obligated t o philosophize actively; and were he t o in fact
realize the degree of moral deficiency alleged t o be present in the
Athenianpolis-as Socrates has been made t o realize by the oracle--he
554

would be morally negligent not to practice the elenchus assiduously,

stationing himselfto his task (Ap.28d) even at the risk of death. Such
a n individual would pursue philosophy for prudential reasons of selfimprovement and t o ensure right action (A), but also because piety (P)
demands it, since it is a likely desire of the gods that aN men should
possess eudairnonia.49 This obligation, then, is independent of the
method of discovery of a present moral lack in oneself and others: it
may be by oracle, or by insight, o r by refutation.
On this account, Socrates must be seen as someone with a n
inordinate degree of self-confidence and relative certainty concerning
his own intellectual talents and moral worth. For given Socrates
endorsement of IP, his interpretation of the oracles pronouncement as
a command t o d o philosophy ceaselessly and regardless of material and
bodily consequences must result from a judgment that he, Socrates, is
uniquely qualified as the person who best stands to net the greatest gain
in good for himself and others currently residing in Athe11s.5~In fact,
and in confirmation of my thesis that the duty to d o philosophy is
consequentially varient, this is just how Socrates is portrayed (Ap.30~32a, 36b-e). He is said t o be a rare gift of the gods (Ap.30a, 30d-e), a
great benefactor of the city (Ap.36d); Socrates alone, of all the
Athenians, practices true statesmanship (G.521d).
Furthermore, Socrates portrays his own obligation to pursue
philosophy actively as being of far greater extent than that which is
borne by others: he has neglected his affairs, both public and private,
and his family (Ap.23b, 31b), he has done it without the rewards of
enjoyment, money (Ap.23c, 31b-c), and leisure (Ap.23b), and it has
been a seemingly inhuman and unreasonable (Ap.3 1b 1-2,3 I b7) vocation
in just that way: a n obligation over and above the obligations of others
that would be wrong t o ignore or moderate (Ap.29d, 37e). He alone,
finally, seems to be the one Athenian with the task t o urge others to
philosophize, and to d o so even at the risk of death. Whether or not we
agree with the self-assessment on which he based this account of the
extent of his own duty-and his ultimately optimistic judgment about
the philosophical potential of his fellow men-it proves difficult not to
wish that he was right.5
NOTES

On my view, Socrates is a theist whose theism is integral to his philosophical

presuppositions. Evidence for this thesis-and for the presupposition here that Socrates
believes that all impious acts are unjust-is provided in my paper Socratic Piety in the
Eufhyphro,(hereafter,Socratic Piety), Journalofhe History ofphilosophy 3 ( 1985):
283-309. Socratesgods are our intellectual and moral superiors, and it is wrong not to
obey the commands of such superiors (see, e.g., Ap.29b6-7; Ch.176b-c; Lo.184e8-9).
Throughout this paper I use the terms duty and obligation, but in a relatively
non-technical fashion, since there is no trace of Kantian duties in the thought of Socrates.
So I want to make clear that when 1 attribute to Socrates the belief in a general dutyor
obligation to do philosophy. 1 mean only to claim that Socrates believed that most

555

people of the age of reason ought to--prima facie-do philosophy, that doing philosophy
will benefit them and ought generally to be preferred over all other activities, and that
philosophizing is virtuous; but that on certain occasions one ought to refrain from
philosophizing. Here. then. one might speak of different sorts of duties to philosophize.
where the difference between any two sorts would lie in the degree to which one ought to
prefer other activities to the practice of philosophy.
2 Here the justification could be equally straightforward: one ought to obey the
commands of a god at all costs. and so because Socrates has beencommanded b y a god to
urge others to philosophize (Ap.33c), Socrates ought to urge others to philosophize.
That is. it is not at all obvious in the Apology that the god has commanded
everyone-or even most people-to philosophize.
In fact, 4 . 3 I b uses just this sort of analogy: Socratesgoes to individualsas a father or
older brother might, persuading them to care for virtue (1.e.. to care for the improvement
of their souls, and thus to d o philosophy).
1 am grateful to Gregory Vlastos for bringing this possibility to my attention.
6 See Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, The Origin of Socrates Mission,
Journal of fhe History of Ideas 4 (1983): 657-666 (hereafter Socrates Mission), and
Richard Kraut, Socrates a n d rhe State (Princeton. 1984): 271, 11.43.
For a history of the varied interpretations of this problem, see Brickhouse and Smith,
Socrates Mission, pp.657-8, nn. 1-4.
8 The following derivation of Socrates obligation to philosophize from the oracular
pronouncement is--for the most part-an elaboration of the derivation proposed by
Brickhouse and Smith in Socrates Missionp.664. In brief, they argue that Socrates has
a sense of obligation to the god which derives from antecedently held beliefs about the
requirements of piety which are not based on a direct command of the oracle:

There is good reason to suppose that Socrates is presented as believing, even beiore
ChaerophonS startling news. that piety requires one to serve the gods by promoting what
is good. But his astonishment at the oracle and his subsequent understanding of its real
meaning show that he had not fully realized the full extent to which his fellow Athenians
pursued and possessed only apparent goods. The gods message, therefore, is that the
Athenians lack the supreme benefit, virtue, a deficiency of which they are arrogantly
ignorant. As the gods servant, Socrates must free them from the pretense of real wisdom
that is the cause of their deficiency and urge them to acquire virtue. This, he says, he has
done, for he has tirelesslycarried out his pious duty toconvey the gods message toall who
will listen.
Socratic Piety, pp.283-292. Because, as 1 will argue. Socrates firm conviction that
he ought to d o philosophy (Ap.29b) is founded on this principle, I would contend that
Socrates would claim to know P (although it would be a fallibleclaim to knowledge:
Vlastosknow1edge; e; see n.14). For evidence of a Socratic commitment to the masterslave/ superior-inferior metaphor. see. e.g., Ph.62d-63d; Ion 53e: Parm.l34d-e; .4lc.
Major 122a; and Xenophons Memorabilia 1.4.9-12.
10 See Kraut. op. cit., p.271.
1 1 Philosophical practice in this sense includes persuading people(often by means of the
elenchus) to care for truth. virtue, and the perfection of their souls (Ap.29e. 3Oa, 3 Ib), to
care less for material things than for virtue (Ap.29e-30b). and to free them by means of the
elenchus from the pretense of wisdom (Ap.23b. 23e, 28a, 38a). See also, e.g., Ch.l57a,
166a. Here I subscribe to the view that the elenchus is Socratesonly method for searching
for moral truth; see Gregory Vlastos, Socrates Disavowal of Knowledge, The
Philosophical Quarterly I38 ( 1985): p. 18; and The Socratic Elenchus, Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy I (1983): n.47; Kraut, op. cit., p.27 I , 11.43. In opposition to this, see T.
Irwin, Platos Moral Tbeory(Oxford, 1977). pp.37.39. Although divine dispensation may
yield moral beliefs that will withstand the test of the elenchus ( M e n o 99b5-d5), divine
inspiration is not a methodical source of reliable moral belief o r knowledge; seeSocratic

556

Piety, p.3034; Kraut, op. cir., pp.291-3; and Brickhouse and Smith, The Paradox of
Socratic Ignorance in Platos Apology, History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1984):
125-131; and The Divine Sign Did Not Oppose Me: A Problem in Platos Apology,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1986):511-526.
Note that I have said that philosophy-as-elenctic-examinationis the best method forthe
attainment of virtue and happinessin the present situation; i.e., the present state of moral
ignorance in Athens. I have thus left open the possibility that another form of
philosophizing might replace the use of the elenchus should its propaedeutic function
result in a general advance toward the knowledge of virtue.
12 T. and G. Wests translation, Four Texison Socrares(Cornell, 1984), hereand below.
13 E.g., W.A. Heidel, On Platos Eurhyphro, TAPA 3 I (1900): 174, who discovers a
definition of piety in the Euthyphro according to which it isthe intelligent and conscious
endeavor to further the realization of the Good in human society, as under God,(i.e., it is
philosophy).
14 Here and below 1 am relying on Vlastosdistinction between knowledge claims which
are recognized to be fallible but which are none the less to be relied upon for having
survived elenctic testing (knowledge/e), as opposed to claims to certain knowledge
(knowledge/c), Socrates Disavowal of Knowledge, pp. 17-19, See also Irwin, op. cir.
p.40, Socratic Piety, pp.15-21; and Brickhouse and Smith, The Paradox of Socratic
Ignorance in Platos Apology.
15 Socratic Piety, pp.298-309. As Nicholas Smith has pointed out to me in
correspondence, there is another objection to the claim that piety in nothing other than
the practice of philosophy: if there is unity of the virtues, it would then turn out that each
of the virtues is nothing other than philosophy as well, which is plainly false. Although
philosophy always makes some contribution to every virtue, surely courage on the
battlefield and moderation in dining are notjust philosophy.
I h Socratic Piety, pp.297-298.
See, e.g., Ap.21b; Phd.62d-63c; Eu.6a-d, 13c-d.
I n For the sake of brevity I must bypass the many interesting discussions of Socratic
eudaimonism and simply assume that for Socrates a thing is good only insofar as it is
conducive to happiness; hence, that only happiness is intrinsically good. How we are to
define happiness ( i t . , whether or not Socrates equated it with pleasure) I leave open, but
assume that we are not to define it in terms of virtue or virtuous activity; thus, virtue will
be an instrumental good only because it contributes to what is intrinsically good:
happiness.
1 9 Here 1 am presupposing there are such modes: the destructive mode of philosophical
activity is the elenctic revelation of belief-inconsistency, and thus, lack of knowledge
(Ap.2 lc3-22ax29e3-30a2). More controversially, the positive mode is the revelation that
some belief may be relied upon since it has withstood the test of the elenchus ( Cr.48b3-e2;
G.508e6-509a4). See Irwin, op. cit. pp.6,3740,and Vlastos,The Socratic Elenchus,and
Socrates Disavowal of Knowledge.
2o Socratic Piety, p.307. Cf. Kraut, op. cit., pp.291-309. I agree with Kraut that
Socrates presupposes the existence of natural limits-especially as regards piety-that
prevent human beings from havingany realistic hopes of attaining full moral development
and certain knowledge (divine wisdom) in this life.
2 1 E.g., that it is better to suffer wrong than to do it. See n.19.
22 Socrates even subjects the pronouncement of the oracle that no one is wiser than he to
the test of the elenchus. See Vlastos, Socrates Disavowal of Knowledge, p.20.
23 See also Irwin, op. cit., pp.90-94.
2 4 Ibid. Here I say primarily because of Socrates reliance on non-rational sources of
truth; e.g., Ap.33~4-7.
25. Especially if we supply the premise that we ought to d o those things that provide the
necessary conditions for our doing what is right, and the provision that such things may be
done only if their performance is consistent with the principles of virtue.
26 And so here we see a prudential reason for doing philosophy independent of its
desirable results in action. I am in agreement with Irwin, op. cir., p.91, that Socrates values

557

philosophy solely for its results (pace Kraut. up. rig., p.271. n.43). The elenchus, for
Socrates. is a means to a good end (G.472~-d.500c; knowlodge and recognition of
ignorance), but nothingchosenforthe sake ofafinalgood isagood initself(L~~s.2l!,c-d.
220a - b ).
? Given Ap.30e, 3 l a , and G.521d. it seems unlikely that Socrates (or Plato) would
grant that there are any elenchus-wielders in Athens as qualified as Socrates, but that need
not completely absolve others from the duty to philosophize actively.
Sinceno one does wrong knowingly, (Pr.352b-c; Meno 78a). the chastisement spoken
of here should at least include philosophical interrogation (and perhaps other standard
forms of punishment as well), given what Socrates says at Ap.25e-26c.
2 X The Socratic Elenchus, pp.3 1-32.
29 In their reply to Vlastos, Vlastos on the Elenchus, Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 2 (1984): 185-195. T. Brickhousc and N . Smith have argued on the basis of
several of the passages I have cited above that though Socrates may be safelyassumed to
be its [the elenchus] greatest master, any adequate account of the elenchus must permit its
being sensibly commended to any of us inclined sincerely to employ it,(p.195).
3O I think this is true despite the fact that Socrates generally welcomes all comers to
elenctic discussion: anyone he meetsat any given time(Ap.29d). as well as young and old,
citizen or foreigner (Ap.30a). See Vlastos, The Socratic Elenchus, pp.34-35.
Although a t Apologj 23c there is no suggestion that the wealthy young men who
imitate Socrates should moderate their use of the elenchus. I would argue that this is
because Socrates foresees no real harm in the case of fheir activity. Plato seems to have
disagreed with Socrates over this assessment (see n.47). and many have found Socrates
defense against the charge that he is not responsible for the corruption of those who have
listened to him (Ap.23c-26b. 32a-34b) unpersuasive.
31 See Irwin, op. c i f . %p.91.
Jz Ibid., p.93. In a paper delivered to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. New
York, December, 1984, Socrates the Epicurean? Irwin has argued for an adaptive
account of Socratic wisdom. On this view, wisdom secures happiness irrespective of
prevailing external conditions. Given the passages I have cited which conflict with this
(noted by Irwin). I a m disinclined to accept his view. Rather. 1 am more persuaded by
Vlastos in his Happiness and Virtue in Socrates Moral Theory. Proceedings oJ f h e
Cambridge PhilologicalSociefy 2 10 ( 1984): 18 1-2 13, that for Socrates there are a class of
subordinate constituents of the good: n o n m o r al goods ....we shall be happier with than
without them, (p.201). I t is quite conceivable that for some individuals the continued
practice of philosophy might present the possibility of a loss of such goods with no
countervailing possibility of a gain in wisdom: here the greater happiness is secured by
refraining from philosophizing.
A much stronger argument for my view that goods necessary for our greater happiness
could be undermined by our philosophizing is provided by T. Brickhouse and N . Smith in
Socrates on Goods, Virtue. and Happiness. forthcoming in Oxford Studies In Ancienr
Philosophy. There they argue for a Socratic distinction between virtue, considered as a
condition of the soul, and virtuous activity. On that basis they then attempt to show that
Socrates believed in the necessity of the former for happiness, but the sufficiency of only
the latter. Accordingly. since a severly damaged body may prevent one from performing
the virtuous actions necessary for living well,a person may be harmed bodily to such a
degree that he is better off dead rather than alive (regardless of his philosophical
propensities and powers). Given this, I would argue, it is then easy to imagine situations in
which the threat of this sort of harm (without the promise of a countervailing production
of goodness elsewhere) will qualify a persons obligation to philosophize.
J 1 This term may well imply the unbidden doing of an act.
Socrates is supposed to serve as a paradigm of some sort (Ap.23aSb4). but not as a
standard of minimum philosophical obligation. Rather, Socrates servesas an example of
the relative value of human wisdom in comparison with the wisdom of the god.
34 It is true that Apology 38a isa blanket exhortation to philosophize. There it looks as
though Socrates is saying that everyone should spend at least a good part of their day

558

doing what he does in the agora. None the less, Socrates nowhere explicitly demands of
others the same selfless devotion to philosophy that he demands of himself, and even then,
he moderates his own mission with an eye to long-term consequences (Ap.31c-32a, 36b-c).
35. Socratic Piety, pp.304-9, esp. p.307.
36 Irwin, Plat0 S Moral Theory, p.9 I . See also G. Anastaplo, Human Being a n d Citizen
(Chicago, 1975). pp. 18-20. whoargues that the Socraticexamination of oneSlife requires
the examination of the lives of others, since all men share in the one life of the community:
an understanding of ones life requires a n understanding of its setting. Examining others
also seems a prerequisite of examining oneself because of its therapeutic efficacy against
the natural tendency toward self-deception.
3 M. Burnyeat, Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration, BICS 24 (1977), p.9.
Naturally, 1 want to concede that the late date of the composition of the Rzeaetetus
significantly undermines its value as a source of reliable information on the views of the
Socrates of the early dialogues.
38 Translation by E.C. Marchant, Loeb Edition (London, 1979). here and below.
39 As Socrates has it, there is no worse evil for a man than a false opinion on the subject
of the proper care for the soul (fh.I15e; G.458a): even the perplexity brought on by the
elenchus o r a Socratic confession of ignorance is thus a n important gain (Ap.23a-b).
Hence, we should seek out the charmer who will help us attain either truth or perplexity
(Ch.175d-176c). See Kraut, op. cit., p.235 ff.
Should such consistent action even be possible; see premise (2) of argument A. 1 am
imagining here that this possibility would not require the doing of philosophy ineven the
passive mode.
41 Given Socrates exceptionless claim that the unexamined life is not worth living
(Ap.38a), 1 will have to say that Socrates would find the present class of individualsa very
small one at best. This Socratic principle admits of exceptions because, as Irwin notes, op.
cit., p.91, self-examination [for Socrates] is worth while [solely] because of the
importance of correct beliefs about morals,and when [moral] knowledge is found, the
elenchos should no longer be an essential method of moral instruction.(p.97). In these
cases I am discussing, there is no concern that the elenchus is to be valued apart from its
results because the right way of holding beliefs is good in itself apart from its results,
(p.97) since people who are intellectually deficient cannot rationally and autonomously
employ the elenchus in a defense of their views.
4 2 Socratic Piety, pp.305-6. For examples of Socratic religious sacrifice we have only
one dubious instance in the Platonic corpus(fh. I18a). None the less, thereare numerous
instances in Xenophons Memorabilia (1.1.2, 1.1.19, 1.3.64, 4.3.16-17, 4.6.4-6) which
testify to Socratesorthodoxy. Although Xenophon may well haveexaggerated the extent
of that orthodoxy, he seems to confirm a degree of traditional practice independently
testified to in Plato (e.g.. Eud.302~.Phdr.229e, Ph.1 17c).
In accord with my interpretation of piety(P). secularlyjust acts will bealso be piousacts
if performed with the intent to please and serve the gods.
Euthyphro serves as a paradigm case here: the gap between his arrogant claims of
knowledge and the actual state of his knowledge was so wide that he was prepared to
prosecute his own father on the basis of those false claims (Eu.3e-5a).
44 See, e.g., GSOOb, Rep.346a. and fr.33 Ic. Cf. Vlastos, The Socratic Elenchus,
pp.35-38.
4 5 Of course, Socrates may well be thinking here that he is a uniquely qualified
individual. and that we need not pay attention to just any elenchus-wielders that happen
to be in town: he may think that he is the only competent elenchus-monger around. This
possibility raises a problem that crucially affects our duty to undergo the elenchus: is our
obligation to undergoelencticexaminationan obligation to undergo( 1 ) only theelenchus
given by Socrates, (2) only good elenchus, or (3)any elenchus whatsoever? If my account
has beenat all close to the truth, then Socrates will reject the idea ( I ) that we are under no
obligation to philosophize once he isdead,as well as (3). since we ought topositivelyavoid
some elenctic encounters (where false beliefs will be encouraged by an incompetent or
ill-intentioned elenchus-wielder). So although it is then clear that o u r obligation is to seek

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out ( 2 ) only good elenchus, o u r problem will then be to identify the good elenchus we
ought to seek. But if 1 am in great moral ignorance. how shall I recognize good elerichus
and good elenchus-wielders and so differentiate the philosophers from the sophists and
fools? (Socrates may have had a greater faith in the power of divine guidance than we
dreamed.) But perhaps Socrates would have simply advised the pursuit of all elenctic
encounters that appear to pose no significant danger, trusting in what few true beliefs even
a Thrasymachus will possess and in the power of the soul to profit more from the
possession of true beliefs and their testing than it suffersfrom the possession of thost: that
are false.
4h For instance, it is apparently permissible for the jurors who found Socrates guilty to
'trouble' his sons with elenctic examination (Ap.4le).
4' Despite this limitation on the number of people obligated to actively philosophize,
one still gets the overall impression from the early dialogues that Socrates generally sees
little need to restrict access to the philosophical enterprise, especially in the passive mode.
He appears to think that philosophizing in even a limited fashion is a good for virtually all
people. Clearly. Plato came to restrict philosophy to the well-qualified few because he
perceived some danger in this attitude, thinking-it seems-that Socrates was overly
generous in his estimation of the power of rational persuasion and the intellectual and
moral potential of ordinary men (see. e.g., Rep.494a. 519d. 537e-539e [esp. 538d-el). For
an excellent discussion of the very different attitude the mature Plato exhibits toward
unrestricted access to (and so a general obligation in respect of) philosophizing and the
elenchus (e.g., in the Republic), see M. Nussbaum, "Aristophanes and Socrates on
Learning Practical Wisdom," Arisrophanes: Essays in Interprefarion,J. Henderson (ed.),
Yale Classical Studies, vol. XXVI: 43-97 (esp. pp.81-88).
4" I owe this pair of objections to N . Smith.
49 On this view of piety. then, it is the desire of the gods for our well-being that is the
source of our altruistic pursuit of philosophy in the active mode: it is for this reason above
all that we should try to refute others (for prudentially. we might only seek to be refuted
ourselves; G.458a). None the less, refuting others in fulfillment of our pious service will
benefit us as well, for the gods are not indifferent to the welfare of good men ( A p .4 1 ~- d ;
Eu. I5a; Mem. I .4.5-19). See "Socratic Piety." pp.300-308, for evidence that Socrates
would attribute a desire for our happiness to the gods.
5 o On my account, Socrates' refusal to propose exile as a punishment (Ap.37c.38a)
results from a judgment that since he must philosophize no matter where he goes, death,
or pointless wandering at best, will be his fate (Ap.37d-e). Additionally, his death may
further his divine work. Thus. he should not propose exile. Other alternative punishments
which would diminish his capacity for the virtuous activity of philosophizing would for
that reason make his life not worth living, and are thus to be rejected (see Brickhouse'sand
Smith's "Socrates on Goods, Virtue, and Happiness," op. cir.).
51 I am grateful to Gregory Vlastos, Thomas Brickhouse, Mark Strasser,and especially
Nicholas Smith, for their comments on the ancestor of this paper. Any errors or
implausible claims are entirely my own. I would also like to thank Yukio Kachi for
sending me a copy of his unpublished manuscript "Socrates on the Divine Command to
Philosophize," which I found helpful in formulating the Introduction and Part 1 of this
paper.
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Annual Workshop in Greek
Philosophy of the Joint Program in Classics and Philosophy. the University of Texas at
Austin, 1985. 1 would like to thank my commentator, Owen Goldin, for his helpful
remarks on that occasion.

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