Section 14 Succession Act Cases

1. It (sub-section 2) excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from

the operation of Sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision
which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and
economic position of women in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to
impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained
in Sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob Sub-section (1)
of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by
Sub-section (1).
and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the
Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female
shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of Subsection (1), The Explanation to Sub-section (1) which includes within the scope of that
Sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance
would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where
the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or
in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision pre-scribing restricted estate in the
property. The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal
underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been
the intention of the Legislature in enacting Sub-section (2).
This circumstance would also seem to indicate that the legislative intendment was that
Sub-section (2) should be applicable, only to cases where acquisition of property is made
by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right - a kind of acquisition
akin to one under gift or will. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at
a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such
an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Subsection (2), even if the
instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property (prescribes a restricted estate in
the property.
-V Tulasamma and ors v. Sesha Reddy by Lrs.
2. It is interesting to notice in this context that the claim or the right to maintenance
possessed by a Hindu female has been held to be and is considered really, a substitute for
a share which she would have got in the property of her husband".
If that be so, the Supreme Court, with respect, rightly posed the question that if that was
the position, "where a Hindu female who gets a share in her husband's property, acquires
an absolute interest by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, could it be intended by the
Legislature that in the same circumstances, a Hindu female who could not get a share but
has a right of maintenance, would not get an absolute interest?
- Ashok Kumar v. Kishen Kumar

3. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to

Subsection (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods
indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in
the female Hindu who is in possession of the property.
The question arose, whether after the coming into force of the Act she got rights of full
ownership and could alienate the properties in which she had acquired a limited interest
without the consent of the male members of the family. This Court decided that she had
become full owner by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act. This case is
quite apposite for our purpose and we must hold that the respondent became a full owner
of the suit properties when the Act came into force. The mere fact that there was a
partition by means of arbitration which resulted in an award and a decree based on it
would not bring the matter within Sub-section (2) as the provisions of Sub-section (1)
became fully applicable particularly in view of the express terms of the Explanation.
- Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi
4. From the foregoing, it will be clear that the proper perspective of approach is to regard
that property given for maintenance and held by the Hindu female as a limited owner,
becomes an absolute estate, and that it is for the party, who contends otherwise, to
establish that the case comes under the Proviso in Section 14(2).
- Chellammal v. Nallammal
5. Sub-section 2 makes it clear that the object of the section is only to remove the disability
on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants, etc, by virtue of
which a woman's right is restricted. Section 14(1) is comprehensive in its ambit; the
Explanation to that section shows that whatever be the mode of acquisition whether it be
by inheritance or grant, the limited owner will thereafter have full ownership, But Subsection (2) provides an exception to the operation of Section 14(1).
- Rangaswamy Naicker v. Chinnammal
6. The interest acquired by her (widow) under s. 3(2)* is subject to the restrictions on
alienation which are inherent in her estate. She has still power to make her interest
definite by making a demand for partition, as a male owner may. If the widow after being
introduced into family to which her husband belonged does not seek partition, on the
termination of her estate her interest will merge into the coparcenary property. But if she
claims partition, she is served from the other members and her interest becomes a defined
interest in the coparcenary property, and the right of the other coparceners to take that
interest by survivorship will stand extinguished.
- Satrugan Isser v. Smt. Subujpari and ors

(*This section i.e. section 3(2) is from the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937.
This act, however, has now been repealed by The Hindu Succession Act, 1956.)
7. Where, however, there is necessity for a transfer, the restriction imposed by Hindu law
on her power to alienate ceases to operate, and the widow as owner has got the fullest
discretion to decide what form the alienation should assume.
- Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdevan Dubey and ors