PILAPIL vs.

HEIRS OF BRIONES
FACTS:
Maximo was married to Donata with no kids. When he died, Donata
instituted intestate proceedings and received real property from the estate of Maximo.
In 1977, Donata died and her niece Erlinda instituted administration of the intestate
estate of Dona. Briones, the nephew of Maximo, filed a petition for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximo which was granted. Afterwards,
Gregorio filed a motion to set aside the order stating that the properties were already
under their administration The heirs of Maximo filed the for partition, annulment and
recovery of possession against the heirs of Donata. The RTC granted the
aforementioned and the CA affirmed the ruling of the former.
ISSUE:

WON the petition for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession

was proper?

HELD:
NO. The alleged fraud was not proved as the property was registered
pursuant to an order. Arguendo, recovery is not imprescriptible as statutory
prescription may supervene implied trust. Moreover, equity provides that they are
already barred by laches since although they lived nearby the property since 1952, it
took them 33 years before failing for such. An order is void only when it is rendered
by a court in excess or without jurisdiction. As to the claim of the heirs of Maximo
that there was no notice, such procedure is in rem in nature and as such, only
publication is necessary. Finally, the court reiterates the that there is a presumption of
regularity.

GARCIA QUIAZON vs. BELEN

FACTS:
Elisio Quiazon was common-law married to Lourdes Belen whereby
they had a child named Elise. Subsequently, he got married Amelia and had children
as well. Elisio Quiazon died intestate in December 12, 1992. After 2 years, Elise,
represented by her mother Lourdes Belen, filed for petition for letters of
administration with the RTC of Las Pinas, claiming that she was the natural child of
the decedent. Amelia on the other hand filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue since the decedent is a resident of Tarlac and not Las Pinas and that
there was no legal basis for Elise to be appointed. The RTC ruled in favor of Elise
subject to 100k bond stating the venue was proper. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling
stating further that the common-law relationship of Elisio and Lourdes was proved to
exist in Las Pinas from 1975-1992. The MR was denied hence this petition.
ISSUES:

(1) WON venue was proper?

(2) WON Elise had interest?

HELD:
YES. The letters of administration was prayed for before the RTC
where the decedent resides at the time of his death. As to the interest, Elisio actually
filed for partition vs Amelia during his lifetime which shows his intent to divide his
property from Amelia. The CA was also correct in finding that the marriage between
Elisio and Amelia was void though questioned after Elisios death. As such, the court
stressed out Rule 78 Sec 6. (persons entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration) and Rule 79 Sec 2. (letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person). An interested party is one who would benefit in the estate such as
an heir or creditor. In this case, Elise is a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited.

AGRARAP vs. AGTARAP

FACTS:
Joaquin had a first wife, Lucia, with 3 children namely, Milagros, Jesus
and Jose, and 3 grandchildren from Jose namely, Gloria, Joseph and Teresa. He had a
second wife named Caridad, with 3 children namely Eduardo, Sebastian and
Mercedes, and a grandchild named Cecile. When Joaquin died, Eduardo filed with the
RTC of Pasay a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his father.
At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said
realties and had been appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April
1994. The grand children from Jose opposed stating that the 2 lots were conjugal
properties and that Eduardo was not physically nor mentally fit to be an administrator
and that his interest was minimal. RTC issued the letters of administration to Eduardo.
Abelardo, the husband of Mercedes filed an answer-in-intervention stating that
Eduardo is not the best person to be appointed. The parties were then heard and the
RTC issued an order of partition distributed mostly to the 2 nd marriage. On MR, the
RTC held that the 2 lots belonged to the conjugal property of Joaquin and Lucia. The
CA affirmed and partitioned the estate.
ISSUES:

(1) WON the RTC as an intestate court, has jurisdiction to resolve issue
of ownership?
(2) WON the CA erred in distributing the estate of Joaquin?

HELD:
The RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership. As a general rule,
the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or intestate court relates
only to probate or settlement of estate and not a determination in questions of
ownership. However the following are the exceptions: (1) they may provisionally pass
on the inclusion or exclusion of a property without determination of ownership and
(2) questions of collation with consent of the parties and no 3 rd party to be impaired.
In this case, the general rule does not apply because the parties are all heirs of
Joaquin, no rights of 3rd persons shall be impaired and the determination if the
properties are conjugal is collateral to probate courts. As to the distribution, it may
only be done after the payment of debts, funeral charges, administrative expenses,
allowance to widow and payment of inheritance tax.

SUNTAY III vs. COJUANCO-SUNTAY

FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son,
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the
time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. Federico died intestate in 1990. Isabel and the
other 2 lived separeately from their grandfather and grandeparetns since the marriage
of Emukui and Isabel was annulled. After the death of Emilio, Federico filed for
visitation but was stopped due to Isable who claims that those were unwanted visits.
After Cristinas death, Federico adopted Emilio III and Nenita. Subsequently, Isabel
filed a petition for letters of administration which was ooposed by Federico claiming
legal preference and also nominated Emilio III as administrator on his behalf.
Federico died. The RTC appointed Emilio III. The CA reversed the RTC ruling stating
that he was barred from representing his father and that the legitimate had preference
over illegitimate under the description next of kin.
ISSUE:

WON Emilio III or Isabal has a better right to be appointed as

administaror?

HELD:
Isabel should be appinted solely. In this case, the CA was
reversed and the SC held that there should be joint administartion since Rule 78 Sec 6.
was not absolute but rather under the discretion of the court. Isabel filed a motion for
total affirmance and an MR on the co-administratorship on the ground that Emilio III
was not next of kin and has no interest in the case. The SC defined next of kin as
those persons who are entiteld under the statute for distribution. Emilio III was next
of kin but was otherwise not suited due to failure to administer and for inaction or
omission of his duties. Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect
the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina,
did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did
her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this
case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

FACTS:
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of
the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August
11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968,
Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States
of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate alleging that she
is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila.
Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue which he claims
was Laguna, and for failure to state Cause of Action since respondent was a mistress.
The motion to dismiss was initially denied but after the case was re raffled, the RTC
ruled that the Laguna was the proper venue and that the marriage was bigamouse. The
CA reversed the ruling hence this petition.
ISSUE:

WON the venue was proper?

WON respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration?

HELD:
Petition lacks merit. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal

residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a coowner

SABIDONG vs. SOLAS

FACTS:
Trinidad occupies the lot of Hodges in Ilo-ilo while the other portion
was occupied by Priscilla. Priscilla was ordered to vacate in an ejectment suit.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment
Lots 11 and 12. In a letter dated January 7, 1986, the Administratrix of the Hodges
Estate rejected respondents offer in view of an application to purchase already filed
by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give
priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While the check for
initial down payment tendered by respondent was returned to him, he was
nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he could
put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for
approval of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded to him "should the
occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them. The probate court of RTC branch
27 approved the sale of Lot 11 and a Writ of Demolition was issued. Subsequently a
complaint was filed the SC alleging that the clerk of court was prohibited from buying
properties in litigation and that there was grave abuse of discretion in the clerks part
acting as the representative of the estate.
ISSUE:

WON the clerk of court was prohibited from purchasing the property
under probate?
HELD: NO. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the
judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial
settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order
declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the
order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there
is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had
already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale
With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation"
subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. This notwithstanding,
we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending
before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court. On the
charges against the respondent, we find him liable for dishonesty and grave
misconduct. In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led to
believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate, or at least possessed of
such power to intercede for overstaying occupants of the estates properties like
complainant.