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55
Jonathan Rynhold
Jonathan Rynhold is a lecturer in the department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University,
Israel and a research associate at the BESA Centre for Strategic Studies. His research focuses
on Israeli policy towards the peace process. He recently published an article on the Barak
government and the peace process and is co-editor of a forthcoming book on the 2003
Israeli elections.
Survival, vol. 46, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 5576
56 Jonathan Rynhold
The Road Map is unlikely to succeed anytime soon for the basic reason
that it has inherited the fundamental limitations of Oslo. The Oslo
process led to many worthwhile achievements in the period 19932000.
Moreover, the detailed negotiations conducted in 2000 will no doubt
contribute significantly to the shape of any future permanent status
agreement, once conditions are ripe. The problem is that conditions are
not ripe and are not likely to be any time soon.4 This is demonstrated
most notably by the heretofore unbridgeable disagreements over the
emotive issues of identity: sovereignty over Temple Mount/Haram alSharif and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Polls consistently
demonstrate widespread Palestinian opposition to giving up on what
they term a right of return for refugees and their families to Israel.5 On
the other hand, 68% of Israelis are opposed to allowing any refugees
whatsoever into Israel, while a further 16% are only prepared to let in a
few thousand. Israelis perceive the right of return as a serious threat to
their most stable consensus political value the existence of Israel as a
demographically Jewish state.6
In an effort to resolve these issues, there have been
several unofficial permanent status framework
agreements negotiated by left-wing Israeli leaders and
moderate Palestinians, most notably, the BeilinAbu
Mazen plan of 1995 and the BeilinAbed Rabbo Geneva
plan of 2003.7 But the fact that some respected public
figures have been able to reach agreement does not
mean that the conflict is ripe for resolution. None of
these people are currently in positions of significant
power. More fundamentally, it is unlikely that they will
be able to garner the necessary degree of public support
to implement the compromises that they propose.8 Precedents are not
promising: during the permanent status negotiations in 200001, Palestinian
negotiators were constrained by public opinion from adopting compromises
on the refugee question put forward in previous informal meetings.9
Previous attempts by elites to negotiate compromises on these core
issues of identity and symbolism ahead of public readiness allowed
rejectionists to mobilise the public to violence. The most notable example
is Sharons visit to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in September 2000,
which provided the opportunity for the incitement to violence, known by
Palestinians as the the Al Aqsa intifada.10
The same dilemma seems likely to thwart current initiatives.
Specifically, the model for dealing with the refugee question embodied in
the Geneva plan does not appear workable. The idea is to allow refugees
to choose from a number of options, including that of immigration into
Israel, with Israel having the final say on the number. In reality, however,
no Israeli government will agree to absorb all the refugees who wish to
immigrate. According to a recent survey, 10% of all refugees 400,000
people want to immigrate to Israel. Methodological problems with the
survey almost certainly mean this figure is a substantial underestimation.11
But even this figure is several times larger than Israel could be expected to
absorb, as it would significantly change of the countrys demographic
balance. Consequently, if implemented, this aspect of the Geneva plan
would have destabilising consequences, especially given that more than
75% of refugees were unwilling to accept coexistence with Israeli Jews
under any circumstances.12 On the other hand, if hundreds of thousands of
refugees are refused permission to immigrate to Israel, it would be almost
impossible for even a genuinely moderate Palestinian leadership to stand
Israelis
perceive the
right of return
as a serious
threat
58 Jonathan Rynhold
Unilateral disengagement
The disengagement approach to peace guided the policies of former
Labor Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak. In political terms,
disengagement means the creation of a Palestinian state. In security terms,
it means the construction of a security barrier along the border, with no
Israeli settlements on the Palestinian side. In economic terms, it means
lessening reliance on Palestinian labour and separating infrastructure,
including the possible construction of an elevated road and communications
link between the West Bank and Gaza under full Palestinian control.18 For
Barak, disengagement is essential with or without an agreement.19
In the wake of the first intifada in December 1987, public support for
security disengagement became increasingly strong, a fact which Rabin
and Barak successfully exploited in their respective election victories in
1992 and 1999. Following the increase in terror attacks that accompanied
60 Jonathan Rynhold
the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government built a fence around the Gaza
Strip and plans were made for a similar fence around the West Bank.
With the collapse of the peace process in September 2000, the Barak
government began to develop a comprehensive plan for unilateral
disengagement. Since Baraks defeat in the 2001 election, former members
of his team have proposed variants of this plan, one of which was included
in Labors 2003 election manifesto.20 The plans call for a staged unilateral
withdrawal from Gaza and 65-85% of the West Bank including withdrawal
from around 40-70 settlements. Some plans included disengagement from
Arab areas in East Jerusalem, excluding the holy basin.21
Politically, the plan aimed to protect Israels character as a democratic
state with a large Jewish majority. Proponents feared that in the absence
of partition, there would be a Palestinian majority in Israel and the
Territories by 2010. In strategic terms, the plan aimed at conflict
management. The hope was to reduce friction between Israelis and
Palestinians through withdrawal from many settlements and the creation
of a border that would facilitate the removal of Israeli checkpoints and
thus greater freedom of movement within Palestinian areas. The plan
allowed for the creation of a contiguous area under Palestinian control
that could form the basis for a state with temporary borders.
At first, the Sharon government categorically rejected unilateral
disengagement.22 But the government is now constructing the barrier. The
main impetus for its construction has been twofold: pressure from public
opinion; and defence against the massively increased level of terrorism.
Since the collapse of the Oslo process, 80% of Israelis have consistently
supported the construction of a security barrier in the West Bank; by the
end of 2003 a majority of the public also supported a wide-ranging
unilateral withdrawal from most of the occupied territories.23 As public
pressure grew and the death toll continued to rise, the government began,
in spring 2002, construction of the barrier. Nonetheless, Sharon remained
equivocal, and told President Bush that if the PA destroyed terrorist
infrastructure and carried out security reforms, he would re-evaluate the
whole project.24 Meanwhile, there was a growing realisation that the
governments preferred means of fighting terrorism was failing. Operation
Defensive Shield, in which the IDF re-occupied large tracts of Palestinian
territory, led to a major reduction in Israeli casualties in the Territories, but
it has been less effective in Israel proper. 25 Many who initially opposed the
barrier have come to accept the argument of Avi Dichter, the head of the
General Security Service (GSS), that the barrier is the key to Israel
extricating itself from the terrorist quagmire.26 In October 2003 the
Cabinet finally endorsed a complete route for the barrier; since then, the
pace of construction has increased significantly.
All parties
recognise the
barriers
political
implications
62 Jonathan Rynhold
deep into the West Bank, and has focused its opposition to the inclusion
of the Ariel bloc inside the barriers perimeter. Washington has argued
that this undermines Palestinian moderates ability to implement their
Road Map obligations and contradicts the Road Maps vision of a viable
and territorially contiguous Palestinian state.34 As a result of US pressure,
Israel decided not to connect the Ariel bloc to the main barrier for the
time being, constructing non-contiguous barriers instead; but the issue is
up for review in spring 2004.
nea
n S
ea
LEBANON
rra
SYRIA
Jenin
ed
ite
Nazareth
Nablus
Tel Aviv
Gaza
West JORDAN
Bank Jericho
Jerusalem
Hebron
Tulkarm
Dead
Sea
25km
25 miles
Nablus
Qalkilya
Ariel
ISRAEL
Ramallah
Jericho
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Dead
Sea
Hebron
IISSmaps
secondary fence
main Palestinian towns and villages
main Jewish settlements
64 Jonathan Rynhold
Use of force
has only
increased
motivation for
terrorist
attacks
66 Jonathan Rynhold
The barrier
has already
damaged the
Palestinian
economy
Deadly friction
Reducing friction in a systematic way requires maximum disengagement
between Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, there must be
provision for everyday activities to continue on each side of the barrier.51
The route of the barrier, how it is managed and the fate of settlements
will determine whether the barrier reduces or worsens this friction.
So far, the barrier has increased friction by making Palestinians daily
lives more difficult. These problems can be somewhat mitigated. More
problematic are the main secondary fences that border some Palestinian
villages on both sides and the smaller enclaves. Quite apart from their
high costs in human-rights terms, the supposed security benefits of
68 Jonathan Rynhold
Israeli side of the barrier. To date, the barrier has put about 3,500
Palestinians on the Israeli side of the barrier. If one includes the
secondary fences, then around 70,000 Palestinians are on the wrong side
of the line. An additional 200,000 Palestinians will also be on the Israeli
side, because the barrier will place East Jerusalem within its confines. If
the barrier became a de facto border, then the current path would
undermine Israels political-demographic interests as understood by the
vast majority of Israelis. The only way to resolve this situation would be
to remove the secondary fences and alter the path of the barrier to divide
Jerusalem more closely along ethnic lines as proposed in the December
2000 Clinton Parameters for a Permanent Status Agreement.
Construction of the barrier also carries political costs for the
government, in terms of international pressure against it. The UN has
declared that its route is a violation of international law. The
International Court of Justice in The Hague is also due to deliberate on
the matter. Some members of the Israeli Cabinet fear that the likely
negative judgment will strengthen trends towards Israels international
isolation and might serve as a basis for future sanctions.55 Conversely,
right-wing elements in the government and the settler lobby are
demanding that the barrier be routed deeper inside the West Bank. In
the absence of a major change on the Palestinian side and given
overwhelming domestic support for the barrier, international pressure is
likely to remain ineffective, unless that pressure comes from the US.56
Palestinian interests
The main threat posed by the barrier to Palestinian political interests is
that it will become the de facto border. The inclusion of parts of the
West Bank within the perimeter of the barrier threatens to limit the size
of any future Palestinian state, calling into question its viability.
The barrier route approved by the Israeli government does not
prevent the coming into being of a viable, territorially contiguous
Palestinian state with temporary borders, as envisaged in the Road Map.
Certainly its route makes that contiguity very awkward, but technical
solutions can make it workable. The current route is actually closer to the
territorial settlement agreed to by the left-wing Israeli government in the
200001 Permanent Status negotiations than to the territorial settlements
previously proposed by Sharon and Netanyahu.57 Removing the
secondary fences and making the settlement blocs smaller would
improve the Palestinian position further, but even if Ariel ends up inside
the barrier, it need not block a contiguous Palestinian state from coming
into being. The Ariel bloc was included on the Israeli side of the line in
the 1995 Yossi BeilinAbu Mazen peace plan and appeared again on the
70 Jonathan Rynhold
The barrier is criticised on the grounds that it will ruin any chance of
a return to fruitful negotiations. This argument would be far more
persuasive if fruitful negotiations were actually on the horizon. It is
indeed possible, as former Israeli Labor leader Amram Mitzna argued in
the 2003 election, that construction of the barrier might spur the
Palestinians to act decisively against terror and re-enter negotiations
sooner rather than later. In addition, if the barrier succeeds in
significantly reducing terrorism within the Green Line, it will lower the
sense of threat felt by Israelis. This in turn will increase their readiness to
make concessions in negotiations.62 On the Palestinian side, the inability
to carry out successful attacks against Israeli civilians inside the Green
Line could strengthen the position of Palestinian moderates.
Whither disengagement?
There is a fair amount of scepticism regarding Ariel Sharons intentions.
Some argue that he will construct the eastern fence, dismantle just a
handful of settlements, annex some consensus settlements and try to
implement his old plan for creating Palestinian cantons on just half of the
West Bank. Others believe that Sharon actually supports the more
extensive plan for unilateral withdrawal put forward by Deputy Prime
Minster Ehud Olmert: moving tens of thousands of settlers and drawing
the dividing line inside Jerusalem, while retaining the major settlement
blocks and the Jordan valley. 63 If Sharon moved to dismantle settlements,
the Labor party would not allow the Israeli right to bring down the
government.64 On balance, it seems more likely that Sharon will adopt the
second course, although he is likely to dismantle only a few settlements
to begin with. Sharon has promised that any unilateral measures will be
co-ordinated with the US, and Washington is adamantly opposed to the
eastern fence.65 In any case, for the reasons argued above, it seems that
construction of the fence makes a more extensive withdrawal virtually
inevitable whatever Sharons initial preferences.
These two versions of unilateral disengagement would entail radically
different consequences. Implementation of the first version would cause a
serious rupture in USIsraeli relations and an escalation of the conflict with
the Palestinians. The Palestinians, having seen the castrated state on offer,
might abandon their pursuit of a two state solution and revert to the one
state solution that is Israels nightmare.66 Given that Israels borders under
this scheme would be extremely long and difficult to defend, and that they
would include within them over 250,000 Palestinians, both the strategic and
the demographic logic of the original disengagement plan would be
severely compromised. On the other hand, the closer the implementation
to the original Barak plan, the better the chances that the plan will have
72 Jonathan Rynhold
disengagement in the right direction. First, Sharon will need the support
of the Labor Party to implement any unilateral withdrawal. Second,
Israeli public opinion needs to be made aware of the fact that the
barriers current route threatens to undermine the demographic and
security logic they support. Finally, against this
backdrop and with Sharon committing himself to coordinating measures with Washington, the US has a
good chance of seriously influencing matters as well.
In any event, the barrier is being built.
Consequently, the key is to maximise its benefits and
minimise its costs. The best way to achieve this is by
de-emphasising political considerations related to
settlements, focusing instead on the underlying
strategic logic of the original concept of unilateral
disengagement proposed by Ehud Barak and his
associates.
It has been reported that some significant steps are
due to be taken in this vein. For example, in January 2004 it was decided
to alter the route near Qalkilya and Tulkarm.69 In addition, the secondary
fence around Baka al- Sharkiya is to be removed, and the depth barriers
planned for the northern section of the barrier are now unlikely to be
built.70 Meanwhile, the other secondary fences are to be built only after
the main fence closer to the Green Line is completed. Even then, these
secondary fences are to remain open unless there is a major security alert.
These changes, which will cost over a million dollars to implement, are a
result of both US pressure and pragmatic operational considerations.71
While such moves represent a step in the right direction, more needs to
be done. More enclaves should be removed and mobile forces should
replace secondary fences, as envisaged in Baraks original disengagement
plan.72 While an Israeli withdrawal from Arab East Jerusalem is not going
to happen soon, disengagement from infrastructure there could
commence more quickly.
The security barrier is hardly an optimal strategy for resolving the
IsraeliPalestinian conflict. It will impose significant costs, particularly on
the Palestinians. If an eastern fence is constructed, it will serve to further
aggravate the conflict. However, if implemented wisely, the barrier could
turn out to be the best means available for managing a deadly conflict.
Sharon will
need Labor
support to
implement
unilateral
withdrawal
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor
Gerald Steinberg, Dr Shlomo Shpiro and
the anonymous reviewers for their helpful
insights and comments.
Notes
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
NusseibehAyalon initiative:
www.mifkad.org.il/eng; Khaled Abu
Toameh, Dozens deny signing
Nusseibeh ad on right of return,
Jerusalem Post, 10 June 2003. Only 19
27% of Palestinians support the Geneva
Plan. Support is lowest regarding the
clauses relating to refugees, see Poll no.
118, 22 December 2003, Palestinian
Centre For Public Opinion (PCPO) and
Poll no. 10 December 2003, Centre for
Policy and Survey Research (PSR),
pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/
p10b.html.
Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon, Middle East
Policy, 2001, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 94105.
As Donald Horowitz, a leading expert
on ethnic conflict has suggested, while
elites can do much to moderate ethnic
conflict, the bottom line is always
what the wider public are willing to
accept in their name. Donald
Horowitz, Community Conflict: Policy
and Possibilities (Coleraine: Centre for
the Study of Conflict, University of
Ulster, 1990).
PSR July 2003 poll; Max Abrahms,
The Right of Return Debate
Revisited, Middle East Intelligence
Bulletin, AugustSeptember 2003, vol.
5, no. 8-9.
Ibid.
Ron Pundak, From Oslo To Taba:
What Went Wrong, Survival, vol. 43,
no. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 3145.
Figures taken from World Bank
website, http://
www.worldbank.org/data/
countrydata/countrydata.html; http:/
/lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/
mena.nsf/0/
F192A5DA7D266F048525694700278825?
OpenDocument; http://
www.worldbank.org/html/schools/
regions/mena/israel.htm
Dan Schueftan Disengagement (Tel
Aviv: Zamora-Bitan, 1999) [Hebrew]
pp. 97, 103106, 126128.
74 Jonathan Rynhold
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76 Jonathan Rynhold
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