"Dikaiosune". An Essay in Greek Intellectual History.

(In Tribute to George Grube, the

Distinguished Author of "Plato's Thought")
Author(s): E. A. Havelock
Source: Phoenix, Vol. 23, No. 1, Studies Presented to G. M. A. Grube on the Occasion of His
Seventieth Birthday (Spring, 1969), pp. 49-70
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1086568 .
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DIKAIOSUNE
An Essay in Greek IntellectualHistory
(In tributeto George Grube, the distinguishedauthor
of Plato's Thought)
E. A. HAVELOCK
ALTHOUGH THE DOCTRINE of the four cardinal virtues cannot be
documentedin a formalsense earlier than Plato's Republic in the first
quarterof the fourthcenturyB.C., it is commonlyassumed to have been
supported by a traditionwhich went back perhaps two centuriesinto
the archaic period.' The priorityof dikaiosunein the Platonic canon
needs no demonstration.Its proposed definitionconstitutesthe formal
"hypothesis" of the treatise and though the firstbook in the manner
of the other early dialogues on virtue ends aporetically,the treatiseas
a whole devotes itself to completing the definitionwith meticulous
exactitude.2The effectof theeloquent argumentofferedin Plato's written
masterpiecehas been to riveton the mindsof scholarsand laymenalike
the presumptionthat the English terms"justice" and "righteousness"
representwhat had always been a general idea available to the Greeks
throughouttheir earlier cultural history,a concept lying at the back
of theirminds and taken forgranted.
If one asks, Is thispresumptionbased on fact?,the answerwilldepend
on how "fact" is defined.Is it a datum supplied by the intuitionsof
moral philosophy,which has always been prone to assume forits own
purposes that the notion of the moral law as idea or ideal informsour
common humanityand must exist as a realized concept in the minds
of all men who share such a culture as the Greeks possessed? Or is it
'W. Jaeger,Paideia, translated by Gilbert Highet, 1 (Oxford 1946) 106: "Plato took
it over en bloc fromthe ethical systemof the early Greek city-state."Pind. Nem. 3.71-76
and Aesch. Sept. 610 have been interpretedas assuming the doctrine(see also TheognisPhocylides, below notes 50, 51); so L. R. Farnell (Amsterdam 1965) on Pindar ad
loc. (but contraWilamowitz, Pindaros [Berlin 1922] 279, n. 3); P. Groeneboom (Groningen 1938) on Aeschylus ad loc.; James Adam (reprinted, Cambridge 1963) on
Plato Resp. 427E. A "Pythagorean" origin was admitted as possible but unprovable
by Adam (loc. cit.) and supported with demonstrationby F. M. Cornford(CQ 6 [1912]
246-265). See below, n. 4 sub fin.
2Dikaiosune in the polis 432B 2 ff.; in the psyche442D ff.In each case the definition
is completed by a definitionof the contrary and correspondingvice. Further demonstration of the profitabilityof dikaiosune (444E 7 ff.) in effectextends the definition
(588B 6-7) and is again formallycompleted by an expositionof the miseryof the corresponding vice (576B 11 ff.). A mathematical ratio is even established between the two
(587B 4 ff.).

49
PHOENIX, Vol. 23 (1969) 1.

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50

PHOENIX

guaranteedby the contentof historicalstudies,which by revealingpatterns of action approved or rejected will reveal also the presumed
guidance of correspondingmoral principles?Or, finally,is it safest to
test the presumptionby the canons of linguisticusage where alone the
idea alleged to exist in the common mind can find verbal expression
and thus submit to verbal measurement?This last will be the methodology of the present paper. We address ourselves to a study of terminology,more particularlyto the historyof the word dikaiosuneitself.
If we except a couplet found in the Theognidean corpus (a false
exception: to this we shall returnlater) the word is not foundin extant
Greek literature before Herodotus. The fact can fail to attract the
attention it deserves because of the prevalence in all authors from
Homer onwards of dike and dikaios, and because of our habit, difficult
to resist,of translatingthese two words as thoughthey belongedin the
mental and moral context of Platonic dikaiosune.3The comparatively
late appearance of dikaiosunetakes on added significancewhen we note
that (with one exception: a fragmentof Euripides) it does not occur in
any of the extant remainsof the pre-Platonicpoets. To the end of the
fifthcentury,its occurrencesare limitedto fivecontextsin Herodotus,
one in Thucydides,one in the Antiphonpapyrus,one in Thrasymachus,
and one (which depends on editorialsupplement)in Damon as cited in
a Philodemus papyrus.4By the second decade of the fourthcenturyon
the otherhand the word has obtained commoncurrency.
One is justifiedin the case of this particularword in notingthe comparative rarityof occurrenceas remarkable.Here, afterall, is the most
convenientGreek noun by which to index the notion of moralityas an
ethicalprinciple,a notionbasic to our own discoursein theWest (whether
we accept or reject it) and one which thereforewould have been thought
equally basic to the discourseof the Greeksto whomwe tracethe founda'The habit is as unconscious as it is pervasive in all who write on such topics as
"Greek Ideals" or the "Greek way of life." Two recent and careful studies of Greek
ethical thoughtare not immune to it. A. W. H. Adkins,Meritand Responsibility(Oxford
1960) 185-186, discussing Euripides' Electra 1051 ("You have spoken dikaia, but the
dike in them is aischron") comments on "the choice of aischron as the term to express
the claims of dikaiosune." L. C. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece(Stanford
1962) 116-117, contrasts the assured claims to justice put forward by Agamemnon
and Clytaemnestrawith "the language of Cassandra, who in all her catalogue of blood
and vengeance has no thought of dike. Her terms are more savage and more primitive
. . . it is only when Clytaemnestra exults over her deed that the notion of justice is
reintroduced."
4The unwary should not be misled by the entries in the index to Diels-Kranz, Vorsokr.,s.v. "dikaiosune," listed under the names of (Archytas), Anaxagoras, Pythagorean
School (four entries), Bias, Hecateaus of Abdera. On this last see below, n. 34. The
s
vocabulary of the formula SLKaLOorV71
printed by Diels-Kranz
dAPLO/EldOKLKSeoos,
(1.452.22) as "Pythagorean," is Platonic; see LS7, s.v. llcdKIS.

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DIKAIOS UNE

51

tionsofourmoraland politicalphilosophy.One does nothave to be a philosopher to use it. One would have thought,for example, that it would
be likely to recur in the moralisingmeditations addressed by Pindar
to his patrons and by the chorusesof Greek tragedyto theiraudiences,
or that it would have appeared not infrequentlyas a verbal counterin
the dialectic of Thucydides' speeches. Its scansion, so far as the poets
are concerned,offersno difficulty
in dactyls or anapaests, or for that
matterin lyric.Pindar could have used it, as he does use philophrosune.
Is it not rather an odd accident-to cite a conspicuous example of
omission-that it does not occur anywherein Aristophanes' Clouds, a
play which in its revised versionwas amended to findroom fora fairly
lengthyconfrontationbetween Dikalos Logos and Adikos Logos?
Nor is it easy to identifyany equivalent for the term which might
have made the coinage unnecessary.The neuter of dikaios with the
article carriesus no furtherthan the bounds of meaningset by dikaios
(and to these bounds we shall return).Dikaiotes appears to be a fourthcenturycoinage.' Tentatively we conclude that dikaiosune was coined
sometimeduringthe fifthcenturyand possiblynot before450 to express
a notion which,forwhateverreason, had not hithertodemanded it.
The -osune words (there are several in Homer) have been studied as
evidence of early abstraction.6It is to our purpose to note that they
denote personal properties(what Aristotlewould call dynameis)which
match the behaviourindicatedby the correspondingadjective: theyare
"psychological" words. If we apply this rule of thumb to dikaiosune,as
opposed to dike and dikaios, we might conclude that the notion of
resident
moralityas an attributeof a person,or as a set ofhabit-patterns
in him, did not achieve the status of a "name" (onoma) until Greek
culture had matured,if that is the word, to the stage representedby
Periclean Athens,and that even then the -lame forit was not a popular
one nordid it becomeso untiltheinfluenceof the fourth-century
thinkers
made it so. Further it might be guessed that its appearance marks
the beginningof the internalizationof a moral conception hitherto
viewed froma purelyexternaland social point of view. Dike and dikaios
referto the maintenanceof reciprocalrelationsof right: they connote
"rights" rather than "righteousness"; they were indexes of purely external behaviour whetherof gods or of men.' With the appearance of
dikaiosuneit had occurredto some that this kind of reciprocalpropriety
correspondedto a personalvirtue,the propertyof an individual.
If social and economicchanges occurringat the time were such as to
6It occurs neitherin the extant remains of lyric and drama, nor in the historians.Epic
and elegy would have had to reject it if available.
der Homerkritik(Leipzig 1895) 439.
6Paul Cauer, Grundfragen
7See below, n. 48.

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52

PHOENIX

thenan individualized
encourageindividualism,
conceptionof "right"
wouldbe encouragedalso. If thecoinagedoes not appearto be poetic,
thisneednotsurpriseus, forpoeticvocabularyfavoursthe traditional.
Was it not morelikelyto be theworkof the thinkers,
thespeculators,
ofsocietywhomitis oftenconvenient
andtheprosaicminority
toidentify
as theintellectuals?
whichlie in advanceof our investiThese,however,are conclusions
gation.It is timeto turnto usageitself.
The fivecontexts
inwhichHerodotususesthetermarewidelyscattered
hishistory.
It willbe convenient
to listthemalphabetically,
as
through
follows:
A. HERODOTUS
1.95-129
The conquestof Lydia becomesthe historian's
occasionto narratethe
of the
historyof Cyrusthe Persian,whichin turncalls fora summary
ofMedia-Persia.The Medes,havingbrokenawayfrom
previoushistory
theAssyrian
Theirexamplewasfollowed
Empire"gainedtheirfreedom."8
was confined
by theentireAsiaticmainland.Theirpoliticalorganization
to thevillage.A certainDeioces,a manofintelligence
and widereputation,had monarchical
ambitions,whichhe soughtto realizeby conon the "practice"of dikaiosuneforhe understoodclearly
centrating
that in the presentlawlessconditionof the countrythe antagonism
between"right"and "wrong"was fundamental.'
He was accordingly
chosento be "judge" ofhis village.The reputation
ofhislegaladministrationwhichwas "straight"and "correct"'0in contrastto decisions
renderedin othervillagesinducedneighbouring
villagesto bringtheir
suitsto himuntilhe had a monopoly
ofthejudicialprocess.Deioces,as
partof his plan, finallydeclinedto continuethis,pleadingthatit was
forhim to neglecthis own affairs.Faced withan in"unprofitable"
creasingdegreeof "lack of order"(&volt-s,1.97.2 and 3) the Medes
heldassemblyto decidepolicyand votedto establisha monarchy
which
would bringlaw and orderand the opportunity
to get workdone.
man
Chapter98 describeshowtheypickedon Deioces as a well-known
to be monarch,whereupon
he requiredthemto furnish
a royalcapital
An architectural
(whichbecameEcbatana) and a bodyguard.
description
ofEcbatanais followed
ofthePersianpalaceceremonial
by a description
whichDeioces,says the historian,
invented,its motivebeingto stress
his own uniquenessin separationfromhis subjects.His legal administrationbecamesevereand morebureaucratic,
thesubmission
requiring
8TheGreekadds emphasisby repeatingtheidea in triplicate.
OTLTCDa
91.96.2: 5LKaLOacvTV1
7KEE....
ayc-Psr
r6 &bKov
rtLO7/IEVOo
rB baly
iroAf6v eiatL.
0o... .O)
Te Kal 6tK~Covw
Kaos . . . Kard 76 6p0bv
1.96.2-3; cf. Hesiod
...,
Op. 35-39 and 263-264.

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DIKAIOSUNE

53

of writtenbriefs,but enforcingappropriateand adequate penalties for

all acts of hybris.His spies and agents pervaded the kingdom.
Here the tale breaks off.Chapter 101 in two lines narratesthe formation of the Medes as a nation under Deioces and in two more the
ethnic composition of Media. Chapters 102 if. narrate the dynastic
succession and the wars of the Median dynasty thus established, including the conquest and absorption of Persia and finallyof Assyria,
and then the Median recoveryfromdefeat inflictedon them by the
Scythians. This brings the dynasty down to Astyages (chapter 107),
whereupon the folk tale of the boy Cyrus takes over. He, the halfPersian grandsonof Astyages, was in infancyordered to be killed for
dynastic reasons, but pity had prevailed over the savage instructions
issued, and he in fact grew up as the putative son of a herdsman,till
one day (1.114), when he was ten, the boys playing "I am King of the
Castle" in the villagestreetchose him as "king," whereupon(apparently
with kinglyinstinct)he proceeded to distributehis "subjects" by function, assigningthe builders,the soldiers,the messengers,and the royal
agents their respective tasks (1.114.2). A nobleman's son refused his
assignmentand was duly ordered whipped by the herdsman's son in
his capacity as "king." Complaint was then laid beforeAstyages, the
boy was broughtbeforehim to answer,and replied,"O King, I did this
'rightfully.'I was chosen king as evidentlythe most fittedforthe post.
This boy refusedto carryout orders until he 'got his right'" [that is,
was punished]. If this makes me deservingof evil, here I am."
The story ends happily for Cyrus, with the king recognizingand
accepting his grandson,thoughinflictingsavage retributionupon Harpagus, the ministerwho had failed to carry out the original order.
Finally, with the help of this minister,Cyrus organizes a revolt of the
Persians against the Medes, and defeats and deposes his grandfather.
The triumphant Harpagus, and the captive Astyages, two mortal
enemies, then confronteach other in dialogue. Harpagus, tauntingthe
deposed monarch,claims main credit for the success of the revolt. "It
is rightlymy achievement." Whereupon Astyages uses argument to
prove to him that he is both the most "stupid" and the most "wrongful"
of mortals.If the achievementis reallyhis, he could have made himself
king instead of someone else. Hence the complete stupidity. If his
motive was a grudge against Astyages, then it would have been more
"right" to make anotherMede king ratherthan a Persian. As it is, the
Medes have been enslaved for something they were not themselves
responsiblefor,a result totally"wrongful.""2
K .. ..Xaoe
.
'8
"uov
7jV 85tKi
v, 1.115.2 and 3.
12'Apira-os 8 iy r... r6 Irpya.c ~owvrob6 5&KalLws
e.vat.
'Aorv&y-rsbe
.
&&K(T aTo 5, 6T&... 6&Ka.6,juv
...
oKa&6TracroV
Lv
&,
6,ra
ye,El...
a7rkiaLe...
etvat Mtbwv (y
7k rep43aXelv
, 1.129.2-4.
7epov
oaY
6...
7"ov7"o 7"6

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54

PHOENIX

The narrative then resumesthe historyof the Median-Persiankingdom. Though dikaiosuneitselfhas occurredonly once in these 35 chapters, this small event will be seen to gain some significancefromthe
extendedcontextin whichit is found.
B. HERODOTUs 2.141-152 (with extensiveomissions)
The historianhas narratedin garbled forma highlycondensedversion
of Egyptian dynastichistory,concludingwith the reignof one "Sethos,
a priest of Hephaestus" whose policies neglected the interestsof the
Egyptian warriorsto the extentof expropriatingtheirlanded holdings.
At the conclusionof his reginthe Egyptians were "liberated" (2.147.2).
But being unable to conduct theirlives forany lengthof timewithouta
king, they divided the entire countryinto twelve districts,each with
its own king.
These twelve, besides intermarrying,
governed their administration
mutual subversionand also
or
which
forbade
three
rules
regulations
by
mutual aggrandisement,and which guaranteedcompletemutual amity
(2.147.3). Herodotus then gives his account of the motive behind this
arrangement.Directly they had assumed theirrespectivekingdoms,an
oracle had foretoldthat one of them would be monarchof all Egypt.
Their carefulobservance of these three rules was designed to prevent
this. Accordingto the oracle the futuremonarchwould be identifiedby
the fact that he would pour libation in the templeofHephaestus froma
cup of bronze.
And so the twelve kings "employed dikaiosune"'3and continued to
do so until,on a certainoccasion,one of themseemed to fulfillthe oracle
by accident. The eleven took no chances. They establishedby examination that he had done so without intention,so could not consider it
"right" to kill him,'4but they stripped him of his powers and exiled
him. He had in fact,adds the historian,been exiled once before.Being
now a victim of hybris(2.152.3), he planned vengeance on his persecutors, and in due course with the aid of "bronze men fromthe sea"
(that is, Greeks) he deposed the eleven and become monarch of all
Egypt. This was Psammetichus,who foundeda dynasty(chapters158 ff.)
C. HERODOTUS 6.73 and 85-87

The two Spartan kingsCleomenesand Leotychidesdescendupon Aegina

and, in the absence of resistance,select and seize ten prominentAeginetans, take them to Athens, a bitterfoe of Aegina, and "place them on
deposit"'" at that city. There theyremainedas hostagesuntil the death
'"tKatool'vwlXpewlI.vpw,2.151.1.
.4. . KTE'aL L
OL)oK Kvwo'v...
O1 ... , 2.151.3.
'7rodaropa K
6.73.2.
15irapaO7 KaTaitOver"t,
"
V

S.

. f
7

ovqJLi7

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rpoVoLrjs abr"V

DI K AIOS UNE

55

of Cleomenes,whereupon,on complaintof the Aeginetansat Sparta, a

Spartan tribunalfoundthe plaintiffsto have been the victimsof hybris
(6.85.1). Leotychides,it was finallyagreed, was to accompany them to
Athens to take back the hostages. So Leotychidescame and demanded
his "deposit." The Atheniansdid not thinkit "right" to comply6":the
deposit had been made by two kings,not one. To thisLeotychidesmade
a lengthyreply:
To restorethemis an act of piety; to refuseto do so is the opposite;
the choice is yours (6.86a). But I want to tell you of a "happening" in
Sparta which concerneda deposit.7 There is a Spartan traditionabout
one Glaucus three generationsago who, besides being generallypreeminent,enjoyed a unique reputationamong Spartans fordikaiosune.
Tradition reportsthat in the course of time the followingthing "happened" to him. A Milesian arrivedand told him: "I want to enjoy the
benefitof your dikaiosune which has gained wide reputationin Ionia
and indeed in all Hellas.'8 Ionia, so I have reflected,is continuallyinsecure, and moneycontinuallychanges hand, whereas the Peloponnese
enjoys secure and settled conditions.I have decided to converthalf my
property into silver and deposit it with you, well understandingthat
deposit with you means security for me. Here it is, and here are the
tokensyou must keep. You will restoreit to the bearerof corresponding
tokens." Glaucus accepted the deposit on these terms.' Aftera long
interval of time the children of the depositor arrived, produced the
tokens,and asked payment.Glaucus put themoff;"I don't remember,"
he said, "I can't carryback to any knowledgeof what you are talking
about. I want to recall the matter and do the 'right' thing. If I was
the recipientI would be correctto pay up. If I was not, I will apply
the usual Greek regulationsagainst you. Give me fourmonths."
The Milesians made out that theyhad been disastrouslyrobbed,and
left. Glaucus resortedto Delphi, asking the oracle: Shall I take oath
and plunder the money?The oracle replied in seven hexameterverses
to the effectthat (a) it would be more profitableto take oath, and to
prevail, and to plunder the money. Afterall even the man of faithful
oath must die. (b) However, oath has a demonic offspringwhich can
exterminatea man's lineage and household,whereas the lineage of the
man of faithfuloath can prevail.
Glaucus promptlyasked pardon of the oracle, but the oracle refused:
w.s U 7l..
. daraTEE

77P )rapaOflK1V,
ELXKOV...
V7E o0 'AO7v7a-oLrpo)claLc
ioLo6bvAL, 6.86.1.
,GLKoov a
E
rEpt ~rapaOOtKt?s. ., 6.86a; cf. ovzve-tX17... KOtO...
o'vr.v1 'XOt8yeV'oOaL
6.86.3.
Oljvat,
6.86.2; iKCw
prViaV6pa4afp . .. laKOtVEW ptoTa fLKaLoovr'p
ip7rrp ...,
6 18To'ToY
T
7s ai s, PXai3KE, tKaLOoLV)YSp
o
fOUvX6IE'cosroXaictoat,
s -s
6.86.3;
v7 Xbyos 7roXXbs,6.86.4.
SLKatoobof?,r
V rL 7T Eiprlpy(UyP
7T?
X6'7, 6.863.
klTbOaro
rapaOcK71'

S. .

ob

..

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PHOENIX

56

to temptthe god was equivalent to doing thedeed. Glaucus restoredthe

money. "And why, then,O Athenians,do I tell this tale? There is now
no root or branchof Glaucus' line leftin Sparta. The moralof thisstory:
in the case of a deposit do not even harbourintentionof refusingpayment to a claimant."20
However, Athens gave no hearingto this argument,and Leotychides
left. The Aeginetanshad not yet paid "redress" forthe "wrongs" previously committedagainst Athens to please the Thebans. Now, complaining against the Athenians and claimingthey had been "wronged"
themselves,they prepared to retaliate.2'
D. HERODOTUS 7.44-52

Xerxes on his way to Greece pauses at Abydos in order to ascend an

eminencefromwhichhe can reviewhis army and fleet.At the spectacle
of such incomparable numbers of men he firstcongratulatedhimself,
but then wept, whereuponhis uncle Artabanus, an originalopponent
of the expedition,engaged him in a dialogue of which the followingis
a summary:
Art.: Your actionsare in flatcontradiction:22self-congratulation
followed
tears.
by
X.: It occurredto me to calculate"2how briefis the lifeof man; of all
these myriadsnone will be around one hundredyears fromnow.
Art.: There are worse thingsthan that which can happen to us. Short
as lifeis, no one is born blessed withoutthe certaintythat he will often
wish himselfdead rather than alive. Disaster and disease can make
even a shortlifeseem protracted.Death is man's most preferredrefuge;
the god grudgesus more than a taste of pleasure.
X.: You have correctlydefinedwhat human lifereallyis. But to another
topic:24 evils are irrelevantwhen a good enterpriseis in hand. If that
dream had not been so vivid, would your negative view of this expedition still hold, or would you have changed your mind?
Art.: I could hope the vision may issue as we both want it to. But my
fears persist, more particularlyas I see two supreme (elements) extremelyadverse.25

M
rept rapaGOjK
v
rs OiXXoye 7
8tavoaEOat
'7rarEbVrwc
d.yaO6Bv
6.866.
'
arobb6vat,
. . . rpLv7rC rp6repovabLK7arT 80uao
v 3ptoav . . .
0o bLKas r&Pv 'AOnV'aLouS
2ooirw

a cbs r&EAwpa6Aevot. . TapKcUM6.OYTO, 6.87.

&ALOYVres &8LKfeiaQ
22
's iroXX6Y&XXXiwv KeXoptporPa pTpydao....,
7.46.1.
y&p

23ooXO~

. . , 7.46.2.

XooTLdAero.
ab
243LtoTfjsj'V VvUv
VOpwr77s
riTpt, obva7s Troabrls o'lr7v lrep obatpiat

...
8i ot 7r68e,7.47.1.
?rava&/eOaa
4pdpaov
7.47.2.
2b56ora /itywcrar&vrwrov
6vra roXeAtLrcara,

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etvat,

DIKAIOS UNE

57

X.: My dear man, which are these? Is our land army open to criticism
or is our fleetinferior?If eitheris true,additionsare immediatelyavailable.
Art.: No, theirsize is beyond criticism.To increase them is to increase
the hostilityof the two elements: these are land and sea. The sea has
no harbour large enough to shelter the fleet in a storm and you will
need a successionof harbourson the route; the lesson is that men cannot
controlcalamities but are controlledby them. That is one of the two
elements.Now I come to the second: otherobstacles aside, the hostility
directed against you by the land will increase in proportionto your
advance. Success is a commodityin short supply for human beings,
and even in the absence of otheropposition,the land as distance accumulates will starve you. Human excellence consists in planning with
extremecaution, reckoningon every possible vicissitude,beforeacting
with ilan.
X.: You distinguishand define these several matters correctly."6But
you must avoid excessive timidity.If you keep giving second thought
to anything that can come up you will never do anything.An elan
which ignoresexceptionscan run into dangers-say half of those anticipated-but this is far better than a general timiditywhich runs into
nothing.Contentiousargumentsofferedagainst any and every proposal
with no demonstrationof the secure course to take are just as likelyto
court failureas theiropposite. They are self-cancelling.A human being
in fact is denied certainknowledgeof the most secure course. A willingness to act is usually rewardedby success, whichis not trueof continual
hesitation and second thought.The rise of the Persian empire proves
this. My ancestors threw themselvesat danger to achieve what they
did. Great enterprisesin fact always involve great danger. Had they
been guided by your frameof mind this would not have happened. Like
themwe proceedin this campaign to subdue all Europe beforereturning
home. We carry supplies and will also live offthe land which is tilled
and not prairie.
Art.: Since nothing may deter you, take one piece of advice. Great
extensivecalculation.27Cyrusreduced
enterprisescall forcorrespondingly
Ionia to tributarystatus-all of it except Athens. Do not-so I advise
-do not by any means lead forththe Ionians against theirparents.We
don't need them to win. If theyjoin our expeditioneither(a) they will
put themselvescompletelyin the wrong by enslaving their metropolis
or (b) they will put themselvescompletelyin the rightby conspiring
with her to defend her freedom.In the case of (a) they will add no
advantage to us; in the case of (b) theywill gain the capability of doing
2solK6brws Ipv o1' ye rob70rwV
EKaora btLapiaL, 7.50.1.
7.51.1.
X6yov
27wrXevpa
~rKeiYva,,

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58

PHOENIX

severe damage to your expedition." Remember the old saying: you

don't see all the end at the beginning.
X.: Of the ideas so farexpoundedby you"2this last one whichexpresses
fear of revolt by the Ionians is particularlyerroneous.They gave us
supreme proof,witnessedby yourselfand others,when duringDarius'
incursioninto Scythia they could have destroyedthe entireexpedition
and come out on top themselves.What theyin fact respondedwith was
dikaiosuneand loyaltywith everysign of courtesy." Besides, theyhave
left children,wives, and propertybehind them to remindthem not to
revolt. Abandon these fears. I want you to protectmy household and
throne.You are my sole regent.
WhereuponArtabanus was sent back to Susa.
These nine chapters furnishonly one occurrenceof dikaiosune,but,
as in the case of passage A, the occurrencemay be seen to gain significanceonce the extended context is taken into consideration.
E. HERODOTUS7.163-164
Xerxes' invasion,had invitedGelo rulerof Syracuse
Greece,confronting
to lend her militaryand naval assistance,but had refusedhis conditions
for doing this. After the departure homeward of the Greek embassy,
Gelo concluded that the Greekswould probablybe beaten; it was safest
to play a waitinggame. He accordinglydespatched an agent, one Cadmus, a native of Cos, to Delphi entrustingto him a large supply of
funds.His instructionswere to maintain good relationswith everybody
but to await the issue. If Persia won, he was to give the fundto Xerxes
with the usual tokensof submission.If the Greekswon he was to return
with the money. He chose Cadmus because of his past history.Having
inheritedthe kingdomof Cos in good conditionfromhis father,Cadmus
had "deposited" his authorityover Cos with the commonsand gone off
to Sicily. His action was entirelyvoluntary and prompted by dikaiosune.31(In Sicily he acquired Zankle fromSamos and made a settlement
there. The town changed its name to Messene.) Gelo was well aware
that his arrival under these circumstanceswas only one instance of a
generaldikaiosunein him. That is why he used him as emissary.Cadmus
crownedthe recordof rightfulacts emanatingfromhim by the following
supremeexample:32 he completelycontrolledthe large funds entrusted
'
281 ydpoeaS ..
Se
~ALKW7-aTOr
V yLYEovaatL..
7TOVS.. .. L. KCOraTOL
..
tKaoQ
U~LYt6ptIVOL
iv vvv7wb6eYOLob6YKfp'OSiya 7ptvrpoa3aXXovuO,6SKa67arTOL

olot ree67X aaoOatL. . . 7.51.2.

,
7.52.1.
s29rcv&redlvao yvwyc'-wp,

e
7.52.1.
Kal lreYTTS7a YwKav, aXapt& obekv,
aol a6 5LKaLOealvYvY
is
K
eibov wOLcnKaTaOelsv &pXjv. . . , 7.164.1.
3'rb
r5oLatobvjs
r
32S..
6L tLKaLO
bntvfY ol ars6 &XXpv
o-vvl7ee
&oioav,
rvY
6 IrlroeY
tLKaLOLeYL
ToLtL

AXMOLLr7.164.2.
o.2WU.vroi
iXlrero,

epyaUEPVOLUL Kal TIe

i'e/.re.

OiK AXXLtTrovTroUrwY

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DIKAIOSUNE

59

to him and could have appropriatedthem,but he refused.AfterSalamis

and the departureof Xerxes he departed too, but this time to Sicily,
and broughtall the money back with him.
These five contexts yield a total of eight occurrencesof the term
dikaiosune, three of them concentrated in C. They are distributed
through Books One, Two, Six, and Seven, producing the impression
that the usage of the termmay be casual ifnot accidental.But comparison between the five reveals some shared characteristicswhich are
curious.
In A, B, and E dikaiosuneis an "attribute" (we use thistermto avoid
furtherdefinitionat this point) employedby kingsto gain power (Deioces), to keep it (the twelve kings), or (apparently) to relinquish it
(Cadmus). In C and D it occurs as a termplaced in the mouthof kings
(Leotychides and Xerxes); this may be fortuitous,but again perhaps
not. Admittedlyin these two examples it is assigned to persons other
than kings. The "kings" in examples A and B won power through
electionor popular approval (this also coversthe case of the boy Cyrus),
and Leotychidesand Cadmus representthe attitudesnot of absolutism
but limitedmonarchy.In these fourexamplesdikaiosuneas a conception
suffersno impairment.Xerxes in D on the other hand, speaking as an
absolute monarch,posits the presenceof a dikaiosune (in the Ionians)
whichis to be falsifiedby events.33
All these passages have a paradigmatic flavour.The dikaiosuneof
Herodotus is not a virtue of commonmen. It appears in historyas the
propertyof personswho are treatedas exemplars.The unique reputation
of Deioces among his fellowmen is stressed (A), as is that of Glaucus
(C) and Cadmus (E), in each case providing a model of dikaiosune
which effectivelyguides and governs the attitude of others toward the
exemplar.In B this colorationpertains to the peaceful and harmonious
reignof the twelve kingsconductedjointly accordingto threeprinciples
previouslyadopted.34Sometimes it is suggested that the example narrated has in factpassed into history.Thus, in C, a long Spartan tradition
is stressedas the groundof the tale, whichis itselfnarratedas a "happening" of unusual significance.In D, Xerxes invokes the personal
witnessof those who were presentat the crisisof the Danube bridgein
Darius' reign. In E, the hero's act ofintegritycrownsa previousrecord.
Nor is it irrelevantto note the air of historicalromance with which
33That is, if the dialogue looks forwardto Mycale; if only to Salamis, then Xerxes
states a view confirmedby the event (and perhaps offeredto justifyit?).
34Egyptiandikaiosune turns up again in the Aegypticaof Hecateaus of Abdera (DielsKranz, Vorsokr.2.242, lines 13, omitted in index, and 23). The absence of the term in
other Presocratic literature (above n. 4) may suggest that Hecataeus and Herodotus
drew on a common source (Protagoras? See the conclusion of this article).

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60

PHOENIX

all five contextsare invested. In A and B the exemplarsof dikaiosune

are furnishedby the historiesof Persia and Egypt respectively.
The extended contexts (A and B) in which these firsttwo instances
happen to occur may not at firstsight seem directlyrelevant to the
occurrence.Yet comparison between them again yields some curious
and unexpected results. In A, the continuitybetween the romance of
Deioces and the romance of Cyrus is interrupted,but on examination
both turnout to be storieswhichexploreor illustratethe applicationof
dike and dikaion as operative principlesin history. Deioces fromthe
beginningis guided by the conviction that "right" and "wrong" are
irreconcilable.His ascent to power is made logical because he makes
himselfthe effectiveinstrumentforimplementing"right" judicially and
administratively,and the monarchyhe finallyestablishes concentrates
itself upon these aims, with the accompanyingsuppressionof hybris.
The boy Cyrus, like Deioces, is firstdiscoveredoperatingin a village.
His election as king becomes the occasion forthe enforcementof orders
against a subject, and when called to account he cites the claim of dike
as his justification. After the success of his conspiracy against the
Median dynasty, his trusted ministerand the deposed monarch confronteach other in a dialogue which pits the rightand the wrong,the
intelligentand the stupid in dialectical confrontationwith each other.
The schematismof the passage exploitsthat device of formalantithesis
already noted as an intellectualinfluenceon the early career of Deioces.
Although the scenes of A and B are laid in differentcountriesand
alien histories,theyboth turnout to be instanceswherean ethnicgroup
gains its freedomaftera period of subjection and then is rescued from
misgovernment
by a monarchywhichpractisesdikaiosune.35In the case
of A dikaiosune reflectsthe relationshipbetweenjudge and litigantor
betweenmonarchand subject; in B it marksthe maintenanceof a covenanted partnershipin power based on an agreementwhichis kept until
finallyabrogated at the expense of one of the partners,who becomes
the victim of hybris,thus gaining the rightof retaliation,which leads
to dissolution of the partnershipand the re-establishmentof an undivided monarchy.Thus the overall context resemblesthat of the first
of impart of A, a story illustratingthe effectand also the difficulty
plementingdikaion as a principleof government.
The story of Glaucus, told in C, is embedded in an account of a
judgment of hybrisformallypassed against Athens, but a judgment
countered by an Athenian claim of dikaion. This in turn is countered
by a challenge phrased by Leotychides in terms of a schematic antia"The rebellion led by Cyrus likewise conferred"freedom" on the Persians (Hdt.
1.126.6; 127.1). This example of monarchical leadership as an instrumentof liberation
is recalled in the conclusion of the constitutionaldebate (3.82.5).

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DIKAIOSUNE

61

thesis.The plot of the storywhichhe then tells to supportthe challenge

turnson a contrastbetween political and social anarchy (in Ionia) and
its opposite (in the Peloponnese). Dikaiosune, as in the two previous
examples,is to be foundin a contextof political stability.However, the
story about Glaucus proves ineffective.The narrative concludes by
returningto the pointwhereit began: the Athenianspreviouslywronged
by the Aeginetansrepudiatethejudgment against them; the Aeginetans
in turn now claim to have been wronged,and to have "right" on their
side, they demand redress,and they prepare to retaliate. They sound
much like Psammetichuspreparinghis retaliationagainst the eleven.
The context of item D is supplied by a lengthydialogue between
Xerxes and his uncle Artabanus who (as previously,in chapters eight
to nineteenof Book Seven) is cast in the role of a cautionarycounsellor
offeringto his monarch a review of the possible obstacles to Xerxes'
policies. In the final exchange between them the point Artabanus
chooses to make is one of policy but also morality: what will be the
moral postureof the lonians if compelledto serve against theirkindred?
Once more, as in previous examples, the problem is schematized as a
choice poised upon an antithesisbetween the dikaion and the adikon,
each again pushed to the superlative degree. This time the dialectical
dilemmais "solved," so to speak, by Xerxes' complacentrelianceon the
propositionthat the lonians have already demonstratedtheirdikaiosune
by their loyalty to Persia in a similar crisis. The dialogue ends there,
but it should be noted that any reader of Herodotus, aware of the
fallibilityof Xerxes' judgment,would realize that this piece of dialogue
in effectpresents an unsolved dilemma; conduct which is alleged to
exhibitdikaiosunein one instancemay whenrepeatedexhibitthe reverse
in another.
Since it is the dialogue formatwhich makes possible this type of
dialectical confrontation,
it is relevant to consider the entire exchange
which has led up to this concludingdilemma. It was provoked by an
inconsistencyof behaviour amountingto a flat contradiction,noted by
speaker A and explained by the other in termsof a "calculation" he
was making,whichitselfis thenmade the subject of further
commentary
by A. That commentaryis thenapproved by X as a "correctdefinition"
of matters which are accordinglydismissed, in order to introduce a
second topic of discourse.This when taken up by speaker A is developed
by consideringa pair of elements and the role they are respectively
likely to play. Once more speaker X rejoins by approving the correctness of A's "definition"withinthe termsso offered.But X now adds a
set of furtherconsiderationswhich are intended to outweigh what A
has just said. So finallyA is induced to propoundhis thirdproposition,
the problem of "right" as it concernsthe Ionians. In short,the single

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62

PHOENIX

instance of dikaiosunewhich occurs only in the conclusionof this entire

contextcan be seen to occur not onlyin a schematizedcontextof its own
but in a dialogue settingwhichhas a stronglydialecticalflavourthroughout. It may be pertinentto recall the traces of dialogue formatwhich
are perceptiblein the latter half of A, as well as the triple dialogue
whichcomprisesC.
The story of Cadmus on the other hand as told in E is a straightforwardnarrationinnocentof verbal schematismand with no dialectical
overtones.Yet it should be noted that the dikaiosunein questionappears
to have been firstauthenticatedin the political sphere as was the case
in examples A and B, even thoughits expression-the voluntarytransfer of power to the commons-reverses the pattern illustrated in A
and B.
The historian'sstyle is discursive,admittingnot only frequentnarrative digressionbut also the inclusionof descriptivematerialsdrawn from
a variety of sources. The fact that these fivecontextsthemselveswear
the air of intrusionin his narrativeis thereforeno anomaly,nor of itself
does it indicate a commonsource. But the kind of coincidencesbetween
them which our examination has revealed does permit the hypothesis
of a common source and permits also the conclusion that these eight
occurrencesof the termdikaiosune(in view of its rarityotherwise)were
also supplied fromthis source. The precise meaning intended by the
term is not altogetherclear, or perhaps we should say, the emphasis
varies. In A it is the propertyof a judge who demonstratesthe clarity
of distinctionbetween dikaion and adikon by the probity of his legal
administration" which becomes the direct vehicle of his election to
supremepoliticalpower; his politicaladministrationcontinuesto enforce
the same kind of legal probity,thoughhis dikaiosuneis not again mentioned,nor is it mentionedin the account of the administrationof Cyrus
and his seizure of power,despite the fact that this part of the narrative
is preoccupiedwithacts whichexpressdike and dikaion,or are evaluated
by their light. In view of the common legal context of the two terms
fromHomer onwards we need not be surprisedif dikaiosuneat its first
appearance in extant Greek literaturedenotes the quality residentin a
judge who (followingHomeric models) is also a prince, the repository
of political power built on legal authorityand designed to enforceit.
Yet though this kind of paradigm suggests a positive evaluation of
monarchy as the instrumentreplacing disorder by social stability,"
Deioces himselfis cast in the role of a power-hungryplotter,whose
"'Cf. also the proceedings of the Spartan tribunal in example C.
3"See A. T. Cole, Democritusand the Sources of GreekAnthropology
(American Philological Association 1967) 120-130.

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DIK AIOS UNE

63

dikaiosuneserves his personal aggrandisement.Has the historian'stale

combinedtwo disparate versions?Or did his source considerthat dikaiosune was properlyan instrumentat the disposal of ambition and of
absolute authority?
It certainlyremains the instrumentfor maintainingpolitical power
in example B but the context of its operation is more complex. This
time a partnershipagrees to keep a compact concluded under three
heads: two of these are negative, prohibitingintrigue to undermine
authorityand aggressionto overthrowit; the thirdenunciatesa general
principleof social and political goodwill.These are threeguarantees of
social harmonyand stability,and the dikaiosuneemployedby the partnersis by inferenceat least definableas themaintenanceof thisharmony.
Examples C and E, however,transferits operation fromthe political
to the commercialsphere. It becomes that attributeof a man which
makes him a reliable trustee.To be sure, in E the notionof "deposit" is
applied to politics; Cadmus voluntarily transferredor deposited his
power with the commons,and this political act earned him that reputation for dikaiosune which commended him as a trustee. The case of
Glaucus the Spartan is more complex. He is a member of a secure
society,as opposed to the insecurityof Ionia, the countryof the depositor. Hence his dikaiosuneexists in a given political context. But the
storyconcentrateson the problemof his financialprobityand reveals an
intriguingcomplication.The originaldepositorhas died. His heirsmake
the claim of redemption.This has some parallel in the situationof Leotychides confrontingAthens; one of the original depositors had died.
Does this in any way release the trusteefroman obligationcontracted
with a previous party? (The tokens profferedmight have been stolen,
after all.) So the dialogue between the trustee and the depositors is
succeeded by one between the trustee and the religious authorityof
Delphi. The firstresponseis characteristicallyambiguous,but when the
trustee interpretsit as a reproofand offersredress he unexpectedly
discovers it is too late, because according to the moral of the tale as
underlinedby Leotychides,a trusteemust be faithfulin intention38
as
well as in deed. Are we meant to connectthisprinciplewith that dikaiosune which as it turnsout had failed the test? Is therea hint here of a
conceptionof "righteousness"which is internalized,its existence to be
tested by characterratherthan externalobservance?The tale itselfdoes
not make this explicit and the denouementis all the more surprising.
The moral has no effecton the Athenian case, which in despite of it is
sustained on othergrounds.
As forexample D, the dikaiosuneattributedto the Ionians by Xerxes
"8Compare the absence of "intention" in example B, n. 14, above.

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64

PHOENIX

is linked by him with the expressionof "loyalty" and "courtesy." Narrowly considered in this context, it seems almost synonymouswith
personal civility,a freshovertoneto the word, thoughwe recall its link
with amity in example B. However, the matchingreferenceto the same
episode in the historyof IPersian-Ionianrelations (Hdt. 7.10) makes it
clear that the loyalty on this occasion was a piece of prudenceexercised
by a vassal (Histiaeus) who preferredto sustain his overlordin orderto
guaranteehis own security.So the remarkof Xerxes may in factcharacterizeas dikaiosunesimplythe maintenanceof a compact betweenruler
and subject or between two partners-a usage analogous to B. But in
any case the objections of Artabanus are clearlyintendedto cast doubt
on the status of such a dikaiosune: a relationshipwhich is righteousin
one case may turn out to be completelywrongin another."9
The net effectof the slight ambiguitiessurroundingseveral of these
contexts reinforcesthe impressionthat the common source was dialectical, presentingthe concepts of dikaion and dikaiosune as problematic and perhaps relativistic.
These eight occurrencescan be supplemented by four more culled
fromsurvivingprose sources of the pre-Platonicperiod.
F. THE PAPYRUSANTIPHON(Diels-Kranz, Vorsokr.87 B 44; 2.346)
.. . Dikaiosune ... to avoid breakingthe lawful usages of the (particular) city wherecitizenshipis operative. If a human being is to employ
(that formof) dikaiosune most conformablewith interest he should,
when attended by the testimonyof reporters,treat the customs-andlaws as sovereign,but when (he findshimself)isolated fromreporters
(he should substitute) the (rule) of nature.40
G.

(as cited by a commentatoron Plato) (Diels-Kranz,

Vorsokr.85 B 8)

THRASYMACHUS

He wrote in one of his own treatisessomewhat to the followingeffect:

the gods do not look upon the human condition. For they would not
have failed to observe that supreme good found among human beings,
namelydikaiosune.We can observe that human beings evidentlyrefuse
to employit."
3"The dilemma may point up an implicit conflictbetween the claims of dikaiosune
as between friendsand allies (cf. the referenceto Xerxes as an authorityon this subject, Plato Resp. 336A 5) and those of dikaion which regulate relationships of blood
kin.
40
...
tKa
OovvT
....- oi V rv ri 7roX0
# rapa3aivE
vXa
L. Xp4r' &v oiv
.
.
lavr
...
&LKatLOoviY,
/aXto'wra
~vEpUpOVrOS
.vOpwcros
41ob yelp v r iytoarov
r7v v avOpcnrotsdyao3v rape^ov 7rV
6LKaLOOUvV7v.
ydp
robp s dvOpwrovs ravr?7
6p&.te-v
Xpwo4vovs.

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DI K AIOS UNE

65

H. DAMON(as cited in a Philodemus papyrus) (Diels-Kranz, Vorsokr.

37 B 4)
S.. to the inquiry: does music conduce to all virtuesor a few,he says:
"Damon the mousikosthinkstheyconduce to practicallyall; that is, he
says, it is appropriatethat the youngpersonas he chants and plays the
kithara should display the presence not only of courage and (temperance) but also (dikaiosune)."42

J.THUCYDIDES 3.63.3-4 (Thebans respondingto Plataeans)

You say: it is dishonourableto betray benefactors(sc. the Athenians).
We reply: it is more dishonourableand more wrongfulto betray
all Greece.
Nor is the courtesyyou renderreciprocallyto themeitherequated or
exempt fromdishonour.
You say: you had wrongdone to you and so called themin.
We reply: you made yourselvesaccomplices of those who do wrong
to others.
As for dishonour: this consists in a failure to render reciprocally
courtesieswhichmatch each other.
However, the obligationof a courtesyincurredwhen accompanied by
dikaiosune should not be reciprocatedwhen the result is going to be
adikia (i.e., the opposite).43
Antiphon(F) would appear to supplya formaldefinitionof dikaiosune,
and a fairlynarrowone, restrictingit to obedience to law. This recalls
the ambience of the term in contexts A, B, and C above, where its
exercise served to replace anomia by eunomia (A), maintained constitutionaiharmony(B), and affordedrefugeto those livingunderunstable
conditions(C). But Antiphon'sfullstatementleaves open an ambiguity
whichmay enlarge the application of the term.Does the sophist,when
givinghis own prescriptionforcorrectbehaviour,intend that the rules
of dikaiosune and those of nature be mutually exclusive? Or does he
intend to suggest (as our bracketed additions to the text imply) that
the rules of nature are themselvesan expressionof dikaiosune-but a
truerexpression?The point has to be raised because of otherstatements
in the papyrus which,while not employingthe abstract noun, indicate
that Antiphon"wants to keep and to use the termsrightand righteous
and to definethem normatively.""44
Arguingforinstance against those
Ka' u-w(4kpoo-i~vti)v,
VXX&K 8L(KaroUiv2v).
Et6vovavLpe(Lav qcai'vEo-OaL
M
'iKairot ras
Xpt7ras M7 dvrLL66tvat alaXpov
s /e&T
1
6#oias
#aXov
&KaUoav27ssp&v 6IetlX77Oelaas, s aLKlav 68 & robtbojvas, 3.63.4. rVA
42~7

"E. A. Havelock,LiberalTemperin GreekPolitics(London1957) 260.

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66

PHOENIX

legal procedures which forced witnesses into hostile relationshipwith

the parties in court, he writes as follows: "if it is true that it is right
to do wrongto no man if you are not wrongedyourself,then if a man
do the above he cannot be right."45Clearly this kind of argumentproposes not a rejection of the dikaion but a redefinitionof it as the law
of personal non-aggression.This would be Antiphon's own formulafor
dikaiosune. It may appear eccentric,but it is in conformitywith that
aspect of the term which was personal and which connected it with
amity and civility (B and D). Moreover such usage would reflectan
important fact, that by his day dikaiosune had become a prestigious
term to which,whateverits precise meaning,all serious thinkerswould
wish to lay claim.
Such a conclusion throws light on example G. The quotation from
Thrasymachusmay be in part a paraphrase,but it would lose its entire
point if dikaiosune was not employed in the original." In the eyes of
this sophist, the term,whatever he means by it, does indeed identify
a supreme human blessing-but it is honoured in the breach, and so
we must conclude that heaven takes no interestin our human lot. It is
easy to understand how Plato would find such religious and social
cynicismrepugnantand yet also how he would wish to be reconciled
to such a thinker(Resp. 498c 9), whose despair masked but did not
repudiate the existenceof dikaiosune as a cardinal principlein human
affairs.4?
The case of contextH consideredas a piece of testimonyis unsatisfactory.Damon's reputation as a musical theoristis well established.
He was a Periclean figurepresumablyanteriorto all authors in our list
save Herodotus. But it is impossibleto be sure whetherwhen cited in
"4Diels-Kranz, Vorsokr,2.354, col. 1.10-15: roiro robvv' ob 6LKatos Cabra0rotGv,
6

r
&KaLovqarL.
7re1rbp
TL?7)
aLKE&Lv va 1
A7)
&wLKOlV'Evova
avirrwv
L~-q
This is an objection
madeto theconventional
viewof dikaionpreviously
cited:

t
6 aprvpcEVEVdAXX'XOLs
'
T'dlaX1
o70 &KalovV. .. 8KO^VTos 7T
&Kacov voAlterat.c....
echo
the
of the original; cf.
...
may
conceivably
paronomasia
"4IIapebov
6p&w^Lev
the style of Thrasymachus in B 1; Havelock, op. cit. (see n. 44) 231-233. The sentiment
reads like a sophistic "improvement" upon Hesiod Op. 256-273.
47M. Untersteiner,The Sophists translated by K. Freeman (Oxford 1954) 325, tries to
bringthe statementinto line with the position attributed to "Thrasymachus" in Republic 1 by arguingthat it describes a "tragedy forthe intellect" undergoneby a citizenwho
can only act freelywhen he acts as the majoritywills, and so is paradoxicallysubject to
"a coalition of the weak" who maintain the power of the law. This is fairlyabstruse for
a sophist. It is surely more probable that Thrasymachus argued that what existing
society calls "dikaiosune" is really the interest of the stronger,but refrained from
committinghimselfpersonally to the view that this should always be so; so that he
was capable of using the termdikaiosune at two contrastinglevels. Compare the similar
ambiguity in Antiphon's terminology(above, notes 40, 45) and in Hesiod, loc. cit. The
Marxist position is not very different.

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DIK AIOSUNE

67

the Hellenistic age his theorieshave been accommodated to an ethical

terminologywhich Plato's influencehad rendered familiar.Moreover
the trilogyof three virtues which appears in our quotation depends
upon a restorationof the text. If authentic,this is the firstindication
in Greek that dikaiosunehad attained formalclassificationas a virtue,
and that it has joined a canonical list perhaps as the most recent addition. The nature of Damon's theorywould strengthenthe emphasis on
dikaiosune as a personal attribute,though if we rememberPlato's dictum (Resp. 424c 5) that "according to Damon the patternsof mousike
are never changed withoutmajor involvementof the laws of the state"
(with a possible pun on nomos) we can plausibly conclude that for
Damon as forall thinkersof his time,the personalhas not been isolated
in separate conceptionfromthe social and civic. But Damon's role in
our story,if indeed he had one, must remain speculative.
The readerof contextJ (our condensedversionof a portionof a Thucydidean speech) may note a dialectic which recalls th.. flavourof some
of the dialectic found in Herodotus (compare A and D). Competing
moral claims are, as it were,paraded beforethe readerunder competing
banners labelled the honourable and rightful:which claim carries the
correctbanner? In this schematized context once more we confronta
single instance of dikaiosune.The occasion for the use of the word is
supplied by the termcharis,combiningthe notionsof service rendered,
gratitude forthe service, and courtesytenderedand received.The law
of courtesy,say the Thebans, is symmetrical:it conformsto the rule of
reciprocityset by dikaion,which demands that the responsebe morally
equivalent to the stimulus. The original courtesy (from Athens to
Plataea) involved dikaiosune. But the present response of Plataea to
Athens involves adikia. So the law of moral symmetryis broken,the
Plataeans are in the wrong.
Possibly the historianseized for this once on dikaiosune for purely
stylisticreasons: he needed an abstraction to balance adikia. But the
collocation with "courtesy," recallingas it does the language of Xerxes
(Herodotus D) may point to a more deliberate choice of a termwhich
had come to embrace the notion of a civilitymore generousand more
personal in its application than the term dikaion would allow.
It is time to draw togethersome conclusionspertinentto the history
of Greek ethical thought.The citationsavailable to us frompre-Platonic
literaturereveal a term of somewhat Protean dimensions,indexing a
type of behaviour proper to a judge and a ruler and a trustee,but also
to a subject, an ally, and perhaps a personalfriend.It generallybecomes
effectivein social and political contexts.It is (as Aristotlenoted, E.N.
1129b 26 ff.)par excellencea term of social orientation(irphs'repov).It

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PHOENIX

is of major relevance to the maintenanceof social order and political

stability. Yet we have hints that it is a quality of the "heart," as we
would say, and involves personal attitude and choice. Are we to style
it a "virtue"? This became its classic categoryin the fourthcentury.We
instancesit can be "employed" (xpia0ac;
note that in these fifth-century
items B, F, and G) and "practised" (&aKEtv; item A) which mightsupport the authenticityof Damon's canon and suggest that dikaiosune
enjoyed currencyin ethical theorybeforePlato. Above all, it tends to
whetherof state or individual,through
be presentedas a master-virtue,
in
famous
history,or by way ofexplicitstatementthat
personalexamples
it indeed does enjoy or should enjoy a unique status.
When we compare this area of referencewith that connoted by dike
and dikaios and their derivatives and negatives, the traditionalterms
fromwhich this abstractionwas coined,we note the contrastbetweena
conception of proprietybased on the maintenanceof reciprocalrights
and requiringalso the rightof redressand hence of punishmentas the
mechanismof enforcementon the one hand-and on the other a more
ambitious, generous, and ultimatelyinward-lookingconception which
we can convenientlyidentifyas "morality" in the largest sense, or
"righteousness."We spoke earlierof the habit, hard to resist,of rendering the traditionaltermsas though they could express the values that
were to gather around dikaiosune." A truerview of this matterwould
require a narrowerrestrictionof the meaning of dike and the dikaion,
not least in Greek tragedy,and a recognitionthat the idea of morality
in the larger sense came into existence-was in fact invented-only
through the intellectual processes of the Greek enlightenmentin the
last half of the fifthcenturybeforeChrist. Hence the two citationsof
dikaiosune available fromthe poets are simply devoted to celebrating
4"The article in LS7, s.v. 6LKaLosillustratesthe point. Meanings are listed as follows:
under A "observant of custom and rule," a sense classified as Homeric and general;
under B I "equal, even, well-balanced," a sense identifiedas "later," though Pindar is
cited; under B I b "legally exact, precise"; under B II "meet and right, fitting"and
also "normal" and "real, genuine, equitable"; under C "personal: you are bound to
. I have a right to ... ," this usage being also listed in the neuter fortragedy.
These meanings are faithfulto the original limitations of the adjective. But under
A 2 LS7 inserts "observant of duty to gods and men: righteous"; the corresponding
entries do not justify the moralisticimplications of this translation. Under BI 2 LS7
inserts"lawful, just": the entriesindicate that the "justice" involved is still a function
of propriety,reciprocity,and the like. The article s.v. "61bK," on the other hand,
though listing eight classifications of meaning, completely and correctly avoids the
translations"justice," "righteousness."
Aristotlein his doctrineof distributivejustice in effectrationalizes the original usage
of dike and dikaion (E.N. 1130 14 ff.),while giving a preliminarynod towardsjustice
as "complete virtue" (1129b 25 ff), that is, the dikaiosune of Plato.

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DIK AIOSUNE

69

the prestigeof this new discovery.Not unexpectedlyit is Euripides"

rather than his predecessorswho firstrecognizesthe term.Its presence
in the corpus attributedto Theognis50cannot predate the same period.
The age of Theognis himselfwas innocentof any such conception.But
the corpus patentlycame to serve as a school textbookand as such was
receptiveto editorialinterpolations,especiallyof a moralizingcharacter.
The language of the crucial line: "In dikaiosune,to sum up, does all (or
every) virtue exist," is in fact philosopher's language, as the adverb
may indicate."
Therefore in preparing his mighty argument that righteousnessis
indeed a law of the soul, a law of society, and a law of the universe,
Plato was not workingin an intellectualvacuum. Amid the increasing
cynicismof the intellectualatmospherewhich surroundedhis youth,he
facedwhat he thoughtwas a mortaldanger,that the principleof general
moralitynow adumbratedmightbe discreditedas soon as it was born.
Did such a moralityafterall profita man? And so he set out, surrounded
by what he saw as social disintegration,to rehabilitateit on intellectual
foundationswhich should be permanent.In so doing, he rightlysaw
that neitherHomer nor the poets could provide him with any secure
prop fora conceptionwhich had come into existenceat a time not far
precedinghis own birth,and whichowed nothingto them.
Are thereany clues whichcan point to any one thinkeras the inventor
par excellenceof dikaiosune?To framethe question in this way is itself
misleading,since such conceptionsare not so much inventionsas crystallizations formedin epochs which are preparingto receive them. Nevertheless, one thinkermore than most may have played a leading role
in this story. The clues point to Protagoras. But their unravellingis
a task of freshcomplexitycovering not only the testimoniesso far
"'Frag. 486 (Nauck).
"OTheog.147-148. 147 is also attributedto Phocylides (frag. 10) and is quoted anonymously in Aristotle (E.N. 1129b 29) as a proverb, appropriately in his discussion of
Platonic dikalosune (above, n. 48).
61H. K. Usener, Kleine Schriften1. 248, firstsuggested that it could have been a
schoolmaster's interpolation, doubting authenticity because Theophrastus attributes
it at one point to Theognis, at another to Phocylides, and also because of its prosaic
character. P. Friedlander, in Hermes 48 (1913) 587, n., agrees that this kind of
"virtue" is not archaic. E. R. Dodds, The Greeksand the Irrational (Berkeley 1951)
35, accepts the line as "popular in that age," but identifiesdikaiosune as characteristic
of a guilt culture (which, on the view presented in this paper, he may place too early).
occurs otherwise in contexts of a theoretic or argumentative character:
avXX35v677V
Aesch. P.V'. 505 (concluding the kulturgeschichte);Eurip. frag. 362; Plato Protag.
324A, 325c; Resp. 344B, etc.; Lysias 13.47 and 62; compare also avXXap6vow in this
sense Hdt. 3.82.5 (concluding the constitutional debate; cf. n. 35 above), 7.16 (in an
Artabanus-Xerxes dialogue).

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70

PHOENIX

reviewed, and the documented traditionsurroundingthis thinker,but

also much more in the textof Herodotus and of Plato himself,and even
rangingas fardown as the fifthbook of Aristotle'sEthics.This exploration must await a separate treatment.52
YALE UNIVERSITY,

NEW HAVEN

acknowledgethe assistancerenderedby Mr StephenBecrofttowards

521I
gr-.tefully
of thispaper.
thecompletion

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