De Man, 'Conclusions' On Benjamin's Task of The Translator

"Conclusions" on Walter Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator" Messenger Lecture, Cornell
University, March 4, 1983

Author(s): Paul de Man
Source: Yale French Studies, No. 97, 50 Years of Yale French Studies: A Commemorative
Anthology. Part 2: 1980-1998 (2000), pp. 10-35
Published by: Yale University Press
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PAUL DE MAN
"Conclusions" on WalterBenjamin's
"The Task oftheTranslator"
MessengerLecture,
CornellUniversity,
March4, 1983*
EditorialNote
ofthelast ofsix Messenger
Whatappearshereis an editedtranscript
andMarchof1983.The text
Lecturesdeliveredat Cornellin February
supplemented
is based on a collationofthreesets oftaperecordings,
in detail,
witheightpagesofmanuscript
notes.Asidefromdifferences
and emphasis,the notes divergesignificantly
fromthe
formulation,
tapesonlyon thelast sheet,wherede Man wrote:"Im Anfangwardas
Wortund das Wortwar bei Gott/Dasselbewar bei Gott/ohneDasselbe" (thelasttwowordslinedout)-the beginning
ofLuther'stranslation of St. John'sgospel,which Benjaminquotes in Greekand to
in the questionsessionfollowingthe
whichde Man made reference
Cornelllecture.This textretainstracesof the contextin whichthe
to thethreeprecedingleclecturewas delivered,
notablyin references
tures.
Thoughthe task of the transcriber-togive to an unwrittentext
the afterlife
of canonicity-maybe undertakenonlyby suspending
thatunderwrites
theideal offidelity
it,I have triedwhereverpossible
to resistthe necessityoffixingor immobilizingpassageswhichapDe Man's sometimes
pearedto be stillunderwaytowardformulation.
unnaturalized
withtheexceptionofa few
Englishhas beenpreserved,
modifications
attemptedforthe sake ofcoherence.Some sentences,
had to be rearranged.
Solecismsand redundanand a fewparagraphs,
*FromYaleFrenchStudies69 (1985):TheLessonofPaul de Man.
ed.,Displacement:DerridaandAfter,
HegelontheSublime"(inMarkKrupuick,
in
and Materiality
Bloomington:
University
ofIndianaPress,1983),"Phenomenality
Amherst:
UniverQuestionsand Prospects,
Kant"(inShapiroand Sica,Hermeneutics:
sityofMassachusettsPress,1983),afid"KantandSchiller"(unpublished).
**
YFS 97,50 YearsofYaleFrenchStudies,Part2, ed. PorterandWaters,C 2000

byYale University.
10
PAUL DE MAN
11
cies havebeenretained,however,wherethepossibilityofforegrounding a gap betweenoral performance

and printedtextseemedto outof
weigh the likelihood inconvenience;in this way I have triedto
transmitsome of the burdenand risk of reconstruction
on to the
reader.Omissionsand emendationsare intendedto conformto this
principle.I have punctuatedless with an eye to correctusage than
withtheaim ofremaining
faithful
to thetentativenatureoftheact of
transcription.
Here it was myintentionto reproducethepace oforal
deliveryandto close offas fewreadingsas possible,evenwhenleaving
ambiguitiesopenmayhavebeenless trueto de Man's intentthanto a
certainreluctanceto compromisetheinstability
ofthisartifact.
Paragraphing
generallyfollowsde Man's oralpauses and therepetitions
of
thesisstatements
in
withwhichhe seemedto demarcatearticulations
his argument;
suchbreaksareto an extentreflected
in themanuscript
outline.Exceptfora few passages in which de Man adopts Harry
Zohn's translation,
quotationsin this textreproducede Man's own
whichsometimesbearlittleresemblanceto
impromptu
translations,
theavailableEnglishtranslations
citedin mynotes.
The articleis printedwiththekindpermissionoftheUniversity
of
MinnesotaPressto whomithad beenpromised.
-William D. Jewett
I at firstthoughtofleavingthislast sessionopenforconclusionsand
discussion;I stillhope forthe discussion,but I have givenup on the
conclusions.It seemed to me best, ratherthan tryingto conclude
(whichis alwaysa terrible
anticlimax),
justtorepeatoncemorewhatI
have been sayingsince the beginning,
usinganothertextin orderto
have still anotherversion,anotherformulation
ofsome ofthe questionswithwhichwe have been concernedthroughout
this series.It
seemedto me thatthistextbyBenjaminon "The Task oftheTranslator"is a textthatis verywell known,bothin thesensethatit is very
widelycirculated,and in thesense thatin theprofession
you are nounless
have
said
about
this
text.
Since
body
you
something
probably
mostofus have triedto saysomethingaboutit,let me see whatI can
to
do,and sincesome ofyou maybe well ahead ofme,I look forward
thequestionsorsuggestions
youmayhave.So, farfromconcludingor
frommakingverygeneralstatements,
I want to stayprettyclose to
thisparticulartext,and see whatcomes out. IfI say stayclose to the
12
YaleFrenchStudies
I will need(andthatis whyI have

text,sinceit is a texton translation,
all thesebooks) translationsof this text;because ifyou have a text
whichsaysit is impossibleto translate,
it is veryniceto see whathappens when that textgets translated.And the translationsconfirm,
brilliantly,
beyondany expectationswhichI mayhave had,thatit is
impossibleto translate,
as youwill see in a moment.
a
Nevertheless,I have placed this withina kind of framework,
framework
which is historical.Since the problemsof historyhave
I thoughtit wouldbe goodto situateit withina
come up frequently,
or
and thento move on from
historical pseudohistorical
framework,
I startoutwitha recurrent
there.Therefore
problemin historyandhisI use as an introducwhichis theproblemofmodernity.
toriography,
tionintothisa littleessaybytheGermanphilosopherGadamer,who
in a collectioncalledAspektederModernitdt
wrote,manyyearsago,
interestingarticles called "Die philosophischenGrundlagendes
zwanzigstenJahrhunderts"
["The PhilosophicalFoundationsof the
Twentieth
Century"].Gadamerasksthesomewhatnaivebutcertainly
relevantquestion,whetherwhat is beingdone in philosophyin the
twentieth
centurydiffers
essentiallyfromwhatwas beingdonebefore,
in philosophical
and if it thenmakes sense to speak of a modernity
speculationin the twentiethcentury.He findsas the generaltheme,
thegeneralenterprise
ofcontemporary
a criticalconcern
philosophy,
withthe conceptof the subject.Perhapsone wouldn'tsay thisnow,
whichperhapsdatesthispiecea little,butit is stillrelevant.His questionthenis whetherthewayin whichthecritiqueoftheconceptofthe
differs
subjectis beingaddressedbypresent-day
philosophy,
essentially
fromthewayit had been addressedby thepredecessors
ofcontempoin GermanIdealistphilosophy-in some of the auraryphilosophy,
thorswithwhomwe have been concerned,such as Kant,Hegel,and
others.He writesthefollowing
sentence,whichis ourstarting
point:
oftheconcept
in
Is thecritique
ofthesubject
whichisbeingattempted
ourcentury
froma mererepetisomething
else,something
different
tionofwhathadbeenaccomplished
byGerman
Idealistphilosophylesspowerof
and,mustwenotadmit,
with,inourcase,incomparably
andwithouttheconceptual
thatcharacterized
abstraction,
strength
1
theearlier
movement?
1. The Germantext,whichappearedin AspektederModernitdt
Van(G6ttingen:
derhoeck& Ruprecht,1965),77-100, is mostreadilyavailablein Gadamer'sKleine
Schriften
J.C. B. Mohr,1967),v. 1, 131-48. An Englishtranslation
maybe
(TiAbingen:
foundin thecollectionPhilosophicalHermeneutics,
trans.,David E. Linge,(Berkeley:
ofCaliforniaPress,1976),107-29.Cf.KleineSchriften,
v. 1, 141;PhilosophUniversity
ical Hermeneutics,
119.
PAUL DE MAN
13
Is what we are doing just a repetition?And he answers,surprise:

"Thereis not thecase." Whatwe are doingreallyis somethingnew,
somethingdifferent,
and we can lay claim to beingmodernphilosophers.He findsthreerubricsin which we-contemporaryphilosophers-he, Gadamer-is ahead ofhis predecessors,
and he characterizes thesethreeprogressions
in termsof a decreasednaivete.To us
now it seems,ifwe look back on Hegel orKant,thatthereis a certain
benaivetetherewhichwe havenow grownbeyond.He distinguishes
tween threetypesof naivete,which he calls Naivitdtdes Setzens
(naiveteofpositing),
NaivititderReflexion(naiveteofreflection),
and
Naivitdtdes Begriffs
(naiveteoftheconcept).
whatis meantbythefirst,
Verybriefly,
bya certainnaiveteofposition,is a critiquewhichwe have been able to developofpureperceptionandofpuredeclarativediscourse,in relationto theproblemofthe
subject.We are now ahead ofHegel in thatwe knowbetterthatthe
subjectdoesnotdominateitsownutterances;we aremoreawarethat
itis naiveto assumethatthesubjectreallycontrolsitsowndiscourse;
we knowthisis not the case. Yet he qualifiesthisone bit:nevertheless,understanding
is availabletous to someextent,bya hermeneutic
processin whichunderstanding,
by a historicalprocess,can catchup
it had made aboutitself.We geta developwiththepresuppositions
mentofGadamer,discipleofHeidegger,
ofthenotionofa hermeneutic circle,wherethe subjectis blindto its own utterance,but where
ofthatblindneverthelessthereaderwho is awareofthehistoricity
nesscan recoverthemeaning,can recovera certainamountofcontrol
overthe textby means of thisparticularhermeneuticpattern.This
modelofunderstanding
is aheadoftheHegelianmodelexactlyto the
ofHeideggerare
sameextentthatone couldsaythatthehermeneutics
aheadofthehermeneutics
ofHegel,in Gadamer'ssense.
He thenspeaks ofthe naiveteofreflection,
and developsfurther
whatis alreadypositedin thefirst;namely,he assertsthepossibility
in a way thatis notaccessible
now ofa historicity
ofunderstanding,
to individualself-reflection.
It is said thatHegel,in a sense,was not
historicalenough,thatin Hegel it is stilltoo muchthe subjectitself
which originatesits own understanding,
whereasnow one is more
awareofthedifficulty
oftherelationship
betweentheselfand its discourse.Wherein thefirstprogression
he refersto Heidegger'scontrihistoricizbution,herehe refersverymuchto his own contribution:
ingthenotionofunderstanding,
byseeingunderstanding
(as thelater
which comes fromGadamerto a largeextent,
Rezeptionsdsthetik,
will developit) as a processbetweenauthorand readerin whichthe
14
Yale FrenchStudies
readeracquiresan understanding
ofthetextbybecomingawareofthe
ofthe movementthatoccursbetweenthe textand himhistoricity
self.Here Gadameralso makes a claim thatsomethingnew is going
on nowadays,and indeed,the stresson reception,thestresson readtheory,
and can be claimedto
ing,arecharacteristics
ofcontemporary
be new.
Finally,he speaksofthenaiveteoftheconcept,in whichtheproblem oftherelationshipbetweenphilosophicaldiscourseand rhetorical and otherdeviceswhichpertainmoreto therealmofordinary
discourse or commonlanguagewere not,with Kant and Hegel, being
when
examinedcritically.
We alludedto an exampleofthatyesterday
andinvitesus tobecomeaware
Kantraisestheproblemofhypotyposis
oftheuse ofmetaphorsin ourownphilosophicaldiscourse.That type
of question,which at least was mentionedby Kant,and was mentionedbyHegel muchless, is now muchmoredeveloped.Gadamer's
and also indirectlyto Nietzsche.We no
allusionis to Wittgenstein,
languageare
longerthink,saysGadamer,thatconceptualandordinary
separable;we now have a conceptof the problematicsof language
whichis less naive in thatit sees to what extentconceptualphilosophicallanguageis still dependenton ordinarylanguage,and how
whichhe suggests,andwhichhe
closeitis to it.This is themodernity
detailsbythesethreeindications.
Now althoughthisis Kantiantosomeextentin itscriticaloutlook,
it is still verymuch a Hegelian model. The scheme or conceptof
ofa certainnonawarenessornaiveteby
as theovercoming
modernity,
meansofa criticalnegation,bymeansofa criticalexaminationwhich
and theachievimpliesthenegationofcertainpositiverelationships
ofa new disingofa new consciousness,allowsfortheestablishment
coursewhichclaims to overcomeor to renewa certainproblematic.
Thispatternis verytraditionally
Hegelian,in thesensethatthedevelofa
opmentofconsciousnessis alwaysshownas a kindofovercoming
certainnaiveteand a riseofconsciousnessto anotherlevel.It is traditionallyHegelian,whichdoes notmeanthatit is in Hegel,butit is in
Hegel thewayHegel is beingtaughtin theschools.Indeed,Gadamer
endshis piecewitha reference
to Hegel:
from
theChristian
Theconcept
ofspirit,
whichHegelborrowed
spiriofthesubject
andofthe
is stilltheground
ofthecritique
tualtradition,
subjective
spiritthatappearsas themaintaskofthepost-Hegelian,
ofspirit
whichtranThisconcept
thatis tosaymodern,
period.
(Geist),
oftheego,finds
itstrueabodeinthephenomescendsthesubjectivity
PAUL DE MAN
15
ofcontemwhichstandsmoreandmoreas thecenter
nonoflanguage,
porary
philosophy.2
philosophyis a matterof gettingbeyondHegel in
Contemporary
Hegelianterms,byfocusingtheHegeliandemarche,theHegeliandialectic more specificallyon the questionof language.That is how
is heredefined,as a Hegelianismwhichhas concentrated
modernity
moreon linguisticdimensions.
If we comparethe critical,dialectical,nonessentialist(because
pragmaticto some extent,since an allowance is made forcommon
whichGadamerhereadvances,with
language)conceptofmodernity
thenat
Benjamin'stexton languagein "The Task oftheTranslator,"
He would apfirstsight,Benjaminwould appearas highlyregressive.
messianic,in a waythatmay
religiously
pearas messianic,prophetic,
well appeartobe a relapseintothenaivetedenouncedbyGadamer;indeed,he has been criticizedforthis.Such a relapsewouldactuallyreturnto a muchearlierstageeventhanthatofKant,Hegel,andidealist
The firstimpressionyoureceiveofBenjamin'stextis that
philosophy.
whichwould be veryreof a messianic,propheticpronouncement,
motefromthe cold criticalspiritwhich,fromHegel to Gadamer,is
Indeed,as you readthistext,you
held up as the spiritofmodernity.
will havebeenstruckbythemessianictone,bya figureofthepoetas
as a figurewhichechoessacredlanguage.All
an almostsacredfigure,
references
to particularpoetsin the textput thismuch in evidence.
The poetswho are beingmentionedare poets one associateswith a
sacerdotal,an almostpriestlike,spiritualfunctionof poetry:this is
trueofH1lderlin,of George,and ofMallarme,all ofwhom are very
muchpresentin theessay.
(SinceI mentionGeorge,one is awareofthepresenceofGeorge-a
butwhichat that
name whichhas now lost muchofits significance,
time in Germanywas still consideredthe most important,central
poet,althoughin 1923or 1924whenthiswas writtenthiswas already
gettingtowardits end.Forexample,BenjaminquotesPannwitz,a discipleofGeorge,at theendofthetext.Andhe refersto Georgein a relevantway; in Georgetherewas a claim made forthe poet again as
some kindofprophet,as a kindofmessianicfigure-Georgedoesn't
kidaroundwiththat,he sees himselfat leastas VirgilandDante combinedintoone,withstillquitea bitaddedto it ifnecessary-therefore
he has a highlyexaltednotionoftheroleofthepoet,and incidentally
p. 128.
v. 1,p. 148;PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
2. Cf.KleineSchriften,
16
YaleFrenchStudies
ofhimself,and ofthebenefitsthatgo withit.Butthistonehangsover

theGermanacademicdiscourse,and overa certainconceptofpoetry,
whichwerethencurrent.
Therearemanyechoesofit in thewayBenjaminapproachestheproblem,at leastseen superficially.
The same is
trueofreferences
to Hblderlin,who at thattimewas a discoveryof
Georgeand ofhis group,whereyoufinda certainmessianic,spiritual
conceptofH6lderlin.Manyechoesofthisarestillto be foundin Heion H1lderlinto Nordegger,
who afterall dedicatedhis commentaries
bertvon Hellingrath,
who was a discipleofGeorgeand a memberof
theGeorgecircle,andwhowas,as youknow,thefirsteditorofH6lderlin. I sketchin thislittlepiece ofbackground-itmaybe familiarto
you,it maybe entirely
redundant-toshowthatthemood,theatmospherein whichthisessaywas writtenis one in whichthenotionof
thepoeticas thesacred,as thelanguageofthesacred,thefigureofthe
is common,and is frequent.)
poetas somehowa sacredfigure,
It is notjustin theformofechoesthatthisis presentin Benjamin,
it almostseemsto have beenpartofthestatementitself.This notion
ofpoetryas the sacred,ineffablelanguagefindsperhapsits extreme
in thecategoricalwayin whichBenformalreadyfromthebeginning,
jamindismissesanynotionofpoetryas beingorientedin anysense,
towardan audienceor a reader.This passagehas provokedthe ire of
thedefenders
ofRezeptionsisthetik,
who analyzetheproblemofpoeticinterpretation
fromtheperspective
ofthereader-StanleyFishor
in thiscountryfollowthatline to some extent,but it is of
Riffaterre
courseJaussand his discipleswho do thisthemost.Forthem,a sentencelike the one whichbeginsthis essay is absolutelyscandalous.
Benjaminbeginstheessaybysaying:
ofa workofartoranartform,
ofthe
Intheappreciation
consideration
Notonlyis anyreference
to a certain
receiver
neverprovesfruitful.
buteventheconceptofan
publicoritsrepresentatives
misleading,
inthetheoretical
ofart,
"ideal"receiver
is detrimental
consideration
ofmanas such.Art,inthe
sinceallitpositsis theexistence
andnature
sameway,positsman'sphysical
andspiritual
butinnoneof
existence,
No poemis intended
for
itsworksis it concerned
withhisresponse.
nosymphony
thereader,
nopicture
forthebeholder,
forthelistener.3
3. Walter
Benjamin,
"TheTaskoftheTranslator,"
inIlluminations,
trans.,
HarryZohn,
fromtheFrenchtranslation
ofMaurice
(NewYork:SchockenBooks,1969),69. Quotations
de Gandillacaretakenfrom
WalterBenjamin,
Oeuvres(Paris:EditionsDenoe1,1971).Page
notidennumbers
referring
toeitheroftheseversions
aregiveninparentheses;
translations
in Gerwitha pagenumberaretheauthor's.
tified
Pagenumbers
suppliedwithquotations
manrefer
tothepaperback
Illuminationen
2ded.,1980).
(Frankfurt,
Suhrkamp,
PAUL DE MAN
17
He couldn'tbe morecategoricalthanin thisassertionat thebeginning

of the essay.You can see how this would have throwntheminto a
slightpanicin Konstanz,a panicwithwhichtheydeal bysayingthat
thisis an essentialisttheoryofart,thatthisstresson theauthorat the
sincealreadyKanthad giventhe
expenseofthereaderis pre-Kantian,
reader,thereceptor,
thebeholderan importantrole,moreimportant
thantheauthor's.This thenis heldup as an exampleoftheregression
to a messianicconceptionofpoetrywhichwould be religiousin the
wrongsense,andit is verymuchattackedforthatreason.
But on the otherhand,Benjaminis also frequently
praisedas the
onewhohas returned
thedimensionofthesacredto literary
language,
thesecuandwhohas thusovercome,orat leastconsiderably
refined,
larhistoricity
ofliterature
on whichthenotionofmodernity
depends.
Ifone can thinkofmodernity
as it is describedbyGadameras a loss of
the sacred,as a loss of a certaintypeofpoetic experience,as its rewhichloses contactwithwhatwas
placementbya secularhistoricism
originally
essential,thenone can praiseBenjaminforhavingre-establishedthecontactwithwhathad therebeenforgotten.
Evenin Habermas therearestatementsin thatdirection.Butcloserto home,an exampleofsomebodywho readsBenjaminwitha greatdeal ofsubtlety,
and who praiseshimpreciselyfor
who is awareofthecomplications,
the way in whichhe combinesa complexhistoricalpatternwith a
senseofthesacred,is Geoffrey
Hartman,who writesin one ofhis latestbooksas follows:
ofhopeandcatastrophe
Thischiasmus
is whatsaveshopefrom
being
as anillusionorunsatisfied
movement
unmasked
as onlycatastrophe:
ofhopebecomesreofdesirethatwreckseverything.
Thefoundation
thefunction,
whichconfirms
eventhedutyofhistorian
membrance;
thatinandcritic.To recallthepastis a politicalact:a "recherche"
us
volvesuswithimagesofpeculiar
power,
imagesthatmayconstrain
toidentify
withthem,thatclaimthe"weakMessianic
power"inuse
theirfixedlocationinhistory,
(Thesis2).Theseimages,
splitofffrom
the
undoconcepts
ofhomogeneous
time,flashupintoorreconstitute
"ToRobespierre,"
continuing
Marx'sreflecpresent.
Benjamin
writes,
tionsin TheEighteenth
"ancient
Romewasa pastcharged
Brumaire,
withthetimeofnow(Jetztzeit)
whichheblastedoutofthecontinuum
The French
revolution
vieweditselfas Romeincarnate"
ofhistory.
(Thesis14).4
in theWilderness:
TheStudyofLiterature
Today
Criticism
4. Geoffrey
H. Hartman,
Press,1980),78.
(NewHaven:Yale University
18
YaleFrenchStudies
The reference
hereis to historicalremembrance,
to a historicalconceptwhichthendovetails,whichinjectsitselfintoan apocalyptic,
religious,spiritualconcept,thusmarrying
historywiththe sacredin a
It is certainly
waywhichis highlyseductive,highlyattractive.
highly
attractive
to Hartman,and one can understand
why,sinceit givesone
boththelanguageofdespair,thelanguageofnihilism,withtheparticularrigorthatgoeswiththat;but,at thesametime,hope!So youhave
it all: youhave thecriticalperception,
youhave thepossibilityofcarryingon in apocalyptictones,you have theparticulareloquencethat
comeswiththat(becauseone can onlyreallygetexcitedifone writes
in an apocalypticmode);but you can stilltalk in termsofhope,and
Benjaminwouldbe an exampleofthiscombinationofnihilisticrigor
with sacredrevelation.A man who likes a judicious,balancedperspectiveon thosethings,likeHartman,has reasonto quoteand to admirethispossibility
in Benjamin.The problemofthereceptionofBenit
jamincenterson thisproblemofthemessianicand veryfrequently
is thistexton "The TaskoftheTranslator"thatis quotedas one ofthe
mostcharacteristic
indicatorsin thatdirection.
We now thenask thesimplest,themostnaive,themostliteralof
possiblequestionsin relationto Benjamin'stext,and we will notget
beyondthat:whatdoes Benjaminsay?Whatdoes he say,in themost
immediatesensepossible?It seemsabsurdto ask a questionthatis so
becausewe can certainlyadsimple,thatseemsto be so unnecessary,
mitthatamongliteratepeoplewe would at leasthave some minimal
aboutwhatis beingsaid here,allowingus thento embroiagreement
derupon thisstatement,to take positions,discuss,interpret,
and so
on.Butit seemsthat,in thecase ofthistext,thisis verydifficult
to establish.Eventhetranslators,
who certainlyare close to thetext,who
had to readit closelyto some extent,don'tseem to have theslightest
idea ofwhatBenjaminis saying;so muchso thatwhenBenjaminsays
certainthingsrathersimplyin one way-for examplehe says that
somethingis not-the translators,
who at least know Germanwell
enoughtoknowthedifference
betweensomething
is andsomething
is
not,don'tsee it! and put absolutelyand literallytheoppositeofwhat
Benjaminhas said. This is remarkable,
I
because the two translators
thetextin English,andMauricede
have-HarryZohn,whotranslated
Gandillac,who translatedthe textin French-are verygood translators,and knowGermanverywell. HarryZohn,you mayknow;Mauricede Gandillacis an eminentprofessor
ofphilosophyat theUniversityofParis,a verylearnedman who knowsGermanverywell, and
PAUL DE MAN
19
who shouldbe able to tell the difference

between,forexample,"Ich
gehenachParis"and "Ich gehenichtnach Paris."It is notmoredifficultthanthat,butsomehowhe doesn'tgetit.
An examplewhichhas becomefamousand has an anecdoteis the
passage near the end of Benjamin'sessay,whereBenjaminsays the
Sinn,"and
ohnevermittelnden
following:"Wo derTextunmittelbar,
so on, "der Wahrheitoder der Lehre angehdrt,ist er tibersetzbar
withoutmediaschlechthin"(62). "Wherethe textpertainsdirectly,
ado,
tion,to therealmofthetruthand ofdogma,it is,withoutfurther
so
there
is
no
schlechthin,
translatable"-thetextcan be translated,
it. Gandillac?-I won'tcommenton thisproblemabouttranslating
translatesthis relativelysimple, enunciatorysentence: "La oui le
texte, immediatement, sans l'entremise d'un sens ... releve de la
veriteou de la doctrine,il estpurementet simplementintraduisible"

(275)-untranslatable.Whatadds some comedyto thisparticularinstanceis thatJacquesDerridawas doinga seminarwiththisparticular textin Paris,usingtheFrench-Derrida'sGermanis prettygood,
but he prefersto use the French,and when you are a philosopherin
FranceyoutakeGandillacmoreorless seriously.So Derridawas bason theuntranslatability,
ingpartofhisreadingon the"intraduisible,"
untilsomebodyin his seminar(so I'm told)pointedout to him that
the correctwordwas "translatable."I'm sureDerridacould explain
thatit was the same-and I mean thatin a positivesense,it is the
same,but still,it is not the same withoutsome additionalexplanation.This is an example,and we will soon see some otherexamples
which are moregermaneto the questionswhich we will bringup
aboutthistext.
theexemplary
figWhy,in thistext,tobeginwith,is thetranslator
ure?Whyis thetranslator
heldup in relationto theverygeneralquestionsaboutthenatureofpoeticlanguagewhichthetextasks?The text
is a poetics,a theoryofpoeticlanguage,so whydoes Benjaminnotgo
as in the
to thepoets?orto thereader,possibly;orthepairpoet-reader,
Andsincehisis so negativeaboutthenotionofremodelofreception?
betweenthepair
ceptionanyway,whatmakestheessentialdifference
and thepairauthor-translator-since
one'sfirst,
simple
author-reader
is a readeroftheoriginaltext?
wouldbe thatthetranslator
impression
Thereare,to some extent,obviousempiricalanswersone can give.
The essaywas written,
as youknow,as an introduction
to Benjamin's
own translation
oftheTableauxparisiensofBaudelaire;it mightjust
But
be out ofmegalomaniathathe selectsthefigureofthetranslator.
20
YaleFrenchStudies
thisis not the case. One of the reasonswhyhe takes the translator
ratherthan the poet is thatthe translator,
per definition,
fails.The
translator
can neverdo whatthe originaltextdid.Anytranslationis
alwayssecondin relationto theoriginal,and thetranslator
as suchis
lostfromtheverybeginning.
He is perdefinition
he is per
underpaid,
definition
overworked,
he is perdefinition
theone historywill notreallyretainas an equal,unlesshe also happensto be a poet,butthatis
not always the case. If the textis called "Die Aufgabedes Jbersetzers,"we have to readthistitlemoreorless as a tautology:Aufgabe,
task,can also meantheonewhohas togiveup.IfyouentertheTourde
Franceand yougiveup, thatis theAufgabe-" erhataufgegeben,"
he
doesn'tcontinuein theraceanymore.Itis in thatsensealso thedefeat,
The translator
has togiveup in relation
thegivingup,ofthetranslator.
to thetaskofrefinding
whatwas therein theoriginal.
The questionthenbecomeswhythisfailurewithregardto an origThe question
inal text,to an originalpoet,is forBenjaminexemplary.
also becomeshow the translator
differs
fromthepoet;and hereBenis radicallyunlike,
jaminis categoricalin assertingthatthetranslator
differs
essentiallyfromthepoetand fromtheartist.This is a curious
thingto say,a thingthatgoesagainstcommonsense,because one assumes(andobviouslyit is the case) thatsome ofthe qualitiesnecesare similarto the qualitiesnecessaryfora
saryfora good translator
thattheyaredoingthesame
goodpoet.This doesnotmeantherefore
so shockingin a way,thathere
thing.The assertionis so striking,
againthetranslator
(Mauricede Gandillac)does not see it. Benjamin
unlikeart,cannot
says(inZohn's translation),
"Althoughtranslation,
claim permanence forits products. . ." (75); Gandillac, the same pas-
encorequ'elle ne puisseeleverune pretensage: "Ainsila traduction,

tiona la dureede ses ouvrages,et en cela elle n'estpas sans ressemblance avec Part. . ." (267). The originalis absolutelyunambiguous
"(bersetzung also, wiewohl sie auf Dauer ihrer Gebilde nicht
AnsprucherhebenkannundhierinuniihnlichderKunst.. . " (55).As
you come upon it in a text,the statementis so surprising,
goes so
muchagainstcommonsense,thatan intelligent,
learned,and careful
cannotsee it,cannotsee whatBenjaminsays.It is remarktranslator
able.Zohn saw it-don't gettheimpressionthatZohn getsit all right
andGandillacgetsit all wrong-basicallyGandillacis a littleaheadof
Zohn,I think,in thefinalanalysis.
At any rate,forBenjaminthereis a sharpdistinctionbetween
tobe goodpoets.Someof
them.It is notnecessaryforgoodtranslators
PAUL DE MAN
21
thebesttranslators-hementionsVoss (translator
ofHomer),Luther,
and Schlegel-are verypoorpoets.Thereare somepoetswho arealso
translators:
he mentionsH6lderlin,whotranslated
Sophoclesandothers,andGeorge,whotranslated
Baudelaire-Dante also,butprimarily
Baudelaire,so Benjaminis close to George.Butthen,he says,it is not
because theyare greatpoets thattheyare greattranslators,
theyare
greatpoetsand theyaregreattranslators.
Theyarenotpurely,as Heideggerwill say ofH6lderlin,DichterderDichter,but theyare Ubersetzerder Dichter,theyare beyondthe poets because theyare also
translators.
A numberof the mosteminentones,such as Luther,
Voss,and
Schlegel,
areincomparably
moreimportant
as translators
thanas creativewriters;
someofthegreatamongthem,suchas HJlderlin
and
besimply
subsumed
Stefan
George,
cannot
as poets,andquiteparticularlynotifweconsider
themas translators.
Astranslation
is a modeof
itsown,thetaskofthetranslator,
too,mayberegarded
as distinct
and
from
thetaskofthepoet.(76)
clearly
differentiated
Ofthedifferences
and that
betweenthesituationofthetranslator
ofthepoet,thefirstthatcomesto mindis thatthepoethas somerelationshipto meaning,to a statementthat is not purelywithinthe
realmoflanguage.That is thenaiveteofthepoet,thathe has to say
thathe has to conveya meaningwhichdoes notnecessarsomething,
ofthetranslator
to theoriginal
ilyrelateto language.The relationship
is therelationship
betweenlanguageand language,whereintheproblem of meaningor the desireto say something,the need to make a
is entirelyabsent.Translationis a relationfromlanguage
statement,
to language,nota relationto an extralinguistic
meaningthatcouldbe
orimitated.That is notthecase forthepoet;pocopied,paraphrased,
notparaphrase,
orinterpretation,
a copy
etryis certainly
clarification,
in thatsense;and thatis alreadythefirstdifference.
Ifitis in somefundamental
wayunlikepoetry,
what,in Benjamin's
resemble?One ofthethingsit resembleswould
text,does translation
in thatit is critical,in thesamewaythatphilosophyis
be philosophy,
critical,ofa simplenotionofimitation,ofphilosophicaldiscourseas
an Abbild (imitation,
ofthereal situation.
paraphrase,
reproduction)
Philosophyis notan imitationoftheworldas we knowit,butit has
anotherrelationship
to thatworld.Criticalphilosophy,
and thereference wouldbe specifically
to Kantagain,will be criticalin the same
wayofthenotionoftheimitativeconceptoftheworld.
22
Yale French Studies
Um das echteVerhaltnis
zwischenOriginal
und Jbersetzung
zu erfassen,ist eineErwdgung
anzustellen,
derenAbsichtdurchaus
den
Gedankengdngen
analogist,in denendie Erkenntniskritik
die UneinerAbbildstheorie
zu erweisen
moglichkeit
hat.(53)
Inorder
toseizeupontherealrelationship
between
theoriginal
andits
translation,
we muststartreflection
ofwhichtheintent
is ingeneral
similarto themodesofthought
bymeansofwhicha critical
epistethe impossimology-there'sKant,Erkenntniskritik-demonstrates
ofa theory
orsimpleimitation.
bility
Kant indeed would be criticalof a notion of art as imitation;this

wouldbe trueofHegelto some extenttoo,becausethereis preciselya
criticalelementthatinterveneshereandwhichtakesthisimage,this
undoesthisconceptofimitation.
model,away,whichdestroys,
Translationis also, saysBenjamin,morelike criticismor like the
thanlike poetryitself.It is bydefining
himselfin
theoryofliterature,
relationto Friedrich
Schlegeland to GermanRomanticismin general
thatBenjaminestablishesthis similaritybetweenliterarycriticism
(inthesenseofliterary
theory)and translation;
andthishistoricalreferenceto theJenaRomanticismheregivesto thenotionofcriticism
and literarytheorya dignitywhichit does not necessarilynormally
have. Bothcriticismand translationare caughtin the gesturewhich
Benjamincalls ironic,a gesturewhichundoesthestabilityoftheoriginalbygivingita definitive,
orin the
canonicalformin thetranslation
In a curiousway,translationcanonizesits own version
theorization.
morethantheoriginalwas canonical.Thattheoriginalwas notpurely
it cannot
canonicalis clearfromthefactthatit demandstranslation;
sinceit can be translated.
Butyoucannot,saysBenjamin,
be definitive
translatethe translation;once you have a translationyou cannot
translateit anymore.You can translateonlyan original.The translationcanonizes,freezes,an originaland showsin theoriginala mobilwhichat firstone didnotnotice.The act ofcritical,
ity,an instability,
theoreticalreadingperformed
by a criticlike FriedrichSchlegeland
performed
byliterary
theoryin general-bymeansofwhichtheoriginal workis notimitatedorreproduced
butis to someextentputin motion,de-canonized,questionedin a way which undoes its claim to
canonicalauthority-issimilarto whata translator
performs.
and thatwill be themostdiffiFinally,translationis like history,
In whatis themostdifficult
cult thingto understand.
passagein this
text,Benjaminsaysthatit is like historyto theextentthathistoryis
PAUL DE MAN
23
notto be understood
byanalogywithanykindofnaturalprocess.We
arenot supposedto thinkofhistoryas ripening,
as organicgrowth,or
even as a dialectic,as anythingthatresemblesa naturalprocessof
growthand ofmovement.We are to thinkofhistoryratherin thereverseway;we areto understand
naturalchangesfromtheperspective
ofhistory,
ratherthanunderstand
historyfromtheperspective
ofnaturalchanges.Ifwe wanttounderstand
whatripening
is,we shouldunderstandit fromtheperspective
ofhistoricalchange.In thesameway,
therelationship
betweenthetranslationand theoriginalis not to be
understood
byanalogywithnaturalprocessessuchas resemblanceor
derivation
byformalanalogy;ratherwe areto understand
theoriginal
fromtheperspectiveofthetranslation.
To understandthishistorical
patternwouldbe theburdenofanyreadingofthisparticulartext.
All theseactivitiesthathavebeenmentioned-philosophy
as critical epistemology,
criticismand literarytheory(the way Friedrich
Schlegeldoes it),or historyunderstoodas a nonorganicprocess-are
themselvesderivedfromoriginalactivities.Philosophyderivesfrom
butit is unlikeperception
perception,
becauseit is thecriticalexaminationofthetruth-claims
ofperception.
Criticismderivesfrompoetry
becauseitis inconceivable
withoutthepoetrythatprecedesit.History
derivesfrompureaction,sinceit followsnecessarilyuponactswhich
have alreadytakenplace.Becauseall theseactivitiesare derivedfrom
originalactivities,theyare singularlyinconclusive,are failed,are
abortedin a sense fromthe startbecause theyare derivedand secondary.Yet Benjamininsiststhatthemodeloftheirderivationis not
thatofresemblanceorofimitation.It is notnaturalprocess:thetranslationdoes notresembletheoriginaltheway thechildresemblesthe
parent,noris it an imitation,a copy,ora paraphraseoftheoriginal.In
thatsense,since theyare notresemblances,
sincetheyare notimitaThe transtions,one wouldbe temptedto saytheyarenotmetaphors.
the German
lationis not the metaphorof the original;nevertheless,
wordfortranslation,
meansmetaphor.Ubersetzentransiibersetzen,
latesexactlytheGreekmeta-phorein,
tomoveover,iibersetzen,
toput
I shouldsay,translatesmetaphor-which,asserts
across.Ubersetzen,
Benjamin,is notat all thesame.Theyarenotmetaphors,
yettheword
meansmetaphor.
The metaphoris nota metaphor,
Benjaminis saying.
No wonderthattranslators
It is a curiousassumption
have difficulty.
to say iibersetzenis notmetaphorical,
iibersetzenis notbased on resemblance,thereis no resemblancebetweenthe translationand the
is notmetaphor.
original.Amazingly
paradoxicalstatement,
metaphor
24
YaleFrenchStudies
All theseactivities-criticalphilosophy,
literary
theory,
historyresembleeach otherin the factthattheydo not resemblethatfrom
whichtheyderive.Buttheyareall interlinguistic:
theyrelateto what
in theoriginalbelongsto language,and notto meaningas an extralinguisticcorrelatesusceptibleofparaphraseand imitation.They disarticulate,theyundo the original,theyrevealthatthe originalwas always alreadydisarticulated.They reveal that theirfailure,which
seemsto be due to thefactthattheyare secondaryin relationto the
original,reveals an essential failure,an essential disarticulation
whichwas alreadytherein theoriginal.Theykill theoriginal,bydiscoveringthat the originalwas alreadydead. They read the original
fromtheperspective
ofa purelanguage(reineSprache),a languagethat
wouldbe entirelyfreedofthe illusionofmeaning-pureformifyou
want;andin doingso theybringto lighta dismembrance,
a de-canonizationwhichwas alreadytherein theoriginalfromthebeginning.
In
theprocessoftranslation,
as Benjaminunderstands
it-which has littleto do withtheempiricalact oftranslating,
as all ofus practiceit on
a dailybasis-there is an inherentandparticularly
threatening
danger.
The emblemofthatdangeris Hdlderlin'stranslations
ofSophocles:
Confirmation
ofthisas well as ofeveryotherimportant
aspectis
suppliedby H6lderlin's
translations,
particularly
thoseof the two
ofSophocles.
Inthemtheharmony
tragedies
ofthelanguages
is soprofound
thatsenseis touched
bylanguage
the
only wayanaeolianharpis
touched
bythewind.... H6lderlin's
inparticular
translations
aresubjecttotheenormous
inall translations:
danger
inherent
thegatesofa
language
thusexpanded
andmodified
mayslamshutandenclosethe
withsilence.H6lderlin's
translator
translations
from
were
Sophocles
hislastwork,in themmeaning
plungesfromabyssto abyssuntilit
threatens
tobecomelostinthebottomless
oflanguage.
depths
(81-82)
to theextentthatit disarticulates
Translation,
theoriginal,to theextentthatit is purelanguageandis onlyconcernedwithlanguage,gets
drawnintowhathe calls thebottomlessdepth,somethingessentially
whichis in languageitself.
destructive,
Whattranslation
tothefictionorhypothesis
ofa
does,byreference
purelanguagedevoidoftheburdenofmeaning,is thatit implies,in
to lightwhatBenjamincalls "die Wehendes eignenen"-the
bringing
ofwhatone thinksofas one'sown-the suffering
suffering
oftheoriginal language.We thinkwe areat ease in ourown language,we feela
a shelterin the languagewe call our own,in
coziness,a familiarity,
whichwe thinkthatwe arenotalienated.Whatthetranslation
reveals
PAUL DE MAN
25
in ourrelationto ourownorigis thatthisalienationis at itsstrongest

inal language,thattheoriginallanguagewithinwhichwe areengaged
in a way whichimposesupon us a particularalienis disarticulated
Here too the translators,
withconsideration,a particularsuffering.
able unanimity,cannotsee this statement.Benjamin'stextis, ".
dass geradeunterallen Formenihrals Eigensteses zufdllt,aufjene
Nachreifedesfremden
Wortes,aufdieWehendes eigenenzu merken"
(54). The two translators-.Iguess theydidn'tcorrespondwith each
other,theydidthisd'un communaccord-translateWehen,pains,as
"birthpangs,"as beingparticularly
thepains ofchildbirth.
Gandillac
is veryexplicitaboutit,he calls it "les douleursobstetricales"(266)in
themostliteral,clinicalway;Zohn says "birthpangs"(73).Whythey
do thisis a mystery.
Wehencan mean birthpangs,but it does mean
withoutnecessarilytheconnotationofbirthand
anykindofsuffering,
ofresurrection,
whichwouldbe associatedwiththenotionof
rebirth,
in producingsomething-andthisis a
birthpangsbecauseyou suffer
magnificent
moment,you'dbe willingto suffer
(especiallyeasyforus
tosay).Benjaminhas justbeenspeakingofthe"Nachreifedesfremden
Wortes,"translatedby Zohn as "maturingprocess,"which again is
wrong.Nachreifeis like the Germanword Spiltlese(a particularly
goodwine made fromthe late,rottengrape),it is like Stifter's
novel
thefeeling
Nachsommer("IndianSummer")-it has themelancholy,
ofslightexhaustion,oflifetowhichyouarenotentitled,happinessto
whichyouarenotentitled,timehas passed,and so on. It is associated
with anotherword that Benjaminconstantlyuses, the word iiberleben,to live beyondyourown deathin a sense. The translationbelongsnotto thelifeoftheoriginal,theoriginalis alreadydead,butthe
translation
oftheoriginal,thusassumingand
belongsto theafterlife
thedeathoftheoriginal.Nachreifeis ofthesame order,or
confirming
has to do withthe same; it is byno meansa maturingprocess,it is a
lookingback on a processofmaturitythatis finished,and thatis no
longertakingplace. So ifyou translateWehenby "birthpangs,"you
would have to translateit by "death pangs" as much as by "birth
pangs,"and thestressis perhapsmoreon deaththanon life.
The processof translation,
if we can call it a process,is one of
changeand ofmotionthathas theappearanceoflife,butoflifeas an
because translationalso revealsthe death of the original.
afterlife,
Whyis this?Whatare thosedeathpangs,possiblybirthpangs,ofthe
is not.It is
original?It is easyto sayto someextentwhatthissuffering
certainlynotsubjectivepains,some kindofpathosofa self,a kindof
26
YaleFrenchStudies
ofa self-pathos
manifestation
whichthepoetwouldhaveexpressedas
his sufferings.
This is certainlynot thecase, because,saysBenjamin,
thesufferings
thatare herebeingmentionedarenot in anysensehuofan individual,orof
man.Theywouldcertainlynotbe thesufferings
Zohn,cona subject.That also is veryhardto see, forthetranslators.
frontedwith thatpassage (I will stop this game of showingup the
butitis alwaysofsomeinterest),
translates:"iftheyareretranslators,
ferred
exclusivelyto man" (70).Benjaminveryclearlysays,"wennsie
nicht... aufdenMenschenbezogenwerden"(51),ifyoudo notrelate
thatis menthemto man. The stressis preciselythatthe suffering
a
human
it
does
not
refer
therefore
the
is
not
to
failure,
tioned, failure,
any subjectiveexperience.The originalis unambiguousin that reis also nota kindofhistoricalpathos,thepathos
spect.This suffering
to Benjaminas theonewho had
thatyouheardin Hartman'sreference
the
of
is
discovered pathos history;it notthispathosofremembrance,
orthispatheticmixtureofhopeandcatastrophe
andapocalypsewhich
Hartmancaptures,whichis presentcertainlyin Benjamin'stone,but
it is not
notso muchin whathe says.It is notthepathosofa history,
Zeit" between
thepathosofwhatin H6lderlinis called the "dtrftige
thedisappearanceofthegodsand thepossiblereturnofthegods.It is
bymeansof
notthiskindofsacrificial,
dialectical,andelegiacgesture,
whichone looks back on thepastas a periodthatis lost,whichthen
givesyouthehopeofanotherfuturethatmayoccur.
are
The reasonsforthispathos,forthisWehen,forthissuffering,
specifically
linguistic.TheyarestatedbyBenjaminwithconsiderable
linguisticstructural
precision;so muchso thatifyou come to a word
like "abyss" in the passage about Hilderlin,where it is said that
the
H6lderlintumblesin theabyssoflanguage,youwouldunderstand
word"abyss"in thenonpathetic,
technicalsensein whichwe speakof
thekindofstructure
a mise en abymestructure,
bymeansofwhichit
is clearthatthetextitselfbecomesan exampleofwhatit exemplifies.
is itselfa translation,
and theuntranslataThe textabouttranslation
bilitywhichit mentionsaboutitselfinhabitsits owntextureandwill
inhabitanybodywho in his turnwill tryto translateit,as I am now
andfailing,to do. The textis untranslatable,
it was untranslattrying,
forthe
who triedto do it,it is untranslatable
able forthe translators
whotalkaboutit,itis an exampleofwhatit states,itis
commentators
a mise en abymein the technicalsense,a storywithinthe storyof
whatis itsown statement.
WhatarethelinguisticreasonswhichallowBenjaminto speakofa
PAUL DE MAN
27
ofa disarticulation,
suffering,
ofa fallingapartofanyoriginalwork,or
ofanyworkto theextentthatthatworkis a workoflanguage?On this
us whatamountsin veryfewlines
Benjaminis veryprecise,and offers
to an inclusivetheoryoflanguage.The disjunctionis firstofall betweenwhathe calls "das Gemeinte,"whatis meant,andthe"Artdes
Meinens," thewayin whichlanguagemeans;betweenlogosandlexis,
ifyouwant-what a certainstatementmeans,and thewayin which
is meanttomean.Herethedifficulties
ofthetranslators
thestatement
are a littlemoreinteresting,
because theyinvolvephilosophicalconcepts that are of some importance.Gandillac, a philosopherwho
knowsphenomenology
andwhowritesin a periodwhenphenomenologyis the overriding
philosophicalpressurein France,translatesby
"visee intentionelle"(272). The way we would now translatein
French"das Gemeinte"and "Artdes Meinens" would be by the distinctionsbetweenvouloirdire and dire: "to mean," "to say." Zohn
translatesby "theintendedobject"and the "mode ofintention"(74).
There is a phenomenologicalassumptionhere,and Gandillachas a
footnotewhichrefersto Husserl:bothassume thatthemeaningand
the way in whichmeaningis producedare intentionalacts. But the
problemis preciselythat,whereasthemeaning-function
is certainly
it is not a prioricertainat all thatthemode ofmeaning,
intentional,
thewayin whichI mean,is intentionalin anyway.The wayin which
I can tryto meanis dependentuponlinguisticproperties
thatarenot
only[not]madebyme,becauseI dependon thelanguageas itexistsfor
thedeviceswhichI will be using,it is as such notmade byus as historicalbeings,it is perhapsnotevenmadebyhumansat all. Benjamin
thatit is notat all certainthatlanguageis in
says,fromthebeginning,
anysensehuman.To equatelanguagewithhumanity-as Schillerdid,
as we saw yesterday-isin question.Iflanguageis notnecessarilyhuman-if we obeythelaw,ifwe functionwithinlanguage,and purely
in termsoflanguage-therecan be no intent;theremaybe an intentof
meaning,butthereis no intentin thepurelyformalwayin whichwe
of the sense or the meaning.The
will use languageindependently
whichputsintentionality
on bothsides,bothin theact of
translation,
meaningandin thewayin whichone means,missesa philosophically
interesting
point-forwhatis at stakeis thepossibilityofa phenomenologyoflanguage,or ofpoeticlanguage,thepossibilityofestablishoflaning a poeticswhichwould in any sense be a phenomenology
guage.
How are we to understandthis discrepancybetween "das
28
Yale FrenchStudies
Gemeinte"and "Artdes Meinens,"betweendire and vouloirdire?

Benjamin'sexampleis the GermanwordBrotand the Frenchword
pain. To mean "bread,"whenI need to name bread,I have theword
Brot,so thattheway in whichI mean is byusingthewordBrot.The
translation
will reveala fundamental
discrepancy
betweentheintent
to nameBrotand thewordBrotitself,in itsmateriality,
as a deviceof
meaning.IfyouhearBrotin thiscontextofH6lderlin,who is so often
whichis the
mentionedin thistext,I hearBrotund Weinnecessarily,
greatH6lderlintext that is verymuch presentin this-which in
FrenchbecomesPain et vin."Pain et vin" is whatyougetforfreein a
restaurant,
in a cheaprestaurant
whereit is stillincluded,so pain et
vin has verydifferent
connotationsthanBrotund Wein.It bringsto
mindthepain frangais,baguette,ficelle,batard,all thosethings-I
nowhearin Brot"bastard."This upsetsthestabilityofthequotidian.
I was veryhappywiththewordBrot,whichI hearas a nativebecause
mynativelanguageis Flemishand we say brood,just as in German,
butifI have to thinkthatBrot[brood]andpain are thesame thing,I
getveryupset.Itis all rightin Englishbecause"bread"is close enough
to Brot[brood],despitethe idiom "bread"formoney,whichhas its
problems.Butthestabilityofmyquotidian,ofmydailybread,thereassuringquotidianaspectsoftheword"bread," dailybread,is upsetby
the Frenchwordpain. WhatI mean is upsetby the way in which I
mean-the wayinwhichitis pain,thephoneme,thetermpain,which
dihas itssetofconnotations
whichtakeyouin a completelydifferent
rection.
This disjunctionis best understood(to take it to a morefamiliar
betweenthe
theoretical
problem)in termsofthedifficult
relationship
Whenyou do hermeneuhermeneuticsand the poeticsofliterature.
tics,youareconcernedwiththemeaningofthework;whenyoudopoof
etics,you are concernedwiththestylisticsorwiththedescription
theway in whicha workmeans.The questionis whetherthesetwo
whetheryou can coverthe fullworkby doing
are complementary,
hermeneutics
and poeticsat thesame time.The experienceoftrying
to do thisshowsthatit is notthecase. Whenone triesto achievethis
thepoeticsalwaysdropsout,and whatone always
complementarity,
doesis hermeneutics.
One is so attracted
byproblemsofmeaningthat
itis impossibleto do hermeneutics
andpoeticsat thesametime.From
themomentyou startto getinvolvedwithproblemsofmeaning,as I
tendto do, forgetabout the poetics.The two are not
unfortunately
thetwomaybe mutuallyexclusivein a certainway,
complementary,
PAUL DE MAN
29
and thatis partofthe problemwhichBenjaminstates,a purelylinguisticproblem.

He statesa further
versionofthiswhenhe speaksofa disjunction
betweenthewordand the sentence,Wortand Satz. Satz in German
means not just sentence,in the grammaticalsense,it means statement-Heideggerwill speakofDer Satz vomGrund;Satz is thestatement,the mostfundamental
statement,meaning-the most meaningfulword-whereaswordis associatedbyBenjaminwithAussage,
theway in whichyou state,as the apparentagentofthe statement.
Wortmeansnotonlytheagentofthestatementas a lexicalunit,but
also as syntaxand as grammar.Ifyou look at a sentencein termsof
words,you look at it notjustin termsofparticularwordsbut also in
termsofthegrammaticalrelationships
betweenthosewords.So the
questionoftherelationship
betweenwordand sentencebecomes,for
Benjamin,the questionof the compatibility
betweengrammarand
meaning.Whatis beingputin questionis preciselythatcompatibility,
whichwe take forgrantedin a whole seriesof linguisticinvestigations.Aregrammar(wordand syntax)on theone hand,and meaning
(as it culminatesin theSatz) on theotherhand-are theycompatible
witheach other?Does theone lead to theother,does theone support
the other?Benjamintells us thattranslationput thatconvictionin
is really
questionbecause,he says,fromthemomentthata translation
wordby word,the meaningcompletelydisappears.
literal,wbrtlich,
ofSophocles,whichare
The exampleis againH6lderlin'stranslations
absolutelyliteral,wordbyword,andwhicharetherefore
totallyunintelligible;what comes out is completelyincomprehensible,
completelyundoesthesentence,the Satz ofSophocles,whichis entirely
gone.The meaningofthewordslipsaway(as we saw,a wordlikeAufgabe,whichmeanstask,also meanssomethingcompletelydifferent,
so thatthewordescapesus), and thereis no grammatical
way to controlthis slippage.There is also a completeslippageof the meaning
when the translatorfollowsthe syntax,when he writesliterally,
has tobe w6rtlich,
has tobe
wortlich.Andto someextent,a translator
literal.The problemis bestcomparedto therelationship
betweenthe
letterandtheword;therelationship
betweenthewordandsentenceis
like the relationshipbetweenletterand word,namely,the letteris
withoutmeaningin relationto the word,it is asimos, it is without
meaning.Whenyou spell a wordyou say a certainnumberofmeaninglessletters,whichthencome togetherin theword,but in each of
the lettersthewordis not present.The two are absolutelyindepen-
30
YaleFrenchStudies
dentofeach other.Whatis beingnamedhereas the disjunctionbetweengrammarand meaning,Wortand Satz,is themateriality

ofthe
letter:theindependence,
orthewayin whichthelettercan disruptthe
ostensiblystablemeaningofa sentenceand introducein it a slippage
bymeansofwhichthatmeaningdisappears,evanesces,andbymeans
ofwhichall controloverthatmeaningis lost.
a disjunctionin languagebetweenthehermeneuSo we have,first,
tic and thepoetic,we have a secondone betweengrammar
and meaning,andfinally,
we willhavea disjunction,
saysBenjamin,betweenthe
symboland what is beingsymbolized,a disjunctionon the level of
tropesbetweenthetropeas suchand meaningas a totalizingpowerof
tropologicalsubstitutions.
Thereis a similarand equallyradicaldisjunction,betweenwhattropes(whichalwaysimplytotalization)conveyin termsoftotalizationand whatthetropesaccomplishtakenby
ofthisparticular
themselves.
Thatseemstobe themaindifficulty
text,
the
full
and
it
because textis
oftropes,
selectstropeswhichconveythe
illusionoftotality.
It seemsto relapseintothetropological
errorsthat
uses imagesofseed,ofripening,
of
it denounces.The textconstantly
harmony,
it uses the imageof seed and rind(l'ecorceet le noyau)
whichseemtobe derivedfromanalogiesbetweennatureandlanguage,
whereastheconstantclaimis constantly
beingmadethatthereareno
in
suchanalogies.In thesamewaythathistoryis notto be understood
termsofan analogywithnature,tropesshouldnotbe basedon resemand the chalblanceswithnature.Butthatis preciselythe difficulty,
lengeof thisparticulartext.WheneverBenjaminuses a tropewhich
seemsto conveya pictureoftotalmeaning,ofcompleteadequacybetweenfigureand meaning,a figureofperfectsynecdochein whichthe
partialtropeexpressesthetotalityofa meaning,he manipulatestheallusivecontextwithinhis workin sucha waythatthetraditional
symbetweensymbol is displacedin a mannerthatactsoutthediscrepancy
bol andmeaning,ratherthantheacquiescencebetweenboth.
One striking
exampleofthatis theimageoftheamphora:
mustmatchone
ofa vesselwhicharetobe gluedtogether
Fragments
inthesmallest
another
details,
although
theyneednotbelikeoneanInthesameway,a translation,
themeanother.
insteadofresembling
theorigiandin detailincorporate
ingoftheoriginal,
mustlovingly
nal'smodeofsignification,
thusmakingboththeoriginaland the
ofa greater
translation
as fragments
recognizable
language,
justas fragmustinlarge
mentsarepartofa vessel.Forthisveryreasontranslation
fromwantingto communicate.... (78)

measurerefrain
PAUL DE MAN
31
Accordingto thisimage,thereis an original,purelanguage,ofwhich

anyparticularworkis onlya fragment.
That wouldbe fine,provided
findaccess again to the original
we could, throughthat fragment,
work.The imageis thatofa vessel,ofwhichliterary
workwouldbe a
is a piece ofthat.It is admittedthatthe
piece,andthenthetranslation
translation
is a fragment,
butifthetranslation
relatestotheoriginalas
a fragment
as such the
relates,if the translationwould reconstitute
original,then-althoughit does not resembleit,but matchesit perfectly(as in the wordsymbolon,which statesthe matchingof two
we can thinkofanyparticular
workas
piecesortwofragments)-then
of the pure language,and thenindeedBenjamin's
beinga fragment
statementwould be a religiousstatementabout the fundamental
unityoflanguage.
Benjaminhas toldus, however,thatthe symboland whatit symdo not correspond.
bolizes,the tropeand whatit seems to represent,
How is thistobe madecompatiblewitha statementliketheone made
ofTranslahere?An articleby Carol Jacobscalled "The Monstrosity
tion,"whichappearedin ModernLanguageNotes,treatsthispassage
in a waywhichstrikesme as exceedingly
preciseandcorrect.First,she
is awareofthe Kabbalisticmeaningof the text,by referring
to GershomScholem,who in writingaboutthistextrelatesthefigureofthe
angelto thehistoryoftheTikkunoftheLurianicKabbalah:
Yetat thesametimeBenjaminhas in mindtheKabbalisticconceptof
theTikkun,themessianicrestoration
andmendingwhichpatchestogetherand restoresthe originalBeingof things,shatteredand corofVessels,"andalso (theoriginalbeingof)hisruptedin the"Breaking
tory.
Carol Jacobscomments,
Scholemmighthaveturnedto "Die Aufgabedes tbersetzers,"where
the image of the brokenvessel plays a more directrole.... Yet
whereasZohn suggeststhata totalityof fragments
are broughttogether,Benjamininsists that the finaloutcome is still "a broken
part."5(763,note9)
All you have to do, to see that,is translatecorrectly,instead of trans-
latinglike Zohn-who made this difficult

passage veryclear-but
who in the processof makingit clear made it say somethingcom5. Carol Jacobs,"The Monstrosity
ofTranslation,"
ModernLanguageNotes,v. 90
(1975),763,note9.
32
YaleFrenchStudies
Zohn said, "fragments

of a vessel which are to be
pletelydifferent.
gluedtogethermustmatchone anotherin the smallestdetail."Benjaminsaid,translatedby Carol Jacobswordbyword:"fragments
ofa
vessel, in orderto be articulatedtogether"-whichis much better
than glued together,
which has a totallyirrelevantconcreteness"mustfollowone anotherin thesmallestdetail"-which is notat all
thesame as matchone another.Whatis alreadypresentin thisdifference is thatwe have folgen,not gleichen,not to match.We have a
a successivepattern,
inwhichthingsfollow,ratherthana
metonymic,
metaphorical
unifying
patternin whichthingsbecomeone byresemblance.Theydo notmatcheach other,theyfolloweachother;theyare
alreadymetonymsand notmetaphors;as such theyare certainlyless
workingtowarda convincingtropologicaltotalizationthanifwe use
theterm"match."
Butthingsgetevenmoreinvolved,ormoredistorted,
in whatfollows.
itselfsimilar
tothemeaning,
So,insteadofmaking
totheSinnofthe
original,
thetranslation
mustrather,
lovingly
andindetail,initsown
formitselfaccording
language,
to themannerofmeaning(Artdes
oftheoriginal,
tomakebothrecognizable
as thebroken
Meinens)
parts
ofthegreater
arethebroken
language,
justas fragments
partsofa vessel.
Thatis entirelydifferent
fromsaying,as Zohn says:
in thesamewaya translation,
insteadofresembling
themeaning
of
theoriginal,
mustlovingly
and in detailincorporate
theoriginal's
modeofsignification,
thusmaking
andthetranslaboththeoriginal
tionrecognizable
as fragments
ofa greater
language,
justas fragments
arepartofa vessel.
are partofa vessel" is a synecdoche;"just as frag"Justas fragments
ments,"saysBenjamin,"are the brokenpartsofa vessel": as suchhe
is notsayingthatthefragments
he saysthefragconstitutea totality,
and thattheyremainessentiallyfragmentary.
mentsare fragments,
and theywill neverconTheyfolloweach otherup, metonymically,
a
I'm
reminded
stitute totality.
of an exampleI heardgivenby the
Frenchphilosopher
MichelSerres-thatyoufindout aboutfragments
but
by doingthe dishes:ifyou breaka dishit breaksintofragments,
you can'tbreakthefragments
anymore.That's an optimistic,a positivesynecdochalview oftheproblemoffragments,
becausetherethe
can make up a whole,and you cannotbreakup the fragfragments
PAUL DE MAN
33
ments.Whatwe havehereis an initialfragmentation;

anyworkis toin relationto thisreineSprache,withwhichit has
tallyfragmented
nothingin common,and everytranslationis a fragment,
is breaking
the fragment-sothe vessel keeps breaking,constantly-andnever
reconstitutes
it; therewas no vessel in thefirstplace,or we have no
knowledgeofthevessel,orno awareness,no access to it,so forall intentsandpurposestherehas neverbeenone.
Thereforethe distinctionbetweensymboland symbolized,the
nonadequationofsymbolto a shatteredsymbolized,
thenonsymbolic
characterofthisadequation,is a versionofthe others,and indicates
ofrhetoricas a systemoftropeswhichwouldbe protheunreliability
ductiveofa meaning.Meaningis alwaysdisplacedwithregardto the
meaningit ideally intended-that meaningis neverreached.Benjaminapproachesthequestionin termsoftheaporiabetweenfreedom
and faithfulness,
the questionwhichhauntsthe problemof translahavetobe faithful,
ordoesithavetobe free?For
tion.Does translation
thesake oftheidiomaticrelevanceofthetargetlanguage,it has to be
free;on theotherhand,it has to be faithful
to some extentto theoriginal. The faithful
translation,
whichis alwaysliteral,how can it also
be free?It can onlybe freeifit revealstheinstabilityofthe original,
andifitrevealsthatinstability
as thelinguistictensionbetweentrope
andmeaning.Purelanguageis perhapsmorepresentin thetranslation
thanin theoriginal,
butin themodeoftrope.Benjamin,whois talking
abouttheinabilityoftropetobe adequateto meaning,constantly
uses
the verytropeswhich seem to postulatethe adequationbetween
meaningand trope;buthe preventsthemin a way,displacesthemin
such a way as to put theoriginalin motion,to de-canonizetheorigiof
nal, givingit a movementwhichis a movementofdisintegration,
This movementofthe originalis a wandering,
an erfragmentation.
rance,a kindofpermanentexileifyouwish,butit is notreallyan exile,forthereis no homeland,nothingfromwhichone has beenexiled.
Least ofall is theresomethinglike a reineSprache,a purelanguage,
whichdoes notexistexceptas a permanentdisjunctionwhichinhabits all languagesas such,includingand especiallythe languageone
calls one's own. Whatis to be one's own languageis mostdisplaced,
themostalienatedofall.
Now it is this motion,this errancyof languagewhich never
reachesthe mark,which is always displacedin relationto what it
meantto reach,it is thiserrancy
oflanguage,thisillusionofa lifethat
As such,historyis not
is onlyan afterlife,
thatBenjamincalls history.
34
YaleFrenchStudies
human,because it pertainsstrictlyto the orderoflanguage;it is not

natural,forthesamereason;itis notphenomenal,in thesensethatno
cognition,no knowledgeabout man,can be deprivedfroma history
whichas such is purelya linguisticcomplication;and it is notreally
temporaleither,becausethestructure
thatanimatesit is nota temporalstructure.
Those disjunctionsin languagedo getexpressedbytemporalmetaphors,
buttheyareonlymetaphors.
The dimensionoffuturity,forexample,whichis presentin it, is not temporal,but is the
ofthefigural
correlative
patternandthedisjunctivepowerwhichBenjaminlocatesin the structure
oflanguage.History,as Benjaminconceives it, is certainlynot messianic,since it consistsin the rigorous
separationand theactingout oftheseparationofthesacredfromthe
poetic,theseparationofthereineSprachefrompoeticlanguage.Reine
Sprache,thesacredlanguage,has nothingin commonwithpoeticlanguage;poeticlanguagedoes notresembleit,poeticlanguagedoes not
dependon it,poeticlanguagehas nothingtodo withit.Itis withinthis
negativeknowledgeofits relationto the languageofthe sacredthat
poeticlanguageinitiates.It is,ifyouwant,a necessarilynihilisticmomentthatis necessaryin anyunderstanding
ofhistory.
Benjaminsaid thisin theclearestofterms,notin thisessaybutin
anothertext called "Theological and Political Fragment,116from
whichI will quote a shortpassagein conclusion.He said it withall
possibleclarity,
it seemedto me,untilI triedto translatethatparticularpassage,and foundthatEnglishhappensto have a property
which
makesit impossibleto translate.Hereis thepassage:
in thesensethatit
Onlythemessiahhimself
putsan endtohistory,
fulfills
ofhistory
frees,
therelationship
tothemessianic.
completely
Therefore,
nothing
thatistruly
historical
canwanttorelatebyitsown
volition
tothemessianic.
ofGodis nottheteTherefore
thekingdom
losofthedynamics
ofhistory,
itcannotbeposited
as itsaim;seenhisitis notitsaimbutitsend.
torically
That is whereI have a greatdeal oftroublewithEnglish,because the
Englishwordfor"aim" can also be "end." You say,"the end and the
means,"theaim and themeansbywhichyou achieveit. AndtheEnglishword"end" can meanjustas well Ziel as it can meanEnde. My
end,myintention.So thatifwe wanttouse thatidiom,thetranslation
6. Cf.Illuminationen op. cit.,262. An Englishtranslation
ofthe"Theologico-Political Fragment"
maybe foundin Reflections,
EdmundJephcott,
trans.,PeterDemetz,ed.
(New York:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,
1978),312-13.
PAUL DE MAN
35
it is notits endbutits end,"its terthenbecomes:"seen historically

mination-it wouldbe perfectEnglish.Butit wouldindicatethatthe
separationwhich is hereundertakenby Benjaminis hiddenin this
word"end" in English,whichsubstitutesfor"aim" theword"end,"
apart.
thetwothingswhichBenjaminasksus to keeprigorously
beposited
Itcannot
as itsaim;seenhistorically
itis notitsaimbutits
theorder
oftheprofane
end,itstermination;
therefore
cannotbe conin termsoftheideaofthesacred.Therefore
theocracy
does
structed
nothavea political
butonlya religious
meaning.
AndBenjaminadds:
To havedeniedthepoliticalsignificance
tohavedenied
oftheocracy,
thepoliticalsignificance
ofthereligious,
messianic
view,tohavedeniedthiswithall desirable
ofBloch'sbook
intensity
is thegreatmerit
TheSpirit
ofUtopia.
Sincewe saw thatwhatis herecalledpoliticalandhistoricalis due
to purelylinguisticreasons,we can in thispassagereplace"political"
by "poetical,"in thesenseofa poetics.Forwe now see thatthenonmessianic,nonsacred,thatis thepoliticalaspectofhistoryis thereoflanguage,so thatpoliticalandpoetical
sultofthepoeticalstructure
in
are
here substituted, oppositionto thenotionofthe sacred.To the
extentthat such a poetics,such a history,is nonmessianic,not a
it has no roomforcertainhistoricalnotions
theocracybuta rhetoric,
suchas thenotionofmodernity,
whichis alwaysa dialectical,thatis
to say an essentiallytheologicalnotion.You will rememberthatwe
in termsofa dialectic
startedoutfromGadamer'sclaimto modernity,
whichwas explicitlyassociatedwiththeword"Spirit,"withthespirto
itualityin thetextofHegel.Wehaveseen,anditis forme gratifying
find,thatHegel himself-when,in the sectionoftheAestheticson
the sublime,he rootsthe sublimein thisseparationbetweensacred
andprofane-is actuallymuchcloserto Benjaminin "The Task ofthe
Translator"thanhe is to Gadamer.I will endon thatnote,andI willbe
gladto answerquestionsifyouwant.Thankyouverymuch.

De Man, 'Conclusions' On Benjamin's Task of The Translator

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"Conclusions" on Walter Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator" Messenger Lecture, Cornell

University, March 4, 1983

YFS 97,50 YearsofYaleFrenchStudies,Part2, ed. PorterandWaters,C 2000

cies havebeenretained,however,wherethepossibilityofforegrounding a gap betweenoral performance

I will need(andthatis whyI have

Is what we are doing just a repetition?And he answers,surprise:

ofhimself,and ofthebenefitsthatgo withit.Butthistonehangsover

He couldn'tbe morecategoricalthanin thisassertionat thebeginning

who shouldbe able to tell the difference

veriteou de la doctrine,il estpurementet simplementintraduisible"

encorequ'elle ne puisseeleverune pretensage: "Ainsila traduction,

Yale French Studies

Kant indeed would be criticalof a notion of art as imitation;this

in ourrelationto ourownorigis thatthisalienationis at itsstrongest

Gemeinte"and "Artdes Meinens,"betweendire and vouloirdire?

and thatis partofthe problemwhichBenjaminstates,a purelylinguisticproblem.

dentofeach other.Whatis beingnamedhereas the disjunctionbetweengrammarand meaning,Wortand Satz,is themateriality

fromwantingto communicate.... (78)

Accordingto thisimage,thereis an original,purelanguage,ofwhich

latinglike Zohn-who made this difficult

Zohn said, "fragments

ments.Whatwe havehereis an initialfragmentation;

human,because it pertainsstrictlyto the orderoflanguage;it is not

it is notits endbutits end,"its terthenbecomes:"seen historically

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