I.

PLACE OF JUDICIAL POWER: ARTICLE 8

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
Section 4.2 All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard
by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential
decrees,
proclamations,
orders,
instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Section 5.2 Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

DOCTRINES:

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION:

The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with
the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual
and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty
to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
OPOSA V FACTORAN: As worded, the new provision (Par. 2.
Sec. 1 Art VIII of the Constitution) vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
KILOSBAYAN v GUINGONA:
Issues involving transcendental
importance allows the brushing aside of procedural barriers.

TANADA V ANGARA:
validity of a treaty

The court has the power to review the

The Court stated they could only exercise the constitutional

duty vested on it which is to determine whether or not there had
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the branch of a government which in
this instance is the Senate, in its act of ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes. To decide as to whether such
exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. Clearly, this poses a political and not a
justiciable question because it is an issue that people can decide on
in electing their policy makers

SANTIAGO v. BAUTISTA:
The Court cannot decide on a
specific case where no law has conferred them the authority to do
so. Since there is no law authorizing the Court to assume
jurisdiction in a case involving the said committee, the Court
cannot decide on the case.

Philippines came from donations and contributions and not by

taxation. There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or
monetary interest.
PEOPLE v. VERA: As a general rule, only those who are parties to
a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision.

CASE OR CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT: ELEMENTS

1. STANDING
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions

PACU V SECRETARY: there is no justiciable controversy

presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury
from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such
powers granted to him by the said law.
GONZALES V HECHANOVA: our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congres

Petitioner has sufficient interest. Case at bar involves

question which is a purely legal one. It falls under the
exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

GONZALES V. MARCOS: The court shall rule that taxpayer has no

legal standing to question executive acts that do not involve the
use of public funds. The funds administered by the President of the

The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns (calls

into question) the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws. the state is a proper party,
indeed, the proper party, to bring this action. The
state is always interested where the integrity of its
Constitution or statutes is involved. (Supreme Court of
Kansas) The mere fact that the Probation Act has been
repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila
but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People
of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its
validity.
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless that question
is properly raised & presented in appropriate cases &
is necessary to a determination of the case = the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.

FRANCISCO V HRET
to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from
real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in
interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public
policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to
whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has
capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed

towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,

standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits,
as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties
have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in
interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled
to the avails of the suit.'
CITIZEN,
the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury

as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or

contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement
that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the
existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take
judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any
interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
FLAST V COHEN: Taxpayers have standing to sue to prevent the
disbursement of federal funds in contravention of the specific
constitutional prohibition against government support of religion.
2. RIPENESS

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of

whether the instant petitions are premature

TAN v. MACAPAGAL: held that for a case to be considered ripe for

adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture." Only then may the courts
pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
POE V ULLMAN: eld that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a
Connecticut law that banned the use of contraceptives, and banned
doctors from advising their use, because the law had never been
enforced. Therefore, any challenge to the law was deemed unripe,
because there was no actual threat of injury to anyone who
disobeyed the law.
3. MOOTNESS
DE FUNIS v ODEGAARD: The case became moot and academic
because whatever the outcome of the case may be, De Funis will
be allowed to finish the term. There is no case or controversy to
decide anymore.

- Federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot

affect the rights of litigants in the case before him.

Due process in administrative proceedings also requires

consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of
evidence to support the decision. The procedures in the expulsion
case were fair, open, exhaustive, and adequate.

II. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE:

Notice and hearing as a due process requirement is not necessarily

an actual hearing but an opportunity of be heard.

Article 3 Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
1. Procedural Due Process

Due Process in Educational Institutions:

1.
The students must be informed in writing of the nature and
case of any accusation against them;

Banco Espanol v Palanca: Jurisdiction of the court can make no

distinction as much or little. Either the court has jurisdiction or not.
As for due process need not be so rigorous. All that the law
provides for due process is the opportunity for the defendant to
be heard, and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it
would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the
notice was fatal.

2.
They shall have the right to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired;

ANG TIBAY v CIR: Fundamental requirements and procedures of

due process in trials of an administrative in character

5.
The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.

3.

They shall be informed of the evidence against them;

4.
They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf

1. right to a hearing
2. consideration of evidence by the court
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached

2. Old Substantive Due Process: Protection for Property

Interest
Lochner v. New York:

4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial

decisions in an admin court so as to free them from technical rules

The 1897 labor law, which limits the working hours of the
employees of a bakery, is an abridgment to the liberty of contract
and a violation of due process.

5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the

hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to other judicial
bodies.

The state may only exercise a valid police power when it relates to
the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.

6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy.

It mustnt merely accept the views of a subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the
decision
ADMU V CA

BALACUIT v CFI
To invoke the exercise of police power, it must appear that the
interest of the public generally requires an interference
with private right but the means must be reasonable as
well.
It is not necessary for public interest because its a private contract.
The means of imposing this law is unreasonable because it is

impossible to determine the child based on looks and the rule on

showing birth certificates are impractical
Lawful Subject and a Lawful Purpose.
1.
The interests if the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference
2.
That the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individual.

3.NEW Substantive Due Process: Protection for Liberty

Interest in Privacy
Olmstead v US: The Fourth Amendment's proscription on
unreasonable search and seizure did not apply to wiretaps.
What was done in the case which was the tapping of telephone
wires, since there was no search and seizure that was done and the
mode the evidence was acquired was through hearing. Therefore
affirming that there was no violation to the right to privacy of
Olmstead
Skinner v Oklahama: Notice and right to be heard are provided
as rights in the act. Though provided for a hearing, he was not
given an opportunity to defend himself. The matter talked about in
the hearing was W/N he was fit to undergo the surgery, and not for
him to raise a defense.
Right to hearing is not just actual hearing per se but an opportunity
of be heard and raise a defense.
Eisenstadt v. Baird: If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.
ROE vs WADE: The right of privacy is broad enough to encompass
a womans decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The
court held under the 9th Amendment that the right of personal
privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.

Laurence v texas: Petitioners were free as adults to engage in

private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause. The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.

BOE v. Earls: Court concluded that the drug testing of Tecumseh

students who participate in extracurricular activities is reasonable
of furthering the School Districts important interest in preventing
and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren.
Constitutional rights of the public school children cannot disregard
the schools custodial and tutelary responsibility for their safety.
OPLE v. TORRES: Bill of Rights Sec. 2. The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized
DUNCAN ASSOC v GLAXO WELCOME: Policies of prohibiting
employees to marry an employee from a competing company are
considered valid because companies have the right to protect its
economic interest and trade secrets against their competitors.

4. Protected Interest in Property

Mere Regulation under the Due Process Clause versus
Taking of Property via the Power of Eminent Domain
YNOT v. IAC: Two tests in exercise of police power:
a.) that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference and

b.) That the means are reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals the carabaos were seized immediately without a trial
BELA-AIR v IAC
.) Police power is the nature that has been invoked by the
Mayor of Makati. There is no taking of property involved.
State authority may enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property In order to promote the
general welfare. The duty of local executive is to take care
the needs of the greater number in many cases at the
expense of the minority
EPZA v DULAY
The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make
the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the

guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree,
or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the courts findings
NPC v CA: The price of just compensation should be the value lost
at the actual taking, not the value it may serve in the future. It is
the time of taking and not as "potential building" site that is the
determining factor, the nature of the land at the time of taking by
the government is the principal criterion for awarding
compensation to the land owner . The taking commences when San
Diego bought the land.
MANOTOC v NHA: The legislature may not take the property of
one citizen and transfer it to another even for full compensation.