Malaga vs.

Penachos
GR No. 86995 03 September 1992Cruz, J
Doctrine: Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26
and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2,
1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3
o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction
and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed
to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against
the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to
their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of
the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also
asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed
not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such
order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government
infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the
provisions of PD 1818?
HELD: Yes. The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as
follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes

regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled

corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies
or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the
monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is
a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of
the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of
the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the
ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third,
heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or
transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M
had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the
prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
De La Llana vs. Alba
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
FERNANDO,
FACTS:
The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section
44, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Blg. 169 which reads as
follows:
It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which
mandates that "upon the declaration upon the President that the reorganization
contemplated in the Act has been completed), the said courts (meaning the Court of
Appeals and all other lower courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office" trenches on all the constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the
independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members
(Section 7, Article X of the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the
Supreme Court to administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof

(Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power of the Supreme Court "to discipline judges
of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal. "
(Section 7, Id.)
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional?
HELD: B.P. Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that
the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments
and commissions."
This court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with
such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue
of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After
the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with
an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is
one of separation.
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
Facts: This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf
and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It
assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The
Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986,
fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code
providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject
to sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie
Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine
Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's
opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by

the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed
to file their Comment in Intervention.
Issue/s
1.) The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of
trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
2.) There is undue delegation of power and authority.
3.) There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is
not.
Held:
1.) In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The tax imposed by
the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the
realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per
annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an
additional source of revenue. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was
imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid
imposition.
2.) Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue
delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority
to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of
such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a
delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to
the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be
the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as
unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be
without adequate remedy in law.
3.) We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated
and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new
industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of
the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that
public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes

containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses
in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention
the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere
payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in
business.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and
expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and
exclusively a matter of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may
be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of
each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of
a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to
the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to
which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the
challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and
cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922
Johns, J.
FACTS: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 wherein one of its salient
provisions (Sec.1) authorized the Governor-General for any cause resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor General signed E.O. 53 which fixed the price
at which rice should On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against defendant
Ang Tang Ho for violation of E.O. 53. It was alleged that defendant, on August 6,
1919, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at
the price of P0.80, which is a price greater than that fixed by E.O. 53. Upon said
charge, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five months imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500.
Defendant interposed an appeal and assailed E.O. 53 as a result of undue
delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General since Act 2868 fails to
define the basis for E.O. 53 and has left it to the discretion of the Governor-General
as to what would constitute an extraordinary rise in price in order to the issue and
promulgate emergency measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act 2868 is unconstitutional due to undue delegation of
legislative power.
RULING OF LOWER COURT: Convicted Ang Tang Ho for Violation of E.O. 53.

RULING OF SUPREME COURT: Act 2868 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The judgment of the

lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause"
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price
at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether
a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes
to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional
and void.
A law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors
or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it
is a law in all its details in present, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

DOCTRINES: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
FACTS: President Ferdinand Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A amending
Executive Order No. 626. Under the questioned EO. 626-A, no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao and carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of National Meat Instpection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos

The petitioner transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
they were confiscated by police station commander for violation of E0 626-A.
Petitioner sued for recovery before RTC by filing supersedeas bond. RTC sustained
the confiscation and, since the carabaos could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The Court declined to rule on Constitutionality of EO for
lack of authority and for it presumed validity. CA upheld the decision of trial court.
ISSUES:
1. WON Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, which gives the
President the power to issue decrees not for implementation of laws
but in the exercise of his legislative authority.
2. WON the EO 626-A is unconstitutional
HELD:
1. The challenged is denominated by executive order but it is really presidential
decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It
was issued not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed
but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. Under
Amendment No. 6, whenever there existed grave emergency or threat thereof or
whenever legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in
his judgment required immediate action, he could, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instructions that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of
any exigency to justify such exercise, the petitioner has reason to question the
validity of the EO. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President in his judgment a phrase that will
lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time. The Court reserves
such resolution on more appropriate occasion.
2. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law, which is to prevent indiscriminate slaughtering thereof, and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers.
Also, the EO authorized the seized property to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos. The phrase may see fit is extremely generous and dangerous. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
Therefore, there was indeed an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 168

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents
to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified
by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in
this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his
own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right
to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the
same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a
well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law
of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined
that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
Cario vs. Commission on Human Rights
204SCRA1991
December 2, 1991
Facts:
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPTSA) undertook mass concerted
actions because of the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their
grievances.
The teachers, through their representatives, were served with an order of Secretary
of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days.
Secretary Cario, rendered dismissal of respondents. MPSTA filed a petition against
Cario but later on dismissed by RTC.
In the meantime, respondents also filed their complaint to the CHR with regard to
their suspension and replacements and alleging that they were denied of due
process of law. CHR ordered Secretary Cario to appear before the Commission to
enlighten the latter on the issue. Secretary filed a motion saying that CHR lacks
cause of action and has no jurisdiction over the case.
CHR ordered that respondents were denied of their due process and their civil and
political rights have been violated.
Issue:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
Held: No.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994
FACTS:
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first
securing
an
Environmental
Compliance
Certificate
(ECC)
from
the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and
clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE
and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of
the dumpsite.
ISSUES:
1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain
the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in
Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional
Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases w here the special law
provides for another forum
RULING:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA,
as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and
Caloocan with
due regard
and
adequate provisions
for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological
systems, and
the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an

administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law ,
it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasijudicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the
LLDA to issue.
Rizal Empire Insurance Corp. and/or Sergio Corpus (PETITIONERS) vs
National Labor Relations Commission, Teodorico L. Ruiz, as Labor Arbiter
and Rogelio R Coria (RESPONDENTS)
G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987
Facts: In August, 1977, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by
petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of
P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been
appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent
employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information,
Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change
in his position-designation, he was transferred to the CLAIMS DEPARTMENT and his
salary was increased to P450.00 a month.
In 1980, he was transferred to the UNDERWRITING DEPARTMENT and his salary was
increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred
to the FIRE DEPARTMENT as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an INSPECTOR of
the Fire Division with a monthly salary P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work,
allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences.
Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter
Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with backwages. Petitioner filed an
appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a
Resolution dated November15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, theinstant petition.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners appeal on a technicality.
Held:
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal,
provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. - Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. - No motion or request for extension of the
period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner- Rizal Empire Group) received a
copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1,1985. It filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the
Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of
the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time
was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal
was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the National
Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for
interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that
administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled
to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA
314 [1985]).Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the
decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no
longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private
respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be
retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot
after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of
Animal Industry,
FACTS: Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance
of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent
Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue
a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the
slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at
present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands. He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the
introduction of cattle diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the
petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demande
d
because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the
respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was
constitutional and, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of
petitioners failure to file another complaint. The petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the
fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner cannot be allowed
to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional

2. Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act
No.3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.
3. Whether or not Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law
RULING OF LOWER COURT:
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the
failure of the petitioner to file another complaint.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts
of laws by implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes
unless it is necessary to do so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155
is entirely valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle
industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of
industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the
country are objects within the scope of the police power. The Government of the
Philippine Islands has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. At the time the Act No.
3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be
said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.
2. No. The true distinction is between the delegations of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff
Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited
by the Tariff Law. It is not an amendment but merely supplemental to Tariff Law.
Araneta et al. v. Gatmaitan et al.
Doctrine
The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring
of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former
necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the
authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can
be made
Facts: San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of
the Bicol region.
Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places
migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur,
for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of

the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the
depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among
the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in
San Miguel Bay.
This move was manifested in the resolution of December 18, 1953, passed by the
Municipal Mayors' League condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the
wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of
the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl
fishing at a certain period of the year.
In another resolution dated March 27, 1954, the same League of Municipal Mayor,
prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by
banning the operation of trawls therein.
In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order
No. 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was
amended by Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954, apparently in
answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the
allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954,
however, Executive Order No. 80 was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to
take effect after December 31, 1954.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint
for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries,
answered the complaint alleging, that the executive orders in question were issued
accordance with law; that the encouragement by the Bureau of Fisheries of the use
of Otter trawls should not be construed to mean that the general welfare of the
public could be disregarded
The lower Court rendered decision on February 2, 1955, the last part of which reads
as follows:
The power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters, from the fact that
Congress has seen fit to define under what conditions it may be done by the
enactment of the sections cited, in the mind of Congress must be of transcendental
significance. It is primarily within the fields of legislation not of execution: for it goes
far and says who can and who can not fish in definite territorial waters. The court
can not accept that Congress had intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate
on this matter of national importance. To accept respondents' view would be to
sanction the exercise of legislative power by executive decrees. If it is San Miguel
Bay now, it may be Davao Gulf tomorrow, and so on. That may be done only by
Congress. This being the conclusion, there is hardly need to go any further. Until the

trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel

Bay by executive proclamation. Thus said Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are
declared invalid;
Issue/s
(1) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders
Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay
(2) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance
thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the
President.
Ruling
(1) Yes. We are of the opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the
restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the
law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in
compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in
violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in
the Philippine waters.
Now, if under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
authority to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obnoxious for it
carries away fish eggs and fry's which should be preserved, can the President of the
Philippines exercise that same power and authority?
One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources
which by law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who
exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the
President of the Philippines. Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and
proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a
Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President
of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and
recommendation of the respective Department".
For the foregoing reasons We do hesitate to declare that Executive Orders Nos. 22,
66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law.
(2) Yes. In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry
or fish eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the
promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device
like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of sea food, and to that
end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by
regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the
aquatic resources of the land.
Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and
authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did
nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal

province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were in
consonance and strict conformity with the law.
PEOPLE v. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN
DOCTRINE:
An administrative agency cannot amend the act of Congress. The rule-making
power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
FACTS: In 1969, Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario
Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1. The five accused resorted to electro fishing.
As legal background, sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Sec. 76 of the same law punishes any
person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not
less than P500 nor more than P5,000 and imprisonment of not less than 6 months
nor more than 5 years. It is to be noted that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
punish electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84 prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters and providing for a fine of not
exceeding P500 or imprisonment of not exceeding 6 months or both. Fisheries
Administrative Order 84-1 amended the former by restricting the ban against
electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.
RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS:
The municipal court dismissed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court
of First Instance affirmed the dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing
cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous
substance as contemplated in sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a
substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances.
The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
CONTENTION OF THE PROSECUTION:
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the prosecution, as legal basis for Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1, cites sec. 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that
"any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than P200,
or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both."
The Fisheries Law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or
explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of
marine mollusca; (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to
report the kind and quality of fish caught; and (6) other violations.

ISSUE: Does electro fishing fall under "other violations" of the Fisheries Law, thereby
giving the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries authority to issue Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 penalizing
electro fishing?
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
NO. Electro fishing does not fall under "other violations." Therefore, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. Nowhere in the
Fisheries Law is electro fishing specifically punished. Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls
within the category of "other violations" because the penalty for electro fishing is
lower than the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, fixed in sec. 76, and is not the same penalty for "other violations" of the
law fixed in sec. 83 of the Fisheries Law.
Administrative agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the
lawmaking body finds impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for
the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the
law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute, otherwise, it would constitute an attempt to
legislate.
Administrative regulations issued by a department head in conformity with the law
have the force of law. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
In the instant case, the regulation penalizing electro fishing (Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1) is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the
regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro
fishing. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations
to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with
the power to enact a criminal statute.
An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.
Bautista vs Juinio
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May
31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant
thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land
Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed

"the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on

owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses
Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the
energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme
Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the
LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use
private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to
an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause.
Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more
specifically, of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their
freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends
and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is
likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of
legislative power."
Issue:
1. Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum
Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights
2. whether the impounding of the vehicles in violation of the LOI is ultra vires
Held:
1. No. the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that
presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent.
Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power
may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if
they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.
2. Yes. While the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the
conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of
Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear
that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the
procedure required by law.
MACEDA V. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARDG.R. No. 96266 July 18,
1991ERNESTO M. MACEDA,
petitioner,vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX(Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS
SHELLPETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRONCORPORATION,
respondents.
Nature:
Petition for nullification of the EnergyRegulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated
December 5and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second
provisional increase in oil prices did not allow herein petitioner substantial crossexamination, in effect, allegedly,a denial of due process.
Facts:

On August 2, 1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their
respective
applications on oil price increases. On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order
granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition
for Prohibition on September 26, 1990.Hearing for the presentation of the evidencein-chief commenced on November 21, 1990. ERB subsequently outlined the
procedure as follows:.. it has been traditional and it is the intention of the Board to
act on these applications on an industry-wide basis, whether to accept, reject,
modify or whatever, the Board will do it on an industry wide basis, so, the best way
to have the oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are
asking for is to have all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and then
the examination will come later, the cross-examination will come later. .Petitioner
Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his
cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine
each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed procedure
resulted in the denial of due process.\
Issue:
WON the EBR acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the
ERB which
In matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative
, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the
strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. In fact, Section 2,
Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB
provides that These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before
the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation
and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board.
However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter,
except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote
the objectives of the Order
.We dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority to
grant provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No.
172, under Executive Order No.172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude
the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to
itsfinal disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or
increase it further; or (3) to deny the application
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.
Facts:
Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled
"Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees."
Report recommendation: (1) private schools may increase its total school fees by
not more than 15 to 20 per cent. Beyond it, it would be subject to the discretion of
DECS; (2) private school may increase its school fees in excess of the ceiling

provided it will not exceed P1000 for the school year in elementary and secondary
levels and P50 per unit on semestral basis for collegiate level.
DECS, following the report, issued an order authorizing the 15 to 20 per cent
increase on school fees.
PCF sought a reconsideration of such order. Ground: increases were too high.
DECS: issued Department Order No. 37, reducing the ceiling to 10 to 15 per cent
PCF still opposed the increase; then sent a telegram to the president urging the
suspension of said D.O. (no reply)
PCF filed a petition for prohibition (SC). Grounds: unconstitutional, without any legal
basis, violation of due process clause. It also argues that in support of the first
argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to
regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not
always include the power to increase school fees.
Sec. of DECS: the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary,
and that the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in character
Issue: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees.
Held: YES.
Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education
Act of 1982: Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry shall promulgate
rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of
the educational system in accordance with declared policy.
SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. The Minister of Education and Culture,
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations.
In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to
prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the
authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with
the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under
the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a
legislative or an adjudicative function.
Legislative function: the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties
is not a requirement of due process.
Quasi-judicial function: prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of
such rates.

 When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of
a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
character.
CIR vs CA
FACTS: On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a
one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and
donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing
itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in
October 1986 and November 1986, its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41and
Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, respectively, and paid the
corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by private respondent on 13
August 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal
years ended 30 September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount
of P1,410,157.71. However, the request to cancel the deficiency taxes was denied.
ISSUES: WON private respondent can avail of the tax amnesty
RULING: YES. Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything
beyond a simple application of its provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues,
Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities
already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986,the law could have
simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is
unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the
nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically
excepted by it. It might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods covered by
the amnesty include the years immediately preceding the 1986revolution during
which time there had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for
civil Disobedience, most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law
regime. It should be understandable then that those who ultimately took over the
reigns of government following the successful revolution would promptly provide for
a broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and
ACE TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION
Facts:
1. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation
composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public
Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon.

2. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued

Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. This is about Phasing out and Replacement of Old
and Dilapidated Taxis. No car beyond 6 yrs shall be operated as taxi.
3. Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular
No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars
and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said
Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances.
4. Cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model
1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981..
5. Petitioners filed petition with BOT. Petitioners filed before the BOT a
"Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition.
Petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
Resolve or Decide Main Petition." Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made
personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case
could not be located.
Issues:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord
with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners'
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
Held:
On Procedural and Due Process
(3D) Page 1
1. The leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering
necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is
not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of
position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected,
this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were
deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the
challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary
sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

2. With regard to the contention of petitioners that fixing the ceiling at 6yrs is
arbitrary and oppressive, the Court held that As public contend, however, it is
impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to
speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,
possible collusion, and even graft and corruption.
A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly,
fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. They are
also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the
public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24
hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has
been met.
Equal Protection Clause
3. Petitioners alleged that the Circular is being enforced only in Metro Manila and
solely towards taxi industry. The Court held that the Board's reason for enforcing the
Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of
other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This
is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in
every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal
protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
4. The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from
the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the
language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
5. As the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is
concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply
that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons
Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of
the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction,
which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform
operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance
would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities
imposed.
G.R. No. L-9876US VS. PANLILIO
Doctrine:
The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued
pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a

violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless the statute
expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS: In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been
exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in
accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture,
duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, Pampanga; that, on said
place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and
while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered
said carabaos to betaken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and
conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused,
his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them
from one place to another for the purpose of working them. The accused was
convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering
from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs
of trial. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved
on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760
ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of
Agriculture?
HELD:NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a
violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760 provides that any person violating
any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the
only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are
Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of
the provision of the Act. Theorders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal
statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute
itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal
offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did
violate Art. 581, par 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates
regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY MICHAEL
DEFENSOR Citation : G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006 Ponente : TINGA, J.:
Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government
Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the
NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded

portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid
increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from
the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development
of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively
become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14,
2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association
from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F.
Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of
the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act
of 2003."
Issue : Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and
should be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
Held: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rulemaking power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by
R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued
by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and
purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity
or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasilegislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
FACTS:

On December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" . Petitioner Ople filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking to
invalidate the issuance claiming that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order
but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue, thus
unconstitutional for usurping the legislative powers of Congress
ISSUE: WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the President of legislative
power properly belonging to Congress?
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
NO.
The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasilegislative powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders,
proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars and general or special orders. An
administrative order, like the one under which the new identification system is
embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987 Administrative Code:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders
The National Computerized Identification Reference System was established
pursuant to the aforequoted provision precisely because its principal purpose, as
expressly stated in the order, is to provide the people with "the facility to
conveniently transact business" with the various government agencies providing
basic services. Being the "administrative head," it is unquestionably the
responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the government
bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those
government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which
the citizenry constantly transact with, like the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and National Statistics Office (NSO).
The national computerized ID system is one such advancement. To emphasize, the
new identification reference system is created to streamline the bureaucracy, cut
the red tape and ultimately achieve administrative efficiency.
The project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within
the ambit of the Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to
successfully carry out his administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasilegislative powers, quoted above.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION vs DE JESUS
G.R. No. 157286 June 16, 2006
DOCTRINE: The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law
or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
legislature.
FACTS:

RA 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001

became a law on August 11, 2001 in accordance with Section 27 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution. Under the law, the office of the schools district supervisor shall
have no administrative, management, control or supervisory functions over the
schools and learning centers within their respective districts but shall be limited to
(1) providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads
and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster; (2)
curricula supervision; and (3) performing such other functions as may be assigned
by proper authorities.
Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations,
petitioner PSDSA sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the PH
National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the
following administrative issues: (1) restoration of the functions, duties,
responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives and position level of Public School District
Supervisors; and (2) upgrading of Salary Grade Level of Public Schools District
Supervisors from alary Grade Level 19 to Salary Grade 24.
DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus thereafter issued DECS Office Order No. 1
which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9155. PSDSA filed
a petition for prohibition and mandamus alleging that the act of the DepEd in
removing the petitioners administrative supervision over elementary schools and
its principals within his/her district and converting his/her administrative function to
that of performing staff for the division is a gross violation of RA 9155. Furthermore,
petitioners also allege that the IRR of RA 9155 expanded and included provisions
which are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the subject law. They
argue that the said law should be read in harmony with the existing educational
laws. Ultimately, petitioners allege that by the implementation of the IRR they are
stripped off of their administrative functions.
ISSUE: Whether DECS Office Order No. 1 issued by DepEd expanded RA 9155 or not.
HELD:
NO. It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for
in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the legislature. It bears stressing, however, that administrative
bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details. All that is required is
that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the
regulation does not contradict but conforms to the standards prescribed by law.
Here, the assailed IRR provisions merely reiterated and implemented the related
provisions of RA 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority
and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district
supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching
personnel, including school heads. A school head is a person responsible for the
administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The

division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public
and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.
Administrative supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or
neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.
Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks
Doctrine: the additional electricity cost for common facilities of the apartment
building used by the tenants in common is purely civil in character, (involving the
conditions of lease between landlord and tenant), to be adjudged under the
applicable civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of general jurisdiction and is
beyond the jurisdiction of respondent board.
Facts:
Private respondents(Ruiz, Enriquez, and Moses) filed a complaint to the Board of
Power and Waterworks charging Syquia, their landlord, of selling electricity without
permit or franchise and billing them for amounts in excess of Meralco rates.
Petitioner Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the regulatory board(respondent)
contending that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes
to the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance to their lease
contract.(basically contractual in nature ang meron siya sa tenant at pinapasa lang
nya yung mga bills) Respondent Board in its re-computation allowed petitioner to
charge respondents only the cost of electricity registered in their individual
apartment meters and disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged
them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of electricity consumed by all tenants in the
common areas. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Power and Waterworks has jurisdiction.
Held:
No.The Board of Power and Waterworks has exceeded its jurisdiction. Petitioner is
not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or
franchise. The complaint by the tenant give rise to a question that is purely civil in
character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code
(not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has
no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
GLOBE WIRELESS LTD., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and
ANTONIO B.
ARNAIZ,
G.R. No. L-27520 January 21, 1987
FACTS: Petitioner was charged of negligence by Private Respondent Arnaiz for
having failed to deliver a message that the latter sent to Maria Diaz of Spain. As per
complaint to the Public Service Commission (PSC), Arnaiz sent a message through
the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City. The

same was transmitted to the head office in Manila. It was forwarded to Petitioner for
transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and
Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa
Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said
message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.
Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint and denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee.
PSC: Issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and
unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and
ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS.
ISSUE: Whether or not Public Respondent PSC has jurisdiction, supervision and
control over Petitioner.
HELD: NO.
Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise known as the
Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision
and control over all Public services and their franchises, equipment and other
properties.
However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which
petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over
petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public. Thus,Sec. 5. The
Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with
respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to
international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines.
In administrative law, too basic is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such
body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The
order under consideration belonged to this category.
Here, the imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter
of the very limited jurisdiction of the PSC over petitioner. Also, Petitioner operated
under a legislative franchise and not under a certificate issued by the PSC. The PSC
is empowered to impose
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION (PLA), petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.
FACTS:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and
injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent Office (PPO). Respondent Director issued a circular on May 27, 1957

announcing that an examination will be held to determine who will be qualified to

practice as patent attorneys before the PPO. Attorneys, engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical skills are qualified to take the examination.
The Director, prior with the issuance of the circular, has already been holding such
examinations.
PLA argued that those who has passed the bar examinations and is duly licensed by
the SC to practice law and who is in good standing, is already duly qualified to
practice before the PPO and that the examination requirement, as condition
precedent to practice before PPO, is in excess of the Directors jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law. Respondent argued that the prosecution of patent cases does
not entirely involve the practice of law, but also includes the application of scientific
and technical skills. Also, he contends that Rules of Court does not prohibit the PPO,
or any other quasi-judicial body, from requiring further conditions from those who
wish to practice before the PPO. He also argues that his action is in accordance with
RA 165, or the Patent Law, which similar to the US Patent Law, allows a similar
examination as that prescribed by him.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the Director is authorized to prescribe such examinations as condition
precedent to determine who are qualified to practice before the Patent Office.
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: N/A
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
No. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines and to any member of the Bar in
good standing may practice law before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial
or administrative.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court.
Although transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use of scientific
and technical skills, still, all business has to be rendered in accordance of the Patent
Law.
Much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable. PPO exercises both judicial and quasi-judicial functions. The Director, in
issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises
quasi-judicial functions. He exercises judicial functions in patent applications
involving questions of law as well as questions of fact.
His claim that the Philippine Patent Law, similar to the US counterpart, allows him to
prescribe such requirements is untenable.
Unlike the US Patent Law which
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require the show of qualifications, the
Philippine Patent law is silent on that point.
Thus, lawyers may practice before the patent office since it is a practice of law and
PPO being a judicial and quasi-judicial body. administrative fines in cases of violation
of or failure to comply with the terms and condition of any certificate, or any orders
of the PSC, inter alia. So there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued
by the PSC to violate, neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the

latter applicable to Petitioner that it had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or

disregarded.
GUEVARA vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which
tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the
adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts
entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot
boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash
upon the ground, among others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish
as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC
denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which
to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct
contempt proceedings
HELD: No, Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in
controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial
duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation
to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this
matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR
Facts:
Respondent National Labor Union sought reconsideration and new trial for the
Supreme Court's ruling in favor of the petitioner. Respondent union alleged:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance
and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

ISSUE: Can the respondent be granted new trial to present new evidence?
RULING (No lower court ruling discussed in the actual case):
BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE MAIN ISSUE:
Nature of the CIR
"The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court
of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions
in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees
or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103."
On administrative due process "In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion
to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial
Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable"xxxxxx The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character."
Requirements of due process in administrative proceedings:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.

(3) "...duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded... that of having something to
support it..."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be "substantial." It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. The Court of Industrial
Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice
of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such
powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary,
but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. Respondent's request for
new trial was granted considering that the records of the case showed no sufficient
evidence to produce a conclusion of law.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
Facts: In 1977, PD 1069 or the Philippine Extradition Law was issued by Pres.
Marcos. In 1994, RP-US Extradition Treaty was signed in Manila between Phils and
USA, and said treaty was concurred by the Senate. In 1999, an extradition request
of private respondent was sent by the Secretary of State of the US to the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Based on the document, Mark Jimenez was
being charged with Conspiracy to commit offense, Attempted tax evasion, Fraud by
wire, radio or TV, False statement and Election offense. On the same day, DFA
Secretary transmitted the extradition request to the DOJ Secretary for its technical
evaluation and assessment.
Pending evaluation, private respondent Jimenez wrote a letter to the DOJ requesting
to be furnished with the Extradition documents from the US. The DOJ denied the
letter request on the ground of confidentiality of documents and for being
premature. Note that evaluation by the department of the document is NOT a
preliminary investigation nor akin to investigation of criminal cases. The purpose is
merely to determine whether the procedures and requirement under the law and
treaty have been complied with by the requesting State.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed before the RTC petitions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and Prohibition with application for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.
Judge Lantion of RTC Manila issued a TRO in favor of respondent. DOJ Secretary filed
before the SC for immediate remedy. SC ordered RTC judge to cease and desist from
enforcing the assailed order. Issue on the merits of the case was heard on oral
arguments.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF NOTICE AND
HEARING ARE
INDISPENSABLE
PROCEEDINGS

DURING

THE

EVALUATION

STAGE

OF

THE

EXTRADITION

HELD: (*2 DECISIONS)

1. On JANUARY 2000, SC through Justice Melo ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. [NOTE
THOUGH THAT there was a failure on the DFA to strictly observe the Extradition Law.
Under Sec. 5 (1) of said Law, the DOJ Sec. has the ministerial duty of filing the
extradition papers. In this case, it was the DOJ Secretary who made the extradition
evaluation when it should be done by the DFA Sec. ]
NUANCES. The evaluation
process, just like extradition proceedings, is sui generis. It is not criminal
investigation, but it is also not merely an exercise of ministerial functions. During
the evaluation stage, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall :1. Make technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers b.
outrightly deny the request if on its face the documents are incomplete and/o crime
indicated is not extraditable and 3. Make a determination W/N the request is
politically motivated Hence, this process is investigative or inquisitorial process in
contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys
quasi-judicial power.
The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non observance of these
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests and upon notice, they may claim the right to
appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of opposing party.
REASON FOR RULING IN THE AFFIRMATIVE: 1.The evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are criminal. Although the law is silent on whether or not notice and hearing
shall be granted to the extraditee , the extradition request pending evaluation
creates an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty which is imminent
in nature. Because of this possible consequence of arrest, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
2. This case does not fall in any of the instances when right to notice & hearing may
be dispensed with.
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of evaluation
proceeding is that on one hand, there is yet no extradite, but ironically on the other,
it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person
involved, may cause immediate incarceration.

The accused faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is
filed in court, but even during the evaluation stage itself by virtue of the provisional
arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. There is therefore blatant
and manifest prejudice to the accused during the evaluation stage. Therefore, it
cannot be dispensed with.
3. In case of conflict between international law and municipal law, efforts should
first be exerted to harmonize them. In case of irreconcilable difference,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld. In the case at bar,
although said rights are granted to extradite after the filing of the extradition
petition in court by the DOJ Secretary, the law is silent as to W/N these rights are
granted during the evaluation. When the law is silent, we must apply rules of fair
play. A libertarian approach is thus called for.
2. In OCTOBER 2000, SC through Justice Puno REVERSED decision issued in January
2000. We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process, for 6 REASONS:
First. P.D. No. 1069[3] which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the
time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as
well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the
extradition court. (Art. 6 of the Law)
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in
light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the
parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general
interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with
the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret
treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight.[7] The
reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,
[8] where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys
the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."
Fourth, An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.[13] His guilt or innocence will
be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition
papers are still undergoing evaluation.

Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right
to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be
more priceless than life."[24] The supposed threat to private respondents liberty is
perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D.
No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention. BUT THIS IS MORE
IMAGINED THAN REAL.
Sixth. To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves serious
consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due
process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be
ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. In tilting the balance in
favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the
private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and
breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is
due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether
procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends
on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss.
Abejo vs. De la Cruz G.R. No. L-63558; May 19, 1987
Facts:
Case involves a dispute between the principalstockholders of the corporation Pocket
Bell Philippines, Inc (Pocket Bell) namely spouses Abejos and the
purchaser, Telectronic Systems, Inc. (Telectronics) of their
minorityshareholdings and of shares registered in
the
name
of spouses Bragas. With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the
majority stockholder, holding 56% of the outstanding stocks and voting powers of
the corporation on Pocket Bell. Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the
corporation, Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to its name, and those of its
nominees the total 196,000 PocketBell shares in the corporations transfer book
cancel the surrendered certificates of stocks in its name and those of its nominees.
The latter refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate books,
asserting that the Bragas claim pre-emptive rights over the Abejo shares and that
Virginia Braga never transferred her shares her shares to Telectronics but had lost
the five stock certificates corresponding those shares. This triggered off the series
of intertwined actions between the protagonists, all centered on the question of
jurisdiction over the dispute. The Bragas asserts that the regular civil court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction as against the SEC, while Abejos and Teletronics,
as new majority share holders, claim the contrary.
Respondent Judge de la Cruz issued an order rescinding the order which dismissed
the complaint of the Bragas in the RTC, thus holding that the RTC and not the SEC
had jurisdiction. Respondent judge also revived the TRO previously issued
restraining Telectronics agents or representatives from enforcing the their
resolution constituting themselves as the new set of officers of Pocket Bell and from
assuming control of the corporation and discharging their functions. The Abejos filed
a MR, which motion was duly opposed by the Bragas, which was denied by
respondent judge.

Issue: Whether or not SEC has jurisdiction

Held: The Court ruled that the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction and that
the SEC correctly ruled in dismissing the Bragas' petition questioning its jurisdiction,
that "the issue is not the ownership of shares but rather the non-performance by
the corporate Secretary of the ministerial duty of recording transfer of shares of
stocks of the corporation of which he is secretary.
The dispute at bar, as held by the SEC, is an intra-corporate dispute that has arisen
between and among the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell due to
the refusal of the corporate secretary, backed up by his parents while majority
shareholders, to perform his ministerial duty to record the transfers of the
corporations controlling (56%) shares of stock, covered by duly endorsed
certificates of stock, in favor of Telectronics as the purchaser thereof.
BERNARDO vs. ABALOS
FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong City and
his son, Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the same city for the
May 1998 elections. Petitioners herein interposed that respondents conducted an
all-expense-free affair at a resort in Quezon Province for the Mandaluyong City
public school teachers, registered voters of the said city and who are members of
the Board of Election Inspectors therein. The said affair was alleged to be staged as
a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle was played all
throughout and his shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr.
also made an offer and a promise then to increase the allowances of the teachers.
In this regard, petitioners filed a criminal complaint with the COMELEC against
Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-buying, further alleging that they conspired with
their co-respondents in violating the Omnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the
recommendation of the Director of the Law Department of the COMELEC, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due course
without the petitioners first submitting a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In the instant case, it was said that filing of the motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC is the most expeditious and inexpensive
recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give the COMELEC an
opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. As the petitioners then did not
exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that
their instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised
any plausible reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the
instant petition was ruled to fail.
Industrial Enterprises vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating
contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for
the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied
with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the
exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two
blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area." IEI was later on advised that the
logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in another area
(Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to
MMIC. IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned
and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are
the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. IEI filed an action for rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then Minister of
Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. IEI prayed that
the Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating contract
from MMIC to petitioner, with a written confirmation that said contract is valid and
effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract from an exploration
agreement to a development/production or exploitation contract in IEI's favor.
In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum
of Agreement, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating contract in
favor of IEI; ordered the reversion of the two coal blocks covered by the coal
operating contract; ordered BED to issue its written affirmation of the coal operating
contract and to expeditiously cause the conversion thereof from exploration to
development in favor of IEI; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application for a
coal operating contract; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application for
three more coal blocks; and ordered the payment of damages and rehabilitation
expenses
In reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition of the
summary judgment was not proper since there were genuine issues in controversy
between the parties, and more importantly, that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction
over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED
that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation
and development of coal blocks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for
rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract
over coal blocks
HELD: The BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board (abolished by
Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked with the function of
establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program for the exploration,
exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's
coal resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all activities
relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or through service contracts such
exploitation and development, all in the interest of an effective and coordinated
development of extracted resources.

If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the
competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration,
exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These
issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand
aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of
the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the
dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within
the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal
purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.
GSIS vs. CSC
Facts: Salazar was employed by GSIS as a casual laborer on September 23, 1968.
She became a permanent employee in the same office on February 28, 1974 with a
designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical
Assistant Aide also under permanent status on December 9, 1975.Salazar's GSIS
Service Record however, revealed that also on December 9, 1975, she was
appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then
GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. On
August 13, 1982, she was promoted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held
when on May 16, 1986, her services were terminated by the newly appointed
President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was coterminus with the term of the appointing authority. Salazar filed a petition for
reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration was denied.
Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review
Committee created under Executive Order No. 17. The said Review Committee
referred the petition both to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the Civil
Service Commission. On July 22, 1987, the Civil Service Commission, issued
Resolution No. 87-230 directing the reinstatement of Salazar. GSIS, through the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration
dated September 14, 1987.On the other hand, the Board, acting on the same
petition of Salazar referred to it by the Review Committee, issued an Order on March
9, 1988, finding the petition of Salazar for reinstatement, without merit and affirmed

her termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order
which was set aside. GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Civil Service Commission erred in not holding that it
was the Merit Systems Board, not said Commission, which had appellate jurisdiction
over the subject personal action of termination of services of private respondent?
Held:
Sec. 8., (P.D. 1409) Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. Decisions of
the Merit Systems Board (now Merit System Protection Board) involving the removal
of officers and employees from the service shall be subject to automatic review by
the Civil Service Commission. The Commission shall hear and decide appeals from
other decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission shall be
subject to review on certiorari only by the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. (as amended by D.O. 135
dated February 27, 1987)
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall
take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing
officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original
cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case
specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such
power.
The appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee created under
Executive Order No. 17 to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service
Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the
Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision
(Resolution No. 87230) in favor of Salazar dated July 22, 1987 and all subsequent
resolutions of the Commission in this case are void.
Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary
surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such jurisdiction.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte
FACTS: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on June 4,1986, requesting to
be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)
of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be
Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte,
Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro.
Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the

GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a
duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."
On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote
Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986,
Ricardo Valmonte, et al. filed directly with the Supreme Court a special civil action
for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoking their right to information.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, among which, is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are
reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however did not seek
relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since
administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of
action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal
issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of
their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under
one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls under the exception from exhausting all
administrative remedies since it only involves a question of law.
RULING OF LOWER COURT: None.
RULING OF SUPREME COURT: YES, it falls under the exception. The respondent
General Manager of GSIS is ordered to allow petitioners to access the documents
and records pertinent to said loans granted to members of the former Batasang
Pambansa. Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party
can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means
of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law,
comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled
exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved.
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular
courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does
a purely legal question.
Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.

Mangubat v. Osmea judicial review

Facts:
Mangubat and Mundo, petitioners, were detectives in the Police Department of Cebu
City when their services were terminated by City Mayor for lack of trust and
confidence. Thereupon, the respondents were appointed to their positions and
collected the corresponding compensation. Having failed to secure reinstatement,
petitioners filed petitions for quo warranto and mandamus. Subsequently, Mangubat
was reinstated but he was not able to collect back salaries. After trial, the court
ordered the reinstatement of petitioners and payment of their back salaries. The
respondents appealed and questioned the failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Issues: Won the petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies
Ruling: It is now well-settled that when, from the very beginning, the action of the
Mayor is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive; when there has been no
semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws;
when, manifestly, the Mayor has acted without jurisdiction, or has exceeded his
jurisdiction , or has committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority, as
in the case at bar, the employee adversely affected may forthwith seek the
protection of the judicial department.
ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORP. V BOT & SULTAN RENT-A-CAR, INC G.R.
No. L-39655 | March 21, 1975 | J. Fernando
Facts:
1. Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic
corporations. Arrow has in his favor a certificate of public convenience (CPN) to
operate a public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck service from Cebu City to
Mactan International Airport and vice-versa with the use of twenty (20) units.
2. Sultan filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a CPN to
operate a similar service on the same line. Eight days later, without the required
publication, the Board issued an Order granting it provisional permit to operate.
3. After filing an MR and for the cancellation of such provisional permit filed but
without awaiting final action thereon, Arrow filed the present petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction, alleging that the question involved herein is purely legal
and that the issuance of the Order without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of
the case yet, is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.
4. In their
provisional
authorized
compelling
inquiry.

answer, the respondents denied the need for publication before a

permit can be issued, in light of Presidential Decree No. 101, which
respondent Board to grant provisional permits when warranted by
circumstances and to proceed promptly along the method of legislative

Issue: W/N publication is necessary before provisional permits can be granted

Held:
No. It is the well-settled doctrine that for a provisional permit, an ex parte hearing
suffices. The decisive consideration is the existence of the public need, as shown in
this case by the respondent Board. Petition for certiorari dismissed.
KBMPBM vs. Dominguez
In the early morning of October 29, 1988, Mayor Bunye accompanied by heavily
armed men, allegedly thru force , violence and intimidation forcibly broke open the
doors of the offices of petitioners located at the second floor of the KBS Building,
purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and to implement the same, by taking over and assuming the
management of KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board of directors for that
purpose and excluding and prohibiting the General Manager and the other officers
from exercising their lawful functions as such.
As claimed by the petitioners, the Order served on them was not written on the
stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere xerox copy. The
so-called petition upon which the Order is based appears to be an unverified
petition signed, according to Mayor Bunye, by 371 members of the KBMBPM.
Respondents challenged the personality of the petitioners, set-up the defense of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and assert that the Order was lawfully
and validly issued under the above decree and Executive Order. G.R. No. 91927
(more on arraignment of Mayor Bunye and their rights as an accused)
ISSUE: (relevant to Admin Law)
Whether or not the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture was valid.
NO. The Order was not valid.
Petitioners have the personality to file the instant petition and ask, in effect, for
their reinstatement as Section 3,Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, defining an action for
mandamus, permits a person who has been excluded from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which he is entitled, to file suit. Petitioners, as ousted directors
of the KBMBPM, are questioning precisely the act of respondent Secretary in
disbanding the board of directors they then pray that this Court restore them to
their prior stations.
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well settled that this
requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures
speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal
the decision to the office of the President recourse to the courts could be had
immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also
yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in

the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
And now on the validity of the assailed Order. Regulation 34 of Letter of
Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the
removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of
majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly.
The person involved shall have an opportunity to be heard. A substantially identical
provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM's bylaws, Sec. 17. Removal
of Directors and Committee Members. Any elected director or committee member
may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good
standing present at the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose
after having been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the
annual general assembly and a special general assembly. Indubitably then, there is
an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It
is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision,
petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this
case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the
members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which
grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does
not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and
those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be
extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate (b) direct the
performance of duty restrain the commission of acts (c) review, approve, reverse
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units (d) determine priorities
in the execution of plans and programs and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines,
plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day to day activities (2)
require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department (3) take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of
violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration (4) review and pass upon
budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them. The power
to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the bylaws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate
the manner by which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should

have known better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition
by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an ongoing audit by Department of
Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or
impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General
that the Secretary's power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above
quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative
includes the "milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the election of
new officers." Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes the takeover and
ouster of incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have
expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as
postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted. Likewise,
even if We grant, for the sake of argument, that said power includes the power to
disband the board of directors and remove the officers of the KBMBPM, and that a
hearing was not expressly required in the law, still the Order can be validly issued
only after giving due process to the affected parties, herein petitioners.
Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution and extends to administrative
proceedings. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations this
Court, through Justice Laurel, laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due
process in administrative proceedings, foremost of which is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support
thereof. The need for notice and the opportunity to be heard is the heart of
procedural due process, be it in either judicial or administrative proceedings.
Nevertheless, a plea of a denial of procedural due process does not lie where a
defect consisting in an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the
aggrieved party himself as when he had the opportunity to be heard on a
subsequent motion for reconsideration. This is consistent with the principle that
what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute
absence thereof and lack of an opportunity to be heard.
In the instant case, there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the
general membership of the KBMBPM there was, as well, not even a semblance of a
hearing. The Order was based solely on an alleged petition by the general
membership of the KBMBPM. There was then a clear denial of due process.
National Development Company and DOLE Philippines Inc. (PETITIONERS)
vs. Wilfredo Hervilla
Facts: The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and
damages filed on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo Hervilla against DOLE Philippines
involving four lots with a total area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo
Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in-interest of his brother, Hernane Hervilla
who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former],filed with the District Land
Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent Application for the
said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant,filed with
the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted agricultural
plants. On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successorin-interest
of
Candido
de
Pedro.
Counsel of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for theinvestigation of
the said lots, to which a report was rendered and an order was issued as to the

adjustment of the said title numbers. The trial court dismissed the action for
recovery, to which was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial
court decision and declared that the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of
Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void.. A motion for reconsideration was filed
and subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the purpose of submitting
original certificate of titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-in-interest by
the Bureau of Lands while the case was pending. The two motions were denied.
Thus this petition for review on certiorari
Issue: Whether or not the court in a deciding a case involving recovery of
possession declare null and void title issued by an administrative body or office
during the pendency of such case?
Held: In the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to
the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural
Resources.
The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respe
ctive rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition
and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions
involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical
possession or occupation of the land in question(in forcible entry cases, before
municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana,in cases
before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at bar, the
petitioners possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance
of Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is
left for the courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has
been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the Director of Lands.
Defendants' possession of the lands disputed, for purposes of the free patents, has
been confirmed in the administrative case. The administrative branch of the
government has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed Into finality. Accordingly,
plaintiffs' claim of possession is lost. Moreover, records do not show that private
respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of
the
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest.
Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the Philippines. In
short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind,
is fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become
final. The Courts may no longer interfere with such decision. The decision of the
Appellate court is reversed and set aside.
Atlas Minning vs. Factoran
Facts: On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim with the
Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10, 1973, private respondent Asterio
Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph

Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973, Atlas
registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with
the same Mining Recorder. Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were
surveyed and the survey plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines
and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published in the
February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post. During the said period of
publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining
claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, giving respondent
(Buqueron) given preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate
the areas covered by his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims, except the
area covered thereby which is in conflict with adverse claimant's (Atlas) "Master VII
Fr." Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural, the decision of the Director of Mines
was set aside. On further appeal, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated
the decision of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Office of the President was
time-barred;
(2) Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining
claims.
Held:
(1) It is not disputed that private respondent received a copy of the decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources dated November 10, 1978 on November 27, 1978 and
that under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the decision of the Minister is
appealable to the Office of the President within five (5) days from receipt thereof. In
the case at bar, the 5-day period expired on December 2, 1978, a Saturday, private
respondent filed his appeal on December 4, 1978, a Monday.
Petitioner and private respondent are in accord on the fact that at the time of the
filing of the questioned appeal, Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the
Office of the President pursuant to Section 29 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended.
The same law provides: Section 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or
the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the
act may be done on the next succeeding business day.
Coming back to the case at bar, as the next working day after December 2,1978
was December 4, 1978 a Monday, it is evident that private respondent's appeal
was filed on time.
(2) It is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there was a valid
location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact best left to
the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the implementation of
the law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient
that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated,

it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence.

Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of
fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Ang Tibay vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 762
[1984]).
In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines' decision was
supported by substantial evidence.However, petitioner would have this Court look
into the said findings because of the open divergence of views and findings by the
adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues
which warrant appellate review.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an
administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many
decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there
has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary
action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is
present in the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact
of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the
contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing
administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of
the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that
was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in
this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DOCTRINE: As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at
the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.
FACTS:
Republic
Act
No.
6975
entitled
AN
ACT
ESTABLISHING
THE PHILIPPINENATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed.
Petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the
Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990, seeking this
Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary
restraining order. In the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that
RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its power
"to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control"
remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police
Commission and the PNP were placed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and
NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is
the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to
delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under
the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a
system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and
the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under
the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the
national government.
HEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS, INC. vs. IAC
DOCTRINE: In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true
with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of
fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, following a hearing, are
binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official
has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers, or
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. (HEVR) was
incorporated by the late Eufrocino Roxas and his seven children. Its articles of
incorporation include, among others, the purpose of operation of Hidden Valley

Springs Resort. Eufrocino Roxas was Chairman of the Board of Directors and
President of HEVR. Upon his death, his son Eriberto succeeded as President.
Private respondents are the heirs of Eriberto Roxas. The latter and his family had
been exclusively operating the restaurant and liquor concession at the resort under
an "Agreement" executed between Eufrocino Roxas, as President of HEVR, and
Eriberto Roxas, in his behalf and that of his family. Upon Eriberto's death, his son
Guillermo Roxas took over all the corporate duties and assumed the authority of his
father pertaining to the resort. Guillermo continued the operations of the restaurant
and liquor concession incorporated under the name Hidden Valley Agri-Business and
Restaurant, Inc. (HVABR).
When HEVR held a stockholders' and Board of Directors' meeting, the treasurer
reported that the resort's financial difficulty was due to the fact that the biggest
profit center, the restaurant therein, was not managed and operated by HEVR itself
and that the concession fee paid by private respondents was not enough to pay for
the interest and amortizations on the loan secured by HEVR to upgrade the
restaurant and kitchen facilities. Hence, the Board passed a Resolution authorizing
the President to notify HVABR of its intent to take over the operation of the
restaurant, and if the latter refuses or fails to vacate the premises within 30 days, to
close the resort for an indefinite period of time to prevent further losses to the
corporation.
Private respondents consequently filed an action to prevent the closure of the resort
and the unilateral termination by the HEVR of the concession agreement.
Petitioners, in their answer, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, the
declaration of the nullity of the concession agreement, and for an order requiring
private respondents to vacate and surrender the restaurant premises. The RTC
dismissed the complaint but the IAC granted a temporary restraining order against
HEVR. Aggrieved, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction with the Court (GR No. 67195).
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) denied a previous petition by the HVABR
to increase food and beverage prices at the resort restaurant, finding that HVABR
was operating the restaurant and liquor facilities of the resort without the requisite
MOT license.
In the meantime, HEVR entered into a contract of lease with Valley Resort
Corporation, whereby the latter leased the Hidden Valley Springs Resort, including
the subject restaurant premises, for a term of 10 years. Such lease was approved by
the MOT. Doing business under the name and style of MJB Food and Services
(MJBFS), Guillermo Roxas obtained a license from the Department of Tourism (DOT)
to operate the restaurant at the Hidden Valley Springs Resort. HEVR contested the
issuance of the license alleging that Guillermo Roxas was not authorized to possess
and operate the restaurant. The DOT refused to reconsider the issuance of the
license hence, HEVR filed the herein second petition (GR No. 78618).
Prior to the filing of the second petition, a mayor's permit to engage in the
restaurant business was issued to Guillermo Roxas/MJBFS despite protests by the
HEVR. Thus, HEVR filed a complaint for injunction which was dismissed by the RTC.

HEVR's subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Consequently,

HEVR filed a third petition (GR Nos. 78619-20) in this Court.
ISSUE: Did public respondent DOT Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and,
therefore with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in the issuance of restaurant license in favor MJBFS?
HELD:YES. Public respondent undeniably had knowledge prior to the issuance of the
license to Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS that the subject restaurant was owned by
petitioner and presently leased to Valley Resort Corporation, and that Guillermo
Roxas and/or MJBFS' right to possess and operate the restaurant was the subject of
a pending litigation. MOT records show that the department was aware of the
controversy between petitioner and Guillermo Roxas, et. al., who were then doing
business under the name HVABR, regarding the restaurant and liquor concession at
the resort.
In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of
the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with
respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact.
Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, following a hearing, are
binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official
has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion.
In fine, the Court holds that it was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion
on the part of public respondent to have issued, and thereafter to have refused to
revoke, the restaurant license in favor of Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS knowing
that: (1) the latter was not the owner of the restaurant for which the license was
sought; (2) the latter's right to posses the same was being disputed by no less than
the petitioner as restaurant owner; and, (3) the subject restaurant was already
leased to Valley Resort Corporation pursuant to a contract of lease approved by the
department.
Public respondent's action, which contravenes the acceptable standards of justice
and reason, is indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Industrial Power Sales vs Sinsuat
Facts: In April of 1965 two (2) Invitations to Bid were advertised by the Bureau of
Supply Coordination of the Department of General Services.The first, dated April 6,
1965, called for 'eight (8) units TRUCKS, Line Construction, left-hand drive,
complete and special factory built, series of 1965, brand new, for the use of the
Bureau of Telecommunications pursuant to Requisition No. 18792 dated March 9,
1965." The Invitation to Bid as well as the requisition itself contained a proviso
limiting the offers to foreign made products on a CIF basis, Port of Manila.
The second, dated April 29, 1965, amended the first notice on the basis of
suggestions contained in letters of Industrial Power Sales, Inc. sent on April 7 and

13, 1965, which were evidently found worth considering. Those letters proposed
that the invitation to include local manufacture on an FOB Manila basis. Concerning
this, Acting Undersecretary of Public Works & Communications Lachica addressed a
3rd Indorsement to the Director of Supply Coordination, dated April 22, 1965.
Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc. and Delta Motor Corporation,
hereafter respectively referred to simply as IPSI and DELTA. Letter-Order No. B207495 was drawn up in IPSI's favor, dated June 10, 1965 and signed by the acting
Director of Supply, Conrado L. Ledda.DELTA protested the award to IPSI on the
ground that the trucks offered by IPSI were not factory built, as stipulated in the
specifications contained in the requisition itself and in the Invitation to Bid. the
Director ruled that the bidding had been made in strict compliance with the
technical
specifications
and requirements
stated
by the
Bureau
of
Telecommunications as modified and that after due deliberation on the different
bids received, the Committee on Awards, with the concurrence of the requisitioner's
duly authorized representatives, had resolved to award the contract in IPSI's favor.
However, Acting Undersecretary Lachica tried to reverse himself it having been
"found out that the requisition as approved by the Secretary calls for special factory
built, Line Construction Trucks, and not merely utility trucks." The reply of the
Acting Director of Supply dated July 27,1965 however reiterated and reaffirmed the
conclusions in his Decision of June 23, 1965.Delta filed with the Office of the
Secretary of General Services a letter of protest against the proposed award to IPSI.
In Secretary Sinsuat's view, when Acting Director Lachica agreed to announce and
advertise a supplemental or amended Invitation to Bid which would admit offers of
trucks with locally manufactured utility bodies," the latter had violated a
department rule 13 thatAny subsequent alteration or modification made
separately or on the requisition itself by any subordinate official should bear the
approval of the Department Head concerned, pursuant to Section 2048 of the
Revised Administrative Code, or of the Undersecretary if so delegated.Sinsuat
asserted that as there was no showing that Undersecretary Lachica had been
authorized to approve any modifications of the requisition, the modification
sanctioned by him in his aforesaid 3rd Indorsement of April 22, 1965 was null and
voidIPSI lost no time in appealing from Secretary Sinsuat's decision to award the
purchase contract to DELTA. It appealed on September 9, 1965 to the Office of the
President as well as to the Office of the Auditor General. Judgment was in favor of
DELTA. IPSI then filed with the Q.C. CFI on September 21, 1965, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction. CFI ruled against IPSI. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether the respondent Secretary had gravely abused his dicretion in
granting the award of the contract to DELTA
Held: Yes. The respondent secretary ignored circumstance of estoppel as regards
DELTA. For DELTA, with full knowledge of the amendment of the notice to bidders
(making acceptable bids for truly with locally manufactured bodies, or FOB-Manila)
made no protest at all but, on the contrary, participated in the bidding under said
advertised terms, objecting thereto only after its bid had been rejected by the
Committee on Awards and the other Government offices concerned.The plea made
in behalf of respondent Secretary that IPSI had gone to Court without first
exhausting all administrative remedies cannot be sustained in view of the doctrine

which states that: "Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review
through the extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of
administrative officers or agencies: first, that before said actions may be
entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all the administrative
remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second, that
the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear
showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. There are however exceptions to the
principle known as exhaustion of administrative remedies, these being: (1) where
the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or
was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
latter's implied or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."
National Development Company Vs Collector of Customs
FACTS
The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on board an
unmanifested cargo consisting of one television set, and respondent Collector of
Customs sent a written notice to the operator of the vessel and the latter answered
stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be
manifested. The operator requested an investigation and hearing but respondent
finding the operators explanation not satisfactory imposed on the vessel a fine of
P5,000.00, ordering said fine to be paid within 48 hours from receipt, with a threat
that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued
if the fine will not be paid.
NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for
certiorari before the CFI of Manila against the respondent. Respondent contended
that petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of
which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector committed grave
abuse of discretion because petitioner NDC was not given an opportunity to prove
that the television set involved is not a cargo that needs to be manifested.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the
administrative superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, as where it is undisputed that the respondent officer has acted in
utter disregard of the principle of due process.