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1 Introduction
It is well-known that Euclid obtains universal results from particular geometrical constructions.2 How? In opposition to Ian Muellers view that
Euclids definitions of the most elementary geometrical objects points,
lines, straight lines, angles, etc., are mathematically useless and never invoked in the subsequent development3 of Euclids geometry, I will argue
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that all of his definitions, including those of the most elementary objects,
are fundamental to that development. And, in opposition to Reviel Netz,
who holds that no use can be made of such definitions in the course of
first-order, demonstrative discourse, 4 I will argue that Euclids definitions
play a crucial role in establishing a universal result with a particular diagram. They are fundamental to Euclids diagrammatic reasoning. That is,
the definitions are not simply a kind of second-order discourse about
mathematics in which [b]efore getting down to work, the mathematician
describes what he is doing,5 but rather, Euclids definitions, including
those of the most elementary objects, are significant to his style of deduction in Book I in at least four ways:
First, the definitions of point and line, etc., limit the focus to the most generalized
features of elementary geometrical objects.
Second, an explicit reciprocal dependency relation establishes a non-hierarchical codependency between geometrical objects in the form of boundary and figure.
Third, Euclids derivation style employs a combination of diagrams in tandem with
the highly abstract definitions. Reciprocal dependency relations contribute to the
logical structure within the diagrammatic reasoning.
Fourth, this combination renders all non-universal features of a particular diagram
irrelevant and the use of reciprocal dependency relations limits the role of the diagram in a way that is reminiscent of Aristotles characterization of the geometers
use of diagrams: the diagrams make the truth of a fact obvious, the geometer does
not reason on the basis of a drawn line, but on the basis of the facts made clear by
them.6 Highly abstract geometrical objects are linked together via co-relatives.
In short, the particular, non-universal features of a diagram are systematically excluded from having a role in the demonstrations. In this way, the
geometer does not reason on the basis of a drawn line, but on the basis of
the facts made clear by them.
The combination of definitions and diagrams provides for a style of
deduction that exploits the heuristic advantages of diagrams, while managing the concern that accidental properties may lead one astray. The
highly abstract definitions of point and line severely limit ones attention
to highly abstract features in the diagram. The combination of definitions
and diagrams effectively removes accidental features of the diagram from
the proof. The reciprocal dependency relation (the co-relative pairing) between figure and boundary maximizes our ability to exploit the heuristic
advantages of reasoning with diagrams. The reciprocal relation allows us
to move in both directions.7
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2 Discussion
Mueller distinguishes between definitions that are simply part of a traditional list and have no role in the demonstration, and those that are essential to the demonstrations.8 While Mueller acknowledges that there is no
evidence that the difference between these two sorts of definitions were
felt by the Greeks,9 there does appear to be a divide between highly abstract definitions whose function is not obvious, and more robust definitions whose role in a demonstration is more transparent. For example, the
definitions for a point, a line, and a surface appear to be unlike the definitions for figures such as circles.
A point is that which has no parts.10
A line is breadthless length.11
A surface is that which has length and breadth only.12
A circle is a plane figure contained by one line in such a way that all straight lines
falling upon it from one point among those lying within the figure are equal to one
another.13
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Figure
Two points
Circle
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The proof begins with a line whose points are AB. While the drawn
line has breadth, the definition and the reciprocal pairing that links two
points with breadthless length renders all but the points and the breadthless length irrelevant to the demonstration. Since the object is to construct
an equilateral triangle, the demonstration proceeds by constructing two
circles: one with A at the centre and B on the circumference, called AE;
a second one with B at the centre and A on the circumference, called
B. Each circle (figure) coexists with its reciprocally dependent boundary. In drawing each circle, we simultaneously create a context to compare
lines: lines with one point on the center and falling on the circumference
are equal to one another. Since it is taken for granted that this construction is on the same plane, the two circles intersect at a point, called . We
now have two additional sets of two points, A and B. Given two points
a breadthless length co-exists between them automatically. Postulate 1 allows us to draw straight lines A and B, completing the respective pairings.
Each stage in this construction is governed by reciprocal pairings. The
members of each pairing are highly abstract, which limited properties.
Breadthless length co-exists between two points. All there is to a line is
length. Two lengths are measured within a context created by figureboundary pairing of a circle. The contexts for each of the circles establish
that line AB equals A and that B equals AB. The equivalency between
A and B is established by means of Common Notion 1: Things which
are equal to the same thing are equal to one another.26 As Reed observes,
the common notions do not establish contexts, they relate measured
things to each other.27 The contexts provide for measuring, and contexts
emerge via reciprocal pairings.
The particular diagram aided the study by drawing attention to geometrical facts. The highly abstract definitions, in combination with reciprocal relations, make many features of the diagram irrelevant. The scale
of the particular diagram, the thickness of the lines, even to some degree
the accuracy of the sketch, including the straightness of the lines, the
shape of the circle, the presumed location of the circles centre, all play no
role in the demonstration. The highly abstract definitions and the reciprocal pairings exclude non-universal items, such as non-essential features and
inexact renderings, from having a role in the demonstration. Provided that
the diagram is reasonably close, minor variations will not alter the result.
After all, if there is a circle, it co-exists with its boundary. That boundary
contains the context in which pairs of lines are equated. All lines, even if
they are not equal when a ruler, are equal by definition.
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The tight reasoning results because of the reciprocal pairings and the
contexts to which they gave rise. They provide the necessity of the links.
And the highly-abstracted pairings contribute to the repeatability of the
proof. After all, the role of reciprocal pairs and highly abstract definitions
renders scale irrelevant to the demonstration. Proposition 1.1 holds for
the construction of an equilateral triangle on any length of line.
3 Conclusion
I have argued against Muellers claim that the definitions of point and
line, etc., are mathematically useless and never invoked in the subsequent
development. I have argued instead that Euclids definitions, including
those of the most elementary objects, are significant to his style of deduction in Book I in at least four ways:
First, the definitions of point and line, etc., limit the focus to the most generalized
features of elementary geometrical objects.
Second, an explicit reciprocal dependency relation establishes a non-hierarchical codependency between geometrical objects in the form of boundary and figure.
Third, Euclids derivation style employs a combination of diagrams in tandem with
the highly abstract definitions. Reciprocal dependency relations contribute to the
logical structure within the diagrammatic reasoning.
Fourth, this combination renders all non-universal features of a particular diagram
irrelevant, and the use of reciprocal dependency relations limits the role of the diagram in a way that is reminiscent of Aristotles characterization of the geometers
use of diagrams: the diagrams make the truth of a fact obvious; the geometer does
not reason on the basis of a drawn line, but on the basis of the facts.28 Highly
abstract geometrical objects are linked together via co-relatives.
Particular, non-universal features of a particular diagram are systematically excluded
from having a role in the demonstrations.
The combination of definitions and diagrams provides for a style of deduction that exploits the heuristic advantages of diagrams, while managing
the concern that accidental properties may lead one astray. The highly
abstract definitions of point and line severely limit ones attention to
highly abstract features in the diagram. In large part this role manages
concerns about being led astray by accidental features of the diagram. The
combination of definitions and diagrams effectively removes these features.
The reciprocal dependency relation between figure and boundary maximizes our ability to exploit the heuristic advantages of reasoning with diagrams. The reciprocal relation allows us to move in both directions with a
visual demonstration.
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