Special Civil Actions | Atty.
Melo
Mandamus
Section 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
What is mandamus? Elements?
1. Tribunal, corporation, board, officer exercising MINISTERIAL functions
2. Legal right or legal duty
3. No other remedy
Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301 (1997)
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of either.
In the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to
act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in
cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or
palpable excess of authority.
Atty. Melo:
OMB said he couldnt be compelled to decide one way or another because he
had to exercise his discretion. SC said mandamus proper to compel OMB to
ACT on the case but not HOW to decide on it, OMBs argument is misplaced
because mandamus was not to compel him to decide how to decide the case
but to act promptly on the duty mandated by the Constitution.
SC went further and said there was GAD, OMB transgressed on
constitutional rights of petitioner so mandamus was proper.
Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 (1912) [long case! ]
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and any unnecessary
delay in the exercising of such duty occurs, the courts will interfere by the
extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is
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purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretional, the court, by mandamus, will require action only.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the plaintiff have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.
While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely express, it is
necessary that it should be clear.
The writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an officer to do anything
which is not his duty to do, or which is his duty not to do, or to give the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ of mandamus
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
Discretion may be defined as the act or the liberty to decide, according to
the principles of justice and ones ideas of what is right and proper under
the circumstances, without willfulness or favor.
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law, of acting officially, under certain
circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and
conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment,
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
J. Trent, dissenting:
In determining whether the writ of mandamus should issue, the court must
be governed by the nature of the duty sought to be enforced and not by the
nature of the office held by respondent. In this jurisdiction this standard
rule has been modified by excepting from its operation the Chief Executive.
None of the reasons which induced the court to make this exception apply
to the office of the Auditor for the PI.
Duties of public officers are of two kinds: (1) those of a political or
legislative character, in the discharge of which their discretion is generally
uncontrollable by mandamus; (2) those administrative, judicial, and quasi-
judicial duties imposed by law which, under certain circumstances, are
controllable by mandamus.
Broadly speaking, public officers in the performance of all their official
duties use discretion. Such discretion is one of degree and not of kind.
Where anything is left to any person to be done according to his discretion,
the law intends it must be done with a sound discretion, and according to
law. The discretion conferred upon officers by law is not a capricious or
arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and controlled in its
exercise by fixed legal principles. It is not a mental discretion to be exercised
ex gratia, but a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit
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of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends
of substantial justice.
The only discretion which public officers can use is legal discretion
conferred upon them by law.
Where it is alleged and shown that the officer has grossly abused the legal
discretion conferred upon him by law or has manifestly misinterpreted the
law to the prejudice of the rights of citizens, the courts will then control the
acts of the officer and direct him to go forward in accordance with the law
and the principles of justice.
Atty. Melo:
Discretion decide according to principles of justice/right or wrong
J. Trent, dissenting: discretion granted is never unlimited. It is always legal
discretion it may only be exercised in a way consistent with purpose or
spirit of law.
When anything is left for officer to be done on his own discretion, law
intends it to be done on sound discretion (see above)
Not emphasized properly: appeal to the governor general was not adequate
because you had to send papers internationally, it wouldve taken a long
time. It wouldve been unjust on petitioner because he couldnt leave the
Philippines and go back to the US without that clearance. Appeal was not
the speedy and adequate remedy.
Trents dissent accepted now
PLDT v. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas, 463 SCRA 418 (2005)
Discretion is defined as the act or the liberty to decide, according to the
principles of justice and ones ideas of what is right and proper under the
circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Where anything is left to any
person to be done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be
done with a sound discretion, and according to law. The discretion
conferred upon officers by law is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion,
but an impartial discretion guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed
legal principles. It is not a mental discretion to be exercised ex gratia, but a
legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and
in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial
justice. No matter how broad the exercise of discretion is, the same must be
within the confines of law.
MMDA v. Concerned Citizens, 18 December 2008 (not assigned)
MMDA argues that it cannot be compelled by mandamus to do something as
complicated and immense as the clean up of Manila Bay because it has to
exercise discretion on what to do. SC said MMDA is not being told how to do
its job but to comply with law, maintain cleanliness, employ wastewater
facilities (I guess Art II, Sec 16 also). Mandamus is issued not to tell the
MMDA how to do it [the clean up] but to act to achieve purpose of law.
Mandamus granted. Case introduced Indian principle of continuing
mandamus which states that the court has the power from time to time to
issue orders which compel compliance with the original decision. SC said all
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agencies must submit progress reports how theyve been complying with
the order.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagagawa v. Manila Railroad, G.R. No. L-25316 (1979)
Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect
on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the
law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and
enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled Only specific legal rights may
be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of
the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be
dismissed.
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the
imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues
in doubtful cases.
Atty. Melo:
Only right given was deduction, not first priority in preference of credits
Mandamus must be clear legal right, something that is actually existing,
not anything that is in doubt.
Carbungco v. Amparo, 84 Phil. 638 (1949)
[Petition for mandamus, actual doctrine is regarding rental law]
Atty. Melo:
Does court have discretion to extend period? No, no discretion to extend the
period in rental law. Period provided by law is mandatory. Ministerial for
court to apply the law duty to issue writ of execution is ministerial, thus a
proper subject of mandamus.
University of San Carlos v. CA, 166 SCRA 570 (1988)
Schools are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the
granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic
freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence
of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of
honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic
matter may not be disturbed much less controlled b the courts unless there
is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
Atty. Melo:
Conferment of honors on a student is not a matter of ministerial duty.
School has discretion, part of academic freedom.
Peralta v. Salcedo, 101 Phil. 452 (1957)
No recourse to the courts can be had until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted; and special civil actions have been held not entertainable if
superior administrative officers could grant relief. Mandamus in this case is,
therefore, premature.
Atty. Melo:
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Since SC decided mandamus improper because there was another remedy,
was there discussion that issuance of certification of completion is a
discretionary or ministerial duty? SC just decided on basis of presence of
adequate remedy. Assuming there was no adequate remedy, would the SC
have decided that issuance of certification is discretionary or ministerial
(will mandamus lie)?
Madrigal v. Lecaroz, 191 SCRA 20 (1990)
Petitions for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office
must be filed within one year from the date the petitioner was ousted from
his office to provide stability in the service so that public business may not
be unduly hampered.
Atty. Melo:
Mandamus was for petitioner to exercise legal right to his office. SC said this
is actually quo warranto, want to regain a public office already abolished.
But for purposes of public policy, QW must be filed within one year.
Mandamus can be filed against tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, as in
the USC case where it was filed against a school. Mandamus is unlike certiorari in this
sense as certiorari can only be filed against judicial or quasi-judicial body.
Common Matters
Section 4. When and where petition filed.The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain casesWhen the petition filed relates to
the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or
respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such
private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the
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costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the
private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the
public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition
or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the
public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless
otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in
the proceedings therein.
Section 6. Order to comment.- If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to
justify such process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy
thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the court
may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the
provisions of section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto,
the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to
dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such
other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper.
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief.The court in which the petition
is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation
of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case.
Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed.After the comment or other pleadings
required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court
may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing
or submission of memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof the
court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for
the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.
The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently
without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Section 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment.A certified copy of the
judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served
upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be
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punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in
accordance with section 1 of Rule 39.
Atty. Melos lecture:
In your petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, you must include
certificate of non-forum shopping, certified true copies of questioned
orders/decision, filed w/in 60d [from notice of judgment/denial of
MR/MNT] to SC or CA or RTC in respective territory where case found, or SB
in its appellate jurisdiction. If filed against a quasi-judicial agency, must be
filed with CA
Judicial hierarchy, background: certiorari or prohibition can be filed against
interlocutory orders, so main case in RTC still not terminated. Common
practice to forestall any action by lower court, certiorari is filed questioning
interlocutory order raising threshold issues or prejudicial questions.
o Ex: complaint filed, MTD filed, denied. To stall case, petition for
certiorari saying denial of MTD GADALEJ, while thats pending in
CA, tells TC that it cannot proceed since certiorari pending.
Sec 7 petition shall not interrupt course of main case unless TRO or PI is
issued.
Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993)
The original and special civil action filed with the SC is, for all intents and
purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the
lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of
jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them.
The mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in
relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not even interrupt
the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.
For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the
special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing
to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding
with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is
issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over
the principal action.
Atty. Melo:
Do not immediately go to SC for relief if relief available in lower court.
Santiago shouldve filed with the SB a motion to lift the HDO/cancel it
SC will always say other reliefs are available in lower courts, go there first.
Dont go to SC immediately.
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. CA, 164 SCRA 421 (1988)
Although the SC did not issue any restraining order against the IAC to
prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively
granting respondents motion to expunge from the records the petitioners
MTD and denying the latters MR, upon learning of the petition, the
appellate court should have refrained from ruling thereon because its
jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of the petition for
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certiorari with the SC questioning the propriety of the issuance of the
resolutions. Due respect for the SC and practical and ethical considerations
should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final
determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and
trying to render moot exactly what was before the SC.
The statement whatever rights the movants were allowed to exercise in the
SC could be exercised by them in the CA is clearly misplaced. It implies
concurrence of jurisdiction between the SC and the CA, which is totally
unacceptable. It would lead to the absurd situation where within the
reglementary period from finality of a decision or resolution, a party can
simultaneously file a petition for review before the SC as well as an MR
before the CA. This interpretation does havoc to the rules on orderly
procedure. A party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies
in two different forums.
Atty. Melo:
Propensity of litigants to delay cases because of pending certiorari
As soon as petition was filed with SC, LC lost jurisdiction to act on the
particular issue pending before the SC. Allowing LC to proceed, theres
possibility of conflicting decisions.
Litigants like citing this case when they want to delay/prevent LC from
proceeding with the case
Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. CA, 209 SCRA 738 (1992)
Once a writ of preliminary injunction issued by a trial court is elevated to a
higher court, the former loses jurisdiction over it and can no longer dissolve
it.
In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ of preliminary injunction which
they themselves had brought up to the CA for review, Phoenix and LRTA
engaged in forum shopping. After the question of whether the writ of
preliminary injunction should be annulled or continued had been elevated
to the CA for determination, the trial court lost jurisdiction or authority to
act on the same matter. By seeking from the trial court an order lifting the
writ of preliminary injunction, Phoenix and LRTA sought to divest the CA of
its jurisdiction to review the writ. They improperly tried to moot their own
petition in the CA a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the
appellate court or of disrespect for said court.
Trial judge played into the hands of Phoenix and LRTA, and acted with
GADAEJ in granting the motion to dissolve the writ of injunction. Judicial
courtesy behooved the trial court to keep its hands off the writ of
preliminary injunction and defer to the better judgment of the CA the
determination of whether the writ should be continued or discontinued.
Non-issuance of TRO by the CA simply meant trial court can proceed to hear
the complaint, but not to lift the injunction on review by the CA.
Atty. Melo:
RTC issues writ of PI, issuance elevated to CA and SC while thats pending,
RTC dissolved writ of PI leaving CA and SC without anything to dissolve. SC
said thats wrong, CA should not have noted act of lower court in reversing
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itself, at the time pet was filed with CA, LC lost jurisdiction to rule upon the
same issue.
Go v. Abrogar, 398 SCRA 166 (2003)
The rule of judicial courtesy would apply only if there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot
and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower
court.
Atty. Melo:
Continuing execution does not render petition moot. Assuming petition
decided in favor of Go, it can be remedied by return of proceeds of
execution. It is Go who violated rule on judicial courtesy since he engaged in
forum shopping
Atty. Melos lecture:
Given these cases on judicial courtesy and hierarchy, it behooves lower
court to respect pending petition with higher court. So how do you reconcile
these with sec 7, that petition under Rule 65 does not interrupt main case
unless TRO/PI?
Understandably, w/o sec 7, no case will ever be finished with all the
incidents/interlocutory matters in a single case, litigants can always file
certiorari and cases will be interminable. On the other hand, Eternal
Gardens and Joy Mart, issue raised in higher court, wait for higher court to
decide it otherwise you end up mooting or disrespecting higher courts
authority
Resolution of the apparent conflict is lately, unless you can really show
entitlement to TRO/PI, lower court case will proceed. Unless you show issue
in higher court will affect lower court proceedings, lower court proceedings
cannot be halted.
Remedy if case mooted appeal the decision of the RTC. Appeal almost
coincides with the petition for certiorari. Petition for certiorari is low
priority in that situation. Remember certiorari is remedy of last resort, so a
pending appeal moots the certiorari.
Differentiate from Eternal Gardens and Joy Mart? EG and JM lower court
issues were not pursuant to further proceedings, in JM issue was injunction,
whether it was valid, but LC cancelled it. This is obviously wrong because
the issue is with the CA. not mentioned in the case, but the main case
continued, not restrained by SC. SC said insofar as injunction concerned, LC
can no longer act on it. Other matters, LC can still act.
So if the issue/matter raised to higher court, LC can no longer act on such
issue/matter.
What if issue is whether LC has jurisdiction? Can you say LC cannot act in
main case because issue of jurisdiction being questioned? Atty. Melo thinks
not because the lower court maintains it has jurisdiction, only petitioners
word says LC has no jurisdiction. No TRO/PI, LC can still act. (sorry, medyo
Malabo intindi ko dito)
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Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
General Rule: Tendency is to continue with LC case.
Exception: Limited cases as in Eternal Gardens and Joy Mart. If particular
matter/issue raised and LC acts to make the issue pending in higher court moot.
Always depends on circumstances.
Additional notes on Rule 65
Refusal to comply with order of court constitutes indirect contempt so you
can file an action to enforce the decision through petition for indirect
contempt. Court not precluded from issuing orders ___ asking/commanding
sheriff to take possession of property
You can also claim damages in the form of costs/litigation expenses and this
can be a matter of execution, court can issue writ of execution to allow
claims for costs, attorneys fees, etc
Rule 66
Quo Warranto
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals.An action for the usurpation of
a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without
being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action.The
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must
commence such action.
Section 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with
permission of court.The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the
permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action
at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer
bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in
an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose
request and upon whose relation the same is brought.
Section 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action.
Upon application for permission to commence such action in accordance with the
next preceding section, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so
that he may be heard in opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court
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shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested
parties, and the petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court.
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action.A person claiming to
be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action therefor in his own name.
Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation.When the action is
against a person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall
set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any, with an
averment of his right to the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession
thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise
may be made parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position or
franchise determined, in the same action.
Section 7. Venue.An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents
resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a
Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme
Court.
Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given
precedence .The court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing
pleadings and for all other proceedings in the action in order to secure the most
expeditious determination of the matters involved therein consistent with the rights
of the parties. Such action may be given precedence over any other civil matter
pending in the court.
Section 9. Judgment where usurpation found.When the respondent is found guilty
of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office,
position or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be,
recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to
the action as justice requires.
Section 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and
papers; damages.If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the
complaint to be entitled to the public office he may, after taking the oath of office and
executing any official bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the
office, and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and
papers in the respondents custody or control appertaining to the office to which the
judgment relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper
pursuant to such demand, he may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a
lawful order of the court. The person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring
action against the respondent to recover the damages sustained by such person by
reason of the usurpation.
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Section 11. Limitations.Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or
the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an
action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioners right to the office in question.
Section 12. Judgment for costs.In an action brought in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, the court may render judgment for costs against either the
petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a
corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires.
Atty. Melos lecture:
What is quo warranto?
Used when there is usurpation. Three instances:
o A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
o A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision
of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
o An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines
without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so
to act.
Can you file petition for quo warranto against Dean CLV on the ground you are
entitled to his office?
No, he is not a public officer, nor is his office created by law. Only public
office can be subject of petition for quo warranto
Who can commence petition for quo warranto?
Government through solicitor general or public prosecutor
When is Sol Gen required to file the case? (MUST)
Sec 2: required by President OR upon complaint or otherwise he has good
reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof, must commence such action
When may he file the case?
Sec 3: with the permission of the court in which the action is to be
commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of
another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an
indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved
by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is brought.
Distinguish section 2 and 3
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QW MUST be commenced by Sol Gen in Sec 2 required by President or if
he has good reason to believe that any case in section 1 can be established
Discretionary: section 3 Also when third person files a complaint with Sol
Gen
Private person filing complaint alleges he is entitled to office and wants to
replace person currently holding office: section 5
o With no such allegation, he must go through the Sol Gen and ask
him to file the complaint
o Is person filing complaint claiming the position for his own. If not,
go to Sol Gen.
More lecture:
When the Sol Gen commences the action upon the relation of another party
or a third person, the Rules say the courts permission must be secured.
Rules further provide that if permission is required, Sol Gen must first file a
request for permission asking the court for permission to file the petition
itself. Upon filing request, court will notify the respondent (Person holding
the office) who may oppose the filing of such petition (first level of
opposition). If permission is granted, thats the only time Sol Gen can file
petition for QW itself. Thats another level of opposition for respondent
Two steps in petition for quo warranto under section 3
If commenced by party who wants to replace, no such request for
permission is needed. Party can go directly.
Another thing to remember: in QW, you must implead all persons interested
in the position or office.
What basic allegations must be contained in the petition for quo warranto if you are a
person who wants to take over the public office?
1. Petitioner is entitled to the office; AND
2. Person holding the office is unlawfully holding it.
Potot v. Bagano, 82 Phil. 679 (1949)
Acceptance of other public offices incompatible with judicial functions
operate as an abandonment of the position of a justice of the peace
Atty. Melo:
What did the court rely on that Potot was no longer entitled to the office?
Acceptance of a position incompatible with the position of justice of the
peace
If he filed the case within 1y, would he still have lost the case due to
abandonment? Yes, taking up of another position is an overt act that shows
you are no longer interested in the office. By taking up another position,
unless you are forced to, requires that you no longer hold any other office.
(Prohibition against holding concurrent offices)
Prescriptive period: 1y. action for QW must be filed within 1y from date
cause of action accrues so from when holding of office by current officer
becomes unlawful or from date petitioner becomes entitled to the office
K Suarez | 4A 2010
Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
Petitioner in QW, when he wins, can seek damages from public officer
ousted. Usually happens when respondent fails to turn over effects of office.
Damages can be claimed by prevailing party. Theres a limitation for the
action for damages, separate action, also within 1y from date action for quo
warranto becomes final
Venue for QW: Where respondent resides
EXCEPT: When Sol Gen commences it, in which case it can be filed in RTC Manila, CA
or SC
Abaya v. Alvear, 82 Phil. 103 (1948)
Because of the abnormal conditions obtaining during the war, there is
reason to believe that the changing of the original circuit occupied by
petitioner by eliminating one town therefrom, was a mere temporary
expedient to meet the exigencies of the administration of justice in that
area, under abnormal conditions, and that acceptance of the new post did
not involve or entail abandonment of his old position. In proof of the
temporary nature of the change in the circuit is the fact that when
conditions returned to normal, the old circuit was restored, petitioner was
likewise restored to his old post by appointments extended to him.
Teves v. Sindiong, 81 Phil. 658 (1948)
Members of the SC and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office a justice of the peace
appointed and qualified before the war, but who ceased to discharge his
duties as such at the outbreak thereof, may, after liberation or after the war,
resume and continue in his office until he either reaches the age limit,
becomes incapacitated, resigns from office, is properly removed therefrom,
or abandons the same.
Abandonment of an office by reason of the acceptance of another, in order to
be effective and binding, should spring from and be accompanied by
deliberation and freedom of choice, either to keep the old office or renounce
it for another.
Abandonment of an office may not and should not be too strictly applied to
cases occurring during war, especially in those areas occupied partly or
entirely by the enemy.
Under normal conditions, failure to discharge the functions and resume the
duties of an office may clearly be regarded as an abandonment and vacation
of his office, a voluntary relinquishment through non-user.
One cannot be properly appointed to the same post that he is already
holding under a valid appointment.
An appointment to the post of justice of the peace extended to one who had
a right to it because of a previous pre-war appointment under which he had
qualified and discharged his duties, may be regarded as a mere restitution
or restoration of the position which belonged to him; and that the new
appointment can add nothing to or diminish his right to the office conferred
by his original appointment.
7

Atty. Melo:
Reappointment of Teves as JP of three towns was only to meet exigencies of
war. When exigency ended, he is deemed reinstated in his original position
of JP Luzurriaga
Serafin v. Cruz, 58 Phil. 611 (1933)
The extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto does not lie against a duly
and legally appointed chief of municipal police who has duly qualified for
and has entered upon the performance of his duties, in order to reinstate
another who has been legally dismissed from the said office.
Atty. Melo:
Serafin forgot about the second requirement he only alleged that he was
entitled to the office. He forgot to assail the legality of the holding of the
office of the other person. Nothing wrong with the appointment of Cruz as
new chief of police.
Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740 (1949)
The transfer of Lacson to Tarlac by his nomination to the post of provincial
fiscal of that province was equivalent to and meant his removal as provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental; that said removal was illegal and unlawful for lack
of valid cause as provided by law and the Constitution; that the
confirmation of the nomination by the Commission on Appointments did
not and could not validate the removal, since the Constitution is equally
binding on the Legislature; that a provincial fiscal is a civil service official or
employee whose tenure of office is protected by the Constitution; and that
Antonio Lacson could not be compelled to accept his appointment as
provincial fiscal of Tarlac; that having declined said appointment, he
continued as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that inasmuch as he
neither left, abandoned nor resigned from his post as provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental, there was no vacancy in said post to which the respondent
could be legally appointed; and that consequently, the appointment of the
respondent was invalid.
Atty. Melo:
Lacson was deemed not to have relinquished his position because he did not
accept the transfer so there was no vacancy.
Acosta v. Flor, x Phil. 18 (1905)
A private person cannot maintain an action for the removal of a public
officer unless he alleges that he is entitled to the same office. When such an
allegation is made but not proven, the court is justified in dismissing the
case without inquiring into the right of the defendant to retain the office.
Atty. Melo:
Acostas main gripe was although he was not able to prove that he won, he
assailed that Flor still usurped the position. Again, go back to the
requirement that you must prove your right and that the other party is
unlawfully holding the office. Here, petitioner could not prove his right so it
need not even decide whether the other party unlawfully holds the office.
K Suarez | 4A 2010
Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
Garcia v. Perez, 99 SCRA 628 (1980)
In a quo warranto proceeding, petitioner must show that he is entitled to
office. One whose claim is predicated solely upon a more or less remote
possibility, that he may be the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of
action against the office holder. This is precisely the situation in the case at
hand, and there is no cogent reason to change the rule. She was not even
next in rank. Mere expectancy of appointment is not the same with title over
the position.
Petitioner alleged that she was next in rank (claim to office). SC said petition
should not be based on the remote possibility of appointment. Preference,
seniority, age is not equivalent to legal right to the office.
Legal right must be something you can enforce. Ex: an appointment paper.
Cruz v. Ramos, 84 Phil. 226 (1949)
The present petition for quo warranto is not authorized because the
petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the public office alleged to be
unlawfully held or exercised by the respondents.
A public office or a franchise is created or granted by law, and its usurpation
or unlawful exercise is the concern primarily of the government. Hence the
latter as a rule is the party called upon to bring the action for such
usurpation or unlawful exercise of an office or franchise. The only exception
in which the law permits an individual to bring the action in his own name
is when he claims to be entitled to the public office alleged to be usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.
QW is a hardly used procedure because when it comes to elective officials,
OEC applies. Rarely do appointive official file QW.
Rule 67
Expropriation
Section 1. The complaint.The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the
filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and
join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part
thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of
each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in
the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title
is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the
complaint.
Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government
depository.Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due
notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
8

government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.
Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit
of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the
amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly
submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.
Section 3. Defenses and objections.If a defendant has no objection or defense to the
action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and
a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in
which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter,
he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or
any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer
within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or
identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and
extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the
taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be
alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the
interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than
ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just
compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he
may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his
property, and he may share in the distribution of the award.
Section 4. Order of expropriation.If the objections to and the defenses against the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party
appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expro -
priation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid.
K Suarez | 4A 2010
Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and
equitable.
Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation.Upon the rendition of the order of
expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall
designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the
commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to
the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of
any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from
service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall
have received copies of the objections.
Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners.Before entering upon the performance of
their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court
with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party
before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before
them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after
due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be
expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either
party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the
consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from
the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the
corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the
property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his
property so taken.
Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. The court may order
the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have
been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and
direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the
property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such
property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all
their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall
have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their
recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report
shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of
their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon
the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all
interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file
objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire.
9

Section 8. Action upon commissioners report.Upon the expiration of the period of
ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of
such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report
or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the
report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may
recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set
aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part
and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall
secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
Section 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims.If the ownership of the property
taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may
order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the
court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to
either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
Section 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. Upon payment by the
plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal
interest thereon from the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to
him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right
to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or
purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate
possession thereof under the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his
counsel absent themselves from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered,
the same shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the
same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the person ultimately
adjudged entitled thereto.
Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The right of the plaintiff
to enter upon the property of the defendant and appropriate the same for public use
or purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate
court determines that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be
rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the
defendant of the possession of the property, and to determine the damages which the
defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the possession taken by the
plaintiff.
Section 12. Costs, by whom paid.The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a
part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating
their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of
the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal
shall be paid by the owner.
K Suarez | 4A 2010
Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
Section 13. Recording judgment, and its effect.The judgment entered in
expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the
particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use
or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified
copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which
the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the
real estate so described for such public use or purpose.
Section 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings.The guardian or guardian ad
litem of a minor or of a person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the
approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter,
or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging
to such minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or
person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such proceedings if he were
of age or competent.
Atty. Melos lecture:
Verified petition
ALL initiatory complaints must be verified.
Complaint should state right and purpose of expropriation
Right? Allege that theres power to expropriate
Who has power? State
Who in particular? Sol Gen? Judiciary? The executive? Expropriation is
exercised by the Legislature but Legislature may delegate this to the
Executive such as when it delegates it by law to the DPWH, etc. Power
originates from law-making power. Essentially a legislative act, must be in
accordance with law.
Indispensable requirements: for public use and payment of just
compensation
Where filed? RTC
Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, 334 SCRA 127
(2000)
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and falls within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. In determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the criterion
is to first ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in courts of first instance would depend on the amount
of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits for specific
performance and in actions for support, or for annulment of judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, such actions are considered as cases where the
10

subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class of cases, besides the
determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the
law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time the first organic
laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.
Atty. Melo:
RTC has jurisdiction. While property is capable of pecuniary estimation,
what is SM of the action is not the value of property but the governments
right to expropriate whether expropriation is proper or not, whether it is
for public use, amount of just compensation that must be paid.
Atty. Melos lecture:
In expropriation, the government can take property immediately after filing
complaint or after. Requirements if it takes property upon filing of
complaint: government must deposit amount equivalent to assessed value
with bank or court, in money (except: CARP where bonds allowed). Without
this deposit, government cannot enter or take the property (yeah right, it
does whatever it wants). Just compensation is computed from time of taking
or from filing of complaint, whichever is earlier.
Why is there deposit required, based on assessed value? Deposit is just pre-
payment for just compensation. Indemnity for damages if proceedings are
dismissed. Otherwise, property owner has no other recourse if his property
is taken without such deposit. Suing the government for damages is
practically impossible.
Eminent domain has two stages. First is determination of propriety of
expropriation, w/n it is for public use. Second is determination of just
compensation. So there are two decisions, first the determination of
propriety results in an order of expropriation. This concludes the first stage
and it is appealable. If you dont appeal, first stage (order of expropriation)
becomes final. Second stage is determination of just compensation, which
comes with another order stating how much just compensation must be
paid to land owner, this is also subject to separate appeal. [thus, multiple
appeals are allowed, 30 days to appeal/MR]
National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 (1992)
There are two stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned
with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the court on
the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
K Suarez | 4A 2010
Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
thereafter as the rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the trial
court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of eminent domain is concerned with the determination
by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more
to be done by the court regarding the issue.
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has
the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved upon
compliance with PD 42 which requires petitioner, after due notice to the
defendant, to deposit with PNB in its main office or any of its branches, an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation.
PD 42 repealed the provisions of Rule 67 of the (old) Rules and of any other
existing law contrary to or inconsistent with it. Accordingly, it repealed
Section 2 of Rule 67 (old rules) insofar as the determination of the
provisional value, the form of payment and the agency with which the
deposit shall be made are concerned.
PD 42 effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the
provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the
assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for that
purpose. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to
be condemned.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function; accordingly, we declared as unconstitutional and void, for
being, inter alia, impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives
which tends to render the court inutile in a manner which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination, the method of
ascertaining just compensation prescribed in PD Nos. 76, 464, 793 and
1533, to wit: market value as declared by the owner or administrator or
such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower in the
first three decrees, and the value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property or the value as determined by
the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower,
prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate government
office to acquire the property, in the last mentioned decree.
Visayan Refining Company v. Camus and Paredes, 40 Phil. 550 (1919)
The power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty, being
essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its
most primitive forms. No law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this
right upon sovereignty or upon any government exercising sovereign or
quasi-sovereign powers.
The existence of a legislative appropriation especially destined to pay for
land to be acquired by the government through the exercise of the power of
11

eminent domain is not an essential prerequisite to the institution and
maintenance of judicial proceedings for the expropriation of such land. All
that can be required of the government is that it should comply with the
conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions arise.
Atty. Melo:
Under organic law, government in general had inherent power to
expropriate.
Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989)
In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than
two appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of
condemnation is thirty days counted from the notice of said order and not
the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in general,
conformably with sec 39 of BP 129, in relation to par 19 (b) of the
Implementing Rules to the effect that in appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty days, a
record of appeal being required.
Atty. Melo:
Two appeals, two orders so rule on ordinary appeals. 30d. if you dont
question within 30d, becomes final
Atty. Melos lecture:
How is just compensation determined? Court appoints three
commissioners. JC is FMV Consequential damages to property +
consequential benefits. Consequential benefits cannot exceed consequential
damages. In any case, minimum that must be paid is FMV.
What are consequential damages/consequential benefits?
o Ex: I have a huge tract of raw land, government wants to
expropriate of my land to build a public market. The
consequential damages brought about by that section for use as
public market would be the smell, the risk to health, increase in
crime rate. Consequential benefits to the remaining land would be
property value would rise because its now a commercial area.
FMV consequential damages + consequential benefits.
Consequential benefits cannot exceed CD. So if you have 10p CD
and 10k CB, whats considered is only 10p in CB. Unjust
enrichment.
Provincial Government of Rizal v. Caro de Araullo, 58 Phil. 308 (1933)
The value of the property taken by eminent domain should be fixed as of the
date of the proceedings, and with reference to the loss the owner sustains,
considering the property in its condition and situation at the time it is
taken, and not as enhanced by the purpose for which it is taken. Our law
says compensation shall be just and, to be exactly just, the compensation
should be estimated as of the time of the taking.
K Suarez | 4A 2010
Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
Atty. Melo:
Value of JC is computed from time of entry
In this case, property increased in value because of the expropriation.
When is there taking/entry?
Republic v. vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
Elements of taking: (1) expropriator must enter a private property; (2)
entrance must be for more than a momentary period; (3) entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property
for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The word momentary, when applied to possession or occupancy of real
property, should be construed to mean a limited period not indefinite or
permanent.
Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind landowner;
expropriation must be commenced in court.
Atty. Melo:
What constitutes taking? Physical taking which is not for mere momentary
basis (momentary ex: army platoon on the way to Basilan camps in your
land for a day thats not taking). Yearly term of the lease is still momentary
Taking must be under warrant or color of title
So (1) physical taking and entry must (2) not be for momentary period of
time and (3) taking is under warrant or color of legal authority (4) taking
for public use (5) taking deprives or ousts owner from all beneficial use of
the property. When PAF was leasing the land, it was paying rent a benefit
of ownership. Taking in contemplation of ED began when lease was not
renewed and the government persisted in occupying the land.
Difference here, if you start from beginning of lease, value of property was
only 20c/sqm at time complaint was filed, 15/sqm.
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the
time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is
less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity.
Provisions of PD Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533 on just compensation are
unconstitutional and void; the Court has the power to determine just
compensation and to appoint commissioners for the purpose. The method
of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives, it tends to render the
court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for
final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the
court technically would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task
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would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it
would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67. x x
Spaced out and didnt take down notes oops, sorry
Although there are commissioners to determine value of JC, it is the court
which will approve or deny the report. Court finally decides everything.
City of Manila v. Corrales, 32 Phil. 85 (1915)
In taking private property for public use, under the power of eminent
domain, the person whose property is thus taken should be paid the
reasonable market value for the same. The owners of property should not
take advantage of the necessity of the public for the purpose of requiring the
government to pay more than their property is worth; neither should the
government be permitted to take the property of private persons at a less
price than it is reasonably worth at the time of the expropriation. When we
speak of the market value of property taken under the power of eminent
domain, we mean the value which purchasers generally would pay for it. We
do not mean what a purchaser would pay who had no particular object in
view in purchasing and no definite plan as to the use to which to put it. The
owner has a right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most
in the market.
The owner is entitled to recover the value of the land at the time it was
expropriated. He should not be charged with the expense necessary to put
the property so taken in the condition in which the public desires to use it.
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic, 143 SCRA 466 (1986)
The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that the
petitioners property is no longer part of the public domain. The power of
eminent domain refers to the power of government to take private property
for public use. If the mineral claims are public, there would be no need to
expropriate them. Mineral claims of the petitioner are not being transferred
to another mining company or to a public entity interested in the claims as
such. The land where the mineral claims were located is needed for the
PMA, a public use completely unrelated to mining. The fact that the location
of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar the governments exercise
of its power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain covers all
forms of private property, tangible or intangible, and includes rights which
are attached to the land.
After party whose mineral land is being expropriated has shifted its position
to the issue only of just compensation, it cannot later claim that its motion
to dismiss (which operates as an answer in expropriation cases) should
have been resolved first before entry of condemnation order.
Atty. Melo:
Here we see the two-step procedure of expropriation. Benguet first opposed
governments right to expropriate. Then in second stage, it did not present
evidence what JC is proper. Maybe counsel wary that by presenting evidence
for JC, it is deemed abandonment of MTD. But given nature of
ED/Expropriation, shouldve presented evidence.
K Suarez | 4A 2010
Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
Atty. Melos lecture:
An appeal of decisions, whether order of expropriation or filing just
compensation, will not delay or hold taking in abeyance. As long as amount
is deposited, taking may be done. Of course you can file for TRO but thats
another thing.
For instance, there are conflicting claims on the property. Property sought
to be expropriated claimed by two different people. Court will proceed with
expropriation case and hold JC with whoever will be adjudged proper
recipient. Something like an interpleader goes on.
For instance, there is a decision, JC determined, theres taking already,
nominal deposit, property already in possession of government but
government does not pay JC. Can you say property will be returned to you?
No, even though JC is not paid, it is not necessarily a ground for return of the
property. Its only a ground for asking for interest or damages for non-
payment.
Can you execute the order or decision awarding JC? No, you cannot execute
against public funds. EXCEPT: Coscolluela case. There was a public road
project. There was taking, finding of JC, no payment for a long time (6/7y)
so LO tried to execute on the funds of the project (DPWH). SC said that the
road had earnings (from toll), and since there was earning, appropriations
for project (for the expropriation of private lands), there were funds
earmarked for payment of JC and this is what you can execute the judgment
against. Either earnings from public use or what has been appropriated
under the law. If there is no appropriation by Congress, you cannot execute.
Rule 68
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Section 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure.In an action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage or other encumbrance upon real estate, the complaint shall set forth the
date and due execution of the mortgage; its assignments, if any; the names and
residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee; a description of the mortgaged
property; a statement of the date of the note or other documentary evidence of the
obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid thereon; and
the names and residences of all persons having or claiming an interest in the
property subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage, all of whom shall
be made defendants in the action.
Section 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale.If upon the trial in such
action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation,
including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the
court or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor
more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of judgment, and that in
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default of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment.
Section 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect.When the defendant, after being
directed to do so as provided in the next preceding section, fails to pay the amount of
the judgment within the period specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order
the property to be sold in the manner and under the provisions of Rule 39 and other
regulations governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale shall not affect
the rights of persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property or a part
thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, also upon motion, it shall
operate to divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest
their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed
by law.
Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon the expiration of the period of
redemption when allowed by law, the purchaser at the auction sale or last
redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession of the property unless a third
party is actually holding the same adversely to the judgment obligor. The said
purchaser or last redemptioner may secure a writ of possession, upon motion, from
the court which ordered the foreclosure.
Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.The amount realized from the foreclosure
sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to
the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue,
after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there
be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them,
then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.
Section 5. How sale to proceed in case the debt is not all due. If the debt for which
the mortgage or encumbrance was held is not all due as provided in the judgment, as
soon as a sufficient portion of the property has been sold to pay the total amount and
the costs due, the sale shall terminate; and afterwards, as often as more becomes due
for principal or interest and other valid charges, the court may, on motion, order
more to be sold. But if the property cannot be sold in portions without prejudice to
the parties, the whole shall be ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire
debt and costs shall be paid, if the proceeds of the sale be sufficient therefor, there
being a rebate of interest where such rebate is proper.
Section 6. Deficiency judgment.If upon the sale of any real property as provided in
the next preceding section there be a balance due to the plaintiff after applying the
proceeds of the sale, the court, upon motion, shall render judgment against the
defendant for any such balance for which, by the record of the case, he may be
personally liable to the plaintiff, upon which execution may issue immediately if the
balance is all due at the time of the rendition of the judgment; otherwise, the plaintiff
shall be entitled to execution at such time as the balance remaining becomes due
under the terms of the original contract, which time shall be stated in the judgment.
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Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
Section 7. Registration.A certified copy of the final order of the court confirming
the sale shall be registered in the registry of deeds. If no right of redemption exists,
the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall be cancelled, and a new one
issued in the name of the purchaser.
Where a right of redemption exists, the certificate of title in the name of the
mortgagor shall not be cancelled, but the certificate of sale and the order confirming
the sale shall be registered and a brief memorandum thereof made by the registrar of
deeds upon the certificate of title. In the event the property is redeemed, the deed of
redemption shall be registered with the registry of deeds, and a brief memorandum
thereof shall be made by the registrar of deeds on said certificate of title.
If the property is not redeemed, the final deed of sale executed by the sheriff in favor
of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale shall be registered with the registry of deeds;
whereupon the certificate of title in the name of the mortgagor shall be cancelled and
a new one issued in the name of the purchaser.
Section 8. Applicability of other provisions.The provisions of sections 31, 32 and 34
of Rule 39 shall be applicable to the judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages
under this Rule insofar as the former are not inconsistent with or may serve to
supplement the provisions of the latter.
Atty. Melos lecture:
In a complaint for judicial foreclosure, what must you state?
Complaint in action for foreclosure (Sec 1)
In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other encumbrance upon
real estate, the complaint shall set forth:
o The date and due execution of the mortgage;
o Its assignments, if any;
o The names and residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee;
o A description of the mortgaged property;
o A statement of the date of the note or other documentary evidence
of the obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount claimed to
be unpaid thereon; and
o The names and residences of all persons having or claiming an
interest in the property subordinate in right to that of the holder
of the mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in the
action.
If as mortgagee, you win. What will the court award you?
Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale (Sec 2)
If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the
complaint to be true it shall render a judgment containing the following
matters:
o Ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt
or obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by
the court, and costs;
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o A judgment for the sum so found due;
o An order that the amount found due be paid to the court or to the
judgment obligee within a period of not less than 90 days nor
more than 120 days from the entry of judgment; and
In default of such payment property shall be sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment.
Sale of mortgaged property; effect (Sec 3)
When the defendant, after being directed to do so as provided in the next
preceding section, fails to pay the amount of the judgment within the period
specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold
in the manner and under the provisions of Rule 30 and other regulations
governing sales of real estate under execution.
Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior encumbrances
upon the property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the
court, also upon motion, it shall operate to divest the rights in the property
of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.
Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon the expiration of the
period of redemption when allowed by law, the purchaser at the auction
sale or last redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession of the
property unless a third party is actually holding the same adversely to the
judgment obligor.
Said purchaser or last redemptioner may secure a writ of possession, upon
motion, from the court which ordered the foreclosure
Procedure for judicial foreclosure
1. Complaint
2. Judgment
o Pay within 90-120d
o If not auction sale
3. Confirmation
4. Writ of possession
Does judicial foreclosure pertain only to real estate?
No, Seno v. Pestolante
Seno v. Pestolante, 103 Phil. 414 (1958)
Although the purpose of an action is to recover an amount plus interest
which comes within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace
court, yet when said action involves the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage
covering personal properties valued at more than P2,000, the action should
be instituted before the CFI.
Of course a chattel mortgage may be foreclosed judicially, following
substantially the same procedure in the rule. When the mortgagor refuses to
surrender possession of the mortgaged chattel, an action of judicial
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Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
foreclosure necessarily arises, or one of replevin to secure possession as a
preliminary step to the sale.
Atty. Melo:
Chattel mortgage may be subject to judicial foreclosure
Limpin v. IAC, 166 SCRA 87 (1988)
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage understood in the sense
of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the
foreclosure sale exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except
only where the mortgagee is the PNB or a bank or banking institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act No. 3135 grants to the
mortgagor the right of redemption within one year from the registration of
the Sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale.
No equivalent right of redemption exists where the foreclosure is judicially
effected. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, when confirmed
by an order of the court, shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to
the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of
redemption as may be allowed by law. Such rights exceptionally allowed by
law are those granted by the charter of the PNB and the General Banking
Act. These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any
judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold
on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale
which right may be exercised within a period of one year, counted from the
date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
Section 2, Rule 68 (now 69) provides the mortgagors equity of redemption
which may be exercised even beyond the 90-day period provided it be
before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of
confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer.
Atty. Melo:
In judicial foreclosure, there is no right of redemption, only an equity of
redemption.
Equity of redemption is available only before confirmation of the sale. Once
sale is confirmed and registered, equity of redemption is no longer
available.
Right of redemption is a right granted by law (such as in EJF under Act No.
3135)
No law in judicial foreclosure granting such right of redemption.
Equity fairness. If debtor is granted opportunity to pay, junior
encumbrancers also are given the opportunity.
All mortgagees must be impleaded, otherwise they will not be bound by the
judgment. Law does not say when they should redeem but this will be
tempered by the courts based on circumstances.
Quimson v. PNB, 36 SCRA 26 (1970)
The mortgagor has the right, within the year after the sale of the real estate
as a result of foreclosure of a mortgage by PNB to redeem the property.
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Redemption from execution sales under ordinary judgments pursuant to sec
30, Rule 39 should be made within 12 months from the registration of the
sale and has uniformly applied the same rule to sales upon extrajudicial
foreclosure of registered lands.
The ruling is applicable when the property involved is registered land
whether the sale is an execution sale or a foreclosure sale. There is no valid
reason why the rule in foreclosure of mortgages of registered real estate
where the mortgagee is the PNB should not be the same.
When it comes to the period of redemption of registered real estate sold on
execution whether in foreclosure proceedings or in ordinary cases, actual
notice of the sale by the judgment debtor or redemptioner is immaterial, the
period must always be computed from the date of registration of the
corresponding auction sale. The rule laid down is precisely for the person
entitled to exercise the right of redemption, who necessarily is the owner of
the property sold and not any third party.
Mortgagor shall have the right to redeem the property by paying the
amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at
the rate specified in the mortgage, and all costs and other judicial expenses
incurred by reason of execution and sale and for the custody of said
property, not the amount for which the property was acquired at the
foreclosure sale.
Atty. Melo:
Period of redemption is counted from registration of sale but in this case,
there was an agreement between the bank and Quimson which did not
contravene the spirit of the law so it was allowed.
Ramos v. Maalac and Lopez, 89 Phil. 270 (1951)
The issuance of writ of possession in a foreclosure proceeding is not an
execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, but is
merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court to put an end to
the litigation which the court can undertake even after the lapse of five
years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons
have not intervened in the meantime.
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a
foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser,
and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The
power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in possession,
is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decree
and thus avoid circuitous actions and vexatious litigation.
Atty. Melo:
When you ask for writ of possession, thats not the same as asking for writ
of execution. When you ask for writ of possession, the judgment is already
executed- execution takes place upon auction, not the issuance of writ of
possession.
Grimalt v. Velasquez, 36 Phil. 936 (1917)
Title to real property sold under foreclosure proceedings does not pass until
the sale of the same has been confirmed by the court. In order that the sale
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Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
may be confirmed validly it is necessary that a hearing be given the
interested parties at which they may have an opportunity to show cause
why the sale should not be confirmed. Failure to give notice is a good cause
for setting aside confirmation of the sale.
Atty. Melo:
In general, there is a right of redemption given to the mortgagor if the
mortgagee is a bank (under GBA), but look at GBA of 2000 which says that if
you are a corporation and you mortgage in favor of bank, upon EJF, there is
no right of redemption. Upon auction sale, title can immediately be
transferred in name of bank and no more redemption (huh? Sorry I dont
think I got this right. Check the GBA.)
Sy v. CA, 172 SCRA 725 (1989)
The amounts to be paid to redeem a foreclosed property are the amounts
due under the mortgage deed plus interest and expenses.
Entities like SIHI are authorized to extrajudicially foreclose and sell
mortgaged properties only under a special power inserted or annexed to the
real estate mortgage contract, and interested parties are given one year
from the date of sale within which to redeem the foreclosed properties. The
GBA provides the amount at which the subject property is redeemable- the
amount due under the mortgage deed, plus interest and expenses.
Tolentino v. CA, 106 SCRA 513 (1981)
The right of redemption is not an obligation but an absolute privilege. A
bona fide tender of redemption price and formal offer to redeem is not
essential where the redemption is being exercised by way of judicial action.
A redemption is not rendered invalid by the fact that the sheriff accepted
check rather than cash. The exercise of this right being optional, no
importance can be attached to the fact that a stop payment order was issued
against the check.
Atty. Melo:
Redemption is preferred. If one party wants to redeem, the court will
indulge all chances to redeem party. Tender of check was not a valid
objection to the offer to redeem.
Gravina v. CA, 220 SCRA 178 (1993)
Act No. 3135 (Extrajudicial foreclosure) requires only posting of the notices
of sale in three public places and the publication of the same in a newspaper
of general circulation. Personal notice is not required.
Ouano v. CA, 398 SCRA 425 (2003)
Statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and even slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.
Failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with
statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the
sale. Consequently, such defect renders the sale absolutely void and no title
passes.
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Republication in the manner prescribed by Act 3135 is necessary for the
validity of a postponed extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Where required by
statute or by terms of the foreclosure decree, public notice of the place and
time of the mortgage foreclosure sale must be given, a statute requiring it
being held applicable to subsequent sales as well as to the first advertised
sale of the property.
All that section 24, Rule 39 authorizes is the adjournment of execution sale
by agreement of parties and nowhere does it state that republication and
reposting of notice for postponed sale may be waived.
Atty. Melo:
New posting and publication is required for each postponement. Lack of
posting and publication is a jurisdictional defect.
Yulienco v. CA, 393 SCRA 143 (2002)
Act 3135 mandates that jurisdiction over a petition for writ of possession
lies in the court of the province, city, or municipality where the property
subject thereof is situated.
An action for injunction, reformation and damages does not raise an issue
that constitutes a prejudicial question in relation to a petition for writ of
possession.
A mortgagor has only one year after registration of sale with the RD within
which to redeem the foreclosed real estate, after which period he loses all
his interests over it.
After consolidation of title in the buyers name, for failure of the mortgagor
to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right its issuance to
a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.
Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the mortgagor is bereft of valid title and right to
prevent the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the buyer.
Atty. Melo:
Issuance of writ of possession is a ministerial duty. Cannot delay the
issuance by claiming there is a prejudicial question pending.
This frequently happens. Debtors dilemma is whether to file different cases
in different courts or to file just one and ask for injunction. What happens if
you file just one case in the RTC, that court cannot control what happens in
the other judicial regions and those other pending cases cannot be stopped
by pendency of the case you filed, so you file a complaint for injunction in
each region where there is property mortgaged.
Look at Act No. 3135 and General Banking Act when it comes to banks, there is no
longer any right of redemption in EJF and corporations after sale is registered.
General Banking Law of 2000 (RA 8791), Section 47. Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage. - In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extra-judicially, of any
mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan or other credit accommodation
granted, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold for the full or
partial payment of his obligation shall have the right within one year after the sale of
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Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
the real estate, to redeem the property by paying the amount due under the mortgage
deed, with interest thereon at rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and
expenses incurred by the bank or institution from the sale and custody of said
property less the income derived therefrom. However, the purchaser at the auction
sale concerned whether in a judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure shall have the right
to enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the date of the
confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in accordance with law. Any
petition in court to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure proceedings
instituted pursuant to this provision shall be given due course only upon the filing by
the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay
all the damages which the bank may suffer by the enjoining or the restraint of the
foreclosure proceeding. Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose
property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the
right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not
after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable
Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been sold in a
foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights
until their expiration.
Rule 69
Partition
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.A person having the right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth
in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the
real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
Section 2. Order for partition, and partition, by agreement thereunder.If after the
trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition
of the real estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they
are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same,
shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is
situated.
A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby.
Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree.If the parties
are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three
(3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and
proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
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Section 4. Oath and duties of commissioners.Before making such partition, the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their
duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other
proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and
examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and
examination, and shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the
property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof, and shall set
apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and
equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the
different parts thereof.
Section 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners.When it is made to
appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be
divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, the court may order it
assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other
parties such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the
interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in
which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public
sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine.
Section 6. Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed.The
commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their
proceedings as to the partition, or the assignment of real estate to one of the parties,
or the sale of the same. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve
copies thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10)
days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. No
proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners shall pass the title to the
property or bind the parties until the court shall have accepted the report of the
commissioners and rendered judgment thereon.
Section 7. Action of the court upon commissioners report. Upon the expiration of
the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the
expiration of such period but after the interested parties have filed their objections to
the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, upon hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown,
recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or set aside the
report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the report in part and reject it in
part; and may make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a fair
and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or sold as above
provided, between the several owners thereof.
Section 8. Accounting for rent and profits in action for partition.In an action for
partition in accordance with this Rule, a party shall recover from another his just
share of rents and profits received by such other party from the real estate in
question, and the judgment shall include an allowance for such rents and profits.
Section 9. Power of guardian in such proceedings.The guardian or guardian ad litem
of a minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of
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Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing
respecting the partition of real estate, which the minor or person judicially declared
to be incompetent could do in partition proceedings if he were of age or competent.
Section 10. Costs and expenses to be taxed and collected.The court shall equitably
tax and apportion between or among the parties the costs and expenses which accrue
in the action, including the compensation of the commissioners, having regard to the
interests of the parties, and execution may issue therefor as in other cases.
Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds.If
actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and
bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to
each party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in
severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him. If the whole property is
assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the others the sum or sums ordered
by the court, the judgment shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment
of the real estate to the party making the payment, and the effect of the judgment
shall be to vest in the party making the payment the whole of the real estate free from
any interest on the part of the other parties to the action. If the property is sold and
the sale confirmed by the court, the judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or
purchasers and a definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to each
purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the
purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free from the claims of
any of the parties to the action. A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case
be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated,
and the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action.
Section 12. Neither paramount rights nor amicable partition affected by this Rule.
Nothing in this Rule contained shall be construed so as to prejudice, defeat, or
destroy the right or title of any person claiming the real estate involved by title under
any other person, or by title paramount to the title of the parties among whom the
partition may have been made; nor so as to restrict or prevent persons holding real
estate jointly or in common from making an amicable partition thereof by agreement
and suitable instruments of conveyance without recourse to an action.
Section 13. Partition of personal property.The provisions of this Rule shall apply to
partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and personal
property, in so far as the same may be applicable.
Who can ask for partition?
Anyone with a right or interest over the property.
But what kind of right or interest?
As a co-owner. If youre just a mortgagee, no right to ask for partition. Your right or
interest must be as a co-owner.
NCC articles- every co-owner may ask for partition.
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When can you ask for partition?
Any time. There is no prescriptive period.
Partition is like expropriation in the sense it is a two-stage proceeding. The first stage
is determining the right to partition if you are a co-owner, if there are other co-
owners and if partition is proper. The second stage is determining how to partition.
How to partition if the parties can agree, court will approve it. If they do not agree,
it will be referred to commissioners.
This is judicial partition. Is there extrajudicial partition?
Yes, in fact, the rules state that this [rule] does not prejudice an amicable partition by
the parties.
If there is a paramount right above the rights of the supposed co-owners, partition
will not affect the paramount right. Ex: there is a co-owned property mortgaged to a
bank, the property is subsequently partitioned. The order of partition will not affect
the mortgage. Instead, the mortgage will be carried over to the partitioned
properties.
If there is commissioners findings about how to partition, when does title pass to
each of the co-owners? When is it actually partitioned?
It becomes effective when the report of the commissioners is approved by the court.
Upon court approval, title can be divided among the co-owners.
Partition is capable of pecuniary estimation because it involves property. Distinguish
if it is the main action or just incidental. If it is the main action, jurisdiction is
determined by the value of the property sought to be partitioned. If it is just
incidental, jurisdiction depends on the relief sought whether it is capable of
pecuniary estimation. See Russell v. Vestil.
Russell v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 (1999)
While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just
incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the
document. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Nullification is not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Value of property in this case is not relevant to where you file the case for
partition because partition is an action quasi in rem. If the partition
however involves purely personal property, maybe then value is relevant. So
for real property, it should always be filed with the RTC.
Is there such a thing as de facto partition? This is outside what weve seen in
cases, but sometimes we see a co-owned property is partitioned orally and
in actuality, but the title was not transferred. Later, one part was sold to the
government in expropriation but government took more than the . The
government tendered payment for 1/4th. Guy who sold it took the entire just
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compensation because his entire property was taken. Others said
government took more than that so he should not be entitled to all of it.
Considering property actually divided, how does that affect rights? Atty.
Melo thinks actual partition should govern. [uh fix this]
Actual partition without touching on the title is possible and it will be
recognized by the court.
Ruguian v. Ruguian, 9 Phil. 527 (1908)
An action for partition of an undivided interest in land cannot be
maintained unless all the co-owners are made parties to the action.
Atty. Melo:
Partition must implead all co-owners otherwise proceedings are void. Each
co-owner is an indispensable party.
Miranda v. CA, 71 SCRA 295 (1976)
Yeah I didnt understand this case (probably because I didnt read it haha)
so this is the most relevant thing I could get out of it (c/o the digest):
Rule 39 says that judgment directing an accounting shall not be stayed after
its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal. Thus, if the judgment directing accounting is upheld on appeal,
there would be no time lost and the accounting as rendered could be passed
upon by the trial court at the stage of execution; and if the judgment were
reversed on appeal, reimbursement of the actual expenses incurred by the
successful appellant. As a general rule, an appeal stays the execution of
judgment. But in case of accounting, such is not the case.
Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989)
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally prescribed) and may be made
by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, ff they are
able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In
either case i.e. either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting
is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby.
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable
to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event partition
shall be done for the parties by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
19

rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the
parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award
for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in
the rents and profits of the real estate in question." Such an order is, to be
sure, final and appealable.
In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than
two appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of
condemnation is thirty days counted from the notice of said order and not
the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in general,
conformably with sec 39 of BP 129, in relation to par 19 (b) of the
Implementing Rules to the effect that in appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty days, a
record of appeal being required.
Quimpo v. vda. de Beltran, 545 SCRA 174 (2008)
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support
the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of
partition may be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds,
possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long
series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence
that there was actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in
the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded.
Any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. An action for
partition does not prescribed and is not subject to laches.
Rule 70
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
[No lecture/case notes for Rules 70 and 71. I was absent and I dont have time to
listen to and transcribe the recording]
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.Subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.Unless otherwise
stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or
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comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by
serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by
posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee
fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in
the case of buildings.
Section 3. Summary procedure.Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy
laws or when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to
be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided.
Section 4. Pleadings allowed.The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the
complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the
answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified.
Section 5. Action on complaint.The court may, from an examination of the
allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss
the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are
apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue
summons.
Section 6. Answer.Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant
shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.
Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived,
except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory
counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from
service of the answer in which they are pleaded.
Section 7. Effect of failure to answer.Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of
the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion
reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or
otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of section 3(c), Rule
9 if there are two or more defendants.
Section 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties.Not later than thirty (30)
days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The
provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference
unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for
the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the
plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next
preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to
judgment in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not
20

apply where one Of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action
who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.
No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly
meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the
exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant.
Section 9. Record of preliminary conference.Within five (5) days after the
termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the
matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:
1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the
terms thereof;
2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;
3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions
made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further
proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty
(30) days from issuance of the order;
4. A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and
5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.
Section 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit
the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in
the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied
upon by them.
Section 11. Period for rendition of judgment.Within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same,
the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may,
during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and
require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within
ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen
(15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing
the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the
rendition of the judgment.
Section 12. Referral for conciliation.Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where
there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied
with.
Section 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions.The following petitions, motions, or
pleadings shall not be allowed:
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1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening
of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions.
Section 14. Affidavits.The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall
state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in
evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the
same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit
or portion thereof from the record.
Section 15. Preliminary injunction.The court may grant preliminary injunction, in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer
may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the
motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership.When the defendant raises the defense
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
Section 17. Judgment.If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the
complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution
of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that
said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his
costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum
found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.
21

Section 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership.The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by
the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.If judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in
favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the
absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at
the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the
Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court
to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or
authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final
disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or
in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the
payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the
appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall
order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until
the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by
the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it
appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or
building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of
possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
disposing of the appeal.
Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal.Upon motion of the
plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial
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Court, the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the
plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that the defendants appeal is frivolous
or dilatory, or that the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious.
Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
Reyes v. Sta. Maria, 91 SCRA 164 (1979)
Refusal to deliver possession of property of a party and adverse claim of
ownership of the same property by another entitles the former to the
remedy of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not ejectment or
unlawful detainer.
There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property, namely (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer
(denominated accion interdictal), which seeks the recovery of physical
possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace
court; (2) accion publiciana, which is for the recovery of the right to possess
and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a CFI; and (3)
accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of
course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi), also brought in the CFI.
Hilario v. CA, 260 SCRA 420 (1996)
At present, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases have to be tried
pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure regardless of whether
or not the issue of ownership of the subject matter is alleged by a party.
As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment
cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing
upon the issue of ownership subject to the same caveat that the issue posed
as to ownership can be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
An adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and therefore would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land.
Allegations in the complaint for ejectment should sufficiently make out a
case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer as the case may be otherwise
jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it contains the allegation
that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. CA, 208 SCRA 108 (1992)
An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in the RTC based
on tenants claim that his right of preemption was violated.
The following cases should not be regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment
suit:
22

o Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment
actions in the first level courts do not abate the latter; and neither
do consignation of rentals.
o Accion publiciana does not suspend an ejectment suit against the
plaintiff in the former.
o Writ of possession case where ownership is the principal issue
before the RTC does not preclude nor bar the execution of the
judgment in unlawful detainer where the only issue involved is the
material possession or possession de facto of the premises.
o Action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment
suit involving the same property.
o Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment
actions.
o Action for reformation of instrument does not suspend an
ejectment suit between the same parties.
o Action for reconveyance of property or accion reivindicatoria also
has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property.
o Suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property
do not operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same
property.
Muoz v. CA, 214 SCRA 216 (1992)
The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who
had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the
possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint
by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the
restoration of his possession?
Failure to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal
because this will determine the start of the counting of the one year period
for the filing of the summary action for forcible entry. When the complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or
reivindicatoria in the RTC.
Sumulong v. CA, 232 SCRA 372 (1994)
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct
causes of action.
Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer
One unlawfully withholds possession
Deprivation of physical possession of any
thereof after the expiration or
land or building by means of force,
termination of his right to hold
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
possession under any contract, express
(FISTS)
or implied
Possession is illegal from the very Possession was originally lawful but
beginning became unlawful by the expiration or
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Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
termination of the right to possess
Issue is who has rightful possession
(defendant is party in actual possession
Issue is who has prior possession de
and plaintiffs cause of action is
facto
termination of defendants right to
continue in possession)
Allegation of prior physical possession is Plaintiff need not have prior physical
indispensable possession/it need not be alleged
Demand to vacate not really necessary Demand to vacate is a jurisdictional
but better if alleged requirement
What determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.
In an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient,
and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Ong v. Parel, 355 SCRA 691 (2001)
The one year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that
when entry was made through stealth, the one year period is counted from
the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
Stealth is defined as any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and
to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without
permission.
Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 (1946)
A demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer when the
action is for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his
lease, and not where the action is to terminate the lease because of the
expiration of its term.
A lease ceases upon expiration of its term without necessity of any notice to
the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant withholding the property
unlawfully after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In other words,
upon expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property
and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for
unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before the
expiration of the fifteen days (land) or five days (building) provided in
section 2.
There may be a tacit renewal of a lease, as when, with the acquiescence of
the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days as
provided in the Civil Code; and the lessors acquiescence may be inferred
from his failure to serve a notice to quit. But tacit renewal, in such case,
being a new contract, is a matter of defense which may be alleged by the
23

defendant in his answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by
way of anticipation of such defense.
Where a notice to quit was in fact made, though not specifically pleaded in
the complaint, and said notice had been offered and admitted in the
municipal court as evidence, the deficiency of the complaint, supposing
there was any, was cured by evidence.
[substantial compliance with requirements of allegations is acceptable]
Penas, Jr. v. CA, 233 SCRA 744 (1994)
The rule is that the one year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 within
which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted
from the last letter of demand to vacate.
Notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or
otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules in
unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he
thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he
defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.
Caiza v. CA, 176 SCRA 72 (1989)
An owners act of allowing another to occupy her house, rent-free, does not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latters favor.
A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period
for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the
date of the last demand, the reason being that the lessor has the option to
waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises.
Cetus Development, Inc. v. CA, 176 SCRA 72 (1989)
The demand required and contemplated in section 2 is a jurisdictional
requirement for the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit for failure
to pay rent or comply with the conditions of lease. It partakes of an
extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued before resorting to judicial
action, so much so that when there is full compliance with the demand,
there arises no necessity for court action.
Existence of cause of action gives the lessor the right under Art 1659 of the
New Civil Code to ask for the rescission of the contract of lease and
indemnification for damages or only the latter, allowing the contract to
remain in force. Where rescission is clearly the option taken, the whole that
has been followed in our jurisdiction is that both demands to pay rent and
to vacate are necessary to make a lessee a deforciant in order that an
ejectment suit may be filed.
There are two requisites for bringing an ejectment suit: (1) there must be
failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there
must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods
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specified in section 2, namely 15 days in case of lands and 5 days in case of
buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for
unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement
of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.
The demand required in the NCC may be in any form, provided that it can be
proved and proof of this demand lies upon the creditor. Without such
demand, oral or written, the effects of default do not arise. This demand is
different from the demand required under the rules which is merely a
jurisdictional requirement before an existing cause of action may be
pursued.
Here, there is no proof that petitioner demanded payment of rentals when
the obligation matured and there being no accrued cause of action for
ejectment, the demand to vacate was premature.
Cursino v. Bautista, 176 SCRA 65 (1989)
PD 20 suspended ejectment when the lease is for an indefinite period; it did
not suspend ejectment on grounds like lack of payment of the rental
stipulated.
Failure or refusal of the lessor to receive the rent is not a valid defense in
ejectment cases; in such instances, the debtor-lessee must consign the
amount due from him.
It is the landlords demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the
tenant has failed to pay the rent on time and tenants refusal or failure to
vacate, which makes unlawful withholding of possession.
Heirs of Suico v. CA, 266 SCRA 444 (1997)
Where the rentals are paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal may be deemed
to be on a monthly basis, expiring at the end of every month, pursuant to
Article 1687, in relation to Article 1673 of the NCC, and in such a case, a
demand to vacate is not even necessary for judicial action after the
expiration of every month.
Mara, Inc. v. Estrella, 65 SCRA 471 (1975)
Article 539 of the NCC is an exception to the general rule that a writ of
injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take property out of the
possession or control of one person and place it in the hands of another
whose title has not clearly been established by law.
Therefore, if the petitioner asking for an injunction is the registered owner
and the oppositor is an interloper or squatter who has no possessory right
to the land in litigation, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may be
issued pendente lite.
Balagtas Realty Corp. v. Romillo, Jr., 114 SCRA 28 (1982)
Under this rule, judgment in favor of plaintiff must be executed immediately
in order to prevent further damage to him arising from continued loss of
possession. However, the defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting an
appeal and filing a supersedeas bond, and (b) by paying promptly from time
to time either to the plaintiff or depositing with the CFI the adjudged
24

reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property. This rule is
mandatory, the exception being when the delay is due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.
In ejectment cases, the tenants-defendants in an ejectment case must
deposit in court the monthly rentals specified in the dispositive portion of
the courts decision regardless of statement in the body of the opinion or
the contract of the parties on giving of discounts if rental is paid on time.
Chua v. CA, 286 SCRA 437 (1998)
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising
from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the
immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending, the
foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1)
the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3)
he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency
of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these
conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty
of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the
defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of
the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the
supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the
appeal.
The supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals, damages
and costs which accrued before the decision was rendered, as determined
by the MTC in the said decision. The bond does not answer for amounts
accruing during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject
of the periodic deposits to be made by the defendant.
An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of material possession or
possession de facto of the property under litigation, not on the issue of
ownership. On the other hand, the issue of ownership is considered in an
ejectment suit only for the limited purpose of determining who between the
contending parties has the better right to possession.
De Laureano v. Adil, 72 SCRA 148 (1976)
Supersedeas bond answers for damages adjudged in appealed judgment
and rentals as fixed in the judgment. Damages recoverable refer to
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property which
is generally measured by its fair rental value. It cannot refer to other
damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the
property. Consequently, attorneys fees cannot be considered as damages.
If this were a case where the defendant did not file any supersedeas bond or
did not make any monthly deposit, then plaintiff would be entitled as a
matter of right to the immediate execution of the city court's judgment both
as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals
or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. In such a case '
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the execution is mandatory. The only exceptions are the existence of fraud,
accident, mistake or execusable negligence which prevented the defendant
from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the
occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in
the situation of the parties and which would make the execution
inequitable.
This is a case where there was a supersedeas bond and where monthly
deposits were made but the bond and the deposit were inadequate or were
not in conformity with the city court's judgment. Defendant committed a
mistake because he followed the erroneous order of the city court which
fixed the supersedeas bond and the monthly deposit in contravention of its
own decision and, consequently, in violation of section 8 of Rule 70. Because
of that mistake, immediate execution under Rule 70 would not be
warranted.
Rule 71
Contempt
Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily.A person guilty of misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before
the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit
or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in
contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment net exceeding (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
Section 2. Remedy therefrom.The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court
may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or
prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of
such petition, provided such person flea a bond fixed by the court which rendered the
judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the
petition be decided against him.
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.After a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties
or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of
a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or
ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into
or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
25

or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of
an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending
such proceedings.
Section 4. How proceedings commenced.Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out
of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt
shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
Section 5. Where charge to be filed.Where the charge for indirect contempt has
been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where
such contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the
proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the
Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as provided in section 2 of this
Rule.
Section 6. Hearing; release on bail.If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith,
the respondent may be released from custody upon filing a bond, in an amount fixed
by the court, for his appearance at the hearing of the charge. On the day set therefor,
the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and consider such comment,
testimony or defense as the respondent may make or offer.
Section 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.If the respondent is adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent
or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
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imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of
contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or
both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary
restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete
restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such
amount as may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a
judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides.
Section 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed.When the contempt consists in the
refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it.
Section 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer.When a
respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court
may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be
forfeited and confiscated, or both; and, if the bond be proceeded against, the measure
of damages shall be the extent of the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party
by reason of the misconduct for which the contempt charge was prosecuted, with the
costs of the proceedings, and such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party
injured. If there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as in
criminal cases.
Section 10. Court may release respondent.The court which issued the order
imprisoning a person for contempt may discharge him from imprisonment when it
appears that public interest will not be prejudiced by his release.
Section 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The judgment or final
order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as
in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended
until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the
court front which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided
against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order.
Section 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities.Unless otherwise provided by
law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such
rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to
punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has
been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefor.
Halili v. CIR, 136 SCRA 112 (1982)
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of
the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or
their witnesses during litigation; disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
26

disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends
to bring the authority of 'the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.
Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of
the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.
The exercise of the power to punish contempts has a
twofold aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the
guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order;
and (2) to compel his performance of some act or duty
required of him by the court which he refuses to
perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the
power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil
or criminal.
Civil Contempt Criminal Contempt
Conduct directed against the authority
Failure to do something ordered to be and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in
done by a court or a judge for the benefit unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
of the opposing party therein authority or dignity of the court or judge,
or in doing a duly forbidden
Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a
stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power
of the court, either by fine payable to the government or by imprisonment,
or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment
is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of damages for the
wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the
performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final
judgment or decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if
made before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory
order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be
reviewed only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is
appropriate to the review of judgments in civil cases. The question of
whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the
jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the same.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part
showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the
attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence and that the statutory grounds
for disbarment or suspension are not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of the courts in this respect. The inherent powers of the
court over its officers cannot be restricted.
Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 (1933)
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The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, to the administration of justice.
Our statute divides contempt into two kinds:
Direct Contempt Indirect Contempt
May be punished summarily May be punished only after due hearing
Misbehavior in the presence of or so near
the court or judge as to obstruct the
administration of justice, including the
refusal of a person present in court to be
sworn as a witness or to answer as a
witness when lawfully required.
[The rest is found in the Halili case, citing this case]
The nature of contempt proceedings does not in any case necessarily
partake of the nature of the original action or proceedings out of which it
arises. The fact that a contempt has arisen in a civil action in no way tends to
characterize the nature of the proceedings for its correction. While it is true
that it would be hard to imagine a contempt of a civil aspect arising in a
criminal case, it is equally true that acts of contempt of a criminal aspect do,
and most frequently, arise in action of purely civil character. If the contempt
consists in the refusal of a party or a person to do an act which the court has
ordered him to do for the benefit or the advantage of a party to a suit or
action pending before it, and he is committed until he complies with the
order, the commitment is in the nature of the execution to enforce a
judgment of a court, and the party in whose favor that judgment was
rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings.
The question of whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal does
not affect the jurisdiction of a court to punish the same. Where the court has
jurisdiction of the person of the contemner, who was properly brought
before the court, and had jurisdiction to hear the charge and had the
jurisdiction to decide upon the same, such jurisdiction does not become
affected by any distinction between a civil and criminal contempt.
Lim Se v. Argel, 70 SCRA 378 (1976)
It is obvious that Atty. Adaza's characterization of the mandatory injunction
as "unjust and a miscarriage of justice" and as devoid of factual and legal
basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He treated a resolution of this Court as
if it were a pleading of an adversary which he could assail in unrestrained
and abrasive language. His unjustified and disrespectful characterization
carries with it obvious derogatory implications or innuendos which clearly
constitute direct contempt or contempt facie curiae.
Ang v. Castro, 136 SCRA 453 (1985)
The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular
judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not
direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of
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 Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Neither do we believe that the publication in question was intended to
Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so. The
malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to which is extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so
interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to
provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and, if disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.
found guilty he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally
Court. and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of
passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that in every case
In re: Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916) where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another; and
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, oftentimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there
obstruct the administration of justice and subjects such persons to should be other than a bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the
contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and
causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by tolerate everything which appears as but the momentary outbreak of
publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal right to disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of
have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of such, outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in
law, free from outside coercion or interference. silence.
Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect,
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, primarily, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the
or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some act or duty
and is punishable. required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform. Due perhaps
The power to fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, or enforce the to this two fold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them,
observance of order, are powers which cannot be dispensed with in the contempts are classified as civil or criminal.
courts, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others. Civil contempt v. Criminal contempt
The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to Civil Contempt Criminal Contempt
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as Consists in failing to do something Conduct that is directed against the
essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their ordered to be done by a court in a civil dignity and authority of the court or a
authority, is a part of the law of the land. action for the benefit of the opposing judge acting judicially; it is an act
party therein and is, therefore, an offense obstructing the administration of justice
In re: Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801, 805 (1930) against the party in whose behalf the which tends to bring the court into
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the Supreme Court. That violated order is made. disrepute or disrespect.
this power extends to administrative proceedings as well as to suits at law Being directed against the dignity and
cannot be doubted. It is as necessary to maintain respect for the courts, Proceedings to punish a civil contempt authority of the court, is an offense
indeed to safeguard their very existence, in administrative cases concerning are remedial and for the purpose of the against organized society and, in
the removal and suspension of judges as it is in any other class of judicial preservation of the right of private addition, is also held to be an offense
proceedings. persons. It has been held that civil against public justice which raises an
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or contempt is neither a felony nor a issue between the public and the
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding misdemeanor, but a power of the court. accused, and the proceedings to punish it
constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. are punitive.
The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. Since the purpose of civil contempt
It is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish Intent is a necessary element in criminal
proceedings is remedial, the defendant's
any matters which their policy requires should be kept private. contempt, and that no one can be
intent in committing the contempt is
punished for a criminal contempt unless
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the
People v. Godoy, 2343 SCRA 64 (1995) the evidence makes it clear that he
absence of intent to violate the court's
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level intended to commit it.
order is not a defense in civil contempt.
of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
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 Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo
Primary purpose is to provide a remedy Primary purpose is to preserve the subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent
for an injured suitor and to coerce courts authority and to punish for was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all defenses,
compliance with an order. disobedience of its orders. arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the consideration of
If the contempt consists in the refusal of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the
a person to do an act that the court has respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the
ordered him to do for the benefit or Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as
advantage of a party to an action pending Criminal contempt involves no element constituting "direct contempt."
before the court, and the contemnor is of personal injury. It is directed against To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is
committed until he complies with the the power and dignity of the court; simplistic at best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the
order, the commitment is in the nature of private parties have little, if any, interest power to punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted
an execution to enforce the judgment of in the proceedings for punishment. upon his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates the authority,
the court; the party in whose favor that dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to respectful
judgment was rendered is the real party behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most
in interest in the proceedings especially from those who are officers of the court.
Civil contempt proceedings look only to
the future. And it is said that in civil
contempt proceedings, the contemnor
must be in a position to purge himself.
This is getting too long [thats what she said]. Just check the decision.

In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949)

That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior
jurisdiction independently of any special expression of statute, is a doctrine
or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in
the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our
Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision.

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)

In the per curiam Resolution, the Court concluded that "respondent
Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did
not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct
contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United States have
sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts
in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded
the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading
filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the
misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of
the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court
and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would
stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to
explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
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