ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs.

JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL
Facts: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for
women(170) of ill repute/ prostitutes, which had been
permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila,
closed. The women were kept confined to their houses
in the district by the police. Presumably, during this
period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters
Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a
guard of soldiers.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an
application for habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court. The writ was granted.
Issue: WON HC is the proper remedy?
Held: NO
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the
parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
The persons in question are not restrained of their
liberty.
When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties
in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint;
the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao. Others h
A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of
these women from Manila by officials of that city, who
handed them over to other parties, who deposited them
in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned.
NOTE: The writ has already been granted, and since SC
find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in
this connection remains to be done.
-----------------------------Alfie Luzana Omega

G.R. No. 138731

December 11, 2000
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA MANUEL Vda. DE
BIASCAN, petitioner, vs. ROSALINA C. BIASCAN
Facts: Respondent Rosalina J. Biascan filed a petition
praying for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea
Zulueta. Respondent was appointed as regular
administratrix of the estates.
Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of
Florencio Biascan entered her appearance as Oppositor.
Simultaneous with her appearance, she filed a pleading
containing several motions including a motion for
intervention, a motion for the setting aside of private
respondents appointment as special administratrix and
administratrix, and a motion for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan.4
After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, CFI
granted Marias intervention and set for trial the motion
to set aside the Orders appointing respondent as
administratrix.
Trial court issued an Order6 resolving that: (1) Maria is
the lawful wife of Florencio; (2) respondent and her
brother are the acknowledged natural children of
Florencio; (3) all three are the legal heirs of Florencio
who are entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings; (4) the motion to set aside the order
appointing private respondent as administratrix is
denied; and (5) the motion to approve inventory and
appraisal of private respondent be deferred. Maria,
through her counsel, received a copy of this April 2, 1981
Order on April 9, 1981.7
On June 6, 1981, or fifty-eight (58) days after he receipt
of the April 2, 1981 Order, Maria filed her motion for
reconsideration8 which private respondent opposed.9
On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall
of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records of
the settlement proceedings were among those lost in the
fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a
Petition for Reconstitution10 of the said records.
Due to the delay caused by the fire and the
reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30,
1985 that the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4
issued an Order11 denying Marias June 6, 1981 Motion
for Reconsideration.
Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her testate estate
also became the subject of settlement proceedings.

The trial court issued an Order16 denying petitioners

appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed out of
time. The trial court ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order
which was the subject of the appeal already became
final as the Motion for Reconsideration thereof was filed
sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In
addition, the court ruled that the notice of appeal itself
was filed manifestly late as the same was filed more
than 11 years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985
Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13,
1996 of petitioner was likewise denied by the trial court
in an Order17 dated February 12, 1997.
ISSUE: WON Appeal is still proper?
Held: NO
The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent
Rosalina Biascan and German Biascan were entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely
under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the
trial court has effectively determined that the three
persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such,
the same may be the proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioners
motion to set aside the order appointing private
respondent as the regular administratrix of the estate of
Florencio Bisacan is likewise a proper subject of an
appeal.
In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding
for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any
decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30)
days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being
required.
Petitioner admits that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, its
predecessor-in-interest, received a copy of the same of
April 9, 1981. Applying these rules, Maria or her counsel
had thirty (30) days or until May 9 within which to file a
notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may also file
a motion for reconsideration, in which case the appeal
period is deemed interrupted.
Considering that it was only June 6, 1981, or a full fiftyeight (58) days after receipt of the order, that a motion
for reconsideration was filed, it is clear that the same
was filed out of time. As such, when the said motion for
reconsideration was filed, there was no more appeal
period to interrupt as the Order had already become
final.
--------------------------------ALfie Luzana Omega

G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG
Facts: Respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son
of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he
was but two and a half years old and then known as
Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was
then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their
natural parents and by order of the court adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both
naturalized Filipinos.
Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent
while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher.
They decided to adopt the children as they remained
childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples
showered their adopted children with parental love and
reared them as their own children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private
respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering
student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was
averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed
and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the
same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed
for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his
business and social life; and that his adoptive mother
does not oppose his desire to revert to his former
surname.
Petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo
Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. 5 On appeal to
respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner
Republic through the Solicitor General, the decision of
the court below was affirmed in full, hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: whether or not the reasons given by private
respondent in his petition for change of name are valid,
sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said
petition.
Held: YES.
Title XIII, Book I of the Civil Code, in Articles 364 to 380,
provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of
surnames. Considering the subject and personalities
involved in this present review, particular attention must
be called to Article 365 which mandates that "(a)n

adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter," in

correlation with Article 341 on the effects of adoption,
among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to use
the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an
adopted child is maintained in Article 39(3), Title II of
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. More recently, Executive
Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No.
227, or the Family Code, echoes the same statutory right
of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter.

in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion;

25
(d) Having continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien
parentage; 26 (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; 27 and (f) When the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.

A change of name is a special proceeding to establish

the status of a person involving his relation with others,
that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of
the community. It is a proceeding in rem 14 and, as such,
strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements,
particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest
the court with jurisdiction thereover.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of

the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be
borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object
of adoption proceedings.

The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name

as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to
improve his personality and to provide his best interest.
(Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721).
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for
change of name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 24
Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as

While we appreciate the Solicitor General's

apprehensions and concern, we find the same to be
unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his old
name, private respondent would then be using a name
which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law
prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but
the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the
use of any other surname, and only subjects such
recourse to the abstention of the requisite judicial
sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under
our law only by way of exception to the mandatory
provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames