r#

't
{swPp
THE PouTrcs oF

THE

F;ry;q;H;ti::H#

THE POLITICS OF THE

SWP AND THE DIVISION
AMONGST THE STATE
CAPITALISTS
CONTENTS
Page

INTRODUCTTON
............ 3
r BLIILDING A NEW WORKERS' PARTY: OUR
TRADrTrON...........
................ 5
2 ON THE PROBLEMS OF SWP PHILOSOPHY AND
THEORY
................. 9
3 ECONOMISM AND THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION . 13
4 THE QIIESTTON OF STRATEGY .......
...... 2r
5 THE QUESTTON OF PROGRAMME ......... 27
6 IRELAND AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTTON .......
............... 33
7 THE QITESTTON OF TACTTCS-N/SWP OUT
ONMANOEUYRES 1975-80
...... 39
8 TIIE SWP'S DOWNTIIRN 1981-84
............. 47
9 TIIE SWP'S $OLATIOMST TACTICS REASSESSED
1984

10

II
12

.......

1985.85 FOR GEI\UII\E ITNITY?-OR DESPERATELY

SEEKINGMILITANT? ............
..............
TIIE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY_PROGRAMME,

57

STRATEGY AND TACTICS SUMMED UP ................ 6I

CONCLUSION_BUILDING THE PARTY: WHAT IS

TOBEDOI\E?
.......

REFERENCES

.........
.......

63
67

INTRODUCTION

With the publication in early 1985 of 'Republican Worker', the paper of the Revolutionary Democratic Group (RDG), the division within the state capitalist tendency came out in the open. In 1983 the SCT was synonymous with the SWP. Now
this is no longer true.
There have been a number of splinters from the IS/SWP in the past including what
became Socialist Organiser, the Revolutionary Communist Group, Workers Power,
the Revolutionary Communist Party, Red Action and the Socialist Federation. The
difference between these and the RDG is that we continue to stand on the basis of a
state capitalist analysis ofthe Soviet Union.
At the moment the majority of state caps follow the SWP and only a small minority
support the RDG. But as has happened before, on the basis ofcorrect politics even a
tiny minority can win over the majority.
Every serious marxist therefore asks herself/himself what are the political differences and root causes ofthe division. Every philistine on the other hand is content
to know that one group is a Goliath and the other one merely a David. Marxists read
on. Philistines stop here.

BUILDINGANEW
WORKERSPARTY: OUR
TRADITION
"Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." (knin
'What is to be done?')

Building a revolutionary party is both a theoretical and practical project. The theor-

etical project has always been the need to separate middle class theory from the
revolutionary theory of the working class. Under the banner of marxism both these
trends, the middle class (or anarcho-bureaucratic) and the working class (or revolutionary social democratic) can be found. To build a workers party it is absolutely
essential to draw a line between the two.

knin recognised this fact more than other marxists. It led to the split between
Menshevism (anarcho-bureaucratic) and Bolshevism (revolutionary social democratic) which although considered unnecessary by many marxists at the time, later
proved to be of immense significance. Following the Russian revolution and the rise
of Stalin to power the Bolshevik Party became a tool of the ruling bureaucracy.
Anarcho-bureaucratic 'marxist' ideology came to dominate the world communist
movement. We now find the clearest expression of this trend in the modern Communist Parties.

When Trotsky broke with Stalin, he attempted to uphold and defend the revolutionary democratic tradition. He began the essential work of re-examining the
nature of the Stalinist regime which had arisen from the Russian revolution. He
grappled with the problem in'The Revolution Betrayed'. His analysis was ambivalent. As one commentator said "it must be admitted that throughout 'The Revolution
Betrayed' , as in the rest of his writings of the 1930s, Trotsky could not quite make up
his mind as to how to define precisely the social character of the Soviet regime and
the society it was creating".'
Trotsky began the analysis but did not complete it. He himself declared that "the
question of the character of the Soviet Union (had) not yet Oeen) decided by history".'This theoretical problem was in part due to the difficulty in coming to terms
with the results of a revolution which he was so intimately involved. But it was also
because of Trotsky's own theoretical tradition. He took a 'libertarian' view in the
Menshevik/Bolshevik dispute which led him to side with the Mensheviks. l,ater he
took an ultra bureaucratic position in the trade union debate in the 1920s.

Trotskyism

After Trotsky's death, there arose the politics of 'Trotskyism" defined by the
boundaries of Trotsky's preliminary analysis and sharing its weaknesses. It became
an ossified politics, a step forward from Stalinism but not a complete break with the
anarcho-bureaucratic trend.
Consequently 'Trotskyism' has been associated with many aspects of middle class
revolutionism such as workerism, sectarianism, philistinism and dogmatism. But the
most telling evidence of the anarcho-bureaucratic trend lies in the degeneration of the
Fourth International.
'Trotskyism' has shown a theoretical inability to solve the problems of the international class struggle. It has taken the appearance of a Janus facing two ways at
once, towards stalinist and other radical nationalist bureaucracies, and towards the
working class. This tension underlay its propensity to split. Today there are at least
four versions of the Fourth International (the International Committee (ICFI), the
International Secretariat (ISFI), the Organising Committee for the Reconstruction of
the Fourth International (OCRFI), and the United Secretariat (USFD).
The State Capitalist Tendency (SCT)
The theory of state capitalism goes back to Marx and Engels. In 1950 when Tony
set up the Socialist Review Group they founded a state capitalist
tendency in the UK which they correctly believed was a theoretical advance on traditional Trotskyism.
This break with orthodox Trotskyism was a further step towards revolutionary
workers democracy. It enabled the SRG to develop a more creative tradition. However, the Group was organised on federal lines. Its inspiration came much more from
Rosa Luxemburg than Lenin. Its "conception of the future revolutionary party emphasised its role as a seryant of the mass movement''.' As a consequence "the rest of
the far left regarded it as a Iibertarian anarchist formation-rather than marxist-

Cliff and others

leninist".'

ln 1962 the SRG was renamed the International Socialists (IS). It had an estimated
400 members by 1965 and grew to over a 1,000 by 1968. In 1965 the IS left the
Labour Party. According to Ian Birchall (an historian of the SWP), the IS "inherited
a somewhat libertarian attitude to organisation, a tendency to distrust discipline or
any kind of formalised or centralised structure".6 This in part accounted for "its
growing appeal among young leftist intellectuals".'
The IS also rejected the formalities of a programme. What began as a healthy
scepticism about Trotsky's 1938 Transitional Programme became a more general
anti-programme position. Duncan Hallas, a leading member, argued against "the
assumption that the answers to all problems are known in advance".'He also rejected
the notion that maintaining "the purity of the programme (should be) seen as one of
the main tasks of the selected few".o Hence, "the development of a programme, in
the sense of a detailed statement of partial and transitional aims and tactics in all
important fields, is inseparable from the development of the movement itself ' . ''
The conclusion IS drew from this was that the method of building the group was to
orientate onto the spontaneous movement. Not surprisingly, like Cliff, Comrade

Hallas "dismissed the Leninist model of 1903 as irrelevant".',)

The International Socialists/Socialist Workers Party

Between 1968 and 1974 the

"IS

was converted to Leninism-or Cliff s version of

whilst retaining a sympathy for anarchistic ideas. Consequently when in 19161'l the IS was declared a party, the SWP, it
became a Party-Without-A-Programme. It was launched without the necessary foundations being laid. It simply changed its name.
Clause 15 of the "Theses on conditions of admission to the Communist International" (1919-22) explains that "parties that have still retained their old socialdemocratic (2nd International) programmes have the obligation of changing those
programmes as quickly as possible and working out a new communist prograrnme
corresponding to the particular conditions in the country and in accordance with the
decisions of the Communist International. As a rule the prograrnme of every party
belonging to the Communist International must be ratified by a regular Congress of
the CI or by the Executive Committee. Should the Executive Committee of the CI
reject a party's programme, the party in question has the right of appeal to the Congress of the Communist International".'3
On its present basis the SWP would not have been allowed to join the Communist
International. The SWP claim to stand on the tradition of the first four congresses of
the CI must be treated with scepticism. Building a Party-Without-A-Programme has
become a dogma of its own-one which has nothing in common with Marx or Lenin,
but plenty to do with anarchism. To anarchists a prograrnme is like a red rag to a bull.
If you believe in spontaneity why bother with the rigour in theory and practice which
a prograrnme imposes. When this position is upheld in the name of marxism, it is
evidence ofa middle class trend ofthought.
The programme issue is not simply a matter of words on a piece of paper. It in-

it".'' It became organisationally centralised

volves the whole method

of Party building. It

also involves the relationship of

workers and intellectuals inside the Party. A programme ties a Party down but especially it 'ties down' the intellectuals. Their interests are best served either by an opportunist programme or no prograrnme at all. The latter gives them the maximum
freedom for bureaucratic manoeuvre.
The co-existence of different ideological strands within the SCT is not the best
guarantee of tranquility. Through the 1970s and early 80s there have been a series of
factional struggles. Minority opposition has come from Workers' Fight, the Right
Faction, the l,eft Faction, the IS Opposition, the Faction for Revolutionary Democracy, the Reds Faction, the Republican Faction, as well as undeclared factions (e.g.
Pro Women's Voice and the Building Workers Fraction). The typical outcome has
been either splits or bureaucratic suppression (i.e. expulsions and forced resignations). As a result many abandoned the SCT.

The Revolutionary Democratic Group (RDG)

A workers party cannot be founded on an ideological mix ofthe middle class and
working class brands of marxism. A workers party must be based in theory and

practice on the working class and the working class alone. Any party which is an
ideological hybrid is fatally flawed. That is one of the major lessons to be drawn from
the Bolshevik/Menshevik dispute.
Whilst a state capitalist analysis

of the Soviet Union is a necessary component of

it is by no means sufficient. Consequently the

revolutionary democratic marxism,

struggle against anarcho-bureaucratic 'marxism' is essential if a party is to be placed

on a sound class basis. This was recognised by Duncan Hallas in his attack on some
aspects of anarchism and stalinism in an article 'Towards a Revolutionary Party'.'o
But it is one thing to write about it, and another to carry on the battle in your own
backyard.
For this reason a number of comrades formed the Revolutionary Democratic Group
to carry forward the struggle within the SCT both by our theoretical work and practical contribution to the class struggle. Now the SCT is no longer synonymous in the
UK with the SWP. We believe that traditional theory does not contain all the weapons
to fully expose and defeat the middle class trend. We need to re-examine the theory of
the revolution in the light of historical experience. Without this it will be difficult if
not impossible to understand the programmatic tasks. Theory is indissolubly linked to
prograrnme, strategy and tactics. Without clarity on these questions there can be no
real workers party, only a caricature (i.e. a middle class sham). In this respect we
believe the theoretical project is not completed.

ONTHEPROBLEMSOF
SWP PHILOSOPHY AND

THEORY

Introduction

ln l92ol2l an important debate took place in the Bolshevik Party over the role of
the trade unions. l,enin was attacked for taking "a political approach" as against the
"economic approach" ofhis opponents Trotsky and Bukharin. Lenin understood the
importance of philosophy. He turned his counter attack to the whole method of his
opponents. He accused them of "neglect of marxism, as expressed in the theoretically
incorrect, eclectic, definition of the relation between politics and economics"...
"Politics must take precedence over economics. To argue otherwise is to forget the
ABC of marxism". This was the source of their "glaring theoretical error".' Hence
Lenin notes that "Bukharin's theoretical attitude is 'on the one hand. and on the
other', 'the one and the other'. That is eclecticism' ' .'
The problem is repeated today. For like Trotsky and Bukharin, the SWp has a
"glaring theoretical error" known as economism. To investigate the method of economism we must begin with class. For method is a class question.
The middle class: the anarcho-bureaucrats
The real middle class, as opposed to those who imitate them, occupy a special
position within the system of capitalist production. In the building industry for example a typical multinational would employ managers (foreman to senior managers)
as well as small entrepreneurs or subcontractors. These form the middle strata between the employers and the workers.

More broadly in any national economy, the middle class could include the peasantry (farmers), small entrepreneurs, and intellectuals as well as the managerial and
supervisory employees. It has been estimated that in the uK these comprise of about
of theeconomically active population.
This class is not uniform. Its economic activity rests upon individual initiative
and/or managerial control. Hence we can capture its social essence as the anarcho-

20Vo

bureaucratic class, whose top layer is close to the bourgeoisie proper whilst its lowest
layer shades into the working class.
In observing the role of the middle class in the Russian revolution, Victor Serge
observes that "the petty bourgeoisie, educated, comfortable and held in a position of
subordinancy by the bourgeoisie, is often threatened with impoverishment, and consequently tends towards socialism". But "the socialism of the petty bourgeois is a
socialism of administrators: liberal, confused, individualist-sometimes utopian,
sometimes reactionary

".'

The Janus Characteristics

. . . On

one

hand . . . On the other

The term 'anarcho-bureaucratic' indicates the contradictory essence that is the

middle class. Marx called them "a mixture that cannot gel" . . . a "clot of contradictions" . . . "a focus of social eclecticism".o
As a class they are pulled in two directions at once, towards the capitalists and
towards the working class. The position of shopkeepers in the mining areas during the
miners strike illustrates this. On one hand the shopkeeper is a small capitalist and
property owner. He or she may identify with the Tories and think it is dangerous if
unions are too powerful. On the other hand the Tories attempt to starve the miners
out, close pits and reduce wages is very bad for business. He or she could go bankrupt. Perhaps it would be better if the miners won? Consequently, the middle class
tend to vacillate, never quite sure which side they are on.
Janus was a Roman God whose two faces looked in opposite directions. The month
of January is named after him as a month which looks back into the old year and
forward in the new. Marx used this term to describe the contradictory nature of
middle class politics. Lenin's comments on the great Russian intellectual tro Tolstoy
illustrate the middle class dilemma:
"The contradictions in Tolstoy's works, views, doctrines, in his school, are indeed
glaring. On the one hand, we have the great artist, the genius who has not only drawn
incomparable pictures of Russian life but has made first-class contributions to world
literature. On the other hand we have the landlord obsessed with Christ. On the one
hand, the remarkably powerfirl, forthright and sincere protest against social falsehood
and hypocrisy; and on the other, the 'Tolstoyan', i.e. thejaded, hysterical sniveller
called the Russian intellectual, who publicly beats his breast and wails: 'I am a bad
wicked man, but I am practising moral self-perfection; I don't eat meat any more, I
now eat rice cutlets.' On the one hand, merciless criticism of capitalist exploitation,
exposure ofgovernment outrages, the farcical courts and the state administration, and
unmasking of the profound contradictions between the growth of wealth and achievements,of civilisation and the growth of poverty, degradation and misery among the
working masses. On the other, the crackpot preaching of submission, 'resist not evil'

with violence."'

Middle class politics

In stable times the middle class is a moderate class, seeing itself as having a stake in
the system. But in periods of economic, social and political crisis, the middle class

10

may turn to radical extremes, whether revolutionary or reactionary, left or right.

Fascism is an example of middle class radicalism of the right. Mostly it comprises
middle class elements on the fringe of politics, awaiting their opportunity. But in
times of crisis the middle class and the backward elements amoogsi the woikers can
turn to the fascists for a solution to their problems. Fascism may then become a mass
movement.
Socialist reformism is an example of middle class radicalism of the left. It holds
contradictory Janus politics, half looking to the working class and half to the state and
trade union bureaucracy.

Anarcho-bureaucratic marxism: Centrism and [Jltra-Leftism

Middle class radicalism can also be disguised as 'marxism'. Anarcho-bureaucratic
marxism has the two-faced characteristic. Its left face, merging with anarchism, is
known as ultra leftism. Its right face, merging with the reformist bureaucracy, is
centrism. Menshevism is one historical example of this type of marxism, as in the
1930s what became known as Stalinism.

Economism is the dominant ideology existing 'spontaneously' in the working class

especially amongst the mass of average and backward workers. It means that the
working class is not revolutionry, it is an appendage to bourgeois liberalism, which in
Britain is represented by the Labour Party.
The advanced workers cannot mount any challenge to this if they themselves are
under the sway of middle class 'marxism'. For this is based on what tcnin called "the
glaring theoretical error of economism". This cannot be separated from the struggle
against anarchism and bureaucracy, ultra leftism and centrism.

Economist or democratic politics

"A most characteristic feature of Economism is its failure to understand this connection, more this identity of the most pressing needs of the proletariat with the need
of the general democratic movement".6 For economism is kind of politics which
narrows the scope of democratic politics and class struggle, reducing it to trade union
struggle.
Liberalism desires that workers keep out of politics and confine themselves to trade
unionism. workers should abstain from democratic issues. Economism dresses up
this proposition in a 'left' guise as if it represented the interests of the workers. Hence
economism surrenders a whole terrain of class struggle to liberalism because in
Lenin's words it, "abandons the tasks of actively intervining in every 'liberal' issue
and of determining a Social-Democratic attitude to the question' ' .'
An economist would not champion a purely political cause. she/he would claim this
was nothing to do with working class struggle. Abstain, leave it to bourgeois politicians to resolve. After all, they would say, pure politics has norhing 6 do ;ith
economics. But pure politics is concentrated economics, that is the ABCbf marxism.
This is why l,enin reminded us that "he is no social-democrat who forgets in practice
his obligation to be ahead of all in raising, accentuating and solving every general
democratic question" .'

11

Economism and spontaneity

Economism narrows working class politics to the spontaneous struggle. It means
the domination of the present, the abandonment of the future. The result is following
the movement rather than leading it (to act as the tail end rather than the vanguard).
"Our task" said Lenin "the task of Social Democracy is to combat spontaneity to
divert the working class movement from this spontaneous, trade unionist striving to
come under the wing of the bourgeoisie and bring it under the wing of revolutionary
social democracy"."

Lenin argued that hostility to the conscious element, to planning, to programme

and to theory meant adapting to bourgeois ideas and the backward element in the
movement. "All worship of the spontaneity of the working class movement, all belittling of the role of 'the conscious element' of the role of Social Democracy means,
quite independently of whether he who belitttes that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology on the workers'

' .'o

Conclusion

It is our proposition that economism is the dominant trend in the SWP. This repreofthe anarcho-bureaucratic class which is shown up in centrism and
ultra leftism. Without a determined ideological struggle against economism, the SWP
will only represent the ideals of radical intellectuals who adapt themselves to the
backward element amongst the working class and as a consequence mislead and misdirect the advanced workers. We intend to examine this proposition in the rest of the
sents the politics

pamphlet.

12

ECONOMISMANDTHE
POLITICAL REVOLUTION

Introduction
Economism pulls revolutionary socialists away from the central question of the
political revolution. It puts them on either a parliamentary or a general strike road to
socialism. The strategy of the centrists and ultra lefts was explained in lrnin's pamphlet titled "The Nascent trend of imperialist economism'. He says that "the old
economism of 1894-lXJ2 reasoned thus . . . capitalism has triumphed in Russia.
Consequently there can be no question ofpolitical revolution". (And of course capitalism has "triumphed" in the UK!)

"The practical conclusion: either economic struggle be left to the workers (i.e.
trade unions-our addition) and political struggle to the liberals (i.e. Labourism-our
addition)-that is the curvet to the dght (i.e. centrism-our addition) oR instead of
political revolution a general strike for socialist revolution-that curvet to the left (i.e.
ultra leftism-our addition) was advocated in a pamphlet now forgotten, of a Russian
economistof the late 1890s" '.
If we are to consider the swP view of political revolution we must begin with its
foundations in 'socialism from below' and stageism (the theory of rwo National
Revolutions).

Socialism from below

The swP view of political revolution is explained in 'The Revolutionary Road to

Socialism-what the SWP stands for' by central committee member Alex callinicos. The starting point is their notion of "socialism from below". This is contra-

sted to "something which comes above" which is ..an arrogant and elitist approach".'
Marx saw socialism as the self emancipation of the working class. The principle
was written into the statutes of the First International. It means a complete rejection of
the reformist view that state bureaucracy will introduce socialism on behalf of the
working class. This is not quite the same as "socialism from below" which is advocated by the SWP.3

t3

It was the anarchists for whom self-emancipation meant 'socialism from below',
that is spontaneous mass action without leaders. Engels observed that "the Bakuninists had for years been propagating the ideathat all revolutionary action 'from above'
was pernicious and that everything must be organised and carried out from below
upward".'The anarchists says Lenin "condemn all action from a above". Yet socialism "only from below" is "an absurd theory". Hence "Engels demonstrates the
utter absurdity of this principle' ' .'
Lenin was not simply concerned to combat the anarchists and syndicalists. This
strain of anarchist thought could be found amongst certain sorts of marxists for example the Mensheviks in 1905." In l9l8 the German ultra lefts set up the contrast
between "a party of leaders which is out to organise the revolutionary struggle and to
direct it from above", and their ideal of a party "which expects an upsurge of revolutionary struggle from below". Lenin called this ''old familiar rubbish''.'
Unlike the anarchists and ultra lefts Lenin saw the self emancipation of the working

class involving a correct combination of 'action from below' with 'action from
above', of leadership and rank and file. Iradership is the missing element in the
anarchist equation. For them leadership equals 'bureaucracy'. Those like the SWP
who start with "socialism from below" end up with the worship of spontaneous mass
action. Those, who like knin reject both bureaucratic reformism and anarchist
spontaneity, stress revolutionary leadership, consciousness and programme as an essential ingredient in a successful mass struggle.

The General Strike Road to socialism

The key element in the SWP's "socialism from below" is strikes. "Every strike,
however minor, interrupts the daily routine of society . . . As such it is a bridge
between merely accepting capitalist society and openly organising to overthrow

it. Of

course whether strikes fulfil this potential largely depends on the circumstances
which surround them".'
Little strikes don't get very far, the SWP concludes. But big strikes or mass strikes
''carries within it the potential of revolution". Hence the mass strike of May 1936 in
France "threatened the very basis of the capitalist order" '. In the SWP view mass
strikes fall into two categories. If there is any leadership 'from above' then regardless
of the politics of that leadership the strike is 'bureaucratic'. However "there is always
the possibility that such a struggle will break out of the leadership's control, will
become a genuine mass strike in which initiative comes from below". Hence the
SWP ideal mass strike is one in which the "rank and file spontaneously"'o take over.
The mass strike is not the last stage in the process because "mass strikes alone
cannot bring socialism . . . something more is needed""). Next comes the general
strike. When "a strike becomes general, embracing different sections of workers, the
threat becomes greatest. For during a general strike, when the entire economy is
paralysed, strike committees are forced to take on the responsibility for running certain essential services, such as ambulances and making sure that food is distributed.
In other words, workers' organisations begin to take over some of the functions of the
state. This process began to happen in Britain during the General Strike of 1926" ."

74

From General Strike to Dual Power

The final stage on the SWP's general strike road is dual power. (This is a special
political situation like that existing in Russia in March 1917 analysed in Lenin's
'April Theses'.) Referring to the General Strike of l926the SWP says "the General
strike lasted only nine days but in other countries things have developed much more
dramatically. Situations of dual power have emerged... The first example of this was
the Paris Commune"."
Here of course the whole argument falls down. To complete the ideal scenario by
adding together random events from history is a bogus method. you cannot leap from

Britain 1926 to Paris March 1871. Why is it not (apart from upsetting the SWp
applecart) just as valid to say that dual power leads to a general strike? After the paris
Commune comes a general strike like that in1926?
In reality we are comparing a general strike without a revolutionary situation, with

a revolutionary situation without a general strike. It is wrong to imply that one follows on from the other.
of course it is valid to study revolutionary and dual power situations and to draw
lessons from this. If we wanted to examine the paris commune we would surely
begin with the collapse of t ouis Napolean trI's regime in September 1870. But this is
not what the SWP theorists are doing. They are taking bits of history which match
their own scenario. This is simply an attempt to idealise the general strike.
This trend is confirmed by the fact that the armed popular uprising gets hardly a
mention. The reference in the chapter on the 'Revolutionary Tradition' is when Alex
callinicos explains that "revolutionaries do not, even in revolutionary situations,
spend their time running around with guns and bombs".'o Perhaps he should remember Lenin's comment on the Mensheviks in the 1905 Revolution. who were ..for
instance in favour of the slogan of preparing for the insurrection, but were against

setting their organisation to work actively to procure arms and train men to use
them". Thus in Moscow in December 1905 it was "the Bolsheviks who provided the
organisation and most of the fighting detachments for the insurrection".'' Lenin was
scathing of the Menshevik vacillation "These vulgarizers of Marxism have never
given a thought to what Marx said about the need to replace the weapon of criticism
with the criticism of weapons . . . Taking the name of Marx in vain they in
fact . . . failed to understand that a time for revolution is a time for action from both
above and

below".''

Syndicalism
The general strike road to socialism has a long history going back to chartism. It
has been supported by various strands of anarchist and bureaucratic thought. But
perhaps its clearest expression is in syndicalism.
In 1873 the Geneva Conference ofthe International Alliance ofBakuninists took up
the general strike as the means of starving out the bourgeoisie; if all work ceased for
ten days the social order would collapse. The French syndicalists later developed the
idea of the General strike as the chief weapon of the working class.'' It w;s also
debated in the German Social Democratic Party at the turn of the century. whilst the
majority ofthe trade union bureaucracy rejected the general strike weapon, some left

15

bureaucrats enthusiastically supported it. Bernstein and Eisner and the 'marxist
centre' saw it as an alternative to street fighting and barricades.
Karl Kautsky saw the general strike as a revolutionary weapon only applicable to a
revolutionary situation. "His thesis of the general strike as a revolutionary weapon
actually meant adopting a wait-and-see attitude, until, some day historical destiny
brought forth the revolution".''

Spontaneity
Spontaneity as a theory of political consciousness underlies the general strike road.
The SWP explains this theory in simple terms. "Workers get involved in strike action
for some limited goal, for higher wages or better working conditions. But once involved in struggle, united to achieve a common goal their ideas change".'" Mass
strikes take this further because they "break down the barrier between economics and
politics".' Hence "only in struggle can significant numbers of people be won over
to socialist politics".'' As a contrast "the focus of the l,abour Party activity is not
workers struggles, but elections"."
There is of course an element of truth in each of these statements. But the overall
thrust of the argument is false. It is true that when people become involved in struggle
their ideas change. Experience is a great teacher. Usually, but not always, workers
views will shift to the left. But the spontaneisists instead of seeing the limitations of
this imbue the process with almost romantic mysticism. Paul Foot for example
preaches powerfrrlly in this vein. In 'Why you should be a socialist' he says
"If workers were stuck for ever in a single apathetic pose, the future would be
bleak indeed. But all the messages from working class history tell us that when people
take action against their oppressors they change. The flame suddenly spurts up, and
lightens up great spaces which seemed to be plunged in darkness.""
When Alex Callinicos speaks of workers' struggle he means economic struggle
especially strikes. But workers' struggles also include political struggles between
Parties for winning power. The political struggle includes the involvement of workers
in campaigns, demonstrations, elections, political strikes and armed uprisings. Are
these less appropriate means of raising consciousness? The economists forget this and
put strikes on a pedestal. To place something called "workers' struggles" as an
alternative to an election campaign by a workers' party is no more correct than putting ' ' workers struggles ' ' as an alternative to armed insurrection .
The Bolshevik Party was a workers' organisation engaged in political struggle including election campaigns. Was the Bolshevik Party less important than strikes in
winning "significant numbers of people" to socialist politics?

The Syndicalist Workers Party

The hnal element in the SWP's general strike road is the party. But what kind of
party do we need? In this respect it is absolutely wrong to think of syndicalism as
non-party. Of course like all middle class ideology syndicalism divides in Janus
fashion. On one hand there is non-party syndicalism which is closer to pure anarchism. On the other there have been syndicalist worken parties much closer in con-

16

ception to Bolshevism.
In 1929 Trotsky cited the example of the French Syndicalist League as ..an embryo
Party".'o He explains that the League acknowledges "the proletarian revolution and
even the dictatorship of the proletariat". But "its programme is extremely
amorphous, as are its tactics. In its political evaluations it acts only from event to

event"."t

The National Revolution

The SWP's "socialist revolution" is summed up by Alex Callinicos as having

mass strike, workers councils, an insurrection to overthrow thi
existing state and a revolutionary party".^ This check list of four elements is a

"four elements-a

substitute for a real concrete historical analysis on which which revolutionary tactics
must be based. The SWP has made no analysis of the development of the national
revolution in the uK. But then why bother if revolutionary tactics can be reduced to
'build the party' and wait for the other three elements to arrive.
How does the socialist check list relate to actual revolutionary development in
Ireland or South Africa? some elements missing perhaps? Exactly so. Alef explains
that "this revolutionary crisis (socialist) with its four elements is probably still years
ahead in South

Africa".'

However 'the socialist revolution' is not the only type of national revolution envisaged by the SWP. A later section on 'Revolution in the Third World', presents a
different scenario for "the poor and backward countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America". Herc revolutions "were bourgeois revolutions". China, Vietnam, Cuba,
Angola, Mozambique are best compared "not with Russia in l9l1, but with an earlier wave of revolutions-England 1640, America 1776,France 1789 . . . bourgeois
revolutions".'o The theory we have here is neither new nor the sole property ofthe
SWP. It is called stageism.

Stageism: The theory of Two National Revolutions

According to the theory of stageism, every national revolution is one of two types.
Eittrer it is'bourgeois'or'socialist'. The appropriate type is determined by the l-vel
of economic development (i.e. economic determinism). In 'backward' or 'Third
world' countries a bourgeois revolution is necessary. In an 'advanced' country it is
determined that the next stage is national socialist (four elements).
But even Trdsky's theory of permanent revolution which Alex forgets to mention
does not alter stageist theory totally. In a 'backward' country a'bourgeois' revolution
could become or merge with a 'socialist' revolution. Yet the basic concepts of rwo
National Revolutions theory remain. And in advanced countries the original perspective is not altered at all. The idea that the next stage is socialism remains. Trotsky's
theory is only a partial negation of stageism.

17

Abstentionism: the practical consequences

In an 'advanced' country the logical conclusion of stageism is that the problem of

bourgeois democracy was already solved in a previous historical stage. Therefore we
must concentrate on the economic struggle until the "socialist revolution" arrives.
Stageist theory leads directly to abstentionism or the liquidation of the struggle for
(bourgeois) democratic rights. A broad category of issues come under this heading
including national self determination, civil liberties, equality of opportunity (e.g.
racism, sexism, etc.), republicanism, one person one vote, proportional representation etc.
Here is the direct link of stageism with economism. As we argued earlier economism is the failure to relate correctly to the democratic movement. Lenin spelt out
this connection is 'Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism'. In 1916 he noted that
"a new economism is born. Its reasoning is similarly based on two curvets: Right
(i.e. centrist) we are against the right to self determination-and 'Left' (i.e. ultra left)
we are opposed to the minimum programme (i.e. opposed to the struggle for reforms
and for democracy) as contradictory to the socialist revolution".'Today the SWP is
one representative of this (not so) 'nascent trend' of economism in the UK.

Abstentionism, spontaneity and tail ending

Stageist theory in a country like the UK does not always mean total abstention from
democratic struggles. Normally the issue is seen as irrelevant. Bland indiference is
therefore the appropriate attitude. This standpoint is modified by spontaneity. For if
the masses spontaneously take up democratic demands then a token recognition will
be forthcoming. The abstentioni$ts will modi$ their stand because of course they will
want tojoin any popular bandwagon in typical opportunist fashion. The fact that the
masses themselves may take up democratic demands means that abstentionism becomes tail-ending or adapting to the consciousness of the more backward section of
the class.

A worker with average consciousness recognises the need for trade unions and
improved wages and conditions. An issue like British presence in Ireland or the existence of the monarchy would be considered, if at all, as an irrelevancy. Such a worker
might 'support our boys in lreland' and remain a 'loyal suflect of Her Majesty'. For
it seems that'bread and butter' issues have no connection to politics. That is false
consciousness, for the combination of trade unionism and indifference to political
matters will keep the working class in slavery. Economism, stageism and abstention
are ideas which help perpetuate that slavery. They are ideas to be fought and destroyed.
A case ofJanus and Scottish Devolution

A good example of this was the debacle over the SWP line on the Devolution
Referendum in 1979. The growth of democratic aspirations in Scotland and Wales
had led the Callaghan Labour government to offer Devolution as a concession. This
put SWP politics to the test.
18

The party divided into three camps arguing variously that it should urge workers to
vote No, Abstain or Yes in the referendum. In 1977 the SWP led by the Central
Committee adopted its offrcial position of Abstain. On one hand we are not against it,
on the other we are not in favour of it. Their thesis explained that "under no circumstances can we be opposed to Devolution".'' Yet by 1979 the SWP switched to
urging a No vote, to the embarrassment of a CC which was now hoping for a Yes
vote.
Economists of course applied their own logic to the problem. Since Devolution is a
purely political matter, it must either be irrelevant or a diversion from the 'real' or
'bread and butter' struggle. Workers should not involve themselves. Therefore either
abstain or vote against and preach instead pure socialist propaganda.
Real life has a habit of exposing the false logic of economism and the bankruptcy of
propagandist methods. And so it proved. Between 1977-79 the anti-democratic forces
led by Thatcher, the CBI and the Labour Unionists mounted a militant and well
financed campaign. They brought in the infamous 4OVo rule to help fix a result in their
favour. Meanwhile it became obvious that the working class movement and working
class votes supported this moderate extension of democracy. But this side had no
militant leadership. Callaghan provided the same nonleadership as Neil Kinnock was
later to offer the miners.
Even the SWP could not ignore reality, when action by these forces destroyed the
Abstention position. With nowhere to hide the SWP had to take sides. The Central
Committee didn't suppon a No vote. When they saw the working class 'spontaneously' supporting the yes camp they tried to push the party into tail-ending that
mood. To no avail. They had compromised with economism in urging abstention.
Ilaving implied it was irrelevant they could hardly expect credibility in urging yes.
Consequently the party naturally switched to No. It was only the same logic after

dl."

So it transpired that the CBI, Thatcher, the 'scotland is British Campaign', the
Labour Unionists plus the SWP urged a No vote. In the event the relatively large No
vote proved to be the launching pad for Thatcher's subsequent 1979 General Election
victory.

Conclusion
The SWP does not relate correctly to the central issue of the political revolution. Its
theory of Two National Revolutions (or stageism) is economistic. In a developed
economy like the United Kingdom this means following the (syndicalist) general
strike road to socialism whilst either abstaining from or tailing ending the democratic
movement.

19

TIIE QT]ESTION OF
STRATEGY

Introduction
The question of strategy concerns the medium and long term orientation and perspective rather than the pressing issues of the day. Present day tactics must relate to
the longer term. Tactics must be subordinate to strategy. If this is not the case, there
will be no sound tactics. Instead we will be reduced to opportunist manoeuvrings,
jumping from event to event and wasting energy in what turns out to be futile activity.
Since our strategy is based on the political revolution rather than the general strike
we must begin by spelling out our view of the political revolution and how the prospects are changing with the world recession (or 'breakdown of the permanent arms
economy' in SWP terminology).

IVorld revolution and international socialism

Capitalism is international, organised through multinational banks and corporations. It has divided the world into competing spheres of influence between the
USA, USSR, EEC and Japan. To transform imperialism (i.e. international capital)
into socialism is an international task. It cannot be done within the confines of one (or
a few) countries. National socialism is a utopian ideal. It is supported by middle class
radicals whose interests lie in the subordination of the working class to the national
bureaucracy in the state, the enterprise or firm and the trade unions.
International socialism is the only practical form of working class socialism. It will
be built through the transformation of international capitalism by workers organisation, planning and cooperation. For this to be possible a world revolution is necessary. A world revolution is not an abstract ideal but a living reality. The seeds of the
world revolution can be seen today in Nicaragua, South Africa, poland, Ireland, the
Philippines and Haiti. In these national revolutions is the potential for world socialist
revolution.

27

The National Democratic Revolution (NDR)

International socialism is only possible through national revolution. The working

class, as Marx once said, must first of all settle accounts with its 'own' bourgeoisie.'
Gramsci, when discussing strategy, made a similar point, "to be sure, the line of
development is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is 'national'-and
it is from this point of deparh.rre that one must begin". "
Capitalism and class struggle continues to change national states and economic
relations. This is an uneven process rooted in differing historical circumstances. "In
reality, the internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which is
'original' and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations must be understood and
conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one wishes to dominate them and
direct them.' "
A strategic task of any national section of a workers party is the preparation of its
'own' working class, ideologically and practically, for its role as leader of the national democratic revolution with the aim of taking power.

Permanent Revolution

A victory for the working class in the national democratic revolution could not be
achieved until power passed into the hands of workers councils. Such a victory could
not of itself lead to the creation of a socialist society. The power of international
capital both externally and internally would eventually destroy genuine workers democracy. The only defence ofnational workers democracy is international socialism.
The national revolution would have to become international. The permanent revolution is a revolution which develops both nationally and internationally until the
working class holds power on a world scale. A strategic task of a workers party is to
prepare the working class not merely for national revolution, but for international
revolution with an international programme and party.
The Permanent Arms Economy (PAE) and the prospects for permanent
revolution 194fj-1973

The prospects for world revolution were highest betwen 1943-48 because of the
in Europe, China, Vietnam, India and
the Philippines. These national democratic revolutions were halted by incorporation
or force without the working class being able to take power. Only on that basis would
international socialism have become a real possibility. One important factor in the
failure of the working class to take power in these national democratic revolutions

mass resistance to imperialism centred mainly

was the degeneration of the communist parties under Stalin's leadership.

What undercut the possible revival of these movements was the restabilisation of
capitalism itself. A long period ofboom from 1950-1973 meant the absence ofeconomic crisis in the imperialist centres of the USA, West Germany, UK, France, USSR
and Japan. National democratic revolutions in the imperialist centres were postponed

or delayed. No major economic or political crisis of revolutionary

occurred.

22

significance

This was not the case in the states and colonies of the periphery. National democratic revolutions did occur in Hungary, Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, etc. But in none of
these did the working class take power. The closest was the Hungarian revolution of
1956. However, in the late 1960s the possiblity of national democratic revolutions
returned to the imperialist centres. Mass democratic movements grew in the USA (for
Black civil Rights) and in the uK (for catholic civil Rights). But the French crisis of
1968 was the nearest example to a national democratic revolution in an imperialist
power. These events marked the period of transition (1968-74) to a new era of world
recession.
In the 1950s and 1960s the State capitalist Tendency, then as the Socialist Review

Group, developed a strategic orientation under the name of the 'Permanent Arms
Economy' (PAE).'This theory, elaborated by Kidron and Cliff provided an explanation for the long boom and capitalist restabilisation. In political terms it meant that
reformism would be restabilised and the workers' movement incorporated. on this
basis the socialist Review Group set out on a long haul which by the early 1970s had
developed a cadre, independent of the Labour and Communist parties, some 2-3,(X)0
strong.5

The PAE led to the conclusion that the national revolution would be postponed in
the imperialist centres by the economic conditions. Consequently international socialism was not immediately on the agenda at 'home'. whether in retrospect the theory
of the PAE was sound in all its aspects, as Kidron himself later queriei, nevertheless
its strategic conclusion was sound (even ifby coincidence)..
The breakdown of the Permanent Arms Economy and the consequences for the

permanent revolution (197+ )

The French crisis, the civil Rights Movement in the USA and in Ireland, were a
timely reminder of the potential national revolution in the imperialist centres. In the
early 1970s world economic conditions also began to change significantly. The long
boom gave way to a world recession. This (breakdown oi tfre feny marks a new
period ofinternational class struggle. This must require a reconsideration ofthe perrnanent revolution. What are the important features of this new period?

Economic conditions necessitate an offensive by the major imperialist powers

against their own working class and against each other. The consequinces of tiris can
be seen both in the preparations for a new world war and in the growth of mass
unemployment, increasing poverty and misery for millions of people. These problems are repeated on an even more horrific scale in Third World courrries.
This crisis also produces massive social upheaval, mass struggle, popular rebel_.
lions and national revolutions. The Polish Solidarity, the mineri; strike-in the uK,
and the south African struggle are examples of this process. The national democratic
revolution is brought once again to the centre of the stage. world war Three or the
Permanent Revolution for World Socialism is the ultimate choice.
The Employers' Offensive and the United Front

The initial stage of this new period has been marked by an employers' offensive

23

against workers'jobs, wages, working conditions and trade union organisation. The
nature of this offensive varies from country to country and is intemrpted occasionally
by mass struggle.
In the case of the UK the employers began to mount their attack under the WilsonCallaghan govemment. From 1979 Thatcher carried this attack even further with
mass unemployment rising to over 4 million.
The period 1975-85 has seen a series of working class defeats (e.g. British Leyland'
the Steelworkers, NGA, GCHQ, the Miners, etc.) as well as some notable fightbacks
(e.g. Winter of Discontent 1979, the Miners, Liverpool Council) and outbursts of
popular anger (e.g. the riots).
Successive defeats sharpened the divisions within the movement. The liberal or
right wing in the workers' movement sought to promote splits in the trade unions and
political organisations to divide the class and marginalise the left. The political
climate shifted to the right with a growth in racist and sexist attacks.
The employers' offensive means that the fight for unity is the central strategic battle
in this initial period of recession. Its aim is to counter the splitting and fragmenting
policy of the employers. The lessons of this struggle are summed up by the united

front tactic. Revolutionary social democracy must prove itself in practice to

the

workers by its determined use of this tactic.

The united front tactic is primarily concerned with workers' defence. But its aim is
not simply defensive, it seeks to turn defence into offence. In the Present period a
workers' offensive must not be conceived as purely economic (i.e. winning strikes).
A workers' offensive must be a political offensive with political objectives' e.g.
against the anti-union laws.

Prepare for the national democratic revolution or prePare for the'upturnt

The present employers' offensive may culminate in the scale of defeat suffered by
the German working class in the 1930s. Fascism may reaPpar as a Potent force and
World War Three would inevitably follow. Such a disaster may of course be possible
even without fascism.
It is also possible that in some countries the working class may develop in struggle
into an offensive against the ruling class. Consequently it is not sufficient simply to
prepare for defensive struggle, it is necessary to preparc for a workers' offensive for
the national democratic revolution. We need a new workers party prepared to lead the
national democratic revolution to workers power and international socialism.
The slogan of 'prepare for the upturn" is ambiguous and misleading. It leaves
advanced workers only a vague idea of what we are preparing for and the tasks ahead.
It can easily be thought of as a return to the economic militancy of the early 1970s.
This slogan is advanced by the SWP.

Conclusion: The breakdown of SWP strategr

In the 1950s and 1960s the theory of the PAE gave the IS/SWP a clearer strategic
orientation than its rivals. The group emerged in the early 1970s as the largest to the
left of the CPGB.

24

Since the breakdown of the PAE we have seen a breakdown of SWP strategy. It has
failed to draw 0re correct conclusions about the period.It was slow to recognise the
employers' offensive until "the downturn" thesis. It has failed to use the united front
correctly. It advances the ambiguous slogan of economism, "prepare for the upturn", instead of the political slogan, "prepare for the national democratic revolu-

tion".

25

THEQUESTTONOF
PROGRAMME

Introduction
A programme is a political statement or platform which serves as a conscious plan
of action for a party. It is not simply a list of demands or policies, it contains implicitly or explicitly the strategy ofthe party.
As a plan of action, a prograrnme "must formulate our basic views; precisely establish our immediate political tasks; point out the immediate demands that must show
the area of our agitational activity; give unity to the agitational work, expand and
deepen it, thus raising it from fragmentary partial agitation for petty isolated demands
to the status of agitation for the sum total of Social Democratic demands".'
The Communist Manifesto (1848) is perhaps the most famous programme of our
movement. But there have been many more. Towards the end of the l9th century
German Social Democracy produced the Gotha and Erfurt programmes. In Russia the
Emancipation of Labour Group formulated a programme which was to become the
starting point for the Bolshevik programme. Later still the Third International (1928)
and the Fourth International (1938) 'Transitional Programme' have added to the heritage. In this tradition, and with the experience gained since the Communist Manifesto, we today face the same problem-the formulation of a programme for the
political movement of the international working class.

Party and programme

As an instrument of working class struggle the party, according to Trotsky "must
be inspired by a distinct programme which requires organisation and the tactics for its

"it is the union of programme, organisation and tactics that

constitutes the party".'The party and its programme are inseparable. J.P. Cannon,
commenting on Tiotsky's politics summed up the relationship when he said "it is not
the party that makes the programme, it's the prograrnme that makes the party".'
Therefore there is a dehnite method of building a party. It is built by winning support
for its programme and ultimately taking power on that basis.
application". Indeed

27

The method of building a psrty

The Russian Social Democratic labour Party was created out of scattered circles of
workers and intellectuals. When Lenin wrote "On the draft programme of our

party"'he

spelled out why a prograrnme was necessary to forge the circles into a real

fighting party. We will quote extensively from Lenin's basic arguments when he
began explaining "the tremendous importance of a programme for the consolidation
and consistent activity of a political party".' The programme would serve the purpose

of:

a) Uniting andcentralising
A programme helps to overcome localism and amateurism and unite both workers
and intellectuals around a conscious plan. In this way activity becomes more purposefirl and more effective. "At the present time the urgent question of our movement is

no longer of developing the former scattered 'amateur' activities, but of uniting... of

organisation. This is a step for which a programme is a necessity."u
For "today when Social Democratic activity has aroused a fairly wide circle of
socialist intellectuals and class conscious workers, it is urgently necessary to strengthen the connections between them by a prograrnme and in this way give all of them a
sound basis for further, more extensive activity".'

b) Informing the people and especially the workers

A programme is an educator and assists in raising consciousness about the real aims

of the Party. This is necessary "because Russian public opinion is very often profoundly mistaken in respect of the real tasks and methods of action of Russian Social
Democracy".'Misunderstanding amongst the workers arises from two sources. First
is "the morass of political putrefaction that is our real life". Second are misconceptions "artificially nurtured by the opponents of Social Democracy".'A party
armed with its programme must "dispel all these misunderstandings if it is to stand at
the head of all democratic elements in Russian societv'

' .'o

c) To bring clarity into political disagreements

Some socialists argued that it was premature to have a prograrnme "because there
are differences of opinion that give rise to polemics among Social Democrats themse-

lves"." Lenin believed

that far from this being an argument against a programme it

will easily degenerate "into personal
rivalry" and "lead to a confusion of views" or to "confounding enemies and
friends".'" To avoid this "it is absolutely essential that the question of programme is
introduced into the polemic".'' This is because the programme method enables us to
pin-point differences and helps us to understand the significance of such disputes.
was a fact which necessitated one. For polemics

Differences on the method of party building

Not everybody claiming to stand in the marxist traditon agrees with the conception
and method of building it advocated by knin and Trotsky. The differences that exist today on how a party should be formed have been summarised as
follows, "there exist at present two basic lines on party formation: one holds that the

of the party

28

main obstacles are organisational, the other holds they are political".
"The organisational obstacles are obvious; there are few who consider themselves
to be revolutionaries, and these are organised in groups which, separately and collectively have little influence upon the proletariat. The organisational problem presents itself as the need to extend memberstrip of the revolutionary groups, until one or
another of them has grown to the point at which it is a viable and influential party.' '
"In opposition to this rather naive view, the second line assignsprimacy to politicd
problems. Among the revolutionary groups there as yet exists no clear conception, let
alone agreement, as to what would be the strategy and tactics of a communist party in
the British Isles. But without clear strategical and tactical conceptions, no communist
party could have a viable political practice. Thus according to this second line the
prime task in the present stage of party formation must be the clarification of communist doctrines on the strategy and tactics of the party, and following that a struggle
against the distortion of communist politics by bourgeois ideology".'n This can be
called the political method.

The organisational method and spontaneity

The organisational method is a pragmatic approach. It affects the whole character

of the group/party. For without a conscious plan-programme the organisation is built
by recruitment-related-activity. 'Chasing the action' will not necessarily be purposeful activity and may easily become activity for the sake of it.
What can result from this except adapting to the spontaneous movement of the
class. "Bowing to spontaneity", as Lenin called it, is built into the organisational
method. British socialism, with its rejection of theory, 'muddling through', 'playing
it by ear' and 'hoping something will turn up' is naturally at home with such a
method.

It would be wrong to conclude that the spontaneisists have no political platform. Of

course they do, but these are reduced to a few abstract principles. As lrnin noted the
"spontaneisists do recognise political struggle-but that politics which arises spontaneously from the working class movement itself, it absolutely refuses independently

to work out a specifically Social Democratic politics corresponding to the general

tasks of socialism and to present day conditions in Russia."'') The 'refusal' which
Lenin refers to is nothing but the refusal to work out a prograflrme.

The political method and consciousness

The political method implies a different approach, by building around a definite
plan or prograrnme and seeking to raise consciousness to the level ofthe plan and its

tasks. This was the method

of

Bolsheviks

for whom

socialist consciousness

"represented the completely formulated programme of the Emancipation of Labour

Group".'u
"Our task, the task of Social Democracy is to combat spontaneity, to divert the
working class movement from the spontaneous trade unionist striving" said Lenin.''
A conscious plan is essential if we aim to divert the working class from its 'normal'
course. Hence Lenin praised the Russian social democrats who "justly considered it

29

possible even then at the very beginning of the 'spontaneous movement' to come
forward with a most extensive progr:unme and a militant tactical line"."
Marx noted in the Communist Manifesto that "the Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the
working class; but in the movement ofthe present, they also represent and take care
of the future of that movement".'e
Taking care of the future is the role of the programme. Without this it would be
very easy to adapt to spontaneity leading inevitably to opportunism. Lenin emphasised this in 'State and Revolution' quoting Engels that ignoring the future meant
"concealing immediate concrete questions which at the moment of the first great
events, the first political crisis, automatically pose themselves. What can result from
this except that at the decisive moment the party suddenly proves helpless and that
uncertainty and discord on the most decisive issues reign in it because these issues
have never been discussed... This forgetting ofthe great, the principal considerations
for the momentary interests of the day, this struggling and striving for the success of
the moment regardless of later consequences, this sacrifice of the future of the movement for its present may be 'honestly' meant, but it is and remains opportunism, and
'honest' opportunism is perhaps the most dangerous of all".'
Socialist (i.e. programmatic) consciousness comes in part from the historical experience of the international working class. A rich experience from the past shapes
our view of the future. In the Workers Councils of Russia, Hungary, Italy and Germany etc. we see a future workers democracy. But general lessons are not sufficient.
For national economies, societies and politics have developed differently. Because of
uneven development each national section faces different tasks. This requires concrete study. For "only an objective consideration of the sum total of the relations
between absolutely all classes of a given society, and consequently a consideration of
the objective stage of development reached by that society and of the relations between it and other societies can serve as a basis for the correct tactics ofan advanced

class".t'

The class nature of these two methods of party building

The organisational method means adapting to the spontaneous movement. It means
the dissolution of programme in vague and loose generalisations combined with recruitment related activity. As a method it shares conrmon ground with anarchism
which is more fully anti-programme or anti-party. This is the method favoured by
anarchistically minded intellectuals. By contrast the political or prograrnme method is
the method of the Bolsheviks and is the method of advanced workers who are contemptuous of the opportunism, vagueness and looseness favoured by the intellectuals.

Conclusion
Marxism in the UK has so far failed to create a sound revolutionary prograrnme
which can serve as the proper basis for a working class party. The rejection of the
programme method by the SWP is nothing less than opportunism, borrowed from the
politics of anarchism. When this is combined with their spontaneity, it leads straight

30

to unscrupulous recruitment.

Unfortunately neither the Communist Party nor the Trotskyist groups who formally
have a programme method have provided a correct alternative. The CpGB's programme "the British Road to Socialism" is based on the abandonment of workers
democracy (e.g. soviets and the dictatorship of the working class) which is offensive
to middle class libertarians. Instead the civil Service will introduce socialism as
ordered by Parliament. The 'British road' is the historically proven British way of
avoiding socialism. It is an opportunist prograrnme, which acts as a barrier to the
development of a genuine working class programme. Most Trotskyist groups have a
different attitude. The programme has become a rigid dogma, like a holy writ.
Trotsky's 1938 Transitional Programme serves this function. But it has been an excuse for not developing a prograrnme for the conditions of the 1980s.

31

IRELANDANDTHE
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTION

Introduction
Ireland is the litmus test of the politics of every marxist group or party in the UK.
The centrist lmarxists', following the parliamentary road, see Ireland as a side show,
largely irrelevant. The ultra left'marxists', who are awaiting'The General Strike',
feel the same way. This is no coincidence. As we suggested, underlying both middle
class trends is economism or, perhaps more appropriately, 'imperialist economism'
to use Lenin's term. Ireland more than anything else shows up every shade of economism in the British working class movement.
Revolutionary democratic marxists do not begin either with the Labour Party or the
General Strike but with the interests of national and international revolution.

Ireland and the national democratic revolution

Working class democrats recognise that the Six Counties is the front line in the
baftle for democracy both in Ireland and in the rest of the UK. Here all the most
anti-democratic forces are concentrating their efforts. Armed police and troops patrol
the streets whilst semi-fascist masses gather under the flag of the British monarchy.
Here is the training ground for repression, state terror, political surveillance and riot
control. Here democratic rights have been seriously eroded by the growth of police
power. From here comes the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act, the Public Order Act, and the riot police with plastic bullets. All the
anti-democratic techniques of modern British governments are tried and tested in the
North.
The Six Counties is also the location of the strongest popular democratic and repub-

lican movement in the UK. The very strengths of this movement is shown by the
inability of the police and troops to suppress it. The result at present is a deadlock
whose real origins are in the historic defeat of the Irish (and international) working
class in the 1920s.
RW-{

33

Mass unemployment, deindustrialisation, discrimination, crumbling infrastructure,

poor housing, divided working class and paralysed trade unions are symptoms of
class stalemate. These are conditions found in the whole of the UK but in the Six
Counties they are experienced in the most extreme form. They are the historical
consequences of democratic stalemate and working class defeat. As Connolly had
argued, a carnival of reaction has followed the division of the country.
The stalemate in Ireland produces a stalemate for all democratic forces in the UK.
A victory in Ireland would open the floodgates for democratic change in the rest of

the UK. Tied to Ireland is the stability of the whole UK constitutional-political

system. In this sense the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed minority in the North
is the harbinger of a revolutionary democratic movement in the whole of the UK.
The ruling classes of Britain and Ireland continue to oppose a democratic solution
by the use oftheir armed forces. In 1918 the Irish people showed their opinion by
voting for national independence. Ifan All-Irish referendum were held today it would
likely show the same. Whilst the ruling classes have no interest in popular opinion

except when it supports their plans, the people of the UK do have an interest in
upholding lreland's right to self determination.
Working class democrats understand that amongst the lrish, English, Scots and
Welsh peoples it is the working class who will gain most from a democratic solution.
This is why in the course of the miners strike, the biggest industrial struggle in recent
times, many militant miners began to see the Irish situation with a new clarity. They
saw the parallels between the industrial and political struggle against the same policestate.

The working class is the class most capable of forcing democratic change. This is
why Lenin described the working class "as the vanguard fighter for democracy".'
What prevents the working class from fulfilling its historic role is its lack of consciousness and organisation. It is this fact which leads us to the role ofthe party.
Working class democrats realise that it is the consciousness and organisation of the
advanced workers which determines the preparedness of the working class to take

political action. By placing themselves in the forefront of the battle for democracy in
the UK the advanced workers organise the political struggle, and thus draw the
masses into action. The Irish issue must therefore be brought into all political/
constitutional issues and into the economic struggles of the class, not merely through
propaganda but by political action (campaigns, demonstrations, strikes, etc.).

The Labour Party, the TUC and imperialist economism

British imperialism is fully aware of the significance of the Irish question in UK

politics. Its secret was discovered by Marx over a century ago. The explosive potential burst into civil war over sixty years ago. Now that same potential is a permanent source of danger and leaves the ruling class unable to make a safe retreat from its
last colony. They have placed a 'cordonne sanitaire' around the issue to exclude it
from 'normal' politics. Propaganda and disinformation marginalise the war and present is as an Irish wrangle with Britain as 'peacemaker; and upholder of the wishes of
the 'majority'.
The British ruling class operates essentially through a two-party system. The more
conservative faction controls the Torv Partv as the more liberal wing runs the Labour

Pany, in conjunction with the trade union bureaucracy. This policy offers the apparance of'democracy', providing a safe opposition and a safe alternative. In times of
crisis both the factions close ranks. However critical they may be ofeach other, they
are united on essentials.
This was the case during the miners' strike. But nowhere is this more obvious than
on Ireland. Because of the danger posed to the ruling class, a 'bipartisan' policy is in
operation. This extends from Thatcher, Owen, Steel and Kinnock to the TUC and into

the trade union movement. Bipartisanship is essentially about supporting the state
against the republican movement. The Anglo-Irish deal is an initiative of the bipartisan type.
The trade union movement is the most organised section of the working class. It is
one arena in which working class opinion is formed, an obvious channel for the
bipartisan politics of the Labour leadership. The message is simple. Workers mind
your own business, 'keep out'. If that line fails, then 'no support for the republican
movement'.
Trade unionists are thus met with a barrage of economist, pseudo-democratic and
pacifist ideas. They are told by the bureaucracy that unions should concentrate on
economic issues and especially sectional interests. To mention Ireland is 'divisive'
and could upset our Northem Ireland (i.e. protestant) members. If only workers in the
North could unite by forgetting political issues, etc. etc. Then we may be told that the
republican movement is 'violent' whereas Norman Willis, Neil Kinnock and trade
unionists in general are pacihsts. Furthermore what about the wishes of the (Prot-

estant)'majority' (i.e. minority)?

This is how liberalism undermines the working class movement. Our own 'marxist'
economists cannot deal with this. They support these arguments or fall into abstentionism. The Militant Tendency is one example of a group whose economism has led it
to unconsciously aid British imperialism in Ireland. But abstentionism isn't confined
to them. Not far behind comes the CPGB and the SWP who from different positions
come to the same conclusion-Nothing can or should be done. No challenge should
be made to liberal domination of the trade union movement and the working class.
The downturn is merely the Iatest SWP excuse.

Ireland and the SVIP

As one of the largest marxist organisations in the UK left the SWP does not have a
good reputation on Ireland. For the last ten years Ireland has been a marginal issue for
the majority of members. Between 1975-81 the SWP did have an interventionist position through its Irish Sub-Committee. But such activity was generally peripheral to
party work and involved only a small number of dedicated comrades. Since 1982 this
activity has been replaced by propagandism.
We can see what some of the members thought about this from comments in the
SWP Internal Bulletin. "Our solidarity work with Irish people is often expressed, yet
rarely translated into cohesive action . . . our response (to recent events) has been
abysmal . . . if we cannot come to terms with a situation on our own doorsteps, then
we may as well give up".'[,es Hearn and Roger Welch writing in 1978 complain that
"the organisation has adopted a very laissez faire attitude, with no fightby the leadership to ensure that work is done . . . there has been a total lack of work around the

35

demand for political/POW status for Republican prisoners".'

In June 1980 Trish Calvert and Geoff Robinson characterised the attitude of the
SWP (CC) as "Irish work is okay, if we have time, but is really a distraction from
'serious'political work, e.g. steel strike and trade union work". They note that only
"a small number of comrades are involved in Irish work. We say small, not because
most comrades aren't interested, but because the party does so little on Ireland that
few members have had little opportunity to be involved".o Pat Walsh, writing in
1981 following the hunger strikes, says that "at no point was there any central direction ofwhatever work was done. There was no national speakers tour, no coverage of
any significance in 'Socialist Review' or the rank and frle papers, no organised intervention around the TU conferences or the TUC. Local work was remarkably patchy
and totally dependant on individual members responss . . . And whilst Socialist
Worker did cover the hunger strikes, coverage was hardly 'regular and massive'.
In l98l a group of dissidents wrote a pamphlet critical of the party. They called
Ireland "the blind eye of the SWP". Why? Because "the work the SWP is doing on
Ireland . . . is woefully inadequate. Socialist Worker carries articles about Ireland,
admitted, but where do these articles lead to? Two national marches in support of the
prisoners' demands were totally ignored . . . and we learn that the death of Bobby
Sands didn't make the frontpage . . . it was the People's March".

In

hit the Irish work of the party. The Irish

1982 the downturn theory

sub-

committee, which acted as a pressure group to carry out the perspectives, was folded.

The excuses for SWP indifference to the Irish struggle-moralism and the
objective situation
The lack of commitment to the democratic revolution has become virtual abstentionism in practice plus occasional articles in party publications. The SWP provides its
own rationale for this.

It

seems that the SWP sees Ireland as a moral issue and those who urge the party to

actively campaign are 'moralists' or people with a conscience. An example of this

view can be found in the l98l Internal Bulletin No.4. It was claimed that critics were
guilty of 'breast beating' and 'moralism' for saying that the SWP didn't do much
during the Hunger Strikes.' According to them this is because critics fail to take
account of the 'objective situation'

The SWP calls the objective situation 'the downturn'. They conclude that in the
downturn you can't do anything because of the passivity of the workers. The real

"objective situation" (even if we agree what that is) but what we do

about it. As Marx might have said-philosophers have merely interpreted the downturn, the point is to change it.
The hunger strikes led to little, if any, spontaneous protest action by workers in
England, Scotland and Wales. But only a sponteneisist would think this fact determines the action of a workers party. For the party aims to influence the masses of
workers rather than be determined by them. To do this the party must draw the
advanced workers into political struggle against the government. But the SWP did not
draw more than a fraction of its own members into struggle. Without its own members much less could it hope to lead the advanced workers. Without them it could
have no chance of drawing the masses into struggle. These are also facts about the
issue is not the

36

'objective situation' which cannot be blamed on the passivity of English, Scottish or

Welsh workers.

The effect of economist ideology on the SWP

Ireland is not a moral issue. It is a political (i.e. class) issue. As a political issue it is
inevitably a problem for economistic politics. It is the politics of the SWP rather than
'the objective situation' which is on trial. What features of SWP politics lead them to
a passive and abstentionist position in relation to the Irish struggle.

(a) The organisational method of party building

The SWP does not build around an action prograrnme but through activity-relatedrecruitment. This draws the party spontaneously towards the most popular issues, the
most lucrative source of recruits. In terms of recruits work in CND would likely be
more profitable than work around the Irish issue.
With the rise and fall of popular interest such a method undermines consistent
effort. Before the abstentionism of the 'downturn' period Cmrdes Dyer, Mintoff and
Philippd summed up the party's approach "We are afraid the depressing truth may be
that (the leadership) see the SWP, our party, as a tool to enter this or that campaign
with a big bang, make a big noise, be seen to be taking the initiative, recruit a lot of
people and then drop out without any consideration of the consistent work many of
our members have done",'

(b) Abandoning the minimum prograrnme

Without the programme method, the SWP has unconsciously abandoned the fight
for the minimum prograrnme of democratic reforms. Self determination for the Irish
people is one of these demands which must be prioritised. Ditching the minimum
prograrnme was one of the characteristics of imperialist economism in its ultra left
form.
(c) Economic and political struggle
Without clear minimum political aims, ultra lefts have nothing but trade union
struggle to fall back on. The SWP's propensity to prioritise trade union struggle
above all else follows logically.
Economists naturally think that trade union struggle is the real struggle and political struggles are of secondary importance. For an economist the miners strike is of
greater significance than the Irish question. Working class 'politicians' do not make
such an assumption. Whilst the miners strike could have led to a general strike, the
Irish issue could lead to civil war. The heroic miners struggle forced the SWP to
temporarily drop 'downturnitis'. But the heroic struggle of the Republicans in the
North has produced no such response in the SWP.

(d) The stageist theory of revolution

The SWP does not see Ireland for what it is-a revolutionary movement within its
own state territory held in check by that state-So whilst the SWP talks about the
ideal of revolution it largely ignores the revolutionary potential in its own backyard.
The reason for this blind spot stems from SWP stageist theory. Is the Irish revolu-

37

tion 'bourgeois' or 'socialist'? This question has never been asked nor answered. But
if it were, a stageist must conclude that it was not 'bourgeois' because Ireland was a
country that already had bourgeois democracy. Neither is it socialist because the 'four
elements' (see Chapter 3) are missing.
The crisis of the Six Counties is seen in an Irish context. It must also be seen as part
of a proto-UK revolution. The UK revolution is the one which the SWP proclaims
itself as potential leader. But you cannot prepare for this by means ofabstentionism.
The fact is that the SWP does not consider Ireland as a potential revolutionary
situation at all. They are too busy waiting for the Great Revolution in the sky.
(e) Consciousness and sponteneity
The task of the party is to raise the democratic consciousness of advanced workers
and to encourage their political organisation, which can draw larger numbers of
workers into political struggle. To do this the party must combat the ideas of imperialist economism which is spread amongst the workers by the Labour left, Militant
and CPGB etc. Ideological struggle is an essential component ofthis battle.
The spontaneisists are disinterested in ideological struggle and interested in what
they claim brings 'practical' results (i.e. trade unionism). Their 'concern' is the'average worker'. The'average British worker'is not interested in Ireland and is not
demonstrating about it. This is called the'objective situation'and hence'determines'
the passive role of the party. This is how 'the objective situation' determines the
politics of the SWP. After all, if the masses 'determine' the politics of the SWP this
helps convince the SWP that they are connected with the masses.

Conclusion
The Irish question is a good test for any revolutionary party. The SWP has failed to
make any significant or serious intervention. Its 'soft' attitude is a result of its method

of party building, its indifference to democratic political questions, its worship of

spontaneous economic struggle, its failure to analyse the revolutionary movement in
its own backyard and its blaming of its own inactivity on the masses (or 'the objective

situation').

38

THEQUESTIONOF
TACTICS-IS/SWPOUT ON
MANOEUVRES 1975-80

Introduction
The period from 1973-76 marked a turning point in the development of post-war
capitalism. The oil crisis paved the way for a new period of world economic recession. Initially in the uK the working class, led by the rniners, were on the offensive.
"IS's strategy was predicated on a continuation, indeed a further escalation of the
industrial struggle of the previous five years".' This proved to be wrong.
By 1976 the employers began to mount their offensive, "the downturn" had oegun.
Instead of tuming to a united front approach the IS's tactics remained formally the
same. It adopted a tactic of "steering left" in defiance of the movement of class
forces. This tactic simply helped to isolate IS and, for example, led to a split in the
Rank and File Teachers group.

'Steering left' led to the declaration of the Socialist Workers party. The idea was
first floated in 1975. According to shaw "the name was presented from the start as a
fait accompli, never put up for discussion by the membership"., The idea was then
dropped in 1976 and then "without a real discussion, without even a founding conference, the Socialist Workers Party was born on lst January 1977', .,

Nevertheless despite the isolationism of 'steering left' the Is/swp made a number
of interventions in the movements (e.g. trade union, unemployed, women, anti-racist
and anti-fascist). But no consistent united front approach was developed. All was
subordinated to building the party through the ,tactic' of recruitment.

Rank and File Groups

ln

1973 the IS set up a number

of Rank and File groups especially in white collar

was the declared aim to build these into a national movement across industries and unions along the lines of the communist Party's Minority Movement in
the 1920s. This offered a different strategy to the current CP's Broad L,eft approach
based on supporting left wing trade union bureaucrats.
unions.

It

39

In some unions such as the NUT, EIS and NALGO these groups won the leadership
of the left. At the same time the CP's Broad Left strategy began to run into difficulties
as they followed Scanlon and Jack Jones into the arms of the Labour Government.
The IS saw the opportunity to launch the rank and file movement.
The first national conference was held in March 1974 sponsored by the various
Rank and File papers. Around 500 delegates participated from 300 sponsoring
bodies. A National Rank and File Organising Committee (NRFOC) was set up. By
1976 the NRFOC had run out of steam, being superceeded by the Right to Work
Campaign. Most Rank and File groups continued to wither away. In 1982 the Central
Committee decided to kill off the remaining groups. Only the Building Worker and
Scottish Rank and File Teacher successfully resisted this. Within two years the SWP
joined the Broad Lefts.
Why did the IS/SWP fail so badly to build any solid rank and file base in the
unions? The official SWP view explains this in terms of the 'objective situation', that
is the employers' offensive and the drift to the right both politically and in the unions.
The tide was flowing against easy gains, easy growth and easy success. However it is
precisely in this period of retreat, that Rank and File groups are necessary to build
resistance to ttre right wing in the unions. This would require a consistent use of the
united front. This is where the IS/SWP fell down.
"The NRFOC was established, and quickly became an all-IS body, with hardly any
existence independent of IS's industrial depanment".o "Many Rank and File groups
became, and were see as, little more than extensions ofIS and controlled centrally by
it". The policy of "steering left" simply reinforced this process. In the Rank and File
Teacher group this resulted in a split as other left political groups and independents
pulled out in the face of IS control. The Rank and File groups increasingly became
IS/SWP fronts most clearly shown when the NRFOC dissolved into the Right to
Work campaign 1976 in line with party policy.
In these circumstances "the idea that a rank and file grouping involving a wider
layer of trade unionists willing to fight for more militant and socialist policies in their
particular union, democratically deciding their own policies, was quickly being
lost".'It was the policy of the party that was responsible for the failure to build any
serious base.
Shaw sums up the situation when he says that "the decline in support was put down
to 'the period' (before the word 'downturn' was invented) which itself was seen as a
temporary lull. The period certainly had something to do with it: it was a time when

patient, united work might have established a minority in the unions politically opposed to the wage cutting of the 'Social Contract', but now IS had little time for
that".6

The Right to Work Campaign (RTWC)

The RTWC was launched in October 1975 as an initiative from the NRFOC, soon
to become a campaign in its own right. Its first march from Manchester to London in
March 1976 was sponsored by over 400 trade union bodies. "In some ways it was an
imaginative and useful venture: it was for a time virtually the only public protest at
the monstrous rise in unemployment and the only nationally based movement to organise the unemployed".'

40

The campaign gained some credibility in the movement but its main problem was
_
the uncertainty as to whether it was an SWp front for recruiting unemployed youth or
a united front campaign against unemployment. Increasingly it became the former, as
Martin Shaw notes "the campaign was narrowly controlled and served mainly as a
means of recruiting unemployed youth to the organisation,'..
Had the RTWC been built on a consistent united front basis with a stronger orientation to organised workers it could have established a more successful and riore enduring link between the unemployed and the labour movement. Its potential was such
that the TUC was forced to set up its own bureaucratic popular fiont "The peoples
March". when the RTwc was closed down the TUC promptly ditched its own rival
venrure.
The swP recently remarked that the RTwc "was a brave effort. but sadlv it did
not dentgovernment policy".'Sadly we are left to wonder whether it waslust an
opportunistic adventure and whether the SWp had any serious perspective in campaigning against unemployment?

The Women's Voice

In the early 1970s IS had an ambivalent attitude to the women's liberation movement (wLM). official party historian, Ian Birchall, explains that "IS can be criticised for the fact that in the early 1970s the organisation is a whole failed to recognise
the importance of the rise of the wLM and to make any serious intervention in it".,o
Dave widgery, a well known activist at that time, complained in 1975 that "for the
Iast five years, we have been toing and froing in IS about our atritude to the wLM,
about how we organise women at work and at home, about the weight revolutionaries
should put on the question of the family, marriage, homosexuality and other nonindustrial aspects of women's oppression"."
Nevertheless a small number of IS women were actively involved from the beginning, and gained some credibility for their work. They, however, "took the initiative,
with little guidance or encouragement from the central leadership of the organisation".'' From this source came the first edition of 'women's vbice' maeazine in
1972.

,ln 1975, Abortion Rights were again under threat. In June over 40,000 people
demonstrated against this attack. IS comrades were active in the National Abortion
campaign (NAC) organising with wv magazine. Martin shaw points to the same
underlying problem. He says that "IS's support for NAC was grudging and highly
conditional, bringing it into immediate conflict with the majority of the activists,'. the
cause of this was that "the main emphasis was not on building a united movemenr,
and trying to win that movement to IS's distinctive politics, bui counterposing IS and
its front organisationally to the rest of the movementl ' . ''
In this period the women's movement was growing. It was reflected around wv
magazine. For example in 1975 a wv Rally drew over 6(x) women and a similar
event in Sheffreld in 1978 had over a thousand in attendance. At the l97g swp
conference the magazine was to become the basis for a wv organisation with local
groups.

ln

1979, the SWP Conference decided that WV Groups should be or-

ganisationally but not politically independent. The ambiguity of thiJrehtionship soon

led to a major internal struggle. within three years the wv organisation and magaz-

41

ine were closed down. In doing this the party passed verdict on its previous ten years
work in this area-started badly, ended in failure. In examining how WV groups
came about, and the contradictions within the strategy, we can understand more about
the SWP's failure.
At the beginning of the period women comrades active in the wLM and NAC were
dissatisfied with the general attitude of the party. This had real causes. In 1978 some
ofhcial recognition was being made of "the need for self criticism on IS's line on
women".'o A 'socialist Worker' editorial explained that "just like those male socialists 60 years ago, we on 'socialist Worker' have tended to turn our back on that
(women's-our addition) movement: to denounce it as 'middle class', to protest that
we were fighting for the rights of all workers and to ignore the discrimination against

women".'t
This root of this problem is the economism and workerism which led the IS/SWP to
downgrade the struggle for women's rights. Instead of confronting this ideological
problem and its practical effects, an organisational solution was sought. In retrospect
it seems quite likely that these women comrades would share the same economistic
assumptions of the rest of the organisation. For economism is the blindspot of economists. In which case they would be unaware of the nature of ideological problems,
but not of course its practical results. Consequently the organisational 'solution'
would seem the obvious answer to a practical problem. As a 'Socialist Worker' editorial in 1978 explained "Women comrades organised themselves in WV groups and
changed the face and tone of their paper 'Women' s Voice' . 'u
In addition there was another tendency in the party represented in the leadership
who were opportunists. Their workship of spontaneity would soon convince them to
tail-end anything that moved. And the women's movement was on the move. Ian
Birchall puts this more diplomatically. He says it was seen ' 'that there was a small but
significant periphery of women open to revolutionary politics, but who could not be
won directly through 'socialist Worker"'.'' Hence for opportunists, WV groups
were conceived as a stepping stone or bridge into the party rather than a united front.
This combination of forces within the party, the militants and the opportunists,
were able in 1978-79 to overcome the opposition which centred round Tony Cliff.
The WV Groups were therefore founded on quicksand. The combination of forces
supporting them was not solid. As soon as the opportunists considered there were no
recruits to be found they would change their minds. For they would be incapable of
anything except following the ups and downs of the women's movement. This was
exactly what happened, leaving the militants isolated and defeated.
The militants were in a no-win situation. They were not aware of, or avoided, the
ideological problem of economism. Some were to adapt to feminism. But this was
simply a mirror image of the problem. The organisational solution of semi-autonomy
and/or independence was ambiguous. 'Independent but under the thumb of the SWP'
satisfied nobody. It meant either 'playing games with the party' or 'playing games
with the non-party women'. Whilst the WV organisation'worked'then its ambiguities could be ignored by both the militants and the opportunists. And briefly this
seemed to be the case. Ian Birchall speaks of "the success of Women's Voice as an
organisation".,. But as soon as it faltered then Cliff was able to drive a coach and
horses through all the gaps.
Finally we must conclude by pointing out that the one question not confronted in
ten years of failure was the issue of the united front and its relevance to the relation-

42

ship of the party to the movement. It was pointed out by Shaw in 1974 and 1975 and
again in the WV debate by Vandesteeg, Freeman and Greig. But on the whole this had
little impact on an IS/SWP.''

Anti-racism and the Anti Nazi League (ANL)

In the mid-1970s the fascist movement began to grow and registered some electoral
success. Earlier they had become more united in the form of the National Front (NF).

Now with a Labour Government in office and rising unemployment, 1976 saw the
arrival of East African Asian refugees. A vicious racist campaign by the media set the
scene for an upsurge in racist activity. Three black youths were murdered and rnany
more black people attacked on the streets.
A series of provocative NF marches culminated in August 1977 when a massive
counter demonstration at Lewisham broke up an NF march. It was an important event
in which the SWP played a leading role and marked a turning point in NF fortunes.
Shortly afterwards the SWP, in conjunction with Labour MPs and trade union
leaders, launched the Anti Nazi League (ANL). This was to be the most successful
initiative (even with limited objectives) taken by the SWP. It was the only real turn to
united front work in this period. Indeed the success ofthis approach was to catch the
party by surprise. Suddenly the SWP was in the middle of a mass movement.
"In general" says Ian Birchall "the ANL was an important and valuable experience of how revolutionaries can work in a broader mass movement"..0 But there was
an obvious danger. In passing to the united front one can easily get carried away with
excitement and end up acting as its right wing. That this was a real danger to the SWP
leadership is best illustrated at the time of the second ANL Carnival in September
1978. Here, as Ian Birchall admits, "one serious mistake was made".,'
The NF planned a provocative march to Brick Lane on the very same day as the
Carnival. They sought to split the ANL. It was therefore necessary that the Carnival,
a mass peaceful protest, should continue as planned. This was recognised by the party
leadership. But because deep down they considered it 'their' ANL, they were incap
able ofdetaching the party from it. The paay became indistinguishable from the right
wing of the ANL.
The party should have instructed those comrades in key organisational positions
(e.g. Paul Holborrow) to remain at their posts. The Carnival should continue as
planned, and party members in responsible positions should not disrupt that. But the
party itself should make a public call for militant anti-racists to go to Brick Lane to
defend the Asian community. The Carnival would have continued, but many thousands would have followed the party call to Brick Lane especially because of SWp
credibility on this issue.
In fact the public line of the swP was to stick with the carnival. It was the line of
the paper. No leaflet was put out to call people to Brick Lane. Privately, some comrades were sent to Brick Lane. Instead of separating itself from its 'own' ANL offrcials,
the party dutifully followed them. It was a serious mistake especially for the unfortunate ones who were isolated in Brick Lane whilst the party marched into the
setting sun. Birchall tries to cover up the nature of the mistake. He says "the line was
right but the organisational arithmetic was wrong: too few comrades arrived at Brick
Lane and too late"."

/B

Comrade Birchall is wrong. It was not organisational arithmetic but political confusion that failed to deliver comrades to Brick Lane. A typical SWP member on the day
wondering, "shall I go to Brick Lane?" would get the answer . . . the party says 'we
should stay with the Carnival except those who are good at organisational arithmetic'!
The source of that error was the same as the other examples, namely the inability
of the SWP to utilise the united front correctly in the period of downturn. The ANL
did not survive the 1979 qeneral election when Thatcher stole the NF's rhetoric.

Defend Our Unions

The results of the SWP's opportunistic approach to industrial work was illustrated
in the birth and subsequent strangulation of the 1978-79 Defend Our Unions organisation. Quite correctly the SWP saw the Concordat being entered into by the TUC and
the Callaghan Government as posing all sorts of dangers for the rank and file of the
movement. They also saw the inherent dangers in a Tory Government with its promised anti-union legislation as an even greater threat. The SWP linked this with the
vague idea of replacing the CP's Broad Left strategy and thus the Liaison Committee
for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU).
The SWP therefore initiated the Defend our Unions (DOU) organisation which
culminated in a successful conference in Manchester in June 1979. l,l$ R&F delegates from 487 TU bodies meet and agree to a Code of Practice which was projected
as the best method of defence against the Tory anti-union laws. The infant organisation had the potential not only to replace the LCDTU, so successful in the early
1970s, but actually to surpass it, and the CP, Broad Left, et al, and indeed to create
the basis for a militant trade union organisation.
The Code of Practice and the definitive Central Committee view of the DOUs (see
Deason's booklet 'DOU' published December 1979 atd January 1980) provides the
answer as to why the DOU organisation was actually strangled at birth by the politics
of the SWP. No where in the Code of Practice or the DOU booklet was the crucial
strategic question ever mentioned. This was the need to build a political movement in
the class and unions capable of challenging directly, with political strike action, the
anti-union laws and, ofcourse, the inevitable official trade union and labour Party's
political capitulation to the offensive of the employers and the state. But when one
considers that the SWP had no strategic or progranrmatic ideas or intentions in this
most important direction, the rest is hardly surprising.
In conclusion, the SWP threw down a challenge to the CPs industrial strategy then
backed out. In doing this they handed possible leadership ofthe trade union militants
to the Mititant Tendency and the Broad lrft Organising Committee (BLOC). BLOC
is a tribute as much to the failure of the SWP as to the efforts of the Militant Tendency.

Conclusion
Even the most successful of the initiatives taken by the SWP between 1975-80 were
not founded on any clear strategy or programme. Despite the best intentions it would

be impossible to escape an underlying opportunism. The SWp substituted pragmatism for the development of a consistent united front approach. And whilst pragmatism may sometimes produce 'success', equally it may end in mistakes, disillusion
and cvnicism.

45

THE SWP'S DOWNTURN

1981-84

Introduction
In the early 1980s it appeared to the Central Committee that even British pragmatism wasn't working. An analysis called "the downturn" was put forward as an
attempt to fill the strategic void.' But what was the downturn? Was it a lull in strikes
between 1980-82? Or a purely British incorporation of shop stewards going back to
the 1960s? Or was it a term to cover the world recession in 1974-75? Or was it the
employers' offensive coinciding with that recession?
More significantly, the tactical views which came to correspond with the downturn
were 'otzovist' (a Russian word meaning to recall their members from the movement). No more initiatives would be taken. Even a token attachment to the united
front was dropped. The SWP began to isolate itself, turning to ultra-left sectarianism.
A mood of 'downturnitis' grew in the party. Why bother trying to lead a struggle
when everything is doomed to failure? Doom, gloom and defeat was the order of the
day. The SWP developed an ultra-left version of the 'new realism' that was to envelop the TUC. The roots of this mood was in the intellectuals' lack of confidence in
the working class. In the party this was expressed in a rise of student 'hacks' and a
growth of petty intolerance. Not surprisingly, many workers instinctively found this
mood repugnant and repellent.

"I)efend class unity, defend the united front"

In 1982 a small group of comrades came out against the tactical formulations of the
CC and the drift of the party. They called for the formation of a faction to campaign in
the party for the united front. In October 1982 they published a document under the
above title stating their case.' The critics of the SWP CC drew on the history of the
united front tactic. They argued that it was not whether the united front was applicable in a 'downturn'but how it should be applied.
Without the united front tactic the party would inevitably be threatened by 'liquidationism' and 'bureaucratic ultimatumism'. Liquidationism is an old Bolshevik term
which means the dissolution of the party as a fighting force. The cornrades argued
that "the effect ofthe downhrrn is to liquidate the Party as a fighting force. In order to

47

combat this we have to be able to locate those political ideas which threaten to undermine the Party to the right and to the left. Both of these will be incompatible with the
united front tactic."'
They argued that the united front was incompatible with liquidation into the move-

ment (right) and isolation from it (left) as well as opportunism (right) and sectarianism (left). The CC's call for a "temporary abandonment of the united front"
meant this danger was real. This would manifest itself as sectarianism' Two years

later the SWP's own internal documents admitted that sectarianism was in evidence in
the

party's stance.

'Bureaucratic ultimatumism' was a a term used by Trotsky in explaining stalinism

in the 1930s. It meant the party bureaucracy begins commanding the rank and file and
internal democracy withers away. The comrades perceived a similar danger. Therefore, they argued, it was necessary in the present period "to stand up for a democratic
Party, for open debate and the encouragement of discussion" and also "to stand
against the use of force and expulsions to solve political disagreements".'
Within a year a number of comrades, including a group in Bradford, had been
expelled or suspended withoutjustifiable cause. The Internal Bulletin, a platform for
rank and file debate was scrapped.

Abandoning the united front was an unstable position

The comrades predicted that the CCs idea of downturn tactics led them into the
marsh (or soft soggy centre ground). They said:
"If we consider the argument dialectically we can see three positions. At one pole
stand those who are for using the united front tactic (and the slogan of the united
front). At the opposite extreme are those against the united front, the otzovists and
ultimatumists (with the slogan 'Join the Party').
"In between the 'marsh' as lrnin called the soggy centre ground. This is neither
for nor against the united front. It is difhcult to pin down as it appears to be all things
to all people. Even if in the short run the vast majority of the party support the marsh,
it is an inherently unstable position. Every experience of struggle will force us to
choose between the two poles. This will demonstrate that a line derived from the
marsh will fail. The party will be slow to take up a correct fighting stance. We will
find ourselves tail-ending the struggle".'
Within two years these words were proven by the miners' strike. The SWP was
forced to switch tactics, to adopt the united front approach. Instead of the tactical
stance of the SWP from 1982 being confirmed and bearing fruit in the miners strike,
the SWP was forced to change. In a caricature of Bolshevism the class led the party to
the united front. The instability of sectarian isolationism was proven.

Conclusion
The period from 1981-84 was a period in which the SWP abandoned the pretence of
front approach. It began to isolate itself from the movement and turn into a
propaganda group. Sectarian isolation is a product of a downturn in which an intela united

ttg

lectual leadership loses confidence in and contact with its best militants. Those militants who attempted to resist this process were forced to resign, or were expelled or
became disillusioned.

49

I
THE SWP'SISOLATIONIST
TACTICS REASSESSED
1984

Introduction
The miners' strike 1984 awoke the left. Even those intellectuals who had sunk into
a sloth of 'downturnitis' were forced to sit up and take notice. The miners' strike
provided the biggest test of SWP ractics in the 1980s. The party joined the struggle on
the basis of the tactical stance it held from 1982, as a propaganda sect whose prime
aim was to recruit new members. As Chris Harman said at the 1984 Easter Rally "the
key thing to do, and we shouldn't be ashamed about this, is to build the network of
revolutionary militants (code words for SWP!) in the class necessary for the banle

afterwards . . ."'
The SWP was unable to provide leadership in two key areas, amongst militant
miners and amongst those rallying to their support. The reason for this either inability
or slowness was because oftheir failure to develop the united front tactic prior to the
strike. Militant miners had no united fiont organisation to link them together. There
was no rank and file paper with the credibility to lead. Without this, the SWP had no
means of intervening seriously to influence the new layer of militants. This was not
simply 'unfortunate' or 'bad luck', it was also a result of the SWP's own policy prior
to the strike. It is worth remembering that in late 1981 the Rank and File 'Collier',
before its untimely death, had a print order of 16fi).'
Neither was the SWP quick to provide leadership through the united front to
miners' supporters. It was Labour Party members who took the initiative on setting
up miners' support committees. These were not backed by the SWP who worked
separately under their own flag. 'Socialist Worker' did not support the committees
until June 1984. The SWP did not actually get involved until September 1984 when

they then began to play a proper part.3

In October 1984 an internal bulletin noted that "when the miners' strike began our

method of working was determined by our experience of the preceeding years".o

Clearly, it took a good few months for the SWP to try to shake themselves from those
sectarian methods. Eventually the party began to ernbrace the united front. Duncan
Hallas, an SWP CC member spelled out the reality when he said, "We have no
51

choice whatsoever but to recognise that a retreat is forced on us... a retreat into the
institutions of the workine class"!'

Janus makes a reassessment

A comrade from Oxford writing in the restored Internal Bulletin 'welcomed the
turn because the Central Committee now admits:
O "that the main danger now facing the Party is that of ultra left sectarian isolation
from the class";
(ii) "recognise that much emphasis needs to be placed on building in the trade
unions under Party direction';' and
(iii) "that united fronts should be used where possible".
Such a U-turn could not go unjustified. The SWP CC assessed the situation in its
statement to members in the party's Internal Bulletin (IB) called 'Filling in the Per-

spective'.'
In the manner of Janus, the Central Committee assumes the role of 'moderate in the
middle, looking both ways at once'. They note that "two sorts of critical comments
are being made at some aggregates (party meetings). On one hand, there are those
who say that since the downturn continues the turn is unnecessary and represents an
unnecessary shift to the right by the CC and the National Committee . . . On the
other hand, there are people who say the turn has come far too late and that the fight
against 'sectarian ultra-leftism' should have begun years ago"." (The RDG of course
supports this lafter group. We believe that not only should it have begun, but some of
our comrades when they were in the SWP tried to begin it!)

The objective situation

The CC rejected both these consistent positions because of its adherence to "the
objective situation". "Today (in the middle of the miners' strike) things are very
different", says the CC, because "a minority is being driven by its activity to the
Ieft". Hence, "the tactic of the united front was developed to deal precisely with this
sort of situation".'
The miners' strike in 1984 was the most important single strike since at least 1975.
But did this significantly change "the objective situation" or rather force the CC to
recognise its real nature. The general situation both before and after the miners' strike
has been a generally low level of industrial struggle. Defeats are more typical than
victories. This is punctuated by occasional mass struggles, but the movement is largely on the defensive. Splits are a likely result of a movement under such Pressure
(e.g. the split in the NUM and in the TUC). If we call this situation the downturn,
then the downturn continues despite the miners' strike. And it is the downturn that
demands the united front tactic. Hence the objective situation offers us a logical
choice:

(i) the downturn continues and therefore the sectarian isolationist tactics should
also continue (the ultra left position);

(ii) or the downturn continues and we continue with the united front tactic. Why
therefore was it not adopted "years ago''?
52

And where is our Janus central committee? Agreeing with both and disagreeing
with both, whilst trying to hide behind the ..objective situation".
The CC justifies previous faulty theory
Between l98l/84 the cc misrepresented the united front tactic to justify its policy
These arguments are repeated in 'Filling in the perspective;. Not
surprisingly, the cc has a problem. How can the swp return to ttre united front
withorrt exposing its own mistakes and undermining its credibility. Its method is
clearly revealed by the document. old practice must change, but old theory must be
shored up. Later when nobody is looking old (ultra leftist) theory can be quietly

of isolationism.

buried. The logical conclusion is quite simple. Insofar as mistakei were made between 1981/84 they were the fault of the SWp rank and file practitioners. Theoreticians, on the other hand, who happened to be congregating in the cc had basically
been right all along!

With whom
The

cc

is an

alliance permissible?

document indicates that a united front is permissible with the Labour party

or 'reformism'. whilst it may be permissible, they say, it is not practical because thL
'swP-.has insufficient political weight (or "in electoral tenns we have nothing to
'Impracticality' was one of the main arguments used to justif, sectarian
9m9r.').'l
isolationism. once again the cc reduces a politi-al question to an organisational

question.

The RDG rejects this way of presenting

-between
liberal reformism

the issue because it fails to distinguish

and socialist reformism (i.e. left and right of the Labour
Party). A united front with liberal reformism (Hattersley and Kinnock) is impermissible in present circumstances. Kinnock represents the employers against whom
the united front is built. Hence we have formulated this as the Anti-Tliatcher/AntiKinnock united front. The Labour left by contrast represents the radical middle class
and a political alliance with them is permissible. Noi only is it permissible, but it is
quite practical as the Miners Support Groups have shown.
The cc formulation of permissibility makes the united front seem impracticable
since the swP and the Labour Party are not in the same league. our formulation is
more precise and indicates the united front as a practical proposition with the Labour
left.

Downturn equals no action equals no united front

basic proposition underpinned isolationist tactics from lggl-g4. It equates
with strike activity. But a lull in strikes is not a lull in the employers'
offensive and does not mean the united front tactic should be switched off. In a recent
IB Martin Gregory" has pointed out that 1985 has the lowest level of strikes since
1935. on the old isolationist logic this even deeper downturn should switch off the
united front. But it is not the united front but the ol-d sectarian logic that must go.

-This

cla-ss struggle

53

Anarchist demagog;r
The CC says "We are in favour of the united front when it can lead to real action.
We are against it when it is simply a talking shop which rests on passivity".'' This is
a piece of anarchist or leftist rhetoric used between 1981-84 to justify isolationism.
Substituting 'talk' for 'action' is the forte of reformists, just as substituting action
for talk is the rhetoric of anarchists. In fact building the united front involves both talk
and action. To prepare for action involves talk, discussion, negotiation, open letters
etc. The united iront tactic is not reducable to the moment of action. Unity in action is
the high point of the united front. But revolutionaries must build for that, not tail end
it. Beiween 1981-84 ultra left phrases were in fashion. Now that the swP is trying to
'talk' to Militant then leftist phrases are abandoned.

The vacillations of left wingers

Isolationist tactics were justified because of the tendency for "former left wingers
to veer to the righf '. Consequently "our members would be pulled to the right".
Therefore "the clntral emphasis of the Party had to be fighting that danger" . " Later,
the SWP justihed its turn lo the united front because a minority is being "driven to
the

left".

This reasoning is totally erroneous on a number of grounds:

(i) Our tactical stanci is not determined by the vacillations of "former left
wingers". Tactics are derived from the needs of the class not because former left
winlers are hopping around in circles (i.e. "veering to the right", then "driven to the

left").

(ii) Why should we assume that ultra Ieft sectarianism is the best means of ftghting
drift to the right. On the contrary ultra leftism is incapable of such a fight.
(iiD If the CC upholds the correct tactic (i.e. rejects sectarian isolationism) why
shouid we assume that the members will be pulled towards "former left
wingers" rather than towards the central committee. This seems to imply a lack of

by the CC in the membership. Reformism has such an all powerful pull on

"onitdetrce
the membership that the way to combat it is to bury your head in the sand.

The CC linds a scapegoat arnongst the members

The problem then, according to the CC, is not the faulty analysis but that

"a

few

ultra left errors were bound to be made, particularly by newer comrades"''n) Even
this is a very revealing formulation. The CC dare not blame the old hands who have
the experience to makl an obvious reply. Some of this group were 'baited' by leftist
hacks when sectarianism was 'in'. So in fact it is the weakest (i.e. least experienced)
section of the membership which makes an ideal scapegoat.

Conclusion-What is revealed by the SWP's reassessment

The SWP has not developed a consistent tactical line for the 'downturn'. It adapted

54

itself to a mood of pessimism, demoralisation and passivity amongst the intellectuals.

When the miners strike broke this spell it forced the SWP belatedly into a U-turn.
The aBempt to critically examine these mistakes in "Filling in the perspective"
was simply a cover up. But it does reveal certain features of SWP politics. Most
obvious was the incorrect view of the united front tactic as advanced between l98l84. The consequence was that the SWP was ill-prepared for the miners strike. It
joined the struggle as a propaganda sect rather than a party seeking to provide real
leadership.
We can also see the tendency for the leadership to blame the membership for its
own errors. The CC discovers "sectarianism" amongst some members but cannot
see the connection with their own line. "Feminism" and "squadism" were likewise
discovered in 1981 when it was conveniently forgotten where that had come from.
Finally, there is the opportunist method of chasing recruits, adapting to the movement and moods of the periphery. Where is the party going to gain recruits? Between
l98l-84 the answer was given in the negative. Not from Women's Voice groups,
Rank and File groups or the RTW campaign. And of @urse not from former left
wingers, etc.
In the middle of the miners' strike a more positive answer was given. Look to the
miners' support groups. In 1985 it has become, Iook to the Militant Tendency.

55

10

985-86-GENI]INE UNITY
ORDESPBRATELY
SEEKING MILITANT?
1

Introduction
Following the miners strike, in 1985 the swp publistred "An appeal to all socialaddressed itself to the "militant minority" who are-';increasingly distressed at the (labour Party's) swing to the right". The swp went on to argu- that if
that minority "were together in a single organisation, we would be in a very good
position to put up resistance to the advance of the right" . . . "That is why we recently wrote to the Militant suggesting discussions onunity. we repeat thisiall, not
only to Militant, but to all those who want to resist the stampede to tG right".
Th9
ryw unity policy of the SWP seemed to have two aspects, support for the
united front and support for a united independent revolutionary party. These policies
say the central committee (cc), quite correctly, are "in the o6jective interesti of the
movement". what socialists want to know is whether the swp is genuine and serious
in is policy and capable of fighting to implement it? A clue to ansiering this question
is given when we read a statement from the cc in the Internal nurJtin e*it"ioiog
"our orientation on the Labour Left, of which the open letter is part, will allow us to

ists"'which

recruit in threes and fours rather than ones and twos"..

Opportunism and sectarianism in the downturn

the employers' offensive and the defeats

-lead
to a growth of opportunism

suffered by the workers' movement will

and sectarianism. This can be seen when we look at
previous periods of working class defeat. Duncan Hallas in his discussion on the
degeneration of the communist International points us in the right direction when he
says "the Parties of communist International had, especially since 1923 committed a
series of blunders . . . increasingly followed opportunist oi sectu.ian policies under
the direction of Stdin".3
The fight for unity is therefore a fight simultaneously against the twin dangers of
opportunism and sectarianism. Following the miners' defeat the struggle for unity is

57

even more central to working class politics. The sectarians refuse to open discussions

or debate with other marxists. The opportunists by contrast recognise the need for
unity but approach this in an unprincipled way. These two trends are two sides of the
same method. A party based on anarcho-bureaucratic methods might appear to be
sectarian one minute and opportunist the next.

Sectarianism and the RDG litmus test

The SWP's 'Appeal to All Socialists' ended by calling on "anyone wishing to

of this appeal should write to the SWP". The RDG took up the
offer. We wrote to the SWP on four occasions in 1985-86 and received no reply. On
October 12th 1985 they issued a second open letter. They stressed that "The need is
urgent. All those who regard themselves as marxists have responsibility of showing
that they are serious about the need for a revolutionary socialist party, not in some
discuss the contents

indefinite future, but now . . ."

As well as writing to the Central Committee we have appealed to party members
and to the 1986 SWP Conference. We drew a blank. Not only has the SWP refused to
open discussions with us but they have refused to provide any explanation for this
despite repeated requests.
The only reasonable conclusion is that the SWP apeal is an unprincipled one applied in a sectarian manner. Their action has reduced the need for a serious unity policy
into nothing more than a publicity gimmick. This only serves to promote general

cynicism and anti-party feeling. The facts we have discovered by putting SWP words
to the test are only confirmed when we examine the SWP's orientation to the Militant
Tendency.

Opportunism and the case of the Militant Tendency

Originally the SWP called for a united front with Militant. "In striving for the
united front in particular localities, workplaces or unions, we have to pay Particular
attention to the 'Militant Tendency"'.(4) Why is this? Because "it attracts towards it
some of the best activists from a working class background. In effect it competes to
recruit very much the same sort of people as us". In the battle for recruits the SWP
would gain the upper hand because "every time they (Militant) argue against united
front activity with us (SWP) it will widen the gap between their hard core and their
looser supporters".
Later the SWP began to call for a joint organisationiparty with Militant, going
beyond their original united front proposal. Some SWP members do not believe the
CC is serious but are comforted by the thought that it will never come about. Militant's sectarianism means that they will never respond. Other SWP members do take
the move seriously and some of these are worried by the implications.

The danger of opportunism was pointed out by a proposed faction in the SWP
called the Leninist Faction.' They say that "while we do want left unity, we realise
that it must be on the basis of a revolutionary marxist prograrnme, or it will in fact be
a setback and not an advance". They go on to say quite correctly that "even united

58

organisations must have programmes and

grammes".

dl

progranrmes must be class pro-

Central Committee members do not seem to understand the programme issue at all.
Consequently they are left floundering when questioned about it. Apparently Cmrde
Alexander suggested that those who raised such questions were engaging in "silly
arguments".u Cmrde Harman formulated the joint organisation as "a socialist AntiKinnock League" which according to Cmrde Strouthous "need not be based on democratic centralism" which is "negotiable".'
This suggests a confusion between a united party and a united front. In a united
party certain things (e.g. democratic centralism and the programme) are not negotiable, but in a united front they may be. These are not new arguments. We met them
when we were involved in forming and trying to define the basis of the Socialist
Federation. There the libertarian faction argued for a new political organisation (not a
united front) on the basis of a lowest cornmon denominator progftrrnme in which
democratic centralism was 'negotiable'. The RDG and the democratic faction rejected
that method as opportunistic, in the sa.me way as we reject the formulations of cmrdes
Alexander, Harman and Strouthous. The short-cut to a larger membership which a
minimal progftunme seems to offer will always prove illusory.
The Leninist Faction says quite correctly that when a revolutionary party proposes
unity with centrists (MilitanQ "the centrists must adopt the Leninist programme. No
political compromise is possible".'
"This" they say "is a far cry from approaching Militant with no preconditions".
Here they make a fatal mistake which leads them into ultra leftism. The first step is to
demand discussions and negotiations with the centrists. we make no preconditions to
this. To do so would let the centrist leadership off the hook. we demand that the
centrists drop their sectarian stand and 'talk turkey'. whilst Militant are not prepared
to do that, to put forward "conditions'' is tactically naive.
If the centrists indicate that they are prepared to hold discussions, then we put
forward the fact that a united party is not possible without an agreed marxist programme. That is the condition. The Leninist Faction, insists on taking that second
step before the first. It ends up abandoning the fight for a united party with Militant
and against its centrist leadership. This is shown by the fact that they end their article
with no proposals of how to fight the centrists at all. The Leninist Faction, despite
making many sound points, was an ultra left reaction to CC opportunism.
The only factor which prevents a full exposure of that opportunism is the sectarianism of the Militant. If the Militant agreed to 'talk turkey' how could the swp
advance a Marxist programme. The SWP doesn't have one!

Conclusion
The cases of the RDG and the Militant Tendency show that the SWP is not serious

in the struggle for unity. It is simply chasing what it considers to be the

means

speediest

of gaining recruits. Far from this approach strengthening the socialist move-

ment or the SWP it can only weaken the ongoing struggle to build a principled marxist workers party.

59

11

TIIESWP: PROGRAMME,
STRATEGYAND
TACTICS-ST]MMED UP

Introduction

A revolutionary party cannot be built on a sound basis unless it draws the correct
lessons from the history of the international working class. The experience of the
Russian workers remains for us a crucial reference point. There is no other example
of the overthrow of a capitalist state by a workers movement.
The Bolshevik Party which played a leading role in the Russian movement was
built around a strategic orientation to an imminent national revolution. This was exqressed clearly and openly in the party programme. This orientation was later modified by.Lenin's theory of imperialism. His analysis pointed to new prospects for
international revolution and to a changed understanding of the potential of the national revolution.
Lenin stressed the importance of ideological struggle, part of which is the continual
striving for strategic, programmatic and tactical ctirity. our criticism of the SWp
begins ty drawing attention to its weaknesses in this respect. For without these anchors the party is reduced to the position of a ship without a rudder, tossed about on
the stormy sea of class struggle.
hogrammatic Anarchy
Most swP members are not sure whether it is correct to say "there is no programme" or "there is one really but we are keeping it shrouded in mystery".
Amongst those who think there is a programme, no t*o members will suggest the
same one.

on the face of it, the swP does not have a programme. But in reality the leadership
has one which is implicit. Every now and again some aspect will be revealed to the
membership as if a rabbit were suddenly pulled magically out of a hat. Bureaucratic
revelation is the other side ofprogramatic anarchy.
without a programme the whole method of party building is distorted. programme

61

is essential to the marxist method and this can only be soundly based if it is made
explicit and tested by theoretical and practical struggle.
Programmatic anarchy is a term which captures the SWP position. Anarchy can
mean chaos as a source of confusion in the minds of party members. But anarchism is
also an ideology which promotes the virtues of anti-partyism/anti-programmism. The
SWP intellectuals flirt wittr that backward attitude in order to justify what is indefensible for a marxist.

Strategic breakdown
The collapse of the Permanent Arms Economy in the mid-1970s signalled the collapse of the SWP's explicit strategy. No new strategic perspective has been advanced.
They did not draw the conclusion that the national democratic revolution was now
imminent (or that in the period of capitalist expansion the NDR had been delayed).
In the period of the FeE when in some countries national democratic revolutions
could beivoided then programmatic anarchy would not be decisive. In the 1950s and
1960s the IS could rebuild a small marxist cadre without a programme. This weakness would not be a signifrcant factor. But when the national revolution is imminent
programmatic anarchyheans concealing the issues which "at the moment of the first
great events, the first political crisis, automatically pose themselves" (Lenin, 'state
and Revolution', p.68).'

Tactics reduced to manoeuvres

The combination of programmatic anarchy and strategic breakdown mean quite

simply that serious tactics are reduced to the level of sectarian/opportunist manoewres. Most experienced SWP members experience that as "oversteering", where
the organisation treers violently in one direction and when it is about to crash offthe
veers violently in the opposite direction. Not surprisingly there are a number
unnecessary casualties as comrades are thrown out of the vehicle at every
swerve.
The most obvious rnanifestation of this process is the well known joke that there are
more ex-SWP members than there are actual members. It explains the cynicism of the
more experienced members in respect of the latest "turn". Oversteering has been
road

ii

of quite

covered up and dignified in terms of "bending the stick". But it has very little in
corlmon with Lenin's methods which were based on a definite strategy and programme.

Conclusion
Programmatic anarchy and the breakdown of the strategy associated with the pennanent arms economy have reduced SWP tactics to a series of manoeuvres. An examination of the last ten years of SWP history shows this to be the case. The SWP has had
its occasional success but overall it has failed to make any significant gains in membership or influence in the movement.

62

t2
CONCLUSION: BUILDING
A PARTY-WHAT IS TO BE
DONE?

our aim, shared by many other revolutionary marxists, is to build an independent

Party of class conscious workers capable of leading the struggle for international
socialism. At present none of the marxist organisations within the LJK left, for instance the CPGB, Militant, swP, wRp and RCp, have yet laid the proper foundations
for this. They are not based on a sound theory and practice. An independent workers
party must be politically independent of the anarcho-bureaucratic (i.i. middle) class.
Any pTty which compromises with the ideology of that class will ultimately, no
matter how working class in composition, dance to the middle class tune.
_-The Russian question remains the great issue for any budding revolutionary party.
The Russian revolution is still the most advanced experience of the working tliss. It
is the only example of a revolution led by the armed workers in the towns ird cities.
To draw the correct lessons from that experience must be the starting point for any
real advance in the future. on this issue the SWp and its theory of saijcapitalism ii
closest to the truth of the matter. But even here it hasn't hiithe nail on the head.
Nevertheless because of this, the SWp stands above all the other contenders.

An examination of the last l0 years' history of the SWp shows that a number of
mistakes have been made as the party has swung from one policy to another. some of
these mistakes have later been partially admitted, but their root causes never analysed. Everybody makes mistakes. we are after all human. But the mistakes of the
SWP leadership are not accidental. They stem from an incorrect method and theory
which creates errors of judgement and leads to practical mistakes. From programmatic anarchy and strategic confusion comes the opportunist tactics.
The present task facing all 'state capitalist' revotutionaries is not to set up or proclaim an alternative party to the SWp. It is to win the SWp to working chsj pohiics.
This cannot be done without a long hard struggle against the middleilass (i^.e. anarcho-bureaucratic) trend within the party. criticism, debate and struggle are the essential means to combat this trend whether it appears as ultra leftism oi centrism. we,
in the RDG, have embarked upon this course of struggle because these vital issues
must be tackled now and not when 'mistakes' have even more dangerous consequences.

63

In 198? the Revolutionary Democratic Group became a faction of the SWP in order
to show up not only our connection with the Party, but also our political differences.
The statement made by the Group in April 1987 explains that we are campaigning on
the basis of:

l) A revolutionary Marxist programme.

2) For a strategJi of permanent revolution and a reiection of syndicalist
strategy.
3) For a consistent application of the united front tactic in the downturn.
4)

For intervention in Parliamentary elections with

revolutionary

marxist candidates.
5) For the development of a revolutionary cadre through open ideological
struggle and the strengthening of party democracy by:
o regular internal bulletins;

o fullfactionrights;
o opposition to unprincipled expulsions;

O the party to give account of its decisions to the broader

movementl

o public meetings to be open to the public;

o an end to the policy of open recruitment.
We realise this will be anathema to the hacks and peBy bureaucrats who sometimes
gravitate to revolutionary politics. But class conscious workers will take a different
view. They have no fear of our criticisms and will consider them on their merits. For
they realise that only through struggle will the truth come out.
Some of the hacks will no doubt try to say that because we are criticising the SWP
we are 'sectarians'. This accusation is false for two reasons. First, criticism is vital to
the whole marxist method. Without it the party will wither and die like a plant without
water. Second, because we have not allowed our criticism to prevent us seeking
principled unity with the SWP. We, the RDG, remain committed to principled unity
and are prepared to have the necessary discussions with other marxists to see if this is
a practical proposition.
We end by appealing to all class conscious workers' Whether you are inside the
SWP or outside, link up with us in the struggle to forge the kind of unity and party
our working class movement so urgently needs.

64

REFERENCES

Chapter 1: Building a New Workers Party

r)

Knei-Paz : The Social and

Political Thought of Leon Trotslq , p .390 .

Ibid. p.391.
3) We do not use the term 'Trotskyism' to describe our politics-we use it neither
as a tenn ofpraise or abuse but for those groups who accept that label for their
own politics.
4) Callaghan, I: BritishTrotslcyism-Theory and Practice, p.100.
2)

5) Ibid.p.rD.

A lbid.p.r0r.
7) Ibid. p.r0r.
8) Ibid. p.r02.

9)
f0)
f f)

12)

f3)

14,

Ibid.p.r02.
Hallas, D: Party and Class, p.17-18.
Callaghan, I: op.cit. p.102.

Ibid. p.107 .
Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses
C ommuni st Int e mati oml, p.96.
Hallas, D: Towards aRevolutionary Pany, in'Party and Class'.

of

the

Chapter 2: On the Problems of SWP Philosophy and Theory

f) Lenin: Selected Worl<s Vol.3, p.480.

2\ Ibid. p.486.
3) Serge, V: Year One of the Russian Reyolution, p.l04.
4) Draper, H: Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, VoL II, Chap. I I, p.291-295.
t I-enin: CollectedWorlcs, Vol.15, p.205.
6) Lenin: Collected Works, Yol.5, p.432.
7)
8)
9)

10)

Ibid. p.436
Ibid.. p.425.
Ibid. p.384.
Ibid. p.382.

Chapter 3. The Political Revolution

1)

2\

l-enin: ColleuedWorks, Vol.23, p.13.

Callinicos, A: The Revolutionary Road to Socialism-Wat the S\VP Stands
For, p.33.

67

3)

4\

6)

7)

McNally, D: see SWP pamphlet Socialismfrom Below.

l*njn: Colleaed Works, Vol.8, p.475.
Ibid. p.475.

l*nin: Seleaed Wofl<s Vol.l,'Two Tactics

Democratic Revolution' .
l*nin: Seleaed Worlc Vol.3 , p.3ll.
Callinicos, A: op.cit. p.38.

of

Social Democracy

in

the

E)
9) Ibid. p.40.

fi)
rr)

12)
13)

l4l
lt

16)

lT
t8)

19)

Ibid. p.4o.
Ibid. p.40.
Ibid. p.a.
Ibid. p.43.

lbid.p.48.
Harding, L: lznin's Political Thoughr, Vol.I , p.204-2O8.
Lenin: Collected Works , Vol.9 , p.96.
Frolich, P: Rosa ltxenbourg, p.127.

Ibid..p.r32.
Callinicos, A: op.cit. p.35.

201 lbid.p.39.

2r)

22\
23,

Ibid.p.39.
Ibid.p.36.
Foot, P: Wy you should be a socialist, Chap.7, p.84.

24') Trotsky, L: Marxism and the Trade Unions, Chapter on 'Communism

and

Syndicalism', p.34.

2s) Ibid. p.35.

26) Callinicos, A: op.cit. p.77
2T Callinicos, l: South A\rica: The Road to Revolution, p.35
2E' Callinicos, A: op.cit. p.56.
29' Ibid. p.57.
30) Lenin: 'The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism', Collected lVorks,
Vol.23, p.13.
31) See documents of the Republican Faction for a fuller analysis-Pre-Conference
18 SWP, Issue No.2.
32) SWP Internal Bulletin No.6. 1981.

Chapter 4: The Question of Strategy

f) Marx: The Communist Manifesto, p.147.

2) Gramsci: Selected Prison Notebooks, p.24O.
3) Ibid. p.240.
4) Kidron: Westem Capitalism since the War.
t Callaghan: ibid.p.lO4.
6) Kidron: International Socinlism Jourr:ril. No. 100.
7) SWP Internal Bulletin, Oct. 1982-'Prepare for the upturn'
adopted by the Central Committee on the front of this bulletin.

68

was the slogan

Chapter 5: The Question of Programme

r) Inntn: Colleaed
2)
3)

4l
5)

o
7)

r)
e)

r0)
r1)

t2,
13)
14)

rt

Worlcs, Vol. 4, p.230.

Trotsky: Marxism and thc Trade Unions , p .31

Cannon, J: Speechesfor Socialism, Chap.12, p.180.

l*nin: Colleaed Worlcs, Vol.4, p.229-254.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

p.229.
p.23O.

p.230.
p.230.
p.23O.

p.230.
p.23O.

p.23r.
p.231.

'Communist Organisation of the British Isles' in Proletarian No.3.

l*nrn: Colleaed Worla ,

1O Ibid. p.376.

Vol. 5 , p .387

t7) Ibid.p3U.
18)

Ibid. p.377.

r9) Marx: The Communist Manifesto, p.73.

20) l*nin: State and Revofurton, p.68.
2t) l-enin: Selected Works, VoI.I, p.40.
Chapter 6: Ireland and the National Democratic Revolution

r) Lenin:'What
2)
3)
4)

s)

o
7',)

8)

is to be done?', Colle cted Works, Vol. 5, p.421.

Green, J: SWP Intenwl Bulletin, 1977.
Hearn and Welsh: SWP, IB, 1978.
Calvert and Robinson: SWP 18, June 1980.
Walsh: SWP/8. 1981.
Red Action, 'The News the Central Committee Forgot'.
SW P, Inte rnal Bullain, N o. 4, 1981, p. l l, Central Commiftee.
Dyer, Mintoff & Philipps: SWP 18No.5, Nov. 1979.

Chapter 7: The Quetion of Tactics

1)

Shaw

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
o Ibid.
7\ Ibid.
E) Ibid.

2)
3)
4)

e)

: 1 978 Socialist Register , p .125 .

p.r29.
p.r30.

p.r28.
p.128.

p.r28.
p.r29.

p.r3r.

Socialist Worker Appeal, p.7.

69

10)

Birchall, I: Smallest Mass Party, p.28.

12)
13)
14)

Birchall: op.cit. p.28.

l1)

Shaw: op.cir.
Shaw: op.cir.

p.l16.

p.ll6.

Birchall: op.cit. p.28.

l5'S lbid.p.28.

16)

ibid. p.28.

20)
21)
22)

Birchall: op.cit. p.27 .

Birchall: op.cit. p.27.
Birchall: op.cit. p.27.

l7) Ibid.p.28.
l8) Ibid.p.28.
f9) SWP Internal Bulletin,May

1979.

Chapter E: The SWP's Downturn f9E1-84

1) Cliff, T:

2)
3\

4)
5)

'The Balance of Class Forces in Britain Today', Internntional

Socialism6.

'Defend Class Unity Defend the United Front'-this was a document circulated
under that title. It was a further elaboration of an article by Armstrong and
Freeman, 'The Downturn and the United Front', SWP /8, August 1982

Ibid., Section D, p.l

Ibid. p.2.
Ibid.P.3.

Chapter 9: The SWP's Isolationist Tactics

f)

2)
3)

Faith, S: from unpublished article quoting from Socialist Review,May 1984.

rbid.
rbid.

4) SWP Internal Bulletin, October 1984.

5) Hallas, D : from Financial Time s, reported in Republican llorke r No. I
6) SWP Intental Bulletin, No.2,No. 2, Giles Ungpakorn.
7) SWP Central Committee, Filling in the Perspective, p.3-5, 1984, No.2.

8)
9)

l0)
lf)

Ibid. p.3-5.
Ibid. p.3-5.
Ibid. p.3-5.
Gregory, M: SWP Internal Bulletin No.2, 1985.
No.2.

12) SWP CC 18, 1984,

13) Ibid.p.3-5.
14) Ibid.p.3-5.

Chapter l0: Genuine Unity or Desperately Seeking Militant?

f)
70

SWP'Appeal to all Socialists'

2)

SWP Perspectives

for

1985 Conference-see statement by Central Committee

on'LeftUnity'.

3) Hallas, D: Trotsky's Marxism,p.8l.

4) SWP CC 18, 1984, No.2
5) SWP Internal Bulletin No.2, 1985, p.9.
6) Ibid. p.9.
7) Ibid. p.9.
8) Ibid. p.9.
.

Chapter 11: The SWP-hogramme, Strategy and Tactics Summed Up

1)

l-,enin State and Revolution, p.68.

71

Published in 1987 by the Revolutionary Democratic Group (Faction of the SWP)

Printed by A Wheaton & Co Ltd, Exeter
Typesetting by Leveller Graphics (TU), Ol-2742288.
Thanks to Jan, whose hard work made this pamphlet possible.

The Revolutionary Democratic Group is a faction of the SWP. You can

contact us by writing to the:

Review Discussion Group

POBox4,/T
South West D.O.
4 Falcon Road West

Edinburgh EH10 4AB