Bill Tang

Case Rulings
3/26/2015
Wall of Separation v. Dearborn Michigan 2015
In this case, I have decided to rule in favor of the Wall of Separation. It is clear that using public tax
money to fund transportation to private Muslim institutions is in clear violations of at two parts of the
Lemon test, and also coerces citizens to support religion while supporting one specific religion unfairly
above others. Based on the precedent cases presented, it is clear that this action is in violation of the
establishment clause. This situation is remarkably similar to the 1971 Lemon vs Kurtzman case, where
public funding of secular teachers at religious private schools. In both cases, public tax money is being
directed towards a secular purpose at a religious institution, however, it was rule in the Lemon vs
Kurtzman case that such action still furthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the
supervision of distributing such funds is excessive entanglement of government. This would clearly apply
in this case, where money is directed at a secular portion at the Muslim schools, namely transportation,
but doing so is saving the Muslim schools money that they would have spent on transportation that they
can now spend on whatever they want, including religious purposes. Also, in the same way as the Lemon
case, the government would become entangled with religious institutions as they would have to work with
them on the budget. Other precedent cases continue to support the Wall of Separation arguments. In the
1992 Lee vs Weisman case involving the rabbis graduation speech at a middle school. the court stated
that the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise... In Dearborn, every citizen who voted against the bill but is still being forced to
pay taxes towards funding Muslim institutions is being forced to support those institutions. The 1984
Lynch vs Donelly and 1989 Allegheny vs ACLU cases also support the Wall of Separations side. In
Lynch vs Donelly, the court ruled that a religious display was allowed because it was simply a passive
representation and accommodation of a religious symbol that held historical and cultural significance. In
Allegheny vs ACLU, the court decided that simply displaying the words Glory to God for the Birth of
Jesus Christ overstepped the bounds of accommodation and passive representation. Therefore, it should
be obvious that using public funds to help fund a religious institution is far from passive, and far from
accommodation. Accommodation would be providing students of all religions equal access to busing in
public schools, which is already being done. The 1961 Engel v. Vitale cases doesnt share a great deal of
similarity with this one, but it does reinforce the idea that government cannot pass laws that unfairly
established one specific religion, which is being done in this case. No other religious private schools are
receiving and funding, only the Muslim ones. With all these precedent cases in mind, I believe it is only
possible to conclude that the funding of transportation for Muslim schools is unconstitutionally, as a
violation of two parts of the lemon test, and an unfair coercion of citizens to support a specific religious
institution that is beyond mere passive representation or accommodation.

American Atheists vs Port Authority of New Jersey

In this case I have decided to rule in favor of the Port Authority of New Jersey. I think it is clear that in
this context, the display of the Christian cross is part of a display that serves a clear secular purpose, does

not participate in furthering or inhibiting any religion, and also does not excessively entangle government
with religion. I think this case is very similar to the 1984 Lynch v. Donelly case. The cross in the museum
is being displayed with a clear secular purpose, and is also clearly a passive representation. I think it also
clearly fits under the umbrella of accommodation and acknowledgement of historical significance. The
cross is not being displayed to suggest that Christianity is in any way superior to any other religion or
nonreligion, and it plays no part in furthering the Christian message. It is simply a historical display of a
religious symbol that happened to bring hope to workers at the 9/11 wreckage site. This fact clearly
contrasts this situation from the one ruled unconstitutional in Allegheny v. ACLU. In that case, a display
was created for the purpose of spreading a Christian message, not for showing historical and cultural
significance. To say that this display is unconstitutional would mean that any display of religious history
or artifacts related to religion in any public museum or other facility would be illegal. That would be
suggesting that if a museum were to create an exhibit that depicted a history of the world, they would
have to leave out all parts of it that mentioned religion. The only relevance that the 1992 Lee vs Weisman
case has in this situation is the idea that citizens cannot be coerced to support or participate in religion. I
think it is impossible to argue in this case that anyone is being forced to go look at this specific display
and soak in its religious meaning. The Engel v. Vitale case also does not seem very relevant. There is no
religious activity being officially mandated by the government in this display, and the display of the cross
does not lead to the establishment or official approval of the Christian religion. Finally, the Lemon v.
Kurtzman case leaves us with the Lemon Test, which this display clearly passes. As I stated earlier, I think
it is clear that there is a secular purpose, as the display is meant to show a historical example of one of the
symbols that people found hope in after 9/11. It also does not support Christianity or inhibit any other
religion. There is no message suggesting that Christianity is good or that any other religion is bad; the
message is that this Christian symbol was relevant to some at a point in history. The final clause of the
Lemon Test is the only one requires some deliberation. By inviting a priest in to consecrate the ground on
with the cross stands, it could be argued that that action was excessive entanglement with religion.
However, since that event, there has been no ongoing relationship between the government and any
religious institution in maintaining this display. Therefore, even if the action of inviting a priest could be
considered a violation of the Lemon Test, the display that is left now is clearly not. Due to these
reasonings based on precedent cases, I think it can be concluded that the cross display is an example of
passive accommodation and a display that shows the historical significance of religion, not a display that
supports religion in any way or entangles the government with religion.