FIRST DIVISION

MARCOS V. PRIETO,Complainant

A.C. No. 6517

- versus -

Promulgated:

ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and JUDGE FERDINAND A.

FE, Respondents.

December 6, 2006

RESOLUTION

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court

referred the instant administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina
G. Salonga for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
receipt thereof.
Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005,
and directed the complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear
before her and to submit documents relevant to the complaint.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against
respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and
respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious
misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary under Section 27, Rule
138 and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the latters
actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG entitled, Yolanda M. Roque v. Atty.
Marcos V.Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled, Yolanda Marquez Roque v.
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.
Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to
the records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge, he was also
given the liberty to copy what perhaps would help him in his quest to win the case.
Invoking the principle of res ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the fact that
Civil Case No. 1518-BG was raffled to the respondent Judge, who was the former counsel
of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No. 1081-BG. Another reason for his objection is that,
allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in Civil Case No. 1518-BG were obviously
copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein the complaint was prepared by respondent
Judge in his capacity as then lawyer of herein complainant (plaintiff
therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing constitute misconduct which imply malice
or wrongful intent, not just mere errors of judgment. He insists that the fact that
respondent Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which the plaintiff was his former
client and which complaint was copied from the complaint he himself prepared does not
speak well of his intention as to the disposition of the case.
Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the
respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to present it to
court as the latters work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Complainant also asserts that in placing his signature in the
complaint not written by him, respondent lawyer committed deceit, which serves as a
ground for his disbarment.

During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge, after
the marking and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they
would not be adducing any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period
of thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the
case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent
judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent
lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:
In
October
1992,
Salud
Andrada
Marquez (Marquez) mortgaged six (6) parcels of land to the Rural
Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of which is a parcel of land with an
area of Twenty Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Square Meters
(22,599 sq. meters) located at Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FP-15344 under a Free Patent
granted on 5 July 1989.
Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the
mortgage. On 2 August 1993, the mortgaged properties were sold at
public auction the highest bidder of which was the
petitioner. Consequently, OCT No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in
the name of the petitioner.
In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact
Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid
properties to Far East Bank and Trust Company.
Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the
consequent transfer of the mortgaged properties in the name of the
petitioner, Roque, Marquez daughter, filed a complaint docketed as

Civil Case No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67, for Declaration of
Nullity of Contracts with Damages against said petitioner, the Rural
Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust
Company. Respondent judge, then a practicing lawyer, was retained
by Roque as her counsel of record in said case and was the one who
drafted said complaint.

On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC

Branch 67 transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to
RTC Branch 33 through its Clerk of Court, Atty. Richard T. Domingo,
which was duly received by the latter.

On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then

Presiding Judge Jose G. Pineda, issued an order dismissing the case on
the ground that Roque was not a real party in interest since her right
of action has still to ripen upon the death of her mother.

On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC

Branch 67, an Objection to Competency and his Answer to the
Complaint. Since the records thereof were already transmitted to RTC
Branch 33, RTC Branch 67s Branch Clerk of Court had said pleadings
forwarded thereto. Since then, the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1518-BG have been conducted by RTC Branch 33.

On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as

the presiding judge of RTC Branch 67. By reason of his appointment,
he completely severed all his professional relationships with his
clients, including Roque, and turned over or relinquished all case
records of his office to said clients.
Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who
had now acquired by way of succession her mothers right of action to
pursue the annulment of contracts executed over the property
formerly covered by OCT No. 15344, engaged the legal services of
respondent lawyer.
Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roques
counsel, filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts,
Reconveyance of Property, and Damages against petitioner, his
attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, the Rural
Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company,
Inc., now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, before the
Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union.
On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No.
1518-BG, was raffled to the respondent judge. On 8 January 2004,
RTC Branch 67, through Atty. Jeovannie C. Ordoo, its Branch Clerk of
Court, issued summons to the defendants. The summons and copy of
the complaint was duly served upon the petitioner on 20 January
2004.
Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled
cases to his court, respondent judge came across Civil Case No. 1518BG and discovered that the plaintiff therein was Roque, his former
client. Immediately, without going over the allegations of the
complaint, the respondent judge issued an Order dated 23 January
2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordered that the record of
said case be transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 33 (RTC Branch 33).

In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein

filed their Answers and the issues having been joined, Presiding Judge
Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim of RTC Branch 33 set the case for pre-trial
conference and ordered the submission of the parties respective pretrial briefs.
On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an
Amended Answer together with the Authority given by his codefendants Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, in his favor to
appear for and in their behalf, and their Pre-Trial Brief.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second
Division of the Supreme Court referred the instant administrative case
to the undersigned for investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. A copy of the said
Resolution was received by the undersigned on 18 November 2005.
Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November
2005, the undersigned set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005
directing the petitioner and the respondents, and their witnesses, if
any, to appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the
complaint.
During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the
respondent judge, after the marking and offering of their respective
documentary evidence, manifested that they will not be adducing any
further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period thirty
(30) days within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after
which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 13
December
2005,
petitioner
filed
his
Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the other hand, filed his

Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed

his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint

against respondents, and that complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous
complaint.
A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the
present administrative case is unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and
legal basis. Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioners allegations in
support of his complaint against the respondents should be treated for
what they really are, mere allegations founded on speculation and
conjecture. In this connection, it must be stressed that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondents
committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in
this, the complaint must be dismissed.
First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that
the respondent lawyer, through the intervention and assistance of the
respondent judge, had free access to the court records Civil Case No.
1081-BG fails to find evidentiary support. Without more, petitioner
deduced that the court records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG were made
available to the respondent lawyer at the instance of the respondent
judge simply because relevant and substantial portions of the
complaint filed by the latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case
No. 1518-BG. Bare and conclusory as it is, the said allegation deserves
scant consideration.
Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had
adopted relevant and substantial portions of the complaint filed by
the respondent judge does not in any way bespeak of any illegal or
unethical practice on his part.
For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and
gained access to the case record of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be
gleaned from the records, respondent judge had already turned over
and relinquished his case records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG to Roque
after his appointment to the bench on 8 November 2001. Since she
intended to re-file the case against petitioner, it is expected, if not
necessary, for Roque to give the records of the previously dismissed
complaint to her newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is
the right of Roque and the respondent lawyer, as her retained counsel,
to request access to the court records for their reproduction or
certification.

For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and

successively filed by the respondent judge and the respondent lawyer
belies petitioners claim that the latter merely copied, verbatim or
otherwise, the original complaint. True, some allegations contained
therein were substantially retained by respondent lawyer. However,
these allegations are essential and crucial to the cause of action of
Roque against the petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly
a number of ways to construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly
claim that respondent lawyer is legally restrained from retaining or
rewriting sentences earlier constructed by the respondent judge.
More importantly, petitioners assertion that respondent
judge allowed the respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil
Case No. 1081-BG is unfounded. Aside from the petitioners mere say
so, there is not even an iota of evidence to support this assertion. It
is all too obvious that there is a dearth of evidence that would in any
way prove petitioners accusation against the respondents.
In the same vein, petitioners inference that respondent
judge intended to try Civil Case No. 1518-BG is a blatant
fabrication. The records of the case refute this. Reading his petition,
it is evident that petitioner cunningly attempted to mislead this court
to believe that respondent judge is still conducting the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself
therefrom. His intent to deceive this court to achieve his end to vex
and harass the respondents is undeniable.
As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance in this regard. He is well aware that the respondent judge
already issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from
the case and ordering the transmission of the record of said case to
the RTC Branch 33. In fact, petitioner has been actively participating
in the proceedings of said case before the RTC Branch 33 prior to the
institution of the instant administrative case as he had already filed
several pleadings therewith.
If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was
ingeniously written to deliberately and maliciously withhold and
suppress the fact that the respondent judge had already inhibited
himself from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 1518-BG and that the
records thereof had in fact been transmitted to RTC Branch 33.
All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative
case in itself is frivolous, calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast
groundless suspicions on the integrity and reputation of both the
respondents. The only piece of evidence that the petitioner has
offered in support of his claim is his bare assertions, which certainly

deserves scant consideration. It must be emphasized that a mere

charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to
support the charge. This brings to the fore the application of the ageold but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations.
Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner
Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the
respondents, there is merit in the separate counter-petitions filed by
the latter to hold the petitioner administratively liable for filing an
unfounded and frivolous suit.
As already stated, petitioners allegations in support of his
complaint against the respondents are baseless, as they are mere
allegations founded on pure speculation and conjecture. Sans
evidence, his petition was purposely written to mislead the Court and
cast
a doubt
on
the
integrity and
dignity of
the
respondents. Petitioner made the said administrative case as a
vehicle
to
unduly
harass
or
otherwise
prejudice
the
respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his own desire to vex the
respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire judiciary and
the bar.
For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt,
as what the Supreme Court had pronounced in the recent case
of Galman Cruz vs. Alio-Hormachuelos. Said the Court:
Verily, this Court is once again called
upon to reiterate that, although the Court will
never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or
omission that would violate the norm of public
accountability or diminish the peoples faith in
the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield
those under its employ from unfounded suits that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice.
The eloquent words of the late Justice
Conrado
V.
Sanchez
in
Rheem
of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:
By now, a lawyers duties to the Court
have become commonplace. Really, there could
hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of

the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells

out one such duty: To observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers. As explicit is the first canon of legal
ethics which pronounces that it is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Court a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for
the
maintenance
of
its
supreme
importance. That same canon, as corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against unjust criticism and
clamor. And more, the attorneys oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be with all
good fidelityto the courts. Worth remembering
is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can
only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which he is bound to uphold.
We concede that a lawyer may think
highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what
he feels is others lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however,
should not be allowed to harden into a belief that
he may attack a courts decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism
that courts are the temples of right. He should
give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered
by fallibility.
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel, Justice Sanchez further elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he
is. like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice. Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to
the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus
has it been said of a lawyer that as an officer of

the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help

build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice.
Petitioners unfounded imputations against respondents are
malicious and offend the dignity of the entire judiciary. Scandalous as
his bare allegations are, the fact that petitioner maliciously insinuated
that the respondent judge allowed access to and assisted the
respondent lawyer in the filing of his complaint desecrates and mocks
the integrity of the judiciary. Equally insolent is petitioners baseless
postulations that the respondent judge refused to inhibit himself from
Civil Case No. 1518-BG purposely to give leverage to his former client
and her lawyer.
Moreover, in filing a frivolous suit against his opposing
counsel, petitioner violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that all lawyers must
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their
colleagues and should avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel and commands all lawyers to observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
We have reviewed the records, and after careful consideration thereof, we find
the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the Investigator in the above-quoted
report to be well-taken and fully supported by the evidence on record, except for the
penalty imposed on complainant.

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to persons of

good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also
the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public
trust.[4] Thus, a lawyer should not use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a
party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[5] We cannot countenance complainants act of
misleading this Court into believing that respondent judge was still conducting the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG. What is evident is that even complainant was well
aware of respondent judges inhibition therefrom. The respondent judge, in fact, issued
an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibitinghimself from the case.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,[6] respondent-lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for
filing a groundless suit against a former client in order to harass and embarrass her. In the
case of Arnaldo v. Suarin,[7] complainant Atty. Arnaldo was fined P5,000.00 for filing
frivolous complaint. In this case, which we find analogous to Arnaldo, we hold that a fine
of P5,000.00 will suffice.
ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Salonga is APPROVED with
modification
as to
the
penalty
imposed
on
complainant
Atty.
Marcos
V. Prieto. Respondents Judge Ferdinand A. Fe and Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz are exonerated
and the administrative complaint against them is DISMISSED. Complainant Atty. Marcos V.
Prieto is FINED P5,000.00 for filing frivolous suit with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded

complaint. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
litigate, however, this right must be exercised in good faith. [1]
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that
only add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the
court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise
avoid unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.[2] Canon 12[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility
promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any
agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. 7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two
hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was,
in fact, no such agreement. 8 Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern
was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial" 9 and
insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement
(or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case
and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6198

September 15, 2006

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a
charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing
of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M.
Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against
several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the
February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant
Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that
if we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So,
with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving
pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a
number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his
statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading." 3 Weeks passed but Atty.
Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. 4 The complaint, which charged Atty.
Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in]
obstruction of justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant

In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and

recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation
of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 12 and recommending
that he be "suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of
three months."13 This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on
August 30, 2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the
court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not
feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common
reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his
lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only
that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every
lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law."17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this
administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done
nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even
after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in
truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla
resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood
had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to
complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case. 18

The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its

speciousness,19 cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly
readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just
deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith 20 which keeps us from
treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in
the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the case amicably among comrades
in arms without going to trial," 21perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he
really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the
proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have
been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer
to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any
circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the
court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor 22 forbids recourse
to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept
as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must
call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case
tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems,
needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of
the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness
in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for TWO MONTHS.He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge
Advocate General's Service.

Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the
practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty.
Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of
this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal
profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be
improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath,
his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course,
suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a
consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for
us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond
the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's
recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of
Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his
liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during
the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom.
Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a
mitigating circumstance.23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is
entitled to some measure of forbearance.24

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 1955 March 14, 1995

NAPOLEON R. GONZAGA and RICARDO R. GONZAGA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CRISANTO P. REALUBIN, respondent.

MELO, J.:
This refers to a complaint filed by the Gonzaga brothers, Napoleon and Ricardo, for the
disbarment of Atty. Crisanto P. Realubin on grounds of "malpractice, gross misconduct and
violation of oath of office", allegedly committed as follows:
That respondent Notary Public testified during the deposition taking in
connection with the intestate estate of the late Don Julio Gonzaga
and Doa Juliana de la Rama Gonzaga in Manila, that we previously
appeared before him to have the authority of Atty. Eugenio Villanueva
to appear as counsel for the estate of our late parents and the heirs,
notarized;
That he likewise presented his notarial register No. 013753
purportedly showing that our document was duly notarized by him on
August 1, 1977;
That this notarial register in the name of respondent Crisanto P.
Realubin was never sold to him but to a certain Pedro Geling. The true
name of the Notary Public in Notarial Register No. 013753 was erased
and the name of respondent Crisanto P. Realubin was written. Likewise
the year of the issuance of the receipt for the purchase of the said
notarial register was likewise tampered instead of 1976 it was made to
appear as 1977. Xerox copies of the certifications issued by the Office
of the Solicitor General that Notarial Register No. 103753 was sold to
Pedro Geling and that it was sold on January 29, 1976 and not January
29, 1977 is hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B". Likewise attached
as Annex "C" is a xerox copy of Official Receipt No. 5266027 issued to
Pedro Geling on January 29, 1976;
All these erasures and tampering made by the respondent Realubin
and his false testimony during the deposition taking that we appeared
before him to have said authority notarized constitute a violation of
his oath of office, malpractice and gross misconduct. Xerox copy of
page 1 of respondent's Notarial Register No. 013753 is hereto attached
as Annex "D";
That we never appeared before Crisanto P. Realubin on August 1, 1977.

(pp. 4-5, Rollo.)

Following the referral of the complaint to the Solicitor General, a report was submitted
confirming in substance the aforesaid charges and recommending the suspension of
respondent, to wit:
The issue is one of credibility. Complainants claim they never
appeared before respondent for the notarization of their authority to
Atty. Villanueva to handle the criminal case. On the other hand,
respondent claims they appeared before him.
Complainants should be sustained. Napoleon Gonzaga positively
testified that he signed the questioned authority in the San Antonio
Church at Forbes Park in the afternoon of August 1, 1977 (pp. 30-33,
tsn., Aug. 24, 1979); that Napoleon never met respondent before
August 1, 1977 and it was only during the instant investigation that he
met respondent (p. 84, tsn., Ibid); that Napoleon Gonzaga did not
appear before respondent for ratification, first because the document
did not contain a jurat when he signed it; second, because it was
already 6:30 in the evening of August 1; that there was no hurry for
them to have the document notarized; third after signing the
document, Atty. Villanueva took the same from them, without giving
them a copy; fourth, if they wanted it notarized, they could have
gone to Atty. Arturo Alafriz who offered his help to them (pp. 30-32,
tsn., Oct. 26, 1979; pp. 32-33, tsn., Aug. 24, 1979; pp. 45-50, tsn.,
May 31, 1983).
Likewise, Ricardo Gonzaga, who co-signed with his brother Napoleon
(Exhs. E, D, pp. 130, 131, Inv.), positively testified that
he never appeared before respondent for the notarization of said
document on August 1, 1977, and it was only during the instant
investigation that he met respondent (pp. 33-36, tsn., Jan. 5, 1980);
that Atty. Villanueva did not give him nor his brother Napoleon, a copy
of said document after they signed the same (p. 36, tsn., Ibid); that
they were so busy with their parents' coffins at the Forbes Park
Church, that they were not in a hurry to notarize said authorization
(pp. 37-38, tsn., Ibid).
Dionisio Jakosalem Buencamino also positively testified that Napoleon
Gonzaga was beside him at about 6:00 to 6:20 in the afternoon of
August 1, 1977, just before the start of the 6:30 requiem mass at the
Sanctuario de San Antonio for the parents of Napoleon Gonzaga, on
the eve of their departure for the interment in Bacolod the following
day; that he noticed Napoleon stepping aside a few moments before
the start of the mass, and he (Buencamino) saw Napoleon signing a
piece of paper, which Napoleon told him later, was the authority for

Atty. Villanueva to file the criminal case against the killers of

Napoleon's parents (pp. 10, 16-23, tsn., March 25, 1983).

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

As against said three (3) witnesses, namely Napoleon Gonzaga, Ricardo

Gonzaga and Dionisio Jakosalem Buencamino, is the lone testimony of
respondent, claiming that the document was not yet signed when the
Gonzaga brothers presented the same to him for notarization at
respondent's Padre Faura office at about 9:00 o'clock of August 1, 1977
(pp. 6, 9-10, 14, tsn., Aug. 7, 1980); that after examining the
residence certificates of the Gonzagas which tallied with the
residence certificates appearing in the prepared authorization, the
Gonzaga brothers affixed their signatures in respondent's presence
(pp. 14-17, tsn., Ibid).

(pp. 049-052, Rollo.)

Respondent's lone denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies

of said three (3) witnesses. Respondent could have presented his
secretaries who were allegedly present when the alleged notarization
took place to corroborate his testimony (pp. 271-272, Inv.). He chose
not to present any of them. The testimony of Atty. Villanueva could
have been availed of by respondent because complainants claim that
their signatures were procured by Atty. Villanueva (see p. 40-41, tsn.,
June 26, 1980). Yet respondent did not present Atty. Villanueva.
Furthermore, the evidence is indisputable that respondent was in the
practice of leaving blank spaces between entries in his Notarial
Register with only the consecutive numbers of the documents listed
(Exhs. L-1, M-1, N-1, N-2, O-1, O-2, P-1, Q-1, R-1, pp. 197-203, Inv.).
He did not note on said spaces why they were left blank. From August
2, 1977 to August 11, 1977, he left no less than eleven (11) spaces
blank between entries.
This is clear violation of Section 246 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which states:
"No blank line shall be left. between entries."
This practice would make easy the ante-dating of documents for the
convenience of the parties and of the Notary Public.
It is clear that the respondent has violated the oath he took as a
member of the Bar that has resulted in extreme delay, inconvenience
and damage to the complainants. There is no justification for this
violation and corresponding penalty is called therefor.

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings. The very first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that a "lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process". Moreover, Rule 138
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred by this Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of
our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent
clearly violated the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, more particularly
Section 246 thereof.
Then too, respondent has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he
shall not do any falsehood. Not only that, he has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court, nor shall be misled or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it involves public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are
not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the
court and administrative offices generally (Buensucero vs. Barrera, 216 SCRA 309 [1992]
Joson v. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 [1991]).
Respondent's act of falsely certifying that complainants Napoleon and Ricardo Gonzaga
personally appeared before him and acknowledged that the document was their free and
voluntary act and deed is reprehensible, constituting as it does, violation of law and gross
misconduct on his part.
However, since only one instance of unauthorized or false notarization is here involved,
the Court considers the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months as adequate and commensurate to the offense.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Crisanto P. Realubin from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months commencing upon receipt of this
Resolution. Copies of this Resolution shall be distributed to the courts and to the Bar
Confidant and shall be spread on the personal record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

Feliciano, Romero, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members
of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Criminal Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also
filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig,
Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached.
Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil
cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty.
Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to
file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them
followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by
complainant was levied upon.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases,
Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and
the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was
merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money
judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings
and recommendations:

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and

attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which
Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful
reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in
favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in
said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio
Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in
favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress
again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e.

representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate
the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her
husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand
on.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in

violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in

their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722
dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be
SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official
receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to
the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as
his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990,
under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with
the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of

Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it
was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining
to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty.
Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of
her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty
and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP
membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the
courts, as required by the Supreme Court.

Adm. Case No. 7252

[CBD 05-1434]

November 22, 2006

JOHNNY NG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M.

Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27, 2006 of the IBP Board of
Governors, to wit:

RESOLVED
to
ADOPT
and
APPROVE,
as
it
is
hereby
ADOPTED
and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents propensity to resort to
undeserved language and disrespectful stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case
similar misconduct is again committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose
Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for themselves
the evidence before them and not merely rely on their reviewers and on the word of
their ponente. If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty
on the part of the Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence.
Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.

A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng (complainant)
against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.

If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the Honorable
Commissioners of the First Division are doubly so and with malice thrown in. If the
workers indeed committed an illegal strike, how come their only "penalty" is removing
their tent? It is obvious that the Labor Arbiter and the Honorable Commissioners know
deep in their small hearts that there was no strike. This is the only reason for the
finding of "illegal strike". Without this finding, they have no basis to remove the
tent; they have to invent that basis.

Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while
respondent is the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision 2affirming the decision of the LA.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI), 3pertinent
portions of which read:

x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management" and its Annexes
has shown very clearly that the so called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol
opted to believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front
of the wall and closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate beside it. His
eyes, not the ingress and egress of the premises, are blocked by something so thick he
cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.

x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely
copied from the pleadings of respondents-appellees with very slight modifications. But
we cannot accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable individuals, that the
actual writer of the said decision is not at all connected with the NLRC First Division.

Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas, before,
the established rule was, in cases of money claims the employer had the burden of proof
of payment. Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a better name we should
call this new rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But only retirable commissioners are
authorized to apply this rule and only when the money claims involved are substantial.
When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.

x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in maintaining that the
separation pay should be only one half month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on
this not clear enough, or is there another reason known only to them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, First Division, it is
ignominious ignorance of the law on the part of the commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually resulted in prosperity
and not losses. xxxRespondents failed to prove their claim of losses. And the
Honorable Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see these glaring
facts.
x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per year of service
and all of it to the affected workers not to some people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of employers
xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of the First Division do not know this, they are
indeed irrelevant to real life.

x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that the sixteen
(16) claimants were already paid their service incentive leave pay. This finding is copied
verbatim from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress and
egress is a myth seem invisible to the impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He
needs more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as ponente [of] the
decision that he signed and caused his co-commissioners in the First Division to sign)
has shown great and irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance
of the law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should not be allowed to have anything to
do with the instant case any more. Commissioner Go and Chairman Seeres, by
negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC rules prohibit the inhibition
of the entire division, Chairman Seeres should remain in the instant case and appoint two
(2) other commissioners from another division to sit with him and pass final judgment in
the instant case.4 (Emphasis supplied)

In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent Alar contends that
the instant complaint only intends to harass him and to influence the result of the cases
between complainant and the workers in the different fora where they are pending; that
the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the
NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary matters for
litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides for adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in
cases before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply
to lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC
Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do
not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary; and that the labor lawyers who are
honestly and conscientiously practicing before the NLRC and get paid on a contingent basis
are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get cheated in their cases by
reason of corruption and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who make their
lives and the lives of their constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers for the
employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved. 5

been served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived as an excuse
for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their brother lawyers; the
complaint failed to mention that the only reason the number of complainants were
reduced is because of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of
them; their engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases; at no time
were they consulted regarding the tax concerns of their client and therefore were never
privy to the financial records of the latter; at no time did they give advice regarding their
client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at a disbarment case against them is
unwarranted, unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on his part.

Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union president Marilyn Batan

wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in several instances, such that while the labor case is pending
before the NLRC, respondents Paras and Cruz filed a new case against the laborers in the
Office of the City Engineer of Quezon City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus
splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC
which violates Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that although Ng signed the disbarment
complaint against Alar, respondents Parass and Cruzs office instigated the said complaint
which violates Canon 8; that Ng's company did not pay income tax for the year 2000
allegedly for non-operation due to fire and respondents consented to this act of the
employer which violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when the case started, there
were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the acts of the employer and the
respondents, the number of complainants were reduced to almost half which violates
Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02 and 19-03.6

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find any actionable misconduct
against Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint
against them be dismissed for lack of merit.

In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005, 7 respondents Paras and Cruz
alleged: At no time did they file multiple actions arising from the same cause of action or
brook interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs sought before
the CEO has nothing to do with the case pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the
nuisance and illegal structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant and unrelated to
the labor cases of complainant; the CEO was requested to investigate certain nuisance
structures located outside the employer's property, which consist of shanties, tents,
banners and other paraphernalia which hampered the free ingress to and egress out of the
employer's property and present clear and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer
found the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and MMDA ordinances; the pendency of a
labor case with the NLRC is completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or
not, did not validate or justify the construction of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO
proceeded to abate the nuisance structures pursuant to its power to protect life, property
and legal order; it was not their idea to file the disbarment complaint against respondent
Alar; they merely instructed their client on how to go about filing the case, after having

The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner
Patrick M. Velez for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using
improper and abusive language and recommended that respondent be suspended for a
period of not less than three months with a stern warning that more severe penalty will be
imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed.

Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors issued the
Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it
does not agree that respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.

The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack
of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does
not admit any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,8 the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts
and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous
attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the
Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law
and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and
trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,9 the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive
or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which
are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.10 A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful
as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.11 Submitting pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against the
NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being
judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code
of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla,12 the
Court held that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he
nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.13
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous
anger is unavailing. It does not deter the Court from exercising its supervisory authority
over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as
members of the Bar.14
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,15 thus:
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has
admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements,

disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts.

Resort by an attorney in a motion for reconsideration to words which may drag this
Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated
in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." It is in this context that we
must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this
Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him unbridled license in language. To be
sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling
the Courts attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the
effect of "harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." Stability of
judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is
but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really
bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction.
However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for
the proper place of courts in our system of government.16
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
His actions erode the publics perception of the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of
Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount
of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason
to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its
claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.1wphi1

At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office of the City Engineer
really partakes of a different cause of action, which has nothing to do with the NLRC case.
The decision was made by the city engineer. Respondents remedy should be to question
that decision, not bring it to this Commission which has no jurisdiction over it. We can not
substitute our judgment for the proper courts who should determine the propriety or
sagacity of the city engineers action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves of remedies available in
law provided; these acts do not exceed the bounds of decency. In supporting the action
against respondents conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the attorneys
duty as an officer of the court to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless
personal attack. This requires of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge to wild
and groundless accusation but also to discourage other people from so doing and to come
to his defense when he is so subjected. By the very nature of his position a judge lacks the
power, outside of his court, to defend himself against unfounded criticism and clamor and
it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the
judiciary and the incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing People v.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1
(1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957) Whether the disbarment
complaint was filed by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of great import, what is more
apropos would be the contents of the complaint and whether the same is sufficient to
consider disciplinary sanctions.
Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the respondent lawyers have
already stated that they were not engaged as counsels to take care of their clients tax
problems, then they cannot be held accountable for the same. If any wrongdoing has been
committed by complainant Ng, he should answer for that and those lawyers who were
responsible for such acts be held liable jointly. There is no showing [that] attorneys Paras
and Cruz were responsible for that tax fiasco.1wphi1
Finally, while it may be true that Batans group has been greatly diminished from about
100 claimants to less than half the number is not by itself an actionable misconduct.
Lawyers are duty bound to foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial
proceedings while a necessary part of the practice is not encouraged, because it will save
expenses and help unclogged [sic] the dockets. If the compromise is fair then there is no
reason to prevent the same. There is nothing in the counter-complaint which shows that
the compromise agreement and waivers executed appear to be unfair, hence no reason to
hold lawyers liable for the same. Besides, a "compromise is as often the better part of
justice as prudence the part of valor and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less
the clients champion in settlement out of court than he is the clients champion in the
battle in court." (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court, 5 (1958); cited in Agpalos Legal
Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is therefore respondent Alar[]s beef with the execution of
these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?

All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against Attorneys Paras and Cruz;
hence the dismissal of the counter-complaint against them is proper for absolute lack of
merit.17
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons 8
and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00
with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

executing a new contract and this mortgage shall have the same force
and effect as if the said promissory note or notes and/or
accommodations were existing on the date thereof. This mortgage
shall also stand as security for said obligations and any and all other
obligations of the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE of whatever kind
and nature, whether such obligations have been contracted before,
during or after the constitution of this mortgage. 1
In due time, the loan of P3,000,000.00 was paid by petitioner corporation. Subsequently,
in 1981, it obtained from respondent bank additional financial accommodations totalling
P2,700,000.00. 2 These borrowings were on due date also fully paid.

G.R. No. 103576 August 22, 1996

ACME SHOE, RUBBER & PLASTIC CORPORATION and CHUA PAC, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and REGIONAL SHERIFF OF
CALOOCAN CITY,respondents.

VITUG, J.:p
Would it be valid and effective to have a clause in a chattel mortgage that purports to
likewise extend its coverage to obligations yet to be contracted or incurred? This question
is the core issue in the instant petition for review oncertiorari.
Petitioner Chua Pac, the president and general manager of co-petitioner "Acme Shoe,
Rubber & Plastic Corporation," executed on 27 June 1978, for and in behalf of the
company, a chattel mortgage in favor of private respondent Producers Bank of the
Philippines. The mortgage stood by way of security for petitioner's corporate loan of three
million pesos (P3,000,000.00). A provision in the chattel mortgage agreement was to this
effect
(c) If the MORTGAGOR, his heirs, executors or administrators shall well
and truly perform the full obligation or obligations above-stated
according to the terms thereof, then this mortgage shall be null and
void. . . .
In case the MORTGAGOR executes subsequent promissory note or notes
either as a renewal of the former note, as an extension thereof, or as
a new loan, or is given any other kind of accommodations such as
overdrafts, letters of credit, acceptances and bills of exchange,
releases of import shipments on Trust Receipts, etc., this mortgage
shall also stand as security for the payment of the said promissory
note or notes and/or accommodations without the necessity of

On 10 and 11 January 1984, the bank yet again extended to petitioner corporation a loan
of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) covered by four promissory notes for P250,000.00
each. Due to financial constraints, the loan was not settled at maturity. 3 Respondent bank
thereupon applied for an extra judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, herein before
cited, with the Sheriff of Caloocan City, prompting petitioner corporation to forthwith file
an action for injunction, with damages and a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Civil Case No. C-12081). Ultimately, the
court dismissed the complaint and ordered the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. It
held petitioner corporation bound by the stipulations, aforequoted, of the chattel
mortgage.
Petitioner corporation appealed to the Court of Appeals 4 which, on 14 August 1991,
affirmed, "in all respects," the decision of the court a quo. The motion for reconsideration
was denied on 24 January 1992.
The instant petition interposed by petitioner corporation was initially dinied on 04 March
1992 by this Court for having been insufficient in form and substance. Private respondent
filed a motion to dismiss the petition while petitioner corporation filed a compliance and
an opposition to private respondent's motion to dismiss. The Court denied petitioner's first
motion for reconsideration but granted a second motion for reconsideration, thereby
reinstating the petition and requiring private respondent to comment thereon. 5
Except in criminal cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death is
imposed 6 which the Court so reviews as a matter of course, an appeal from judgments of
lower courts is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. The circulars of the
Court prescribing technical and other procedural requirements are meant to weed out
unmeritorious petitions that can unnecessarily clog the docket and needlessly consume
the time of the Court. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to
help secure, not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from the rigid enforcement of
the rules may thus be allowed to attain the prime objective for, after all, the dispensation
of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. In this instance, once again, the
Court is constrained to relax the rules in order to give way to and uphold the paramount
and overriding interest of justice.

Contracts of security are either personal or real. In contracts of personal security, such as
a guaranty or a suretyship, the faithful performance of the obligation by the principal
debt or is secured by the personalcommitment of another (the guarantor or surety). In
contracts of real security, such as a pledge, a mortgage or an antichresis, that fulfillment
is secured by an encumbrance of property in pledge, the placing of movable property in
the possession of the creditor; in chattel mortgage, by the execution of the corresponding
deed substantially in the form prescribed by law; in real estate mortgage, by the
execution of a public instrument encumbering the real property covered thereby; and
in antichresis, by a written instrument granting to the creditor the right to receive the
fruits of an immovable property with the obligation to apply such fruits to the payment of
interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit upon the essential
condition that if the obligation becomes due and the debtor defaults, then the property
encumbered can be alienated for the payment of the obligation, 7 but that should the
obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding from
the accessory character 8 of the agreement. As the law so puts it, once the obligation is
complied with, then the contract of security becomes, ipso facto, null and void. 9

involved, the only obligation specified in the chattel mortgage contract was the
P3,000,000.00 loan which petitioner corporation later fully paid. By virtue of
Section 3 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, the payment of the obligation
automatically rendered the chattel mortgage void or terminated. In Belgian
Catholic Missionaries, Inc., vs. Magallanes Press, Inc., et al., 14 the Court
said

While a pledge, real estate mortgage, or antichresis may exceptionally secure afterincurred obligations so long as these future debts are accurately described, 10 a chattel
mortgage, however, can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is
constituted. Although a promise expressed in a chattel mortgage to include debts that are
yet to be contracted can be a binding commitment that can be compelled upon, the
security itself, however, does not come into existence or arise until after a chattel
mortgage agreement covering the newly contracted debt is executed either by concluding
a fresh chattel mortgage or by amending the old contract conformably with the form
prescribed by the Chattel Mortgage Law. 11 Refusal on the part of the borrower to execute
the agreement so as to cover the after-incurred obligation can constitute an act of default
on the part of the borrower of the financing agreement whereon the promise is written
but, of course, the remedy of foreclosure can only cover the debts extant at the time of
constitution and during the life of the chattel mortgage sought to be foreclosed.

We find no merit in petitioner corporation's other prayer that the case should be
remanded to the trial court for a specific finding on the amount of damages it has
sustained "as a result of the unlawful action taken by respondent bank against it." 17 This
prayer is not reflected in its complaint which has merely asked for the amount of
P3,000,000.00 by way of moral damages. 18 In LBC Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 19 we
have said:

A chattel mortgage, as hereinbefore so intimated, must comply substantially

with the form prescribed by the Chattel Mortgage Law itself. One of the
requisites, under Section 5 thereof, is an affidavit of good faith. While it is not
doubted that if such an affidavit is not appended to the agreement, the chattel
mortgage would still be valid between the parties (not against third persons
acting in good faith 12), the fact, however, that the statute has provided that the
parties to the contract must execute an oath that
. . . (the) mortgage is made for the purpose of securing the obligation
specified in the conditions thereof, and for no other purpose, and that
the same is a just and valid obligation, and one not entered into for
the purpose of fraud. 13
makes it obvious that the debt referred to in the law is a current, not an
obligation that is yet merely contemplated. In the chattel mortgage here

. . . A mortgage that contains a stipulation in regard to future

advances in the credit will take effect only from the date the same
are made and not from the date of the mortgage. 15
The significance of the ruling to the instant problem would be that since the
1978 chattel mortgage had ceased to exist coincidentally with the full payment
of the P3,000,000.00 loan, 16 there no longer was any chattel mortgage that
could cover the new loans that were concluded thereafter.

Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering,

mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in
legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses;
therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish.
Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous
system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life all of
which cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person. 20
While Chua Pac is included in the case, the complaint, however, clearly states
that he has merely been so named as a party in representation of petitioner
corporation.
Petitioner corporation's counsel could be commended for his zeal in pursuing his client's
cause. It instead turned out to be, however, a source of disappointment for this Court to
read in petitioner's reply to private respondent's comment on the petition his so-called
"One Final Word;" viz:
In simply quoting in toto the patently erroneous decision of the trial
court, respondent Court of Appeals should be required to justify its
decision which completely disregarded the basic laws on obligations

and contracts, as well as the clear provisions of the Chattel Mortgage

Law and well-settled jurisprudence of this Honorable Court; that in
the event that its explanation is wholly unacceptable, this Honorable
Court should impose appropriate sanctions on the erring justices. This
is one positive step in ridding our courts of law of incompetent and
dishonest magistrates especially members of a superior court of
appellate jurisdiction. 21 (Emphasis supplied.)
The statement is not called for. The Court invites counsel's attention to the
admonition in Guerrero vs.Villamor; 22 thus:
(L)awyers . . . should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers
and . . . (to) insist on similar conduct by others." This respectful
attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance." And it is through a scrupulous preference
for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his
observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers . . . 23
The virtues of humility and of respect and concern for others must still live on
even in an age of materialism.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decisions of the appellate court and the lower court are set
aside without prejudice to the appropriate legal recourse by private respondent as may
still be warranted as an unsecured creditor. No costs.
Atty. Francisco R. Sotto, counsel for petitioners, is admonished to be circumspect in
dealing with the courts.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part. Bellosillo, J., ic on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses
WILFREDO and LORENA AGUIRRE, respondents.
RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, J.:
In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as
counsel for the petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt with
administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
considering:
. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did
not read the petition as borne out by the following statement:
". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this
Honorable Court had read the petition and the
annexes attached thereto and hold that the same
has "failed to sufficiently show that the
respondent Court had committed a grave abuse of
discretion
in
rendering
the
questioned
judgment". . .
which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering
further his use of intemperate language in the petition, as exemplified
by his characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as
having been "crafted in order to fool the winning party"; as a
"hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn
it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious character,"
although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the
prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his
charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused with that
confusion which is the natural product of having been born, nurtured
and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the nonpropertied class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent Judge, the Honorable
Severino O. Aguilar had not owned any real property until March 5,
1974 when his Honor was already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC
Judge; in one scale of the balance, a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses
from the Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall

of Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brand-new car,

impeccable attire, and dignified "mien"; and his charge that the
respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel in a
scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits
of their property for the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the
Order of 30 May 1994, by describing the respondent Judge as a "liar,"
"perjurer," or "blasphemer."
In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:
If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and
"blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and
blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that
the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a "robber" (Petition, pp. 13
bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26)
and "abetter" of graft and shady deals (Petition, p. 12 bottom, p. 13
top); On the other hand, if the undersigned called anybody "crosseyed," it must be because he is indeed cross-eyed particularly when
he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it must
be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and therefore stands in
dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully expose
incompetent and corrupt judges before this Honorable Supreme Court;
It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his pains, the
undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of being
dealt with administratively or otherwise.
and prays:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
prays of this Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from turning
the undersigned into a martyr to his principles.
Yet, he added the following:
WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING
LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).
It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be
dealt with administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at
all read the petition in this case before it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently
show that the respondent court had committed a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover,
while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief."
perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest of the
intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at

the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he

volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the
respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and
"cross-eyed."
Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following
reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not
read the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and
"blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the other intemperate words and phrases
enumerated in the resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure amounts to an
admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon
which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of
the harsh words and phrase to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court
did not at all read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross
disrespect to and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of
the First Division of the Court and put them to public contempt or ridicule; he, as well,
charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render justice, thereby creating
or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of
"encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining
the foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).
In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against
the respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the
petition and whose glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's
decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case for recovery of possession and
damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty.
Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge,
thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary, or
sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads as follows:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST
ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a
lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers"; and his duty under the first canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary

incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As
explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is
the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor."
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to conduct that
should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati vs. Albert, 57
Phil. 86, 92].
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should
give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board vs. Cloribel(31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." [People ex rel.
Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity
and the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration in the administration of
justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the courts a lawyer
should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial Ethics,
1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and

not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." [People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA
107 [1974]).
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he
cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an
officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, In Re: Almacen(31 SCRA 562, 579-580
[1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty
to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judge, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).
"Above all others, the members of the bar have
the best opportunity to become conversant with
the character and efficiency of out judges. No
class is less likely to abuse the privilege, or no
other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench." (State
Board of Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W. 212,
216).
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts
and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give
advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a
sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is

essential to the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the
assertion of their client's rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and
of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for
every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166
SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of
free spe ech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration justice. There is no antimony between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by
the general community.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra),
or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the
members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In
re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael
Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan,
68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA
391 [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers
Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295
[1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false
and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of the First Division,
and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious.
Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted.
Anger or hate could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby
he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his

own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views"
(Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When such anger or hate is coupled with
haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words in his
petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and
with seething sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . .
[him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL
APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more
can extenuate his liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional
Responsibility and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty. Jose B. Tiongco in this
Court.
Padilla, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 3736 November 16, 1995
CRAIG L. FORD, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ESCOLASTICO DAITOL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Escolastico Daitol seeks the reconsideration of IBP Resolution No. XI-95255 dated 18 February 1995 recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) month after he was found to have been remiss in the performance of his
duties as counsel of complainant Craig L. Ford.
Some time in 1987, complainant Ford engaged the legal services of respondent Daitol in
connection with Civil Case No. CEB-5552 filed by the former against the Philippine
Commercial International Bank ("PCIB") in the Regional Trial COurt ("RTC"), Branch XV of
Cebu City. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of complainant. PCIB thereupon
appealed said judgment to the Court of Appeals ("CA"). After PCIB had filed its appellant's
brief, the CA directed complainant to file his appellee's brief. Despite several inquiries by
complainant about the status of the brief and reminders from him to file the same,
respondent never filed the appellee's brief with the CA.
On 29 April 1991, complainant learned from respondent that the CA had issued a
resolution dated 4 March 1991 stating that the case had been submitted for decision
without the appellee's brief. Aggrieved by respondent's omission and apprehensive that
such failure might prejudice his case, complainant lodged a complaint dated 6 May 1991
against respondent before the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP"). Respondent did not file an answer to the complaint. The IBP-Cebu City Chapter
forwarded the case to the IBP office in Manila.
Complainant also filed a letter-complaint in the Court praying that disciplinary action be
taken against respondent. In his answer, respondent admitted that he was the counsel of
complainant in Civil Case No. CEB-5552 and that he had also entered his appearance as
such in the CA.. However, before he could finish the draft of the appellee's brief,
complainant allegedly terminated his services due to "various difficulties and
misunderstanding" between them. Complainant denied this allegation stating that he had

already advanced an amount of P600.00 as attorney's fees to respondent who had assured
him that he was preparing the appellee's brief.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 1992, the Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
During the hearings conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, respondent
did not show up and did not submit any explanation for his failure to file the appellee's
brief. Twice respondent moved to postpone the scheduled hearings claiming, inter alia,
lack of money for his trip to Manila. He moved to transfer the venue of the hearings to
Cebu City but the Commission denied the motion in its Order dated 22 September 1993
holding that there were no compelling reasons therefor and not all the parties agreed to
such transfer. In lieu of his personal appearance before the Commission, respondent was
directed to submit by mail his affidavit and to attach thereto his evidence to rebut the
charge of complainant. Respondent did not submit any such evidence. The Commission
then considered him to have waived his right to present evidence on his behalf.
The Commission found respondent to have been remiss in the performance of his duties as
counsel of complainant. Respondent was particularly faulted for his failure to secure a
written discharge from complainant before considering himself relieved of his duty to file
the appellee's brief. Accordingly, the Commission recommended to Board of Governors of
the IBP respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month. In
its Resolution No. XI-95-255 dated 18 February 1995, the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission.
The above resolution of the IBP as well as respondent's motion for reconsideration thereof
were forwarded to the Court for its final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, the recommended penalty being suspension from the practice of law.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent claims that the Report of the Investigating
Commissioner, which was made the basis of the IBP Resolution, was rendered ex-parte and
that he was not allowed to present evidence on his behalf. Respondent claims that he has
evidence to show that complainant had discharged him as counsel.
Respondent has no cause to complain since the Commission had given him ample
opportunity to submit his affidavit and supporting documents. The Order of the
Commission dated 22 September 1993 denying respondent's motion to change venue stated
that:
. . . It could be in the best interest of justice that IBP main office hold
a marathon hearing in Manila for one day for complainant and
respondent to present their witnesses and evidence, making it
worthwhile for both parties as to one trip. No postponements would
be allowed. Any absence would be deemed a waiver of right to
present evidence. If any of the parties cannot appear, they are

directed to mail their affidavits, evidence and certified true copies

which will be included as evidence.
On 23 February 1994, the Commission issued another Order stating that:
In order to give respondent an opportunity to present evidence, the
Commission hereby directs respondent within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this order to mail directly to the Commission any
documentary evidence to disprove the complaint with respect to the
following matters: a) that respondent, despite the fact that he
agreed, failed to file appellee's brief on behalf of Craig Ford with the
Court of Appeals; and b) respondent received money in the amount of
P600.00 for preparation of said brief.
The last opportunity for respondent to present evidence in his own
behalf whether personally, by deposition or by mailing certified true
copies of documentary exhibits shall be set for April 13, 1994 at 10:00
a.m. Should the respondent fail to appear, the case shall be
considered submitted for resolution.
Since respondent still failed to submit his evidence, if any, despite said Orders,
the Commission declared that he had waived his right to present evidence on his
behalf and regarded the case as submitted for resolution on the basis of
evidence already of record.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the court finds that the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law is proper. The Court agrees with the IBP that
respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for complainant. A
lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter's interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellee's brief on behalf of his
client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the
Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same
Code also states that:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
In In re: Santiago F. Marcos, 1 the Court considered a lawyer's failure to file brief for his
client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his
ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals,

114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part (People vs. Villar 46
SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in
the duty owed him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People
vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515) (Emphasis
supplied)
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or
merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 2
Having in mind the circumstances of this case and the existing case law of the Court, we
consider that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
month is not commensurate with the respondent's breach of duty and must be adjusted
upward. 3 In previous cases, the Court has imposed for a lawyer's failure to file a brief or
other pleading before an appellate court, suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months; 4 six (6) months; 5 and even disbarment in aggravated cases. 6
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Escolastico Daitol from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with a WARNING that repetition of the
same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with. Respondent is also DIRECTED to
return to complainant the amount of P600.00 which he had received as attorney's fees.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of
respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Romero, Melo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION

SPS. ISIDRO ABEL CRUZ* and

G.R. No. 138208

LEA CRUZ, Petitioners,

- versus SPS. FLORENCIO and AMPARO CARAOS, NATIVIDAD CARAOS,
SPS. MAXIMO and LUISA BANGONON, SPS. FEDERICO and
SUSAN GARCIA, SPS. ENRIQUE and AURORA LOPEZ, SPS.
BENJAMIN and VIOLETA PEPITO, SPS. DIOPANES and
JOSEFINA SUCGANG, SPS. JELMER and MARYRISH SUCGANG,
TERESITA MURCHANTE, LITA JOSE, BRENDA MAMARIL and
ROBERTO SU,

Promulgated:
April 23, 2007

Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

the cooperative had entered into a Contract of Sale with Bill Brothers, Inc., using the
funds of the cooperative which they were able to withdraw from the DBP.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners Sps. Isidro Cruz and Lea Cruz assail the Decision [1] dated 6 January 1999
and Resolution[2] dated 24 March 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41978,
which annulled and set aside the Order,[3] dated 28 June 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 118, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 96-0225, dismissing respondents
Complaint for Specific Performance, Declaration of Nullity of Contract and Damages.
The antecedents follow:
On
7
February
1996,
respondents
Sps. Florencio and Amparo Caraos, Natividad Caraos, Sps. Maximo and Luisa Bangonon,
Sps. Federico and Susan Garcia, Sps. Enrique and Aurora Lopez Garcia, Sps. Benjamin
and Violeta Pepito, Sps. Diopanes and Josefina Sucgang, Sps. Jelmer and Maryrish Sucgang,
Teresita Murchante, Lita Lopez, Brenda Mamaril, and Roberto Su filed with the RTC,
Branch 118, Pasay City, a Complaint [4] for Specific Performance, Declaration of Nullity of
Contract and Damages against petitioners, Sps. Isidro and Lea Cruz (petitioners). The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0225.
In their Complaint, respondent averred, inter alia: that the parties are
occupants
of
a
parcel
of
land
located
at
No.
95
Sporting
Club, P. Villanueva St., Pasay City (subject lot) which was then covered by TCT No. 5609,
and registered under the name of Bill Brothers, Inc. Sometime in December 1972,
petitioner Isidro Cruz (Isidro) initiated the formation of the Sporting Club Multi-purpose
Home/Merchandising Cooperative for the purpose of acquiring the lots where the houses
are built, and distributing the same among its members. He was likewise elected
president of the cooperative with respondents as members thereof. In the process, Isidro
required the members of the cooperative to contribute the amount of twenty pesos
(P20.00) daily for operational expenses, as well as the amount of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) each to serve as downpayment to Bill Brothers, Inc. in the acquisition of the
subject lot. Isidro collected the total amount of P131,981.45, which funds were deposited
in the name of the cooperative with the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP). On 12 September 1994, Isidro called a special meeting where he declared that a
resolution be passed authorizing the treasurer to withdraw the amount of P110,000.00 to
be used as downpayment in the purchase of the subject lot. During the meeting, it was
agreed upon that the subject lot should be distributed among themselves. On 11 October
1994, petitioners approached the members of the cooperative, asking them to affix their
signatures over their typewritten names on a blank piece of paper on the assurance that
the same will be used in securing a financing scheme in the payment of the lot to finance
the housing project of the cooperative. However, contrary thereto, the sheet of paper
containing respondents signatures was attached by the petitioners to a Contract of
Lease. It appears that the former, without the knowledge and consent of the members of

Respondents alleged further that on 17 October 1994, they received demand

letters from petitioners counsel, obliging them to pay rentals in arrears amounting
to P27,000.00 each and to vacate the subject lot. Respondents attempted to settle and
negotiate with the petitioners but the latter refused to cooperate. Instead, petitioners
filed a case for ejectment against respondents with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 47, Pasay City, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 173-95. Subsequently,
theLupong Tagapamayapa issued a Certification to File Action for failure of the parties to
settle the matters contested herein. Likewise, respondents filed a Criminal Complaint for
Estafa against petitioners for their deceit, fraud, and manipulation in obtaining the
subject lot, pending with the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 95-7724. Finally, respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to sell the subject
lot in favor of respondents on installment basis pursuant to the original intention of the
parties; that the Contract of Lease between the parties be declared null and void; that
petitioners be ordered to pay respondents moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
and other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
On 5 March 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 96-0225, RTC, Branch 118, PasayCity, on the ground of forum shopping. [5] In the
main, they asserted that Civil Case No. 96-0225 is but a reiteration of a previous
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-1387 filed by respondents against petitioners
with the RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City, for Specific Performance, Declaration of Nullity of
Contract and Damages, which involved identical issues which had been dismissed on 20
November 1995, by the RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City [6] on the ground of forum
shopping. The RTC, Branch 117, in Civil Case No. 95-1387, said that there is a pending
ejectment case between the parties before the MeTC, Branch 47, and also a pending case
between
the
parties
before
the Lupong Tagapagkasundo for
specific
performance. Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the case was
similarly denied.[7] In fine, petitioners asseverated that as respondents complaint in
Civil Case No. 95-1387 had long been dismissed, respondents Complaint in Civil Case No.
96-0225, containing the same allegations as in the former case must necessarily be
dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
Resolving petitioners Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 96-0225, the RTC
rendered an Order[8] dated 28 June 1996, granting the dismissal sought. The RTC
rationalized that even a mere perusal of the respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. 960225 and their Complaint against petitioners in Civil Case No. 95-1387 filed with the RTC,
Branch 117, Pasay City, would reveal that both pleadings contain similar allegations and
causes of action. It likewise ruled that there was forum shopping as the said Complaint
was filed apparently to obtain a favorable action for the respondents. [9] According to the
RTC:

A perusal of the records of this case, particularly the

present Complaint and Annex A of the [petitioners] [] Motion to
Dismiss which is another Complaint filed in Branch 117 presided by
Honorable Judge Leonardo M. Rivera, reveal that both contain similar
allegations and causes of action, as if two Complaints were filed one
after another, in two (2) courts.
The records also show that the Complaint filed in Branch 117
was dismissed on November 20, 1995 based on the courts finding of
forum-shopping and a motion for reconsideration filed by the
[respondents], dated November 28, 1995 was denied by the same
Court (Branch 117) in its ORDER, dated January 25, 1996.
The present Complaint dismissal of which is being sought is
dated February 5, 1996, or barely eleven (11) days after the denial of
the said Motion for Reconsideration, and was filed with this Court
on February 7, 1996.
Re: ground number one (1) of [respondents][] Opposition
[to the Motion to Dismiss]
A careful examination of the pleadings filed by both parties
reveal that the [respondents] allegations, arguments and evidence in
support of this ground are similar to those alleged and argued in the
motion for reconsideration, dated November 28, 1995 filed by the
[respondents] in Branch 117. As the latter had been denied by Branch
117 on January 25, 1996, with the filing of the present Complaint in
this court and then alleging the same ground in its opposition to
[petitioners] motion to dismiss, [respondents] has (sic) thereby
placed this court in a position wherein it would have to pass upon a
case which was taken cognizant (sic) of and in fact has been dismissed
by another court.
There is really forum-shopping here as the present
Complaint was filed apparently to obtain a favorable action in this
Court.
Moreover, it is improper for this Court to act, much less
reverse, the findings of Branch 117, a court of coordinate and
concurrent jurisdiction.[10]

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing considerations, this

case is, as it is, hereby DISMISSED.[11]
Aggrieved by the dismissal of their Complaint, respondents assailed the Order
of 28 June 1996 of the RTC via a Petition forCertiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the ruling of the court a quo.
According to the appellate court, the dismissal by the RTC, Branch 117, of
respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. 95-1387 did not bar the respondents from refiling
their claim before Branch 118 of the same court docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0225, [12]and
subject of the instant Petition. The Court of Appeals theorized that the dismissal by the
RTC, Branch 117, of Civil Case No. 95-1387 did not operate as an adjudication on the
merits. It held that even though hearings were conducted in the said case, the hearings
were solely for the purpose of resolving respondents application therein for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was merely an incident to the main action. Moreover, the
appellate court also held that respondents did not commit forum shopping in filing the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-0225 because the refiling of their action before the RTC,
Branch 118, is allowed under the Rules of Court. It held that the grant of a motion to
dismiss shall bar the refiling of the action only if the dismissal is based on Section 1 (f),
(h), and (i), Rule 16[13] of the Rules of Court, which grounds do not exist in the said
Complaint. It further held that the dismissal by the RTC, Branch 117, of the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 95-1387 was a dismissal without prejudice; hence, the refiling thereof in a
subsequent action was not barred.
The Court of Appeals explained in this wise, viz:
The petitioners could not be accused of forum-shopping
because the refiling of their action before the respondent court is
allowed under the Rules of Court. Evident it is from the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure that the grant of a motion to dismiss shall bar the
refiling of the action only if the dismissal is on certain specified
grounds. This is the clear import of Sections 1 and 5, Rule 16 of the
Rules, which respectively provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment
or by the statute of limitations;
xxxx

The RTC disposed:

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs

pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;

(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is

unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of
frauds; x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the right of
appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on
paragraphs (f), (h) and(i) of Section 1 hereof shall bar the
refiling of the same action or claim.
Given the fact that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387
by Branch 117 was not for any of the grounds mentioned in Section 5
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, We take it that the petitioners
cannot be prevented from prosecuting their claim anew. It matters
not that the new rules on procedure took effect only on July 1, 1997,
or after the assailed order was promulgated. In this connection,
familiar is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive
effect since there are no vested rights on rules of procedure (Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 627).
In any event, it must be recalled that even prior to the
amendment of the Rules on Civil Procedure, an order dismissing an
action is deemed to be without prejudice unless otherwise stated in
the order (See Section 2, Rule 17 of the old Rules of Civil
Procedure). A perusal of the order of Branch 117 dismissing Civil Case
No. 95-1387 contains no indication that the suit was being dismissed
with prejudice.[14]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision was denied by

the appellate court in the Order of 24 March 1999.
Hence, the instant Petition.
On 9 June 1999, this Court issued a Resolution [15] denying the Petition on the
ground that it lacks the affidavit and proof of service of a copy thereof on the Court of
Appeals. On 18 August 1999, this Court granted petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,
thus, reinstating the Petition.[16]
The crux of the instant controversy revolves on whether the filing of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-0225 with the RTC, Branch 118, constituted forum
shopping. Otherwise stated, we are confronted with the question of whether the refiling
by the respondents of their Complaint for Specific Performance, Declaration of Nullity of
Contracts and Damages with the RTC, Branch 118 (Civil Case No. 96-0225), which
Complaint was earlier dismissed by RTC, Branch 117 (Civil Case No. 95-1387), amounted to
forum shopping.

Forum shopping[17] is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or

order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.[18] It may also
be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. [19] The
established rule is that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of
actions, subject matter, and issues.[20] Forum shopping unnecessarily burdens our courts
with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources of the judiciary
and trifles with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby adversely affecting the efficient
administration of justice.[21] Forum shopping is contumacious, as well as an act of
malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusive of
their processes.[22] A violation of the rule against forum shopping warrants prosecution for
contempt of court and constitutes a ground for summary dismissal of the actions involved,
without prejudice to appropriate administrative action against the counsel. [23]
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[24] The
elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[25]
It is not controverted that the allegations of the respective complaints in
both Civil Case No. 95-1387 and Civil Case No. 96-0225 are similarly worded, and are
identical in all relevant details, including typographical errors, except for the additional
allegations in support of respondents prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction
in Civil Case No. 95-1387. It is similarly not disputed that both actions involve the same
transactions; same essential facts and circumstances; and raise identical causes of
actions, subject matter, and issues.
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the refiling by respondents of their
Complaint in Civil Case No. 95-1387 as Civil Case No. 96-0225 does not constitute forum
shopping because the grounds relied upon by the RTC, Branch 117, dismissing Civil Case
No. 95-1387 do not bar the refiling of the action. To recapitulate, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was not based on Section 1 (f), (h), and
(i) of Rule 16[26] of the Rules of Court, which grounds would have prevented the
respondents from prosecuting their suit anew.[27] It held that the dismissal was not an
adjudication on the merits that would have barred the refiling of the action. Moreover,
the appellate court reasoned that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was without
prejudice. It held that the Order dismissing Civil Case No. 95-1387 did not state therein
that the dismissal was with prejudice; hence, the same should be deemed
otherwise. Proceeding therefrom, the appellate court continued to rule that the parties
can so proceed to litigate the matter in a subsequent action.[28]

We agree. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was without

prejudice. Indeed, the Order dated 20 November 1995, dismissing Civil Case No. 951387 was an unqualified dismissal. More significantly, its dismissal was not based on
grounds under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 [29] of the Rules of Court,
[30]
which dismissal shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim as crystallized in
Section 5 of Rule 16 thereof, thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the right of appeal,
an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h), and
(i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim.

litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been
commenced.[34]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 6 January 1999 and
Resolution dated 24 March 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41978 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i)
of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court constitute res judicata, to wit:
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations;
xxxx
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has
been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable
under the provisions of the statute of frauds.

Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter
that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have
been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the
same parties and for the same cause.[31] Res judicata exists when the following elements
are present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered
judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) and there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[32]
The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 95-1387 does not constitute res
judicata to sufficiently bar the refiling thereof in Civil Case No. 96-0225. As earlier
underscored, the dismissal was one without prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment on
the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. [33] The dismissal of the case without
prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161368

April 5, 2010

MEDISERV, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former 13th Division) and LANDHEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,Respondents.

Aggrieved, Mediserv appealed5 the decision to the RTC of Manila docketed as Civil Case
No. 00-99395. On June 14, 2002 the RTC rendered a Decision, 6 the fallo of which reads:

DECISION

WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila,
dated October 26, 2000, is hereby reversed and set aside; and the Complaint for
Ejectment is hereby ordered to be dismissed.

estionably, tcentof directors. CT No. s consolidated in favor of Landheights and the

register of Deedseficiency whichon. No. toBefore the Court is a petition for certiorari to
nullify the September 16, 2003 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals reinstating the Petition
for Review of private respondent Landheights Development Corporation and the November
7, 2003 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

Further, on the Counterclaims, the plaintiff-appellee is hereby directed to pay the

defendant-appellant, the sum of Php 50,000.00 for actual damages and another sum of
Php 50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.

The facts are as follows:

SO ORDERED.

On September 20, 1994, petitioner Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate mortgage in favor
of China Banking Corporation as security for a loan. The mortgage was constituted on a
500-square meter lot with improvements located at 926 A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc,
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205824 of the Registry of
Deeds for the City of Manila. Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank and the
real estate mortgage was foreclosed. At the public auction sale, private respondent
Landheights Development Corporation emerged as the highest bidder with a bid price
of P17,617,960.00 for the subject property.

On September 16, 2002, Landheights motion for reconsideration 7 was likewise denied.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Sometime in April 1998, Landheights filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila an
"Application for Possession of Real Estate Property Purchased at an Auction Sale under Act
No. 3135."3 On September 21, 1999, the title of the property was consolidated in favor of
Landheights and the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila issued TCT No. 242202 in its
favor. On March 13, 2000, Landheights, seeking to recover possession of the subject
property, filed a verified complaint for ejectment against Mediserv before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
166637.
4

On October 12, 2000, the MeTC of Manila, Branch 15, rendered a decision in favor of
Landheights, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under said entity
to VACATE the premises situated at 926 A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and to PAY
plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.

With costs against plaintiff-appellee.

Accordingly, Landheights filed a Petition for Review 9 with the Court of Appeals, which
however dismissed the petition in a Resolution10 dated December 12, 2002, to wit:
It appearing that the written authority of Dickson Tan to sign the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping, as well as the copies of the complaint and answer,
are not attached to the petition, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Landheights seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration 11 on December 26, 2002 and
subsequently submitted a Secretarys Certificate 12 dated January 13, 2003 executed by its
Corporate Secretary, Ms. Polly S. Tiu, stating that the Board of Directors affirms the
authority of Mr. Dickson Tan to file the Petition for Review.
On March 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 13 granting Landheights a new
period of ten (10) days within which to correct and rectify the deficiencies in the petition.
On April 1, 2003, Mediserv filed a motion for reconsideration 14 praying that the March 19,
2003 Resolution be set aside and the December 12, 2002 Resolution, which dismissed the
petition, be reinstated. On even date, Landheights filed its Manifestation of Compliance. 15
On September 16, 2003, the appellate court issued the first assailed resolution reinstating
the petition for review, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
With the subsequent compliance of the petitioner with the requirement of the rules and in
the interest of substantial justice, We now consider the petition reinstated.

Respondent is hereby directed to file its comment on the petition within ten (10) days
from notice and petitioner may file its reply within five (5) days from receipt of the
comment.
SO ORDERED.
Mediserv filed a motion for reconsideration 16 on October 3, 2003, while Landheights filed
its comment17 thereto on October 14, 2003.
On November 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed resolution, the
significant portion of which states:
However, again, in the interest of justice, we shall consider the belatedly filed Secretarys
Certificate as a subsequent compliance of our March 19, 2003 Resolution.
WHEREFORE, this Courts Resolution dated September 16, 2003 is hereby REITERATED. The
petition is herebyREINSTATED and the respondent is directed to file its Comment on the
petition within ten (10) days from notice.

We are not persuaded.

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitions for certiorarimust be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of nonforum shopping.19 A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge
or based on authentic records.20 The party need not sign the verification. A partys
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged
in the pleading may sign the verification.21
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by
the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.22

SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, petitioner is
now before us via the present recourse. Petitioner faults the appellate court as follows:
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT AND/ OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REINSTATING THE PETITION DESPITE THE CLEAR MANDATE
OF THE RULES AS WELL AS THE JURISPRUDENCE AS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT
CALLING FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE SAID PETITION.18
Petitioner argues that from the beginning, the Court of Appeals found the petition filed
before it to be defective for failure to comply with the rules. It points out that there is no
showing that the respondent corporation, through its board of directors, had authorized
Mr. Dickson Tan to file the petition for review in its behalf and to sign the verification and
certification against forum-shopping. However, instead of upholding the dismissal of the
petition, the Court of Appeals allowed private respondent to rectify its deficiency, which
is contrary to jurisprudence.
Petitioner also cites Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which provides that failure to comply with the requirements on certification against forum
shopping shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the case. Petitioner thus asserts that the
appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in reinstating the petition for review filed by respondent corporation.

The requirement that a petitioner or principal party should sign the certificate of nonforum shopping applies even to corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of
the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons. 23 A
corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly
authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or
by a specific act of the board of directors.24
In the case of Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals,25 the certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by the petitioner corporations counsel; hence, the appellate court
dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 2891, as amended.26 Petitioner corporations motion for reconsideration was denied by the
appellate court "absent any compelling reason for petitioners failure to comply, at the
first instance, with [the circular] ...." On appeal, this Court denied the petition in this
wise:
In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have the certification
against forum shopping signed by one of its officers. Neither has it shown any compelling
reason for us to disregard strict compliance with the rules. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,28 petitioner Shipside Incorporated filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was, however,
dismissed for failure to attach proof that the one (1) who signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, its Manager Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was authorized to
institute the petition in petitioners behalf. Shipside Incorporated filed a motion for

reconsideration to which it attached a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that
ten (10) days before the filing of the petition, its board of directors authorized Balbin, Jr.
to file it. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, so the petitioner
sought relief from this Court. In granting the petition, this Court explained:
It is undisputed that on October 21, 1999, the time petitioners Resident Manager Balbin
filed the petition, there was no proof attached thereto that Balbin was authorized to sign
the verification and non-forum shopping certification therein, as a consequence of which
the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However,subsequent to such dismissal,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching to said motion a certificate issued
by its board secretary stating that on October 11, 1999, or ten days prior to the filing of
the petition, Balbin had been authorized by petitioners board of directors to file said
petition.
The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading
is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v. LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA
419). Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, noncompliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not
curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the
required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification
against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule
applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a
corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a
petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated
filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the
Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election
protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. InRoadway Express, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification
14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. LandBank, supra, the Court had
dismissed Uys petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum
shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to
admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there
were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the
rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.

In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be considered special
circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to
the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, inLoyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court
excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner
herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping , failing only to show proof that
the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a
secretarys certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of
petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally
and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forumshopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of procedure
should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent
ideal.29 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Unquestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold that Landheights has
substantially complied with the verification and certification requirements. We have held
in a catena of cases30 with similar factual circumstances that there is substantial
compliance with the Rules of Court when there is a belated submission or filing of the
secretarys certificate through a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.1avvphi1
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,31 this Court acknowledged that it has relaxed,
under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of these certifications
and has applied the rule of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances with
respect to the contents of the certification. It also conceded that if this Court has allowed
the belated filing of the certification against forum shopping for compelling reasons in
previous rulings, with more reason should it sanction the timely submission of such
certification though the proof of the signatorys authority was submitted thereafter.
The Court is aware of the necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing
petitions for certiorari as this is required under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section
3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. When the petitioner is a
corporation, the certification should obviously be executed by a natural person to whom
the power to execute such certification has been validly conferred by the corporate board
of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Generally, the petition is subject
to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys
authority.32
However, we must make a distinction between non-compliance with the requirements for
certificate of non-forum shopping and verification and substantial compliance with the
requirements as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court has allowed the belated filing of
the certification on the justification that such act constitutes substantial compliance.

In Roadway Express, Inc. v. CA,33 the Court allowed the filing of the certification fourteen
(14) days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,34 the
Court reinstated a petition on the ground of substantial compliance even though the
verification and certification were submitted only after the petition had already been
originally dismissed. In Havtor Management Phils. Inc. v. NLRC,35 we acknowledged
substantial compliance when the lacking secretarys certificate was submitted by the
petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of the
original decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such requirement.
In the present case, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of Mr. Dickson Tans
authority to sign the verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when
the required document was subsequently submitted to the Court of Appeals. The
admission of these documents, and consequently, the reinstatement of the petition itself,
is in line with the cases we have cited. In such circumstances, we deem it more in accord
with substantive justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113591 February 6, 1995

AGUIDO LACSON, JR., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., respondents.

It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there
may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same
does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice. 36
Finally, we note that the instant petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which requires the existence of grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.37 No such grave abuse of discretion exists in this case to
warrant issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The September 16, 2003 and November 7, 2003
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is
hereby DIRECTED to take appropriate action thereon in light of the foregoing discussion
with DISPATCH.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the resolution of 13 July 1994, this Court (a) denied with finality the motion to
reconsider the resolution of 11 May 1994 which denied the instant petition for the failure
of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent court committed any reversible
error in rendering the challenged decision, and (b) directed the counsel for the
petitioners, Atty. Mario G. Fortes, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court and declared liable for misconduct for his "apparently malicious and unfounded
accusation that this Court did not read the petition and for craftily suppressing from the
body of the petition the final decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465.
In his compliance dated 6 August 1994, Atty. Fortes admitted the charge but tried to
explain that:
2 This is the first time that counsel filed a petition of this kind and
nature. The latest resolution has greatly enlightened counsel and
broaden its (sic) outlook on the kind and nature of a petition that
counsel might file in the future.
and justified his outbursts and offered his apology thus:
6 In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, considering
counsel was only motivated with his enthusiasm to protect the
interest if his clients, verily those statements were made without

malice. Counsel was grateful to the Highest Tribunal for its

enlightening Resolution. It is with deep regret that this things
happened. Counsel sincerely offers his apologies for the wrong done to
the Supreme Court. Counsel assures this Honorable Court that this
incident will not be repeated. Counsel also promises to be more
discreet in his statements in his pleadings.
In the resolution of 12 September 1994, the Court required Atty. Fortes to manifest
whether he was willing to submit the matter on the basis of the pleadings already filed.
He asserted in the affirmative in a manifestation dated 15 October 1994.
The contempt aspect of this case arose from the motion for reconsideration of 6 June
1994 which Atty. Fortes filed. He sought therein the reconsideration of the resolution of 11
May 1994 which he denied the instant petition. He contends that "the petition was denied
wholly on the basis of technicality"; that the "denial did not consider the fraud sought to
be stopped"; and that in peremptorily denying the petition, this Court disregarded the
purpose of judicial proceedings, i.e., "to seek the truth," even as it is "unusual that the
Resolution failed on this aspect," and upheld" the fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the
Tuazons." He further stated therein that:
[i]t pained the petitioners and their counsel to surmise that nobody
cared to read the Petition. If they did they refused to understand the
arguments in order not to blur the preconceived resolution of this
case.
In the aforementioned resolution of 13 July 1994, this Court said:
While the motion could be easily treated as mere scrap of paper for
lack of proof of proper service thereof on the adverse parties, in view
of the aforesaid charges, however, this Court chose to take action
thereon.
The petition was not dismissed on the basis of technicality and it is
completely untrue that it was not read by the Court. The petition,
including its annexes, was carefully read, and this Court took pains to
consider the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced therein. It
reached the conclusion that the petitioners have failed to sufficiently
show that the respondent Court had committed any reversible error in
rendering the challenged decision. The petitioners' counsel should
know, or ought to know, the nature, character, and scope of a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He should have,
moreover, been candid enough in the petition for review to disclose in
its body the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 30319, which is the subject of
the instant petition, is actually a petition to annul the same decision
of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 81736 which petitioner Aguido Lacson, Jr. appealed

to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11465 and which the latter
(Thirteenth Division) affirmed in toto in its decision of 11 November
1992. This decision became final on 27 November 1992. Entry of
judgment was then made on 11 January 1993 [Rollo, 23]. In Criminal
Case No. 81736, petitioner Aguido Lacson, Jr., was found guilty of the
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00; however, his wife, Loreta
Quitalig, now his co-petitioner, and two other accused were
acquitted. We gathered these facts only from Annex "A" of the instant
petition, which is the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
(Fourteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 30319, wherein the Court of
Appeals stated:
One Last point. It bears reiterating that the
decision in Criminal Case No. 81736, which
petitioners sought to annul, is the very same
decision which was affirmed in toto by this Court,
through its Thirteenth Division, on November 11,
1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465. Therefore, this
Division, the Fourteenth Division, to which the
instant petition was raffled, is in no position to
nullify a final judgment issued by a co-equal and
coordinate Division, the former Thirteenth
Division. On this ground alone, the petitioner must
fail. (Rollo, 28).
The suppression of the antecedents must have been deliberate since
counsel for the petitioners must have known that a voluntary
disclosure thereof in the body of the instant petition would be fatal to
the petitioner's cause.
This Court further observed that petitioner Loreta Quitalig, having not
joined, for obvious reason, the appeal therefrom by her husband, was
not a party in CA-G. R. CR No. 11465. Clearly then, she could not join
her husband to challenge the said decision in this case.
Finally, the instant petition concentrates its fire on the alleged fake
PCT No. 730. unfortunately, CA-G. R. SP No. 30319 is hardly the proper
remedy to nullify it. Counsel for petitioners should know, or ought to
know, what the proper remedy is.
Indisputably then, Atty. Fortes' assertions in the motion for reconsideration that the
petition was denied wholly on technically; that the Court's peremptory denial disregarded
the purpose of judicial proceedings, which is to seek the truth; that the Court upheld the
fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the Tuazons; and, worse, that the Members of the Court
did not read the petition or that if they did, they simply refused to understand the

arguments "in order not to blur [their] preconceived resolution of this case," are patently
unfounded and malicious. His sole purpose was to show and prove his clients that he was
all the time correct and this Court dismally wrong not only for veering away from the true
purpose of judicial proceedings and suppressing the truth and upholding and illegal title,
but, worse, for not even reading the petition or if it did, for not understanding it in order
to hide its prejudgment of the case. In so doing upon a matrix of false and unfounded
premises, Atty. Fortes did an immeasurable disservice to this Court by putting it into
dishonor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminishing public confidence or promoting
distrust in the Court, and assailing the integrity of its Members and even charging them
without violating their duty to render justice.
Thus, Atty. Fortes deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself
as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to
the courts and his duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers (Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court; Canon 11, Code of Professional
Responsibility), observe candor, fairness and good faith to the courts (Canon 10, Code of
Professional Responsibility), and to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance (Canon 1, Canons of Professional Ethics).
In Salcedo vs. Hernandez (61 Phil. 724, 728-729 [1935]), this Court had already the
occasion to state:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher,
80 Ohio St. rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither
created nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which,
in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The
reason for this is that respect of the courts require respect. The
reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantee the stability of
their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.

and in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), this Court
said:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, not to promote distrusts in the administration of justice. Faith
in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to
the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it had been
said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice. (citations omitted)
His explanation that this is the first petition he has filed with this Court and his
justification that he was only motivated by his enthusiasm to protect the interests of his
clients are unacceptable. On the contrary, if this was indeed the first petition he has filed
with this Court, he should have striven for the best and demonstrated utmost candor to
and respect for the Court. Instead, he tried to hide the futility of his clients cause by
suppressing vital facts in the petition. As to his enthusiasm to protect his clients' interest ,
he should be reminded of what this Court had said in Surigao Mineral reservation Board:
A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between
liberty and license. lawyers must always keep in perspective the
though that [s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients as many
suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their client's
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics' [5 Martin, Rules of Court in
the Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 69, citing In re Kelly, 243 F. 696, 706].
WHEREFORE, for his violations of his oath of office, Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, ATTY.
MARIO G. FORTES is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of Two Thousand Pesos(P2,000.00) and
WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the records of Atty. Mario G. Fortes in this
Court.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.