Aquino v.

Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, September 17, 1974En Banc (

all Justices wrote their opinion
)
Petitioners are: Ninoy, Mitra,
F. Rordrigo, N. Rama, J. Roces, Locsin, Fadul, Galang,Go Eng Guan,
Maximo Soliven, Constantino, Luis Mauricio, Jose Diokno and wife,Carmen,
Voltaire Garcia (case were withdrawn bec. Petitioner died), Yuyitung, TanChin
Hian, Doronila, Mercado, Abaya, Granada, Beltran, Bren Guiao,
Cusipag,Ordonez, Almario, Baun, Guiao and T. Guiao (also died) and
Rondon.Respondents are: Enrile as Sec. Natl Defense, Espino as Chief of
Staff AFP, Ramosas Chief, Phil. Constabulary
FACTS
According to Chief Justice Makalintal:These nine cases are all about the
petitions for
habeas corpus
, the petitioners havingbeen arrested and detained unlawfully by the military
by virtue of Proclamation no.1081 dated September 21, 1972 through the
President exercising his powers heassumed by virtue of Martial Law.The
petitioners were arrested pursuant to Gen. Order no 2 for being participants
orfor having giving aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and
state powerin the country and to take over the Government by force
(September 22, 1972).The provision of the 1935 constitution reads
the President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces in the Philippines and, whenever
it becomes necessary, hemay call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion,insurrection or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Art VII Section
10(2)
Accdg to Castro, J.:On Sept 21 1972, the country was placed under Martial
Law. From Sept 22 to 30,petitioners were arrested by the military authorities
and detained, some at FortBonifacio, Rizal, Camp Aguinaldo and Camp
Crame. They aver that the arrest anddetention were illegal having been
effected without valid order of a court of justice.Writ of habeas corpus were
directed by the Court directing respondents to producethe bodies of
the petitioners in Court. Respondents, through the Solicitor
General,answered that such arrests were legally ordered by the President
pursuant toProclamation of Martial Law as participant or as having giving
aid and comfort in theconspiracy to seize political and state power and to
take the government by force. Hearings were held on 26 and 29 September
and October 6. Meanwhile, some of thepetitioners, with leave of Court,
withdrew their petitions, others were released fromcustody under certain

restrictive conditions. Voltaire died after his release, the actionwas deemed
abated.Only Diokno AND Benigno Aquino was still in military custody
(September 9, 1972the date of the supposed promulgation of the nine
cases.) On September 11 1972,the petitioner Diokno was released.
Eleven members voted to dismiss Dioknos

Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the
arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer
contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos
declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case
at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear
and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
Presidents order.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR.,
RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO
ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35538 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES,
TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALINA GALANG, GO ENG GUAN,
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-35539 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I.
DIOKNO, *1 petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. respondents.
G.R. No. L-35540 September 17, 1974
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO
TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35547 September 17, 1974 *2
ENRIQUE
VOLTAIRE
GARCIA
II, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35556 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND
TAN
CHIN
HIAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35567 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA JUAN L.
MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN,
BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE

BAUN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO
ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35571 September 17, 1974. *3
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M.
GUIAO, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES: AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35573 September 17, 1974
ERNESTO
RONDON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA, respondents.

Accepting your flaws makes you confident and beautiful.

DECISION
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained
by the military by virtue of the Presidents Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.
At the outset a word of clarification is in order. This is not the decision of the Court in the sense that a
decision represents a consensus of the required majority of its members not only on the judgment
itself but also on the rationalization of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. On the final result
the vote is practically unanimous; this is a statement of my individual opinion as well as a summary
of the voting on the major issues. Why no particular Justice has been designated to write just one
opinion for the entire Court will presently be explained.
At one point during our deliberations on these cases it was suggested that as Chief Justice I should
write that opinion. The impracticability of the suggestion shortly became apparent for a number of
reasons, only two of which need be mentioned. First, the discussions, as they began to touch on
particular issues, revealed a lack of agreement among the Justices as to whether some of those
issues should be taken up although it was not necessary to do so, they being merely convenient for

the purpose of ventilating vexing questions of public interest, or whether the decision should be
limited to those issues which are really material and decisive in these cases. Similarly, there was no
agreement as to the manner the issues should be treated and developed. The same destination
would be reached, so to speak, but through different routes and by means of different vehicles of
approach. The writing of separate opinions by individual Justices was thus unavoidable, and
understandably so for still another reason, namely, that although little overt reference to it was made
at the time, the future verdict of history was very much a factor in the thinking of the members, no
other case of such transcendental significance to the life of the nation having before confronted this
Court. Second and this to me was the insuperable obstacle I was and am of the opinion, which
was shared by six other Justices at the time the question was voted upon, that petitioner Jose W.
Dioknos motion of December 28, 1973 to withdraw his petition (G.R. No. L-35539) should be
granted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the ruling of the Court on each of the
arguments raised by him, except indirectly, insofar as they had been raised likewise in the other
cases.
1

It should be explained at this point that when the Court voted on Dioknos motion to withdraw his
petition he was still under detention without charges, and continued to remain so up to the time the
separate opinions of the individual Justices were put in final form preparatory to their promulgation
on September 12, which was the last day of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court. Before they could
be promulgated, however, a major development supervened: petitioner Diokno was released by the
President in the morning of September 11, 1974. In view thereof all the members of this Court
except Justice Castro agreed to dismiss Dioknos petition on the ground that it had become moot,
with those who originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an additional
ground for such dismissal.
2

The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either have been
permitted to withdraw their petitions or have been released from detention subject to certain
restrictions. In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of
firearms were lodged against him with a Military Commission on August 11, 1973; and on the
following August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as his continued
detention by virtue of those charges in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in this Court (G.R.
No.
L-37364). The question came up as to whether or not Aquinos petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed on the ground that the case as to him should more appropriately be resolved in this new
petition. Of the twelve Justices, however, eight voted against such dismissal and chose to consider
the case on the merits.
3

On Dioknos motion to withdraw his petition I voted in favor of granting it for two reasons. In the first
place such withdrawal would not emasculate the decisive and fundamental issues of public interest
that demanded to be resolved, for they were also raised in the other cases which still remained
pending. Secondly, since it was this petitioners personal liberty that was at stake, I believed he had
the right to renounce the application for habeas corpus he initiated. Even if that right were not
absolute I still would respect his choice to remove the case from this Courts cognizance, regardless
of the fact that I disagreed with many of his reasons for so doing. I could not escape a sense of irony
in this Courts turning down the plea to withdraw on the ground, so he alleges among others, that
this is no longer the Court to which he originally applied for relief because its members have taken

new oaths of office under the 1973 Constitution, and then ruling adversely to him on the merits of his
petition.
It is true that some of the statements in the motion are an affront to the dignity of this Court and
therefore should not be allowed to pass unanswered. Any answer, however, would not be foreclosed
by allowing the withdrawal. For my part, since most of those statements are of a subjective
character, being matters of personal belief and opinion, I see no point in refuting them in these
cases. Indeed my impression is that they were beamed less at this Court than at the world outside
and designed to make political capital of his personal situation, as the publicity given to them by
some segments of the foreign press and by local underground propaganda news sheets
subsequently confirmed. It was in fact from that perspective that I deemed it proper to respond in
kind, that is, from a non-judicial forum, in an address I delivered on February 19, 1974 before the
LAWASIA, the Philippine Bar Association and the Philippine Lawyers Association. Justice
Teehankee, it may be stated, is of the opinion that a simple majority of seven votes out of twelve is
legally sufficient to make the withdrawal of Dioknos petition effective, on the theory that the
requirement of a majority of eight votes applies only to a decision on the merits.
In any event, as it turned out, after petitioner Diokno was released by the President on September 11
all the members of this Court except Justice Castro were agreed that his petition had become moot
and therefore should no longer be considered on the merits. This notwithstanding, some of the
opinions of the individual members, particularly Justices Castro and Teehankee, should be taken in
the time setting in which they were prepared, that is, before the order for the release of Diokno was
issued.
The Cases.
The events which form the background of these nine petitions are related, either briefly or in great
detail, in the separate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitioners were arrested and
held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), for being participants
or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country
and to take over the Government by force
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law.
The portions of the proclamation immediately in point read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place
the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and
offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order,
crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and
insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in
orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of
any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction
shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated
representative.
The provision of the 1935 Constitution referred to in the proclamation reads: the President shall be
commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law.
1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the validity of
Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the
exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or
justiciable in character?
Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question is political and
therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons are given at length in
the separate opinions they have respectively signed. Justice Fernandez adds that as a member of
the Convention that drafted the 1973 Constitution he believes that the Convention put
an imprimatur on the proposition that the validity of a martial law proclamation and its continuation is
political and non-justiciable in character.
Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per se beyond the
Courts jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and allembracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain
from interfering with the Executives Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which
the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. But the Court should act, Justice Barredo
opines, when its abstention from acting would result in manifest and palpable transgression of the
Constitution proven by facts of judicial notice, no reception of evidence being contemplated for
purposes of such judicial action.
It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in those opinions involves
disparate methods of approach. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the
existence of the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts.
He disagrees vehemently with the ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971,
and advocates a return to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905), and Montenegro vs. Castaeda, 91
Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that Lansang need not be overturned, indeed
does not control in these cases. He draws a distinction between the power of the President to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Lansang, and his power to

proclaim martial law, calling attention to the fact that while the Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of
the privilege except in the instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification
with respect to the declaration of martial law.
Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there is no
dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the
factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare
martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided
to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.
Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muoz Palma.
They hold that the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court,
and would thus apply the principle laid down in Lansang although that case refers to the power of
the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability
accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly distinguished from
the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining merely
whether he (the President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. The test is not whether the
Presidents decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.
Applying this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the
Presidents proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in
that finding. The factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, had not
disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly
demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee merely refrained
from discussing it.
Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of justiciability is of
not much more than academic interest for purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not unduly
exercised by Americas decisions on the subject written in another age and political clime, or by
theories of foreign authors in political science. The present state of martial law in the Philippines is
peculiarly Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.
In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence as in
an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance
not only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and
events recited in detail in the different Whereases of the proclamation are of common knowledge.
The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go on in
several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon,
and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the
sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of
armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes
subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is
no actual fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in
whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and
material, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence all these are part of the

rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be
counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.
Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their
opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the
transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that all proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be
part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the
ratification of this Constitution To be sure, there is an attempt in these cases to resuscitate the
issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All that, however, is behind us now. The question has
been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March
31, 1973), and of course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in
our relations with other countries.
On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muoz Palma withholds her assent to any sweeping
statement that the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all such proclamations,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President. All that
she concedes is that the transitory provision merely gives them the imprimatur of a law but not of a
constitutional mandate, and as such therefore are subject to judicial review when proper under the
Constitution.
Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the
present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial
law has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 2728, 1973. The question propounded to the voters was: Under the (1973) Constitution, the President,
if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue
beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law? The overwhelming majority of
those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the
proposal. The question was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the
Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the
exercise of that power by the President in the beginning whether or not purely political and
therefore non-justiciable this Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the
sovereign.
2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn
their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions, the ruling of the Court is that the
petitions should be dismissed. The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to
the situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of
rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of the Justices who consider
Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released
detainees conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of
the proclamation. Justice Fernando, however, is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of
petitioner Rodrigo and others similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from the ruling of the
majority; while Justice Teehankee believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of
physical liberty within the meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
5

It need only be added that, to my mind, implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said
privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence.
On this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the
privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically unanimous. Justice
Fernando, however, says that to him that is still an open question; and Justice Muoz Palma
qualifiedly dissents from the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she discusses
therein votes for the dismissal of the petitions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE MEMBERS OF
THE COURT IN THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED
DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS, EXCEPT THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY
WITHDRAWN BY THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS
HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.