Sociological Theory From the Chicago Dominance to 1965

Author(s): Lewis A. Coser

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 2 (1976), pp. 145-160
Published by: Annual Reviews
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
FROM THE CHICAGO
DOMINANCE TO 1965

*:10523

LewisA. Coser
Departmentof Sociology,State University
of New York at StonyBrook,
StonyBrook,New York 11794

INTRODUCTION
WereI to takethetitleofthisessayliterally,
it wouldtakean amountofspace that
theeditorwouldsurelynotcondone.Much,thoughalas notall, sociologicalwriting
in theperiodunderconsideration
involvedsome effort
at theoreticalanalysis.Raw
empiricism,
thoughstillbeingpracticed,was clearlyin retreat.UnderthecircumstancesI was forcedto imposeon myself
a self-denying
ordinancebydiscussingonly
those developmentsthat aimed self-consciously
to erecttheoreticalstructuresof
generalscope whichhopefullywould provideguidelinesforlargevarietiesof concretesociologicalinvestigations.
This essay hence has nothingto say about, for
ofdemographictheoryor abouttheeffloresexample,theimpressive
developments
cenceoftheoreticalthoughtin urbansociology,butlimitsitselfto thosetheoretical
overand beyondany
trendsthatstriketheobserveras havinggeneralsignificance
specializedfieldof inquirywithinsociology.
This is not the place to indulgein yetanothereffort
at explicatingthe relations
betweensociologicaltheoryand sociologicalresearch.I was impressedbytheenormous amountof good sociologicalresearchthatwas producedduringthe period
underconsideration,
eventhoughI was sometimesquitesaddenedto discoverhow
muchresearcheffort
has failedto withstandthetestof time.Most of the valuable
researchwas informed
bytheoretical
notionsofone sortor another,and largelyfor
thatreasoncontributed
to thecumulationof sociologicalknowledge.That noneof
thisis discussedherestemsfromthelimitations
alluded to earlierand is definitely
not meantto indicateany kindof preference
fortheoryover research.
Since variousvarietiesof functionalism
took prideof place duringmostof the
Social
periodcoveredhere,a largepartofthisessayis devotedto theirconsideration.
are also
interactionism,
exchangetheory,conflicttheory,and relateddevelopments
discussedin some detailin the second partof thisessay. There will inevitablybe
145

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some complaintsthatI have failedto includethisor thattheoreticaldevelopment

important
byone or anotherofmyreaders.I can onlyreplythat
judgedparticularly
in checkso as to be
I have attemptedin mychoicesto keep personalpredilections
able to depictwhatI believeto be the generalconsensusabout therelativeimportance of sociologicaltheoriesthatcame to the forein the periodunderreview.
THE RISE AND HEGEMONY

OF FUNCTIONALISM

or structurThe majorpartofthisessaydeals withtheemergenceoffunctionalism,

al-functional
theory,in Americansociology.LargelyfollowingMerton(1968) and
will herebe definedas a mode of analysisconStinchcombe(1968), functionalism
cerned with the interrelations
betweensocial phenomenain generaland, more
or strucwiththeconsequencesofgivenitemsforthelargerstructure
particularly,
turesin whichtheyare variouslyembedded.Functionsare thoseobservedconsedysfunctions
quences thatmake foradaptationor adjustmentof givenstructures;
are thoseobservedconsequencesthatlessenadaptationor adjustment.Functional
analysis,moreover,focusesattentionon the causal loop throughwhichtheconsebringing
quencesofgivencoursesofactionact back on theitemunderobservation,
about,as the case may be, its persistenceor modification.
ofthisorientation
oftheoretical
inquiryis examined,a short
Beforetheemergence
sketchof the antecedentstateof Americansociologicaltheoryis in order.
Establishedin 1892, the Universityof Chicago departmentof sociologydominatedgeneralsociologyand sociologicaltheoryuntilthe 1930s. Albion Small, its
also foundedtheAmericanJournalofSociolrector,
long-time
chairmanand spiritus
scholarly
ogy, which until the 1930s was the most importantand path-setting
members
journalin thefield.RobertParkand ErnestBurgess,twootherprestigious
textbookin sociology,An
of the Department,editedtheearliest,highlyinfluential
to theScienceof Society(1921). W. I. Thomas,and somewhatlater,
Introduction
HerbertBlumer,EverettHughes, Louis Wirth,and W. F. Ogburn,joined these
of
scholarsand helpedconsolidatetheintellectualand organizationalpreeminence
of philosophy's
Its close associationwiththe department
theChicago department.
enhanceditsstatusin thesociological
mainluminaryGeorgeHerbertMead further
suchas thatofColumbia,
community
(Coser 1971,Chap. 8, 9). Otherdepartments,
chairedbyFranklinGiddens,werenotable seriouslyto challengeChicago's
initially
preeminenceduringthisperiod.
be datedin 1935 whenthe
The end of theChicago dominancemayconveniently
AmericanSociologicalSociety,previouslylargelythoughnotwhollydominatedby
or Chicago-trained
theChicagodepartment
scholars,decidedin a minorcoup d'etat
to establishits own journal, The AmericanSociologicalReview,thusseveringthe
long-timeformaland informallinksof the disciplineto the Chicago department.
and
AlthoughChicago has continuedto thisday to be amongthemostprestigious
influential
centersof sociologicalresearchand training,it neveragain attainedthe
dominantpositionit once enjoyedin Americansociology.
Althoughthe importanceof Parson's The StructureofSocial Action(1937) was
not immediatelyrecognized,it may be said in retrospectto constitutethe other

SOCIOLOGY FROM CHICAGO DOMINANCE TO 1965

147

watershedin the developmentof sociologygenerallyand sociologicaltheoryin

particular.This work was a landmarkin that it set a new course that was to
fromthe early 1940s untilroughlythe middle
dominatetheoreticaldevelopments
of the 1960s.
It wouldbe too facileto say,as has oftenbeenasserted,thatAmericansociology
was liberatedfroman atheoreticalempiricismduringthe Chicago periodby Parof severalmajorEuropeansociologicaltraditions.Many of
sons's daringsynthesis
the major Chicago figureshad studiedin Europe and were well acquaintedwith
Europeansociologicaland philosophicalthought.Severalof them,Small and Park
in particular,werefamiliarwith,forexample,the workof Georg Simmel,which
theyintroducedto the Americanscholarlypublic. A simple glance at Park &
textbookreadilyshows that far frombeing parochial,they
Burgess'sinfluential
attemptedto introducetheirstudentsto a great deal of European sociological
thought.Nonetheless,theChicagoreceptionofEuropeansociologicalcontributions
proceeded,so to speak,by bits and pieces. Chicago scholarsmade use of one or
it in
anotheraspect of Europeanwork,but theydid not succeed in appropriating
manner.This was preciselywhattheHarvardgroup,underthe guida systematic
ance of Parsons,managedto accomplishin the wake of the publicationof The
StructureofSocial Action.This book widenedthe vistasof Americansociologists,
makingthemreceptiveto the richheritageof theEuropean sociologicaltradition.
theoryofsocial action"
to developa "voluntaristic
In thisworkParsonsattempted
by way of a creativesynthesisof Durkheim,Weber,and Pareto (the workof the
BritisheconomistMarshall was also consideredin detail but somehowwas later
largelydroppedfromconsideration).
idealand theoretical
premisesofutilitarianism,
themajorassumptions
Surveying
ism,and positivism,Parsonsset out to analyze themcriticallyand to indicatein
whatrespectstheymightbe usefulin elaboratingthe new synthesisforwhichhe
was striving.Agreeingwiththe utilitarianview of individualsas purposiveand
actors,he rejectedwhathe conceivedto be the atomisticand overly
goal-oriented
theoryand itsattendantincapacityto accountfor
ofutilitarian
rationalorientation
activitiesof individual
thegoal-oriented
theemergenceof a social orderregulating
to accountfor
its propensity
actors.Positivismwas attackedforits reductionism;
genetic,or geographpsychochemical,
individualbehaviorin termsofphysiological,
choiceand itsconsequentinabilityto accountforthevoluntaristic,
ical influences;
tendenciesofsocial actors.Finally,theGermanidealistic
making,and goal-striving
such
ofculturaldeterminants
was praisedforitsemphasison theinfluence
tradition
as ideas or symbolicprocesses,whileit was criticizedforitsinabilityto accountfor
and the worldof ideas. Being
betweensocial structures
thecomplexinterrelations
Parsonsargued,idealist
viewof culturaldeterminism,
weddedto an emanationist
could neveraccountfortensionsor descrepanciesbetweenthe worldof
theorizing
ideasand theworldofsocial activity.If,as he contended,ideas and social structure
a theory
werebound to each otherthroughdynamicinterplaysand interchanges,
thatsaw social structuresimplyas an emanationof ideas was surelyinadequate.
ifthecharacterof each particularsocietywas said to be determined
Furthermore,
by its ethos,it would be impossibleto developa generalizingtheoryof societyto

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account for human actions across culturaldiversities.This was preciselywhat

Parsons attemptedto do.
Parsonsdevelopeda seriesofabstractanalyticalconceptsthatwereto be ordered
centralfeaturesofall humansocietieswithouthaving
in sucha manneras to reflect
to accountforthe myriadof empiricalphenomenathatthreatenedto drownthe
thesalientand systemHe wishedto highlight
researcherin a sea ofparticularities.
atic featuresof humanaction.
from
In The StructureofSocial Actionsthesecentralfeatureswereconstructed
emthe followingbasic buildingstones:(a) actors,capable of voluntarystriving,
phaticallynotbehavingand reactingbodies;(b) goals thattheseactorswerestriving
meanstheseactorswereusingin theirpursuits;
for;(c) choicesbetweenalternative
condicomingfrombothbiologicaland environmental
(d) situationalconstraints
of ends;
tions,whichsetboundsto theselectionof meansand theaccomplishment
and (e) setsofnormsand valuesthatchanneltheactors'choicesofbothmeansand
ends. In sum,humanactorswereseen as capable of makingchoicesof coursesof
condiaction,but thesechoiceswereconstrainedby biologicaland environmental
tionsand, moreimportantly
forParsons,by the values and normsgoverningthe
in whichtheywerevariouslyenmeshed.
social structures
This conceptualscheme,as The Structureof Social Actionshowsin instructive
detail,was derivedfromthe synthesis,among otherthings,of the Durkheimian
theWeberianstress
and collectiveconsciousness,
constraints
emphasison structural
on thedetermining
ofsetsof ideas and values,and theParetiannotion
functioning
ofactorspossessed
ofmovingsocietalequilibriabroughtaboutthroughtheinterplay
in varyingdegreesof a set of a fundamental"residues,"or prepotentdrives(at a
later date Freud largelyreplacedPareto in Parsons's theoreticaledificeand the
became majorbuilding
functionalist
theoriesof Malinowskiand Radcliffe-Brown
blocksof the Parsoniansynthesis).
came
In thesubsequentdevelopment
ofParsons'stheoreticalscheme,interaction
to displacetheemphasison individualsocial action.In his secondmajorwork,The
betweenhumanactorsand the
Social System(1951), thesystematic
interrelations
expectationsthatconstrain
relativelystablepatternsbuiltout of institutionalized
of individualactions.While
theiractionsassumeprideof place overconsideration
has involveda toningdownofParsons's
it maybe truethatthisshiftin perspective
continued
earlierstresson thevoluntary
characterofsocial action,he nevertheless
to hold thata social systemcan onlyoperateifitscomponentactorsare sufficiently
of thatsystem.
motivatedto act in termsof the requirements
In TheSocial System,Parsons'sstressis on thecentralimportanceofinstitutionto differensocial rolescorresponding
alized valuesand normsand on differentiated
tiatedstatus positions.The buildingblocks of a social system,or of one of its
are motivatedactorswho play roles governedby the expectationsof
subsystems,
In a relatively
stable
otheractorsinvolvedwiththemin a web ofsocial interaction.
serveto hold themin line
system,therolepartnersofparticularstatusincumbents
and theirpowerto exercisenegativeor positivesanctions.
throughtheirexpectations
The centralvalues and normsof the systemare upheldwhenproperlysocialized
and whentheyare impelledto
actorsare motivatedto liveup to rolerequirements

SOCIOLOGY FROM CHICAGO DOMINANCE TO 1965

149

in theirinteractionwith
requirements
uphold and defendthese institutionalized
otheractors.The primacyofvaluesand normsin Parsons'ssystemmakesit appropriateto call thissystem"normativefunctionalism".
This mainlineof Parsons'ssystemhas had a strongimpacton AmericansociolofParson's
ogy.I shallreturntowardtheendofthissectionto thelaterdevelopment
thought.
yettheHarvard
associatedwithHarvardUniversity,
Parsons'sworkis intimately
by Parsons,
foundedin 1930,was not originallyinfluenced
sociologydepartment,
ofeconomics.The founder
in thedepartment
who was thenstilla younginstructor
and first
chairmanofthedepartment
was PitirimSorokin,a Russianemigrescholar
ofMinnesotaand was alreadywellknownas the
who had taughtat theUniversity
to thetopicthatlaid
contribution
authorof Social Mobility(1927), a path-breaking
SociologicalTheoforall further
investigations
and Contemporary
thegroundwork
ries (1928), an encyclopedicand criticalsurveyof the storehouseof European
sociologicallearning.A fewyearslaterhe publishedhis greatestwork,Social and
systemin whichthecentralstress
CulturalDynamics.(1941) This was a synthetic
importanceover the course of humanhistoryof varying
was on the determining
systemsof thoughtand values.
in sociologyat Harvardin 1931 and servedin that
Parsonsbecamean instructor
rankuntilfiveyearslater.Sorokinwas highlycriticalof his workfromthebeginrelationship
ning,and so it was thatthetwomenneverachieveda close intellectual
despitethe fact that theyshared a numberof centralideas, most particularly
ofhumanconduct.Neverofvaluesin thedetermination
concerning
theimportance
giftedstudentsthatgatheredat Hartheless,thesmall elitegroupof uncommonly
degrees,by
thoughto different
vardin the 1930sall seemto have been influenced,
on themneedsto be briefly
bothSorokinand Parsons.One otherseminalinfluence
and Pareto specialistJ. L. Henderson,whose
mentioned,thatof the physiologist
famousseminaron Paretowas attendedby manygraduatestudentsand members
of the Harvardfacultyin the early 1930s (cf Barber 1970).
were
The mostprominent
studentsin thepre-WorldWar II Harvarddepartment
George Homans, RobertK. Merton,KingsleyDavis, WilbertMoore, and Robin
Williams.All of themleftan enduringmarkon the subsequentdevelopmentof
sociologicaltheory.Homans was greatlyinfluencedby Henderson,and his first
to theworkofPareto.
majorwork(writtenwithCurtisin 1934) was an introduction
He subsequentlyturnedto workin Englishsocial historythatculminatedin his
Century(1941). Though thisbook was highly
English Villagersof the Thirteenth
praisedby historians,it did not make much of an impactin Americansociology.
Such was not the case withhis subsequentwork;in The Human Group(1950), a
theoretical
reanalysisofa seriesofpreviousstudiesofsuch diversesubjectsas work
societies,and the
groupsin factories,
streetgangs,the kinshipsystemin primitive
Homans attemptedto develop
structureof a decliningNew Englandcommunity,
derivedfromobservedregularities
a theoretical
schemeofinterrelated
propositions
in theinitialaccountsofthesestudies.He thenusedan inductivestrategy
verymuch
at variancewiththatof Parsons.Howeverthebook was at leastpartlyrooted,like
approachesofDurkheimand oftheBritish
Parsons'sownwork,in thefunctionalist

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Homans's strategyset out to

anthropologists
Malinowskiand Radcliffe-Brown.
a numberofpropositions
and to estabextractfromthestudiesunderinvestigation
lish theconditionsunderwhichsuch propositionswould in facthold. He showed,
betweenpersonswould increasetheirliking
forexample,thatincreasedinteraction
forone another,but qualifiedthisstatementby notingthatthiswould onlybe the
authorityover each other,thatis, if
case if thesepersonsdid not hold significant
theyhad roughlyequal statuspositions.While TheHuman Groupmaystillbe said
to be largelycongruentwith the emergentfunctionalistperspective,Homans's
subsequentwork,notablyhis Social Behavior,Its ElementaryForms(1961), abandons this perspectivein favorof an exchangetheorylargelyconstructedfrom
buildingblocks providedby the Skinnerianversionof psychologicalbehaviorism
and classical utilitarianeconomictheory.This workwill be discussedlater.
Robert K. Merton,who was to become the only seriousrival of Parsons as a
centralfigurein the theoreticaldevelopmentof Americansociologyduringthis
byboth,
period,studiedunderbothParsonsand Sorokin.He was clearlyinfluenced
thoughParsons's impactwas more pronounced.His thoughtwas markedby a
varietyof Europeanthinkers
to whomhe is likelyto have been introducedby both
Sorokinand Parsons,especiallythroughthelecturesParsonsgavebeforepublishing
The Structureof Social Action.Merton'soveralltheoreticalstanceowes much to
thatbook and, to a lesserextent,to Parsons'ssubsequentwork.Merton'swritings
in the sociologyof science were also influencedby Sorokin,withwhom he collaboratedin partsof thelatter'smonumentalSocial and CulturalDynamics.Still,
Social Theoryand Social StruclongbeforeMertonpublishedhis highlyinfluential
publishedpapers,it had becomeapparture(1968), consistingmainlyofpreviously
on Mertonhad becomeattenuatedand, whileholding
entthatSorokin'sinfluence
a broadlyfunctionalist
as he refinedthemethodof functionalanalysis
perspective,
his pathbegan to divergefromthatof Parsons.Largelyrootinghis thoughtin the
same set of thinkersthatParsonshad highlighted
(thoughaddingKarl Marx and
Georg Simmelto Parsons'sset of seminalEuropeans),MertonrejectedParsons's
theoryand opted insteadfor an
attemptto develop a generalall-encompassing
oftheoreticalpropositions
ofmiddle
apparentlymoremodestaim: thedevelopment
to analyzea limitedsetofempiricalphenomena(cf.Parsons1949,
range,purporting
considerMerton1968).MertonarguedthatParsons'senterprise
was overambitious
ing the generalstatusof sociologicalknowledgeand theory.Sociologydid not yet
have its Kepler, let alone its Newton,and attemptsto build a generaltheoretical
systemat thisstagewere,accordingto Merton,condemnedto failure.Theoriesof
the middle range,on the otherhand, could elucidate limitedsets of empirical
phenomenaand be susceptibleto empiricaltesting.Yet, far fromonly putting
forwarda series of brilliantdetailedstudiesin delimitedareas, Mertonhad an
overalltheoreticalvision.This perspective,
as Stinchcombe(1975) has shown,focuses on motivatedactorswhose consequentialchoices are largely,thoughnever
locationin the social structure.People,
wholly,constrainedby theirdifferential
Mertonargues in all of his work,are not freeto act as theyplease, but have
alternativemodes of action. These, however,are patternedand institutionalized.
Most ofMerton'sworkaimsto elucidatestructural
sourcesofvariationsin patterns

SOCIOLOGY FROM CHICAGO DOMINANCE TO 1965

151

of choice. His apparentlydisparatecontributions,

whetherin the studyof anomie
or the sociologyof science,whetherin the analysisof the functionsof political
machinesor ofreference
groups,are rootedin thisoverallperspective.
WhilerejectingtheParsonianattemptto buildan all-encompassing
generaltheoryat thisstage
of sociology'sdevelopment,Mertonneverthelesstaughthis studentsthe art of
approachinga varietyofsubstantively
different
theoreticalproblemsundera unified
theoreticalangle of vision.
In addition,Mertonendeavoredto counteractthe rigidyof previousfunctional
theoryby suggesting
a numberofparadigmsand a protocolforfunctional
analysis,
which,among otherthings,stressedthe need to considerdysfunctions
as well as
functions,
questionedMalinowski'sassumptionthateverysocial phenomenonnecessarilyhad a social function,
and attackedthe conservativeimplicationthatany
itemwas necessarilyindispensableto theoperationof a givensocial structure.
By
highlighting
the twinnotionsof functionalalternativesand dysfunctions,
Merton
did yeoman'sworkin banishingthe Panglossianoptimismthatall was alwaysthe
bestinall possible(functional)
worlds.On thecontrary,
he stressedthatsocialactors
are alwaysfacedby ambiguities,
and dilemmasof choice;
conflicting
expectations,
and societies,far frombeing rigidlyunifiedwholes,contain in theirstructures
and incongruities
ambiguities
ofexpectations
thatprecludethepossibility
oftreating
themas unambiguously
unifiedwholes.
His closelyargueddistinctions
betweenmanifestand latentfunctions,
i.e. those
consequentialactivitiesthatare presentin theactor'smindand thosethatare not,
and his distinctionof individualpurposesfromfunctionaleffectshelped remove
someoftheteleologicalimplications
thatmanycriticshad discernedin thewritings
of some of his predecessorsand contemporaries.
Invidiouscomparisonson therespectiveimpactof Parsons'sand Merton'swork
on subsequenttheorizingwouldbe out of place in thisessay,but it seemsopen to
littledoubt thatMerton'stheoreticalstresson problemsof the middlerangehas
been morepronouncedin its impacton empiricalresearchthan Parsoniangrand
theory.
KingsleyDavis graduatedfromHarvardin 1936,the same yearas Mertondid.
AlthoughDavis later rejectedallegiance to functionalist
analysisas a peculiar
method(1959), and althoughhis workin recentyearsis almostcompletely
devoted
to specializeddemographicstudies,he mustsurelybe reckonedamongthehandful
of figureswho helpedestablisha functionalstyleof analysisas the predominant
theoreticalmode in the 1940s and 1950s. His textbookHuman Society(1949)
enduredformanyyearsas themostthoroughand systematic
attemptto presentan
overallview of social structuresand social functionsfroma largelyParsonianIt was onlysupersededbyH. M. Johnson'sSociology,(1969)
Mertonianperspective.
a muchless imaginative
and considerably
ofthemajorlines
morerigidpresentation
of Parsons'sand Merton'sthought.In addition,Davis presenteda seriesof interrelatedpapers on the sociologyof the family,the sociologyof prostitution,
and
relatedareas in whichfunctional
in his characteristically
analysiswas exemplified
lucidfashion;theseessays,thoughno longerreferred
as Merton's
to as frequently
essaysof the same period,serveas examplesof functionaltheorizingat its best.

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Althoughevidentlybeholdento the teachingsof Parsons,theydo not followhim

strategy.
a Mertoniantypeof middle-range
in his granddesignbut exemplify
WilbertMoore,who graduatedfromHarvardin 1940,and RobinWilliams,who
analysis
graduatedin 1943,are othermajorfigureswho helpedestablishfunctional
in thatperiod.The formerdid thisthrougha seriesof
as thedominantperspective
relations(1951) and thesociologyofmodernizaworksin thesociologyofindustrial
tionand social change(1963):
relations(1947)
The latteraccomplishedthisend throughhis workin intergroup
textbookAmericanSociety(1951), thefirstmajorattempt
and his highlyinfluential
and his
perspective,
to analyzethewholeof Americansocietyfroma functionalist
et al) in The AmericanSoldier (1949), a landmarkin
collaboration(withStouffer
sociologicalresearch.MarionLevy,who graduatedin 1951,authoreda majorbook,
verymuchalongParsonianlines,
ofSociety(1953), whichattempted,
TheStructure
His workon theChinesefamily(1949)
offunctionalism.
to presenta grandsynthesis
from
(1966), thoughmarginallydifferentiated
and on the theoryof modernization
teacher.In the 1950sa number
ofhis erstwhile
him,followscloselyin thefootsteps
of otherproductsof Harvard,too numerousto mentionhere,continuedthetraditionof theirpredecessors.By thattimeParsonsand his colleagueshad succeeded
ofsocial relations
ofsociologyintothedepartment
thedepartment
in transforming
social anthropology,
throughthe amalgamationof social and clinicalpsychology,
fortenyears.Thoughnotall ofhis
and sociology.Parsonschairedthatdepartment
dominatedthe
colleaguesshared all aspects of Parsons's vision,he nevertheless
and servedas a
and intellectually,
departmentas a whole both organizationally
In addition,
majorvehiclein spreadingthemessageof Parsons'sstyleoftheorizing.
Parsons'searlierstudentshad now assumedleadingpositionsin otheruniversities,
Mertonat Columbia(whereDavis also taughtbeforegoingto Berkeley),Williams
at Cornell,and Moore and Levy at Princeton.In addition,a numberof other
sociologistscontinuedto workin the generalHarvardtradition,
Harvard-trained
thoughmostofthemtendedto divergeto a greateror lesserdegreefromParsons's
grandschemeofanalysisas timewentby. Merton'sstudentsat Columbia,Selznick
(1949) and Gouldner(1955),forexample,continuedto workina broadlyMertonian
tradition.Others,likeGoode (1963, 1973) and Gross (1958), whilenotgraduating
stillpatternedtheir
in whichfunctionalanalysispredominated,
fromdepartments
workaccordingto themodeofeitherParsonsor Merton.By around1950thismode
in Americansociologicaltheory.
had clearlybecome predominant
In the meantime,Parsons'sown workdevelopedin severalnew directions.In
1951 he collaboratedwithShils in publishingTowarda GeneralTheoryofAction.
so theyclaimed,all action
The authorsdevelopeda set ofconceptscharacterizing,
systems.These theytermedpatternvariables,whichweresupposedto accountnot
butalso forthedominant
ofsocial systems,
priorities
onlyforthevariantnormative
modes of orientationin personalitysystemsand the patternsof values foundin
of the Gemeinschaftculturalsystems.Essentiallyan elaborationand refinement
Gesellschaftdichotomyof Toennies,thesepatternvariableswerepresentedas diand affective
neutrality,
forexamplebetweenaffectivity
chotomousalternatives,

SOCIOLOGY FROM CHICAGO DOMINANCE TO 1965

153

or
and specificity,
betweendiffuseness
betweenuniversalismand particularism,
betweenachievementand ascription.
refersto theamountofaffectallowedto enterinto
neutrality
Affectivity-affective
situation.A modernphysician,forexample,could not performhis
an interactive
involvedwith his patient,whereashigh affective
task were he to be affectively
medicineman.Univermightbe a conditionofsuccessfortheprimitive
involvement
pertainsto thestandardsofevaluationofothersin an interacsalism-particularism
tive situationas individualspecimensof generalcategoriesof persons(as in the
proceduresof modernbureaucracies),or as particularhumanbeings(as in courtrefersto the natureof obligationsin interactive
ship). Diffusenessand specificity
whethertheyshouldbe narrowlydefined(as in a modernlaborcontract)
situations,
Finally,thedistinction
nature,as in a maritalrelationship.
or be of a morediffuse
arejudged
and ascriptionrestson whetherstatusincumbents
betweenachievement
of specificexpected
or on qualitiesjudged independently
on theirperformance
as whena moderncivilservant'sactivitiesare evaluatedin termsof
performance,
whathe does, as opposedto a nobleincumbentof a statusin medievaltimes,who
isjudgedin termsofwhohe is. Thesepairsofvariableswerethenseenas focalpoints
Theyweresaid
ofindividualdecisions,normativedemands,and value orientations.
to channeltheactionsof actorsthroughthetwinmechanismsof socializationand
social control.Proponentsofthistheoryclaimedthatthesepairsofvariables,being
system,ensureda desirablefitbetweenindividualactions
builtintothepersonality
and societalrequirement.
Onlytwoyearsafterthepublicationof Towarda GeneralTheoryofAction(1951),
Parsons,again joined by Shils, and now also forthe firsttimeby his Harvard
colleagueBales, publishedanotherbook, WorkingPapers in the TheoryofAction
(1953), in which he presentedyet anothernovel theoreticalconceptualization.
Buildingon ideas adumbratedin The Social System,as well as on the resultsof
conductedby Bales, Parsonsand hiscollaborators
researchpreviously
small-group
now suggestedthatall actionsystemswerefacedwithfourmajorproblemsifthey
resourcesfromtheir
were to surviveand develop. They must secure sufficient
thesewithinthesystem.This is termedadaptation.They
environment
and distribute
of systemgoals and establishpriorities
mustmobilizeresourcesfortheattainment
Theymustcoordinateand adjust
amongthesegoals.This is called goal attainment.
Finally,
relationswithinthe systemand hence have mechanismsfor integration.
motivatedto
theremustbe waysof insuringthatcomponentactorsare sufficiently
play theirparts(patternmaintenance),as well as mechanismsdevotedto internal
was called the
requirements
tensionmanagement.(The entiresetofthesefunctional
A.G.I.L. scheme). Any item under sociologicalanalysis,it was now suggested,
to the overall
would have to be assessed in termsof its functionalcontribution
of the system.
requirements
ofotheraspectsofParsons'samazSpace does notallow extendedconsideration
inglyfertilesociologicalimaginationin workspublishedin the 1960s.I shall limit
myselfto mentioninghis concernwith generalizedmedia of exchange,such as
moneyand power,withinand betweensocial systems(1963), as wellas his explicit

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of his
developmentof whathad alwaysbeen fairlystrongidealisticunderpinnings
hierarchy
ofcontrol
(or cybernetic)
thoughtthroughthenotionofan informational
(1970). Parsons now assertedthat in the last analysissymbolicprocesseshave
factors.Finally,I can onlynotethatin the 1960sand
primacyoversocial structural
obsolete,
early1970sParsons,who had once rejectedSpencer'sthoughtas entirely
now returnedto a Spencerianevolutionary
schemein an attemptto counterthose
ofhis criticswho had accusedhimofbeingunableto offeran explanationofsocial
(1966) Parsons
and Comparative
Perspectives
change.In his Societies.Evolutionary
markedtheevolutionof all
now arguedthata processof increasingdifferentiation
humansocietiesand of particularsocial systemsover time.
Parsons'sworkbecamethetargetofa numberof attacksin the 1950sand 1960s
(Lockwood 1956,Mills 1959,Coser 1956,Dahrendorf1958,Gouldner1970). His
criticscomplainedofa built-inbias towardconformity,
an absenceofconcernwith
social conflict,an inabilityto perceivethe centralplace of materialinterestsin
concern
human affairs,a persistentPanglossianoptimism,and disproportionate
withintegration
and consensusat theexpenseofconcernwithchangeand instability.Thisbeingan expository
essay,thesematterscannotbe pursuedhere,butitmust
be notedthatthe eclipseof Parsonianthoughtin the last ten yearsor so may be
due less to thesepersistent
criticalonslaughts,importantas theywere,than to a
and structural
featuresof
generalshiftin concernawayfromthemacrosociological
theoryin general.
Parsoniantheoryin particularand of structural-functional
THE RESURGENCE
OF MICROSOCIOLOGICAL
AND CONFLICT THEORIES
Homans's shiftof analyticalattentionfromthe systemapproachin The Human
fullydevelopedin his Social
Group(1950) to a psychologicalexchangeperspective,
ofthingsto come. In
Behavior:Its Elementary
Forms(1961), was a firstintimation
thelatterwork,Homansmounteda full-scaleattackon sociologicalsystemtheories
and assertedthata fullexplanationofhumanbehaviorwouldneverbecomepossible
on the sociologicallevel,but had to proceedfroman accountingforthebehavior
ofindividualpersonson thepsychologicalplane.Borrowinglargelyfromtheparticularformofbehaviorism
developedby his HarvardcolleagueB. F. Skinner,as well
was
as fromutilitarianism
and classicaleconomics,Homansarguedthatself-interest
theuniversalmotivethatmade theworldgo aroundand thatmenand women,just
like Skinnerianpigeons,modifiedtheirbehaviorin termsof positiveor negative
reinforcement
Homans'ssocial worldnowconsisted
providedbytheirenvironment.
As distinctfrom
of interacting
individualsexchangingrewardsand punishments.
thenineteenth-century
imageof economicman,Homans's incentivesto actiondid
not only consistof moneyor commodities,but also of approval,esteem,love,
and othernonmaterialistic
or symbolictokens.Homans'spersonwas seen
affection,
intenton maximizingreturns
as a rationalcalculatorofpleasuresand pains,forever
and minimizinglosses. Homans now tendedto couch his argumentsin termsof
chainsof deductivereasoning,startingwithaxiomssuch as "Men are morelikely
to performan activity,themorevaluabletheyperceivetherewardof thatactivity

SOCIOLOGY FROM CHICAGO DOMINANCE TO 1965

155

to be," and to proceedfromtherethrougha seriesofderivationsto explainwhyin

concretesettingsparticularpersonsweremotivatedto adapt theirbehaviorin terms
presentin a givensocial environment.
of the incentivesand disincentives
by severalof his critics,who attempted
Homans was attackedas a reductionist
to showthathis deductiveschemestendedto be eithertautologicalor ad hoc. They
charged,in particular,thathe was unableto explainsuch sociologicalvariablesas
scheme.His
withhis reductionist
degreeof literacyor level of industrialization
thesymbol-using
natureof thehumananimal,
criticscontendedthatbyneglecting
Homans was incapableof explainingthe worldof values and normsthatlargely
determinedthe course of humanactions.They furtherarguedthat he neglected
thatcould notbe reducedto individual
thoseaspectsof social structural
attributes
propensities.
by Homans's work,proceededin his
PeterBlau, thoughclearlymuchinfluenced
of
Exchangeand Powerin Social Life (1964) to remedysome of the deficiencies
perspective
Homans'sconceptualizations,
and to reconcilethemwiththestructural
thathad previouslydominatedhis own workand to whichhe was laterto return
(Blau 1975).
In thefirstpartofhisbook Blau followsHomans's lead and developsan elemento accountfor"an exchangeof activity,tangibleor intangitarymodelpurporting
and costly,betweentwo persons,"eventhoughhe
ble,and moreor less rewarding
economicmodelsof
is moresharplyaware thanHomans thatpurelyrationalistic
humantransactionsare inadequatewheneverthereis no acceptedmediumof exchange3uchas money.He acknowledgedthatwhereverthereis no standardmeasureofvalue,thenotionofexchangemustlose muchofitsprecisemeaningand may
be largelyanalogic. Blau argued that in additionto money,people findsocial
desirable.Actors
approval,respect,and compliancewiththeirwishesinherently
competewithone anotherin orderto maximizetheserewardsand theircompetitive
exchangesalways proceedunderthe assumptionthatpeople who can bestowreprevail
wardswillreceiverewardsin theirturn.Whileideallynormsof reciprocity
in factthesenormsare systematically
infringed,
creating
amongexchangepartners,
imbalancesand deprivationsthatalways threatenthe smoothoperationof social
in termsof the resourcestheypossess create
systems.People beingdifferentiated
powerbasesthroughwhichtheymaybe able to exploitthosedeprivedofsuchbases.
In thispartofthebook,thoughfollowing
someofHomans'smainleads,Blau tones
sourcesof
down the latter'semphasison balance and equilibriumand highlights
conflictand contention.
In the secondpartof his book Blau proceedsto modifyconsiderablythe rather
bleak Hobbesianmodel of societythathe presentedin the first.AbandoningHoBlau showsthatprocesses
mansand returning
to a macrosociologicalperspective,
makeitimposvaluecommitment,
and normativeregulation
ofinstitutionalization,
terms.Whilethe firstpart
sibleto explainthe workingsof societyin reductionist
of the book limiteditselfto elementary
exchangesbased on the maximizationof
attractionand repulsion,the shared
advantageor the processesof interpersonal
thesceneinthesecondpartand macrosociological
valuesofthefunctionalist
reenter
issuesreplaceconcernwiththe minutiaeof microsociological
exchangeprocesses.

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COSER

Almostlikethereturnofthepreviously
repressed,
thesymbolicnatureofthehuman
animaland its immersionin a universeof normsand values now come to the fore
of analyticalattention.It now turnsout thathumanactorsmay well be movedby
adherenceto legitimating
values,eventhoughthismayinvolvecostsin self-interest
and the maximizationofadvantages.Sharedvalues,it turnsout,controlexchange
relations,
just likein Durkheim'sstructural
explanation,wherecontracting
individuals can proceedin theirdealingsonly withina matrixof previouslyestablished
norms.
It shouldbe clearthatin Blau's workthereexistsa tensionbetweena theoretical
commitment
to the primacyof a micro-levelexchangemodel and a concernwith
ofhumanconducton themacro-level.
thestructural
explanation
In symbolicinteractionismthestructural
levelofanalysisis all butabandoned,and thesceneis almost
completelyoccupied by interacting
individualswho modifytheirrespectiveconductsregardlessof differentiated
positionin thesocial structure,
socioculturalclimatesof values and norms,or institutional
settings.
My accountofsymbolicinteractionism
willbe brief,chiefly
becausethistheoretical schemeseemsto be based largelyon a systematization
and elaborationof the
intellectualheritageof Mead (and to a lesserextentDewey and James),whose
writings
predatetheperiodunderconsideration.
Moreover,symbolicinteractionism
has, in themain,limiteditselfto analysisof interpersonal
and social-psychological
processes.Its major tenents,as formulatedby its spiritusrectorHerbertBlumer
(1969) and hisdisciples,can be briefly
summarized:Humanbeingsact towardsocial
objectsmainlyin termsof the meaningtheyattributeto theseobjectsratherthan
to theirintrinsic
in the
character.Such meaningsare constructed
and reconstructed
processofsocialinteraction.
Shapedas theyarebytheactualor anticipatedresponse
of others,humanactionscannotbe accountedforby backgroundcharacteristics,
prepotentimpulses,structural
or externalstimuli.Social reality,far
requirements,
frombeingstable,is theresultof ongoingnegotiations
betweenmutuallyinvolved
setsofactors.These actorsare alwaysengagedin fluidinterpretative,
evaluational,
and definitional
inductiveprocedurescan helpeluciprocessesso thatonlystrictly
or attempts
date theirbehavior.Any sociologicaltheorythatproceedsdeductively
is bound to founderon the rockof theinevitable
to build nomotheticpropositions
and theever-changing
characterof humanconduct.Hence symbolic
particularities
interactionism
is at bottoman antitheoretical
sociologicaltheorythat refusesin
ofsocial processesin thehereand
principleto transcendthepeculiarcharacteristics
now. It rejectsconceptualgeneralizationand abstractionand allows conceptsto
performat best a sensitizingfunction.Since the social worldis constructedfrom
itis onlyamenabetweenindividuals,
interpretative
processesarisingintransactions
as opposedto theoretically
ble to carefuldescription
aidedbysensitizing,
grounded,
in the fluxof social
concepts.Only by insertinghimselfor herselfimaginatively
interchanges
betweenactorsby takingthe role of others,can the sociologicalresearchermake sense of data. Blumerand his co-thinkerwish,in fact,to teach a
who is seenas incapableofconstructlessonofhumility
to thesociologicaltheorist,
but who must,in theirview, be
ing enduring,objective,theoreticalstructures,
of thesituations,and the
thedefinitions
attentiveto thesubjectiveinterpretations,

SOCIOLOGY FROM CHICAGO DOMINANCE TO 1965

157

and be contentwiththat.Needmeaningsthatarisein humaninteraction

emergent
ofmanyparticularinsights
haveavailedthemselves
lessto say,thoughfunctionalists
providedby Mead and his successorsin the elucidationof social-psychological
processes,theyhave rejected,as a kind of scientificLuddism,the extremeidioThey,as well
bias inherentin symbolicinteractionism.
graphicand antitheoretical
of
as othercritics,have assertedthatthisorientationpreventsthe understanding
or of patternsof human
social structuresand theirconstrainingcharacteristics
organizationsuch as class hierarchiesor powerconstellations.
ofattention
It is preciselytheanalysisofthesemattersthatstandsat theforefront
of scholarswho are said to belongto the "conflictschool." I have advisedlyused
sincesome sociologists,includingmyself,who are often
thiscautiousformulation
it maybe
said to belongto thatschoolhave rejectedsuch labeling.More generally,
simply
said thatthis"school" has a somewhatproteanshape.The termis sometimes
used as a code wordforMarxism,but it also sometimesrefersto sociologistswho
to the sociologicalstudyof conflictand who have highhave made contributions
interactionin society,without,however,
lightedthe importanceof conflict-ridden
claimingthat"conflicttheory"presentsan encompassingtheoreticalschemelike,
say,Ptolemaicastronomyin relationto Copernican.Gluckman(1956) and Coser
(1956, 1967) havemaintainedinsteadthattherecan be onlyone overallsociological
theoryeventhoughit mayconsistofvariousconceptualschemesand setsofpartial
a particular
theoriesof the middlerangeconsideredimportantforunderstanding
social dimension.
to a fullerpresentationof only one "conflict
I shall limitmyself,therefore,
theory",thatof Dahrendorf(1958, 1959),because his workdoes indeedattemptto
lay the groundworkfor an overall theoreticalsystemsharplyat variance with
functionalism
and with the othertheoriesdiscussed in this paper. (I shall not
in thatvein
considerAmericanMarxistsociologyhere,sinceall majorcontributions
-apart, ofcourse,fromtheclassics-were in factpublishedafter1965). A critical
discussionof my own workcan be foundin Turner(1974).
Dahrendorf'spointofdepartureis theassertionthatall social organizationsare
ofpowerin whichthepowerfulare able throughvarious
infactbased on hierarchies
to theirexpectations
means,amongwhichcoercionis central,to extractconformity
are conceivedas scarceresourcesand
fromtheless powerful.Powerand authority
engagedin struggles
thecomponentactorsofeverysocietyare said to be perpetually
of theseresources.At timestheircontentionsmay be latent
overthe distribution
Societiesare always
or muted,but theyare neverabsentfromany social structure.
of some humanactorsare alwaysopposedto
in a stateof conflictand theinterests
seen in economicterms,as in the
are not primarily
thoseof others.These interests
ofpower.
overthedistribution
Marxianscheme,but ratherin termsofcontentions
Conflictscan neverbe eradicatedsince everyparticularsolutionto a conflictof
of intereststhatmustgive riseto new conflicts.
powercreatesa new constellation
has as itscorollaryin Dahrendorf'sscheme
ofinterests
ofconflicts
The inexorability
the assertionthat societiesare always in fluxand that social change is hence a
ubiquitousfeatureof society.An attempt,as in Parsonian theory,to postulate
is rejected.The detailsof Dahrendorf'sworkare
equilibriain societalfunctioning

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structuralfactors,with
concerned,by way of discussinga varietyof intervening
specifyingconditions that help exacerbate or mute conflictinginteractions.
to his majorcontentionthatthoughconflicts
Throughouthis workhe holdsfirmly
and shornoftheirmoreviolentmanifestations,
maybe channeled,institutionalized,
are, to
theycan neverbe eradicatedfromthe humanscene. Power and authority
prerequisites
ofanysocial system
thathe wouldreject,functional
use a terminology
and social change
social conflict,
invitecontentions,
and sincetheymustnecessarily
theyare, in Dahrendorf'sview,the nodal pointsof any explanationsof human
affairs.
thoughit may be
This is not the place to evaluateDahrendorf'scontributions,
as Parsuffers
fromthesame one-sidedness
imperialism
notedthathis panconflict
however,that
sons's panconsensusviews.It maybe assertedwithsome confidence,
his work,togetherwiththatofMarxiansociologistsand theotherso-calledconflict
withthoseversionsoffunctionhas contributed
to growingdissatisfaction
theorists,
modelsand assumedthatsocietiesare mainly
alisttheorythatclungto equilibrium
thosesocietal
bynormative
consensus.Theseauthorshavehighlighted
heldtogether
has been
processeswhereconsensus,farfrombeing spontaneouslyforthcoming,
or all thoseothermeansthatare available
achievedthroughcoercion,manipulation,
to the powerfulin theirattemptto maintaintheirdominationoverthe powerless.
and ofthe
theworkofGoffman
Two majoroutgrowths
ofsymbolicinteractionism,
so-calledlabelingschoolwillnotbe discussedhere.Althoughtheirinitialformulationscame duringthe periodunderconsideration(Goffman1959, Lemert 1951)
onlyafter1965. For the same reasons,ethnometheyattainedtheirfullflowering
thodologyfalls outsidemy givenchronologicalframeof reference.I shall only
remarkherethatwhatseemscommonto theseapproachesis sustainedattentionto
and a rejection
strategies,
thepointofviewofhumanactorsand to theirinteractive
oftheoretical
or systemperspectives.
A consideration
developments
ofstructuralist
and microsociinthelasttenyears,itseemsto me,wouldnotea riseofsubjectivistic
ological perspectivesat the expense of concernwith objectivesocial structure,
althoughat the end of thatperiodone can alreadynote (Blau 1975,Coser 1975)
a resurgenceof interestin structuralexplanations.
CONCLUSION
A balancedassessmentofthetheoretical
trendsdiscussedin thisessaywillbecome
possibleonly afterconsiderablymore time has elapsed. We are still too closely
involvedwiththemto allowsuchan assessment.Justlikeyoungtreesthathaveonly
that
theirultimateworthwillhave to be judged bya generation
begunto bearfruit,
is able to evaluatethequalityof theirproducts.Some of them,no doubt,will turn
out to have been barren,whileotherswill have producedan abundantharvest.
one conclusioncan alreadybe made withsome confidenceat this
Nevertheless,
pointintime.Americansociologyhas comeofage duringtheperiodunderconsideration.It is no longermiredin theswampofad hoc explanationsor rawempiricism.
No longercontentwithgenuflections
beforeclosed theoreticalsystems,whether
homegrownor importedfromEurope,Americansociology,largelyunderthe im-

SOCIOLOGY FROM CHICAGO DOMINANCE TO 1965

159

pact of the theoreticalthoughtdiscussedin thesepages, is now equippedwitha

remarkablearrayof theoreticalnotions,includingthosedevelopedin the last ten
years,thatshould allow it in the futureto contributemightilyto thatmajor task
its founderenvisagedforit fromthebeginning:to providea reasonedexplanation
of the social rootsof the humanpredicament.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to recordmy indebtednessto Mullins's Theoriesand TheoryGroupsin

AmericanSociology(1973) and to Turner'sTheStructure
Contemporary
ofSociological Theory(1974). I have profited
a greatdeal, and borrowedquiteliberally,from
bothof thesevolumesin the presentessay.
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