Elizabeth Miller Thesis Final

Boko Harams War on the West
Do the Activities of the Salafist Jihad in Nigeria Pose an Increasing Threat to Americans and the U.S.
Homeland?
Betsy Miller
Thesis: Security Studies Program
Fall 2012
Table of Contents
I. Introduction: The History of Social Unrest in Nigeria ................................................................... 3
II. Literature Review............................................................................................................................. 6
a. Nigeria: Longstanding Problems and New Issues ...................................................................... 6
b. Religion and the Salafist Jihad in Nigeria ................................................................................... 7
c. Boko Haram: Goals and Evolving Tactics .................................................................................. 9
III. Evaluating the Influence of the Salafist Jihad in Nigeria before and after the Attack on the
U.N. Building in Abuja ...................................................................................................................... 11
IV. Content Analysis of Coverage of the Salafist Jihad Prior to the Attack on the United Nations
Building in Abuja ............................................................................................................................... 17
V. Content Analysis of Coverage of the Salafist Jihad in the Aftermath of the Attack on the
United Nations Building in Abuja ..................................................................................................... 20
VI. Policy Implications and Future Directions ................................................................................. 30
VII. Bibliography and Further Reading ............................................................................................ 36
I. Introduction: The History of Social Unrest in Nigeria
The United States government and private sector have a critical but tenuous relationship
with Nigeria. Due to the wealth of crude oil in the Niger Delta, Nigeria has been home to
numerous Western multinational oil companies since the 1950s. For this reason, Americas chief
security concerns in Nigeria historically focused on mitigating the threats targeting major U.S.
oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, including Chevron, Shell, and Exxon Mobil. Threats
towards the petroleum industry have historically been economically, not religiously or politically
motivated.1 Groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
have targeted the facilities and personnel of U.S. oil companies in hopes of receiving
compensation for the economic and environmental devastation they have suffered. These
companies have largely partnered with the Nigerian government in order to silence MEND and
other groups with amnesty payments. 2
Despite the efforts of the Niger Delta amnesty program, violence targeting Western oil
companies is still prevalent in the southern states of Nigeria, particularly as new generations of
potential militants come of age in a region that has few economic opportunities for local
populations.3 In the midst of the ongoing economically motivated unrest in the southern states,
new religiously motivated violence has arisen in the northern states in the aftermath of the 1998
bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well the attack on the U.S. homeland
on September 11, 2001. Both of these attacks motivated al Qaeda sympathizers all over the
1
Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Evolving Issues." Congressional Research Service. January 30, 2008.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/102651.pdf.
2
Davidheiser, Mark. "Demobilization or Remobilization? The Amnesty Program and the Search for Peace in the
Niger Delta." African Security 4, no. 1 (March 18, 2011).
3
Murdock, Heather. "Former Nigerian Militants Say Amnesty Program Failing." VOA. June 18, 2012.
http://www.voanews.com/content/former-nigerian-militants-say-amnesty-program-failing/1212337.html.
world to take up arms against the West in the name of the Salafist jihad. Groups such as
Somalias al Shabaab and Yemens al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) mobilized to
prove that the Salafi jihadist ideology could be exported anywhere in the world. 4
This new Nigerian extremist group, known as Boko Haram, which translates in Hausa to
Western education is a sin, is tangentially inspired by al Qaeda and other major jihadist groups
without seeking to mirror their level of coordination and organization. In fact, one Nigerian
scholar explicitly states that Boko Haram should not be understood as a organized terrorist
group or a conventional insurrection. 5 While Boko Haram receives its motivation from groups
like al Qaeda and its affiliates, its lack of organization and the malleable nature of its objectives
make the groups actions and targets increasingly difficult to predict.
Since its formation in 2001, Boko Haram operatives in Nigeria have claimed the lives of
over 10,000 people in the name of the Salafist jihad. In order to build a more significant
following and call attention to their goal of diminishing Western influences and ideology in
Nigeria, members of Boko Haram have consistently targeted Nigerian Christians and moderate
Muslims. The threat of terrorist activity remains high throughout the country, particularly in
northern areas where Boko Haram has been able to cultivate a stronghold. 6
Major recent attacks conducted by Boko Haram operatives include the December 2010
bombing in Abujas Mammy Market, the 2011 bombing of the Nigerian police headquarters, and
the August 2012 bombing of This Day newspaper. 7 The most troubling component of all of these
attacks, in addition to the obvious tremendous loss of civilian life, is the evident variation in both
"Terrorism in Nigeria: A Dangerous New Level." The Economist. September 03, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/21528307.
5
Campbell, John. "To Battle Nigeria's Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns." Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2011.
6
7
"Nigeria." Nigeria. June 21, 2012. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5739.html.
the groups targets and tactics. The Mammy Market attack utilized a more traditional explosive
device to target civilians patronizing a popular shopping center and beer garden. 8 In distinct
contrast, the attack on the police headquarters marked the terrorist groups first suicide bombing.
This attack also specifically targeted government officials, indicating a shift towards an
operational strategy more similar to that of an insurgent group than a terrorist organization. 9
Finally, the recent attack on the This Day newspaper building in Abuja targeted civilians for the
political attitudes voiced in their publications. This attack utilized a suicide borne vehicle
improvised explosive (SVBIED) in order to attack the building and its employees. 10
These attacks only represent a small portion of the violence occurring throughout
Nigeria, and they largely attracted American attention due to the presence of the U.S. Embassy in
Abuja. Americans showed little interest in this violence or the jihadist motivations of Boko
Harams operatives until the group began to target international entities. On August 26, 2011, a
suicide bomber drove a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) into the United
Nations (U.N.) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, killing over twenty people and injuring more than
80 others.11 Through this attack, the unpredictable and transient nature of Boko Harams tactics
manifested itself in a manner that directly impacted the United States and its allies.
Since last years attack on the U.N. building in Abuja, the Western media has increased
their coverage of Boko Haram, including the groups motivations and tactics, and the U.S.
government has increased their interest in the group from a policy perspective. In order to
evaluate the threat that Boko Haram presents to American citizens, it is critical to explore the
8
"Many Dead in Nigeria Market Blast - Africa - Al Jazeera English." Al Jazeera English. December 31, 2010.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010123120182342788.html.
9
Brock, Joe. "Nigerian Islamist Sect Claims Bomb Attack: Paper." Reuters. June 17, 2011.
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE75G0BF20110617?sp=true.
10
Eboh, Camillus. "Two Bombs Hit Nigerias This Day Newspaper offices." National Post. April 26, 2012.
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/04/26/two-bombs-hit-nigerias-this-day-newspaper-offices/.
11
evolution in their tactics and capabilities in order to determine whether they will continue to
target Westerners to gain attention and support for the Salafi jihadist movement in Nigeria and
beyond.
II. Literature Review

a. Nigeria: Longstanding Problems and New Issues
Much of the existing literature on the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria begins by
exploring the problems intrinsic to the state itself. In his recent book regarding the countrys
potential for state failure, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell writes that
economic frustrations and rampant ethnic tensions have made Nigeria an easily penetrable
stronghold for members of the Salafist jihad. Ambassador Campbell served as the Chief of
Mission in Abuja from 2004 to 2007, allowing him to evaluate the effectiveness of the countrys
transition back to democracy after years of military rule in 1999. Although Nigeria gained its
independence from Great Britain in 1960, its quest for democracy has been subverted by several
years of civil war and numerous military dictatorships. These dynamics were further aggravated
by the expansion of the oil industry in the country in the 1970s, which inspired a culture of longstanding political corruption that has lasted to the present day. 12
Campbell writes extensively on how the countrys oil reserves have influenced the
economy, facilitating the creation of a highly ineffective rentier state that squandered oil
revenues without bettering the conditions of the population. Due to the ineffectiveness of
government spending and extensive corruption, miscalculations regarding oil revenues
contributed to a massive national debt. While it is incorrect to state that the countrys economic
12
Campbell, John. "Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Council on Foreign Relations Books) [Hardcover]." Nigeria:
Dancing on the Brink (Council on Foreign Relations Books): 11.
struggles have directly contributed to the emergence of terrorist groups, Nigerias overwhelming
percentage of unemployed and disenfranchised youth does leave the population susceptible to the
influences of the Salafist jihad.
In addition, the countrys multitude of over two hundred different ethnicities mak es it
difficult to build political and social cooperation to address many of the countrys problems.
Because of the extensive number of the ethnic groups and the various tensions that exist between
them, it is difficult to ascertain which groups may be susceptible to the influences of the Salafist
jihad and willing to conduct terrorist acts in support of Boko Haram. Not only do the countrys
economic and ethnic tensions make it easier for the terrorist influence to take hold due to the lack
of opportunities or promising political future, but they also make it more difficult for the
government to adequately combat terrorism. Even if military and law enforcement entities are
effective at identifying and disbanding Boko Haram operations, the government will struggle to
offer members alternative economic opportunities outside a life of terrorism.
b. Religion and the Salafist Jihad in Nigeria
Nigerias lack of ethnic cohesion and ongoing political divisiveness are aggravated by the
countrys pronounced religious fault lines, with the Christian population residing in the southern
states and the Muslim population residing in the north. Campbell writes that Nigerian Muslims
and Christians have a marked disrespect for each other, and that other countries tend to have a
lack of understanding of the Muslim population in Nigeria because their objectives are
consistently misrepresented by the predominantly Christian-controlled media. Because
Christians dominate media coverage, including the portrayal of Muslims, it is easy for
Americans to overlook the strong dislike Nigerian Muslims harbor towards the United States.
Like most Muslims worldwide, public opinions towards the United States have rapidly
deteriorated in the aftermath of 9/11 and Americas invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. 13
Campbell writes that Nigerian Islam has been heavily influenced by Middle Eastern
Sunni ideology. To this end, many Nigerian Muslims support the implementation of Sharia law
throughout Nigeria or, in a more holistic sense, the transformation of Nigeria from a democratic
state to an Islamic caliphate. Northern cities like Kano and Maiduguri, both of which are Boko
Haram strongholds, already operate extensively under Sharia law. Women are extensively
required to wear veils in these locations and substances like pork and alcohol are banned. These
changes are of note not just because they illustrate the dichotomy between the Christian and
Muslim states, but because they illustrate the type of environments where violent extremism and
jihadist attitudes can take root. 14
As previously stated, many scholars and government officials have taken note of Boko
Haram due to the obvious motivations they share with al Qaeda and its affiliates. Discussions of
violent extremism in Nigeria became more prevalent in late 2009, after a Nigerian Muslim
named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, also known as the Underwear Bomber, attempted to
detonate an explosive device on a Christmas Day flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. At the time
U.S. policymakers accepted the story that Abdulmutallab had been indoctrinated by members of
AQAP and undergone training in Yemen, but hindsight suggests that the Underwear Bomber had
possibly been influenced by the Salafist jihad in his native Nigeria.
15
Campbell suggests that Osama bin Laden initiated attempts to motivate Nigerians
towards jihad in 2003, and that his violent rhetoric resonated among those who supported
13
Campbell, 42.
Campbell, 44.
15
Meyer, Josh, and Peter Nicholas. "Obama Calls Jet Incident a 'serious Reminder'" Los Angeles Times. December
29, 2009. http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009/dec/29/nation/la-na-plane-terror29-2009dec29.
14
Taliban-like regimes or embraced Sharia law. One particular individual who adhered to this type
of Islamic extremism, Mohammed Yusuf, went on to found Boko Haram and oppose Muslim
leaders who embraced tolerance. In 2009, Yusuf inspired his followers to take up arms against
government leaders that advocated for a non-violent form of Islam in Nigeria. This deadly
standoff, which began with a small skirmish between police officers and Boko Haram operatives
over traffic laws, eventually erupted into an extended conflict that led to the death of over 1,000
people in Nigerias northern states. 16 Yusuf was detained and later killed by Nigerian police in
the midst of the 2009 insurrection, memorializing him as a martyr-type figure to his followers. 17
In his book, Campbell argues that there are few established linkages between al Qaeda
and other threat groups and Boko Haram, which appears to be an entirely indigenous
movement. 18 This is interesting due to the fact that U.S. lawmakers have recently taken an
increased interest in Boko Haram due to the groups alleged connections with AQIM or even al
Qaeda senior leadership. 19 Instead of emphasizing the importance of Boko Harams connections
with other threat groups, Campbell instead notes that the groups ability to maintain a low profile
contributes to their lasting influence. He specifically states that followers collective ability to
melt back into the population may indicate that [Boko Haram] enjoys a measure of popular
support. 20 This type of information regarding the groups ability to function within Nigerian
society is critical when illustrating the types of tactics available when conducting operations.
c. Boko Haram: Goals and Evolving Tactics
16
Bavier, Joe. "Nigeria: Boko Haram 101." Boko Haram 101: Introduction to Nigeria's Terrorists. January 17, 2012.
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/nigeria-boko-haram-terrorist-group-islam-christian-church-targets-youth-military.
17
"Nigeria's Boko Haram Chief 'killed' - Africa - Al Jazeera English." Al Jazeera English. July 31, 2009.
http://www.aljazeera.com/NEWS/AFRICA/2009/07/2009730174233896352.html.
18
Campbell, 54.
19
Brock, Joe. "Nigeria Security Officers Held over Suspected Militant Links." Reuters. September 30, 2012.
http://af.reuters.com/article/nigerNews/idAFL6E8KU0VM20120930.
20
Campbell, 54.
In a separate publication particularly geared towards evaluating the Nigerian

governments response towards terrorism, Ambassador Campbell writes about the relatively
inscrutable and broad nature of Boko Harams political and religious objectives. Campbell
alleges that, The goals of Boko Haram's adherents range from the release of their sympathizers
from prison and the enforcement of Sharia in areas where it is already formally in place to the
establishment of God's kingdom on earth and the destruction of the secular state, to be replaced
by an Islamic one. 21
Other scholars, including Obafemi Awolowo Universitys Abimbola O. Adesoji, allege
that Boko Harams goals mimic those of previous Nigerian Islamic insurrections in rejecting
Western civilization and its products, and the enforcement of strict Islam. 22 Some have gone a
step further by likening Boko Harams motivations to those of a traditional insurgency, claiming
that the groups rejection of Western ideas and products has resulted in their ultimate objective
of creating an Islamic caliphate in Northern Nigeria. 23 In some ways it is difficult to evaluate the
validity of these claims since so many northern cities have already embraced Sharia law,
negating the need for any type of government overthrow.
In addition to his assertions that Boko Haram has a variety of different motivations,
possibly to the point of randomness, Campbell states that the major shift in the groups tactics
occurred when operatives chose to target the U.N. headquarters in Abuja. Specifically, he asserts
that, Until the attack on the UN building, Boko Haram had waged its battle locally, primarily
targeting facilities and personnel deemed un-Islamic or complicit with the Nigerian federal
21
Adesoji, Abimbola O. "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the
Nigerian State." Africa Today 57, no. 4 (Summer 2011).
23
Yusufu Bagaji, Ali. "Boko Haram and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to Impose Religious
Ideology through Terrorism?" Cross-cultural Communication 8, no. 1 (2012).
22
10
government, such as army barracks, police checkpoints, beer halls, brothels, local and federal
officials, and in a few cases, churches and Christian clergy. 24 While the U.N. attack did
represent the noted shift in operations that finally attracted significant attention from Western
governments and media outlets, further exploration into the groups tactics must be done to
confirm that a more nuanced evolution has not taken place, perhaps indicating the groups shift
from a terrorist group to a more formalized insurgency.
III. Evaluating the Influence of the Salafist Jihad in Nigeria before and after the Attack on
the U.N. Building in Abuja
Since the attack on the United Nations building, Boko Haram has received sustained
attention from Western media outlets, academic publications and think tanks, and, perhaps most
importantly, the United States Congress. These entities are questioning why the Salafist jihad has
manifested itself in Nigeria at this point in time, as well as what connections Boko Haram has, if
any, to global jihadist movements. In addition, the United States government is attempting to
qualify the severity of the threat that Boko Haram operatives present to both the U.S. homeland
and to Americans living and traveling in Nigeria. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of
these questions while recognizing that Boko Harams alleged lack of cohesion makes it difficult
to evaluate the groups motivations and predict the nature of their future operations. In brief, this
paper will ask the following: What are Boko Harams goals and what tactics is the group
implementing in order to realize these goals? How have the American and Nigerian governments
responded to these evolving tactics and does this response indicate that Boko Haram is achieving
some degree of success?
24
11
In order to answer these questions, it is critical to evaluate the existing literature

regarding how Boko Haram was able to gain a following as a threat group in Nigeria, how their
goals and tactics have evolved over the past decade, and how the U.S. government and private
sector is responding to the perceived threat through new security policies and procedures. To
date, the United States government is increasing their attention towards Boko Haram in order to
evaluate whether the group poses a threat to the U.S. homeland, in conjunction with al Qaeda
affiliates like al-Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 25 The fact that U.S.
decision-makers are attempting to evaluate whether the group will permeate the United States is
indicative of experts increasing concern that Boko Harams tactics will be exported out of
Nigeria and Western Africa in support of the global jihadist cause.
In support of my research, I will conduct an extensive content analysis of major Western
publications and United States government documents in order to evaluate their increased
coverage of the group and its capabilities, as well as their predictions on the threat presented to
the U.S. homeland and to U.S. citizens living and working in Nigeria. By analyzing the coverage
related to Boko Haram in Western media sources and government publications, my research will
reveal how the group is gaining international legitimacy and more advanced tactical capabilities
in the eyes of U.S. policymakers and reporters. My research will also attempt to evaluate how
U.S. policymakers are responding to Boko Haram based upon the groups apparent growth from
a loosely defined Islamic insurgency to an organized terrorist group with rapidly evolving
technical capabilities.
25
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. LRA, BOKO HARAM, ALSHABAAB, AQIM
ANDOTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN AFRICA. 112th Cong., 2d sess. H. Bill. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 2012.
12
In an attempt to properly address the research questions outlined above, I utilize the longterm, historical implications of the writings of Nigerian scholars like Ambassador John Campbell
in conjunction with current analysis of Boko Harams goals and tactics being produced in realtime, chiefly in support of policy implementation and government decision-making. The
scholarly works produced by Campbell, Abimbola O. Adesoji, and Ali S. Yusufu Bagaji, tend to
focus on Boko Harams religious and political evolution within Nigeria in the context of the
countrys Islamic tradition. These scholars focus their research on the economic, historical, and
political origins of the movement without heavily exploring Boko Harams current motivations
and capabilities as a threat group. Their contributions are vital in providing long-term context but
lacking in terms of making short-term predictions regarding threats to the U.S. homeland or U.S.
government and private sector entities living and operating in Nigeria.
In order to improve upon the predictive quality of some of these texts, I will supplement
them with U.S. government publications, such as reports authored by Lauren Ploch, the
Specialist in African Affairs for the U.S. Congress. Ploch has researched Nigeria from the
American perspective for some time, and her products note the shift in U.S. interest towards
Boko Haram in the aftermath of the August 2011 bombing on the U.N. building in Abuja. Since
that attack, the U.S. Congress (as well as American think tanks, academic institutions, and other
research entities) have shown a marked increase in interest in Boko Harams ability to inflict
harm to American persons and facilities. However, in their efforts to identify immediate policy
solutions, these publications often jump to conclusions or heavily contradict each other. They
also fall short in their ability to provide meaningful context when discussing Boko Harams
aspirations as an extremist group, often striving to link operatives to other jihadist elements
without substantial explanation as to why or how the groups objectives coincide. By evaluating
13
both the academic texts and the policy documents described I will be able to articulate a fuller
picture regarding Boko Harams relationship with other threat groups and ability to inflict harm
upon Americans based upon their intentions and capabilities.
In addition to a review of the academic texts and policy documents available on Boko
Haram, I provide a content analysis of the print media articles available prior to the groups
bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja and following this brutal attack. The purpose of this
methodological approach is to evaluate whether the evolution of Boko Harams tactics and
intentions poses an increasing threat to the U.S. homeland and American people based upon realtime reporting. The U.N. bombing represents a critical juncture in Boko Harams development as
an extremist group because it was the groups first attack using a Suicide Vehicle-borne
Improvised Explosive Device (SBVIED), a tactic that the group continues to use on an almost
weekly basis in bombings on Christian churches throughout northern Nigeria. 26
In addition, the U.N. bombing served as Boko Harams first well-known attempt to target
an international entity instead of their traditional targets, such as Christians and Nigerian
government officials. This represents a troubling shift that could indicate that Boko Haram is
seeking to attract alliances with al Qaeda and its affiliates or to expand its footprint to other parts
of Africa and beyond. Finally, prior to mid-2011 Boko Haram largely kept its activities confined
to Nigerias most northern states, but the groups willingness to expand its activities further
south signaled a dangerous transition to the U.S. government and the diplomats employed at the
American Embassy in Abuja. See the map below for a visual representation states ruled by
Sharia law in Nigeria, a useful illustration of the areas that Boko Haram has successfully
infiltrated.
26
"Nigeria." Nigeria. June 21, 2012. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5739.html
14
*See Footnote 27 for Map Citation
As shown above, Abuja is directly on the dividing line between the democratically
governed south and Muslim northern states ruled by Sharia law. 27 Abuja is a planned metropolis
in central Nigeria far removed from the pollution and crime of the more densely populated Niger
Delta region. While the southern states surrounding the Delta are home to over twenty thousand
Americans, mostly employed by the plethora of U.S. oil companies operating in Nigeria, Abuja
has a comparatively small American population. 28 On a recent trip to Abuja, I was able to
interview several U.S. government officials regarding how they felt the U.N. bombing had
27
"Life and Death in the Middle Belt: A Clash of Civilizations in Nigeria." SPIEGEL ONLINE. January 6, 2010.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/life-and-death-in-the-middle-belt-a-clash-of-civilizations-in-nigeria-a670178-2.html.
28
"Background Note: Nigeria." U.S. Department of State. April 19, 2012.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm
15
shifted attitudes towards the Salafist jihad in Nigeria. One security professional told me that
Abuja had been a relatively safe and quiet post for Americans until approximately June 2011,
when Boko Haram attacked the Nigerian Police Headquarters. 29
Following this attack, American officials felt increasingly insecure when visiting
Nigerian government buildings. When the U.N. building was attacked just two months later,
Americans doubted their ability to conduct business and diplomacy, as well as safely go about
their daily lives in Abuja. One of the most disturbing elements of the bombing was the proximity
between the U.N. building and the American International School, where many American
children matriculate while residing in Nigeria. 30 Americans feared for their own safety and the
safety of their families in Abuja and began to greatly limit their personal and professional travel
around the city. While these comments represent the opinions of a few select individuals, they
demonstrate the role the U.N. bombing played in changing perceptions regarding the threat Boko
Haram presents to Americans and the U.S. homeland. A chief purpose of this paper will be to
evaluate some of these perceptions when contextualized with the groups tactical ability to inflict
harm on the U.S. and its citizens. 31
Finally, it is necessary to better qualify Boko Harams tactical capabilities because the
United States government is currently determining the amount of resources it will dedicate to
combating the groups influence in Nigeria. On August 9, 2012, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton visited Abuja to meet with President Goodluck Jonathan to renew an offer to help
Nigeria marshal military and intelligence resources against a growing extremist threat that U.S.
29
"Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists 'bombed Abuja Police HQ'" BBC. June 17, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13805688.
30
"American International School, Abuja." American International School Abuja. http://www.aisabuja.com/.
31
Interview 2. September 13, 2012.
16
officials fear could spread to neighboring nations. 32 Since the United States is already
responsible for fulfilling similar commitments in Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and a number
of other high threat states, it is vital to appropriately gauge the threat posed by the Salafist jihad
in Nigeria when allocating American counterterrorism resources.
IV. Content Analysis of Coverage of the Salafist Jihad Prior to the Attack on the United
Nations Building in Abuja
Boko Harams existence was initially noted in African publications in 2009, when outlets
such as Nigerias This Day newspaper and AllAfrica.com consistently reported on the smaller
attacks occurring in the northern states. In fact, only these types of African publications reported
on the death of Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf, Boko Harams de facto leader that was detained and
then executed in an extrajudicial killing by Nigerian police. 33 This was a critical juncture in Boko
Harams evolution as a group because it helped create a martyr-type figure for the loosely
affiliated group members to identify with and rally around. The fact that this event was largely
ignored by the Western media indicates that the United States and its allies were slow to
recognize the growing strength of the Salafist jihad in Nigeria. In subsequent articles, Western
publications have referenced the importance of Boko Harams attack on the police headquarters
in Maiduguri and Mohammed Yusufs resulting detainment and death, but there was not
significant coverage of the event at the time. 34
32
Gearan, Anne. "U.S. Offers Help to Nigeria to Fight Terror Group." Washington Post. August 10, 2012.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-offers-help-to-nigeria-to-fight-terror-group/2012/08/09/98820a60-e26e11e1-89f7-76e23a982d06_story.html.
33
Haruna, Mohammed. "Nigeria: The Meaning of the Boko Haram Massacre." AllAfrica (Abuja, Nigeria), August 5,
2009.
34
Nossiter, Adam. "Prison Raid In Nigeria Releases Hundreds." The New York Times. September 09, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/world/africa/09nigeria.html.
17
One of the first major acts attributed to members of Boko Haram reported on in Western
media outlets was the Bauchi prison break of October 2010. This attack was significant because,
like the death of Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf, it allowed the groups members to generate public
support and cultivate a more substantial following. This attack showed more significa nt
coordination and preparation than prior acts of violence conducted by Boko Haram, and resulted
in the release of over seven hundred prisoners that owed their new found freedom to members of
the Salafist jihad. By releasing these prisoners, many of which were already adherents to Islamic
extremist ideology, Boko Haram built up a de facto army willing to participate in subsequent
attacks. The Daily Mail newspaper noted that this attack was significant due both the level of
coordination evident in the over two hundred operatives responsible for conducting the attacks,
as well as the advanced nature of the weapons and improvised explosive devices found outside
the Bauchi prison. 35
In 2011, Boko Haram adopted new tactics to generate funds and raise its international
profile by engaging in high profile political assassinations and kidnappings. On January 28,
2011, the group killed a Borno State All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) gubernatorial candidate
and several of his political associates. 36 This attack held little significance for the U.S. and was
not reported on in American media publications. Perhaps more alarmingly, in May 2011 Boko
Haram operatives kidnapped two foreign nationals, a Briton and an Italian, from their homes in
Kebbi state. This is significant because it indicates that Boko Haram targeted Westerners prior to
the U.N. bombing. Although the latter incident continues to serve as the groups first large-scale
35
"Prison Break: Violent Muslim Sect Frees 750 Prisoners from Nigerian Jail Sparking Fears of Direct Assault on
Government." Mail Online. September 9, 2010. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1310377/Muslim-sectfrees-750-prisoners-Nigerian-jail.html.
36
"AllAfrica." AllAfrica.com: Nigeria: 2011 U.S. Terrorism Report: Nigeria (Page 1 of 3). July 31, 2012.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201208011105.html.
18
attack on an international target, the kidnapping indicates that the motivations were present long
before they captured the attention of American policymakers. News coverage of the kidnapping
indicates how little was known about Boko Haram outside of Western Africa prior to the U.N.
bombing. A BBC article refers to the Boko Haram operatives involved with the kidnapping
simply as armed gunmen and even notes that kidnappings are usually initiated by MEND in
the southern states of Nigeria. 37
The general lack of awareness and media reporting surrounding Boko Haram and its
capabilities persisted until the summer of 2011. Approximately one week prior to the attack on
the U.N. building, Adam Nossiter, the West Africa bureau chief for the New York Times,
published an extensive profile on Boko Haram and its coordination with other African jihadist
groups. In the article, Nossiter initially refers to the group as an Islamist insurgency, giving the
impression that most readers would be unfamiliar with Boko Haram. He notes that:
Just two years ago, the Islamist group stalking police officers in this bustling city seemed
on the verge of extinction. In a heavy-handed assault, Nigeria soldier shelled its
headquarters and killed its leader, leaving a grisly tableau of charred ruins, hundreds
dead, and outmatched members of the group, known as Boko Haram, struggling to fight
back, sometimes with little more than bows and arrows. 38
By referencing the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, Nossiter reminds us that Boko
Haram has been operating in Nigeria for some time. This begs the question of whether the U.N.
bombing actually represents a major shift in the groups intentions and capabilities, or whether
37
"Nigeria Gunmen Kidnap Briton and Italian in Kebbi." BBC News. May 13, 2011.
38
Nossiter, Adam. "Islamist Threat With Qaeda Link Grows In Nigeria." The New York Times. August 18, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/africa/18nigeria.html?pagewanted=all.
19
Boko Harams steady growth was merely overlooked by U.S. journalists and policy makers due
to the lack of U.S. equities that were targeted prior to this incident. It is important to make this
distinction regarding the perceived threat climate versus the reality in order to assess the danger
Boko Haram presents to Americans and the U.S. homeland.
V. Content Analysis of Coverage of the Salafist Jihad in the Aftermath of the Attack on the
United Nations Building in Abuja
While Western media outlets did begin to report more frequently on Boko Harams
activities in the aftermath of the Bauchi prison break and the previously mentioned attack on
Mammy market in December 2010, the group received little recognition by United States
policymakers until operatives began to engage in attacks of international significance. A U.S.
Institute of Peace article published in June 2012 states that while Boko Haram has been known to
the U.S. government since 2004, major violence has only been initiated from the group since
August 2011, coinciding directly with the U.N. bombings. 39 Jennifer G. Cooke, Director of the
Africa Program for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, gave a slightly more
nuanced account on the significance of the U.N. bombings in her testimony before Congress in
November 2011. Cooke states that the U.N. bombings not only propelled the group to
international notoriety but demonstrated that the Nigerian government was unprepared to
combat the Boko Harams growing influence in a coherent, strategic, and calibrated way. 40
39
Walker, Andrew. "What Is Boko Haram?" United States Institute of Peace. June 2012.
http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram
40
Cooke, Jennifer. "Hearing on Boko HaramEmerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland." Proceedings of House
Committee on Homeland Security: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 311 Canon House Office
Building, Washington, D.C. 2011.
20
Cookes testimony in front of the House Committee on Homeland Security resulted from
the increased Congressional interest in Boko Haram in the aftermath of the U.N. attack. Boko
Harams willingness to attack an international target like the U.N. caused policymakers to view
the group as part of the global jihadist movement instead of an organization chiefly confined to
West Africa. These assumptions were supported by reports coming from Nigeria, where the local
Christian population refers to Boko Haram as the Nigerian Taliban. 41 Prior to associating Boko
Haram with the global Salafist jihad, Congress had little interest in Nigeria beyond issues that
threatened oil production and the success of American extractives companies in the southern
states. A recent congressional report on Nigeria, written by African analyst Lauren Ploch,
highlights American policymakers previous perception of Boko Haram as the Nigerian
governments problem by stating that until 2011 the groups activities were limited in scope
and contained within several highly impoverished states in the predominately Muslim
northeast. 42
Plochs assessment for Congress confirms the findings that I came across through my
content analysis regarding Boko Harams evolving tactics. Ploch alleges that the groups
methods have altered since 2010, when attacks increasingly featured improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), car bombs, and suicide attacks. 43 In addition, Ploch explores the nature of Boko
Harams financing strategy, noting that the group is increasingly utilizing bank robberies and
kidnappings in order to generate funds. As I stated in my earlier section regarding Boko Harams
kidnapping efforts, these developments are important because they reveal a greater level of
41
http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram.
42
Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service, July 18, 2012.
43
Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service, July 18, 2012.
21
organization and future planning than has been attributed to Boko Haram operatives in the past,
possibly indicating that a more cohesive strategy is evolving in support of concrete goals.
In a recent congressional publication evaluating Boko Harams status as an emerging
threat to the U.S. homeland, the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security
begins by stating the following findings:
FINDINGS BY COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY:

1. Boko Haram has quickly evolved and poses an emerging threat to U.S. interests and
the U.S. homeland.
2. Boko Haram has the intent and may be developing capability to coordinate on a
rhetorical and operational level with al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and al Shabaab.
3. Boko Harams evolution in targeting and tactics closely tracks that of other al-Qaeda
affiliates that have targeted the U.S. homeland, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula(AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
4. The U.S. Intelligence Community largely underestimated the potential for al-Qaeda
affiliate groups to target the U.S. homeland, wrongly assessing they had only regional
ambitions and threats against the U.S. homeland were merely aspirational.
5. The United States should work with the Government of Nigeria to build
counterterrorism and intelligence capability to effectively counter Boko Haram. 44
44
United States of America. Committee on Homeland Security. House of Representatives. Boko Haram: Emerging
Threat to the US Homeland. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011.
22
There are several critical elements to note regarding these recommendations. Perhaps
most importantly, the findings note that Boko Harams evolution in targeting and tactics to
similar to that of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP). I would argue that this is a misleading and inflammatory statement because these groups
are considered Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), while Boko Haram has not been granted
that distinction by the Department of State at this time. 45 In addition, the findings note that Boko
Haram should be considered a threat to the U.S. homeland because in the past the U.S.
intelligence community has incorrectly assessed the intentions of al Qaeda and its affiliates and
that policymakers should coordinate counterterrorism efforts with Nigeria based upon this
premise. If this is the case, the United States should be prepared to coordinate extensive
counterterrorism efforts with every country housing state or non-state actors with aspirations to
target the U.S. homeland. The U.S. simply does not have the resources to launch such extensive
global counterterrorism operations and doing so would arguably make America and its citizens
even greater targets, as proven by the controversial nature of the ill-fated Global War on
Terror.46
In addition to Congress fears that Boko Haram is targeting the homeland, other
testimony indicates that policymakers believe the group will shift its tactics to increasingly target
Westerners operating overseas, as in the case of the U.N. bombing. In recent testimony to the
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs Don Yamamoto noted that Boko Harams tactics have expanded in scale and improved in
45
"Foreign Terrorist Organizations." U.S. Department of State. September 28, 2012.

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
46
Zalman, Amy, and Jonathan Clarke. "The Global War on Terror: A Narrative in Need of a Rewrite [Full Text]."
The Global War on Terror: A Narrative in Need of a Rewrite [Full Text]. June 24, 2009.
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/23_2/essays/002.
23
sophistication in recent years, and that the Department of State is continuing to seriously
evaluate the threat to American interests in Nigeria. That being said, Assistant Secretary
Yamamoto stressed that the Department of State continues to believe that Boko Haram
operatives have responded principally to security and political developments within
Nigeria. 47
Despite Assistant Secretary Yamamotos assurances to Congress, the State Department
has strict travel restrictions for U.S. government personnel traveling to Nigeria and advises all
Americans to avoid all but essential travel to the countrys northern states. 48 The Travel
Warning for Nigeria states that the risk of continued attacks by Boko Haram remains high for all
Westerners working and traveling in Nigeria and lists the wide range of attacks the group has
conducted, as well as the tactics commonly utilized by operatives. The Travel Warning also goes
into detail regarding the 140 international kidnappings that have taken place in Nigeria since
2010, but the facts presented in this section of the report are somewhat misleading. Along with
the kidnappings that took place in the northern states, the Travel Warning also details incidents
that occurred in Lagos and Port Harcourt. Because Boko Haram has not infiltrated the Christian
south at this time, it is almost certain that MEND was responsible for these kidnappings, not
Boko Haram. While the Travel Warning exists merely to report threats to the traveling U.S.
public, not to analyze those threats, this should serve as a reminder that not all acts of violence
that take place in Nigeria are attributable to Boko Haram.
Based upon the variety of threats that exist within Nigeria, as well as the varying
accounts of Boko Harams capabilities presented in U.S. government documents, it is difficult to
47
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. LRA, BOKO HARAM, ALSHABAAB, AQIM ANDOTHER
SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN AFRICA. 112th Cong., 2d sess. H. Bill. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 2012.
48
24
assess the accurate evolution of Boko Harams tactics and capabilities. To this end, I would like
to present several new trends that suggest the group is growing more powerful and adding to its
extremist qualifications. In recent months, Boko Haram has expanded their target set to include
schools in northern Nigeria. The group has attacked schools in the same way it has attacked
Christian churches and gathering places, by lighting them on fire or blowing them up with
crudely made IEDs. 49 This new target set is disturbing because it points to a more indiscriminate
type of destruction and seeks to cripple the little infrastructure that currently exists in northern
Nigeria. Due to a lack of funding and the fear of further attacks by Boko Haram, Nigerian
officials have made little effort to identify other educational opportunities for Nigerian students
whose schools have been destroyed. Through this new, devastating tactic, Boko Haram has
proved itself to be particularly adept at belittling the Nigerian government and pointing out their
inadequacy to their constituents.
Many allege that Boko Harams willingness to target Nigerian government officials
suggests that there is a method to their madness. In January 2012 Boko Haram launched their
deadliest attack to date in Kano, in which the group targeted a total of eight government
buildings with a combination of coordinated bombings, suicide bombings, and shootings. 50
In an article describing the attack, Adam Nossiter notes that Boko Haram operatives believe they
are combating a greedy and corrupt government as part of a legitimate insurgency. Nossiter
insists that the U.S. government is misleading both the Nigerian and American public in its
assertions that Boko Harams alleged connections with AQIM and other terrorist groups make it
49
Nossiter, Adam. "Wielding Fire, Islamists Target Nigeria Schools." The New York Times. March 26, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/in-nigeria-boko-haram-targets-schools.html?pagewanted=all.
50
Nossiter, Adam. "Dozens Killed by Radical Islamic Group in Nigeria." The New York Times. January 22, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/world/africa/dozens-killed-by-radical-islamic-sect-in-nigeria.html?ref=nigeria.
25
a foreign organization.51 In fact, Boko Harams motivations are inspired by decades of

domestic discontent causes by government inefficiency and corruption.
Along with their willingness to attack schools and government entities in order to shame
the Nigerian government, Boko Haram is mimicking the efforts of other jihadist groups by
embracing a type of public relations campaign to attract international attention. On September
30, 2012, Boko Harams de facto leader Abubakar Shekau released a video asserting that the
jihad in Nigeria shares the same goals as other global Islamist groups, including those operating
in Mali, as well as North East Africa and South Central Asia. Shekau directly threatens America,
the United Kingdom, and Israel, noting that jihad will not stop simply because its leaders are
killed.52 While this video creates the impression that Boko Haram serves as a direct threat to
Americans and the U.S. homeland, much of the existing literature on the group suggests that a
more nuanced viewpoint should be taken.
To this end, a number of African scholars agree with Adam Nossiters assertions that
Boko Haram should not be viewed as a foreign organization, claiming that bestowing
international credibility upon the group plays directly into their hand. In May 2012, a group of
African scholars wrote an open letter to Secretary Clinton urging her not to designating Boko
Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In their words, An FTO designation would
internationalize Boko Harams standing and enhance its status among radical organizations
elsewhere.53 In addition, these scholars allege that Boko Harams motivations and activities
have an overwhelmingly domestic focus. Since then, the Department of State has made a
51
Nossiter, Adam. "In Nigeria, a Deadly Group's Rage Has Local Roots." The New York Times. February 26, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/world/africa/in-northern-nigeria-boko-haram-stirs-fear-andsympathy.html?pagewanted=all.
52
Smith, M.J. "AFP: Boko Haram Leader Salutes Global Jihadists in Video: SITE." AFP. November 30, 2012.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jhFbjEVx178EynTYduTBMMehSVA?docId=CNG.8bd6ab7ecb8bf4df76476d42d50048b7.3c1.
53
"AllAfrica." AllAfrica.com: Nigeria: Letter to Secretary Clinton from Nigeria Scholars (Page 1 of 2). May 21,
2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201205230006.html
26
compromise of sorts by naming Shekau and two other senior leaders within the group as foreign
terrorists without giving the group as a whole the FTO designation.
In a recent editorial to the New York Times, Jean Herskovitz articulates the issue with
conflating Boko Harams motivations with those of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Herskovitz states
the following to assert that Boko Harams intentions and capabilities are still relatively
underdeveloped:
But the news media and American policymakers are chasing an elusive and ill-defined
threat; there is no proof that a well-organized, ideologically coherent terrorist group
called Boko Haram even exists today. Evidence suggests instead that, while the original
core of the group remains active, criminal gangs have adopted the name Boko Haram to
claim responsibility for attacks when it suits them. 54
Herskovitz notes that Boko Haram only turned to violent tactics in the aftermath of the
extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, a fact agreed upon by Adam Nossiter. Herskovitz,
Nossiter, and other African scholars note that most of Nigerias issues date back to long before
the emergence of Boko Haram, resulting from unrelenting poverty and government corruption.
In Jennifer Cookes testimony to Congress she states that, Boko Haram is a product of
deepening economic decline in the north, which has resulted in disrespect for the government
authorities that ignore and their disenfranchised constituents. The governments extrajudicial
killing of Mohammed Yusuf and aggressive counterterrorism tactics have only further alienated
the northern population, perhaps even generating greater respect for Boko Haram. 55
54
Herskovitz, Jean. "In Nigeria, Boko Haram Is Not the Problem." New York Times. January 2, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/in-nigeria-boko-haram-is-not-the-problem.html?pagewanted=all.
55
27
V. Conclusions: Do Boko Harams Evolving Tactics Present an Increased Threat to

Americans and the U.S. Homeland?
The increased attention that Boko Haram is receiving in the Western media is creating a
more polarizing climate in Nigeria. While the U.S. government and military allege that Boko
Harams tactics are becoming more sophisticated, it is my opinion that the increased media
attention awarded to the group in the aftermath of the bombing on the U.N. building in Abuja has
helped raise Boko Harams international profile and increase their legitimacy as an extremist
group. Although the sophistication of the attacks in Damaturu and Mammy Market was already
quite high, Boko Haram did not begin generating significant awareness with Western media
outlets and government publications until 2011, two full years after the group began conducting
complex attacks in Nigeria.
The overwhelming amount of reporting that has surfaced in the sixteen months following
the U.N. bombing calls to questions whether Boko Haram is becoming more dangerous as an
extremist organization or if American policymakers are overestimating the groups intentions
and capabilities. The findings from my content analysis suggest that while Boko Harams tactics
have become more advanced, the group does not present a viable threat to the U.S. homeland.
While Boko Haram seeks to conflate its capabilities and intentions with those of al Qaeda and
other global jihadist organizations, this is mostly a show of pageantry to undermine the Nigerian
government and gain international clout. The Department of State was correct in its decision not
to designate Boko Haram as an FTO because the group does not have the ability to take on
foreign missions in support of its jihadist goals at this time. Even more importantly, while Boko
28
Harams tactics have inarguably become more sophisticated and its target set has become larger,
the groups intentions doe not coincide directly with the global Salafist jihad.
Many scholars assert that it is impossible to view Boko Haram as part of the global
jihadist group because the organization has so many factions. It is difficult to attribute one set of
intentions to Boko Haram because the organization has at least three different splinter groups.
The first faction of Boko Haram was developed following the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed
Yusuf and most closely resembles a jihadist organization. This group is led by Abubakar Shekau,
but its leadership structure has faltered and become fractionalized since Yusufs death. The
second faction of Boko Haram serves as the groups anti-government wing and strives to
undermine President Jonathans administration. Finally, the third wing does not necessarily have
any political motivations and merely uses Boko Haram as a cover for other types of criminal
activity, such as kidnapping. 56 Boko Harams fractured nature and affinity towards domestic
operations makes it difficult to believe that the group would or could attack the U.S. homeland
on behalf of the Salafist jihad.
That being said, the group continues to wreak havoc on Nigerias national infrastructure
and thwart the countrys ability to rise above its legacy of poverty, violence, and corruption. For
the past year fifteen states in northern Nigeria have been under a national state of emergency,
and many of these have curfews or travel restrictions. In addition, the violence initiated by Boko
Haram in Nigeria is often supplemented with acts of aggression by MEND in the southern states,
tribal skirmishes, and political violence. American citizens have extensive travel restrictions
56
29
throughout both northern and southern Nigeria, making it difficult to conduct business and
diplomacy within the state.57
My findings suggest that while Boko Haram does not pose as significant threat to the
U.S. homeland at this time, the group will continue to target American citizens throughout
northern Nigeria and in Abuja. In addition, the ongoing religious tension that already exists
between Nigerias northern states could be exacerbated if the group attempts to conduct attacks
south of Abuja. Infiltration of Nigerias southern states would undoubtedly incite waves of ethnic
and religious tension that could result in a major civil conflict. This type of incident is arguably
more threatening to the American population that any danger Boko Haram poses to the U.S.
homeland. If Boko Haram transitions its operations to the south, the civil unrest that would erupt
would endanger U.S. oil companies and the large American population residing in Nigerias
southern states. U.S. goals in Nigeria should focus on mitigating the influence of Boko Harams
extremist agenda to prevent the groups infiltration of the south and the resulting civil strife that
would erupt throughout the country.
VI. Policy Implications and Future Directions

In a recent U.S. Institute of Peace report on Boko Haram, author Andrew Walker
evaluates how the U.S. might best combat the influence of the Salafist jihad and the threat the
group presents to Americans. 58 Walker astutely points out that the U.S. should be wary of
providing tactical military support due to Americas historical legacy of infringing upon the
sovereignty of other nations and supporting unjust regimes in states such as Egypt and Libya.
57
"Nigeria." Nigeria. June 21, 2012. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5739.html

58
30
More specifically, Walker notes that the AQIM officers responsible for the March 2012 coup in
Mali had been trained by the U.S. military during the conflict in Afghanistan.59 This serves as a
reminder that the U.S. has a long-standing reputation of placing the tools for violence into the
wrong hands and, much more egregiously, of using intervention as a means of oppression.
The U.S. Embassy in Nigeria has already identified the need to distance itself from the
Nigerian security and intelligence services due to their willingness to employ excessive violence
in their efforts to defeat Boko Haram. In a recent speech by Michael H. Posner, Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the U.S. Consulate in Lagos
asserted that they do not support the Nigerian governments more nefarious counterterrorism
tactics including mass arrests, extra-judicial killings, torture, and prolonged detention without
due process of law. 60 Ambassador John Campbell reaffirmed the need for Nigeria and the U.S.
to combat Boko Harams influence through nonviolent means in a recent article. Campbell states
that the U.S. should urge President Jonathan to address what are essentially political problems:
poverty and the corruption-driven alienation felt by the population of northern Nigeria. 61
Campbells policy recommendations are indicative of the findings from my content analysis.
While Boko Haram does pose a significant through to U.S. citizens living and working in
Nigeria, American policymakers should opt for counterterrorism strategies that address Nigerias
systemic poverty and widespread corruption instead of embracing violence that could further
alienate the Muslim population in Africa.
59
"Council on Foreign Relations." Council on Foreign Relations. October 15, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/northafrica/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717.
60
"United States Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria." Statement by Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor - Lagos, Nigeria. November 16, 2012.
http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/statement_11192012.html
61
31
Based upon my analysis of Boko Harams intentions and capabilities to date, my

recommendation is to provide significant tactical and monetary support to the combating violent
extremism (CVE) program in northern Nigeria to fight the spread of the Salafi jihadist influence
among vulnerable populations. To date, current counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria are focused
on professionalizing local law enforcement, mitigating widespread corruption and financial
fraud, combating violent extremism, and coordinating all of these efforts in other nations in West
Africa and beyond. The following summarizes all of these efforts and argues for U.S. support to
Nigerias CVE program as the most effective way to mitigate the threat that Boko Haram
presents to Americans while maximizing available resources.
Counterterrorism efforts in northern Nigeria currently consist of four different
components, several of which should continue to be solely under the control of the Nigerian
government. One of these components includes efforts to draft stricter antiterrorism legislation
and enable local law enforcement officials to better withhold these laws. While the U.S. can and
does make efforts to coordinate with Nigerian law enforcement officials, a U.S. counterterrorism
official recently told me that, Attempting to mitigate corruption within the Nigerian law
enforcement is like trying to empty the ocean with a bucket. 62 By passing the Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2011, the National Assembly made impressive progress in following
international standards in order to properly apprehend and prosecute terrorists, but law
enforcement agencies still have a long way to go in terms of identifying specific counterterrorism
roles and responsibilities. 63 While the United States government can continue to coordinate with
the Nigerians on these efforts, more extensive support should be withheld until the new
legislation is operating more effectively and Nigerian law enforcement agencies have made
62
Interview 1: September 10, 2012.

Eboh, Camillus. "Nigeria Senate Passes Maiden Anti-terrorism Act." Reuters. February 18, 2011.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/ozatp-nigeria-terrorism-idAFJOE71H02L20110218.
63
32
strides in mitigating the corruption within these ranks. If the U.S. chooses to take a more active
role at this point in time, significant funding will be wasted on law enforcement efforts with illdefined purposes, or, in a worst case scenario, smuggled by corrupt officials.
In addition to efforts to bolster counterterrorism legislation and professionalize law
enforcement, Nigerians must recognize that terrorism in Africa is an issue that transcends
borders. AFRICOM Commander Carter Ham has supported this assertion by claiming that Boko
Haram has ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali and Algeria and perhaps
even al-Shabaab in Somalia, located across the continent. Coordination between the two groups
can be viewed through Boko Harams increased willingness to use AQIMs tactics to achieve
their goals, specifically their recent adoption of kidnapping as a tool to raise funds and generate
global awareness. Ham cites that one of his greatest fears in terms of the African terrorist threat
is the potential coordination between the West African and East African groups cited above,
which would potentially create a Salafist insurgency across the entire continent. 64
To this end, the Nigerian government has made strides to cooperate with other African
governments in order to better combat terrorist groups that can move easily through the
continents porous borders. Specifically, Nigeria has joined the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) in order to develop a joint counterterrorism strategy with neighboring
states, as well as to confront issues related to terrorist financing. The latter is especially
important because if Boko Haram is able to generate substantial funding, they have a greater
chance of attracting the attention and support of al Qaeda senior leadership. Some of the efforts
to curb terrorist financing will likely be mitigated by the governments efforts to curb corruption
in law enforcement. In addition, Nigeria has entered the Inter-Governmental Action Group
64
"Boko Haram Seen Linked to Other African Terror Groups." VOA. December 26, 2011.
http://www.voanews.com/content/boko-haram-seen-linked-to-other-african-terror-groups--136260858/150015.html.
33
Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) which works in partnership with ECOWAS
to evaluate the financial integrity of fifteen African states and provide training to detect fraud
and prevent money laundering. At this point Nigeria has not made sufficient strides in
implementing GIABAs recommendations in order to mitigate deficiencies in the countrys
financial integrity so the U.S. should be wary of involving itself with this element of their
counterterrorism strategy until they have made more significant progress. 65
Perhaps most importantly, Nigeria partnered with the U.S. and numerous other
governments in support of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), launched in New York
City in September 2011.66 The GCTF has a number of various working groups committed to
dissolution of global terrorist networks, including efforts focused on specific regions, as well as
more holistic efforts to increase the rule of law worldwide and combat violent extremism. It is
my recommendation that the U.S. can play the most instrumental role in assisting Nigeria in their
counterterrorism efforts by supporting both global and local efforts to eliminate violent
extremism and deter the youth population from joining Boko Haram or other militant groups.
At a recent Department of Defense conference dedicated to exploring a framework and
definition for combating violent extremism, leading counterterrorism officials cited the
existence of Boko Haram and the threat the group poses to Americans. as an instrumental
example of the need to prevent radicalization in other countries. 67 As a result of DoDs research
and my own efforts to assess Boko Harams sphere of influence in Nigeria, I recommend that the
U.S. work to further the CVE efforts of the GCTF and United Nations Counter-Terrorism
65
About Giaba. GIABA. Accessed November 28, 2012. http://www.giaba.org/about-giaba/34_about-giaba.html.

"Global Counterterrorism Forum." U.S. Department of State. September 22, 2011.
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/gctf/index.htm.
67
Tudor, Jason. "Solving Violent Extremism Takes Many Paths at DOD Seminar." United States European
Command. September 11, 2012. http://www.eucom.mil/article/24162/solving-violent-extremism-takes-many-pathsat-dod-seminar
66
34
Implementation Task Force (CTITF). As I have outlined extensively in this paper, the U.N. has
had a very personal stake in the efforts to defeat Boko Haram since the bombing of its
headquarters building in Abuja. Despite the extreme horror inflicted by that act of terrorism, the
U.N. has chosen to embrace nonviolent means in their efforts to undermine the Salafist jihad in
Nigeria. The CTITF recognizes that terrorism in Nigeria is the by-product of deep societal
cleavages, decades of civil unrest, and extreme poverty impacting the majority of the population.
Instead of continuing the legacy of violence in counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram,
the U.N. advocates an approach promoting peace-education, community engagement and local
conflict resolution. 68 The U.S. should identify ways to assist the U.N. and Nigerian government
in these CVE efforts in order to counter the influences that have allowed the Salafist jihad to
flourish in Nigeria, instead of engaging in acts of violence that could further alienate Muslims in
Africa and beyond.
68
CTITF Launches Counter-Terrorism Project in Nigeria." Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Summer
2012. http://www.un.org/ru/terrorism/ctitf/ctitf_beam_vol5.pdf.
35
VII. Bibliography and Further Reading
"About Giaba." GIABA. Accessed November 28, 2012. http://www.giaba.org/aboutgiaba/34_about-giaba.html.

Adesoji, Abimbola. "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria." Africa
Spectrum 45, no. 2 (2010).
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Boko Harams War on the West

I. Introduction: The History of Social Unrest in Nigeria

"Nigeria." Nigeria. June 21, 2012. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5739.html.

II. Literature Review

In a separate publication particularly geared towards evaluating the Nigerian

In order to answer these questions, it is critical to evaluate the existing literature

"Nigeria." Nigeria. June 21, 2012. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5739.html

*See Footnote 27 for Map Citation

FINDINGS BY COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY:

"Foreign Terrorist Organizations." U.S. Department of State. September 28, 2012.

a foreign organization.51 In fact, Boko Harams motivations are inspired by decades of

V. Conclusions: Do Boko Harams Evolving Tactics Present an Increased Threat to

VI. Policy Implications and Future Directions

"Nigeria." Nigeria. June 21, 2012. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5739.html

Based upon my analysis of Boko Harams intentions and capabilities to date, my

Interview 1: September 10, 2012.

About Giaba. GIABA. Accessed November 28, 2012. http://www.giaba.org/about-giaba/34_about-giaba.html.

VII. Bibliography and Further Reading

"About Giaba." GIABA. Accessed November 28, 2012. http://www.giaba.org/aboutgiaba/34_about-giaba.html.

Affairs, February 7, 2012.

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