COMPENDIUM OF

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASE DIGESTS

By 2nd Year - Special Section A

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASES /GR NO. / SCRA / PHIL
PAGE NO.
Arbia vs. Republic GR 173808 ----------------------------------------------------------------------2
2008Alcantara vs. DENR GR 161881 2008 --------------------------------------------------------4
Buenaventura vs. Republic GR 186865 2007 ----------------------------------------------------6
Republic vs Candymaker GR 163766 2006 --------------------------------------------------------7
Republic vs Heirs of Lachica-Sin GR 157485 2014 -----------------------------------------------8
Carino vs Insular Government 41 Phil 935
Cruz vs DENR GR 135385 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------10

Sec of DENR vs Yap GR 167707 ----------------------------------------------------------------------12

Central Mindanao University vs Executive Secretary GR 184869 ---------------------------13
Malabanan vs Republic GR 179987 -----------------------------------------------------------------15
Ching vs Malaya 153 SCRA 412 ----------------------------------------------------------------------17
Legarda vs Saleeby GR 8936 --------------------------------------------------------------------------19
Vagilidad vs Vagilidad GR 16136 ---------------------------------------------------------------------20
Castillo vs Escutin GR 171056 -------------------------------------------------------------------------23
Phil National Bank vs CA 153 SCRA 435 -------------------------------------------------------------26
Bornales vs Court of Appeals 166 SCRA 519 -------------------------------------------------------28
Viajar vs CA 168 SCRA 435 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------30
Coronel vs IAC 155 SCRA 270 --------------------------------------------------------------------------31
Galloy vs CA 173 SCRA 26 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------33
Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. Vs Chavez GR 174160
---------------------------------------------------------34
Director of Forestry vs Munoz 23 SCrA 1183 -------------------------------------------------------35
Acosta vs Salazar GR 160134 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------37
SM Prime Holding vs Madayag GR 164687 ---------------------------------------------------------39
Manotok vs Barque GR 1622335 ----------------------------------------------------------------------41
Santiago vs SBMA GR 156888 --------------------------------------------------------------------------43
Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro vs CA GR 103727
---------------------------------- 45
Baranda vs Gustilo 165 SCRA 757 ---------------------------------------------------------------------46
Ledesma vs Villsensor 13 SCRA 494
-------------------------------------------------------------------47
Almirol vs Register of Deeds 22 SCRA 1152
---------------------------------------------------------50
Balbin vs Register of Deeds 28 SCRA 12
-------------------------------------------------------------51
Gallardo vs IAC 155 SCRA 248 -------------------------------------------------------------------------52
Canete vs Genuino Ice Co GR 154080 ---------------------------------------------------------------53

Republic vs CA 131 SCRA 532 --------------------------------------------------------------------------55

Republic vs Alagad 169 SCRA 466 ---------------------------------------------------------------------56
Municipality of Antipolo vs Zapanta 133 SCRA 820
-----------------------------------------------58
Martinez vs CA 66 SCRA 674 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------59
Navera vs Qunicho 5 SCRA 454
-------------------------------------------------------------------------62
Ampoloqio vs CA 232 SCRA 47
Laurel vs Garcia 187 SCRA 797
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 63
Republic vs CA 83 SCRA 453
----------------------------------------------------------------------------65
Navera vs Quicho 5 SCRA 454 -----------------------------------------------------------------------67
Republic vs Ayala y Sia 14 SCRA 259
------------------------------------------------------------------69
Hilario vs City of Manila 19 SCRA 931
-----------------------------------------------------------------71
Republic vs Soison 9 SCRA 533
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 72
Martines vs CA 56 SCRA 647
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74
Republic vs CA 132 SCRA 514
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 76
Land Bank vs Rep GR 150824
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 77
Diaz vs Republic GR 181502
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 78
Director of Forestry vs Villareal 170 SCRA 598
--------------------------------------------------------- 81
Tongson vs Director of Forestry 79 SCRA 130
---------------------------------------------------------- 82
Rep vs Algad 169 SCRA 455
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 84
Cagampang vs Moreno 22 SCRA 1040
------------------------------------------------------------------- 85
Dizon vs Rodriguez 13 SCRA 704
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 86
Rep vs Vda de Castillo 163 SCRA 286
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 88
Cantoja vs Lim GR 168386
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89
Lahora vs Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 91
Lepanto Consolidated Mining vs Dumyung 89 SCRA 532
-------------------------------------------- 92

Atok Big Wedge Mining vs CA 193 SCRA 71

------------------------------------------------------------- 95
Mateo vs Moreno 28 SCRA 796
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 98
Rep vs CA 132 SCRA 514
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 99
Maneclang vs IAC 161 SCRA 469
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100
Rep vs Reyes 155 SCRA 313
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 101
Director of Lands vs Aquino GR NO 31688
-------------------------------------------------------------- 103
Director of Forestry vs Munoz
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 104
Rep vs CA 73 SCRA 146
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 105
Rep vs Animas
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 107
Heirs of Ammunategui vs Director of Lands
------------------------------------------------------------ 109
Rep vs Sps Maximo 135 SCRA 156
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 113
Rep vs Marcos 152 Phil 204
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 114
Rep vs IAC 155 SCRA 412
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116
Director of Lands vs Meralco GR No. L 57461
--------------------------------------------------------- 117
Director of Lands vs CA 179 SCRA 522
------------------------------------------------------------------- 119
Chavez vs National Housing Authority GR 1333250 Rep vs Fangonil 133 SCRA 517
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 122
Rep vs Sangalang 159 SCRA 515
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 125
Heirs of Dicman v Carino GR 146459
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 126
Rep vs Remman Enterprise GR 199310
----------------------------------------------------------------- 128
National College of Fisheries vs Heirs of Maxima Lachica-Sin GR 157485
----------------------- 130
Carlos vs Rep
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 132
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs Cresenia Sta. Teresa Ramos GR 179181
------------------------- 133
Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Rep GR 158449
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 136
Rep vs IAC and ACME GR 73002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 138

Director of Lands vs Meralco 153 SCRA 186

------------------------------------------------------------- 139
Susi vs Razon GR 24066
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 141
Rep vs INC GR 180067
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143
Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company vs Director of Lands 44 SCRA 15
---------------- 144
Director of Land Management vs CA 205 SCRA 485
--------------------------------------------------- 146
Reyes vs Sierra 93 SCRA 472
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 147
Ramirez vs CA 144 SCRA 292
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 149
Kidpalos vs Baguio Mining 14 SCRA 913
------------------------------------------------------------------- 150
Balais-Mabanag vs Register of Deeds Quezon City GR 153142
-------------------------------------- 153
Malabanan vs Rep GR 179987
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 155
City Mayor of Paranaque vs Ebio GR 178411
---------------------------------------------------------- 156
Republic vs Diloy, GR No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413 (2008)
--------------------- 158
Republic vs de Porkan 151 Scra 88
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 160
Ong vs Republic, Gr No 175746 , 12 March 2008 , 548 Scra 160 (2008)
------------------------ 161
Miller vs Director of Lads, 12 Scra 292
------------------------------------------------------------------ 163
Roxas vs Court of Appeals 63 SCRA 302
----------------------------------------------------------------- 165
DELOS ANGELES VS SANTOS , 12 SCRA 622
------------------------------------------------------------ 166
Benin vs Tuason 57 SCRA 531
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 167
REPUBLIC VS MARASIGAN, 198 SCRA 219
--------------------------------------------------------------- 169
PO VS REPUBLIC 40 SCRA 37
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 170
FEWKES vs Vasquez, 39 SCRA 514
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 171
Republic vs CA, 236 SCRA 442
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 173
Leyva vs Jandoc, 4 Scra 595
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 175
De Castro vs Marcos, 26 SCRA 644
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 176
Regalado vs Republic, GR. No. 168155, February 17,2007
------------------------------------------ 178

Fernandez vs Aboratigue, 36 SCRA 476

------------------------------------------------------------------ 180
Republic of the Philippines vs Antonio Bacas, et. Al. GR No. 182913 November 20 ,
2013 --- 181
Miller vs Director of Lands, 12 SCRA 292
---------------------------------------------------------------- 183
Cachero vs Marzan, 196 SCRA 601
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 184
Esconde vs Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 186
Director of Lands vs Santiago , 160 SCRA 186
----------------------------------------------------------- 189
Omico Mining vs Catolico, 63 SCRA 300
------------------------------------------------------------------ 193
Valisno vs Plano, 143 SCRA 502
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 195
Secretary of DENR vs YAP, GR NO. 167707 , October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164
------------------- 197
Republic vs Lee 197 SCRA
13--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 198
Laragan vs CA 153 SCRA 172
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 199
Republic vs Sayo 191 SCRA
71-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 201
SEC. OF DENR VS YAP GR NO. 167707 , October 8, 2008,
-------------------------------------------- 203
Director of Lands vs CA 129 SCRA 689 , citing Rep vs CA 99 SCRA 742
---------------------------- 206
Republic vs De Porkan, 151 SCRA 88
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 207
IHVCP vs UP 200 SCRA 554
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 210
Director of Lands vs CA 178 SCRA 708
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 211
Heirs Amuunategui vs Director of Lands 126 SCRA 69
------------------------------------------------- 213
Republic vs TAN Properties GR no. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA 477 (2008)
--------------Repblic vs Tan
Properties--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 214
Sunbeam Conveience Foods vs CA 181 SCRA 443
--------------------------------------------------------215
Director of Lands vs CA 133 SCRA 701REPUBLIC vs CA 154 SCRA 476
------------------------------ 216
Republic vsCA 154 SCRA 476
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 217
Director of Lands vs CA 129 SCRA 689
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 216
Republic vs Bacus 176 SCRA 376
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 218

Republic of the Philippines vs Remman Enterprises Inc. represented by Ronnie P.

Inocencio GR. No. 199310. February19,2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 219
Republic Cement Corp. Vs CA. 198 SCRA 734
------------------------------------------------------------- 221
Director of Lands vs Reyes 68 SCRA 177
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 222
Republic vs Sps. Maximo 135 SCRA 156
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 224
MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC GR NO. 179987, April 29 2009
---------------------------------------------- 225
Municipality of Antipolo vs ZAPANTA. 133 SCRA 820
----------------------------------------------------- 226
Reyes vs Sierra 93 Scra 472
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 227
Regalado vs Republic GR NO. 1681155 February 15 2007
----------------------------------------------- 229
Daclag vs Macahilig GR No. 159578, July 28 2008
--------------------------------------------------------- 230
Santiago vs SBMA Gr No. 156888, November 20, 2006
-------------------------------------------------- 231
Republic vs CA 73 SCRA 146
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 233
Republic vs Sayo, 191 SCRA 71
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 234
Director of Lands vs IAC 195 SCRA 38
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 237
Director of Lands vs CA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 239
Gomez vs CA 168 SCRA 503
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 238
Mendoza vs CA 84 SCRA 76
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 240
Caragay Layno vs CA 133 SCRA 718
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 241
Director of Lands vs CA 181 SCRA 450
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 242
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO G.R. No. L-60413
-------------------- 245
Director of Lands vs Reyes 68 scra 177
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 246
Gomez vs ca 168 scra 503
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 249
Cayanan vs De Los Santos 21 SCRA 1348
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 250
Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs De Banavar 25 SCRA 316
---------------------------------------------------- 251
Vda. De barroza vs Albano 157 SCRA 131
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 253

Dela Merced vs CA 5 SCRA 240

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 254
Director of Lands vs Busuego 12 SCRA 678
------------------------------------------------------------------ 255
Eland Philippines Inc. vs Garcia GR NO 173289 February 17, 2010
------------------------------------ 257
Bolanos vs JM Tuason and Co. 37 PHIL 223
------------------------------------------------------------------ 260
Heirs of Marcos vs De Banuvar
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 261
Realty Sales vs IAC 161 SCRA 56
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 263
Manotok vs Barque GR NO. 162335, December 12, 2005
----------------------------------------------- 266
Manotok vs CLT Realty, GR No. 123346, December 14 2007
------------------------------------------- 271
Manotok vs Barque GR NO. 162335 AND 162605 , August 24 2010
---------------------------------- 273
Vencilao vs Vano 182 SCRA 491
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 274
Bernas vs Nuevo 127 SCRA 399
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 276
Lucero vs Loot 25 SCRA 687
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 278
Vda. De Barroga vs Albano 157 SCRA 131
------------------------------------------------------------------- 279
Gawaran vs IAC, 162 SCRA 154
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 282
Republic vs Diloy GR No. 174633
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 283
CHING VS. MALAYA 153 SCRA 412
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 285
Vda, de Arceo vs. CA, 184 SCRA 602
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 286
Widows and Orphans vs. CA, 201 Scra 175
----------------------------------------------------------------- 288
Pamintuan vs, San Agustin, 43 Phil,558
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 289
Gabriel vs. CA, 159 SCRA
461----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 290
City of Baguio vs. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 291
Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 292
Republic vs. CA, 9 SCRA 651
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 294
Heirs of Cornelio Labrada vs. Monsanto, 131 SCRA 651
----------------------------------------------- 295
Silvestre vs. CA, 115 SCRA 63
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 297

Director of Lands vs CA, 106 SCRA 426

--------------------------------------------------------------------- 298
De la Merced vs. CA, 5 SCRA 145
---------------------------------------------------------------------------300
Cayanan vs. Delos Santos, 21 SCRA 1348
------------------------------------------------------------------ 302
Abellera vs Guzman, 85 Phil 738
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 305
Medina vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 306
Balbin vs RD, 28 SCRA 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 307
Republic vs CA 83 SCRA 453
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 309
Lorenzana vs CA 231 SCRA 713
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 311
Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp. vs. Eridanus Development Inc., GR no.
152445, 4 July 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------312
Pagaduan vs. Ocuma, GR No.176308,8 May 2009
------------------------------------------------------ 315
Roxas v Dinglasan 28 SCRA 430
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 316
Egao v CA, 174 SCRA 484
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 317
People v Reyes 175 SCRA 597
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 318
Ching v CA 181 SCRA 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 320
Dela Cruz v CA 298 SCRA 172
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 321
Cabrera v CA 267 SCRA 339
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 322
Avila v Tapucar 201 SCRA 148
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 323
Tan v Bantegui GR No. 154027, 24 October 2005
------------------------------------------------------- 325
Demasiado v Velasco 71 SCRA 105
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 326
Odsigue v CA, 233 SCRA 626
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 327
Budlong v Pondoc 79 SCRA 24
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 328
Cana v Evangelical Free Church GR NO. 157573, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 225
(2008) ---- 330
Natalia Realty Corp. vs Valdez 173 SCRA 534
------------------------------------------------------------- 331
Lucas v Gamponia 100 Phil 277
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 333

JM Tuason v CA, 93 SCRA 146

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 335
Dablo v CA, 226 SCRA 618
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 336
Melgar v Pagayon 21 SCRA 841
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 338
Eagle Realty Corporation v Republic GR NO 151424, 24 July 2008
----------------------------------- 339
De Guzman v Agbagala GR NO 163566, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 278 (2008)
---------------- 340
Bornales v IAC 166 SCRA 512
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 341
Heirs of Tiro v PES, GR NO 170528, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 309 (2008)
------------------------- 342
Agne v Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 46
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 343
Martinez v CA GR NO 170409, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 604 (2008)
------------------------------ 345
Caragay-Layno v CA 132 SCRA 718
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 346
Iglesia v CFI of NE 208 Phil 441
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 348
Heirs of Sps. Lim vs RTC Judge GR NO 173891, 8 September 2008 (564 SCRA 352)
--------------- 349
Tapuroc v Loquellano GR NO 152007, 22 January 2007
-------------------------------------------------- 351
Natalia Realty v Valdez 173 SCRA 534
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 353
Estanislao v Honrada 114 SCRA 748
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 354
Ferrer v Bautista 231 SCRA 748
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 356
National Grains Authority v IAC 157 SCRA 380
--------------------------------------------------------------- 358
Roxas et. al vs Tagaytay City 60 OG 6, p. 820
----------------------------------------------------------------- 361
Digran v Auditor General 64 OG 19, p. 4512
------------------------------------------------------------------ 363
Fajardo v Freedom to Build GR NO 134692, 1 August 2000
----------------------------------------------- 366
REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION
---------------------------------------------------- 367
Republic v Sayo 191 SCRA 71
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 368
Republic v CA 135 SCRA 156
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 369
Gomez v CA 168 SCRA 503
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 370
Republic v Estenzo 158 SCRA 282
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 371

10

Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v De Banuvar 25 SCRA 316

----------------------------------------------------- 373
Nieto v Quines 6 SCRA 74
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 375
Director of Lands v Reyes 68 SCRA 177
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 376
Talavera v Mangoba 8 SCRA 837 (1963)
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 378
Antonio v Ramos 2 SCRA 731 (1961)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 380
People v Dela Cruz 207 SCRA 632 (1992)
-------------------------------------------------------------------381
Garcia vs Mendoza 203 SCRA 732 (1991)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 384
Rublico v Orellano 30 SCRA 511 (1969)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 385
Crisolo v CA 68 SCRA 435 (1975)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 386
Cruz v Navarro 54 SCRA 109 (1973)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 387
Boniel v Reyes 35 SCRA 218 (1970)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 389
Baldoz v Papa 14 SCRA 691 (1965)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 390
Walstrom v Mapa Jr. 181 SCRA 431 (1990)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 391
Sterling Investment Corp. v Ruiz 30 SCRA 318 (1969)
------------------------------------------------------ 392
Ramirez v CA 144 SCRA 292 (1986)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 393
Heirs of Dolleton vs Fil-Estate Management GR NO 100750, 7 April 2009
---------------------------- 394
Regents v Tanjuatco GR NO 168800, 16 April 2009
--------------------------------------------------------- 395
Municipality of Victorias v Ca 149 SCRA 32 (1987)
---------------------------------------------------------- 396
Rodriguez v Torena 79 SCRA 356 (1977)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 397
Esconde v Borlongay 152 SCRA 603 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 398
Daclag v Macahilig GR NO 159578, 28 JULY 2008, 560 SCRA 137 (2008)
----------------------------- 400
Heirs of Dominga Lustre GR NO 151016, 6 August 2008, 561 SCRA 120 (2008)
--------------------- 401
Cabrera v CA 163 SCRA 214 (1988)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 402
Esconde v Borlongay 152 SCRA 603 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 403
Huang v CA GR NO 198525, 13 September 1994
----------------------------------------------------------- 404

11

Villagonzalo v IAC 167 SCRA 535 (1988)

---------------------------------------------------------------------- 406
Alzona v Capunitan 4 SCRA 450 (1962)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 408
Almarza v Arquelles 156 SCRA 718
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 409
Tamayo v Callejo 46 SCRA 27 (1972) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 411
Castillo v Heirs of Madrigal 198 SCRA 556 (1991)
---------------------------------------------------------- 413
Ching v CA 181 SCRA 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 414
Yujuico v Republic GR NO 168861 26 October 2007
------------------------------------------------------- 416
Galicia vs Manliquez GR NO 155785, 13 April 2007
-------------------------------------------------------- 418
Levin VS. Bass, 91 Phil 420 (1952)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 420
Garcia vs. CA, 95 SCRA 389 (1980)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 422
National Housing Authority vs. Basa, Jr., GR No. 149121, 20 April 2010
----------------------------- 424
Republic VS. Ravelo GR No. 165114 6 August 2008
------------------------------------------------------ 426
AFP-MBA Inc. m Santiago GR No. 147559, 27 June 20 2008 556 SCRA 46 2008
------------------- 428
Campillo vs. CA, 129 SCRA 513
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 430
Centeno vs. CA, 139 SCRA 545 (1985)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 431
Ibarra vs. Ibarra Sr., 156 SCRA 616 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------------ 434
Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 (1985)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 436
David vs. Bandin, 149 SCRA 140, (1987)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 437
Sps. Villamil vs. Villaros GR No. 1777187 7 April 2009
-------------------------------------------------- 439
Reality Corporation vs. Republic, GR No. 151424, 24 July 2008
-------------------------------------- 441
Egao vs. CA, 174 SCRA 484 (1989)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 442
Francisco vs. CA, 153 SCRA 330 (1987)
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 443
Quiniano vs. CA, 39 SCRA 221 (1991)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 444
PNB vs. CA, 98 SCRA 207 (1980)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 445
Bernales vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 519 (1988)
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 448

12

DBP vs. Mangawang, 11 SCRA 405 ; Realty Sales Enterprises vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 328
------------ 449
Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 451
De Villa vs. Trinidad, 22 SCRA 1167
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 454
Bergado vs. CA, 173 SCRA 497
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 457
Heirs of Tiro vs., GR No. 17052 26 August 2008 563 SCRA 309
------------------------------------------ 458
Raneses vs. IAC, 187 SCRA 397 (1990)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 460
Solivel vs. Francisco, 170 SCRA 218 (1989)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 462
Tenio-Obsequio vs. CA, 230 SCRA 550 (1994)
--------------------------------------------------------------- 464
Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 (1985)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 465
Torres vs. CA, 186 SCRA 672 (1990)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 466
PNB vs. CA, 187 SCRA 735 (1990)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 468
Lonzame vs. Amore, 134 SCRA 386 (1985)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 470
Gonzales vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 587
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 472
Prudential Bank vs. Panis, 153 SCRA 390 (1987)
------------------------------------------------------------ 473
Central Bank vs. CA, 139 SCRA 46 (1985)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 474
Rural Bank of Sariaya vs. Yacon, 175 SCRA 62 (1989)
------------------------------------------------------ 476
Uchuan vs. CA, 161 SCRA 710
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 478
B & I Realty vs. Caspe, GR No. 146972, 29 January 2008, 543 SCRA 1
---------------------------------- 480
Rural Bank vs. CA, 101 SCRA 5 (1980)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 481
DBP vs. Doyon, GR No. 167238, 25 March 2009
-------------------------------------------------------------- 483
Gorospe vs. UCPB, 193 SCRA 546 (1991)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 484
Limpin vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 87 (1980)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 486
Tolentino vs. CA, 106 SCRA 513 (1981)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 488
Ramirez vs. CA, 219 SCRA 598
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 490
Medida vs CA GR 98334
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 491

13

PNB vs. IAC, 199 SCRA 508 (1991)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 492
China Banking Corporation vs. Lozada GR No. 164919, 4 July 2008
------------------------------------ 494
PNB vs. Gotesco, GR No. 183211 June 5, 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------- 499
BPI vs. Tarampi G.R. No. 174988, December 10, 2008
----------------------------------------------------- 501
Veloso vs. IAC, 205 SCRA 227
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 502
Lam vs. Metrobank GR No. 178881. 18 February 2008
---------------------------------------------------- 504
David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America,191 SCRA 516 (1990)
----------------------- 506
Sueno vs. LBP, GR No 174711 17 Sept 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------ 508
Joven vs. CA, 212 SCRA 700 (1992)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 510
Sps. Vaca vs CA, GR No. 109672, 14 July 1994
--------------------------------------------------------------- 512
Glapuno vs. Gapultos, 132 SCRA 429
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 514
Sulit vs. CA, 268 SCRA 441
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 515
Leong vs. Tanguangco, GR No. 154632, 14 march 2008, 548 scra 387 (2008)
----------------------- 518
De Ramos vs. CA, 213 SCRA 207 (1992)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 520
San Fernando Rural Bank vs. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corp., GR 168088, 4
April 2007
-------------------------------------- 523
Vda de Delfin vs. Dellota, GR No. 143697, 28 January 2008 (542 SCRA 397)
------------------------ 525
Cachola Sr. vs. CA, 208 SCRA 496, (1992)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 527
Mindanao Development Authority vs. CA 113 scra 429 (1982)
----------------------------------------- 529
Santos v Aquino 205 scra 127
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 531
Arrazola v Bernas 86 scra 279 (1978)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 533
Arrazola v Bernas 175 Phil 452 1978
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 535
Sanchez v Ca 69 scra 327
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 537
Lozano v ballesteros 195 scra 681 (1991)
------------------------------------------------------------------- 539
Ching v enrile gr 156076, sept 17 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 541

14

Arrazala v bernas 86 scra 279

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 542
LP Leviste vs. Noblejas, 89 scra 529 (1979)
------------------------------------------------------------------ 544
Tanedo vs. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil 84 (1996)
----------------------------------------------------------- 546
Atty. Ferrer vs. Sps. Diaz GR No. 165300, April 23,2010
-------------------------------------------------- 547
Junio vs. Delos Santos, 132 SCRA 513 (1979)
---------------------------------------------------------------- 548
Director of Lands vs. Ababa, 88 SCRA 513 (1979)
---------------------------------------------------------- 549
Estella vs. RD 106, 106 Phil 911
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 551
Castro vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 183719, February 02, 2011
------------------------------------------------- 554
SPS. JESUS CHING AND LEE POE TIN, PETITOINERS VS. SPS. ADOLFO & ARSENIA
ENRILE, G.R. No. 156076, September 17,2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 556
Sajonas vs. CA, GR No. 102377, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 79
------------------------------------------------ 559
Ty Sin Tie vs. DyPAo, 103 Phil. 858
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 561
Villaflor vs. Juezan, 184 SCRA 315 (1990)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 564
St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. vs Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City,
GR No. 174290, January 20, 2009
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 565
Republic vsRavelo, GR No. 165114, August 4, 2008
------------------------------------------------------- 567
Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. IAC, 152 SCRA 325 (1987)
-------------------------------------------------- 569
Magdalena Homeowners Assn. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 325 (1990)
------------------------------------------ 571
Biglang-awavsConstantino, 109 Phil. 168
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 572
Tirador vs. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 (1990)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 573
Doronilla vs. CA, 157 SCRA 26 (1988)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 575
Lopez vs. Esquivel, GR No. 168734 & NORDEC vs Esquivel, GR No. 170621, Both
Dated April 24, 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 579
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Viray, GR No. 162218 Feb. 25, 2010
------------------ 582
AguravsSerfino Sr., 204 SCRA 569
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 584
Heirs of Tengcovs Heirs of Aliwas, 168 SCRA 198
---------------------------------------------------------- 586

15

Gomez vs CA, 168 SCRA 503

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 588
PNB vs. Banatao, GR No. 149221, april 7, 2009
------------------------------------------------------------- 589
Gonzaga vs. CA, 51 SCRA 381
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 591
Decolongon vs. CA, 122 SCRA 843
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 593
PNB vs. Delos Reyes, 179 SCRA 628
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 594
Santanasvs Marinas, 94 SCRA 853
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 596
Vallanga vs. CA, 173 SCRA 42
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 599
Director of lands vs CFI, 135 SCRA 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 601
Republic vs. Mina 114 SCRA 945
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 602
Republic vs. heirs of abrille, 71 SCRA 57
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 603
Kayaban vs. Republic 122 SCRA 652
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 605
Almirolvs RD, 22 SCRA 1152 (1968)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 606
Land Bank of the Philippines vsOrilla, GR No. 157206, june 27, 2008;
-------------------------------- 608
LBP vs. Heirs of Domingo, GR No.
168533, feb. 42008, 543 SCRA 627 (2008)
------------------ 609
Lee vs LBP, GR no. 170422, Mar. 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 52
--------------------------------------------------- 611
LBP vs heirs of cruz, GR No. 175175. Sep. 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 31
-------------------------------------- 613
LBP vsnatividad, GR No. 127198 (2005)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 615
Nepomucenovs City of Siargao, GR No. 146091, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 41
----------------------- 616
NPC vs Suarez GR. No. 175725, oct. 8 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------ 617
NPC vsPurefoods, GR no. 160725 sep. 12 2008, 565 SCRA 17
------------------------------------------- 618
FORFOM Dev. Corp. vs. PNR, GR No. 124795 dec. 10, 2008
---------------------------------------------- 620
Aleman vs DE Catera 1 SCRA 776 (1961); Montano vs Lim Ang , 7 SCRA 250
------------------------------- 623
Montano vs Lim GR . L-13057
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 624
Camitan vs. CA, GR no. 128099, Dec. 20, 2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 625
Republic vs. SAntua, GR No. 155703, Sep. 8 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------- 627

16

Pascua vs. Republic, GR No. 162097, Feb. 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 186
------------------------------------------- 628
Villanueva vsViloria, GR No. 155804, Mar. 14 2008, 548 SCRA 401
------------------------------------------- 630
LAyosvsFil-Estate Golf and Devt. Corp., GR No. 150470 Aug. 6 2008
---------------------------------------- 631
Republic vsTaustumban, GR no. 173210 april 24, 2009
--------------------------------------------------------- 632
Republic vsSantua, GR No. 155703 sep. 8 2008
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 633
Republic vs. lagramada GR. No. 150741 june 12, 2008
----------------------------------------------------------- 635
Republic vs .Oyales,GR no. 168742 sep. 3 2008
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 636
Manotok vs. Barque GR No. 162335, dec. 18 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------- 638
Valiao vs Republic GR 170757
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 645
Republic vs Estenzo 158 SCRA 282
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 647
Director of Lands vs Rivas 141 SCRA 329
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 649
Homenavs Casa 157 SCRA 232
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 651
Tan Vs Director of Forestry
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 653
Republic vs Imperial
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 654
Sec of DENR vs Yap GR 172775
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 656
Cayanan vs Estenzo 21 SCRA 1348
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 662
Talusan vs Tayag GR 133698
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 663

17

FERNANDA ARBIAS vs THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 173808
Facts:
On 12 March 1993, Lourdes T. Jardeleza (Jardeleza) executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale selling to petitioner, married to Jimmy Arbias (Jimmy), a parcel of
unregistered land situated at Poblacion, Estancia, Iloilo, and identified as Cadastral
Lot No. 287 of the Estancia Cadastre (subject property), for the sum
of P33,000.00. According to the Deed, the subject property was residential and
consisted of 600 square meters, more or less.
Three years thereafter, on 17 June 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
Application for Registration of Title over the subject property. On 3 September
1996, the RTC transmitted the application with all the attached documents and
evidences to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) that petitioner had already
complied with all the requirements precedent to the publication.
Subsequently, the RTC ordered that its initial hearing on 17 February 1999. On 6
January 1999, the respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Notice of Appearance and deputized the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo City to appear on its behalf before the RTC.
At the hearing on 23 July 1999 before the RTC, petitioner took the witness stand
where she identified documentary exhibits and testified as to her purchase of the
subject property, as well as her acts of ownership and possession over the
same. The owners of the lots adjoining the subject property who attended the
hearing were Hector Tiples, who opposed the supposed area of the subject
property; and Pablo Garin, who declared that he had no objection thereto.
When its turn to present evidence came, respondent, represented by the City
Prosecutor, manifested that it had no evidence to contradict petitioners application
for registration. It merely reiterated its objection that the area of the subject
property, as stated in the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner and the Tax
Declarations covering the property, was only 600 square meters, while the area
stated in the Cadastral Survey was 717 square meters.
Issue:
Whether or not the public respondent court of appeals erred in not holding
that the lot in question ceases (sic) to be public land in view of petitioners
18

and that of her predecessors-in-interest possession en concepto de

dueno for more than thirty (30) years.
Held:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration.
The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states the requirements
necessary for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title to be issued. In accordance
with said provision, persons who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, may file in the proper trial
court an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of
the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of
the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners
have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain.
The fact that no third person appeared before the RTC to oppose the petitioners
application for registration is also irrelevant. The burden of proof imposed by law
on petitioner does not shift. Indeed, a person who seeks the registration of title to a
piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest
must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title
and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.
Furthermore, the court has the bounden duty, even in the absence of any
opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and
by positive and absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple
of the lands which he is attempting to register
The Survey Plan and Technical Description of the subject property submitted by
19

petitioner merely plot the location, area and boundaries thereof. Although they
help in establishing the identity of the property sought to be registered, they are
completely ineffectual in proving that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest
actually possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner for the
necessary period.
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA vs. DENR
G.R. No. 161881
Facts:
Nicasio Alcantara is a lessee under Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542
(FLGLA No. 542) which he claimed to be subsisting since 1983 issued by DENR
with an area of nine hundred twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land
located at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City. In which the land is
claimed as ancestral land of indigenous Blaan and Maguindanaoans since time
immemorial and that only after World War II that Christian settlers started
occupying the area.
On April 10, 1990, private respondents, representing the B'laan and Maguindanao
tribes, filed a complaint against petitioner before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No.
542 and the reversion of the land to the indigenous communities. Alcantara
questions the authority of the COSLAP and alleged that it was the secretary of the
DENR who should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands.
Despite opposition, Alcantara was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 in 1993 for
another 25 years, or until December 31, 2018.
On October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous
People's Rights Act (IPRA), which was intended to recognize and promote all the
rights of the country's Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) within the framework of the Constitution. Later, COSLAP rendered its
decision in favor of the complainant indigenous people and recommended to
DENR to cancel Alcantaras renewed FLGLA No. 542 and declare the area as
ancestral lands of the Blaans. Alcantara filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
questioning the decision of the COSLAP, but the CA affirmed in toto the decision
of the COSLAP, ruling that the issues and arguments it raised had all been
addressed squarely in the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 145838 which
upheld the COSLAP's decision and which had long become final and executory.
Issue(s):
20

Whether petitioner, based on his alleged residual rights, may continue his
enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGA No. 542 on December 31,
2018;
Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of discretion in
implementing the COSLAP's decision.
Ruling:
The question whether FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled conclusively in
G.R. No. 145838 in which the Court made final finding that FLGLA No. 542 was
issued illegally, and that it was made in violation of prevailing laws. It was
likewise declared that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the
indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are further
declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the
members of the indigenous cultural group concerned. Petitioners alleged "residual
right" has no legal basis and contradicts his admission that FLGLA No. 542 has
been declared invalid by the Court in its decision in G.R. No. 145838. Petitioner
has had no residue of any right and no entitlement to the land, from the very
beginning.
The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent
DENR officials in their implementation of the COSLAP decision, FLGLA No. 542
is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or
exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has
sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses,
a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action,
can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public
welfare or public interest so requires. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the
nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is
in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the
supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State. Such a
privilege or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it create
a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance.
BUENAVENTURA VS. REPUBLIC
GR NO. 186865 March 2, 2007
Facts:
The subject property

in

dispute

was acquired

by

Amado
21

Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) even

before World War II. In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura
transferred, by way of Deed of Sale, the subject property to their
children, among whom are herein petitioners, Angelita and
Preciosa. Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of
Title on 5 June 2000 before the RTC of Paraaque City of the
subject property, where they alleged that "they and their
predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land
thru inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same
since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by
law." They also presented and identified various documents
supporting their claim. On 29 October 2001, the court a quo
issued an Order granting the application for registration of title of
the subject property. Feeling aggrieved, the Republic appealed to
the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners own evidence
tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and
disposable because it was a salt bed and a fishpond and under
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except for agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Likewise,
under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision in favor of the Republic, thus, overturning the Order of
the court a quo.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property in dispute is a public land.
Held:
NO. It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. However, such presumption is not conclusive.
It can be rebutted by the applicants presentation of
incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of the
application for registration is alienable and disposable.
The certification issued by the Department of Environment and
22

Natural Resources verified that the subject parcel of land is

alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The said
certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character
of the subject property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.

GR.NO. 163766, June 22, 2006
Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the
Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC
of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its alleged title over the lot.
The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and
disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land Registration Authority recommended
the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and
intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the
Republic of the
Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the
application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered
part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the property subject of the amended application is alienable and
disposable property of the State, and if so, whether respondent adduced the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the property.
Ruling:
The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable
title over the property. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural
lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession
and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of
the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to
presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing, the petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is granted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.
23

GR.NO. 163766, June 22, 2006

Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the
Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC
of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its alleged title over the lot.
The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and
disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land Registration Authority recommended
the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and
intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the
Republic of the
Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the
application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered
part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the property subject of the amended application is alienable and
disposable property of the State, and if so, whether respondent adduced the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the property.
Ruling:
The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable
title over the property. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural
lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession
and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of
the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to
presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing, the petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is granted.
REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF LACHICA-SIN
GR. NO. 157485
Facts:
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a
complaint against Lucio Arquisola (Superintendent of ANCF) for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages.
Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of the property they
inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to
24

their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF
reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by
respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said
portion of private respondents alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent averred that the subject parcel of
land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan,
in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the
jurisdiction of first-level courts.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. The
MCTC ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of
their and their predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan and
the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC Judgment. Petitioner Republic
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review and the
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred on a question of law in upholding
respondents claim to supposed private rights over subject land despite the
DENR certification that it is classified as timberland.
Ruling:
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents
supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property, through their
predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on
December 22, 1960. It must be noted that respondents have not filed an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the
Property Registration Decree.
The Court held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. With respect to the second
requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and
disposable before 1960, citing petitioners failure to show competent evidence that
the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such
25

on said year. In Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic, the members of this Court were
in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12,
1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was,
however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their
predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the
purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said
proclamation to the subject property. The SC grant the prayer of petitioner
Republic to dismiss the civil case for lack of merit.
CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT
41 Phil 935
Facts:
Don Mateo Carino, an Igorot, sought to register with the land registration court a
parcel of land in the Province of Benguet. He claimed that the said land had been
possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial. His grandfather
had lived upon it, and had maintained fences around the property for holding of
cattle. Furthermore, his father had cultivated some parts of the land. And that he
inherited it in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had
been issued from the Spanish Crown.
In 1901, Carino obtained possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage
Law. The American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and
built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property
in the land registration court.
In 1904, the land registration court granted Carinos application for absolute
ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S.
Government appealed to the CFI of Benguet which reversed the land registration
court and dismissed Carinos application. The Philippine Supreme Court affirmed
the CFIs decision by applying the Valenton ruling. Carino took the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court. On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian
Doctrine and contended that Carino failed to comply with the provisions of the
Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a
limited period of time. Carino, on the other hand, asserted that he was the absolute
owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public
domain.
26

Issue:
Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish
Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Ruling:
No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted
title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes
declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never
to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land
by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership
since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the
Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
CRUZ V. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
G.R. No. 135385
Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa in their capacity as citizens and
taxpayers assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8371 which is also known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) on the ground that it amounts to
the unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain
and all other natural resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands based on their native title. After the deepseated deliberation, the members of the court voted as follows: Seven Justices have
voted to dismiss the petition while the other 7 Justices ruled in favor of the
petition. They failed to come up with the necessary majority instead the votes were
equally divided. Both parties initiated a redeliberation but nothing happened since
the voting remained the same. As a result, in virtue of Section 7, Rule 56 of the
27

Rules of Court, the petitioned was dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Regalian Doctrine negates native title
Ruling:
The Regalian Doctrine does not negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial. The Congress in its wisdom did not intend to
have clashing of laws. In this case, it also resolved the question on whether the
existence of native title to land is considered as an exception to the theory of
Regalian. It has been clearly elucidated by the Supreme Court that the Doctrine of
native title is not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. The Regalian Doctrine and
the Doctrine of the Native Title can exist side by side. The possession per se since
time immemorial has ripened to ownership. By having this IPRA, it serves as a
way that removed the barriers when it comes to the idea of reconciling the
Regalian Doctrine and Doctrine of Native Title such as for this instance wherein it
is impossible to own land in Baguio or in the whole Cordillera Administrative
Region under PD 1529 since lands which are beyond 18 % slope cannot be titled
but this problem was cured. On the other hand, the NCIP does not give title but it
merely facilitates the recognition of ancestral lands. It is a recognition of
something that is already present. Moreover, registration may spawn if ownership
of land is not acquired or proven by the seven modes of acquiring ownership.
SECRETARY OF DENR VS. YAP
G.R. NO. 167707
Facts:
The DENR identified several lots in Boracay as being claimed by named persons.
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay
Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas as tourist zones and marine
reserves under administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Respondentsclaimants alleged that it raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since
the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. The Office of the Solicitor General countered that Boracay Island was
unclassified land of the public domain which formed part of the public forest
.
Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No. 1801 has posed any legal impediment
to the titling of lands in Boracay Islands.
Ruling: The RTC and CA ruled that the Proclamation No. 1801 was not a legal
28

impediment in the titling of lands in Boracay Islands. The CA held that

respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind
the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by
the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering
the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas
alienability. Thus the islands remain as public domain which is governed by the
Regalian doctrine.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR NO. 184869
Facts:
This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation
appropriating state university property to be allocated to indigenous peoples and
cultural communities.
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational
institution owned and run by the State. In 1958 President Garcia issued Presidential
Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in
Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its
name over 3,080 hectares of those lands.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after forty-five years (January 7, 2003) issued
Presidential Proclamation 310. Said proclamation takes 670 hectares from CMUs
registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in
Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
CMU subsequently filed a petition to declare the presidential proclamation as
unconstitutional.
RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid
State act. More so, the RTC posited that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State
and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf.
29

Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is unconstitutional for being contrary to law
and public policy.
CMU is a school established to promote agriculture and industry; as such the need
for a vast tract of agricultural land for future programs of expansion is justified.
When President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476 exempting from sale or
settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the
CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares is for the promotion of the schools
agriculture and industry.
Through the years the CMU lands were used to support the expanding activities of
the school in the fields of agricultural technology and scientific research. It is in
Bukidnon that it was built, so that there are enough resources and wide open
spaces. These are needed fro an agricultural educational institution to grow, and for
the furtherance of development and training of future farmers of Mindanao.
The taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes
for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of law.
Indeed ,the education of the youth and agrarian reform are among the highest
priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither have to
be compromised. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in
Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be allocated to qualified
beneficiaries.
The decision in this case is of optimum significance. This ruling concerns state
colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually
eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARP). State colleges and universities like the CMU are the
countrys conduit towards scientific and technological advancement in the field of
agriculture, which is apparently an important field in our society.
Still, the proclamation of President Arroyo is immaterial, for the lands in dispute
ceased to be alienable public lands from the time President Garcia dedicated them
for CMUs use in scientific and technological research in the field of
agriculture.Thus, the petition of the CMU asking for the unconstitutionality of
Proclamation No. 310 is granted.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987April 29, 2009
Facts:
On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
30

before the RTC of Cavite, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 sq. meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than 30 years. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe
fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence
presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No.3013 established under project no. 20-A and approved
as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On December 3, 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
application of Malabanan.
Issues:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June12, 1945 or
earlier?
31

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, may a parcel
of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its
use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The Petition is denied.
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
32

the public dominion begin to run. Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
CHING VS. MALAYA
153 SCRA 412
Facts:
The petitioners Jose Ching and Caridad Ching had alleged in their complaint for
ejectment that the private respondents Cesar and Araceli Alvarado had forced
their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused
to vacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands were based on the
petitioners case that they were the owners of the said property, having acquired it
by virtue of a valid sale. The property in question consists of a residential house
and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 and registered in the name of petitioner Jose
Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. The private respondents, in their
answer, had challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged to
them by right of inheritance.
The municipal court, affirming its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and thereafter
rendered judgment ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed
property. The respondents argued, as the basic question was one of ownership and
not of mere possession, the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss
the complaint.
On appeal, this decision was set aside by the respondent judge, who held that the
municipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a question of
ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not Ching is the rightful owner of the residential land.
Ruling:
Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over ownership
cases. But the Supreme Court held that this particular case is not
an ownership case. The mere circumstance that proof of title, or
evidence of ownership, had been introduced during the trial
before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of
jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical
possession. The parties just showed evidence of ownership so as
to prove possession and this will not divest the Municipal Court of
33

its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the land is registered under Chings
name in the Registry of Deeds in Laguna. The land was actually
sold to him by Alvarados father in 1978. No protest was ever filed
against the Deed of Sale since 1978. Alvarado only filed an
annulment case (which is a separate case) when the ejectment
case was filed. With a strong evidence to back Chings claim, the
Municipal Courts decision was reinstated by the Supreme Court.
CONSUELO LEGARDA vs. N.M.SALEEBY
G.R.No. L-8936 October 2,1915
Facts:
The plaintiffs, Consuelo and Mauro, and the defendant, Saleeby,
are owners of adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of
Manila. Between the said lots was a stone wall which is located on
the lot of the plaintiffs. On the 2nd day of March, 1906, the
plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition
the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title
of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said
registration and certificate included the wall. Subsequently, the
defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th
day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title
and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the
defendant also included said wall. On December 13,1912, the
plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties.
However, the lower without notice to the defendant, denied said
petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition
34

for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make

any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in
the name of the defendant. The decision of the lower court is
based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the
lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not
appear and oppose it.
Issue:
Who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons?
What is the purpose of registration?
Ruling:
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.
If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered
title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has
been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby
has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered
land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it
all.
In case of double registration under the Land Registration Act,
that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land.
That is the rule between original parties.
VAGILIDAD V. VAGILIDAD
G.R. No. 161136. November 16, 2006
35

Facts:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253) situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique was owned
by Zoilo Labiao as per Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2301 issued on March
3, 1931. Sometime in 1931, Zoilo died. Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto
Labiao, son of Zoilo, sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a portion of Lot No. 1253,
measuring 1,604 square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Loreto.
Zoilos children Loreto, Efren Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva, in view of their
fathers death, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20,
1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No. 1253, covering 4,280 square meters, to
Loreto. On January 29, 1987, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16693 was
issued in favor of LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No.
T-16693 was cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said property, was
issued in the name of LORETO alone.
On July 31, 1987, Gabino Jr., as petitioner, filed a Petition for the Surrender of
TCT No. T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253 against LORETO, docketed as Cadastral
Case No. 87-731-A. The parties however seemed to have already reached an
amicable settlement without the knowledge of their counsels, the trial court issued
an Order dated March 21, 1994 sending the case to the archives. Gabino Jr. paid
real estate taxes on the land he bought from Loreto as per Tax Declaration No.
1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. 1253-B. Gabino Jr. thereafter
sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 7, 1989. On the same date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land
involving the opt-described property was also executed by Loreto in favor of
Wilfredo.
On February 14, 1990, the sale of Lot No. 1253-B to Wilfredo was registered.
Consequently, TCT No. T-18023, cancelling TCT No. 16694, was issued in favor
of Wilfredo pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989.
Spouses Wilfredo and Lolita obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank in
the amount of P150,000.00 and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the said
loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No.
186876. Subsequently, the real estate mortgage was cancelled under Entry No.
191053 as per inscription dated November 17, 1992 in TCT No. 18023.
Subsequently, Wilfredo obtained another loan from Development Bank of the
Philippines in the amount of P200,000.00 and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as
collateral of the loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No.
18023 as Entry No. 196268. The said loan was paid and, consequently, the
mortgage was cancelled as Entry No. 202500.
36

Spouses Gabino and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad, as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages. But Wilfredo claimed that
they are the owner the land because they already bought it to from the former
owner who sold the same to Gabino. Then Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to
fraud to obtain ownership of the said property. They raised that defendant Wilfredo
requested Gabino Jr. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in defendant
Wilfredos name for loaning purposes with the agreement that the land will be
returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They added that, pursuant to the
mentioned agreement, plaintiff Gabino Jr., without the knowledge and consent of
his spouse, Dorothy, executed the Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1989 in favor of
defendant Wilfredo receiving nothing as payment therefor.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. Gabino, Jr. and Dorothy filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision
of the trial court.
Issue:
Are the petitioners correct in their contention that since the
subdivision plan of Lot No. 1253 was only approved on January 19,
1987, the appellate court can not presume that the aliquot part of
Loreto was the parcel designated as Lot 1253-B?
Ruling:
No. The mere fact that Loreto sold a definite portion of the coowned lot by metes and bounds before partition does not, per se,
render the sale a nullity. We held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong
that the fact that an agreement purported to sell a concrete
portion of a co-owned property does not render the sale void, for
it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
In the case at bar, the contract of sale between Loreto and Gabino, Jr. on May 12,
1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of sale, Loreto had an aliquot share
of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property or some 1,426 square meters but
sold some 1,604 square meters to Gabino, Jr. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells
more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Be that as it may,
the co-heirs of Loreto waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 1253 in
favor of Loreto in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987.
They declared that they have previously received their respective shares from the
37

other estate of their parents Zoilo and Purificacion. The rights of Gabino, JR. as
owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively
transferred by Loreto to Wilfredo in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land.
Nor were these rights alienated from Gabino, Jr. upon the issuance of the title to
the subject property in the name of Wilfredo. Registration of property is not a
means of acquiring ownership. Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be
successfully invoked by Wilfredo because certificates of title cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud.
DINAH C. CASTILLO vs ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN
G.R. No. 171056
March 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of Raquel K. Moratilla. Racquel, her mother,
Urbana Kalaw and sister, Perla Moratilla, co-owned Lot 13713, 15,000 squaremeter, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
When the petitioner verified the property, she found out that the application of
Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural
landholdings, including Lot 13713, to residential, commercial, and recreational
uses was approved and the property was not covered by a certificate of title,
whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution Lot 13713. Before the scheduled
public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point
Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation. She immediately went to the Makati City office of
Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that
Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by
Summit Realty.
Petitioner bought Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot and was then issued Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A, indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot
13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes, she was shocked to that,
without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot
13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 square
38

meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, both in the name of Francisco Catigbac.
The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed
sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty.
In the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty by Leonardo
Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, it did not express the desire of Summit
Realty to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of
the Deed. There were also missing information in the said Deed.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbacs death, having
acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the Petition for Issuance of
New Owners Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit
Realty before the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. During the ex parte
presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000, Orense testified on behalf of
Summit Realty that Catigbacs property used to form part of a bigger parcel of
land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square meters, covered by TCT
No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbacs death, Lot 1 was informally
subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of
whom again transferred their shares to other persons; Summit Realty separately
bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a
consolidated area of 105,648 square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey;
despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 covering
the same was never cancelled; and the owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost
and the fact of such loss was annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT No.
181 with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order dated 3 January 2001,
the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed the issuance
of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the
same terms and condition as in its original form.
Petitioner cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with
Catigbacs property, purportedly without legal personality and capacity. The
Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on
behalf of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 000376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. Likewise, it was not Yagin,
but Orense, who, through a letter dated 27 June 2001, requested the cancellation of
TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1B. Hence, it was Orenses request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No.
129642 in the name of Catigbac, later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T134609 in the name of Summit Realty.

39

Petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name
of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for
canceling petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A
was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Summit Realty bought Lot 1-B measuring 105,648 square meters, specifically
covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of Catigbac. As a result of such
purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty.
Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good faith that said property was
indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latters certificate of title over the
same. Catigbacs right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No.
129642, was superior to petitioners, which was based on a mere tax declaration.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter
property.
Ruling:
As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioners title,
evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in
the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and
indefeasible as to Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs certificate of title is
binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers and even
petitioner herself. The Court ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax
receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch
as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. Petitioner acquired her title to the
5,000 square meter property from Raquel who, it is important to note, likewise
only had a tax declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals
aptly observed that, "curiously, as to how and when petitioners alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired
portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so
far remained utterly silent."
A title is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful
cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation
of ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly
as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the
foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a
40

mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under the Torrens
system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which
constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of
Title, issued subsequent to the original registration.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
BANK and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86679 July 23, 1991
FACTS:
As found by respondent court and sustained by the record, on May 7, 1985,
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan and
docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N-33399, a petition for the
cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16)
transfer certificates of title. As a backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses
Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real
estate mortgages.For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation
with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended,
the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the real estate mortgages executed by
the said spouses in favor of petitioner. The sheriff s certificate of sale was
registered on April 3, 1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a memorandum
thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the
foreclosed properties.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent International Corporate Bank, as successor in
interest of the defunct Continental Bank, filed an opposition to the petition
contending that, since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued
in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.
On August 28, 1986, the lower court rendered a decision, denying the petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the annotations of levy
over to the new title certificates issued in purchaser's favor is vid and illegal.
b.) Whether Section 108 of "Property Registration Decree" expresly allows the
summary amendment of certificates of title whenever interest annotated has
"terminated and ceased".
41

RULING:
We find the foregoing contentions meritorious.
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens subordinate
to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the purchaser at public auction held
pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter
the Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the
annotation of subordinate liens. 15 In a case with similar features, we had earlier
held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem, within the time
allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136, the land which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy
the first mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of
the annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said
land.
It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands, etc., et al. vs.
Noblejas, etc., et al., 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at
the back of the certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice the mortgage
previously registered, and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the
public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of the
mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for
no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. . . .
This alone is sufficient justification for the dropping of the adverse claim from the
new certificates of title to be issued to her, as directed by respondent
Commissioner in his opinion subject of this appeal."
Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest arising
from the judgment in Civil Case No. 69035 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, appearing at the back of petitioner's certificates of titles, is already without
force and effect consider that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title
for more than ten (10) years without being duly implemented. Properties levied
upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of ten (10)
years during which the judgment can be enforced by action.
BORNALES VS COURT OF APPEALS
166 SCRA 519
FACTS:
As found by respondent court and sustained by the record, on May 7, 1985,
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan and
docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N-33399, a petition for the
cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16)
transfer certificates of title. As a backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses
42

Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real
estate mortgages.For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation
with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended,
the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the real estate mortgages executed by
the said spouses in favor of petitioner. The sheriff s certificate of sale was
registered on April 3, 1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a memorandum
thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the
foreclosed properties.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent International Corporate Bank, as successor in
interest of the defunct Continental Bank, filed an opposition to the petition
contending that, since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued
in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.
On August 28, 1986, the lower court rendered a decision, denying the petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the annotations of levy
over to the new title certificates issued in purchaser's favor is vid and illegal.
b.) Whether Section 108 of "Property Registration Decree" expresly allows the
summary amendment of certificates of title whenever interest annotated has
"terminated and ceased".
RULING:
We find the foregoing contentions meritorious.
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens subordinate
to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the purchaser at public auction held
pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter
the Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the
annotation of subordinate liens. 15 In a case with similar features, we had earlier
held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem, within the time
allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136, the land which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy
the first mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of
the annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said
land.
It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands, etc., et al. vs.
Noblejas, etc., et al., 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at
43

the back of the certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice the mortgage
previously registered, and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the
public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of the
mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for
no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. . . .
This alone is sufficient justification for the dropping of the adverse claim from the
new certificates of title to be issued to her, as directed by respondent
Commissioner in his opinion subject of this appeal."
Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest arising
from the judgment in Civil Case No. 69035 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, appearing at the back of petitioner's certificates of titles, is already without
force and effect consider that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title
for more than ten (10) years without being duly implemented. Properties levied
upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of ten (10)
years during which the judgment can be enforced by action.
VIAJAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
168 SCRA 405
Facts:
The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No.
7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan comprosing of an area 154,267 square
meters and was registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of
Title. Rosendo H. Te,sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for
P5,000 with the confirmation of Ana Te.. A Torrens title was later issued in the
names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.Later Viajar found out that the
propert was in possession of Ladrido and demanded for its return but latter
refused.
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of
possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. During the pendency of the
case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to his mother and
co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. Defendant Ladrido died and substituted by his wife
and children.
The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real
property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was
located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square
meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No.
7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819 square meters of
what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants; that the area
44

of 14,036 square meters, which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per
cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and
that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No.
7340.The lower court rendered its judgment in favour of the defendants.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision if court a quo
Contention of the Petitioners:
Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion
mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and
should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in question having remained the
registered land of the petitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title
there in derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
Issue:
Whether the land registered protected from ownership by accretion in accordance
with article 457
Ruling:
No. The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the
riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land through
gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. InPayatas
Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55.Registration does not protect the
riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers
may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the
owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).
CORONEL v IAC
155 SCRA 270
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land registered under his name against
the private respondents Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan,
Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and Fortunato
45

Ocampo before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Coronel

alleged that at the time he purchased the parcel of land, the
defendants were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants
at will". Despite demands to vacate the premises, the defendants
refused to.
The defendants denied Coronel allegations. They contended that
the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided share of
brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from
their deceased father Gabriel Merlan, one of the three heirs of
Bernabela Lontoc. The Merlan brothers never sold their undivided
1/3 share of the lot to anybody. It was actually their other co-heirs
who sold their undivided portions, hence plaintiffs ownership is
fraudulent, void, and without effect. The Merlans have always
been in open and peaceful possession of their undivided share of
the lot throughout the years.
The lower courts ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring them
as the absolute owners of the remaining 1 1/3 of the 2/8 portion
pertaining to the late Bernabela Lontoc
Issue:
Whether the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is the true
owner of all the property

Ruling:
No, the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is not necessarily
the owner of all property.
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens
System, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner
of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title,
under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight
land which cannot be registered under the Torrens systems, he
does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of
46

the lands illegally included.

Lontocs property was survived by three sets of heirs. 1)
Bernardino Merlan; 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan; and 3)
Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat.
Bernardino Merlan sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to
spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo. However, Ignacio
sold his interest to Mariano Manalo, which Coronel also bought
later on. The deed of sale was registered in the name of petitioner
Rodolfo Coronel.
The private respondents never sold their 1/3 share, what their coowners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot;
and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party
defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of
petitioner Rodolfo Coronel.
Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan
were in open, peaceful and adverse possession of their 1/3 share
over the lot even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took
place. The 1/3 undivided portion of the private respondents was
mistakenly included in the transfer certificate of title of Mariano
Manalo. The petitioner is bound to recognize the lien in favor of
the private respondents which was mistakenly excluded and
therefore not inscribed in the torrens title of the land of his
predecessors-in-interest.
GOLLOY vs. CA 173 SCRA 26
GR No. 47491, May 4, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner possessed and a registered owner of a 41, 545-sq.m parcel of land for
more than 20 years. On the other hand, the Southwest portion of the petitioners
land is bounded by the respondents land.The respondents subdivided their land
among themselves and placed 2 monuments inside the Southwest portion of the
petitioners land. Hence, petitioner filed an action to quit title. In the per-trail, the
parties agreed that they will appoint a public surveyor to relocate the disputed area
to determine the true and correct boundaries of their parcels. Subsequently, the
surveyor submitted a report wherein there are overlapping on the boundaries of the
47

2 lands and that the overlapping are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's
land since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey. Wherefore,
he submitted a report that respondents' land, prevails over petitioner's land, since
the former was surveyed and titled ahead.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute.
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute. It is hardly persuasive that
private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that she has a
rightful claim to the overlapped portions, however, no such objection was made.
These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor,
Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the
overlapped portion. Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or
predecessors have been in continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for
almost 50 years when the property was registered, up to when the respondents
placed 2 monuments inside his land, the latter if they have any right at all to the
overlapped portion, are guilty of laches.
HACIENDA BIGAA, INC. vs. EPIFANIO V. CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 174160 April 20, 2010
Facts:
The lots under consideration in this litigation were originally covered by TCT No.
722, owned by Ayala y Cia and/or Alfonso, Jacobo and Enrique Zobel, with an area
of 9,652.583 hectares, known as Hacienda Calatagan. Ayala and/or the
Zobels expanded TCT No. 722 to cover an additional 2,000 hectares of land
consisting of beach, foreshore and bay areas, and navigable waters (excess areas),
making it appear that these excess areas are part of Hacienda Calatagan's TCT No.
722. The hacienda, including such excess areas, was later subdivided and was sold
to third parties.Among the buyers or transferees of the expanded and subdivided
areas was Hacienda Bigaa, which caused the issuance of titles under its name
covering the purchased subdivided areas. On the other hand, the Republic, through
the Bureau of Fisheries, leased out portions of the same lands to qualified
applicants in whose favor fishpond permits were issued. This event gave rise to
ownership and/or possessory disputes between the owners of Hacienda Calatagan
and their privies and/or successors-in-interest, and the Republic or fishpond
permittees. Suits were filed in various courts in Batangas for the recovery of the
areas in excess of the area originally covered by TCT No. 722.In those previous
cases,the Supreme Court declared that the excess areas of TCT No. 722 are
48

unregisterable lands of the public domain such that any title covering these excess
areas are necessarily void;that the Ayalas and the Zobels were found to be
mere usurpers of public domain areas;and all subdivision titles issued to them or
their privies and covering these areas were invalidated; the wrongfully registered
public domain areas reverted to the Republic.
In this petition,Hacienda Bigaa,Inc. alleged that on April 29,1996,Chavez, by force
entered the premises of Hacienda Bigaa's properties covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 44695 and 56120, built a house on the property, and
occupied the lots without the prior consent and against the will of Hacienda
Bigaa.The case of forcible entry filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the
MTC,and affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Between the petitioner and the respondent,who has the better right of possession of
the disputed lots?
Ruling:
The antecedent cases which were both ruled in favor of the Republic and its lessees
or permittees laid to rest the issues of ownership and of possession oover the
subject lands. The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system cannot convert public lands into private lands.The Republic, as the rightful
owner of the expanded areas portions of the public domain has the right to
place its lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in possession of the
fishpond lots. The certificate of title which Hacienda Bigaa have, does not in fact
support their claim of ownership over the lands in dispute. Since the transfer of
lands by the Ayalas and Zobels to Hacienda Bigaa,Inc. is void, the latter has no
better right over the subject land than the defendant. For that reason,there can be
no valid cause for the ejectment of Epifanio Chavez by Hacienda Bigaa, Inc..
Thus, the case for forcible entry should be dismissed.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs MUNOZ
G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968
Facts:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO) was claiming to
be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in municipalities of Angat,
Norzagaray, and San Jose Del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, province of Rizal. PIADECO relied on the Titulo Propriedad No.
4136 as incontrovertible evidence of its ownership. Piadeco applied
for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. In
1964, the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of Piadecos certificate
because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It actually cut
49

trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower
court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa.
Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of
Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should
have never been used to apply for a Certificate. Justice Sanchez noted the dubious
validity of the title in his opinion, stating Private ownership of land must be
proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with clear identity of the
land claimed xxx no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title.
Issue:

Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

Ruling:

No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for

another Certificate. There should be no question now that
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law.
It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised
Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the
approval of the department head, to issue regulations deemed
expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation
of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued
supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future,
and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest
reserves, to the same end. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2
was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a
valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects
and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is
that
when
Congress
authorized
the
promulgation
of
administrative rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
50

regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the

standards that the law prescribes.

Zenaida ACOSTA vs. Trinidad SALAZAR AND ANICETA

SALAZAR
G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009
Facts:
On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar filed a petition
for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287
registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, who died
without issue. The Salazars claim that two of the entries annotated in the title are
void since no consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of
Tarlac to support the entries; and that TCT No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled
OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according to a certification issued by the RD. On
October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant the petition and
ordered the cancellation of Entry No. 20102. No respondent was impleaded in the
said petition.
Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an
order to direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles issued under Entry Nos. 19756
and 20102 and to cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. The motion
was granted.
Later, the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the
owners of the affected property be ordered to appear before the court to show cause
why their titles should not be cancelled.
On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that the RD of
Tarlac be ordered to comply with the courts order issued on November 7, 1986.
The RD, however, explained that to comply with the said court order would
remove the basis for many other transfer certificates of title and would result in the
deprivation of the right to due process of the registered owners thereof. On this
basis, the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars to elevate the matter en
consulta to the Land Registration Commission. After the Salazars moved for
reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of Tarlac to comply with the orders.
Threatened with contempt, the RD elevated the matter en consulta to the National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, which, in turn, issued a
resolution directing the RD to comply with the RTCs orders.
51

Then herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the
disputed property twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all filed their formal written
comment dated April 17, 1989. In their comment, the oppositors contended, among
others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the
lower court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of
ownership.
Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo Macaraeg, Martha
Estacio (both deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg, Lucio Macaraeg, represented by
Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia
Obcena (hereinafter, Macaraegs) maintained that the November 7, 1986 order of
the RTC is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of the Salazars is
void and that the case for quieting of title is not a direct, but a collateral, attack
against a property covered by a Torrens certificate.
The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the Salazars. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action taken by the Salazars regarding the cancellation of the
subsequent titles and tax declarations is valid.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. the failure of the Salazars to
implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries in
OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least
suspend, the proceedings of the case. Yet, although the action proceeded, any
judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of
authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded
in the action. Thus, the orders issued by the lower court never acquired finality.
More crucial is the fact that both parties in this case are dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system. To allow any individual, such as the Salazars
in this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple
expediency of filing an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would
inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this
country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on
the legality of the title, except claims that were noted, at the time of registration, in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. Rarely will the court allow
another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate,
unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in
court proceeded in accordance with law. Furthermore, the court also noted that for
30 years the Salazars never contested the ownership of the said property in any
52

court, nor the transfer of the portions of the property to the petitioners. Hence, the
Supreme court granted the petition and the appellate courts decision was set aside,
and the case was reinstated to the RTC.
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. v ANGELA V. MADAYAG
G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009
Facts:
On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application
for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square
meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.
Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Region 1, San Fernando City. On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM
Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional
Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of
the respondents survey plan because the lot encroached on the
properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that,
despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not
notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001. Petitioner then
manifested its opposition to the respondents application for
registration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed
their respective oppositions. On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed
its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently
bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta,
delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in ConsolidationSubdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land
Registration Commission on August 26, 1976, and previously
covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau
of Lands on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are
covered by separate certificates of title, some of which are
already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in
the name of the previous owners.
On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except
as to the petitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo
Visperas. Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of
evidence. The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was
53

duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the presumption

of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and
determine all questions arising from an application for
registration.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appelas committed manifest errorr in holding that the Lower
Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings and
archiving the case.
Ruling:
It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of
suits and to promote the expeditious resolution of cases,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latters
limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration
court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide
even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those
involving substantial issues. When the law confers jurisdiction
upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary
powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. It may,
therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a
petition for registration. In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a
land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing
certificate of title. An application for registration of an already
titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title,
which is not allowed by law. But the RTC need not wait for the
decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in
order to determine whether the subject property is already titled
or forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify
this allegation based on the respondents survey plan vis--vis the
certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-ininterest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the
true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel
of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land
registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining
land.Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may
require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination of
54

the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No.

1529

Manotok v. Barque
G.R. No. 162335 &162605 December 18, 2008
Facts:
On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating,
among others, records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
That fire has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with
that office, which were destroyed as a consequence. Respondents Heirs of Homer
Barque (the Barques) filed a petition with the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name of Homer Barque. They
alleged that the Barque title was among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire. In
support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners
duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan
FLS 3168-D covering the property. Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks)
filed their opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the
Barque title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No.
RT-22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et. al.
They further alleged that the Barque title was spurious.
On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA,
denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title.The Barques motion for
reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order dated 10 February 1998;
hence, the Barques appealed to the LRA.
The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting officer
should not have required the submission of documents other than the owners
duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and should have
confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further
found anomalies in the Manotoks title.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The Barques petition for review was docketed as CA55

G.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks petition for review was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.
On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision denying the Barques petition and affirming the LRA Resolution.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the
Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the
Manotoks.
Ruling:
It could not pursuant to Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as
the Property Registration Decree.
Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the
administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence
from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged
incidentally in the appellate review of the LRAs administrative proceeding.There
is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of
property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by
Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for
annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did
acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the Manotoks petitions, albeit in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to
be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a
decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel
a Torrens title in the first place.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land
Registration Commissioner. Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the
LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any
basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which
56

authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we

shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for
administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to
cancel the Manotok title.
PEDRO R. SANTIAGO vs. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY
G. R. No. 156888
November 20, 2006
Facts:
Plaintiffs claim that co-petitioner Victoria Rodriguez is the sole
heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land
registered in his name under a certificate of title denominated as
Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree. Said
parcels of land were leased by Rodriguez to Santiago and Mateo
for a period of 50 years. By virtue of the contract Santiago is
occupying the land. The petitioners further alleged that defendant
having no authority to possess the land, defendant is still claiming
possessory rights over said property. And in fact defendant is
using the two parcels of land for commercial and other purposes.
To comply with her contractual commitments, Rodriguez now
desires to recover possession of the property from the defendant.
Lately, Santiago is informed by the agents of SBMA that he should vacate the
property because said defendant would need the same for its own use. SBMA
further alleged in its counter statement of facts that, Liwanag Santiago (wife of
Pedro Santiago) only availed of the housing units as a privilege for her being an
employee of SBMA. However, since the contract between Liwanag and SBMA
concluded and has not been renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee
of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the
SBMA Housing Policy, she and her family were asked to vacate and return
possession of the subject housing unit.
Issue:
Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of ownership of
lands?
57

Ruling:
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took
effect on 16 February 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their
lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No.
496) within six months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16
August 1976. If not, non-compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of
the real property.
The fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when
they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude
them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain
inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a
land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that Spanish titles
can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. And,
without legal or equitable title to the subject property, Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to
claim entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to that
upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the
extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert
right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103727 December 1, 1996
Facts:
The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying
claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself. The
petitioners contend on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad
Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs,
appears to cover lands, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos,
Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bayin
the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. Considering the vastness of the land
claim, many suits have been filed all for the purpose of owning the lands.

58

Issue:
WON the heirs of Don Mariano have the legal claim over the properties involved.
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. While the petitioners contend that the
lands are subject of The Spanish Mortgage Law or the Titulo Propriedad Numero
4136, It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which took effect on February 16.
1976 the syte of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and
all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be
registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months from date of effectivity
of the said decree. In this case the heirs have no legal claim over the said lands
because PD 892 invaldates any claim of title and must be first registered under the
Torrens system of titling.
BARANDA V. GUSTILO
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
Facts:
This case involves two cases (G.R. No. 64432 and G.R. No. 6204)
over the same parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo covered by OCT No. 6406. This is the subject of the
dispute between petitioner Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, and respondents Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan
Silao. OCT No. 6406 was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was
issued in the names of the petitioner. However, the respondents
refused to honor it on the ground that they also have a TCT
numbered T-25772 over the same lot. The court resolved that TCT
No. T-25772 was acquired fraudulently, and declared it null and
void. It held the validity of Title No. T-106098 to which, the court
also ordered the writ of possession to the petitioners be carried
out. However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason
of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court
of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates
of titles issued to the petitioners. This prompted the petitioners to
file for a new petition directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates
of titles issued.
Issues:
59

1. Whether the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871

with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
2. Whether the Register of Deeds has the duty to annotate or
annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title.
Ruling:
1. No. Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to
delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432.
Lis pendens has been
conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof. The private respondents are not entitled to
this protection. SC have once held that while ordinarily a notice of
pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be
cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the
proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under
peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations
of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for
which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant.
2. No. Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It
shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register
an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore,
and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree.

60

The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the

registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did
not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of
the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of
lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over the subject parcel of land.
LEDESMA v. VILLASENOR
13 SCRA 494
Facts:
Felix Villaseor, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of his
deceased father, Eusebio Villaseor, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to enjoin the Register of Deeds of the
same province from registering a deed of sale by which the deceased conveyed to
Jose Ma. Ledesma two lots registered in his name, to wit, Lots Nos. 2532-C and
2533-B of the Cadastral Survey of Bago, Negros Occidental. The reason given for
seeking injunctive relief was that the deed of sale was fictitious and that the
signature of the vendor was forged. The court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to maintain the status quo. The vendee, Ledesma, who had not been
impleaded as a party-defendant, intervened in the case. On October 3, 1960 the
court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition.
Two days later, on October 5, Ledesma filed his own petition in the cadastral
record of said lots, asking that the Register of Deeds be ordered to register the
aforementioned deed of sale. The ground alleged in the petition was that Civil Case
No. 5662 had been dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued therein had
been dissolved. On the same day the court, without notice either to the Register of
Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis of the allegations in the petition,
issued the corresponding order for registration. In compliance therewith the
Register of Deeds cancelled the two certificates of title in the name of the deceased
Eusebio Villaseor and issued new ones in Ledesma's name. On October 8, 1960,
again upon Ledema's petition, the court ordered the cancellation of the certificates
thus issued and the issuance of still new ones, also in his name.
Villaseor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected this
appeal upon their denial.
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed from
because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to appellant or to furnish him copy of the
petition; (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil Case No. 5662 and not in
the cadastral proceeding; (3) the court had no power to order the Register of Deeds
to register the deed of sale in question when the same was being contested as
61

fictitious nor to order the issuance of titles in the name of the supposed buyer; and
(4) if, as appellee points out, the Register of Deeds had improperly refused to
register the deed of sale, the proper remedy should have been a suit for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in issuing the orders of lifting the injunction and the
dismissal of the petition without notice to the Register of Deeds or to appellant.
Ruling:
We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to it. To
be sure, when the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5662 was
dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant's petition the obstacle to the
registration of the deed of sale was removed. The effect of the dissolution was
immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been perfected from the
order of dismissal (Watson v. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 480; Sitia Taco v. Ventura, 1 Phil.
497). But that is only as far as the Register of Deeds was concerned, his duty under
the circumstances if the document was on its face registrable being
administrative and ministerial. The lifting of the injunction, however, or even the
dismissal of the petition, was no authority for the court in the cadastral proceeding
to issue the orders complained of without notice to the Register of Deeds or to
appellant, considering that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final.
The court knew of the pendency of that case and of the fact that the relief sought
therein by appellant was precisely to prevent registration. Irrespective of the
propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued, that is, whether or not mandamus
should have been resorted to, the least that the court a quo should have done was to
afford appellant proper notice and hearing, so that he could reiterate his objections
to the registration and present evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court's
attention to the fact that the question had not yet been definitely settled in the civil
action since the order dismissing it was not yet final.
It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial duties
under the law, to register an instrument which in his opinion is registrable, and
quite another thing for the court itself to order the registration. The former does not
contemplate notice to and hearings of interested parties such as are required in a
judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of a
court judgment. The court a quo, in anticipating the action of the Register of
Deeds, unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands and at the same time
preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil action filed by
appellant.
ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN
22 SCRA 1152
Facts:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
62

situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by

original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to
Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. The Register of Deeds refused to
register the land contending that it is a conjugal property and needs the consent of
the other spouse. So the petitioner filed to the CFI of Agusan a petition for
mandamus to compel the register of deeds. In its answer, the respondent contends
that the petitioner did not extract all remedies before going to court since he can
appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Lad Registration.
The lower court held that mandamus cannot lie because that exist that adequate
remedy.
Issue:
Whether or not a case can be directly filed to the court without appealing first to
the Commissioner of Land Registration?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal by the lower court is correct and
provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of
Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken
or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all
Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the
petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
AURELIO BALBIN v REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
Facts:
Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Register of
Deeds Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered
owners certificate of title and a deed if donation
intervivos, requesting that the latter be annotated on the
title. Cornelio Balbin(registered owner) appeared to have
donated the 2/3 of the subject land. On the other hand,
the RoD denied the petition for annotation legally defective
or otherwise not sufficient in law.

63

It shows that there was an annotation in the memorandum of

encumbrance on the Original Certificate of Title of 3 separate
sales executed by the registered owner, Cornelio, in favor of
Florention, Juana Gabayan and Roberto Bravo. The said persons
received their co-owners duplicate CTs. The petitioners failed to
present the 3 co-owners copies of CTs, which is why the RoD
denied said annotation. Thus, the petitioners referred the matter
to the LRC, who on the other hand upheld the decision of the RoD.

Issue:

W/N the LRC is correct in denying request for annotation?

Ruling

Yes. Pursuant to sec. 55 of Act 496, there should only be one

duplicate of the title in question( the registered owner himself).
However, if there are duplicates than that of originally issues, it
must contain identical entries of transaction affecting the land
covered by the said title. Thus, if different copies were permitted
to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens system
would cease to be reliable.

In the case at bar, there were several copies of the same title in
existence, there integrity might be affected if it was annotated in
once copy and not on the others..
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal,
that is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia
Mina, there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before
the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance. Assuming
the conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face
an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the
64

fact that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was
more than his share, not to say more than what remained of
such share after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other
parties.
GALLARDO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
155 SCRA 248
Facts:
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva
and first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva de
Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The
subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land
situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300x square meters,
more or less, initially covered by an Original Certificate of Title No.
2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the name
of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner
claimed that the aforesaid land was sold to them in a private
document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that
was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and
transferring the property in question in favour of the petitioners.
Subsequently, the OCT was cancelled and a new certificate of title
was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by TCT NO. RT6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976,
defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr.,
and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim with the Office of the Registered of Deeds of
Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse
Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably, but
they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private
respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filling a
complaint for Quieting of the Title and Damages with the Court of
First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision
declaring the deedd of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the
reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab
initio. Thus, petitioners file a notice of appeal to the IAC. However,

65

the IAC, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate ofTitle No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of
petitioners.
Ruling:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things,
that the conveyance be executed before the judge of a court of
record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice
of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgement
substantially in from next hereinafter stated was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the
registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did
not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale.
With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the land
Registration Act, Act 496 Deed of Conveyance, affecting lands,
whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be
sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the
following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber or
bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix
forms heretofore in use.
It is therefore evident that Exhibit E in the case at bar is
definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also,
the contention that ownership over registered property may be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely
without merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the
registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.
CANETE V. GENUINO ICE CO. INC.,
GR No. 154080 January 22, 2008
66

Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint and an amended complaint for
cancellation of title to property covered by several TCTs for being
spurious, fictitious and issued under mysterious circumstances
considering that the holders thereof and their predecessors-ininterest were never in actual, adverse, and physical possession of
the property rendering them ineligible to acquire title under the
Friar Lands Act. They also seek to annul OCT No. 614 from which
the foregoing TCTs originated of were derived. The amended
complaint alleged that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-ininterest are among those in actual, adverse, peaceful, and
continuous possession in the concept of owner of unregistered
parcels of land in Sitio Mabilog, Quezon City. And that the real
property in question is a portion of the friar land known as the
Piedad Estate, which is intended for distribution among the
bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
Respondent, sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that
it fails to state a cause of action because petitioners are not real
parties-in-interest, that no relief may be granted as a matter of
law, and that petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies. The motion to dismiss was denied. The respondents
filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which granted the petition
and dismissed the amended complain of the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the certiorari and dismissing the complaint
Ruling:
No. The complaint and amended complaint failed to state the
ultimate fact which are essential facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action. The plaintiffs gave only an incomplete narration
of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits, and the

67

allegations are mere conclusions of law also, the allegations of

fraud are not specific and were not substantiated.
The initial claim that OCT 164 of which all the other subject titles
are derivatives is null and void has been proven wrong as held in
previous cases (Pinlac). It has been found that OCT 614 did legally
exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910. An Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of
Natural Resources specifically tasked to investigate the historical
background of the Piedad Estate, found that as early as prior to
the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already
been disposed of. The Piedad Estate has been placed under the
Torrens system which means that all lots therein are titled. Also,
as held in the Balicudiong case one who acquired title under the
Friar Land Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim
successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest
were actual settlers and occupants at the time said land were
acquired by the government. Also, the plaintiffs did not pray to be
declared owners of the subject property-despite their alleged
adverse possession-but only to be adjudged as the bona fide
occupants thereof, conceding to the States ownership of the
property. Being so, they are not real parties in interest for the
purpose of maintaining a suit for cancellation of the subject titles.
Their interest is mere expectancy based on the probability that
the government would give them preference as buyers or lessees
of the subject lands. On real-parties in interest may file for the
cancellation of title of property and not one whose interest is
based on mere expectancy.
REPUBLIC V. CA
131 SCRA 532
Facts:
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina
(should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan,
68

Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue

rivers.
They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent
to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.
The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the
application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court,
hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application. and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting
the application on the finding that the lands in question are
accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner
Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render
untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds.
Issue:
Whether the registration of the lots valid.
Ruling:
No, the registration of the lots is not valid.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2
in the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions
of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as
69

property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and

Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They
are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the
names of the private respondents is null and void. The only valid
conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been
there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in
1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by
reclamation.
REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
169 SCRA 466
Facts:
In 1951, the defendants filed an application for registration of
their title over a parcel of land in Laguna. The Republic, however,
opposed the application on the ground that the applicants and
their predecessors have not been in possession of the land
openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide
claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not
ceased to be part of the public domain. It appears that barrio folks
also opposed the application. In a case, promulgated in 1956,
defendants were declared owners of lots 1, and lot 2 was declared
public land. In a civil case they filed in 1966, they prayed for the
eviction of the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. Judgment
was rendered in 1968, ordering the defendants therein to return
possession of the premises to herein defendants, as plaintiffs
therein.
Issue:
Whether the property in question a foreshore or a part and parcel
of the public domain
Ruling:

70

Properties of public dominion, held by the State by regalian right,

are res publicae and incapable of private appropriation. Laguna
de Bay is a lake. And under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, the
natural bed or basin of lakes is the ground covered by their waters
when at their highest ordinary depth, and in which case, it forms
part of the national dominion. Otherwise, where the rise in water
level is due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for
instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part
of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot
therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the
public dominion, and land capable of registration as private
property. A foreshore land, on other hand, is a strip of land that
lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
This case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO V. ZAPANTA
133 SCRA 820
Facts:
The Municipality of Antipolo, for more than 50 years now, has
considered the disputed property, described below, to be public
land subject to Antipolos use and permission to use within the
prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. There is
indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public
market as far back as 1908, or at the latest, since 1920 up to
today. Gradually, additional public structures were built thereon,
like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center, the Integrated
National Police Building, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and
the public abattoir. Those public structures occupy almost the
entire area of the land.
On August 8, 1977, a single application for the registration of two
distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before
the then CFI Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court).
One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for
71

registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land

containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was Heirs of Joaquin
Avendao, and the land they were applying for registration was a
parcel containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in
the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were
situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The applications were
approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. Antipolo
took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend
the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed.
On May 22, 1981, Antipolo filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) at
the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named Heirs of Joaquin
Avendao, and their assignees praying for nullification of the
judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in
their Answer, pleaded a special defense of res judicata. After a
preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense, the case
was dismissed. Antipolo perfected an appeal to the then Court of
Appeals. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court,
which Antipolo claimed it had not received. Upon motion of the
Avendao heirs to dismiss on the ground the Antipolo had not
filed its Brief within the reglementary period, the appeal was
dismissed on August 23, 1983 despite the fact that before the
dismissal, Antipolo had submitted its Appellants Brief. Antipolo
filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain.
Ruling:
The claim of the Avendao heirs that they merely tolerated
occupancy by Antipolo which had borrowed the disputed property
from them, since they had been in possession, since as far back
as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that
time. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands
until the contrary is established. The fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in their
names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does
not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership. Antipolo had also declared the disputed
72

property as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454.
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the application for registration of public property of Antipolo, its
Decision adjudicating the disputed property as of private
ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be
attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by
Antipolo for its annulment by reason of res judicata.
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the Avendao heirs must
also be held to be null and void.

MARTINEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974
Facts:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitionersappellees, are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
located in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by transfer certificate of
title No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of the said province. Both
parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved in the instant
case is the second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer
certificate of title.
The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino
Montemayor, who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883.
After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed
to his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata
Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a
certain Potenciano Garcia.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration
of both parcels of land in his name, and the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the
registration over and against the opposition of the AttorneyGeneral and the Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the Court's
73

decision, original certificate of title No. 14318, covering said

parcels 1 and 2 was issued to the spouses Potenciano Garcia and
Lorenza Sioson.
These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de
Dios in whose name transfer certificate of title No. 1421 was first
issued on November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until
eventually they were acquired by the herein appellee spouses
who hold them by virtue of transfer certificate of title No. 15856.
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the
matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams, by then
composed of the Honorable Pedro Tuason, at that time Secretary
of Justice, as chairman, and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and
Vicente Orosa, Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources
and Secretary of Public Works and Communications, respectively,
as members.
While Civil Case No. 751 was still pending the Honorable Florencio
Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land, directing
the appellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed,
on the strength of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No.
2056, approved on June 13, 1958, entitled "An Act To Prohibit,
Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or Any
Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In
Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or
Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide
Penalties For Its Violation, And For Other Purposes.
Contention of Private Defendant:
In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent
Secretary in this case is illegal on the ground that the said
respondent Secretary has arrogated unto himself the power,
which he does not possess, of reversing, making nugatory, and
setting aside the two lawful decisions of the Court Exhibits K and
I, and even annulling thereby, the one rendered by the highest
74

Tribunal of the land;. In not sustaining respondent's claim that

petitioners have no cause of action because the property in
dispute is a public river and in holding that the said claim has no
basis in fact and in law;
CA
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the petitioners-appellants
is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the
river covered reverted to public domain, is assailed by the
petitioners-appellants as being a collateral attack on the
indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor
of the petitioners-appellants' predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano
Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued
that as the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration
Court was not re-opened through a petition for review filed within
one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the certificate of
title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land
covered thereby is no longer open to attack under Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the
matter established by this Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of
registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and
indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the
said Act among which are: "liens, claims or rights arising or
existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of
the Philippine Islands which the statute of the Philippine Islands
cannot require to appear of record in the registry."
Ruling:
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed
upon by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. 2
(Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river
of the public domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1
and 2 appearing in Original Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that
Lot No. 2 embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides
75

by rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in

Civil Case No. 1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and
decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"), Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river
that has been covered with water since time immemorial and,
therefore, part of the public domain. This finding having been
affirmed by the Supreme Court, there is no longer any doubt that
Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of petitioners is
a river which is not capable of private appropriation or acquisition
by prescription.

NAVERA V. QUICHO
5 SCRA 45
Facts:
On January 24, 1961 the municipality of Ligao filed for the
correction of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
Godofredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a
portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during
the cadastral survey of Ligao.
Consequently, Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be
granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would
involve the opening of the original decree of registration.
The municipality of Ligao alleged that the land amounting to 123
sq. m. is erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A, for said portion
of land is part of a street in the municipality. Thus, the
municipality prays for the correction in the certificate of title, with
76

a view to excluding therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m.

erroneously included therein.
The trial court affirmed the petition of the municipality. The ruling
of the trial court is founded on the principle that, if a person
obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by
mistake or oversight a land which cannot be registered, he does
not by virtue of such certificate alone become the owner of the
land illegally included therein. Hence, this petition by Navera.
Issue:
Whether the 123 sq. m. of land is erroneously included in Lot No.
2793-A, which title is granted to Navera.
Ruling:
Even if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously
included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the
Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that
portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because
under the law any public highway, even if not noted on a title, is
deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance, is in
our opinion correct. This is upon the principle that a person who
obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot
legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become
the owner of the land erroneously included therein. But this
theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be
excluded is really part of a public highway. This principle only
applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.
In the present case unanimity among the parties is lacking. Thus,
petition is affirmed, the order of the respondent court is set aside.
LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
Facts:
77

The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in

Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956,
the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine
Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial
lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the
Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot). The properties
and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and
property and their suffering during World War II.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese
government through Reparations Contract. The Roponggi property
consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy." As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai
on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major
repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary
funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since
that time.
During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made
by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to
lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm,
in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1
building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine
Chancery in Nampeidai. The President issued EO 296 entitling
non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital
goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the
government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to
sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind
can be alienated by the Philippine government.
78

2. Whether there was a conflict of law between the Japanese law

on property (as the real property is situated there) and Philippine
law.
Ruling:
1. No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public
service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on
the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances
must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
2. No. A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1)
there is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable,
such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to
be determined; and (2) a foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the
same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply. In the present case, none of the above elements exists.
REPUBLIC V. CA
83 SCRA 453
Facts:
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina
(should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan,
79

Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue

rivers.
They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent
to their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.
The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the
application for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court,
hence it was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting
the application on the finding that the lands in question are
accretions to the private respondents' fishponds covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner
Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render
untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds.
Issue:
Whether the registration of the lots valid.
Ruling:
No, the registration of the lots is not valid.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of
the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan
river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article
420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
80

They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication
of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents
is null and void. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not
have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private
respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
NAVERA V. QUICHO
5 SCRA 454
Facts:
On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court
of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No.
496, as amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot
No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was
erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of
Ligao.
Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under
Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the
opening of the original decree of registration. He contends that,
under said section, the court can only authorize an alteration
which may not impair the rights recorded in the decree, or one
which will not prejudice such rights, or one which is consented to
by all parties concerned, or can authorize the correction of any
error or mistake which would not involve the reopening of the
original decree of registration. Here the petition will have such
effect, for it will involve the correction of the technical description
of the land covered by the certificate of title in question,
segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been
erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment
of the original decree of registration. This cannot be done at this
stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the
certificate of title.

81

It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the

construction or repair of Natera street of said municipality it was
ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. 2793-A of the
cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by
depriving the street of an area amounting to 123 sq. m. which
was erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of
Godofredo Navera. Hence, the municipality prays for the
correction of such error in the technical description of the lot, as
well as in the certificate of title, with a view to excluding
therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m. erroneously included therein.
The court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss
and requiring Navera to answer the petition within the
reglementary period. The courts based its decision on the
rationale that It is a rule of law that lands brought under the
operation of the Torrens System are deemed relieved from all
claims and encumbrances not appearing on the title. Among the
burdens on the land registered which continue to exist, pursuant
to said Section 39, is "any public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, have been determined." The principle involved here is
that, if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which
includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be
registered, he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become
the owner of the land illegally included therein.
Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling Navera contends
that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a
clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration
which was issued in 1937, and this is so because the petition
seeks to direct the register of deeds to make the necessary
correction in the technical description in order that the portion
erroneously included may be returned to the municipality of
Ligao. In effect, therefore, the petition does not seek merely the
correction of a mistake or error but the return or reconveyance of
a portion of a registered property to respondent.
82

Issue:
Whether the inclusion of public highways in the title is correct.
Ruling:
The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be
segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to
petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to
the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under
Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law1 any public
highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded
therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance, is in our opinion
correct. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title
which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be
registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner
of the land erroneously included therein.2 But this theory only
holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is
really part of a public highway. This principle only applies if there
is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.
On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court
of First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No.
496, as amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot
No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was
erroneously included in said title during the cadastral survey of
Ligao.
Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under
Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the
opening of the original decree of registration. He contends that,
under said section, the court can only authorize an alteration
which may not impair the rights recorded in the decree, or one
which will not prejudice such rights, or one which is consented to
by all parties concerned, or can authorize the correction of any
83

error or mistake which would not involve the reopening of the

original decree of registration. Here the petition will have such
effect, for it will involve the correction of the technical description
of the land covered by the certificate of title in question,
segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been
erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment
of the original decree of registration. This cannot be done at this
stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the
certificate of title.
Republic vs Ayala
14 SCRA 259
It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the
construction or repair of Natera street of said municipality it was
ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. 2793-A of the
cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by
depriving the street of an area amounting to 123 sq. m. which
was erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of
Godofredo Navera. Hence, the municipality prays for the
correction of such error in the technical description of the lot, as
well as in the certificate of title, with a view to excluding
therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m. erroneously included therein.
The court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss
and requiring Navera to answer the petition within the
reglementary period. The courts based its decision on the
rationale that It is a rule of law that lands brought under the
operation of the Torrens System are deemed relieved from all
claims and encumbrances not appearing on the title. Among the
burdens on the land registered which continue to exist, pursuant
to said Section 39, is "any public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, have been determined." The principle involved here is
that, if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which
includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be
84

registered, he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become

the owner of the land illegally included therein.
Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling Navera contends
that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a
clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration
which was issued in 1937, and this is so because the petition
seeks to direct the register of deeds to make the necessary
correction in the technical description in order that the portion
erroneously included may be returned to the municipality of
Ligao. In effect, therefore, the petition does not seek merely the
correction of a mistake or error but the return or reconveyance of
a portion of a registered property to respondent.
Issue:
Whether the inclusion of public highways in the title is correct.
Ruling:
The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be
segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to
petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to
the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under
Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law1 any public
highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded
therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance, is in our opinion
correct. This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title
which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be
registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner
of the land erroneously included therein.2 But this theory only
holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is
really part of a public highway. This principle only applies if there
is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.
HILARIO V. CITY OF MANILA
19 SCRA 931
Facts:
85

The subject of the petition is a lot situated on the Western side of

San Mateo River. To prevent the river from entering the lot, a dike
was built on the northern side of the river. In 1937, flood occurred
and the river destroyed the dike, left its original bed and
meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest
thereof a lenticular place of land. In 1945, the US Army conducted
excavations in the lenticular strip which stands between the old
river bed and the new course. The US Army has paid for such
activities. In 1947, the sand and gravel plant was turned over to
the respondents. The respondents continued the activities carried
out by the US army. The petitioner then filed the case praying that
the excavation, bulldozing and extraction activities be restrained.
Issue:
Is a newly formed riverbank in a private estate considered
property of public dominion?
Ruling:
Yes. A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several
parts constituting the river, the whole river. Since a river is but
one compound concept, it should have only one nature. And since
rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three
component elements be of the same nature also.
REPUBLIC V. SIOSON
9 SCRA 533
Facts:
The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an
application for registration four (4) parcels of land situated in
barrio San Roque, Paombong, Bulacan, of which the claimed to be
the owners in fee simple.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of
land the registration which was applied for stating (a) that neither
86

the applicants nor their predecessors in interest had sufficient

title to the said parcel of land, the same not having been a
acquired either by composicion title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title under the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894;(b) that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors in interest have possesses the land openly,
continuously, publicly, adversely and under bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894; (e) that the said parcel of land
sought to be registered is a part of the public domain and as such
belong to the Republic of the Philippines.
The CFI Bulacan ordered the registration of Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in
favor of the spouses. However, no adjudication was made with
respect to Lot 4.
The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far it did not
decree the registration of Lot No. 4 in their names.
The Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands, instead of
filing a brief to answer that of the appellants, filed in the Court of
Appeals a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No.
4 be decreed in the name of the appellants. The Court of Appeals
rendered judgment modifying that of the lower court and
decreeing the registration of Lot No. 4 in the name of the
appellants.
The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
filed in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of
registration and cancellation of title to a parcel of land in the
name of the spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. The
parcel of land referred to in the petition is Lot No. 4. The petition
alleges actual and extrinsic fraud practiced by the herein
respondents, then applicants, by intentional and deliberate
concealment of facts and connivance by and between the
respondents and the land inspector.
The respondents filed an opposition to the petition. Respondents
alleged, among other things, that they had not practiced any
actual fraud; that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in
87

fact an accretion to a titled parcel of land; that the present

petition for review under the principle of res judicata is undeniably
improper, unwarranted and illegal; and that the Solicitor General
is deemed to be in estoppel to make allegations in the present
petition contrary to or inconsistent with those stated in the a
pleading entitled "Comments" recommending that the registration
of the fourth parcel of land which was an accretion to the titled
lands of the then applicants-appellants be decreed in their names.
Without hearing and presentation of evidence the lower court
entered an order denying the petition. The Republic of the
Philippines has appealed.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without
hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that
actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the
respondents.
Ruling:
There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court
should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.
Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a
navigable stream, creek or river the decree and title to it in the
name of the respondents would not give them any right or title to
it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under
the Land Registration Act.
MARTINEZ VS CA
56 SCRA 647
Facts:
88

The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an

application for registration four (4) parcels of land situated in
barrio San Roque, Paombong, Bulacan, of which the claimed to be
the owners in fee simple.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of
land the registration which was applied for stating (a) that neither
the applicants nor their predecessors in interest had sufficient
title to the said parcel of land, the same not having been a
acquired either by composicion title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title under the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894;(b) that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors in interest have possesses the land openly,
continuously, publicly, adversely and under bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894; (e) that the said parcel of land
sought to be registered is a part of the public domain and as such
belong to the Republic of the Philippines.
The CFI Bulacan ordered the registration of Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in
favor of the spouses. However, no adjudication was made with
respect to Lot 4.
The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far it did not
decree the registration of Lot No. 4 in their names.
The Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands, instead of
filing a brief to answer that of the appellants, filed in the Court of
Appeals a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No.
4 be decreed in the name of the appellants. The Court of Appeals
rendered judgment modifying that of the lower court and
decreeing the registration of Lot No. 4 in the name of the
appellants.
The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
filed in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of
registration and cancellation of title to a parcel of land in the
name of the spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. The
parcel of land referred to in the petition is Lot No. 4. The petition
89

alleges actual and extrinsic fraud practiced by the herein

respondents, then applicants, by intentional and deliberate
concealment of facts and connivance by and between the
respondents and the land inspector.
The respondents filed an opposition to the petition. Respondents
alleged, among other things, that they had not practiced any
actual fraud; that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in
fact an accretion to a titled parcel of land; that the present
petition for review under the principle of res judicata is undeniably
improper, unwarranted and illegal; and that the Solicitor General
is deemed to be in estoppel to make allegations in the present
petition contrary to or inconsistent with those stated in the a
pleading entitled "Comments" recommending that the registration
of the fourth parcel of land which was an accretion to the titled
lands of the then applicants-appellants be decreed in their names.
Without hearing and presentation of evidence the lower court
entered an order denying the petition. The Republic of the
Philippines has appealed.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without
hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that
actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the
respondents.
Ruling:
There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court
should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.
Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a
navigable stream, creek or river the decree and title to it in the
name of the respondents would not give them any right or title to
it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under
the Land Registration Act.
90

REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514
Facts:
The lot subject matter of this land registration case is situated
near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters there
from in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by
Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When
Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned
his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del
Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance. Santos del Rio, herein
applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration
of said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by
the Director of Lands and by private oppositors. Sometime before
1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio
to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there
was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had
made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of
the original agreement, private oppositors constructed residential
houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an
ejectment suit against the former in 1966. 4Meanwhile, during the
latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had
simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the
Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios
application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna
dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and
obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
Petitions for Review of said decision.
Issue:
Whether the applicant private respondent has registrable title to
the land.
Ruling:
91

Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine

territory, is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as
those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of
private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes.
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and
reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it
is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the
Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the
registration of title which applicant already possesses over the
land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession
of the property. Applicant by himself and through his father
before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful,
exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more
than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax
receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal
requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his
favor of said land.

LAND BANK V. REPUBLIC

543 SCRA 453
Facts:
A parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 41,276 square
meters was issued to Angelito C. Bugayong with OCT no. P-2823
92

(the mother title came from the Sales Patent No.4576) in 1969.
The land was subdivided into four lots with a new TCT in the name
of Bugayong and sold all his lots to different persons. He sold one
particular lot to the spouses Du. They then then subdivided the lot
into two, in which they sold one lot to the spouses Dayola and
registered the other lot in the name of Lourdes Farms Inc. (which
is the subject of the case). Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged the
land to Landbank on April 14, 1980.
The Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation upon a formal
petition and found out that the Land of Bugayong with Sales
Patent no.4576 was classified within the forest zone on August 6,
1923 and was released as alienable and disposable only on March
25, 1981 through an Administrative order. The Bureau resolved
that the sales patent was illegally issued and the OCT was
improperly issued by the Director of Lands at that time. Now, the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands,
through the office of the Sol. Gen. filed a complaint before the RTC
of Davao to cancel the titles that were issued to Bugayong and
the other owners and mortgagors of the land and the reversion of
the land into the mass of public domain. LBP claimed that it is a
mortgagee in good faith and for value. It prayed that should the
TCT issued to Lourdes Farms, Inc. be annulled by the court,
Lourdes Farms, Inc. should be ordered to pay its outstanding
obligations to LBP or to provide a new collateral security.
Issue:
1. Whether a forest land is capable of private appropriation.
2. Whether or not LBP have the Mortgage Right and Interest over
the land for being a purchaser in good faith.
Ruling:
1. No. Forest lands are outside the commerce of man and
unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.
2. No. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it
covers property of public domain classified as forest, timber or
93

mineral lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even

in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be
cancelled. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may
seem. Dura lex sed lex.Ang batas ay maaaring mahigpit subalit
ito ang mananaig.
DIAZ V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181502; February 2, 2010
Facts:
Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia, filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and
Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance on August 12,
1976. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and
worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and
benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for
more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposed the application because the land in
question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation,
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 in 1955. Thus, it
was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
The CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the
Court of Appeals. In its decision dated February 26, 1992, penned
by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,the appellate court reversed and
set aside the decision of the CFI.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the
land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As
Garcias right to the property was largely dependent on the
existence and validity of the possessory information title the
probative value,and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a
military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly
acquire title thereto.
94

During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away
and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza
decision. While the motion was pending in the CA. Subsequently,
however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable
settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient
time to draft and finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with
the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689
hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner
withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the
military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the
amicable settlement in the CA.
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise
agreement. On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration
Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in
petitioners favor.
However, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The
OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of
the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
Issue:
Whether or the land within the military reservation is registrable.
Ruling:
SC ruled that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and
imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration
and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes
res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons.

95

However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they

have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner coupled with possession by the claimant as
well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for
petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence.
Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessorsin-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject
land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be
counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public
Land Act. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released
through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then
will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY V. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
Facts:
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting
of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian,
Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons, including the
Director of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
96

and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal

and held that It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It
is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the
basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared
alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow
long cannot convert it into private property. It is reiterated for
emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied
in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines.

TONGSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL

G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977

Facts:

As early as 1905 the parcel of land (LOT 855) was under the
exclusive possession of Francisco Borja who cut trees therefrom
and converted them into firewood. Moreover, he established a salt
factory, selling salts and the firewood. After his death, his son
Arturo took possession of the land, continued to cut trees up until
1910. May of 1917, Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias
Gayacao evidenced by a private instrument.
Deogracias on the other hand sold 5 parcels of land to Santiago
Bermejo one of the parcels known as parcel No. 4 is cadastral Lot
No. 855. The sale is evidenced by the public instrument. During
his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo possessed said parcel of land,
cut trees for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory.
Upon his death in 1951, his children took possession of this parcel
97

of land and when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial

administrator by the Court of First Instance of Capiz, LOT 855
appeared in the Revised Inventory of the estate of the late
Santiago M. Bermejo. When Macario Bermejo took possession of
the land in 1953 he converted it into a fishpond and started to
construct fishpond dikes. However, due to lack of funds, the
construction of the fishpond was not completed. On May 30,
1956, Macario Bermejo, in his capacity as administrator of the
estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased the land to
Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the Court of First Instance
of Capiz.

The possession of the heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with

that of their predecessors-in-interest was likewise peaceful,
continuous, open, adverse and in concept of owners for a period
of not less than fifty years.
Issue:

Whether or not a parcel of land, in the possession of the

predecessors- in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as
1905, asserted to have originally been mangrove swamps,
thereafter converted into a fishpond, may still be considered as
part of the timber domain which is not disposable.

Ruling:

The decision of the lower court is affirmed. "In the case of Mapa v.
Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural
lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may
have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands
98

in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands,

and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as
nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The
definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested
prior to its enactment," 9 What is even more persuasive as to the
correctness of the decision reached by the lower court is that in
the Garchitorena decision, this Court, through Justice Ostrand who
was famed for his authoritative opinions on public land
controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than fifteen years after
the effectivity of the Revised Administrative Code, was equally
explicit:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the

land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as
shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this
opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch
as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are
not forests lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in
the Act of Congress ... It could be said, therefore, that even
on the assumptions that the parcel of land in question could
be characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion
reached by the lower court is not without support in the
applicable authorities.

In fact, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in

the appealed decision that to the disputed lot was originally
mangrove swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamps where
only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small
and sparse fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing
are not of commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land
into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do
not form part of the public domain." Based on such a finding
which must be accorded due weight and is control the sole
question raised on appeal is one of law, the decision arrived at by
99

the lower court is not open to any valid objection.

REPUBLIC vs. AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
Facts:
In 1951,Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two
parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. In a decision
dated August 31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared
the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements
thereon, for which OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the
Register of Deeds. By virtue of an instrument dated March 18,
1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by OCT No. 0-665, together
with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377
covered by TCT No. 3251-A, were consolidated and sub-divided
into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of Modesto
Castillo, in 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a
deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of
Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which OCT No. D-665 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title
were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al. The Republic of the
Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants, and for
the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court
involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Ruling:
Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
and, therefore, not registrable. Accretions on the bank of a lake,
like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which
they have been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs
to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership
until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed
100

for public use. The defense of long possession is likewise not

available in this case because, as already ruled by this Court,
mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest
the land of its public character.

REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989

Facts:

On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for

registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga,
Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey
plan Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided
into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares
and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey
plan Psu-226971, amd. 2. The Republic opposed the application
on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors
have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously,
publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since
July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the
public domain. Republic claims that the decree and title rendered
and issued in LRC Case is concerned, are void ab initio. The trial
court ruled that the parcel of land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and hence,
available for disposition and registration.

Issue:

Whether or not the properties in question are foreshore lands or

part and parcel of the public domain.
101

Ruling:

The Supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court. The
parcel of land is a foreshore land so it is not registerable. It
defines a foreshore land as that part of (the land) which is
between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of
the tides. If the submergence, however, of the land is due to
precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity
to the waters. The Court cannot make a ruling because the case
is not a trier of facts, and it is in possession of no evidence to
assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition, hence the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-43105 AUGUST 31, 1984
Facts:
The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna
de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto,
the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this
case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses
on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead
constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against
the private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private
oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau
of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration. The CFI
of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and
obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands
and the private oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said
decision to the Supreme Court. The Director of Lands contends that since a portion
of the land is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the
lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
Issue:
102

Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land.

Ruling:
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It
cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that
he has a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens
System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which
applicant already possesses over the land.
CAGAMPANG V. MORANO
G.R. No. L-25738. March 14, 1968
Facts:
The case began with a forcible entry and detainer suit instituted
by Silverio Cagampang to recover from the defendant, Flaviano
Morano, a parcel of land abutting on the sea in the municipality of
Bacuag, Surigao del Norte. Plaintiff, who claimed to have been in
possession of the land for over 80 years, charged that in 1960
defendant, through strategy and stealth, occupied a portion of the
land and refused to vacate it, to the prejudice of plaintiff;
wherefore, the latter sought to have possession restored to him,
to collect a rental of P3.00 a month, plus P5,000.00 damages and
costs. The defendant's answer pleaded occupancy by virtue of a
foreshore "grant from proper authorities".
At the ocular inspection in 1965, the Court found that the lot in
question is not reached, much less, covered by the highest
ordinary tide. It can only be reached or covered by the highest
tide during the months of May, June and July or during the months
when the highest tide of the year will occur.
Issue:

103

Whether or not lands covered by the sea at high tide not due to
abnormal conditions are part of the shore and therefore public
land.
Ruling:
At the ocular inspection, the Court found that the land was
covered by the sea water at high tide in the months of May, June
and, July. This finding makes it clear that the land was part of the
shore, and was, therefore, public land belonging to the State,
conformably to Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866:
Art. 1. The following are part of the national domain open to
public use: (3) The Shores. By shore is understood that space
covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior
or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial
tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on
the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary
storms and tempests. By Article 420 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, shores are declared property of the public domain.
As the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July, and
there is no showing that these tides are due to abnormal
conditions, the land is obviously part of the shore and public
property. Hence, legal possession thereof appertains to the
national government or its grantees.
DIZON V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 April 30, 1965
Facts:
These are separate appeals instituted by Antonino Dizon, et al. (G.R. Nos. L20300-01) and the Republic of the Philippines, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-20355-56), from
a single decision of the Court of Appeals.
Hacienda Calatagan is owned by Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel. In 1938, the Hacienda
constructed a pier, called "Santiago Landing," to be used by the Hacienda sugar
104

mill but when it ceased its operation the owners converted the pier into a fishpond
dike and built additional dikes which were converted into a fishpond. In 1949, the
Zobels ordered the subdivision of the Hacienda which was approved by the
Director of Lands, and the Register of Deeds issued a title in the name of Jacobo
Zobel and the latter sold to Antonio Dizon Lot 49 with 37 hectares. On May 24,
1952, Miguel Tolentino and his daughter filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an
application for ordinary fishpond permit or lease for Lot 49 and Lot 1.
The Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed a protest with the Bureau of Fisheries,
claiming the properties to be private land but were dismissed by the Director of
Fisheries. On October 1, 1954, the protestants filed an action in the CFI of Manila
to restrain the Director of Fisheries from issuing the fishpond permits but the court
dismissed this petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedy. On appeal to
this Court, the decision of the lower court was sustained. Protestants then filed an
appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence the Dizons
filed Civil Case in the CFI of Batangas, to quiet their titles over Lots 49 and 1.
The Republic of the Philippines intervenes in view of the finding that the lots were
part of the foreshore area before their conversion. The CFI of Batangas
promulgated a joint decision making the finding that the subdivision plan was
prepared in disregard of the technical description. In its decision the appellate court
adopted the findings of the lower court but the CA awarded to applicants
Tolentinos damages in the amount of P200.00 per hectare. Appellants were thus
declared entitled to retention of the properties.
Issue:

Whether or not the Lots in question are part of the seashore or

foreshore area.

Ruling:
It is noteworthy in connection with the appeal of plaintiffs, that
they do not contest the existence of the pier that was used by the
hacienda owners in the loading of their manufactured sugar to
105

vessels. The fact that said pier jutted out 600 meters to the sea
indicates that the area over which such cemented structure
spanned was part of the sea or at least foreshore land. And,
plaintiffs were not able to disprove the testimonial evidence that
the fishponds in question were constructed by enclosing the areas
with dikes, using the pier as one of the ends of the fishponds. It is
clear that the areas thus enclosed and converted into fishponds
were really part of the foreshore. This, and the fact that the
subdivision plan was found to have been prepared not in
accordance with the technical descriptions in but in disregard of
it, support the conclusion reached by both the lower court and the
Court of Appeals that Lots 49 and 1 are actually part of the
territorial waters and belong to the State. And, it is an elementary
principle that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a
Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land thus
covered is not capable of registration.
On the matter of possession of plaintiffs-appellants, the ruling of
the Court of Appeals must be upheld. There is no showing that
plaintiffs are not purchasers in good faith and for value. As such
title-holders, they have reason to rely on the indefeasible
character of their certificates.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
Facts:
In 1951,Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two
parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. In a decision
dated August 31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared
the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements
thereon, for which OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the
Register of Deeds. By virtue of an instrument dated March 18,
1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by OCT No. 0-665, together
with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377
covered by TCT No. 3251-A, were consolidated and sub-divided
into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of Modesto
Castillo, in 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a
106

deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of

Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which OCT No. D-665 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title
were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al. The Republic of the
Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants, and for
the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court
involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Ruling:
One of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the
final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter;
that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public
use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus,
it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the
territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their
inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into
properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant

Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to

the owners of the estate to which they have been added while
accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is
not available for private ownership until formally declared by the
government to be no longer needed for public use. But such
distinction will not help private respondents because there is no
accretion shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was
established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in
duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it
habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as
already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itself
automatically divest the land of its public character.
107

CANTOJA V. LIM
G.R. No. 168386 March 29, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed an application for a Foreshore Lease
Contract over the foreshore area located in Makar, General Santos City in 1989.
The Lease contract was executed on November 23, 1990 and would expire on
October 21, 2015. Five years after, petitioner Harry Lim filed a protest questioning
the grant of FLA to Cantoja since according to him, Cantoja has committed fraud
and misrepresentation in declaring in his application that the subject foreshore area
adjoined his (Cantojas) property.To prove this allegation, Lim presented a TCT
over a lot which adjoins the foreshore area subject of the lease. Upon ocular
inspection, during which petitioner failed to appear despite notice, a Special
Investigator found that Cantoja was in actual possession of the foreshore area
which was utilized as dock-board of the Cantojas Fishing Business. It was
ascertained that no portion has been occupied or possessed by any other person or
persons, nor was there any adverse claimant thereof. Like the DENR Secretary, the
Office of the President also relied on the findings of Special Investigator that the
petitioners titled land is an inalienable foreshore area which could not be subject
of a valid patent or title.
Aggrieved, respondent Harry Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held that Cantoja committed misrepresentation amounting to fraud in his
application for lease when he declared in his application that his lot adjoins that of
the foreshore area sought to be leased.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the Foreshore Lease Contract
granted to Cantoja covering the foreshore area?
Ruling:
No. It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the land adjacent to
the foreshore area leased to Cantoja, Thus, prior to Cantojas foreshore lease
application in1989 and the grant of the foreshore lease contract on November 23,
1990; respondent already owned the land adjacent to the foreshore land. The sketch
108

plan submitted by the Geodetic Engineer clearly shows that respondents property
is in between the foreshore land and Cantojas property. Being the owner of the
land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who
has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of
the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 provides that, while lands added to
the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form
part of the public domain, such lands, when they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
established of special industries, or for the coast guard service, shall be declared
by the Government to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner
(riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or
alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea. The reason for that preferential right
is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is
that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land
suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral
lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.
In this case, Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented himself as the
riparian or littoral owner in his application for the foreshore lease. Under
stipulation no. 15 of the Foreshore Lease Agreement, any fraud or
misrepresentation committed by the applicant is a ground for cancellation or
rescission of the Foreshore Lease Agreement.
LAHORA V. DAYANGHIRANG, JR.
G.R. No. L-28565 January 30, 1971

Facts:

Spouses Lahora and Toribia Moralizon filed a petition for the

registration of the nine parcels of land located in Davao. One-half
109

of the said land was acquired by Toribia through inheritance and

the other half was by purchase and open, continuous, exclusive
and adverse possession in the concept of an owner. Said petition
was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang Jr., who alleged that the
subject lands belong to him and his wife. The Director of Lands
also opposed the petition of Lahora spouses because applicants
or their predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the
parcels of land sought to be registered, nor have they been in
open, continuous, and notorious possession thereof for at least 30
years.The said lot has been previously registered and titled, said
parcel of land can no longer be the subject of adjudication in
another proceeding.The lower court contends that patent issued
to oppositor's wife was procured by fraud, because appellants,
the alleged actual occupants of the land, were not notified of the
application for patent therefor and of its adjudication. Thus,
according to appellants, since they were the actual occupants of
the property, the government could not have awarded it to
oppositor's wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as well as the
original certificate of title subsequently obtained by her, were null
and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject land can be re-registered under

Torrens title even if it was already recorded in the issuance of
public land patent.

Ruling:

In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the
name of oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier.
110

Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of

land on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate
of title (OCT No. P-6053) covering the said property is a nullity,
can no longer prosper. Having become registered land under Act
496, for all legal purposes, by the issuance of the public land
patent and the recording thereof, further registration of the same
would lead to the obviously undesirable result of two certificates
of title being issued for the same piece of land, even if both
certificates should be in the name of the same person. And if they
were to be issued to different persons, the indefeasibility of the
first title, which is the most valued characteristic of Torrens titles,
would be torn away.

In a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again

the registration of land already decreed in an earlier case; and
that a second decree for the same land would be null and void. Of
course, if the patent had been issued during the pendency of the
registration proceedings, the situation would be different. If there
indeed exists a proper case for cancellation of the patent for
intrinsic fraud, the action for review of the decree should have
been filed before the one year period had elapsed. Thereafter, the
proper party to bring the action would only be the person
prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act the owner and grantor,
and not another applicant or claimant. Furthermore, the relief
provided by the law in such instance may be secured by the
aggrieved party, not in another registration, for land already
registered in the name of a person cannot be the subject of
another registration, but in an appropriate action such as one for
reconveyance or reversion, or for damages in case the property
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY V. DUMYUNG

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

111

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines thru the Director of Lands filed

three Civil Cases for the annulment of Free Patents and of Original
Certificates of Title, on the ground of misrepresentation and false
data and information furnished by the defendants.
The lands embraced in the patents and titles comprise a total
area of 58.4169 hectares, and situated in the Municipal District of
Mankayan, Mountain Province.

The defendants alleged that they are entitled to the benefits of

Republic Act No. 3872. It was stipulated therein that a member of
the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied
and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since
July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right to said land.

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein,

filed motions for intervention in the three civil cases, which were
granted.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company alleged that the portion of
the titled land is within its ordinary timber license No. 140-62 and
that another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral
claims.

The defendants in the three civil cases filed an amended joint

answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The
proceedings on the three civil cases were suspended pending the
outcome of the criminal cases.
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three
112

criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on

the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly
issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the
alleged falsification of public documents.

The trial court ruled in favor of the defense and dismissed the
three criminal cases for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused.
Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the three
civil cases on the ground that the extinction of the penal action
carries with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction
proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.

The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the

Director of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
order dismissing the three Civil Cases.

The court of appeals sustained the ruling of the trial court. As

such intervenor filed this petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral

lands.

113

(2) Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the

benefits of Republic Act No. 3872.

Ruling:

(1) Yes, the lands in question are considered mineral lands.

(2) No, because the lands are not alienable and disposable. There
is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the
National Cultural Minorities; that they have continuously occupied
and cultivated either by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955;
and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable
under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent
applications. These qualifications must be established by
evidence. Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that
it was in possession of the lands in question when the private
respondents applied for free patents thereon.

It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers

property of public domain classified as forest or timber and
mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the
hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for

falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles.
Thus, the order of the trial court is set aside.

114

ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, VS.

APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN
193 scra 71

INTERMEDIATE

Facts:
The evidence for the applicant who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows
that he acquired the land from his father-in-law, Dongail, when he married his
daughter; that he was then 18 years old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was
planted with camote, casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on
the land since his marriage up to the present; that he has been paying the taxes
during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never disturbed in
his possession. Supporting his oral testimony, applicant submitted tax declarations
both dated March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the latter for urban land
and improvement therein. The receipt showing payment of the taxes on such tax
declarations is dated Feb. 8, 1949. The said tax declarations show that they cancel
tax declaration No. 439 dated Feb. 10, 1947 which was presented by the Oppositor
Atok Big Wedge Mining Company as its Exhibit 14, and the land tax under Exh.
14 was paid by applicant in 1947. Applicant has also submitted Exh. `C, which
indicates that all pre-war records of tax declarations and real property receipts of
the municipality of Itogon where the property is located were burned and destroyed
during the last world war. The Atok Big Wedge Mining Company came in also as
oppositor claiming that the land in question is within its mineral claims - Sally,
Evelyn and Ethel Atok Big Wedge Mining Company submitted Exhibits 6, 7 and 8,
all showing that the annual assessment work of these mineral claims were
maintained from 1932 to 1967 for Sally and Evelyn and from 1946 to 1967 for
Ethel. It was likewise shown that these mineral claims were recorded in the
mining recorders office; Sally and Evelyn on Jan. 2, 1931 and Ethel on March 18,
1921. Petitioners presentation of evidence proving registration of the mining
claims of petitioner in the Mining Recorder of Benguet dating back to 1931, at the
latest, notably about sixteen (16) years before private respondent declared the land
in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before private
respondent filed the land registration proceedings in 1965, apparently impressed
the court a quo. And so it ruled in favor of petitioner as oppositor in the land
registration proceedings, the court a quo ratiocinating in this wise:
The mining claims were recorded ahead of the time when the applicant declared
the land for taxation purposes based on his documentary exhibits. So the evidence
of the applicant cannot prevail over the documentary exhibits of the oppositor Atok
115

Big Wedge Mining Company. The foregoing facts show that the mining company
had established its rights long before applicant asserted ownership over the land.
The perfection of mining claims over the mineral lands involved, segregated them
from the public domain and the beneficial ownership thereof became vested in the
locator.
The CA reversed the trial courts decision and ruled in favor of the applicant, ruling
that the applicant possessed the land in the concept of an owner.
Issue:
Whether or not the ownership of subject land had long been vested on petitioner
after it had allegedly located and recorded its mining claim in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ruling:
The records bear out that private respondent has been in possession of subject
parcel of land in concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. The court a quo
made the following factual findings based on the testimony of private respondent:
The land applied for is almost 90% improved with numerous irrigated rice terraces
newly planted to palay at the time of the ocular inspection and others planted to
vegetables such as potatoes, banana plants, flowering plants and fruit trees such as
mangoes, jackfruits, coffee plants, avocados and citrus - all fruit bearing.
We agree with respondent Court of Appeals that a reading of tsn. would rather
persuade that applicant had shown quite well that subject property had been in
continuous and adverse possession, first, of his predecessor-in-interest, Dongail
and, after the death of the latter, himself, years before, that is, long before the
outbreak of the last war.
We also learn from our reading of our past and present mining laws in their proper
historical perspectives, that the process of recording mining claims could not have
been intended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral lands. The
recording of a mining claim only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive
rights to undertake mining activities upon the land subject of the claim. The power
to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who records a mining claim. In
fact, this strengthens our holding that the rights of a mining claimant are confined
to possessing the land for purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in exclusion of
any or all other persons whose claims are subsequent to the original mining locator.
Thus, if no minerals are extracted therefrom, notwithstanding the recording of the
116

claim, the land is not mineral land and registration thereof is not precluded by such
recorded claim. Equally borne out by the records is the fact that petitioner has
indeed applied for a mining lease under P.D. No. 1214. For that reason, it has, in
effect, waived its right to secure a patent and it shall have been governed, if private
respondents claim of adverse and open possession of the subject land for more
than 30 years were not established, by P.D. No. 463 in its activities respecting its
mining lease.
MATEO V. MORENO
28 SCRA 796
Facts:
In 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto, Bulacan, sent a lettercomplaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking
that the Sapang Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had
been blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into
fishponds, be ordered reopened and restored to its original
condition.
The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, who caused an investigation to be conducted
pursuant to RA No. 2056. Subsequently, the Secretary rendered
his decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay
was a public navigable stream.
Moreover, the Secretary ordered Mateo, who had acquired the
property inside which the creek is situated, to remove the dikes
and dams constructed therein within 30 days from notice;
otherwise they would be removed at his expense.
Issue:
Whether or the body of water is private property or constitutes a
navigable stream or river of the public domain and subject to
acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:

117

The absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a

property covered by a certificate of title does not preclude a
subsequent investigation and determination of its existence nor
make it private property of the title holder.
It is true that Jacobo who was then the owner from whom Mateo
subsequently bought the property, was able to get her free patent
application approved in 1953 and to secure the corresponding
certificate of title, but said title did not change the public
character of the Sapang Cabay.
Moreover, the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications should be respected in the absence
of illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, as long as such
findings are supported by substantial evidence; and that the
ownership of a navigable stream or of the bed thereof is not
subject to acquisitive prescription.

REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514
Facts:
Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco
Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel
of land covered by TCT T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an application for the
registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu131892: Lot 1, 33837 sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq.
m.).On 6 March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of
the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu131892. On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the
application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2
118

covered by Plan Psu-131892. The lower court rendered a decision

granting the application on the finding that the lands in question
are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds covered by TCT 89709.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the
lower cost.Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the
decision of the CA. The petitioner submits that there is no
accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private respondents
simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River.Thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is
man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. The
private respondents contended that the accretion was without
human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred
after the accretion was complete.
Issue:
Whether the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents fishponds, entitling them to the ownership thereof.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The following are the
three requisites that need to occur before an accretion is said to
have taken place: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.The requirement that the
deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code
all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. Evidence shows the addition to the said
property was artificial and man-made. The alleged alluvial
119

deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the
current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike
towards the river and encroaching upon it.Moreover,the lots in
question were not included in the survey of their adjacent
property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey
of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the
years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for
taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had
permanently formed allegedly on 1939. Said areas existed only
after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the
bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. The accretion claimed is
really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by
reclamation.The lots sought to be registered were portions of the
bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as
property of the public domain .They are not open to registration
under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in
question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void.
MANECLANG V. IAC
161 SCRA 469
Facts:
Petitioners. filed for quieting of title over a certain fishpond
located within the four parcels of land belonging to them situated
in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. The trial court
dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water
traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek
constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in
nature and not subject to private appropriation. Petitioners
appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership
of the property in favor of the petitioner is null and void.
120

Ruling:
Creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in
the flow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the public
domain. It is not susceptible to appropriation & acquisitive
prescription because such is as public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual. Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be
modified by the construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Authority, or by its conversion into a fishpond.
Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of
such property in favor of an individual is null and void.
The compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary
to law and public policy.
REPUBLIC V. REYES
155 SCRA 313
Facts:
Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio filed with the Bureau of
Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land
designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. 7-207 and 7-208 for
Lot No.1and Lot No.2 situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. The said
free patent applications were approved on June 14, 1956. Free
Patent Titles were then issued to respondents Godofredo R.
Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara. These patents were transcribed and
registered on June 21, 1956 the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the
Registration Book for the Province of Rizal.
The Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands
conducted and investigation and it was discovered that the
parcels of land patented and titled in the names of respondents
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara were actually under
water and form part of the Laguna de Bay. Eusebio and Lara
121

expressly agreed to have their patents and certificates of title

cancelled. Complaints were also filed against them before the CFI
of Pasig, Rizal. The lower court then rendered separate decisions
declaring null and void Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139 and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel said patents and
titles and for failure of defendants to move for reconsideration or
appeal, said decisions became final and executory.
Issue:
Whether lakes can be registered under the Torrens System.
Ruling:
That it is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots
even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value,
shall be cancelled. In the case at bar, the free patents and
certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which
form parts of Laguna de Bay. These are neither agricultural nor
disposable. Subject patents and titles were erroneously issued
due to misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore
be cancelled. Any false statement in an application for public land
shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. This
rule applies even after the issuance of the certificate of title. A
certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud,
and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to
free patent secured through fraud. Likewise, the Court ruled in
Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1986], that mere possession of
land does not itself divest the land of its public character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of
its ownership of the land nor operate to change the public
character of the land to private.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. AQUINO

G.R. No. 31688 December 17, 1990

122

FACTS: A 70-hectare lime rich land in Bucay, Abra is claimed by the private
respondents Abra Industiral Corporation (AIC) as their own since they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been occupying the said land for forty-nine years.
They have also complied with all the requirements for registering the said land. On
the other hand, the petitioners opposed the application of AIC since the highly
mineralized parcels of land are within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and
are not yet reclassified as alienable and disposable lands pursuant to the Public
Land Law. The lower court approved the registration of the said parcels of land,
but the Director of Lands thru the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that although the land may be reclassified by the
Bureau of Mines as a mineral land, it has not yet been excluded from the Cordillera
Forest Reserve pursuant to Sec. 1826 of R.A. No. 3092. Therefore, the lands
applied for are still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the 1935
Constitution. Private respondents opposed the motion for reconsideration prayed
for, but the lower court denied it saying that the Bureau of Mines and Bureau of
Forestry should also be parties to the case, but further contended that motion of
intervention by said bureaus are not proper in land registration cases. Then the
petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of appeals but were denied since it was filed
out of time. Meanwhile, registration of AICs applied lands were issued. After a
year from the issuance, the Solicitor General thru the lower court filed for a
petition for review of the said decrees. They alleged there was fraud in the
application of AIC, since they only showed 24 hectares but actually included 46
hectares of the said forest reserve. But the lower court ruled that the judicial error
was not synonymous with actual fraud. Without waiting for the decision, the
petitioners filed to the Supreme Court a petition for review for certiorari under
R.A. No. 5440.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the application of registration of
the said lands, notwithstanding the fact that they are within the forest zone.
Ruling:
The Supreme court ruled in favor of the petitioners, citing a long line of cases, with
mention of Director of Forestry v. Muoz where it was held that forest lands and
forests reserves are not alienable, however long a person was in possession thereof,
as it is premised in the Regalian doctrine which is enshrined in our constitution. It
is the President who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain
upon recommendation of the proper department head. In the case, AIC was not
able to prove that the lands they claimed were alienable and disposable or that the
lands were no longer part of the forest reserve.Hence, the decision of the lower
court was reversed and set aside.
123

DIRECTOR OF FORESTY V. MUNOZ

23 SCRA 184
Facts:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc.
(Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging. It was given a
Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate
in a 72,000 hectare of land. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad
which it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime.
In 1964, the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of
Piadecos certificate because it encroached beyond what was
allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and
Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court
ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with
Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied
by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish
title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to
apply for a Certificate.
Issue:
Whether Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.
Ruling:
No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for
another Certificate. There should be no question now that
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law.
It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised
Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the
approval of the department head, to issue regulations deemed
expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation
of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued
supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future,
and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest
reserves, to the same end. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2
was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by
124

the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a

valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects
and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is
that
when
Congress
authorized
the
promulgation
of
administrative rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes.
REPUBLIC V. CA
154 SCRA 476
Facts:
In 1968, Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming
Piraso filed in the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration
of the land, which the latter claimed to be in their possession and
occupation openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously since
1915. The Director of lands, through the Solicitor General and the
Director of Forestry, opposed the application on the ground that
the said portion land is within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve as shown in the reports and testimonies of the district
foresters. The CFI granted the application, which was also
affirmed by the CA. The governments failure to show that the
disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes is one of the
reasons for the CAs ruling. It also noted the failure to prove that
trees are thriving in the land.
Issue:
Whether the land in dispute is alienable and disposable.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the
reports and testimonies of the district foresters that the land
applied for registration is a part of a forestland. As to the claim of
125

the applicants that they have been in possession of the land since
1915, the court cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. Munoz
(23 SCRA 1184),where it stated that possession of forest lands, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
In its decision, the Court also addressed the CAs ruling by citing
its decision in Heirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126
SCRA 69, 75), where it ruled, A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover.
Forestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.
The Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal
Government declaration that the forestland has been re-classified
into alienable and disposable agricultural land, before private
persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public
agricultural lands can acquire it.
REPUBLIC V. ANIMAS
56 SCRA 499
Facts:
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for
by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and
its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application
therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of
the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of
the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original Certificate of
Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau
of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I,
126

General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102
and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du
Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to
the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered
thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land
Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in
question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said
land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which
was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for free
patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years
thereafter; that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private
respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for.
Issue:
Whether the area is a part of the forest zone
Ruling:
Yes, it is.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area
covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the
forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void.
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be
considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for
registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In
the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply
with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The
lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for
fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may
become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through
fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration
should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. Considering that it is the state is
seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has
not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A title
founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the
issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General. Public
land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act
127

(Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961).
Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of
Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New
Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred
prescription. Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol
can no longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land covered
thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under
Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the remedy of
reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of
such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
HEIRS OF AMMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
126 SCRA 69
Facts:
There are two petitions in this case. The Court of Appeals declared the disputed
property as forest land. These two petitions have their genesis in an application for
confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No.
885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners
in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and
Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot
No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. During the progress of
the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he
may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition,
claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio
Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated
in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their
respective
appeals
with
the
Court
of
Appeals.
In
its
decision,
the
Court
of
Appeals
held
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have
been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of
128

a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest
of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question
that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2)
private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the
opposition
and
evidence
of
the
Director
of
Forestry
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was
filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during
that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose
Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the
area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained
its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to
above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted
into a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing
of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District
Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so
that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942
which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed
in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable
title he must have shown "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the
application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants
or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years
prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title
for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had
been
in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural
lands
of
the
public
domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that
period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors
had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these
applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the
same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves
as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court
129

foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is
always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest
Court
to
pass
final
judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the
application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director
of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library. A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the
Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with
Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No.
496 known as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the
annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of
the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of
Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners
also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative
rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to
declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although
conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land
in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of
private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land"
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be sustained
Ruling:
130

Yes, it should be sustained.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that
in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had
to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that
the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as
"public
forest."
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
REPUBLIC V. SPS. MAXIMO
135 SCRA 156
Facts:
The Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon on March 21,
1961 rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said land,
Lot 1, allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in
the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales,
131

less 200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the

Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion. The basis of the claim of the
Maxinos is a Spanish title, a gratuitous composition title or
adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona
pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29
hectares of pasture land. The decision became final and
executory. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, the Republic filed with court an
amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the
ground that they are void because the land in question was still a
part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory
information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only
29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was
verified by the Acting Director of Forestry. After hearing the judge
denied the petition and ruled in favor of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether the land in question can be registered under the Torrens
System
Ruling:
No, the said land cannot be registered. It is axiomatic that public
forestal land is not registerable. The spouses have not shown that
a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. The
boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal
that a different land was covered thereby. The title states that the
29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. Tesalonas tax
declarations stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga,
now Anonang.
The court said that possession of public forestal lands, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973
Facts:
On November 12, 1966, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil Reservation Case No.
132

1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the re-opening of said
proceeding to have them declared owners, and for the registration in their favor of
four lots with a total area of 74,017 square meters. The subject lots are inside the
Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. Then on December 14, 1966,
respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices
thereof. The Director of Lands duly opposed, as a report of an investigator of his
office was that the area sought to be registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio
City. This notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge rendered
his decision in favour of the Carantes. The efforts exerted by the Director of Lands
and the City of Baguio to appeal said decision did not prosper because respondent
Judge because he believes that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John
Hay.
It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance
in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in
question is part of a duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied
by respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the location of the
lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently, the respondent
Judge in refusing to set aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the
private respondents had been in possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus
came within the protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp
John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights."
Issue:
Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain?
Ruling:
Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act, enacted as far
back as 1903, specifically governs the subject matter of reservations. As provided
therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interests therein, within the Philippine
Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and
declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and interests
therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become registered land
in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the
circumstances hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was sustained as
against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an earlier case
of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the
absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to seek a re-opening
under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance
133

of Pampanga, a 1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's

contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order
the registration portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be
sustained. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of
the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or
buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military
reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land
Registration Act. ... ." ' "
This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic,
respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of
private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931."
REPUBLIC VS IAC
155 SCRA 412
Facts:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,
acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of
land.Possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan.Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to
RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on
land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.Ownership and
possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela. Donated part of
the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the land is already a private land.
2.
Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporations or associations applies.
Ruling:
1.
YES. Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient. It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption. The application for confirmation
is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title
134

as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law
2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private
land
to which the Infields had a legally sufficient and transferable title
On October
29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it
must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. The only limitation then
extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS MERALCO

G.R. No. L-57461
Facts:
Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel
of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila on December 4, 1979. On August 17,
1976, applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo
Natividad who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as
evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28, 1970.
Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept
of an owner for more than 30 years. The property was declared for taxation
purposes under the name of the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.
On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of
the property in the name of the private respondent. The Director of Lands
interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply
for registration of title to land. After comments were filed by the respondents, the
Court gave the petition due course. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director
of Lands has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., etc., No. L73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
135

property.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it
from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations
holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const., Art.
XIV, See. 11) does not apply.
Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply
for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
Public Land Act.
As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings were
instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance, "productive
of a defect hardly more than procedural and in no wise affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings."
Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title
confirmed; only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny private
respondent the right to register its property which was validly acquired.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
179 SCRA 522
Facts:
Lot No. 1736 is a 233.6883-hectare agricultural land in Barrio Kapok, Orion,
Bataan, alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the late Vicente Rodriguez,
who, during his lifetime filed Lease Application No. 1206 but was rejected upon
knowledge that the land was classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation
under Executive Order of the President of the United States of America, embodied
in Proc. No. 10 of the Governor-General of the Philippines.
Upon Vicentes death, his sons, Victorino (the father of Arturo) and Pablo
possessed the property that was subsequently turned over to Arturo. Thereafter,
Arturo sold two-thirds (2/3) undivided portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and
Francisco S. Alcantara.
The land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded
from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement.
Thirty-nine (39) persons filed their Opposition to the petition for registration filed
by Arturo and Guillermo contending that they have been in actual, peaceful,
adverse and continuous possession of portions of Lot No. 1736 for more than thirty
(30) years and have introduced improvements thereon; that the applicants have
never been in possession of the property; and that Arturo could not have inherited
the land from his grandfather, because the children of Vicente are still living.
136

The Director of Lands likewise filed his opposition alleging that the applicants do
not possess sufficient title to the land.
The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants ordering its registration in their
names.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court.
In a resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision and ruled that the prior
decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in question as public land way back
in 1930 does not bar the present application for registration of title or confirmation
of imperfect title under Act 496 of the same parcel of land.
Issue:
Whether the applicants had registrable title over Lot 1736.
Ruling:
None. While the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered a bar to the
registration proceedings instituted by private respondents, the chronology of events
clearly negates compliance by private respondents with the 30-year possession
requirement. The intervening period commencing from the promulgation of Proc.
No. 10 in 1925 declaring the land in question as part of the U.S. Military
Reservation until 1953 when the land was deemed reverted back to the public
domain disturbed private respondents, possession over the land in question because
during this interregnum, no amount of time in whatever nature of possession could
have ripen such possession into private ownership, the land having been segregate
as part of a military reservation.
This circumstance considered, private respondents' claim of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession over the land in question should be counted
only from 1953. Considering that the application for registration was filed in 1965,
the 30-year requirement had not been met at the time the action for registration was
filed that would add up to only fourteen (14) years.
When Cadastral Case No. 15 was instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930, the
land in question was still classified as within the U. S. Military Reservation and
was deemed reverted to the public domain only in 1953. The decision in the
aforesaid cadastral case does not constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action
for land registration considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land
in question since the same would nevertheless have been denied because during the
pendency of the cadastral case, said land was not alienable nor disposable and this
was shown by the denial of the lease application filed then by private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest.
CHAVEZ V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007
137

Facts:
President Cory Aquino, on 1988, issued Memorandum Order No. (MO) 161
directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. Among the agencies tasked for the
implementation of such plan is respondent. NHA was ordered to conduct
feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and
absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects. Respondent
then formulated the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the
Area Across R-10 and submitted it to the President for approval.
The Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law (BOT) being enacted, the role of the private
sector was recognized in national development. NHA then entered into a joint
venture agreement with R-II Builders Inc. (RBI). Part of the profit of the developer
RBI as provided for in the JVA is to own 40 hectares of the reclaimed area.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition against respondents raising constitutional issues.
He alleges that RBI cannot acquire the reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas as
these are inalienable public lands beyond the commerce of man
Issue:
Whether RBI can validly acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas?
Ruling:
Yes. It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to
PEA, does not convert alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial
lands. In a ruling involving PEA alienable lands of public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands.
NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its
charter. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to administer and
dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the
special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to
Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos.
CHAVEZ V. PEA
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002
Facts:
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
138

Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority (PEA). PD No. 1084 tasked
PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same
date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to
PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
MCCRRP containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, on
April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development
Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered
into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On
June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and
the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted
a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.
Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void,
and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on
the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The Legal
Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by
the Senate Committees.
The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were ongoing renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant
139

Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI
of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May
26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration
of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner
now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract
be declared null and void."
Issue
Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to
AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987
constitution.
Ruling:
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There
is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged
areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute
that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present
state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the
sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the
State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when
actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public
agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that
the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural
lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these
lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be
considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.
The DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas
of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not.
Thus, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain
to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
140

much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed
for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public
domain.
Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable.
Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public
domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.
Thus, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose
"object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the
beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
REPUBLIC V. CA
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
Facts:
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de
Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No.
5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now
Davao City). The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as
Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through
141

its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the
subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr.
Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however,
annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus,
failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the
scheduled bidding. In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4,
1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid
previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing
10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare. Because the area conveyed had
not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales Application,
the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936,
the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as
Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400
hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands
ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a
portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de
Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said
application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the
sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due
course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in
question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85
withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for
military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th
installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was
amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2)
as the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the
payment was made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose
P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales
Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the
barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to
Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of
Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares,
and 00 centares. On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked
Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition
under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the
Piapi Beach, Davao City. In the following October 9, President Magsaysay
revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for
142

medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital.
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied
for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of
First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land
on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site
purposes. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale
applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his father,
Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the
Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio Suazo
likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare
portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him. After due hearing,
the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966,
directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao,
and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health. The two
oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of
the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On July 5,
1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining
ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a
Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. Forthwith, petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether the appeal of the petitioner meritorious
Ruling:
We find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious.
Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested
area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion
thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of
President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center,
Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity
sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is
constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of
grants or patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in
the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration
Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." It would be completely absurd
143

to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has
registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the
reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the
proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the
Center. Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds
from the recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive
proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or
service. section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president
"(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific public uses for service,
any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the
use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved "shall be used for
the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by
law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the
President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public
domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of
any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit. It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that
the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his
son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights over the property
reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or
by possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public
lands, such as grants or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain. Nor could respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have
obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by
applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot
was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio
de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public
domain, against which no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in
Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
REPUBLIC VS CA
73 SCRA 146
Facts:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
144

determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is
outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land
than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.
Issue:
Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area and whether
or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To
repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining
a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water
line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. The duty of the court is
to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were
to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did
not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term
foreshore lands. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance
No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra
vires and null and void
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969
145

Facts:
Prior to Civil Reservation Case No. 1, a military reservation known as the U.S.
Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center consisting of Lots 140 and 141 of the Baguio
Cadastre was set aside pursuant to Executive Order No. 1254 of October 10, 1910,
issued by the then President William Howard Taft of the United States. After
independence, the United States relinquished to the Republic of the Philippines all
claims to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots, their
relinquishment being formalized by an agreement of December 6, 1956.
On May 21, 1965 the Pirasos, respondents herein, sought the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, praying for the issuance in their favor of title to a parcel of
land designated as LRC-SWO-6132 (Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre). On
September 11, 1965, respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an opposition, alleging she has
the right to register it.
On October 7, 1967, Judge Marcos decided the case in favor of respondent Daisy
Pacnos.
The Solicitor General filed a motion to annul the decision dated October 7, 1967,
based on lack of jurisdiction.
The Pirasos claimed: "The land in question is not a military reservation under the
Republic of the Philippines although it was formerly reserved and placed under the
control of the Navy Department for the use as Naval Hospital and for other
purposes of the Navy during the American regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to
Executive Order No. 5139, and was subsequently released or turned over to the
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U.S.Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6, 1956 but the same has not been
reserved for military purposes by the Republic of the Philippines."
Issue:
Whether the Baguio Courts can reopen judicial proceedings involving Civil Case
No. 1?
Ruling:
No, the Baguio Courts cannot reopen.
Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is quite explicit
and categorical. Only persons "claiming title to parcels of land that have been the
object of cadastral proceedings" are granted the right to petition for a reopening
thereof if the other conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit
of doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of cadastral
proceedings, then this statute finds no application. Considering that as far back as
October 10, 1910, the then President of the United States, William H. Taft, issued
an executive order reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could
146

not have been the object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsite
reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922.
The respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private
respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931. This lack of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made more patent by another
specific restriction of the right of a person to seek reopening under this statute. For
the power of the Court to order such reopening is limited "to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government ... ." Included in the
petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of June 19,
1929, declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government of the United States
"that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence Section D, Baguio naval
reservation, heretofore reserved for naval purposes ... ." If there were still any
lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential
determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under American
sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval reservation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS

G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973
Facts:
On November 12, 1966, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil Reservation Case No.
1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the re-opening of said
proceeding to have them declared owners, and for the registration in their favor of
four lots with a total area of 74,017 square meters. The subject lots are inside the
Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. Then on December 14, 1966,
respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices
thereof. The Director of Lands duly opposed, as a report of an investigator of his
office was that the area sought to be registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio
City. This notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge rendered
his decision in favour of the Carantes. The efforts exerted by the Director of Lands
and the City of Baguio to appeal said decision did not prosper because respondent
Judge because he believes that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John
Hay.
It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance
in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the ground of lack of
147

jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in
question is part of a duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied
by respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the location of the
lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently, the respondent
Judge in refusing to set aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the
private respondents had been in possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus
came within the protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp
John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights."
Issue:
Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain?
Ruling:
Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act, enacted as far
back as 1903, specifically governs the subject matter of reservations. As provided
therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interests therein, within the Philippine
Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and
declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and interests
therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become registered land
in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the
circumstances hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was sustained as
against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an earlier case
of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the
absence of any right on the part of the private respondents to seek a re-opening
under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, a 1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's
contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order
the registration portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be
sustained. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of
the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or
buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military
reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land
Registration Act. ... ." ' "
This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic,
respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of
148

private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FAGONIL
G.R. No. L-57112 November 29, 1984
Facts:
In 1912, a petition was filed regarding the Baguio Townsite Reservation (Case
No.211).The purpose of the case was to determine what portions of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation were private and registerable under Act No. 496. Once so
determined, no further registration proceeding would be allowed. In 1915, the
court required all persons claiming lots inside the reservation to file within six
months from the date of the notice petitions for the registration of their titles under
Act No. 496. In 1922, Judge C. M. Villareal held that all lands within the
Reservation are public lands with the exception of (1) lands reserved for specified
public uses and (2) lands claimed and adjudicated as private property. He ruled that
claims for private lands by all persons not presented for registration within the
period fixed were barred forever. The 1922 decision established the rule that lots of
the Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public domain, are not registerable under
Act No. 496. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973 case, the Baguio Court of First
Instance "has no Jurisdiction to entertain any land registration proceedings" under
Act No. 496 and the Public Land Law, covering any lot within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation. After more than half a century from the 1922 decision
declaring the townsite public domain, or during the years 1972 to 1976, petitioners
filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio applications for the registration of
lots inside the Baguio Townsite Reservation. They alleged that in case the lots are
not registerable under Act No. 496, then section 48 (b) and (c) of the Public Land
Law should be applied because they and their predecessors have been in
possession of the lots for more than thirty years.
The Director of Lands opposed the applications, on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, prescription and res judicata. The trial judge held that section 48
cannot be invoked by the applicants because it applies only to disposable
agricultural lands situated outside the reservation. He concedes that lands within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation may not be acquired by long possession for over
thirty years subsequent to Case No. 211. However, the judge refused to dismiss the
applications because presentation of satisfactory evidence in a regular hearing as to
the presence or absence of complete service of notice is needed, in order to
determine whether res judicata applies.
Issue:
149

Whether applications for the registration of lands could prosper in the absence of
complete service of notice of the reservation received by the respondents.
Ruling:
Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 627, the law governing military reservations,
contemplate notification to two classes of persons, namely, (1) those who are living
upon or in visible possession of any part of the military reservation and (2) persons
who are not living upon or in visible possession but are absentees. As to those who
are living upon or in visible possession of the lands, service is not complete, and
the six-month period does not begin to run until the notice is served upon them
personally. Their right relative to the period within which they must respond are
determined by the date of the personal service. In the case at bar, the fact is that the
notice in Case No. 211 was issued on July 22, 1915. The clerk of court certified
that 134 persons living upon or in visible possession of any part of the reservation
were personally served with notice of the reservation. Section 3 of Act No. 627
provides that the certificate of the clerk of court is "conclusive proof of service".
Contrary to the opinion of Judge Fangonil, applications for the registration of lands
could not be made because such would reopen Case No. 211. It would give way to
baseless litigations intended to be foreclosed by that 1912 case. The eight
applicants do not base their applications under Act No. 496 on any purchase or
grant from the State or on possession since time immemorial. That is why Act No.
496 cannot apply to them. Moreover, they are not "Igorot claimants". The trial
court erred in requiring the presentation of evidence as to the notice required under
Act No. 627. Such evidence cannot be produced at this time because the court
record of Case No. 211 was completely destroyed during the last war. The
applicants have the burden of proving that their predecessors were living upon or
in visible possession of the lands in 1915 and were not served any notice. The
Solicitor General is correct that after Case No. 211, it has always been necessary to
issue Presidential proclamations for the disposition of portions of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation. The period of more than fifty years completely bars the
applicants from securing relief due to the alleged lack of personal notice to their
predecessors.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANGALANG
G.R. No. L-58822 April 8, 1988
Facts:
The subject property was inherited by the private respondents Kiangs from their
father, known as old man Kiang (one name) who in turn inherited the same from
his parents Quebec and Cawane, who were in continuous possession of the land
150

since the Spanish times. Kiang had it surveyed by the Bureau of Lands and filed
an application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Benquet, Mountain
Province, rendered a decision declaring as public lands all lands within the limits
of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, with the exception of lands reserved for
specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property.
Among those declared public lands were the lands applied for by old man Kiang
which was dismissed by the court in said decision. After 31 years, the respondent
Kiangs filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet an application
for registration under Act No. 496, as amended, of the parcels of land in question.
The respondent court presided over by Judge Pio R. Marcos rendered a decision
adjudicating the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of the respondents. Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Banquet, docketed as Civil Case No.
3168, for the annulment of the decision of Judge Pio R. Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the court which awarded title do not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.
Ruling:
The decision of land registration court in Civil Reservation Case No. 1 declared all
lands comprised within the Baguio Townsite Reservation as public lands, with the
exception of lands "reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and
adjudicated private property." Outside of those lands specifically excepted from the
effects of the decision, all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation were declared 'public lands' no longer registrable under the Land
Registration Act. It is clear, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Banquet, presided over by Judge Pio R. Marcos, had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Land Registration Case and to render a decision awarding title to
the land in question to the applicants Mariano Kiang et al. The decision of Judge
Marcos was null and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HEIRS OF DICMAN V. CARIO

G.R. No. 146459 June 8, 2006
Facts:
The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cario. Within this site,
a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed by H.C. Heald in connection
151

with his lumber business. On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to
Sioco Cario, son of Mateo Cario and grandfather of private respondent Jose
Cario. Sioco Cario then took possession of the buildings and the land on which
the buildings were situated. The petition originated from an action for recovery of
possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J",
Camp Seven, Baguio City. On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public
instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in
Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cario. On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario sold the
subject land to his son, Guzman Cario.
On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cario filed a Free Patent Application over the land in
question. The application was given due course, but Guzman later withdrew it
when he decided to file his opposition to the petition later filed by the heirs of
Ting-el Dicman. The petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot
76-B. Guzman Cario opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over
Lot 76-B, the land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cario likewise filed an
opposition.
On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and confirmed that
the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman, there having been
no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it necessary to hold
further hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of the parties.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the
trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 excluding
from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public
land known as Igorot Claims situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the
same open to disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land
Act.
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 628 reserved the subject land from Igorot
claims?
Ruling:
Segregating and reserving certain Igorot claims and prohibiting encumbrance or
alienation therein for 15 years from the grant of the patent is not applicable where
vested interest are affected. The executive issuance can only go as far as to classify
public land, but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Proclamation
No. 628 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect
of segregating and reserving certain Igorot claims identified therein, including
one purportedly belonging to the Heirs of Dicman, and prohibiting any
encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition
of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the
property in question had already been vested in private respondent. The executive
152

issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot be construed as
to prejudice vested rights.
Proceedings for registration of land
A.Judicial Registration
a.Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
i. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,applicatns for registration of title must
sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain,second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12,1945, or earlier.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REMMAN ENTERPRISES
G.R. NO. 199310
Facts:
Respondent Remman Ent. Inc. applied for a judicial confirmation of title with the
RTC of Taguig. Said application is comprised of two parcels of land also located in
Taguig. On Dec. 31, 2001, RTC found that the application for registration was
sufficient in form and substance and scheduled an initial hearing which was
published in the Official Gazette, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and the notice was posted in conspicuous places in the City Hall of
Taguig.
May 30,2002, only Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor to the said application. LLDA avers that the subject lands are not
alienable and disposable. Likewise, the Republic of the Philippines also opposed
said registration since they claim that the respondents failed to prove that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the lands since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Each party presented their respective witnesses. Respondents also presented
documents supporting their claim over the subject parcel of lands, it also included
certifications by the DENR that the said lands are alienable and disposable. On the
other hand, LLDA pointed out that under RA 4850 it states that lands surrounding
the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglamentary elevation of 12.50
meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. The engineer
for LLDA testified that upon aerial survey of the subject parcel of lands, it was
found out that the elevations of the lots were less thatn 12.50 m, which the
engineer for the respondents rebutted.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents on May 2007. The Court of Appeals
153

affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the
application for registration filed by the respondent.
Ruling:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. In the case at
bar, the Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to present incontrovertible
evidence to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable
Furthermore, sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect to public land acquired under Sect. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, or the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. Under Sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second,
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The respondents failed to satify the above mentioned requisites. They have
presented certification from a proper government agency but failed to obtain an
approval from the DENR Secretary that the land of public domain is released as
alienable and disposable. The original approved document signed by the DENR
Secretary must also be presented, and should be attested by the legal custodian of
the official records. In addition, the second requisite was not also satisfied, as the
respondents only started paying taxes for the said properties in 2002 which is
contrary to their claim that their predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of said lots in 1943.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for
registration was denied.
NATIONAL COLLEGES OF FISHERIES (ANCF) VS HEIRS OF MAXIMA
LACHICA SIN
G.R. NO. 157485
154

Facts:
Respondent heirs instituted a complaint against the National College of fisheries
(ANCF) in Kalibo, aklan), for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and
declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF,
creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land
they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation. the respondent heirs presented
evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother, Maxima
Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan).
Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale, and
then developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango
trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in
1945.
Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession
of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. To prove possession, respondents
presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by
respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, for educational
purposes of ANCF and that the subject parcel of land is timberland and
therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by
virtue of their and their predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
The RTC affirmed the MCTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin acquired private rights by virtue
of their possession to the disputed property so as to entitle them for the judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Ruling:
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents
supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property, through their
predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on
December 22, 1960.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 ; and (2) the classification of the land as
155

alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show
competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its
formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that
said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date.
On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public
lands.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their
predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the
purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said
proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings
of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil
Case No. 1181 ( 4390) for lack of merit.
Carlos vs RP
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her husband, Cirilo Mendoza,
had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24,
1938. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps.
Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who then took
possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court issued a decision
adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza, their son.
Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely claimed that his
father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from Hermenegildo Mendoza; that
Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo
Mendoza, who had been in possession of the lot since October 15, 1987, and
subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza. The petitioners filed with the
court a petition for review of judgment but denied, so they appealed. Mendoza
countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496, does
not apply to a cadastral proceeding.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is
warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act).
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly states
that except as otherwise provided by the Cadastral Act, all the provision of the
156

Land Registration Act are applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the

decree and certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA VS CRESENCIA STA.
TERESA RAMOS
G.R. No. 179181
Facts:
At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land Lot 1
with an area of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with an area of 760 square meterscovered by amended Plan PSU-223919 property), both located in what used to be
Barrio Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On September 15, 1966, the RCAM filed
before the R TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 11, acting as a land
registration court, an application for registration of title (application) of property,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public Land Act). On October
4, 1974, the RCAM amended its application by reducing Lot 2 to 760 square
meters (from 1,832 square meters).
In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it
acquired the property during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has been in
open, public, continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an owner.
It added that to the best of its knowledge and belief, no mortgage or encumbrance
of any kind affects the property, and that no person has any claim, legal or
equitable, on the property.
On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her
husband Ponciano Francisco, filed her opposition to the RCAM's application. She
alleged that the property formed part of the entire property that her family owns
and has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her grandparents,
during the Spanish time, up to the present. Cresencia submitted documents, among
others, to support her requested confirmation of imperfect title.
Issue:
Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No.
141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and registration of
imperfect title.
Ruling:
Neither RCAM nor Cresencia is entitled to the benefitsof C.A. No. 141 and
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and registration of imperfect
title,.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for the
period required by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not
fictional or constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the Philippines, the Court
157

explained the character of the required possession, as follows:

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by
the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous
with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.
Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession requirement,
the RCAM had to show that it performed specific overt acts in the character an
owner would naturally exercise over his own property. Proof of actual possession
of the property at the time of the filing of the application is required because the
phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," the RCAM
used to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of law,not an allegation of
fact. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent [and] notorious x x x
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when [the possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood."
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act
characterizing its claimed possession in the manner described above. The various
documents that it submitted, as well as the bare assertions it made and those of its
witnesses, that it had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the property, hardly constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required
in cases of this nature. We elaborate below on these points.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the RCAM'
s application, we also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to
prove her claimed possession of the property in the manner and for the period
required by C.A. No. 141. Like the RCAM, Cresencia was bound to adduce
evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the requirements for
confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of proof;
thus, the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and
confirmed Cresencias title over the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be sufficient,
which we do not, confirmation and registration of title over the property in
Cresencia' s name was still improper in the absence of competent and persuasive
158

evidence on record proving that the property is alienable and disposable.

Del Rosario-Igtiben vs RP
GR 158499
FACTS:
The land erected with a building (TCT No. 53628 issued in his name) is owned by
Torres. He was and still in possession of the realties, holding safely to his owner's
duplicate certificate of title, and paying the real estate taxes, and collecting rentals
from tenants occupying the building.
Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law, misrepresenting to be the attorney-infact of Torres and falsely alleging that the duplicate copy of TCT No. 53628 was
lost, obtained another copy of the certificate. He forged a simulated deed of sale of
the realties in his favor. He mortgaged the same to Rosario Mota, wife of Ernesto
Cue, and also to Angela Fermin, who later assigned her credit to the spouses Cue.
Torres filed civil case against Fernandez to annul TCT No. 86018 as well as the
proceedings in LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133.
Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which prompted the Cues to institute an
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Fernandez filed Civil Case No. 75643
against the spouses Cue for the annulment of the mortgage with preliminary
injunction.
The trial court ruled that Torres is the true and legal evidence of ownership of the
subject immovable which was affirmed by the CA.
Prior to the CAs decision, Fernandez failed to comply with his obligation under
the amicable settlement and the Cues were granted a writ of execution. The subject
realties were then levied upon and sold at public auction where Rosario Mota was
the highest bidder.
The redemption period for the property having lapsed without Fernandez nor
Torres redeeming the properties, Mota was issued the title.
Torres filed a complaint to restrain Mota from collecting rentals and for the
declaration as void TCT No. 105953.
The trial court declared that Motas title is void but CA reversed it.
ISSUE: Whether a forged sale may be the root of a valid title.
HELD:
Yes, except if the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering
the same property.
The claim of indefeasibility under the Torrens land title system would be correct if
previous valid title to the same parcel of land did not exist. The petitioner had a
valid title. It never parted with it; it never handed or delivered to anyone its owner's
duplicate of the transfer certificate of title, it could not be charged with negligence
159

in the keeping of its duplicate certificate of title or with any act which could have
brought about the issuance of another certificate upon which a purchaser in good
faith and for value could rely. If the respondent's contention as to indefeasibility of
his title should be upheld, then registered owners without the least fault on their
part could be divested of their title and deprived of their property. Such disastrous
results which would shake and destroy the stability of land titles had not been
foreseen by those who had endowed with indefeasibility land titles issued under
the Torrens system. Fernandez perpetrated the fraud by making false
representations in his petition and the title issued to him being the product of fraud
could not vest him valid and legal title to the parcel of land in litigation. As he had
no title to the parcel of land, in the same way that a thief does not own or have title
to the stolen goods, he could not transmit title which he did not have nor possess.
To hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was an innocent
mortgagee would be futile because no certificate of title covering the realties in
derogation of Torres' certificate of title may validly be issued.
REPUBLIC VS IAC AND ACME
G.R. NO. 73002
Facts:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,
acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of
land.Possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan.Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to
RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on
land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.Ownership and
possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela. Donated part of
the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the land is already a private land.
2.
Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporations or associations applies.
Ruling:
1.
YES. Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient. It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
160

become private property, at least by presumption. The application for confirmation

is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title
as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law
2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private
land
to which the Infields had a legally sufficient and transferable title
On October
29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it
must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. The only limitation then
extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS MERALCO
G.R. No. L-57461
Facts:
Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel
of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila on December 4, 1979. On August 17,
1976, applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo
Natividad who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as
evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28, 1970.
Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept
of an owner for more than 30 years. The property was declared for taxation
purposes under the name of the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.
On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of
the property in the name of the private respondent. The Director of Lands
interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply
for registration of title to land. After comments were filed by the respondents, the
Court gave the petition due course. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director
of Lands has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., etc., No. L73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property.
Ruling:
161

In the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it
from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations
holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const., Art.
XIV, See. 11) does not apply.
Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply
for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
Public Land Act.
As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings were
instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance, "productive
of a defect hardly more than procedural and in no wise affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings."
Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title
confirmed; only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny private
respondent the right to register its property which was validly acquired.
SUSI VS RAZON
G.R.NO. 24066
Facts:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a
complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the
parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the
sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that
the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum
of P500 as damages, with the costs.For his answer to the complaint, the Director of
Lands denied each allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that
the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under
the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela
Razon, which was made in accordance with law.After trial, the CFI of Pampanga
rendered judgment declaring Susi entitled to the possession of the land, annulling
the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela
Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning
thereto that :the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said
parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela
Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of
the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in
162

question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum
of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same. September 5, 1899, sold it to
Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A).
Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price
and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered
thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the
property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio
Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous,
adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an
action in the CFI of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land, after
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in
favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint. Having
failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court,
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August
15, 1914. Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition
thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five
years. After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands
overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. On
August 31, 1921, the register of deeds issued the proper certificate of title to
Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to
vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for
forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga,
which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real
property. Valentin Susi then brought this action.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiffappellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession.
Ruling:
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of
the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years.
While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela
Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in
possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into
account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold
it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
163

occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the
sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right.
REPUBLIC VS IGLESIA NI CRISTO
G.R. NO. 180067
Facts:
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo,
as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in
Paoay-Currimao. Subject Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed
and consisted of 4,201 square meters.
Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing cloth and technical
description of subject lot, the Geodetic Engineers Certificate, Tax Declaration, and
the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of
INC.
The Republic, through the OSG appeared and filed an Opposition to INCs
application.
In February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which
built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was born in 1941 and became
a member of INC in 1948, testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the
small chapel by INC in1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo
Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built.
Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco
for tax purposes and was issued TD 006114.In 1959, Badanguio also sold a small
portion of the bigger lot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
on January 8, 1959.
The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the
essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the subject
lot have been complied with. The MCTC found and appreciated the continuous
possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the
lot. It noted that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-interest of INC, were
never disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to INC constituting the
subject lot.
CA affirmed the lower court decision
PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUCTRIAL COMPANY VS
DIRECTOR OF LANDS
164

G.R. No. L-25914

Facts:
On April of 1920, the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company, Inc. (Palawan
Company) Filed a sales application over a parcel of public land located in Aborlan,
Palawan which was given due course by the Bureau of Lands. On December of
1930, the Palawan Company requested the director of Land to reduce the area
applied for because the portion it originally applied for were squatted and claimed
by others. Subsequently, it issued a letter advising Palawan Company to
recommend to the Sec. Of Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of P18.00/ha.
After 4 years, the Director of Lands issued a notice of auction setting the date of
bidding for Feb. 27, 1935 at Puerto Princesa, however, it did not take place as the
applicant requested for postponement. Subsequently, the applicant prayed that its
Sales Application be not cancelled, in view of the Director of lands that it be
cancelled for lack of interest of the said company.
Momentarily, it was again set to be sold at a public bidding but was again
postponed because the company asked for reappraisal of the value given by the
Director of lands. Since the time, the applicant took possession of the land and
improved portion thereof, planting coconuts and other crops. Thus, he asked this
court that the land be declared in favour of him as he was in an open, continous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands under a
bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not a sales applicant can file a registration of the same land covered by
his sales application.
Ruling:
No.The appellants possession of the land in question was merely that of a sales
applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded because of its refusal to pay
the price fixed therefore by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant
manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a
public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the
application was submitted. The trial court was, therefore, justified in concluding
that applicant possession was not that of an owner, as required by law.
Again, as the trial court had aptly observed:In the mind of the Court, the
possession and occupation by the applicant company of the land sought to be
registered, is not the possession and occupation contemplated by the present law on
this matter (Subsection [b], Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended
by Republic Act No. 1942). If this were the case, there will be many instances
where the government will be defrauded. If confirmation or registration of title can
be done, as it is being done now by the applicant company, a possessor and
165

occupant of a public agricultural land under the administration of the Bureau of

Lands who has applied for the purchase of the same will just sit on his right,
making the application pending for more than 30 years while he possesses and
occupies the land, declare the same for taxation purposes, pay the corresponding
taxes religiously and consistently, and then after a lapse of 30 years, will abandon
his sales application and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or
registration of title. Such situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators
when they passed Republic Act No. 1942, for had it been their intention, our
legislators would have been a party to an act of defrauding our government ... .
Exception: Successor who acquired by prescription a land previously subject to
free patent application of his predecessor-in-interest may file registration.
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS CA
205 SCRA 486
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land
registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision
of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to
grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General
thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the
notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
Ruling:
YES. Petition was granted.The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted
further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement.
166

The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed
by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
REYES VS SIERRA
G.R. No. L-28658
Facts:
Vicente Reyes filed on January 3, 1961 an application for registration of his title to
a parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal covered by Plan Psu-189753 of the
Bureau of Lands which he acquired by inheritance from his father. An opposition
was filed by the Director of Lands, Francisco Sierra and Emilio Sierra together
with Alejandra, Felimon, Aurelio, Apolonio, Constancio, Cirilo, all surnamed
Sierra and Antonia Santos. The trial court declares Vicente Reyes the true and
rightful owner of the land and orders the registration of his title, provided that the
title to be issued shall be subject to a public easement of right of-way over a 2.00
meter-wide strip of the land along Lucay Street for the latter's widening and
improvement.
Oppositors appealed contending that the land applied for was originally owned by
Basilia Beltran's parents, and upon their death in 1894, Basilia inherited the
property. On April 19, 1926, Basilia Beltran, a widow, borrowed from applicant's
father, Vicente Reyes, Sr. the amount of P100.00 and secured the loan with the
piece of land in question. Applicant, in seeking the registration of the land, relied
on his belief that the property belongs to his father who bought the same from
Basilia Beltran. Oppositors contended that the words "isinangla," "na ipananagutan
sa inutang na halagang isang daang piso," "Kahit isangla o ipagbili," etc., manifest
that the document should be treated as a mortgage, antichresis, or pactum
commission and not as an absolute sale or pacto de retro sale.
Issue:
Whether the land was mortgaged or a subject to conditional sale
Ruling:
The Suprem Court held that the applicant's predecessor-in-interest is a mere
mortgagee, and ownership of the thing mortgaged is retained by Basilia Beltran,
the mortgagor. The mortgagee, however, may recover the loan, although the
mortgage document evidencing the loan was non-registrable being a purely private
instrument. Failure of mortgagor to redeem the property does not automatically
vest ownership of the property to the mortgagee, which would grant the latter the
right to appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. The act of applicant in
167

registering the property in his own name upon mortgagor's failure to redeem the
property would amount to a pactum commissorium which is against good morals
and public policy.
Meanwhile, oppositors-appellants are directed to pay the applicant- appellee within
ninety (90) days from the finality of decision, the debt in the amount of P100.00
plus interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from April 19, 1926 until
paid.
RAMIREZ VS C.A.
144 SCRA 292
Facts:
On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina
Bonifacio filed an application for registration of a parcel of Riceland in Pamplona,
Las Pinas Rizal. The petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the
land in question by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the
American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or
record of the same was available. Thereafter, the court ordered the issuance of
OCT No. 2273 in the petitioners names. On March 30, 1960, the private
respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of
fraud. They alleged, among others, that in 1938 respondents obtained a loan of
P400.00 from the petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the land in
question by way of antichresis and that for this reason, Tax Declaration No. 8777
was cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos. 9522 and 2385 issued in the
names of the petitioners. In their answer, the spouses Ramirez denied the material
allegations of the petition, they based their claim to the land on two deeds of sale
allegedly executed on April 15, 1937 and April 23, 1937 which they allegedly
found accidentally in March 1960. After trial, the court found that the deeds of sale
were spurious, and that the respondents took possession of the land as owners after
the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to
secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00. It was agreed that the
respondents could not redeem the property within a period of five years and that
the petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay the land
taxes thereon. Finding the claims of the herein respondents sustained by the
evidence, it ordered the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of herein petitioners and the issuance in
lieu thereof of another original certificate of title in the names of herein
respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not an antichretic creditor can acquire by prescription the land
surrendered to him by the debtor.
168

Ruling:
NO. The Court ruled that the issue was submitted to the appellate court and was
correctly resolved therein. The Court of Appeals stated:...The petition alleged that
'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio willfully and fraudulently
suppressed the facts that the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the rice
field in question and that they possess the said rice field merely as antichretic
creditors as security for the loan of P400.00; that the applicants are guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment when they declared in their
application, in the case at bar, that no other person had any claim or interest in the
said land.' These we believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud.
In the applicant's application for registration, which followed the form required by
the Land Registration Act, the applicants alleged that 'to the best of our knowledge
and belief, there is no mortgage or incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting
said land, nor any other person having any estate or interest therein, legal or
equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy.' This allegation is
false and made in bad faith, for, as We have found, the applicants are not the
owners of the land sought to be registered and they are in possession thereof only
as antichretic creditors.
KIDPALOS VS BAGUIO MINING
14 SCRA 913
Facts:
The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31, 1954, Maglia Cayapa, Nabos
Valenciano, Waldo Kidpalos, Fernandez Kidpalos, and Ipang Lebos Vda. de
Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines in
the Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Cases Nos. 457, 458, 460, 463 and
549), seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels
of land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Benguet,
Mountain Province; to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims
of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by
plaintiffs; and to recover damages from the Company. The complaint also sought to
enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of
The Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the land in
question demolished at the latter's expense. The defendant Baguio Gold Mining
Company, claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to
1930, asked for dismissal of the action and damages.
After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa, et al.,
had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 19628-R to 19632-R), the latter
169

rendered judgment, on July 31, 1958, finding that the land lay within the Cordillera
Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it formed
part of the Public domain.
While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
had filed in Court the present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the
registration, and moved to dismiss the applications.
The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the
oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the
registration cases in the Court of First Instance. The latter dismissed the
applications, and the applicants then directly appealed to this Supreme Court. It
thus appears that appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present
registration proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation, or that
the parties are the same. Neither is it disputable that the causes of action in both
cases are identical, since in both the appellants asserted that they are the sole and
exclusive owners of the land in dispute, allegedly invaded by appellee Baguio Gold
Mining Company. While the former cases were reivindicatory in character and the
ones presently before us are land registration proceedings, such difference in forms
of action are irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not once previously threshed out and finally adjudicated should no
longer be relitigated between the same parties on the same subject matter and cause
of action.
Ruling:
The appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the ground of res judicata
is affirmed.
The substance of res judicata, without which multiplicity of actions will be
unavoidable. Hence the doctrine is that Under this rule, if the record of the
former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without
deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as
to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Or, as stated in
Redden vs. Metzger, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, 99-100:
... . The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts settled and adjudicated as to
causes of action: Whitaker v. Hawley, 30 Kan. 326. The judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction is compulsive on the parties as to all points directly
involved in it and necessarily determined. When a fact has been once determined in
the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in
accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same parties without
virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which, from motives
170

of public policy, the law does not permit to be done The estoppel is not confined to
the judgment, but extend to all facts involved in it as necessary steps, or the
groundwork upon which it must have been founded. It is allowable to reason back
from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that
where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain
premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion.
BALAIS-MABANAG VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. NO. 153142
Facts:
On January 19, 1985, Romulo A. Coronel and other Coronels executed a document
entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating that they received from respondent
Ramona through her mother, respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz, the sum of
P50,000.00 as down payment on the total purchase price of P1,240,000.00 for their
inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City.
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No.
327043 to the petitioner for the higher price ofP1,580,000.00. So the Coronels
rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her down payment of
P50,000.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On February 22,
1985, Concepcion filed a complaint for specific performance and damages in her
own name in the RTC in Quezon City against the Coronels. On March 1, 1989, the
RTC rendered its decision ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a
deed of absolute sale and the plaintiffs claim for damages and attorneys fees, as
well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are dismissed. Upon denial
of the motion for reconsideration, the Coronels and the petitioner appealed to the
CA but was denied hence they appealed the CA judgment to SC but affirmed the
CA decision.
Acting on the respondents motion for execution, the RTC issued a writ of
execution but the petitioner and the Coronels filed their motion to stay execution
and supplemental motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Upon failure
to comply with the writ of execution, the RTC approved the respondentsmotion
for appointment of suitable person to execute deed, etc., and ordered the RTC of
Quezon City to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona in lieu of the
defendants. So the petitioner and Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari
assailing the RTCs orders but the CA dismissed the petition but they presented
their MR in the CA. Ultimately, the CA denied the MR. The petitioner thus
appealed to the Court, which denied her petition for review for being filed out of
time and denied the MR. Thereafter, the respondents moved in the RTC for the
resolution of their pending motion. After the RTC granted the respondents pending
171

motion on July 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a MR against such order, but the RTC
denied her motion on September 23, 1999.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of
Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of indication of the citizenship
of the buyer of the subject property.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. In the complaint dated February 22, 1985, respondent
Concepcion, as plaintiff, categorically averred that she was a Filipino citizen. The
petitioner did not deny or disprove the averment of Filipino citizenship during the
trial and on appeal. The petitioner did not also advert to the issue of citizenship
after the complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff,
despite the petitioners opportunity to do so.
Yet, now, when the final decision of the RTC is already being implemented, the
petitioner would thwart the execution by assailing the directive of the RTC for the
Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the
registration of the deed of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City,
on the ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines.
The petitioners move was outrightly unwarranted. The issue of citizenship of the
registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to forestall the execution of a
final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the opportunity to
raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the
capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during
the execution of a final decision.
MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 179987
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty years. The application was raffled to the
RTC Cavite-Tagaytay City. The OSG duly designated the Jose Velazco, Jr. to
appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, who testified that the
172

property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his

great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both
Ruling:
No. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particular
is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly
invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is
no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE VS EBIO
G.R. NO. 178411
Facts:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of A 406 square meters parcel of land
located in Paraaque City covered by Tax Declarations in the name of respondent
Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert
that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after
executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, Pedro was able to
obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. In
April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the
Paraaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On
April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio. On
March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of
Paraaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the
said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of
Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents
immediately opposed and the project was suspended.
173

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from
the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees
planted on the said lot.On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to
the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or
be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting
their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.
The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque City on
April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question
Ruling:
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits
that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case,
the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457
of the Civil Code. ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous
to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Art. 457. To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.
The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property
must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. In contrast,
properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how
long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against
the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot
acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which
is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its
banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
REPUBLIC vs. DILOY
GR NO. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413 (2008)
Facts:
As early as 1948, Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject property for
taxation purposes under his name. He was then succeeded by his son, Eusebio
174

Leaban, who also filed for taxation purposes in his name from the period covering
the years 1951-1969. Thereafter, in 1974, the subject property was transferred to
Eusebio Leabans daughter, Pacencia Leaban, who, in turn, declared the same for
taxation purposes under her name. On 15 June 1979, the subject property was then
conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her daughter, herein respondent Gregoria L.
Diloy, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In 1997, respondent Gregoria L. Diloy filed an Application for Registration of Title
over the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the Republic,
filed an Opposition to the Application for Registration of Title.
During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title, respondent
presented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos as witnesses to
strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual,
continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of the subject property.
The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the respondent,
granting her application for registration over the subject property.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the respondent failed
to prove her possession as required under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The said
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the Republic appealed the
Decision of the MCTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal of the Republic. Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied. Hence, this
Petition.
Issue:
Whether the respondent has acquired a registrable title.
Held:
No. I is beyond question that the subject property was already an alienable and
disposable land at the time the Application for Registration of Title over the same
was filed by the respondent. However, the subject property became alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in
1982, any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting
of the 30-year possession requirement.
The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be
considered to have started in 1979, when the same was conveyed to her by her
mother. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her
predecessors-in-interest, even if they had occupied and were in possession of the
same since 1948, because during those periods, the subject property had not yet
been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation.
Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
175

computation of the period of possession. Such possession can never ripen into
ownership and, unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, the
rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
From 1982 up to 1997, the year the respondent filed an Application for
Registration of Title over the subject property, the respondent was in possession of
the same for only 15 years, which was short of another 15 years from the 30-yearperiod possession requirement.
Petition is granted.
REPUBLIC vs. DE PORKAN
June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88
Facts:
Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 from
their predecessors-interests, who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the
government by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession
for more than 30years. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin
obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond
Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546. Azurin filed with the Bureau
of Lands a complaint for correction, amendment or cancellation of the Homestead
Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546 and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot
No. 1099 alleging among others that the patentees secured their patents and titles
through fraud, misrepresentation and illegal machinations. The Solicitor General
sided with Azurin; when the case was brought to the Court of First Instance, the
SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed by Azurin and
that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands under the Public
Land Act. Hence, the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were
void insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin.
After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity of
the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute. The SG in
the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could not be the
subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the
Public Act since they are marshy and swampy, certified as such as more suitable
for fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act.
Issue:
Whether possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will entitle the
possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title.
Held:
Yes. As early as 1953, the respondents had already acquired by operation of law
176

not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099, but a grant of the Government over
the same alienable land by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed
possession for more than 30 years, since the Spanish colonial period.
The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. 1099 dates back to the time of
the Spanish colonial period. Such possessions of the said public land has attained
the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant
from the Government. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. By legal fiction, the
land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private land.
CHARLES L. ONG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175746
March 12, 2008
Facts:
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly
authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed
an Application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in
Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy
four (574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of
the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the
same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24,
1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of
the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines
(respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment
of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application
does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage;
that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and
that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of
private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and
his brothers and orders the registration of the said parcel of land stating that
evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient basis to
grant the applicant for registration. The same parcel of land has been declared in
the name of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has been
177

religiously paid. The said circumstances further show that the possession and
ownership of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of
land has been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before
the filing of the instant application for registration on July 1, 1999.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. In reversing the decision of the
trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner
to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration
required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-ininterest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner
since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted
that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971.
Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to
1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest
actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application.
Issue:
Whether possession is sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public
domain.
Held:
Pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Possession alone is not sufficient to
acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba: The law speaks of
possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction
and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
JOHN M. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA, JR. vs.THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, ET AL. ANSELMO IRENEA, ARTURO DE LA CRUZ,
DOMINADOR MANGCAO, LUCAS FRANCISCO, CIPRIANO
178

SEQUILLO, PEDRO TAGALOG, PONCIANO GARCIA, RODOLFO DE

DIOS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-16761
Facts: A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate was applied for registration
in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956 by John M. Miller and
Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20, 1957. The
Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed written oppositions.
Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. All persons,
except the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957.
On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors
were given five days to file written opposition. Of the oppositors, 28 filed written
but unverified opposition. On August 20, 1958 applicants finished adducing
evidence and rested their case.
On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors presented their first witness. After his
cross-examination, counsel for applicants called the Court's attention to the lack of
verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and moved to dismiss
the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After parties had filed
memoranda, the court issued an order on January 13, 1959 dismissing the
unverified opposition, without pronouncement as to costs Motion for
reconsideration was denied by order dated November 18, 1959. The private
oppositors have appealed from both orders.
Issue:
Whether he unverified opposition is sufficient
Held:
Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded with the trial,
presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the first witness of the private
oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel had cross-examined him, was the
defect of lack of verification brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the
defect.
The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is generally a waiver
of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities, formal defects, of fault or defects of
any kind in the pleading of the adverse party.
ROXAS vs. Court of Appeals
63 SCRA 302
Facts:
Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Lipa City. On
June 11, 1959, she sold it to Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan with
different sizes in areas. Long before and at the time of the sales, Francisca Mojica
179

and Victoria Dinglasan were in possession of the Lot. The vendor's Certificate of
Title No. 9125 was not delivered to the vendees because it was in the possession of
another person to whom the lot had been mortgaged by Felisa Kalaw.
Pedro Dinglasan, succeeded in having Certificate of Title No. 9125 in the name of
Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10392 issued in
his name by falsifying a public document of conveyance. He subsequently
mortgaged the lot to Leonora T. Roxas as security for a loan. Roxas, instituted the
instant foreclosure suit against him for his failure to pay his obligation.
Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene since they allege that
they are the true owners.
The lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage was validly
constituted and its foreclosure was in order. The Court of Appeals certified the
appeal of this Court on the ground that it involves only questions of law.
Issue:
Whether Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are the true owners of the land
Ruling:
No, they are not the true owners.
The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the land, their
action to vindicate ownership must fail because such action can prosper only upon
proof by plaintiff that he is the owner. As pointed out, the intervenors did not
acquire ownership of the land because their deeds of sale were not registered.
Delos Angeles vs Santos
12 SCRA 622
FACTS:
In 1958, Caridad J. Torento executed a deed of First Mortgage over a parcel of
duly registered land in favor of defendant-appellant Dolores M. Santos. This was
done in order to secure her indebtedness to Santos in the amount of 7000 Php. Said
deed was validly registered and a subsequent certificate of title in favor of Santos
was issued.
But in 1959, Torento again executed a second mortgage, with the consent of
Santos, over the same property in favor of plaintiffs to secure a debt in the amount
of 6000 Php. Said deed was not registered.
In 1960, the first mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and was put in auction,
where Santos was the highest bidder in the amount 3500 Php. Said sale was then
annotated at the TCT of the subject lot. Afterwhich, Santos filed for the recovery of
the deficiency resulting from the price paid for the property and its value at the
public auction. The court then issued a writ of attachment over the properties of
Torento, who assigned to Matilda Gorospe all her rights on the subject property
particularly her statutory right of redemption.
On March 1961, the Sheriff, who conducted the sale of the foreclosed property,
180

issued a Certificate of Redemption in favor of plaintiffs-appellees as successors in

interest of Torrento over the foreclosed property. The Certificate of Redemption
was registered a on March 13, 1961 with Register of deeds, and the corresponding
entry and annotation made on the original of said certificate of title.
Defendant-appellant, in her answer, denied that Matilda J. Gorospe had validly
redeemed the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of redemption may be transferred or assigned by the
owner?
RULING:
As held by the Supreme Court in Magno v. Viola, the term "successor-in-interest'
includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of redemption;
or one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose
of redemption; or one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of
law; or one or more joint debtors who were not owners of the property sold;. or the
wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of
her husband's title passes to her. There is no question, therefore, that plaintiffappellee Matilda J. Gorospe is a "successor-in-interest" of the debtor Caridad J.
Torrento and as such could exercise the right to redeem the property at any time
within the period provided by law.
In the case at bar, registration of the certificate of sale in favor of the purchaser at
public auction was e only on October 20, 1960. Appellee Matilda J. Gorospe had,
therefore, a period of one year from that date within which to exercise the right of
redemption assigned to her by Caridad J. Torrento. The redemption having been
made on March 10, 1961, it is evident that the same had been timely made.
The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the CA and ordered Santos to
deliver the owners certificate of TCT to the Gorospes.
BENIN vs TUASON
57 SCRA 531
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of
agricultural lands located in Laloma, Caloocan, Rizal, inherited from their ancestor
Sixto Benin, who inturn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that
they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land
openly,adversely,and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the
fruits harvestedtherefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said
parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey
by the Bureau of Lands in 1933, Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the
ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation
purposes in 1940under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last
181

World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from

Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs,
constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other
defendants were ordered summonedbypublication in accordance with Sections 16
and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared.
The other defendants were all declared in default.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiff has a valid claim over the disputed property.
Held:
If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an
area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as
published, a new publication of the amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned
regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the
area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court
would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect
to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who
have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their
rights because of failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by
the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new
publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the
remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.
VICTOR BENIN, et al. vs. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the parcels of
agricultural lands; that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto
Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and
their predecessors in interest had possessed these parcels of land openly, adversely,
and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested
therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land
surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of
Lands of the lands in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership
over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in
182

1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World
War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and
other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their
houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
Sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of
their lands, the J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives,
with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other
demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and
destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs
were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees.
The plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in
1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands had either been fraudulently
or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel
No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the
Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for
registration, the defendants.
The plaintiffs alleged that before the decision was handed down in the application
for registration by the defendants, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions
of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations,
which were made after the publication of the original application, were never
published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based
on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of
registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the
registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa
Estate and Diliman Estate); and that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No.
7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to
render the decision for lack of publication.
In its answer, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., among others, specifically denied plaintiffs'
claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case.
After trial, the lower court, among others, concluded that the decision and the
decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been rendered without
jurisdiction and the plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the possession of the
parcels of land described in their respective complaints.
J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. appealed from the decision. It contends that the trial court
erred in holding that the Land Registration Court lacked or was without
jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that the amendment to
the original plan was not published.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was
183

without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.

Held:
The lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without
jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an
area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as
published, a new publication of the amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned
regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the
area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court
would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect
to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who
have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their
rights because of failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by
the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new
publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the
remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.
When the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is
bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention
the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this
difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in
the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of
the lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were not
originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being
undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or
879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between
the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation
of the area when the amended plan was prepared, cannot be considered substantial
as would affect the identity of Parcel
REPUBLIC v FLORENCIA MARASIGAN
G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991
Facts:
The private respondent, claims to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered
owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, covered
by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy
184

(sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's duplicate
copy. She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of"
the petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the
reconstitution. From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is
one of the vendees of a certain parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and registered in the
name of Epifania Alcano. The original copy of said title which was usually kept in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the
fire which razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said office
on August 12, 1977.
The Regional Trial Court however granted the reconstitution filed by the private
respondent.
Petitioner appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals because the trial court
erred in acquiring jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the
original and the owner's duplicate copies of tct no. t-66062 without the requisite
service of notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the
land as required by section 13 of republic act no. 26. The CA affirmed the Trial
Courts decision.
Issue:
Whether the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the petition
Held:
No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition. Section 23 of P.D.
No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing
and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned,
there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette,
although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However,
publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the
official publication.
The Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is
clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System
through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property.

PO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-27443 July 19, 1971 / 40 SCRA 37
Facts:
185

Judgment was rendered on March 11, 1964, granting the petition of Juanita Po for
naturalization as citizen of the Philippines. On April 15, 1966, she filed a motion to
be allowed to take the requisite oath of allegiance, after the notice and hearing
prescribed by law. On November 14, 1966, the court issued, the appealed order
allowing her to take said oath and directing the issuance, in her favor, of the
corresponding certificate of naturalization.
However, the motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to entertain appellee's petition for naturalization because
the petition was not published in accordance with law.
In the case at bar, the appellee's "petition" for naturalization that was not published,
but a "notice" summarizing the allegations of said pleading. The publication of
such notice is insufficient to vest, in the trial court, jurisdiction to hear and decide
this case. Besides, said notice was published in the "Nueva Era," and the records
do not show that this newspaper is of general circulation in Surigao del Norte, the
province in which the appellee resides.
Issue:
Whether the defect in the publication of the petition deprives the court of
jurisdiction.
Held:
Sec. 9 of Com. Act No. 473 requires that the "petition" for naturalization be
published "in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province where the petitioner resides.
Since the appellees petition for naturalization has not been published, which is in
violation of Sec. 9 of said Act, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain and
hear said petition, much less to grant the same.
FEWKES vs. NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ ,et al.
G.R. No. L-29075 June 10, 1971
Facts:
On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, filed in CFI of Albay,an
application for registration of two lots,referred to as Lot No. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a
portion of Lot No. 1383, Libon PLs-763 D), with an area of 223, 241 square meters
more or less, and Lot with an area of 11,283 square meters, situated Bulusan,
Libon, Albay. Attached to the application were the tracing cloth and blue print of
plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the tax declarations on said land, and the
two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by
the Velascos in favor of applicant. After the initial hearing of case, the court issued
an order dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction, based on the finding
186

that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract of land
which was described in the plan attached to the application, and that the notice of
initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the
registration proceeding. Hence,this appeal.The appellant contended that since the
description of the bigger parcel of which the properties sought to be registered
formed part was already published, then there was no need for further publication
of the aforesaid small portions in order to vest jurisdiction on the land registration
court.
Issue:
Whether the exact description of the land sought to be registered must be published
in order to confer jurisdiction to the court over the res.
Held:
The notice of the hearing must be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the
location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, and
shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. Publication of
the notice of hearing is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of
the court in land registration cases. It is only when there is constructive seizure of
the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is
vested on the court. Moreover, such notice and publication of the hearing enables
all persons concerned having any rights or interests in the property, to come
forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to
be granted. In the case at bar, what was sought to be registered was not the big
parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or Lot No. 21), but the certain portions
thereof (Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B). Therefore, it is the technical description of
these 2 smaller lots that must be published in order that the persons who may be
affected by their registration may be notified thereof. The lower court could not
merely direct the amendment of the application, instead of issuing an order of
dismissal. This is because it is not permissible to make amendments or alterations
in the description of the land after its publication in the newspapers and after the
registration of the property has been decreed, without the publication of new
notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said alterations
and amendments.
REPUBLIC vs COURT OF APPEALS
236 SCRA 442
Facts:
Respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with
a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo
187

BeleN. At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens. The spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two
(2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. The court a quo rendered a decision
confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question. At the outset, petitioner
submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the
subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately
owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that
lands of whatever classification belongs to the State under the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for
in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the
evidence.
Issue:
Whether the application for registration of title is void on the ground of foreign
nationality.
Held:
NO. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed
above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal
impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form
part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945
or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to
be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were naturalborn citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a
parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land
in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly naturalborn citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could
apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of
188

the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over
the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
ELIGIO T. LEYVA vs . COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO LAIZ and
MANUELA JANDOC
G.R. No. 71939 January 25, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner Leyva had an alleged Compromise Agreement with private respondent
Jandoc. Said agreement was entails that spouses Leyva will withdraw their
opposition to the land registration case filed by Jandoc, if the latter will transfer a
ownership over a parcel of land belonging to Jandoc. The agreement was
purpotedly executed in 1963 but was only notarized in 1972.
On the other hand, private respondent Laiz executed an agreement of sale with
Jandoc in 1959 involving the same parcel of land. Laiz was able to acquire transfer
of ownership and possession of the said land by virtue of a case he filed for
specific perfomance against Jandoc.
The RTC ruling was then affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner or private respondent has a preferred right of ownership
over the land in question.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals which are the
following:
1.
The Compromise Agreement was null and void for being undated and
belatedly notarized.
2.
In the registration proceedings, Laiz was mentioned as an adverse possessor
but not Leyva.
3.
The agreement of sale between Laiz and Jandoc is valid, and also supported
by an earnest money given by Laiz.
4.
Due execution of the agreement was witnessed by three credible witnesses.
5.
It has been established that the subject was lot was occupied by Laiz since
1954, and was given TCT over the said lot by virtue of specific performance.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Agreement of Sale prevails
over the alleged Compromise Agreement. The reliance of Leyva on his expert
witnesses was not able to overcome the testimonies given by the three witnesses.
As held in our jurisprudence, "the positive testimony of the three attesting
witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be
mathematically precise but which on the contrary, are subject to inherent
infirmities." In any event, it is well established that the appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter is in a better position to
189

gauge credibility of witnesses.

It is evident that what petitioner seeks from Supreme Court a review of the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the trial
court. Indeed, it has long been established to the point of being elementary, that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this
Court except in certain instances which have no application here. Petition was
denied.
DE CASTRO VS MARCOS
26 SCRA 644
Facts:
The case commenced from the petition of respondent Rufino Akia before the Court
of First Instance of Baguio City, acting as a cadastral court, for the reopening of
cadastral proceedings, pursuant to Republic Act 931, where the registration in his
name of 15,922 square meters of land situated in the City of Baguio was sought
for.
Petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000
square meters allegedly included in the 15,922 square meters of land specified in
respondent Akia's petition. It appears that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with
the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application [TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering
a 1,000 square meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill Subdivision,
Residential Section "K", Baguio City. The lot was awarded in her favor. She also
paid the full purchase price of the land.
Petitioner's motion for intervention was granted. A trial was made and the case
was submitted for decision. However Akia lodged a motion to dismiss petitioner's
opposition to his (Akia's) petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings. Ground
therefor, amongst others, was that petitioner lacked personality to sue. The motion
was granted by respondent judge on the grounds that mere applicants of public
land have no capacity to sue independently of the Bureau of Lands.
But de Castro moved to reconsider. She stressed the fact that she was not a mere
applicant of public land but an equitable owner thereof. Because, she was an
awardee who had paid to the government, in full, the sales value of the land she
applied for but respondent judge refused reconsideration, on the ground of a
"Manifestation" of counsel for the Director of Lands of stating that on October 15,
1965, the Director of Lands had cancelled the award in favor of petitioner. Other
Motions filed by de Castro were all denied.
Issue:
Whether De Castro have the personality or legal standing to oppose the application
for registration of Akia.
190

Ruling:
Petitioner De Castro has legal standing before the cadastral court. Under Republic
Act 931, the petition for reopening is narrowed down by the specific conditions
therein set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "only with
respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased,
granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government." The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall
be reopened only, if the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation,
lease, grant or any provisional or permanent disposition by the government of the
land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public
bidding held upon her own township sales application. Of course, the award up to
now has not been fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one
condition imposed on her. But, if the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at
least a provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the
land. an award under a sales application has "the effect of withdrawing the lands
of the public domain that were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands."
HEIRS OF MARINA C. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C.
REGALADO, REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C. REGALADO vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 168155
February 15, 2007
Facts:
Marina Regalado filed on July 14, 1987 an application for registration of a parcel
of land situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The
application was published on November 14, 1988 in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to withdraw the
application without prejudice to the refiling of the same, citing as grounds the
discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to
the survey plan of the property and for another reason that the inevitable absence
of applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late
widowed sister whose children [were] all minors in London.
The motion to withdraw the application was granted.
On March 17, 1992, Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier application
which was withdrawn. The court denied the petition on a technical ground.
Subsequently, Marina filed another application for land registration before the
Pasig RTC.
Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an "Amended Application for Registration
alleging, inter alia, that she had "by herself or through her predecessor-in-interest
191

have been in open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said
land which is alienable and disposable of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier"; and that she acquired the land "by virtue
of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3, 1977 executed by the registered claimant
Tomas Antero as Assignor in her favor.
The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March 15, 1994, it
claiming to be the owner of the property which it referred to as the "Balubad
Nangka Project" and which had been declared as an Area for Priority Development
under Proclamation No. 1967 dated May 14, 1980. While the case is pending,
Marina died as a result, her eldest son Arnulfo Regalado pursue the land
registration case in their behalf. Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the "area
covered by the National Housing Authority without prejudice to the other land
subject of the petition. In the same Waiver, he ceded, transferred, and waived
30,239 square meters of the property to the NHA.
Issue:
Whether Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner under a bona fide claim of ownership to validly register said
land?
Held:
Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain." This they failed to discharge.
In addition, other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in a previous
attempt to have the property registered, there is not proof to sustain the trial court's
finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other relatives have been residing in the
property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15
years when a Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.
In fine, the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership
fails.
Fernandez vs Aboratigue
36 SCRA 476
Facts:
Ana P. Fernandez is the owner of a parcel of land where the father of defendant
Feliza Aboratigue, was during his lifetime employed as guard at one of the gates to
the property, and as such was allowed to plant fruit trees in a small portion in the
immediate vicinity; and that after his death the said defendant, together with her
husband Restituto Bacnan, were allowed to stay therein, but that later on they
claimed to be the owners of the said portion. In their answer to the complaint the
192

defendants alleged, as basis of their claim of ownership, continuous possession and

cultivation of the disputed area, by themselves and through their predecessors-ininterest since the year 1901. On January 28, 1959 the Court denied the motion and
on the basis of the facts stipulated rendered judgment or the plaintiff, declaring her
to be the owner of the disputed property and ordering the defendants to vacate the
same, with right to reimbursement of the value of the improvements thereon, they
being builders in good faith.
Issue:
Whether a mere claim can defeat a registered title.
Held:
No,It is obvious that a mere claim cannot defeat a registered title. Furthermore, the
"claim" here is only noted on the survey plan, and such notation cannot prevail
over the actual decree of registration as reproduced in the certificate. All claims of
third persons to the property must be asserted in the registration proceedings. If
any claim to a portion thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from the
property applied for, and is not included in the decree of registration and certificate
of title subsequently issued to the applicant. If it is included, the claim is deemed
adversely resolved with finality, subject only to a petition for review of the decree
within one year from its issuance on the ground of fraud, under Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act.
The rule is that the owner of buildings and improvements should claim them
during the proceedings for registration and the fact of ownership, if upheld by the
court, must be noted on the face of the certificate. There is no such notation here in
favor of the appellants. However, inasmuch as the improvements in the disputed
area have been acknowledgment by plaintiff in her complaint as belonging to the
appellants' predecessor-in-interest, and the lower court's decision allowing them to
recover the value of the improvements is not now in question, this right of the
appellants must be upheld. The trial court has left the determination of such value
to mutual agreement between the parties. This disposition should be modified in
the sense that if they fail to agree, the matter should be submitted to the said court
for hearing and adjudication.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO BACAS et al..
G.R. No. 182913 November 20, 2013
Facts:
The Bacases filed their Application for Registration on November 12, 1964
covering a parcel of land together with all the improvements found thereon, located
in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City with Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of
Cagayan, L.R.C. Record No. 1612. They alleged ownership in fee simple of the
193

property and indicated in their application the names and addresses of the
adjoining owners, as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military
Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.
The director of the Bureau of Lands, registered its written opposition and on On
April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the Bacases, the Land
Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision holding that the applicants had
conclusively established their ownership over the subject land and that their
possession, including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty (40) years.
No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC. Thus, the
decision became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of a decree and the
corresponding certificate of title over the subject property
The LRCs decision in both applications for registration the Republic filed a
complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons before the
RTC. More specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months
from the issuance of OCT No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of
original certificate of title, reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the
Republic against the Bacases.
The Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for
military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it was no longer disposable
and subject to registration. The RTC dismissed the complaints of the Republic they
ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for
registration.The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Thus, the appeal on the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels of land
should be allowed.
Held:
The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was
fraud.
It can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC had no
jurisdiction over the land in question. With respect to the Bacases, although the
lower courts might have been correct in ruling that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that Camp Evangelista
was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the
validity of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of
actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing
registration is null and void.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising
194

thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that

sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the State.
MILLER vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
Facts:
A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate was applied for registration in the
Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956 by John M. Miller and Emilio
Espinosa, Jr. After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20,
1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed written
oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. All
persons, except the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in default on July 8,
1957. On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private
oppositors were given five days to file written opposition. Of the oppositors, 28
filed written but unverified opposition. On August 20, 1958 applicants finished
adducing evidence and rested their case. On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors
presented their first witness. After his cross-examination, counsel for applicants
called the Court's attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the
private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same. The private oppositors offered
to verify their opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the court issued an
order on January 13, 1959 dismissing the unverified opposition, without
pronouncement as to costs Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated
November 18, 1959.
Issue:
The sufficiency of unverified opposition.
Ruling:
Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded with the trial,
presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the first witness of the private
oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel had cross-examined him, was the
defect of lack of verification brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the
defect. The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is generally a
waiver of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities, formal defects, of fault or
defects of any kind in the pleading of the adverse party.
CACHERO VS. MARZAN
196 SCRA 601 1991
Facts:
The Spouses Cachero filed a case in the CFI of La Union against the respondents
for recovery of possession and ownership of 2 parcels of land in Barrio Basca,
Aringay, LaUnion. The lower court rendered judgment declaring the petitioners
owners of the subject land. The judgment became final and executory. About 7
years later the Spouses Cachero filed for the registration under the Torrens Act of
195

the subject land (109,480 sq. m.) identified as Lot No. 6860 of the Cadastral
Survey and another parcel of land (50,412 square meters) identified as Lot No.
6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, both lots being situated in Sitio Iriw, Basca
Aringay, La Union. Subsequently, Atty. Yaranon filed oppositions in said case in
behalf of the respondents Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was
substituted by hischildren.The judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses
finding that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous
and notorious possession of subject lots for more than 60 years in concept of
owners except for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6860 which the Cacheros had
sold to Bernardino Marzan; that Tomas Cachero had inherited said lots from his
late father, Simeon Cachero; and that the applicant spouses had been religiously
paying the realty taxes on the parcels of land as owners thereof. The respondents
thru their counsel, Atty. Yaranon, filed a motion for reconsiderationon the ground
that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case and that the subject lands, which
have been the subject of cadastral proceedings, showed that neither the Cacheros
nor their predecessors-in-interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The
Cacheros opposed the motion and argued that by the time the motion for
reconsideration was filed, the judgment sought to be reconsidered had already
become final. The motion was denied. About 7 months after the filing of the
motion for reconsideration, persons not parties to the registration proceedings filed
a"
petition for review of judgment and/or decree
." They alleged that they were the owners of the land designated as Lot No. 6859
which they purchased sometime in 1929 and that they have been in continuous
possession thereof since then. They also alleged that the petitioners fraudulently
omitted to give them notice of their application for registration and that in the
earlier cadastral survey, Lots Numbered6859 and 6860 had been declared public
land for lack of any original claimant and at the cadastral hearing only the Director
of Lands, the Director of Forestry, and they had file cadastral answer. The petition
prayed for the re-opening, review and setting aside of the judgment and for the
accord to them of an opportunity to prove their asserted contentions. The petition
for review was denied. The Registration Court ruled that the according to the report
of the chief surveyor of the Land Registration Commission, there was no decree of
registration issued as regards the subject lots. It also ruled that the movants had
failed to show fraud on the Cacheros' part. Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova
subsequently died and were substituted by their heirs. These Genova heirs filed an
amended petition which was also denied by the Registration Court. Then, they
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which forwarded it to the Supreme
Court, holding that the former had no appellate jurisdiction over the matter. The
CA also declared that the Genovas are third persons who came into the case.
196

Issue:
WON the cadastral proceedings should be deemed as a bar to the Registration
Proceedings.
Held:
NO, the cadastral case mentioned commenced before the outbreak of the Pacific
war. It had been abandoned and had not been continued or resumed after the war,
thus, it had ceased to exist. Hence, said compulsory cadastral proceedings under
the Cadastral Act cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the registration
proceedings under the Torrens Act initiated more than twenty years later by the
Cacheros. A cadastral proceeding which had long discontinued and abandoned, and
which had resulted in no judgment or final order affecting the lands involved in a
subsequent registration act under Act496, cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to
the latter proceedings. There being no final adjudication in the cadastral
proceeding, there is no reason to apply the doctrine of res judicata.
Moreover, the Genovas were and are bound by the order of default issued in Land
Reg. Case No. N-824, a proceeding undoubtedly in rem in character. That default
order was entered "against the whole world," with the exception only of the parties
who had appeared and filed pleadings in the registration case.
BASILISA S. ESCONDE vs.HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and RAMON
V. DELFIN
G.R. No. L-67583 July 31, 1987
Facts:
Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of land located
in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and now covered with an OCT issued by the
Registry of Deeda, Bulacan.
Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of Possession against spouses
Francisco and Basilisa Esconde, as they have been occupying the said land.
Subsequently, on March of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied
by Judge Bautista. Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same branch
presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession against the
spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash which was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyance against Delfin which was rebutted
by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the cause of action, if any,
is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of
action for reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches
from filing the case.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of
court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order, delivered possession to Delfin
however he was barred in entering the premises. Delfin filed a motion for an Alias
197

writ of possession which was granted.

The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin, however,
when the latter went to the premises he was again barred by the petitioner. Then,
Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for a second alias writ of possession
which was again, granted.
Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was dismissed. After
which motions and motions have been filed. The second resolve the issue, a
temporary restraining order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from
enforcing and/or carrying out the third alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed
motion to amend the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of
possession served or to issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said
court.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioner's cause of action is barred by res judicata; and
2. Whether petitioner's motion to admit amended complaint and for issuance of
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction is proper.
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Land registration proceedings in this case commenced on April 14, 1969 and
decision thereon was rendered on December 8, 1969. Hence, the law in force at the
time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise known as Property Registration Decree)
having taken effect only on Jan. 23, 1979.
Petitioner's claim that she came to know of the land registration case only upon
receipt of a Petition for Writ of Possession is completely rebutted by private
respondent's evidence. In the notice of Initial Hearing (Rollo, p. 148-a) she is one
of those cited to appear; in the Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her
husband was notified of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by his
signature opposite his name and in the Surveyor's Certificate (Rollo, p. 148-b) her
husband was reported one of the adjoining owners present. There is no question
that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the
administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code). Otherwise stated,
there was no concealment on the part of private respondent. In fact, the records
show that private respondent stated in his application for registration of title that a
portion of the land was being occupied by petitioner sometime in September 1967,
by breaking the stone wall fence without his knowledge and consent. However,
petitioner and her husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land
registration proceedings, opted not to appear.
Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, "A land registration proceedings which
is in rem, is valid and conclusive against the whole world. The failure of the
plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice of the publication and posting by the
198

sheriff of the notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for

registration will bar her from filing this action."
Director of Lands vs. Santiago
G.R. No. L-41278, April 15, 1988
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of
the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due
course to the petitioners Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the
dismissal of the respondent corporations application for registration. On Sept. 8,
1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI
of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director
of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this
application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized
the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same.
Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the
conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant
from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area
stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge
Santiago. A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties
concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in
default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted
by the sheriff as required by law. On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing,
neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was
issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the
evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered
the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent
corporation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that
the failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the
decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.
Issue:
WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and
decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the
parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation,
2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,
3. Denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial.;
Held:
The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and
the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the Decision dated February 17,
1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all
199

declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporations subject application
for land registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the
respondent corporations application for registration, without sufficient proof that
the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under
Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Supreme Court is not convinced with
the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent
corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years.
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent
corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications as
evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria Garcia
herself. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not
own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the
Bureau of Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their
possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private respondents
were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital
fact)
More than anything else, however, registration in this instance cannot be granted
on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act as said provision
applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject
landswere forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that
the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession
for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The
respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely
because they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands. An examination
of the dates will show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on
October 24, 1971, was done after the lands had been declared as alienable and
disposable.
The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on
substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to the issuance of the Notice
of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of
such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed
to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against
200

the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was made, he had
already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer.
The pertinent provision of law which states: If no person appears and answers
within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no
reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded ,
cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it,
which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than
illogical, unwarranted, and unjust
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land
sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should
have received the applicants evidence and set another date for the reception of the
oppositors evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein
should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the governments claim.
The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial, ignored
the established rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside a default judgment.
The Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their standing in
court and given them an even chance to face their opponents.
The Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case
which would only prolong the litigation unnecessarily, for as it said in a recent
case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before on the records before it.
In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the
State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real
estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and
plans submitted by the private respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the
allegations in the petitioners opposition to the application were so casually
ignored.

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK

G. WEBBER vs. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and
LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of Manila
[G.R. No. L-38974, March 25, 1975]
Facts:
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico, filed against Omico Mining and Industrial
201

Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal capacity and as
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging
first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed
from him by the defendants, and the second, for the payment of his services as
legal counsel for the corporation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in that the case was filed in
Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident, the truth being that he is a resident of
Quezon City where he has his permanent family home; and, as to the second cause
of action, the contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and
defendants was entered into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the case should
have been filed in Manila in accordance with Section I of Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that with regard to the stock
certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the
contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the
plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial
Corporation.
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the
parties nor their respective counsels appeared in court. While the motion to dismiss
was pending resolution by the court because defendants had not yet presented to
the court the required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11, 1974, filed a
petition to declare the defendants in default that defendants had been served with
summons and copies of the complaint on June 8, 1973; that as of January 11, 1974,
or after a lapse of seven (7) months from the service of summons, defendants had
not filed their answer to the complaint. The court granted the petition and,
consequently, it received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered
judgment in favor of Catolico. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but
Catolico file a motion to postpone hearing of motion for reconsideration.
On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the court because the defendants had not filed yet their reply to the
opposition as they had not received a copy, Catolico filed a motion for immediate
execution of judgment, alleging that said judgment had already become final and
executory because the defendants failed to have the order of default lifted; that the
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was a "manifest attempt
on the part of the defendants to delay the proceedings to afford them an
opportunity to have all their assets and shares dissipated by continuous sale of the
same to the prejudice". Thence, the court denied the defendants motion for
reconsideration. Defendants filed their notice of appeal. On July 22, Pio R.
Marcos, as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant Omico
Mining and Industrial Corporation, wrote a letter to respondent Sheriff asking that
the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust the legal remedies available to
202

hold in abeyance the execution and garnishment for the reasons that defendants
were not given a chance to have their day in court in the motion for immediate
execution of judgment and that they have already appealed from the lower court's
decision and order of immediate execution.
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default, in receiving plaintiff's
evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. The motion to dismiss was
pending before the court when such declaration was made, and it is generally
irregular to enter an order of default while a motion to dismiss remains pending
and undisposed of. The irregularity of the order of default is evident from the fact
that when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for filing an answer
had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date, their counsel had not yet
received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to dismiss.
There may be cases where the attendance of certain circumstances "may be
considered substantive enough to truncate the adverse literal application of the
pertinent rules violated." Inasmuch as petitioners were declared in default while
their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were, therefore,
incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits,
in their absence, without due notice to them of the date of hearing, was a denial of
due process. Consequently, the order of default, the judgment and the order of
execution are patent nullities.
VALISNO vs. PLAN
143 SCRA 502
Facts:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blancos and
subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took
possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house
thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a
deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriegas favor from the heirs of
Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment
thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court
decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and
dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the
property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the
respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely
different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that
203

the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Contrasting the evidence of the
respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondents evidence as they were
able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the
adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely
presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works.
Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before
the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. The CFI dismissed the opposition on
ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioner should be
granted.
RULING:
The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to
a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows its application in land
registration proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient.
Therefore, the court may sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration
proceeding as the case at bar. Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the
counterclaim can be taken as a complaint where the defendantbecomes the
plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the counterclaim and he
may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or file a motion to
dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last choice. The SC held
that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case:
[a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for
registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. The
employment of two different actions does not allow one to escape against the
principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of action cannot be litigated
twice. Although the first action was litigated before a competent court of general
jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no significance since that
both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to
apply. For convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the application
for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both
parties have been settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality
of its decision and dismissed the petition.
Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
Facts:
204

On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap, Jr., and others filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that
they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants posited
that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain.
It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the
petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. On November
21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Held:
NO. The petitions were DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals was
reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
205

present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. A positive act
declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
Facts:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap, Jr., and others filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that
they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants posited
that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain.
It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the
petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. On November
21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
206

Issue:
Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Held:
NO. The petitions were DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals was
reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. A positive act
declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE
G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991
Facts:
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then
CFI of Pangasinan, an application for registration in her favor of a
parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less,
located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an
opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the
Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of
title; that neither she nor her predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land in concept of owner at least thirty years immediately
207

preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a

portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether the land applied for has been in the possession of her
respondents predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years and
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive"
evidence required in the proceedings
Held:
No. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the
alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano
Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the
thirty years period prior to the filing of the application, was open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This
burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction
of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more
than twenty years found in private respondent's declaration is
hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases
of this nature.
LARAGAN VS CA

G.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987

Facts:
On 14 October 1968, the herein petitioners filed an application with the CFI of
Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land with an area of
221,667 sq. m., more or less, situated in the Barrio of Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela.
208

The applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute
deed of sale from the spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have
been in possession thereof for more than 34 years. The Land Registration
Commission issued a notice of initial hearing. On 7 July 1969, the Solicitor
General filed a written opposition, on behalf of the Director of Lands, alleging that
the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to the
parcel of land sought to be registered. He prayed that the land be declared public
land. On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco
Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the application claiming
that they are the owners, pro indiviso, of the southern part of the land applied for,
with an area of 16 hectares of their deceased parents and which has been in their
possession for more than 30 years.
The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the
applicants over the parcel of land applied for and ordering its
registration in the names of the applicants. The oppositors
appealed to the CA. On 9 November 1977, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but excluded the
southern portion of the land applied for, the appellate court
declaring such excluded portion to be public land, and part of the
public domain, in view of the failure of the applicants and
oppositors to prove registrable title over the same. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but
their motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction in declaring the parcel of land in question as public
land.
.
Held:

209

The argument is untenable. While it may be true that the Director

of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his
failure to so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court
final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other
oppositors, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Francisco Leano, and
Consolacion Leano, who also seek the confirmation of their
imperfect title over the land in question. Neither did such failure
of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court
from declaring the land in question to be public land, since the
oppositors and the herein petitioners are both seeking the
registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Law where the presumption always is that
the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors
claim an interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required
number of years.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration
is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name
simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose
the registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of
opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute
owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering
property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no
opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any
opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens
system, if the facts presented do not show that the petitioner is
the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to register.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
REPUBLIC vs SAYO
Facts:
The respondent spouses filed an original application for
registration of a tract of land having an area of 33,950 hectares.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others. The case
dragged on for about twenty (20) years. The remaining area of
210

5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement,

adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of
Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were
assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in
payment of his attorney's fees. In a decision rendered on 1981,
the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms.
The Solicitor General contends that no evidence whatever was
adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for
registration; neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the
compromise agreement; as counsel of the Republic, he should
have been but was not given notice of the compromise
agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part
therein; that he was not even served with notice of the decision
approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently
erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate
remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents contended that the Solicitor General's
arguments are premised on the proposition that the disputed land
is public land, but it is not.
Issue:
Whether there was no evidence adduced by the parties in support
of their petitions for registration
Held:
Yes. There was no competent evidence adduced by the parties in
support of their petitions for registration.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to
the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents

211

It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is

based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But
that compromise agreement included private persons who had
not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the
land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in
controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had
presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part
of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise
agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a
totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not
submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to
ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among
themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library. But, as this Court has already had occasion to
rule, that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to
property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish
regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of
ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any
finding of the private character of the land in question.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment
approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void,
and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the
remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private
parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent
evidence their respective claims to the property.
The decision of the respondent Judge complained of is annulled
and set aside.
Secretary of the DENR v Yap
G.R. 172775
**********There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a
212

petition for review on certiorari of the Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted
the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is
G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
Facts:
GR no. 167707
On April of 1976, the DENR approved the National reservation survey of Boracay
which identified several lots as being occupied by named persons.
On November of 1978, Pres. Marcos issued PP 1801 declaring Boracay Island as
tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA), then later on approves PTA Circ. 3-82 to implement the
said proclamation.
Yap, together with other respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the said proclamation prevented them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land
for titling purposes. Moreover, they contend that they or through their predecessorin-interest has been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the subject land since time immemorial and they were paying their realty tax.
Further, the said proclamation did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of men,
classified as a tourist zone, therefore, susceptible of private ownership. Invoking
Sec 48(b) of CA 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they have the right
to have the lots registered under their names.
The republic, through OSG, opposed the petition of the respondents claiming that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of public domain. Invoking Sec 3(a) or PD
705 or the revised forestry code, as amended, it is not susceptible of private
ownership.
The OSG maintained that the right of the respondent to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by PD 705 and CA 141. Since the Island has not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they have cannot ripen into
ownership.
RTC: It upheld respondents right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable. The Circular itself recognized
private ownership of lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public
Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and
that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.
213

OSG moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, they appealed it to the
CA.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court.
OSG moved for reconsideration, but, it was also denied. They appeled to the SC.
GR no. 173775
However, during the pendency of the case (GR no. 167707) Pres. Arroyo issued PP
1064 which classifies Boracay into 400 ha of forest land and 628.96 ha or
agricultural land. On august of 2006, Sacay, Gelito and other land owners filed a
petition for nullification of PP1064. They contend that the said proclamation
infringes their prior vested right over portions of Boracay, also, they have been
occupying the lot since time immemorial.
Nonetheless, the OSG argued that they dont have vested rights over the property
because Boracay is an unclassified public forest land ursuant to PD 705. Therefore,
they are neither alienable nor disposable lands.
*****On November of 2006, the court ordered the consolidation of both cases as
they involve the same issues on land classification of Boracay Island.*****
Issue:
Whether or not private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals decision was reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Appying this law, all unclassified lands, including
that of the Boracay Island is considered as Public forest. Nonetheless, PD No. 705
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
214

that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential

proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The
burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
In the present case, there was neither a proclamation, EO, Administrative action,
report statute nor a certificate presented in court. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed
the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.
If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No.
1801.
Noting that millions were invested for the development of Boracay Island making
internationally known ad some called it their home. However, the SC expressed
that they are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. Thus, saying Ito and
batas, ito ang dapat umiral.

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals

(129 SCRA 689)
Facts:
In May 10, 1976, Antonio Valeriano et al., hereinafter referred to as the
respondents, filed their application for the registration of a parcel of land,
connected to a river and which they have converted into fishponds, in the CFI of
Bulacan. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground
that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan and
that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not
form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the subject land in favor of
the applicants (respondents), which the CA affirmed basing from the evidence that
the applicants predecessors-in- interest have been in open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse possession of the parcel of land for more than 30 years. The
CA further opined that since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond
purposes, it cannot not be categorized as part of forestlands, thus this case.
215

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Courts can reclassify public lands.
Ruling:
No. In its decision, the SC commented that the CFI and CAs approval for the
registration of the subject land in effect released such property from the
unclassified category, which is beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Court further emphasized the rule stating that classification or
reclassification of public lands is an exclusive right vested to the Executive
Department of the Government and not to the Judiciary and in the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land
registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision
of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to
grant the application.
Issue:
Whether the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice
of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
Held:
YES. Petition was granted. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted
further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
216

who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated

essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with.The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
room only for application. There is no alternative.
REPUBLIC vs. DE PORKAN
June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88
Facts:
Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 from
their predecessors-interests, who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the
government by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession
for more than 30years. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin
obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond
Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546. Azurin filed with the Bureau
of Lands a complaint for correction, amendment or cancellation of the Homestead
Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546 and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot
No. 1099 alleging among others that the patentees secured their patents and titles
through fraud, misrepresentation and illegal machinations. The Solicitor General
sided with Azurin; when the case was brought to the Court of First Instance, the
SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed by Azurin and
that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands under the Public
Land Act. Hence, the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were
void insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin.
After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity of
the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute. The SG in
the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could not be the
subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the
Public Act since they are marshy and swampy, certified as such as more suitable
for fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act.
Issue:
Whether possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will entitle the
possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title.
217

Held:
Yes. As early as 1953, the respondents had already acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099, but a grant of the Government over
the same alienable land by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed
possession for more than 30 years, since the Spanish colonial period.
The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. 1099 dates back to the time of
the Spanish colonial period. Such possessions of the said public land has attained
the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant
from the Government. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. By legal fiction, the
land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private land.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
(178 SCRA 708)
Facts:
On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the
registration of two parcels of land, located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of
Capiz. They claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The Director of
Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application
on the ground that said parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public
dominion, so it cannot be the subject of the registration proceedings.
After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the
names of the applicants, herein private respondents after finding that the applicants
and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful
and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of
ownership for more than 80 years.
The CA affirmed the CFIs decision, holding that the classification of the lots as
timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that
the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing
as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil.
10).
Issue/s:
Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can ripen
to private
ownership.
218

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. It emphasized that a positive act of the government, particularly
the Executive Department is needed to declassify land, which is classified as
forest, and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes before registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing various
cases, stated that a parcel of forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry, an office under the Executive Department, and beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
In the present case, the two parcels of land were not declared by the Executive
Department to be alienable and disposable, thus it cannot be registered under
private ownership.
IHVCP v. UP
(200 SCRA 554)
Facts:
IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood. It renewed its timber license, which was granted by the government and
shall be valid for 25 years, in early 1960. Said license authorizes the company to
cut, collect and remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain
municipalities of Laguna, including Paete.
In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an experiment
station for UP. The said experiment station covers a portion of the timberland in
Paete, occupied by IHVCP so UP, who claims ownership of said portion of
timberland, demanded the latter to pay the forest charges to it, instead of the BIR.
IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed a suit against UP, claiming that R.A. 3990
does not empower UP to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by it within the
tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges
prescribed by the BIR.
Issue/s:
Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Court ruled that R.A. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP the
area, which means that the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from
the public domain. In respect to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP,
219

the said Act removed and segregated it from being a public forest.
The Court further cited Sec. 3 of R.A. 3990, which provides that, "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines. The provision of the Act is clear that UP, being the owner of the
land, has the right to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of
IHVCP insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned.
HEIRS OF AMMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
126 SCRA 69
Facts:
There are two petitions in this case. The Court of Appeals declared the disputed
property as forest land. These two petitions have their genesis in an application for
confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No.
885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners
in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and
Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot
No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. During the progress of
the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he
may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition,
claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio
Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated
in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their
respective
appeals
with
the
Court
of
Appeals.
In
its
decision,
the
Court
of
Appeals
held
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have
been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of
a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest
of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question
that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2)
private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the
opposition
and
evidence
of
the
Director
of
Forestry
220

". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was
filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during
that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose
Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the
area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained
its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to
above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted
into a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing
of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District
Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so
that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942
which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed
in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable
title he must have shown "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the
application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants
or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years
prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title
for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had
been
in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural
lands
of
the
public
domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that
period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors
had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these
applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the
same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves
as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court
foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is
always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest
Court
to
pass
final
judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the
221

application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director
of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library. A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the
Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with
Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No.
496 known as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the
annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of
the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of
Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners
also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative
rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to
declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although
conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land
in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of
private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land"
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be sustained
Ruling:
Yes, it should be sustained.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
222

have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by

mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that
in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had
to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that
the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as
"public
forest."
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties Inc. (555 SCRA 477)
Facts:
In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the
registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area of 56.4007
hectares. To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued by
CENRO and FMS-DENR and both certifying that the land applied for was
alienable and disposable. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, opposed the application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties
did not prove that the land was alienable and disposable.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and disposable.
Ruling:
223

No. It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is
alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable.
In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the needed proof. For the
documents provided by the company, the Court cited DENR Administrative Order
No. 20 (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has
no authority to issue certificates, classifying lands to be alienable and disposable;
and DAO No. 38 provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land classification
for lands having a maximum area of 50 hectares. The land applied for in the case
has an area of 56.4007 hectares, thus CENRO has no jurisdiction over it. It is clear
from the aforementioned DAOs that the documents submitted by T.A.N.
Properties did not prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Sunbeam Convenience Foods v. Court of Appeals
181 SCRA 443
Facts:
In 1963, the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in favor of Sunbeam and on the
same year, the latter registered it with the Register of Deeds and obtained an OCT.
The patent covers parcels of land in Bataan, which were claimed to be forestlands.
In 1976, the Sol.Gen. in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, instituted an
action for the reversion of the said OCT. so Sunbeam filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which the CFI granted. When appealed, the CA granted the petition filed by the
Republic since the core issue is the classification of the lands to be forestlands.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the patent issued by the Director of Lands converted the lands to be
alienable and disposable from being forestlands.
Ruling:
No. Forestlands are part of the public dominion so they cannot be the subject of
land registration cases unless they have been declassified and converted into
alienable and disposable lands. For a part of the public dominion to form part of
the disposable lands, there must be a positive act by the government, an official
proclamation by the executive department releasing the land to be alienated.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 701)
224

Facts:
In 1965, the Salazars filed an application for the registration of the 291 hectares of
land (a forestland), which they acquired from their mother Soledad. The
application was opposed by the Director of Lands (DoL) and by 25 occupants of
the land. To prove their ownership, the Salazars claimed that their predecessors-ininterest have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, exclusive, and notorious
possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years prior to their
application and the siblings further presented tax declarations but the DoL still
claimed otherwise.
In 1977, the CA denied the application but in its 1979 resolution, it reversed itself
and granted the application. The basis of the reversal was the declaration made by
the Director of Forestry in April 28, 1961, reclassifying the subject land as
alienable and disposable from being a forestland.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the applicants proved their ownership of the land.
Ruling:
No.The Court affirmed the CAs 1977 decision and acknowledged that the latter
held correctly through Justice Serrano in its decision that whatever possession of
the land the Salazars and their predecessors might have had prior to April 28, 1961
cannot be credited to the thirty-year requirement.
In the present case, the thirty-year requirement should be reckoned from April
1961, the point when the forestland was reclassified by the Director of Forestry to
be alienable and disposable and not prior thereto since it was still a forestland, a
public dominion, thus, non-registerable.
REPUBLIC V. CA
154 SCRA 476
Facts:
In 1968, Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming
Piraso filed in the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration
of the land, which the latter claimed to be in their possession and
occupation openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously since
1915. The Director of lands, through the Solicitor General and the
Director of Forestry, opposed the application on the ground that
225

the said portion land is within the Central Cordillera Forest

Reserve as shown in the reports and testimonies of the district
foresters. The CFI granted the application, which was also
affirmed by the CA. The governments failure to show that the
disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes is one of the
reasons for the CAs ruling. It also noted the failure to prove that
trees are thriving in the land.
Issue:
Whether the land in dispute is alienable and disposable.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the
reports and testimonies of the district foresters that the land
applied for registration is a part of a forestland. As to the claim of
the applicants that they have been in possession of the land since
1915, the court cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. Munoz
(23 SCRA 1184),where it stated that possession of forest lands, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
In its decision, the Court also addressed the CAs ruling by citing
its decision in Heirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126
SCRA 69, 75), where it ruled, A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover.
Forestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.
The Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal
Government declaration that the forestland has been re-classified
into alienable and disposable agricultural land, before private
persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public
agricultural lands can acquire it.
226

Republic v. Bacus (176 SCRA 376)

Facts:
In 1981, Bacus filed an application for the registration of a 496-m2 parcel of land
in the CFI of Misamis Occidental. The Republic through the Director of Lands
opposed the application on the ground that said land was still a part of the public
domain since the land is still part of a public forest. The CFI and CA ruled in favor
of Bacus. The CA relied on the certification of City Development Coordinator of
Ozamis City, who certified that the subject land was within the commercialresidential zone and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Ozamis City, who
certified that the lots near and surrounding the subject land had already been
registered in favor of private persons.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the land has been converted as part of the disposable land of the
Government.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the certifications, which the CA relied on, are not
sufficient to change the nature of the property. The area is still considered
forestland since it has not been declassified as such by the proper authorities. The
Court further stressed that development of forestland into residential and
commercial status does not alter its legal standpoint as forestland.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REMMAN ENTERPRISES
G.R. NO. 199310
Facts:
Respondent Remman Ent. Inc. applied for a judicial confirmation of title with the
RTC of Taguig. Said application is comprised of two parcels of land also located in
Taguig. On Dec. 31, 2001, RTC found that the application for registration was
sufficient in form and substance and scheduled an initial hearing which was
published in the Official Gazette, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and the notice was posted in conspicuous places in the City Hall of
Taguig.
May 30,2002, only Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor to the said application. LLDA avers that the subject lands are not
alienable and disposable. Likewise, the Republic of the Philippines also opposed
said registration since they claim that the respondents failed to prove that they and
227

their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession of the lands since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Each party presented their respective witnesses. Respondents also presented
documents supporting their claim over the subject parcel of lands, it also included
certifications by the DENR that the said lands are alienable and disposable. On the
other hand, LLDA pointed out that under RA 4850 it states that lands surrounding
the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglamentary elevation of 12.50
meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. The engineer
for LLDA testified that upon aerial survey of the subject parcel of lands, it was
found out that the elevations of the lots were less thatn 12.50 m, which the
engineer for the respondents rebutted.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents on May 2007. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the
application for registration filed by the respondent.
Ruling:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. In the case at
bar, the Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to present incontrovertible
evidence to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable
Furthermore, sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect to public land acquired under Sect. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, or the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. Under Sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second,
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The respondents failed to satify the above mentioned requisites. They have
presented certification from a proper government agency but failed to obtain an
approval from the DENR Secretary that the land of public domain is released as
228

alienable and disposable. The original approved document signed by the DENR
Secretary must also be presented, and should be attested by the legal custodian of
the official records. In addition, the second requisite was not also satisfied, as the
respondents only started paying taxes for the said properties in 2002 which is
contrary to their claim that their predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of said lots in 1943.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for
registration was denied.
Republic Cement Corporation v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 734)
Facts:
Republic Cement Corporation filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan, for the
registration in its name of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2880 of the
Cadastral Survey of Norzagaray, Bulacan, Plan Ap-16404, located in barrio
Minuyan, Norzagaray, Bulacan, with an area of 207,996 m2. Spouses Jose Rayo
and Susana Mangahas and one Pedro Legaspi opposed the application. The
oppositor spouses claimed that they are the owners for a period of over 60 years of
the east central portion of the parcel of land, title to which is sought to be
registered by Republic Cement, covered by Plans PSU 229592 and 227659, with a
total area of 68,389m2Oppositor Pedro Legaspi claims that he is the owner of the
eastern portion of the same parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-225872, with a
total area of 31,887-m2. The 3 oppositors were later substituted by private
respondent Moises Correa as subsequent purchaser of the aforesaid portions of said
parcel of land.
After the trial, the CFI ordered the registration of the parcels of land bought by
Correa but Republic Cements application was dismissed. On appeal, the CA
ordered the registration of Lot No. 2880 in the name of Republic Cement but
excluding portions thereof as described in Plans PSU-229592, 227659 and 225872
which were ordered registered in the name of private respondent Correa.
Afterwhich, Republic Cement petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that the CA
erred in ordering the registration of the three parcels of land covered by Plans
PSU-225872, 229592 and 227659 in the name of Correa allegedly because the
latter failed to prove the identity of the lands he claims.
229

Issue/s:
Whether or not Correa proved the identity of the lands he claims.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that contrary to the claim of Republic Cement, Correa,
through his predecessors in interest, was able to establish the identity of and title to
the land sought to be registered in his name. The technical description and the
survey plan duly approved by the Director of Lands submitted in evidence by him
fully describes the meters and bounds of the parcels of land involved.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS REYES
68 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Alipio Alinsurin, later substituted by Paraaque Investment
and Development Corporation, sought to register under Act 496, a parcel of land
indisputably included within the area reserved for military purposes under
Presidential Proclamation No.237, dated December 19, 1955. Applicant claimed
that his predecessors acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title
issued during the Spanish Regime on March 5, 1895. The application was opposed
by the Government. The lower court adjudicated (a) 2/3 portion of the land in favor
of the corporation, subject to the rights of one Ariosto Santos per a manifestation
submitted in court, and (b) 1/3 portion to Roman Tamayo. Within the extended
period, the Government filed the corresponding record on appeal, copy of which
was duly served upon the corporation and Tamayo. Pending approval of the Record
on Appeal, and on motion of the corporation and of Tamayo, the lower court
directed the issuance of a registration decree of the entire parcel applied for, 1/3
pro-indiviso in favor of Tamayo, and 2/3 pro-indiviso in favour of the corporation,
and declared that as to Tamayo's share, the court's decision had become final, but
as to the share of the corporation, the registration shall be subject to the final
outcome of the appeal. Hence, the Government instituted this Special Civil Action
for certiorari and mandamus and the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the lower court from issuing a writ of possession,
the corporation and Tamayo from exercising acts of ownership over the property,
and the register of deeds from accepting for registration documents on the land
until the government shall have filed a notice of lis pendens. During the pendency
of the appeal in the registration case, a certain Honofre A.Andrada and others filed
with the Court of First Instance a complaint against the corporation and Tamayo
for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question. The trial court assumed
230

jurisdiction over, and decided, the case in favor of Andrada. Pursuant thereto, but
in violation of the Supreme Court's injunction (in L-27594), the corporation
executed a subdivision plan of the parcel subject of the land registration, and the
trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the original certificate of title
and to issue new titles to Andrada, et al., "free from all liens and encumbrances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution pending appeal is applicable?
HELD:
The court held that:
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL; FAILURE TO SERVE APPELLEE WITH NOTICE
OFAPPEAL CANNOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF APPEAL, IF APPELLEE WAS
SERVED WITH COPYOF RECORD ON APPEAL. The failure of appellants to
serve a copy of their notice of appeal to the counsel for one of the several appellees
is not fatal to the appeal,where admittedly, he was served with a copy of the
original, as well as the amended record on appeal in both of which the notice of
appeal is embodied. Such failure cannot impair the right of appeal, especially if the
substantial rights of the adverse party is not impaired and the appeal taken was
from the entire decision which is not severable.
2. LAND REGISTRATION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT
APPLICABLE INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. Execution
pending appeal is not applicable in land registration proceedings. It is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real
properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
3.LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE ISSUED BASED ON
JUDGMENT THAT ISNOT FINAL IS A NULLITY. A Torrens Title issued on
the basis of a judgment that is not final, the judgment being on appeal, is a nullity,
as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act, which
requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title
becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the register of
deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
4. ISSUANCE OF TITLE DESPITE TIMELY APPEAL IS ERRONEOUS. The
lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire
decision a quo.
REPUBLIC V. SPS. MAXIMO
135 SCRA 156
231

Facts:
The Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon on March 21,
1961 rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said land,
Lot 1, allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in
the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales,
less 200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the
Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion. The basis of the claim of the
Maxinos is a Spanish title, a gratuitous composition title or
adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona
pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29
hectares of pasture land. The decision became final and
executory. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, the Republic filed with court an
amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the
ground that they are void because the land in question was still a
part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory
information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only
29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was
verified by the Acting Director of Forestry. After hearing the judge
denied the petition and ruled in favor of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether the land in question can be registered under the Torrens
System
Ruling:
No, the said land cannot be registered. It is axiomatic that public
forestal land is not registerable. The spouses have not shown that
a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. The
boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal
that a different land was covered thereby. The title states that the
29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. Tesalonas tax
declarations stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga,
now Anonang.
The court said that possession of public forestal lands, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
232

MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 179987
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
land registration covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty years. The application
was raffled to the RTC Cavite-Tagaytay City. The OSG duly
designated the Jose Velazco, Jr. to appear on behalf of the State.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself
and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, who testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned
by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
or both
Ruling:
No. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan
or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according
to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke
Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
233

was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no

competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification
of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO V. ZAPANTA
133 SCRA 820
Facts:
The Municipality of Antipolo, for more than 50 years now, has
considered the disputed property, described below, to be public
land subject to Antipolos use and permission to use within the
prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. There is
indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public
market as far back as 1908, or at the latest, since 1920 up to
today. Gradually, additional public structures were built thereon,
like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center, the Integrated
National Police Building, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and
the public abattoir. Those public structures occupy almost the
entire area of the land.
On August 8, 1977, a single application for the registration of two
distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before
the then CFI Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court).
One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for
registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land
containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was Heirs of Joaquin
Avendao, and the land they were applying for registration was a
parcel containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in
the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were
situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The applications were
approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. Antipolo
took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend
the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed.
234

On May 22, 1981, Antipolo filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) at

the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named Heirs of Joaquin
Avendao, and their assignees praying for nullification of the
judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in
their Answer, pleaded a special defense of res judicata. After a
preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense, the case
was dismissed. Antipolo perfected an appeal to the then Court of
Appeals. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court,
which Antipolo claimed it had not received. Upon motion of the
Avendao heirs to dismiss on the ground the Antipolo had not
filed its Brief within the reglementary period, the appeal was
dismissed on August 23, 1983 despite the fact that before the
dismissal, Antipolo had submitted its Appellants Brief. Antipolo
filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain.
Ruling:
The claim of the Avendao heirs that they merely tolerated
occupancy by Antipolo which had borrowed the disputed property
from them, since they had been in possession, since as far back
as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that
time. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands
until the contrary is established. The fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in their
names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does
not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership. Antipolo had also declared the disputed
property as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454.
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the application for registration of public property of Antipolo, its
Decision adjudicating the disputed property as of private
ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be
attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by
Antipolo for its annulment by reason of res judicata.
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the Avendao heirs must
235

also be held to be null and void.

REYES VS SIERRA
G.R. No. L-28658
Facts:
Vicente Reyes filed on January 3, 1961 an application for registration of his title to
a parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal covered by Plan Psu-189753 of the
Bureau of Lands which he acquired by inheritance from his father. An opposition
was filed by the Director of Lands, Francisco Sierra and Emilio Sierra together
with Alejandra, Felimon, Aurelio, Apolonio, Constancio, Cirilo, all surnamed
Sierra and Antonia Santos. The trial court declares Vicente Reyes the true and
rightful owner of the land and orders the registration of his title, provided that the
title to be issued shall be subject to a public easement of right of-way over a 2.00
meter-wide strip of the land along Lucay Street for the latter's widening and
improvement.
Oppositors appealed contending that the land applied for was originally owned by
Basilia Beltran's parents, and upon their death in 1894, Basilia inherited the
property. On April 19, 1926, Basilia Beltran, a widow, borrowed from applicant's
father, Vicente Reyes, Sr. the amount of P100.00 and secured the loan with the
piece of land in question. Applicant, in seeking the registration of the land, relied
on his belief that the property belongs to his father who bought the same from
Basilia Beltran. Oppositors contended that the words "isinangla," "na ipananagutan
sa inutang na halagang isang daang piso," "Kahit isangla o ipagbili," etc., manifest
that the document should be treated as a mortgage, antichresis, or pactum
commission and not as an absolute sale or pacto de retro sale.
Issue:
Whether the land was mortgaged or a subject to conditional sale
Ruling:
The Suprem Court held that the applicant's predecessor-ininterest is a mere mortgagee, and ownership of the thing
mortgaged is retained by Basilia Beltran, the mortgagor. The
mortgagee, however, may recover the loan, although the
mortgage document evidencing the loan was non-registrable
being a purely private instrument. Failure of mortgagor to redeem
the property does not automatically vest ownership of the
property to the mortgagee, which would grant the latter the right
to appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. The act of
applicant in registering the property in his own name upon
mortgagor's failure to redeem the property would amount to
236

a pactum commissorium which is against good morals and public

policy.
Meanwhile, oppositors-appellants are directed to pay the
applicant- appellee within ninety (90) days from the finality of
decision, the debt in the amount of P100.00 plus interest at the
rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from April 19, 1926 until paid.
HEIRS OF MARINA C. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO
C. REGALADO, REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C. REGALADO vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 168155

February 15, 2007

Facts:
Marina Regalado filed on July 14, 1987 an application for
registration of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio
Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The application was published on
November 14, 1988 in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to
withdraw the application without prejudice to the refiling of the
same, citing as grounds the discrepancies on the question of the
survey and accession number corresponding to the survey plan of
the property and for another reason that the inevitable absence of
applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate
estate of her late widowed sister whose children [were] all minors
in London.
The motion to withdraw the application was granted.
On March 17, 1992, Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier
application which was withdrawn. The court denied the petition on
a technical ground. Subsequently, Marina filed another application
for land registration before the Pasig RTC.
Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an "Amended Application for
Registration alleging, inter alia, that she had "by herself or
through her predecessor-in-interest
have been in open,
continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said land
which is alienable and disposable of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier"; and that she
237

acquired the land "by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated

January 3, 1977 executed by the registered claimant Tomas
Antero as Assignor in her favor.
The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on
March 15, 1994, it claiming to be the owner of the property which
it referred to as the "Balubad Nangka Project" and which had been
declared as an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation
No. 1967 dated May 14, 1980. While the case is pending, Marina
died as a result, her eldest son Arnulfo Regalado pursue the land
registration case in their behalf. Arnulfo Regalado executed a
Waiver of the "area covered by the National Housing Authority
without prejudice to the other land subject of the petition. In the
same Waiver, he ceded, transferred, and waived 30,239 square
meters of the property to the NHA.
Issue:
Whether Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner under a bona fide claim of
ownership to validly register said land?
Held:
Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear
the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain." This they failed
to discharge.
In addition, other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in
a previous attempt to have the property registered, there is not
proof to sustain the trial court's finding that Marina, her uncle,
aunt, and other relatives have been residing in the property for
more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there
for 15 years when a Tomas Antero executed the deed of
assignment in her favor.
In fine, the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner
under a bona fide claim of ownership fails.
Daclag v Macahilig
238

G.R. No. 159578 July 28, 2008

FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in
which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and
adjudication made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses
Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale, an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her
free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for
reconveyance. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the
respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper.The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of
ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title may be
introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel
One, covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half
portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she
239

sold the land to petitioners. An action for reconveyance prescribes

in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of
the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Records show that while the land was registered in the
name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for
reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus
still within the ten-year prescriptive period.
PEDRO R. SANTIAGO vs. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY
G. R. No. 156888
November 20, 2006
Facts:
Plaintiffs claim that co-petitioner Victoria Rodriguez is the sole
heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land
registered in his name under a certificate of title denominated as
Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree. Said
parcels of land were leased by Rodriguez to Santiago and Mateo
for a period of 50 years. By virtue of the contract Santiago is
occupying the land. The petitioners further alleged that defendant
having no authority to possess the land, defendant is still claiming
possessory rights over said property. And in fact defendant is
using the two parcels of land for commercial and other purposes.
To comply with her contractual commitments, Rodriguez now
desires to recover possession of the property from the defendant.
Lately, Santiago is informed by the agents of SBMA that he should vacate the
property because said defendant would need the same for its own use. SBMA
further alleged in its counter statement of facts that, Liwanag Santiago (wife of
Pedro Santiago) only availed of the housing units as a privilege for her being an
employee of SBMA. However, since the contract between Liwanag and SBMA
concluded and has not been renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee
of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the
SBMA Housing Policy, she and her family were asked to vacate and return
possession of the subject housing unit.
Issue:
240

Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of ownership of

lands?

Ruling:
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took
effect on 16 February 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their
lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No.
496) within six months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16
August 1976. If not, non-compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of
the real property.
The fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when
they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude
them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain
inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a
land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that Spanish titles
can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. And,
without legal or equitable title to the subject property, Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to
claim entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to that
upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the
extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert
right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.
REPUBLIC VS CA
73 SCRA 146
Facts:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
241

them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is
outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land
than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.
Issue:
Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged
area and whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area
is within the commerce of man.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold
the opinion of the respondent court that the term foreshore land
includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore
lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining
a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water
line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. The duty of the court is
to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
242

meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were
to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did
not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term
foreshore lands. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance
No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra
vires and null and void.
REPUBLIC VS SAYO
191 SCRA 71
FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela,
but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
Act No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato
Bayaua opposed such registration. An order of general default
was thereafter entered against the whole world except the
oppositors. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until
a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the
parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded
portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development, Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao &
Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, 5,500
hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the
Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares
were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The parties also
mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over
Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981, the
respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have
that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void
and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
243

ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy
in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land?
HELD:
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development
to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. It
was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for
approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal
counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that
"Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of
the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding
until they are actually received by the Solicitor General."
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null
and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however
indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that
the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by
competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge
complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration
Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court
of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings
therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter
rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC
G.R. No. 73246. March 2, 1993
Facts:
Land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf. Situated in
the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the area consists of 187,288 sq. m., more or
less. The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, as amended. The Republic of
244

the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that the
applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did
its predecessors possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the
filing of application. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant
is a private corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14. The Director of
Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within the
unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties also filed
their oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn. In an amended application,
Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from
Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment, there
was no republication. On 4 October 1979, the trial court rendered a decision
adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio Araneta. On appeal to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, the decision of the lower court was affirmed on 12
December1985. Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in granting registration in favor of private
respondent.
Held:
We are inclined to agree with petitioners that the amendment of the application
from the name of Pacific Farms Inc., as applicant, to the name of J. Antonio
Araneta Inc., was a mere attempt to evade disqualification.
Our Constitution, whether the 1973 or 1987, prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.
Apparently realizing such prohibition, respondent amended its application to
conform with the mandates of the law.
However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the absence of
republication of an amended application for registration is a jurisdictional flaw. We
should distinguish. Amendments to the application may be due to change in parties
or substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied
for.
In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as amended, nor Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, requires
republication and registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the
proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. On the other hand, republication is
required if the amendment is due to substantial change in the boundaries or
245

increase in the area of the land applied for.

REPUBLIC vs SAYO
Facts:
The respondent spouses filed an original application for
registration of a tract of land having an area of 33,950 hectares.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others. The case
dragged on for about twenty (20) years. The remaining area of
5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement,
adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of
Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were
assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in
payment of his attorney's fees. In a decision rendered on 1981,
the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms.
The Solicitor General contends that no evidence whatever was
adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for
registration; neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the
compromise agreement; as counsel of the Republic, he should
have been but was not given notice of the compromise
agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part
therein; that he was not even served with notice of the decision
approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently
erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate
remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents contended that the Solicitor General's
arguments are premised on the proposition that the disputed land
is public land, but it is not.
246

Issue:
Whether there was no evidence adduced by the parties in support
of their petitions for registration
Held:
Yes. There was no competent evidence adduced by the parties in
support of their petitions for registration.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to
the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is
based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But
that compromise agreement included private persons who had
not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the
land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in
controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had
presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part
of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise
agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a
totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not
submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to
ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among
themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library. But, as this Court has already had occasion to
rule, that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to
property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish
regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of
ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any
finding of the private character of the land in question.

247

It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment

approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void,
and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the
remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private
parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent
evidence their respective claims to the property.
The decision of the respondent Judge complained of is annulled
and set aside.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land
registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision
of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to
grant the application.
Issue:
Whether the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice
of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
Held:
YES. Petition was granted. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted
further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with. The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such
248

mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
room only for application. There is no alternative.
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ et,al. VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 77770
Facts:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M.
Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang,
Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father
of Consolacion).
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in petitioners' favor.
On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly
stating that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and
directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots
adjudicated in the decision of August 5, 1981.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the
Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the
land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents
issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land
Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of August 5,
1981 and the order of October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners
opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by
the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that
the decision of August 5, 1981 should be implemented because it
249

had long become final and executory.

After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting
aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated
October 6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this
recourse.
Issue:
Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and
executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set
aside.
Ruling:
Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after
judgment has become final and executory, the court shall
forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration
for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of
title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation
to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes
final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration
must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners
assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25
March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike
the adjudication of land in a cadastral
proceeding does not become final,
incontrovertibility until after the expiration
the entry of the final decree of registration.

ordinary civil actions,

or land registration
in the sense of
of one (1) year after

Petition denied.

MENDOZA VS. CA
250

84 scra 76
Facts:
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is
owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During pendency of the
application before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to Daniel
Cruz. The contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application
for land title. The registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the
registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the
usufructuary rights of Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz
to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be
cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that
the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz who was not
a party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.
Issue:

Whether the title can be dealt with in the name of a third party.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was proven that
Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz pursuant to their contract of
sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which
expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration
proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has
been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the
filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree
of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein
251

described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in
the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title,
in the same manner as if no application had been made. The interested party may,
however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of
presenting them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a motion that
the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to
the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a
said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer
or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. . . .
A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings.
The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the
court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in
relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the
case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that
these requirements have been complied with in this case.

JULIA CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
26 DECEMBER 1984, 133 SCRA 718

Facts:

Mariano De Vera died in 1951. His widow administered his

property until her death in 1966. De Veras nephew (Salvador
Estrada) took over as administrator of De Veras estate. Prior to
the widows death, she made an inventory showing that De Veras
property (located in Calasiao, Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m
(more or less). Estrada however noticed that the Torrens title
under De Vera indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m.
252

He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied

by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the
concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been
paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947
but it only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches
has set in.

Issue:

Whether the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De

Veras estate.

Ruling:

No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was

erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered
woman, agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the
purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime;
that when de Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that
of Juliana, the latters land was erroneously included.
The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her
inventory before she died, attested that de Veras portion of land
is only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates
the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the
only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is
that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A
recalculation must however be made to specify the exact
253

measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained

by Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m.
should go to de Veras estate.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-17696
Facts:
On November 19, 1926 a sales application was filed with the Bureau of Lands by
Benito Tolentino for a tract of public agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares,
situated in Barrio Callang Municipality of Gamu, Province of Isabela. In
accordance with the application, which was given number 8706, the land was
advertised for sale to the highest bidder and on February 15, 1928 was duly
awarded to the applicant pursuant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Public
Land Act On January 19, 1950, Tolentino having complied with the legal
requirements as to actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement of the area
applied for as well as the payment of the purchase price, the Director of Lands
signed the corresponding order for the issuance of a patent in his favor. Upon
investigation, however, the applicant discovered that a portion of the land covered
by his application with an area of 2.3506 hectares, specifically that portion
identified as Lot No. 8091 Pls-62, had been applied for as a homestead by the
herein defendant Braulio Cosme on March 22, 1949 and that Homestead Patent
No. V-19 had been issued to him by the Bureau of Lands on the following August
19, pursuant to which he obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-880 from the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Isabela on November 10, 1949.
The homestead settlement application had been filed with the now defunct
National Land Settlement administration pursuant to Executive Proclamation No.
610 promulgated in 1940, under which certain areas of public agricultural land in
Isabela were reserved for settlement purposes, and it was upon recommendation of
that office that the patent was issued by the Director of Lands.
Upon protest by Benito Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Lands, an investigation
was conducted by the District Land Officer for Isabela, and when it was verified
that the land covered by the homestead patent was embraced within the area
awarded to Tolentino in 1928, the Director of Lands filed the present action on
November 27, 1953, for the cancellation of the homestead patent and the original
certificate of title issued to the defendant Braulio Cosme.
Their principal contention is that after the certificate of title was issued on
November 10, 1949 by virtue of Homestead Patent No V-19 the land in question
254

came under the operation of the Land Registration Act as provided in Section 122
thereof, and that upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance, the
said title became incontrovertible.
Issue:
Whether the court can invalidate the lands covered by titles based on
homestead,free or sales patent.
Ruling:
No. Where a portion of a land subject of a land registration case are covered by
titles based on homestead, free or sales patent, the court cannot simply invalidate
them.
A certificate of title based on a patent, even after the expiration of
one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to certain
conditions and restriction.As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases
and after prior administrative investigations by the Director of
Lands, proper actions may be instituted by said official which may
lead to the cancellation of the patent and the title, and the
consequent reversion of the land to the Government.On the other
hand certificate of title issued pursuant to Act 2259, after the
lapse of one (1) year, becomes incontrovertible.The inescapable
conclusion, therefore, is that, while with the due registration and
issuance of a certificate of title over a land acquired pursuant to
the Public Land Law, said property becomes registered in
contemplation of Act 496,in view of its nature and manner of
acquisition, such certificate of title, when in conflict with one
obtained on the same date through judicial proceedings, must
give way to the latter.7
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the patent to
a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really
a part of the disposable land of the public domain (El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60
Phil. 22; Ramoso vs. Obligado, 70 Phil. 86 and others), and becomes indefeasible
and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance
thereof, ... a certificate of title, be it original or a duplicate, may only be ordered
cancelled under special circumstances, and one of them is when the title is void.
And a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person
applies for the registration of a land in his name although he knows that the
property belongs to another.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO
G.R. No. L-60413
255

Facts:
Spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original
application for registration of 33,950 hectares tract of land but
was opposed by the government including the Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua . The land was formerly part of Santiago, Isabela, but had
been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No.
236.
Then, an order of general default was entered against the whole
world except the oppositors.
After about 20 years, a compromise agreement was entered into
by the parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of
Casiano Sandoval renounced their claims and ceded
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341
hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares;
and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000
hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was adjudicated to
and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Sandoval, but
out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees.
The respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement
and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms.
The applicants for registration presented a mere photocopy
of a certification of the National Library stating that the
property in question was registered under the Spanish
system of land registration as private property. But, that
Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property,
256

it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish

regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of
ownership.
Issues:
Whether the Registration Court correctly rendered decision based
from the
compromise agreement of the parties.
Whether informacion posesoria is a prima facie evidence of
possession.
Ruling:
The compromise agreement and the judgment approving it is
declared null and void.
The decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties but such included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their
ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding.
Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or
entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their
ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider
the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking
part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has
been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons
who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their
pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement
among themselves that they had rights and interests over the
land.
Under the Spanish Mortgage Law, informacion posesoria was
considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to
two conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of
Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of the land for 20 years; but where, as here, proof of
257

fulfillment of these conditions is absent.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS et.al. VS HON. SALVADOR C.
REYES
G.R. No. L-27594
Facts:
On February 24, 1964, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee
simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title
under Act 496, as amended, of a vast tract of land, situated at the municipality of
Laur, province of Nueva Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military
reservation of Fort Magsaysay.
The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without
sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said
land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under
Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the President.
The applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties,
requesting that the Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation be
considered as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests,
ownership and dominion over the property subject matter of the application. The
motion was granted by the lower court.
It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the
area reserved for military purposes under Proclamation No. 237, dated December
19, 1955, of the President. The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and
thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber of commercial quantities.
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a
possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5, 1895,
and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to
his daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate
the land thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death sometime in
1944.
On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel
of land applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to be registered in favor of:
(a) Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, a
258

Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with

address at Manila, Philippines, two-thirds (2/3) portion, subject to
the rights of Ariosto Santos and
(b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit,
Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property.

The oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the

Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the
said decision to the Supreme Court.
By an order, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file
an Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain
orders and pleadings, within ten days from receipt of the order.
On March 16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed
and copies served upon the appellees.
Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant
Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a
motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending
appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion
for the issuance of a decree of registration. Both motions were
opposed by the Government.
On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of
November 19, 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C.
Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the
entire land, one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C.
Tamayo, and two-thirds (2/3) pro indiviso in favor of Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation, subject to the final
outcome of the appeal.
On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued
Decree No. 113485 pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15,
1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No.
0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija.
On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record
259

on Appeal which, together with the evidence and transcripts, was

forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal.
As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing
the issuance of a decree of registration, the petitioners instituted
before the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary injunction, seeking to nullify the order
dated March 11, 1967, the decree of registration issued pursuant
thereto and Original Certificate of Title of the Register of Deeds
for the province of Nueva Ecija.

Issue:

Whether the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its

jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration
despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

Ruling:

The appeal taken by the Government was from the entire

decision, which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the
whole decision.
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not
applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled
into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which
may be reversed on appeal.
260

A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is

a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only
after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and
executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of
Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire
decision a quo.

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ et,al. VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 77770
Facts:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M.
Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang,
Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father
of Consolacion).
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in petitioners' favor.
On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly
stating that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and
directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots
adjudicated in the decision of August 5, 1981.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the
Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the
261

land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents

issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land
Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of August 5,
1981 and the order of October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners
opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by
the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that
the decision of August 5, 1981 should be implemented because it
had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting
aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated
October 6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this
recourse.
Issue:
Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and
executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set
aside.
Ruling:
Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after
judgment has become final and executory, the court shall
forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration
for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of
title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation
to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes
final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration
must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners
assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25
March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike
the adjudication of land in a cadastral
proceeding does not become final,
incontrovertibility until after the expiration

ordinary civil actions,

or land registration
in the sense of
of one (1) year after
262

the entry of the final decree of registration.

Petition denied.
CAYANAN V. DE LOS SANTOS
21 SCRA 1348
Facts:
The title of appellee De Los Santos to Lot 56 of Porac Cadastre was confirmed by
Judge Santos of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
In the same year, there was a petition for review for the said lot. It was alleged that
said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos through actual fraud,
through deceit and through intentional omission of facts. It was stated further that a
simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent
appellee, Felix Camaya.
It prayed further for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of
the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and
the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan,
however it was denied.
Issue:
Whether the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when granted
Ruling:
Yes, it may.
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of one year filed for
the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it.
HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. DE BANUVAR
G.R. No. L-22110.
FACTS:
On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the
263

titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with

certain reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in
favor of the latter.On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the
successors-in- interest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for
reconstitution of the decision of March 24, 1938. During the
pendency of the reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De
Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga, who was thus
substituted as a party for the latter.
However, the petitioners opposed the application for the
reconstitution, on a claim that they have been in actual, adverse,
open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said
parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial, long
before the World War II, and have introduced improvements
thereon. They prayed that the application for the reconstitution of
records be denied and that "the parcels of land in question be
ordered registered in the respective names of the herein
oppositors or declare the same as public land and be subdivided
to oppositors who are landless." On June 13, 1963 the respondent
court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De Banuvar
with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the
land registration case had already become final and executory.
Moreover, the court issued another order granting a writ of
possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who
have entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the
issuance of the decree."
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the order is proper.
RULING:
In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution, the petitioners'
alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior
to or during the registration proceedings. For this reason, the
order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar
against the petitioners, is proper and justified. The petitioners
herein admittedly took possession and occupation of portions of
lot 1 prior to July 1, 1963 when the decree in question was issued.
264

The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued

not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case
and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also
against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at
any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act
similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment
in civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to
be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,
the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge
and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of
the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person
in whom the land is ordered to be registered.
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA,et al. VS. ANGEL
ALBANO,et al.
G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988
Facts:
On July 31, 1941, CFI Ilocos Norte rendered a decision in Cadastral
Proceeding No. 44 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No.
9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino.One of the oppositors was Ruperta
Pascual, who was declared in default. However, the decree of
registration was only issued on October 14, 1955; and it was only
on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title was
issued in Delfina Aquino's name.On August 11, 1970, Eufemia
Barroga and Saturnina Padaca,the children and heirs of Ruperta
Pascual, brought suit in the same Court of First Instance praying
265

that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, and that title
be adjudicated in their favor. Barroga's and Padaca's complaint
was denied by the court. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance
ordered execution of the judgment on December 6, 1973. On
August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an order
granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession
as regards Lot No. 9821. A writ of possession dated August 28,
1975 was issued. The plaintiffs appealed. The motion was
thereafter denied by the court by Order dated September 22,
1975. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Court could still issue orders despite lapse of long
period of time from entry of judgment.
Held:
The judgment of the cadastral court was a judgment in rem,
binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not
parties thereto, and particularly upon those who had actually
taken part in the proceeding as well as their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity. The writ of possession could properly
issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that had
elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to
the same does not prescribe. The appellees are entitled to said
writ of possession, despite the lapse of many years, their right
thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who
were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest.
MAMERTA DE LA MERCED VS.COURT OF APPEALS
5 SCRA 240
Facts:
Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) is claiming ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal
Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court in favor of his father.
Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership
266

over said property as evidenced by an OCT issued to their predecessor Juan de la

Merced and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to
intervene and make common cause with the defendants. The court rendered a
decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding the lot was part of the OCT in the
name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of
plaintiff Ezequiel Santos. The cadastral court declared the lot a public land, as a
consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing a homestead application
therefor, was able to obtain Original Certificate of Title. Holding that the cadastral
court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land, and,
therefore, the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and
void, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT in the name of Juan de la Merced;
directed defendants to vacate Lot. While the court held that the land having ceased
to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to
grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, Plaintiffs
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.. Hence, the filing of the instant
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession.
Ruling:
A decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496,
are two different things. And it is the decree of registration, to be
issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the
basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the
corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the
land. The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner
upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or
adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal
having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be
necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent
disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer
be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering
the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title
over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him
of the said property had already become final, and there being no
imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of
ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of
267

the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and
purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which
could not be acquired by adverse possession.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. BUSUEGO

12 SCRA 678

Facts:
Teodora Busuego applied for a decree of registration of the Lot No. 2497, Gapan
Cadastre. A decree of registration was issued in favor of the applicant. Within one
year from the issuance of the decree, the spouses Amando Joson and Victoria
Balmeo filed in the same proceeding, a petition for the setting aside of said decree
and the cancellation of the certificate issued thereunder, on the ground that the
decision ordering the decree was obtained by Busuego by misrepresenting herself
to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, petitioners, through their predecessorin-interest, were owners of one-half thereof, having acquired the same by purchase
from Teodora's mother, Fausta Busuego. In a separate petition, Antonio and
Rogelio Busuego, children of a deceased brother of Teodora, also prayed for the
same relief on the allegation that their father was an undivided co-owner (with
Teodora) of one-half of Lot 2497, having acquired the same by descent from their
father, Severino Busuego.
The court dismissed the said petitions for the reason that its
jurisdiction as a cadastral court being special and limited, it has
no authority to pass upon the issues raised in the pleadings.
Hence, the present appeal by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the decreed issued in favor of the respondent Busuego is final.
RULING:
It has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does
not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of
the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of
one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
268

court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the
land to another.
... As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and
the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not
elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision
therein rendered continues to be under control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it. Such is the ruling laid down in
the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa (48 Phil. 227), which was
later reiterated in that of Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs.
Philippine Railway Co. and Reynes(49 Phil. 546). ... ( Afalla et al v.
Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622).
In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year
from the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section
38 of Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that
rendered the decision and granted the said decree.

ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO

FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED
TERESA MALABANAN
G.R. NO. 173289, FEBRUARY 17, 2010

Facts:
On March 1998, respomdents filed with the RTC of Tagaytay a complaint for
Quieting of Title with Preliminary Injunction against the petitioner, Eland Phil. Inc.
Respondents contended that they are the owners, in fee simple, of a parcel of land
which was already registered by the petitioner, in fact was already awarded an
OCT for it.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case alleging that the pleading asserting the claim
stated no cause of action and that the respondents are not entitled to the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. After a series of several motions and delays
(postponements), the RTC granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the
respondents on August 1999. The lower court nullified the title held by the
269

petiotioners, and was ordered to be cancelled including the tax declaration

covering the subject land.
The petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on February 2006, but was
dismissed by the said court.
Issue:
Whether a summary judgment is the proper remedy in quieting of title.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that a summary judgment, as provided under Rule 35 of
the 1997 Rules of Procedure, is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise
issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such issues are not genuine.Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that
summary judgment covers any action with the exemption of actions for annulment
of marriage or declaration of its nullity or legal separation.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to clearly
demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They merely reiterated their
averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised by
the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam.
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs cause of action
for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in
the substitution of their landholdings
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of
the basic pleadings, the observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to
prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in
accordance with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended,
Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for summary
judgment have been duly disputed and contested by petitioner, raising genuine
issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded
by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot
take the place of trial. In the present case, the petitioner was able to point out the
genuine issues. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact that requires the presentation
270

of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.

Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a
common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only
when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding,
which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
a cloud is thereby cast on the complainants title to real property or any interest
therein.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff
must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject of
the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority
and period of one year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to
be under the control and sound discretion of the registration court. After the lapse
of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to
reopening or review.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review
the decree of registration refers to the decree of registration described in Section
31, which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and
distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is
not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the
grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where
petitioners acquired their interest in the land before any final
decree had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still
pending and, in these circumstances, they can hardly be
considered innocent purchasers in good faith.

Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within the one-year
271

period from entry of the decree, it is error for the court to deny the petition without
hearing the evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon
which the petition is predicated. The petitioner should be afforded an opportunity
to prove such allegation.
The Supreme court granted the petitioners review and reversed and set aside the
ruling of the lower court.

BOLANOS VS JM TUASON & CO.

37 SCRA 223, 1971
Facts:
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appealed the order dated September 9,
1965 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X in LRC Rec.
No. 7581, Quirino Bolaos, et als., petitioners, versus J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., et al., respondents, which granted the petition of
Quirino Bolanos and ordered herein respondents-appellants (J.M.
Tuason & co. ) their agents and all persons acting for the in their
behalf as well as all other from disturbing the physical possession
of Bolanos of the parcel of land comprising of 13.26 hectares and
included in the area covered by TCT Nos. 37677 & 37686. The
petition of Bolanos not to be disturbed in their physical possession
was upon the ground that in the three other civil cases Nos.
3621, 3622 and 3623 of the same Court of First Instance of Rizal,
the said court has rendered a decision, still pending appeal,
declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the two
above-mentioned titles have been derived null and void,
principally for want of jurisdiction of the court that issued said
original title on account of defects in the publication of the notices
of the proceedings for their registration.
In a previous case filed by appellant Tuason against appellees for
the recovery of the possession of said land (Tuason vs. Bolaos,
93 Phil. 106), wherein appellees Bolanos had alleged among their
defenses that appellant Tuason's titles were obtained "thru fraud
or error and without knowledge (of) or notice, either personal or
272

thru publication to" said appellees, this Court upheld the validity
of the questioned titles and affirmed the decision of the trial court
"declaring defendant (now appellee Bolaos) to be without any
right to the land in question and ordering him to restore
possession thereof to plaintiff (now appellant) Tuason."
Issue:
Whether or not the land registration court has jurisdiction to hear
and to resolve issues of possession, in any of its aspects, after
the original registration proceedings have come to an end and a
writ of possession has already been issued?
Ruling:
No. The appealed order of September 9, 1965 is declared to have
been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the court a quo and it is
hereby declared null and void and set aside.
Once a land registration proceeding is terminated and a
corresponding decree has been issued, the only matter of
possession of the land involved that remains within the
jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court is in regard to the
issuance of the writ of possession, if one should be needed. No
provision of the Land Registration Act (Act 496). Section 112 of
Act 496 which is the only provision in the said law empowering
the land registration court to issue post or after-registration orders
refers exclusively to amendments and alterations of the title
issued and has nothing to do with possession of the land at all.
HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. DE BANUVAR
G.R. No. L-22110. September 28, 1968
FACTS:
On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the
titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with
certain reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in
favor of the latter. On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the
successors-in- interest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for
273

reconstitution of the decision of March 24, 1938. During the

pendency of the reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De
Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de Erquiaga, who was thus
substituted as a party for the latter. However, the petitioners
opposed the application for the reconstitution, on a claim that
they have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted
possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of
owners since time immemorial, long before the World War II, and
have introduced improvements thereon. They prayed that the
application for the reconstitution of records be denied and that
"the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the
respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as
public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless." On
June 13, 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a
decree in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after
finding that the decision in the land registration case had already
become final and executory. Moreover, the court issued another
order granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar and
"against all persons who have entered and occupied portions of
lot 1, Psu-56145 before the issuance of the decree."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the order is proper.
RULING:
In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution, the petitioners'
alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior
to or during the registration proceedings. For this reason, the
order of granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar
against the petitioners, is proper and justified. The petitioners
herein admittedly took possession and occupation of portions of
lot 1 prior to July 1, 1963 when the decree in question was issued.
The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued
not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case
and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also
against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at
any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act
274

similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment

in civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. There is nothing
in the law that limits the period within which the court may order
or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of
a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to
issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been
filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land
is ordered to be registered.

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONRDAY FARMS,

INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
161 SCRA 56
Facts:
Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered by certificates of
title and registration decrees under three (3) different entities, namely Morris
Carpo, Quezon City Devt. and Financing Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. (Realty). Thus, Carpo instituted a complaint before the CFI under
Respondent Judge Vera against Realty and Macondray Farms, Inc. (Macondray)
for the declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title, on the ground
that the same was issued by a court not sitting as a land registration court but one
of ordinary jurisdiction, and that the judge had no authority since the records which
was made basis of the title was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution;
In reply, Realty denied the allegations and countered that the Reyes Court which
issued its title was performing a purely ministerial duty, and that it was Carpos
title that was null for having been issued despite being covered by another title.
Realty further impleaded through a third-party complaint QCDF for nullity of its
own title covering the same subject properties;
In reply, QCDF filed a fourth-party complaint against Alvendia, et al. being the
source of its own title, praying therefor for the reimbursement of its purchase price
paid for the said properties. However, the same was dismissed for QCDFs lack of
275

interest in prosecuting the case;

On January 20, 1981, the trial court rendered judgment annulling Realtys and
QCDFs titles to the property in favor of Carpo. The same was appealed before the
High Court by Realty, but the latter resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals
for determination of the merits; and
The CA in turn set aside the trial courts decision and issued a new one in favor of
Realty. However, the case was subjected to the reorganization of the Judiciary,
from which resulted a re-raffling of the case and later on, a reversal of the prior
decision through Carpos MR. Further, the change from CA to IAC yielded a
change in Justices assigned to the case.
Issues:
1.Whether the Special Third Civil Cases Division was conferred with jurisdiction
to try and render a decision of final resolution for the Court;
2. Whether a Petition for Certiorari was the proper remedy in the case;
3.Whether Carpos title is valid as against Realtys and QCDFs , since Realtys
title was issued when the records relative thereto was undergoing reconstitution;
4. Whether Carpo was an innocent purchaser for value; and
5. Whether QCDF was properly impleaded to the case.
Ruling:
1. Yes. A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129 prohibits is
appointment from one class of divisions to another class. For instance, a Justice
appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases
Divisions. Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth
Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil
Cases Division. The two therefore come from the same class of divisions to which
they were appointed. Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form
the Special Third Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two
(2) "regular" members, is still within legal bounds
2. Yes. There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First
Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal
either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on
certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the latter category belong cases in which only
errors or questions of law are involved. Each of these modes have different
procedural requirements. x x x Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with
this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera
Court, and asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court as it was raising
only questions of law. However, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits
of the appeal. " It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition
first filed as an appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After as, a
276

petition for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People v. Resuello L30165, August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35). x x x Thus it was error for the IAC to hold
that the Decision of the Vera Court "cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court
of Appeals decision because appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy."
Precisely, petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way of
certiorari;
3. No. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the
parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to go back to
the preceding stage where records are available. The land registration case itself
remained pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have
jurisdiction over it. The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an
that remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office
to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an
Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final
(See Government v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111
Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134
Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of the
decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan
Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report of the
decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A final order of
adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of registration.;
4. No. x x x Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent
purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of good faith under
Article 527 of the Civil Code. x x x Carpo bought the disputed property from the
Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before
Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. However, it
was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in favor of the
Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and
that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the same day, October 13,
1970, that the deed evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was
inscribed in the Registry of Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was
cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was
issued. x x x Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo
could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value.
Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better position than
his predecessors-in-interest;
5. Yes. Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party
complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the relief
being sought by the latter from the former is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy
considerations and the factual circumstances of the case compel this Court now to
277

rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property.** To rule on QCDFC's

claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting claims
over the property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity, and exercised
its right, to prove its claim over the land. It presented documentary as well as
testimonial evidence. It was even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which,
however, was dismissed since it failed to prosecute its case.
MANOTOK VS. BARQUE
G.R. NOS. 162335 & 162605
Facts:
Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar,
the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order
of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
The subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and
is located in QC.
On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the
Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The
certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No.
614. The Estate was placed under the administration of the
Director of Lands.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began
after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11,
1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register
of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an
area of 342,945 square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) was issued in 1991.
In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the
LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the
name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their
petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners
duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and
a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.
MANOTOK opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to
land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2
278

parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while

TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land,
with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
In 1997 Barques petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already
registered in the name of the Manotoks.
--> Barques MR was
denied They appealed to the LRA LRA Reversed.
LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was
fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted.
BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent
jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.
The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for
immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques
appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and
sought the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the
subject property.
In 2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed
the RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to
reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and existing TCT No.
210177.
Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which
were ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.December 12,
2005, SC First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA.
Manotoks filed MR Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second
MR with their MR attached. Denied in June 2006 Resolution.
Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of
Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed
multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the
judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer
Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set
motion for oral arguments). Case was referred to the En Banc
in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan
filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in
intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest,
Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering
Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the
documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were
279

purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division

of the LMB recommended to the Director of the LMB the
reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state
Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
In 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1 st division
decision and entry of judgment recalled and the CAs Amended
Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and
set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue
of WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid
alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate,
which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the
Maotoks should be annulled.
CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid
alienation of Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the Friar Lands
Act. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks
is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as
required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the
factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating
to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the
claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks - Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the
Government in 1919. They have since occupied the land, built
their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as
Manotok Compound.
Barques - Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from
Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans - The lot originally belonged to his parents but was
subsequently bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on the
property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just
declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right over Lot No. 823?
Ruling:
280

Manotok Appeal denied

Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are
NULL and VOID. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or
Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the
Philippines w/o prejudice to Reversion proceedings
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be
valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence
that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the
Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce).
In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their
photocopy of the original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced
from the National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly
imprinted typewritten name over the words Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and
above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may
be a stamp of the Secretarys approval.
The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the RDs task in issuing the TCT in the Manotoks
name. The Manotoks contend that we can assume that the
Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the
Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT
No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok. FURTHER,
the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the
presumption of validity in the performance of official duty,
Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27,
2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the
omission of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks
and the Manahans, states that some Deeds of Conveyance on
281

record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretarys
signature despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are
deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that
the applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all
the requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that
the Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had
fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!)
Their basis is SECTION 15 of the Friar Lands Act.
Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks
contention however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias,
the
conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the socalled certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the
property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale
may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full.
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of
the certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the
purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be
signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as
evident from Sections 11, 12 and the 2nd paragraph of Section
15, in relation to Section 18.
Re: Manotoks, could not have acquired ownership of the subject
lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the
Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their
payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings, are
of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably
failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the
name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the
purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to
why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record
of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry
of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds
of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented as
DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No.
22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the
year of issuance and name of registered owner.
282

Re: Manahans, No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can
be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National
Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by
Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no
competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan
or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared
the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. AND MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION
VS.CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 123346
Facts:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 994 which in turnencompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast
tract of land stretches over three (3) cities withinMetropolitan Manila, comprising
an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.CLT Realty
Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok EstateCorporatio
n (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLTs claim was
anchored on TransferCertificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolitos
title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title
appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT,
claiming that Dimsons title,the proximate source of CLTs title, was irregularly
issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing
therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26
and claimed that they derivedit from several awardees and/or vendees of the
National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise tracedas its primary source
OCT No. 994.The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was
denied.
Issue:
Whether the title issued in the name of CLT valid.
283

Ruling:
It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsons
that the properties they purport to coverwere " originally registered on 19
April 1917 in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994
registered on 19 April 1917 hadactually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to
submit such proof but it did not.The established legal principle in actions for
annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking itshould establish not
merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that
theland sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to recover, the property must
be identified, and the plaintiffmust rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim.Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the
burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action forannulment of title and
recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of
theiroriginal complaints before the trial court.As it appears on the record, OCT No.
994, the mother title was received for transcription by the Register ofDeeds on 3
May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April
1917.Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of
transcription of the decree into theOriginal Certificate of Title. Thus, such date
cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when thetitle took effect. It
appears that the transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received by
theRegister of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917here is a marked distinction between
the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entryof the decree
is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of
title is madeby the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in pursuance
of the decree of registration. It wasstressed that what stands as the certificate of the
title is the transcript of the decree of registration made bythe registrar of deeds in
the registry.Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register
of deeds that the certificate of title isto take effect.Hence, any title that traces its
source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title
isinexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994
dated 17 April 1917 casts doubton the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient toinvalidate the CLT claims
over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the
datesappearing on their respective titles.The Court hereby constitutes a Special
Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on remand.In ascertaining which
of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to
makefurther determinations based on the evidence already on record and such
other evidence as may be presentedat the proceedings before it.
284

MANOTOK VS HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,

G.R. NOS. 162335 & 162605
AUGUST 24, 2010
Facts:
Lot No. 823 is a part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar
Land acquired by the Philippine Government from the Philippine
Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola
de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the
Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as
indicated in Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26,
1904. The Piedad Estate has been titled in the name of the
Government under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 and
was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.
After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the
Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the
1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. The decision
of the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the
decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the
Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26,
2006.
The Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales
Certificate No. 511 covering the lot No 823.
On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc
resolution that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the
1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with
1 abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions
of the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for
further proceedings to determine the validity of the Manotoks
title.
In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on
whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid
alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate,
which was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise
allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may
285

have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the

Manotok title.
Issue:
Whether the absence of approval of the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No.
1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 warrants the annulment
of the Manotok title.
Ruling:
Yes, the absence of approval of the Secretary of
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate
1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of
Manotoks predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of
Manotok title.

the
No.
the
the

Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) was
not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary
of the Interior. Exhibits 33 and 34-OSG-LMB contained only the
signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly
secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932 (Exh. 51-A)
which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of
Lands.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides:
SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (Emphasis supplied.)

Vencilao vs. Vano

182 SCRA 491
Facts:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same
parties and parcels of land in question.
286

1) In the first case, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an
application for registration of the subject parcel of land, which
resulted in an OCT. After the heirs tried to take possession of the
property, a reconveyance of property was filed against them by
Vencila et al., asserting that:
a. They have acquired the land by purchase or inheritance and
in
OCEN
possession
for
30
years
b. The parcels of land that they own were by mistake part of Juan
Reyes estate
2) The second case involved the death of the administratix of the
estate of the owners/heirs of the land. After her death, a TCT was
issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in the
name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the
trial court against petitioners.
3) The third case involved one of the registered owners of the
land who filed a petition for complaint against the occupants who
refused to vacate the land and sign the Sheriffs return.
The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case of
reconveyance stating that the other parties had no cause of
action and that they were barred by prior judgement already.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, then set aside the
same order, and then reversed itself partially (some cases were
dismissed, some were not -- since there were several petitioners).
The parties whose cases were dismissed appealed to the SC.
These petitioners contend that they were not claimantsoppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration
case, as their names dont appear in the amended application for
registration. They argue that they have occupied the parcels of
land for more than 30 years which began long before the
application for registration and that even after registration, they
continued to possess the land.

Issue/s:

287

-Whether or not res judicata is applicable in an action for

reconveyance
-Whether or not the writ of possession may be issued against
them considering that the petitioners were not the defeated
parties in the registration case
Held:
1. No. Res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including
land registration and cadastral proceedings. A final judgment is
conclusive even in subsequent cases involving the same parties
and their successors-in-interest as long as the ff. requisites are
present:
a.
The
former
judgment
must
be
final
b. Rendered by a court having jurisdiction on the subject matter
and
of
the
parties
c.
The
judgment
was
based
on
the
merits
d. There is identity of parties, subj matter, and cause of action
between the first and second actions (Land registration and action
for reconveyance)
2. Yes. A writ of possession may be issued not only against a
person who has been defeated in a registration case but also
against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to
the
issuance
of
the
final
decree.
Note: In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of
the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily
carries with it the right of ownership (right to possess-may be
obtained through writ of possession).
On the issue of contempt, the court ruled that the occupants were
not guilty. Contempt only applies when after the sheriff dispossess
or eject the occupants, they enter/attempt to enter the property.
It was the sheriffs and not the petitioners fault that there was
delivery of possession was unsuccessful.

288

Bernas vs Nuevo 127 SCRA 399

G.R. No. L-58438 & G.R. No. L-60423
FACTS:
Heirs of Pascual Bellosillo and Francisca Besa, represented by
Silvestre Bellosillo, petitioners in G.R. No. 60423, filed a complaint
against defendants Edilberto Bernas, Baldonera Bulquirin and
Teofilo Berano for recovery of possession of a 33 1/3 hectare
parcel of land of the Panay Cadastre and for the issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction to restore the plaintiffs to the possession
of the land in dispute. The motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction having been denied, the plaintiffs
subsequently filed another motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession on the ground that the same is paramount for the
prevention of the estate represented by Lot 3382, otherwise it will
be dissipated and the plaintiffs as heirs might have nothing to
inherit, while the defendants have not shown any definite title or
right over the estate as they had first claimed that they were
lessees then later, tenants, which are two incompatible and
divergent sources of right.
On August 28, 1981, Judge Pelayo Nuevo granted the writ of
possession applied for by plaintiffs after pre-trial and hearing of
the motion for the issuance of said writ. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by defendants but the same was not
acted upon due to the retirement of Judge Nuevo. Hence, the
defendants filed the petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the sala
vacated by Judge Nuevo was filled through the appointment of
Judge Oscar Leviste. While the petition assailing the order
granting the writ of possession was pending before this Court,
Judge Leviste, on December 8, 1981, acted on the motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendants (Bernas) on September
12, 1981 and issued an order declaring null and void the writ of
possession issued by former Judge Nuevo. In a subsequent order
dated April 20, 1982, the same Judge also ordered the defendants
to be place in possession of the property in question, Lot 3382.
Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed, this time by the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No.
289

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Nuevo and Judge Leviste erred in granting the writ of possession
filed by the parties.
Ruling:
The Court held that when parties against whom a writ of possession is sought have
been in possession of the land for at least ten years, and they entered into
possession apparently after the issuance of the final decree, and none of them had
been a party in the registration proceedings, the writ of possession will not issue. A
person who took possession of the land after final adjudication of the same in
registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession
secured by a mere motion and that regardless of any tittle or lack of title of persons
to hold possession of the land in question, they cannot be ousted without giving
them their day in court in proper independent proceedings. In the case at bar, the
defendants-petitioners had been in possession of the lot since 1960 under an
alleged lease contract and were not a party to the original registration case of the
same way back in 1930. This notwithstanding, the writ was issued after pre-trial
and hearing of the motion for the issuance of the writ only and not after final
adjudication of the rights of the parties over the lot in controversy. Therefore, it
was a patent error on the part of respondent Judge Nuevo to issue the questioned
writ. The rule is "when other persons have subsequently entered the property,
claiming the right of possession, the owner of the registered property or his
successors in interest cannot dispossess such persons by merely asking for a writ of
possession. The remedy is to resort to the courts of justice and institute a separate
action for unlawful entry or detainer or for reinvidicatory action, as the case may
be." The act of Judge Leviste issuing the orders constituted disrespect and
disregard of the authority and jurisdiction of this Court. He should have waited for
this Court's decision before acting on said motion for reconsideration and issuing
the said orders.
LUCERO V. LOOT
G.R. No. L-16995
Facts:
Julio Lucero filed and was granted a writ of possession of property (based on a
final decree in a land registration proceeding). Although the other party filed a
motion to quash the writ, this was granted by CFI Iloilos Judge Fernan.
The Loots opposed the decision on the ground that there were defects in the
reconstitution of the records and that the motion was not under oath. The court
dismissed these as trivial arguments. Two motions for reconsideration were also
denied. The writ of possession prayed for was issued in favor of Lucero.
The Loots went straight to the Supreme Court for an appeal for certiorari.
290

Issue:
Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with
law.
Ruling:
Yes, the order granting the writ of possession was based on a decision promulgated
on a land registration case in 1938, which became a final decree on October 29,
1941.
After the final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only a ministerial
duty of the court if no writ has been issued to the registered owner yet. The final
decree, in effect, immediately empowered the court to enforce the
order/judgment/decree. This automatic process is to avoid further delay and
inconvenience to a successful land registration litigant if he were compelled to
commence another action to secure possession.
Furthermore, there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession.The writ may be issued not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case, but also against anyone adversely occupying the
land or any portion of the land. Even fraud shall not be a bar to the issuance of the
writ of possession, which necessarily implied the delivery of possession of the
land. As to the questions of fact raised by the Loots, the SC can do nothing. These
must be raised at the CA of appeals; otherwise, the parties contesting the facts are
deemed to have waived the opportunity to question the correctness of the findings.
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA AND SATURNINA
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE PACADA, VS.
ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION
ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND,
JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, ASSISTED BY HER
HUSBAND, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO
ALBANO, AND PEDRO ALBANO, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES.
RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF SALA
I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS
NORTE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. L-43445 JANUARY 20, 1988
Facts:
On July of 1941, a decision was rendered adjudicating a parcel of land in favour of
Delfina Aquino. However, the decree of registration was not issued except until
after 14yrs and only after 24 yrs had passed that an OCT was issued in favour of
the latter.
291

On august of 1970(after the decree has been issued but before title), the children
and heirs of Ruperta Pascual (oppositors to the cadastral proceeding) brought a suit
againsts the children of Delfina Aquino, the appellees.
The appellants argued that they had been in possession of the said land since 1941
an rayed that a new title be made out in their names. Parenthetically, it shows that
the Aquinos title encroached upon a 4sq.m. portion of adjoining land which
belongs to Cesar Castro. Subsequently, Castro filed a complaint of intervention to
recover the said land.
A judgemtn has been rendered awarding the 4sw.m. portion of overlapped land to
Castro and dismissing the complaint filed by the Barrogas and Padacas.
Thereafter, at the instance of defendant Angel Albano, et. Al (heirs of Delfina
Aquino), the court ordered executon of judgemtn. However, the Barroga and
Padacas moved to quash said writ, stating that there was nothing to execute since
the verdict was simply one of dismissing the complaint. The matter apparently
ended. No further development anent this case appears in the record. However, the
record shows that on August of 1975 the Cadastral Court promulgated an order
granting the motion of Angel albano et. Al. for a writ of possesson to the said land
and was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days from entry of
judgment
Ruling:
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court
in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., ruling that:
(1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a
cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496),
or his successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the
title of the land, but also to its possession;"
(2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a
writ of possession as against any "party to the registration
proceeding and who is directly and personally affected and
reached by the decree" (or who had been served with process
therein but had not appeared nor answered); and
(3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of
judgments, since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines
have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
292

"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years

later, "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against
the original oppositors in a land registration case and their
representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any
person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time
before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed
out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a
decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et
al. to the following effect:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except
insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after
the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment. ... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the
Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to
enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership
by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After
the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceedings to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act
similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment
in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. ...
... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which
the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the
293

judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to

be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,
the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge
and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of
the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion
therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person
in whom the land is ordered to be registered.
JULIO LUCERO VS. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-16995, OCTOBER 28, 1968
Facts:
The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero stating that the writ
of possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of
possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor
of the registered owner. There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a
writ of possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it
follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered owner.
This was opposed to by oppositors Loot contending that there are defects in the
reconstitution of the records and that the motion is not under oath is trivial in its
nature and consequently untenable. The court didnt see any merit in the
same. Consequently, a writ of possession was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with
law.
Ruling:
A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has
been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying
the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings. The issuan
ce
of the decree of registration is part of the
registration proceedings. Consequently, any
person unlawfully and adversely
occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject
to a judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the
duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked by the
successful
claimant.

294

If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the
possession of the land to the successful litigant, a writ of demolition must,
likewise issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the
latter, which, without said writ of execution would be ineffective.
JULIO LUCERO VS. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-16995 OCTOBER 28, 1968
Facts:
The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero. This was
opposed to by oppositors Loot, but the court didnt see any merit in the
same. A motion for reconsideration was filed three times, however it was all
denied. Then an appeal was filed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is prescription with regard to the issuance of a writ of
possession.
Ruling::
Regarding the writ of possession, once the final decree has been issued the
issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has
been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is no period of prescription as
to the issuance of a writ of possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has
already been entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor
of the registered owner.
In Demorar v. Ibaez it was decided that: ".. a writ of possession may be issued not
only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also
against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land
registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the
registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings.
Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time
up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by
means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue
said writ when asked for by the successful claimant." As a matter of fact, in a 1948
decision, it was held by us that "the fact that the petitioners have instituted, more
than one year after the decree of registration had been issued, an ordinary action
with the Court of First Instance attacking the validity of the decree on the ground
of fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied for by the
295

registered owners."
Moreover, in Marcelo vs Mencias it was held that If the writ of possession issued
in a land registration implies the delivery of the possession of the land to the
successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise issue, especially
considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without
said writ of execution would be ineffective.

EMILLANO GAWARAN, MAGDALENA GAWARAN ET AL, VS.

HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
ALEJANDRO C. SILAPAN,
[G.R. NO. L-72721 JUNE 16, 1988]
Facts:
Petitioners oppose the application for registration and confirmation of title over Lot
2, PSU-173975 situated in Digman, Bacoor, Cavite, on which petitioners had their
residential house and a "camarin." The trial court awarded the lot to the petitioners.
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of
the trial court and confirmed the ownership of said Lot No. 2 in the names of
private respondents. On motion of private respondents, the respondent Regional
Trial Court, on March 19, 1985, issued the questioned writ of possession with the
complimentary directive for the oppositors to dismantle and remove their building
and/or structure from Lot No. 2 under pain of demolition and to vacate the
premises in favor of private respondents within thirty (30) days. The petitioners
appealed but the petition was dismissed, and an order for the issuance of a decree
in favor of private respondents was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the court is correct in issuing the writ of possession with a special
order of demolition.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent appellate court committed no
reversible error in holding that the writ of possession issued by the trial court and it
is a necessary consequence of the adjudication of ownership and the corresponding
issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. In a registration case, the judgment
296

confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name
necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element
of the right of ownership. Hence, a writ of possession may be issued not only
against the person who has been defeated in a registration case, but also against
any one unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during
the registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. It is the duty of
the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful party.
REPUBLIC vs. DILOY
GR NO. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413 (2008)
Facts:
As early as 1948, Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject property for
taxation purposes under his name. He was then succeeded by his son, Eusebio
Leaban, who also filed for taxation purposes in his name from the period covering
the years 1951-1969. Thereafter, in 1974, the subject property was transferred to
Eusebio Leabans daughter, Pacencia Leaban, who, in turn, declared the same for
taxation purposes under her name. On 15 June 1979, the subject property was then
conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her daughter, herein respondent Gregoria L.
Diloy, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In 1997, respondent Gregoria L. Diloy filed an Application for Registration of Title
over the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the Republic,
filed an Opposition to the Application for Registration of Title.
During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title, respondent
presented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos as witnesses to
strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual,
continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of the subject property.
The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the respondent,
granting her application for registration over the subject property.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the respondent failed
to prove her possession as required under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The said
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the Republic appealed the
Decision of the MCTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal of the Republic. Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied. Hence, this
Petition.
297

Issue:
Whether the respondent has acquired a registrable title.
Held:
No. It is beyond question that the subject property was already an alienable and
disposable land at the time the Application for Registration of Title over the same
was filed by the respondent. However, the subject property became alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in
1982, any occupation or possession thereof could not be considered in the counting
of the 30-year possession requirement.
The period of possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be
considered to have started in 1979, when the same was conveyed to her by her
mother. Neither can her possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her
predecessors-in-interest, even if they had occupied and were in possession of the
same since 1948, because during those periods, the subject property had not yet
been classified as alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation.
Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot was
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Such possession can never ripen
into ownership and, unless the land has been classified as alienable and disposable,
the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
From 1982 up to 1997, the year the respondent filed an Application for
Registration of Title over the subject property, the respondent was in possession of
the same for only 15 years, which was short of another 15 years from the 30-yearperiod possession requirement.
Petition is granted.
Secretary of the DENR v Yap
G.R. 172775
**********There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted
the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is
G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
298

Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

Facts:
GR no. 167707
On April of 1976, the DENR approved the National reservation survey of Boracay
which identified several lots as being occupied by named persons.
On November of 1978, Pres. Marcos issued PP 1801 declaring Boracay Island as
tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA), then later on approves PTA Circ. 3-82 to implement the
said proclamation.
Yap, together with other respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the said proclamation prevented them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land
for titling purposes. Moreover, they contend that they or through their predecessorin-interest has been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the subject land since time immemorial and they were paying their realty tax.
Further, the said proclamation did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of men,
classified as a tourist zone, therefore, susceptible of private ownership. Invoking
Sec 48(b) of CA 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they have the right
to have the lots registered under their names.
The republic, through OSG, opposed the petition of the respondents claiming that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of public domain. Invoking Sec 3(a) or PD
705 or the revised forestry code, as amended, it is not susceptible of private
ownership.
The OSG maintained that the right of the respondent to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by PD 705 and CA 141. Since the Island has not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they have cannot ripen into
ownership.
RTC: It upheld respondents right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable. The Circular itself recognized
private ownership of lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public
Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and
that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.
OSG moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, they appealed it to the
CA.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court.
OSG moved for reconsideration, but, it was also denied. They appeled to the SC.
GR no. 173775
However, during the pendency of the case (GR no. 167707) Pres. Arroyo issued PP
299

1064 which classifies Boracay into 400 ha of forest land and 628.96 ha or
agricultural land. On august of 2006, Sacay, Gelito and other land owners filed a
petition for nullification of PP1064. They contend that the said proclamation
infringes their prior vested right over portions of Boracay, also, they have been
occupying the lot since time immemorial.
Nonetheless, the OSG argued that they dont have vested rights over the property
because Boracay is an unclassified public forest land ursuant to PD 705. Therefore,
they are neither alienable nor disposable lands.
*****On November of 2006, the court ordered the consolidation of both cases as
they involve the same issues on land classification of Boracay Island.*****
Issue:
Whether or not private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals decision was reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Appying this law, all unclassified lands, including
that of the Boracay Island is considered as Public forest. Nonetheless, PD No. 705
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The
burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
300

application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, there was neither a proclamation, EO, Administrative action,
report statute nor a certificate presented in court. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed
the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.
If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No.
1801.
Noting that millions were invested for the development of Boracay Island making
internationally known ad some called it their home. However, the SC expressed
that they are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. Thus, saying Ito and
batas, ito ang dapat umiral.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987April 29, 2009
Facts:
On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
before the RTC of Cavite, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 sq. meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than 30 years. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe
fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence
presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No.3013 established under project no. 20-A and approved
as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On December 3, 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration.
301

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
application of Malabanan.
Issues:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June12, 1945 or
earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, may a parcel
of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its
use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The Petition is denied.
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
302

1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run. Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
CHING VS. MALAYA
153 SCRA 412
Facts:
The petitioners Jose Ching and Caridad Ching had alleged in their complaint for
ejectment that the private respondents Cesar and Araceli Alvarado had forced
their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused
to vacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands were based on the
petitioners case that they were the owners of the said property, having acquired it
by virtue of a valid sale. The property in question consists of a residential house
and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 and registered in the name of petitioner Jose
Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. The private respondents, in their
answer, had challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged to
them by right of inheritance.
The municipal court, affirming its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and thereafter
rendered judgment ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed
property. The respondents argued, as the basic question was one of ownership and
not of mere possession, the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss
303

the complaint.
On appeal, this decision was set aside by the respondent judge, who held that the
municipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a question of
ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not Ching is the rightful owner of the residential land.
Ruling:
Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over ownership
cases. But the Supreme Court held that this particular case is not
an ownership case. The mere circumstance that proof of title, or
evidence of ownership, had been introduced during the trial
before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of
jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical
possession. The parties just showed evidence of ownership so as
to prove possession and this will not divest the Municipal Court of
its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the land is registered under Chings
name in the Registry of Deeds in Laguna. The land was actually
sold to him by Alvarados father in 1978. No protest was ever filed
against the Deed of Sale since 1978. Alvarado only filed an
annulment case (which is a separate case) when the ejectment
case was filed. With a strong evidence to back Chings claim, the
Municipal Courts decision was reinstated by the Supreme Court.
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA
ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 81401
Facts:
Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels
of unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed) located in
Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica
died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed away in 1953. They had one son,
Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children, Jose, Pedro,
Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with whom he
fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo.
304

Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's
widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their children are the
petitioners. On October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of
donation inter vivos, in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose.
Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon. In 1949, he took personal
possession thereof, worked thereon, and claimed them as owner thereof. On
August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another deed of donation inter vivos,
disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose. On January 12, 1972, Virginia,
together with her children, filed with the cadastral court an application for
registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Pedro and
Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on
claims that each of them was entitled to one-third thereof.
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession. Virginia and her children shortly went
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral court and
dismissed the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting
claims of ownership.
Ruling:
We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no
longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
law. It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is
ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court
commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case,
where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims
over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case, registration would not be
possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it.
The evidence for Virginia et al. does not persuade us that they (through Jose) have
acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession
thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner,
he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by itself prejudice the
right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling
either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon a
claimant. The fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide
the property is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they, Virginia,
et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we cannot
validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of prescription.
The weight of authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes
305

irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply

with charges imposed in the donation, or by reason of ingratitude.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., VS.

OF APPEALS

COURT

G.R. No. 91797

Facts:
Widora filed LRC Case before the respondent (trial) court an
application for registration of title of a parcel of land alleging that
the parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136
issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
Respondent Dolores
Molina filed
an
opposition,
claiming
ownership over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8. However
petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that
respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case. The
respondent court issued an order directing the applicant to prove
its contention that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are not
proper derivatives of the original certificates of titles from which
they were purportedly issued, and setting the case for hearing.
This motion to dismiss was denied.
Respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before respondent court praying for the
annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders and
ordered to dismiss the land registration case. On November 27,
1989, respondent court rendered the decision sought to be
reviewed granting the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership. WIDORA argues that respondent court erred in
sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and 77653 despite the
absence of a supporting decree of registration and instead utilized
306

secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy

of Decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself
existing and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent trial court erred in sustaining the validity of the TCT
NOs. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration.
Held:
Yes. The unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own findings
regarding the extent of the coverage of the land included in TCT Nos. 77652 and
77653, ostensibly to correct the error in, and conform with, the technical
description found in OCT 351 based on the plan and other evidence submitted by
respondent Ortigas cannot be sustained. That function is properly lodged with the
office of the trial court sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress
investigation of the matter on the merits. It is before the land registration court that
private respondent must adduce the proof that the disputed parcels of land is
legally registered in its favor.Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued
by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for the subsequent
issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that
quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA
240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering
the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel
of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and void.
PAMINTUAN VS SAN AGUSTIN
G.R. No. L-17943
Facts:
On April 19, 1917, lot No. 625 was decreed in favor of Florentino
Pamintuan, the petitioner herein, by the CFI of Pampanga, and
that certificate of title No. 540 covering the said lot was
thereupon issued to him in June, 1918. Cadastral case No. 132
was instituted. Florentino Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim
the lot of trial of the cadastral case, and the CFI in a decision
dated April 29, 1919, awarded it to the respondents Nicomedes,
307

Maria, Mercedes, Rose and Eusebia Espinosa, and ordered the

cancellation of certificate of title No. 540. Florentino Pamintuan
knew nothing about the adjudication of the land until the clerk of
the CFI of Pampanga required him to surrender his certificate of
title for cancellation. He then presented a motion to the court
asking that the decision of the court in the cadastral case be set
aside and that the writ of possession issued by virtue of said
decision be recalled.
Issue:
Whether or not the court exceeded its jurisdiction in undertaking
to decree in a cadastral case land already decreed in another land
registration case.

Held:
The court exceeded its jurisdiction. Cadastral proceedings are
authorized and regulated by Act No. 2259. What is understood by
"settlement and adjudication" is very clearly indicated in section
11 of the Act: SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any
convinient place within the province in which the lands are
situated or at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in
writing and filed with the record of the case, may designate, and
shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and
proceedings in the Court of Land Registration, and shall be
governed by the same rules. Orders of default and confession
shall also be entered in the same manner as in ordinary cases in
the same court and shall have the same effect. All conflicting
interest shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in
favor of the person entitle to the lands or the various parts
thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for
original certificates of title in favor of said persons, which shall
have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application
for registration of land under the Land Registration Act, and
except as herein otherwise provided all of the provisions of said
Land Registration Act, as now amended, and as it hereafter may
be amended, shall be applicable to proceedings under this Act,
308

and to the titles and certificate of title granted or issued

hereunder. In cadastral case, the jurisdiction of the court over
lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of
technical errors in the description of the lands, provided, such
corrections, do not impair the substantial rights of the registered
owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a
registered owner of his title.

GABRIEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-26348
Facts:
In 1916, the subject land located in Bataan was surveyed for
Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742, with an area of
2,729,712 square meters was subsequently amended because it
was found that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054
in the name of Quimson and later transferred to Naval were
included. The undivided portions were excluded by order of the
Court and so Plan Psu- 9742 was amended with an area of
2,436,280 or a reduction of 293,432 square meters. The OCT No.
1264 issued in the name of Potenciano Gabriel on November 1,
1918 contained the reduced area. A cadastral survey was also
made and the land of Gabriel, covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd.
became Lot No. 557 with a reduced area of 2,096,433 square
meters, or a further reduction by 339,847 square meters. No new
certificate of title was issued. Accordingly the partition of the
estate of Gabriel by his heirs was based on plan Psu-9742 Amd.
instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square
meters.
Issue:
Whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary
correction of an erroneous technical description and make it
conform to the correct area.
Held:
309

In cadastral cases, the jurisdiction of the court over lands already

registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors
in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not
impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that
such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of
his title. In this case, the lower court merely corrected the error in
the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. so as
to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot
No. 557 of the Hermoso Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani
Cadastre which lots embody the correct technical description
thereof
CITY OF BAGUlO vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-26100
Facts:
In 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court
to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, in
the CFI of Baguio, as to the parcel of land he claims. The subject
land was among those declared public lands by final decision
rendered in the November 13, 1922 case. His prayer was that the
land be registered in his name. On December 18, 1961, private
petitioners Francisco Joaquin, Sr., Francisco Joaquin, Jr., and
Teresita Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. They
claimed themselves as farm lessees upon agreements executed
by the Bureau of Forestry in their favour. On May 5, 1962, the City
of Baguio likewise opposed the reopening.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has power to reopen the
cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes
Held:
The title of RA 931 authorizes the filing in the proper court, under
certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act. The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks
310

of parcels of land that have been, or are about to be declared land

of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act.
There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title
and body. RA 931 claims of title that may be filed thereunder
embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public
land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years
next preceding the approval of this Act.
A. Order for speedy settlement and adjudication
B. Petition for Registration
C. Answer
a. Who may file answer; Form and contents of answer; When to file
answer.
b. When motion to dismiss is proper; applicability of Rules of Court.
JOSE O. DURAN vs. BERNABE OLIVIA
G.R. No. L-16589
Facts:
An application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots was filed by Jose
O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran .On April 20, 1954, the case was heard
initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed their opposition to the
application. Four years after, the oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the
application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of
the lots respectively claimed by them. The applicants filed their objection to said
motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not appear in the
application but are mere assertions of the parties and that the trial court has
jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof
are already covered by certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed
by the oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered
successively the two orders of dismissal appealed from.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the application with respect to particular lots upon
mere assertion that these lots are covered by certificates of title based merely upon
the granted public land patents is correct.
Ruling:
Yes, the motion to dismiss is proper in cadastral proceedings which involve land
covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent. The
appellants claim that a certificate of title based upon a mere homestead, sales or
free patent covering private land is null and void as well as the claim that the lower
311

court possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration
proceedings even with respect to the lots already covered by certificates of title are
without merit. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of
registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of
legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to
litigation if every property covered by torrens title may still be relitigated in a
subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above purpose, we have
held in a long line of decisions that a homestead patent once registered under the
Land Registration Act cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and
that any title issued thereon is null and void. A homestead patent, once registered
under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title, and
cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment
in a cadastral case. Any new title which the cadastral court may order to be issued
is null and void and should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may do is to
make correction of technical errors in the description of the property contained in
its title, or to proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned by two or more coowners. As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land
Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance
has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the
same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents.
Republic of the Philippines vs CA
99 SCRA 651
FACTS:
Petitioner relates Supreme Courts decision in Valdehueza v. Republic and the
final judgment of the Court of Appeals in Yu v. Republic. In Valdehueza v.
Republic, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of expropriation of Lot No. 939
in Lahug, Cebu City, and ruled that therein petitioners, Francisca Valdehueza, et
al., were not entitled to recover possession of the lot but only to demand its fair
market value. In Yu v. Republic, the Court of Appeals annulled the subsequent
sale of the lot by Francisca Valdehueza, respondents, Ramon Yu, and held that
the latter were not purchasers in good faith. The parties did not appeal the
decision and so, judgment became final and executory. Respondents filed a
complaint for reversion of the expropriated property. Republic of thePhilippines,
denied respondents right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot on the ground
of res judicata.
ISSUES:
312

Is the action barred by res judicata? Are respondents entitled to reversion of the
expropriated property?
RULING:
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In the
present case, the first three elements are present. The doctrine of res
judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action. Considering that the sale on which
respondents based their right to reversion has long been nullified, they have not
an iota of right over the property and thus, have no legal personality to bring
forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack of legal personality
to sue means that the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. This is a
ground for the dismissal of the case, related to the ground that the complaint
evidently states no cause of action. Consequently, the second issue is now
mooted and made academic by our determination of res judicata in this case.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD
L.
DIOCTON
vs.THE
HONORABLE
SINFORIANO
A.
MONSANTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar, and the
HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA, represented by Tito V. Tizon
FACTS:
The lot is contested by petitioners-heirs of Cornelio Labrada, on
and by respondents-heirs of Isabel Yboa. Said predecessors-ininterest had filed their respective answers in the cadastral
proceedings in June, 1932. Labrada had already been in
continuous possession of said lot for more than forty-three (43)
years when he filed his answer in 1932; and that he continued his
possession until 1943 when he died. His son succeeded in
possessing the land. Immediately after his demise, Meliton
Labrada was succeeded in the possession of said land until he
himself died in 1976; and possession of the property in issue was
passed to Meliton's direct heirs, who until the present are still in
possession. None of the heirs of Isabel Iboa is in possession of any
313

portion of the questioned lot. Petitioners had moved in 1973 for

the case to be heard by the now defunct Court of First Instance of
Samar. The conflicting parties presented both their oral and
documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over
the lot. Respondent regional trial court rendered its decision in
favor of respondents-claimants. An appeal was filed by the
petitioners. After a month respondents-claimants filed their
motion for the issuance of a decree contending that petitioners
had failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to file a
record on appeal. Respondent court granted respondents' motion.
The decree for the registration was accordingly ordered by
respondent court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal
because they failed to file a record on appeal.
RULING:
Petitioners' appeal must be given due course and the issuance of
a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title
were prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court
and must be set aside. The Court provided for specific exceptions
with respect to "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court," wherein multiple appeals at
different stages of the case are allowed such as when the order or
judgment on appeal refers to: (a) the allowance or disallowance of
a will, (b) determination of the lawful heirs of a deceased person
or their distributive shares in the estate; (c) the allowance or
disallowance, in whole or in part, of any claim against the estate
or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it; (d) the settlement of the accounts of an executor,
administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) a final determination in the
lower court of the rights of the party appealing in proceedings
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person or the
administration of a trustee or guardian; and (f) the final order or
judgment rendered in the case. In these cases, therefore, since
the original record has to remain with the probate court in
connection with the other various pending matters, a party
314

appealing from a specific order is required to file the

corresponding record on appeal. Petition is granted. Dispensing
with briefs or memoranda, judgment is rendered (a) setting aside
the questioned orders which denied due course to petitioners'
appeal and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration; (b)
annulling any certificate of title which may have been issued to
respondents pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering respondent court
to give due course to petitioners' appeal from its decision of July
11, 1983 and to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the
records of the case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the
Catbalogan Cadastral survey, together with the oral and
documentary evidence.
FIDEL SILVESTRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RUFINO DIMSON
Facts:
Both private petitioner Fidel Silvestre and petitioner Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources seek the reversal of the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals which set aside the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissing the
complaint filed by respondent Rufino Dimson declaring null and
void Homestead Patent No. 72493 and Original Certificate of Title
No. 292, granted by petitioner Secretary in favor of petitioner
Fidel Silvestre and instead rendered judgment in favor od Dimson.

In 1956, Petitioner Silvestre filed for a homestead application for a

parcel of land he has been occupying since 1927 in Hermosa,
Bataan. In December 1956, he was issued a Torrens title. He
began paying realty taxes thereon in 1957.

In 1959, Respondent Dimson filed for an adverse claim over the

same parcel of land. Claiming that the land could not be the
subject of homestead patent as it was already a private property
even before World War II. Dimson, who also owns the lots
315

adjoining the disputed property, argued that the land was actually
adjudicated to spouses Batungbakal through a cadastral
proceeding;
that
in
1927,
Batungbakal,
through
a
Compromiso de Venta conveyed ownership to Dimson; that
Dimson has paid realty taxes; and that title was never issued in
his name because of the outbreak of war.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Compromiso de Venta entered into by
Batungbakal and Dimson conveyed ownership to Dimson.

Held:
The alleged execution in 1927 of the Escritura of Compromiso
de Venta in favor of Dimson by the Batungbakal spouses was not
tantamount to possession. First of all, there was only an
allegation that a Compromiso was established. But even if there
actually was a Compromiso, Dimson should have made actual
possession. If Dimson had been in possession, then he could have
first asserted his alleged ownership and possession and waited for
Silvestre to controvert his possession and seek recovery of the
land, instead of belatedly suing to annul Silvestres Torrens title
and to recover actual damages.

This is further bolstered by the fact that Dimson started paying

taxes on the land only in 1958 apparently in preparation for his
suit contrary to his allegation in his complaint that he had
allegedly paid all the real estate taxes thereon before World War
II, considering that no evidence was presented by him to prove his
allegation.
Dimson also failed to show that the Batungbakal spouses his
predecessors-in-interest were the actual owner of the disputed
land. He said that Batungbakal acquired the property through a
316

cadastral proceeding but he never showed any proof of such

decree granting Batungbakal title over the disputed land.

In this regard, assuming that there was a transaction between

Dimson and Batungbakal, the property could not have been
conveyed in favor of Dimson due to the fact that Batungbakal was
not the owner of the land in dispute.

Petition granted.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANDRES
REYES, MARIANO V. AGCAOILI and DELFIN FL. BATACAN.
Facts:
The land in dispute is Lot No. 1736, a large tract of agricultural
land in Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, alleged to have been
occupied since 1913 by the grandfather of applicant, Vicente
Rodriguez, who, filed Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands,
but which was rejected upon investigation that the land was
classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation. Upon the death
of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924, possession of the property was
taken over by his three sons, the two waived their share in favor
of petitioner Arturo Rodriguez. Thereafter, Arturo sold two-thirds
portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S.
Alcantara.In 1953, the land in question was deemed reverted to
the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine
Military Bases Agreement. In 1965, Arturo Rodriguez together
with Reyes and Alcantara filed a petition for registration of their
title to Lot No. 1736 on the ground of open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession for more than 30 years. Thirty-nine
persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the
petition for registration contending, that they have been in actual,
peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of portions of Lot
No. 1736 for more than thirty years and have introduced
improvements thereon.The Director of Lands likewise filed his
317

opposition alleging that neither the applicants nor their

predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the land applied
for, as they have not been in OCEN possession and occupation of
the land sought to be registered for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application. The trial court
ruled in favor of the applicants. Canaria filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. Director of Lands filed for a
motion to dismiss or for reconsideration alleging that the present
petition for registration was intended to reopen Cadastral Case
No. 15, L.R.C. Record No. 1021, wherein a cadastral court already
declared Lot 1736 as public land; and that a decision in a
cadastral case constitutes res judicata. The lower court ruled in
favor of the applicants confirming their title. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court but subsequently reversed its decision
upon motion by respondents contending that the cadastral case
constitutes res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the prior decision of the cadastral court in a proper cadastral
proceeding declaring that the lot in question as public land constitute res judicata,
as such, a bar to the present application by subsequent possessors for registration
of title or confirmation of imperfect title over the same parcel of land.
Held:
Res Judicata does not apply. When Cadastral Case No. 15 was instituted in 1927
and terminated in 1930, the land in question was still classified as within the U.S.
Military Reservation and was deemed reverted to the public domain only in 1953.
On this basis, the Court finds that the decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does
not constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land registration
considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in question since the
same would nevertheless have been denied because during the pendency of the
cadastral case, said land was not alienable nor disposable as was shown by the
denial of the lease application filed then by private respondents predecessor-ininterest. A decision in cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public land is not the
final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act.
Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude the
same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the
same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains
alienable and disposable. But while the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be
considered a bar to the registration proceedings instituted by private respondents in
318

1965, the chronology of events in the case at bar clearly negates compliance by
private respondents-applicants with the thirty-year possession requirement. As such
there is not claim for an imperfect title. Petition granted.
d. Effect of failure to appeal.
DE LA MERCED V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claims ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal
Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court dated December 26,
1923, in favor of his father, sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof
from the named defendant, and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the
agricultural years 1950-1956. Defendants asserted their ownership over said
property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued to their
predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous
possession of the land for more than 30 years.
1.) By virtue of the final decision dated December 26, 1923, Santos'
title to Lot No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world,
including the Government;
2.) The same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925
declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to
Inocencio de los Santos. Although no such certificate was actually issued;
3.) On December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without reopening the case,
declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of which Juan de la
Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a homestead
patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;
4.) Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, was the overseer of Inocencio
de los Santos for a big portion of land which included Lot 395 in question
and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a
homestead;
319

5.) That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in
1952.
Respondents predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot on Original
Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10, 1931 in favor of Juan de la
Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to a homestead patent issued on
September 15, 1931, contending that the decision of December 26, 1923,
adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since there was no
decree issued pursuant thereto.
Issue:
What is the effect of failure to appeal the decision of a cadastral court proceeding
within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision?
Held:
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific
provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and
affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office of the register of
deeds for the province where the land lies. In other words, in cases of public lands,
the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the
registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished. (But in the other
way, the land had become private land.) With respect to the question of when title
to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case
of Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural, said: -After trial in a cadastral
case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the
claimants. This constitutes the decision the judgment the decree of the court,
and speaks in a judicial manner. The second action is the declaration by the court
that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days
from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the
decision. The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration
Office. This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and
accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land." The judgment in a
cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law
320

says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of title. The
issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The date
of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has
taken place and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of technical
description. As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is
final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period
allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the
judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken
to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment
as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested
upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision
or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been
perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting
registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would
no longer be necessary. As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court,
ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot
No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had
already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said
cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of
the date of the issuance of such judicial decree.
CAYANAN VS. DE LOS SANTOS
21 SCRA 1348
FACTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac
Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16, 1958, a petition for review was filed
in the same proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of
appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was
rendered and a decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was
stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the
other respondent, Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the said lot. The
321

prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of the
Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the
adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on appeal. It
was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case, as admitted by the
petitioners, even if the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of
final decree, the same cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the
questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. Camaya in accordance with
section 38 of the Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that
such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L. Camaya is
not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary
civil action and not in a simple petition, like the one at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree of registration has
the power to set aside said judgment and readajudicate the land in favor of
another?
HELD:
The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that the cadastral court is
also a court of first instance. It has been held that the adjudication of land in a
registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final
decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said
decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another."
"In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the
issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same are properly
cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree."
As a matter of fact, several decisions held that:
Santos v. Ichon,(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this court, appellee
could have moved for the reopening of the case in the cadastral court so that he
could be given an opportunity to prove his right to the land in question and get a
decree in his favor, since the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case
does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the
entry of the final decree, and until then the court rendering the decree may, after
hearing, set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another person."
Afalla v. Rosauro,: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of one
year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated
and the decision therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound
322

discretion of the court rendering it."

Valmonte v. Nable,: "It should be borne in mind that the adjudication of land in a
registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Within this period of one
year the decree may be reopened on the ground of fraud and the decree may be set
aside and the land adjudicated to another party. As long as the final decree is not
issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed,
the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
it."
Capio v. Capio,: "that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case
does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the
entry of the final decree; that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period
of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to
another party."
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA VS. NARCISO DE GUZMAN, ET AL.
Facts:
Fabian Abellera filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
claiming title to the hacienda found in municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, by virtue of a donation which he failed to
accept in a public instrument as required in article 633 of the Civil
Code but was dismissed.
After the dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff brought another
action against the same defendants for ejectment. This second
action was dismissed, on the ground that the title to the tract of
land from which he sought to eject the defendants might well be
litigated in the cadastral case then pending in the same court
which included the tract of land, divided into lots and claimed by
both the plaintiff and the defendants, the court of first instance
being of the opinion that, should title to the tract of land be
confirmed and decreed in the name of the plaintiff, the latter
could bring an action against the defendants for damages. From
this order of dismissal, the plaintiff did not appeal.
The plaintiff again brought another action with the same court
for ejectment against the same defendants in the two previous
323

cases , or their successors-in-interest, including new or additional

defendants who are the claimants of lots in the cadastral case,
which lie within the area of the tract of land claimed by the
plaintiff, and prayed for judgment declaring him the owner of the
tract of land from which he had sought defendants' ejectment in
the two previous cases; for the possession of the lots unlawfully
occupied or detained by the defendants; for the recovery of
damages from each and every one of the defendants, amounting
all in all to P40,000 and costs; and for general relief.
Instead of answering the complaint the defendants moved for its
dismissal, on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action; and
(2) that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause. On 18 June 1946, acting upon the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court sustained the
second ground of the motion and dismissed the complaint without
costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award
damages
Ruling:
No. The cadastral court possesses no authority to award
damages, for its power is confined to the determination as to
whether the claimants are really entitled to the lost, as alleged in
their answers; and, after finding that they are, to the confirmation
of their title to, and registration of, the lots in their name. In the
present action for ejectment, not only does the plaintiff seek to
have a judicial pronouncement that he is the owner of the tract of
land which he claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but
also to recover damages. After hearing, the cadastral court may
declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled to their
possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in
possession thereof, but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff.
Where there is a case for ejectment between parties who, one
against the other, claim the same parcel of land or lot in a
324

cadastral case, it has been customary or the practice of courts to

hold a joint hearing of both the ejectment and the cadastral cases
in which the same parcel of land is litigated and to render a
decision in both cases in its double role, as court of first instance
of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court of limited
jurisdiction.
Medina vs Valdellon
Facts:
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
alleges that spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal, who are the plaintiffs in
this case, are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, with an assessed value of P800.00.The defendants are family friends of
the plaintiffs and were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the
plaintiffs the premises upon demand. On demand, defendants-spouses refused and
remain obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question. Because of
said defendants' unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage
of P500 as expenses for court litigation; the reasonable value of the use of the
premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its commercial value; and
prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and surrender unto
plaintiffs the said property and defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount
of P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing of
this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the complaint because another case pending between the
same parties over the same property, namely Land Registration Case. The plaintiffs
moved for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages.
Ruling:
No. It is true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a
land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the
determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject
matter of registration, and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession
and claim for damages emanating from ownership.

325

CAYANAN V. DE LOS SANTOS

G.R. No. L-21150
Facts:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56
of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos,
then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On
December 16, 1958, a petition for review was filed in the same
proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name
of appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit
and through intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the
aforesaid decision was rendered and a decree of registration
obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further that a
simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the
other respondent, appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958,
covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the
decree of registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate
of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the
adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant
Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is
on appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the
case, as admitted by the petitioners, even [if] the petition has
been filed within one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same
cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the
questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. [Camaya]
in accordance with section 38 of the Land Registration Act. While
it is true that the petition states that such transfer is fictitious
and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L. [Camaya] is not an
innocent purchaser, this question can be properly threshed out in
an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition, like the one at
bar."
Issue:
When will adjudication in cadastral case becomes final?
Ruling:
"It may be stated that we find had no case squarely ruling on this particular point.
326

The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496 may
be sought in 'the competent Court of First Instance' is no sufficient indication that
the petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general
jurisdiction, considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts
on land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and
that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another."
Then came the concluding portion of the opinion: "In the present case, as the
petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree,
pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court
that rendered the decision and granted the said decree."
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA VS. NARCISO DE GUZMAN, ET AL.
Facts:
Fabian Abellera filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
claiming title to the hacienda found in municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, by virtue of a donation which he failed to
accept in a public instrument as required in article 633 of the Civil
Code but was dismissed.
After the dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff brought another
action against the same defendants for ejectment. This second
action was dismissed, on the ground that the title to the tract of
land from which he sought to eject the defendants might well be
litigated in the cadastral case then pending in the same court
which included the tract of land, divided into lots and claimed by
both the plaintiff and the defendants, the court of first instance
being of the opinion that, should title to the tract of land be
confirmed and decreed in the name of the plaintiff, the latter
could bring an action against the defendants for damages. From
this order of dismissal, the plaintiff did not appeal.
The plaintiff again brought another action with the same court
327

for ejectment against the same defendants in the two previous

cases , or their successors-in-interest, including new or additional
defendants who are the claimants of lots in the cadastral case,
which lie within the area of the tract of land claimed by the
plaintiff, and prayed for judgment declaring him the owner of the
tract of land from which he had sought defendants' ejectment in
the two previous cases; for the possession of the lots unlawfully
occupied or detained by the defendants; for the recovery of
damages from each and every one of the defendants, amounting
all in all to P40,000 and costs; and for general relief.
Instead of answering the complaint the defendants moved for its
dismissal, on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action; and
(2) that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause. On 18 June 1946, acting upon the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court sustained the
second ground of the motion and dismissed the complaint without
costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award
damages
Ruling:
No. The cadastral court possesses no authority to award
damages, for its power is confined to the determination as to
whether the claimants are really entitled to the lost, as alleged in
their answers; and, after finding that they are, to the confirmation
of their title to, and registration of, the lots in their name. In the
present action for ejectment, not only does the plaintiff seek to
have a judicial pronouncement that he is the owner of the tract of
land which he claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but
also to recover damages. After hearing, the cadastral court may
declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled to their
possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in
possession thereof, but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff.
Where there is a case for ejectment between parties who, one
328

against the other, claim the same parcel of land or lot in a

cadastral case, it has been customary or the practice of courts to
hold a joint hearing of both the ejectment and the cadastral cases
in which the same parcel of land is litigated and to render a
decision in both cases in its double role, as court of first instance
of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court of limited
jurisdiction.
Medina vs Valdellon
Facts:
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
alleges that spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal, who are the plaintiffs in
this case, are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, with an assessed value of P800.00.The defendants are family friends of
the plaintiffs and were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the
plaintiffs the premises upon demand. On demand, defendants-spouses refused and
remain obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question. Because of
said defendants' unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage
of P500 as expenses for court litigation; the reasonable value of the use of the
premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its commercial value; and
prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and surrender unto
plaintiffs the said property and defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount
of P500 as incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing of
this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the complaint because another case pending between the
same parties over the same property, namely Land Registration Case. The plaintiffs
moved for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award damages.
Ruling:
No. It is true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a
land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the
determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject
matter of registration, and it has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession
and claim for damages emanating from ownership.
329

BALBIN VS RD
28 SCRA 12
Facts:
Petitioners presented to the register of deeds a duplicate copy of
the registered owner's certificate of title and an instrument
entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the
same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the
instrument sought to be annotated, one Cornelio Balbin,
registered owner of the parcel of land described in the OCT,
appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/)
portion thereof in favor of petitioners.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being
"legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law as it appears
that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances
on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of
the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three
different buyers. The final part of the annotations stated that
three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title have been issued in
favor or 3 buyers.
The commissioner of land registration upheld the decision of the
register of deeds.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Register of Deeds in refusing the
request for annotation of donation proper?
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 55 obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate
copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner
himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument
330

is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the

register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of
registration.
It is essential that all the duplicate copies of the title be presented
before annotations are entered. There being several copies of the
same title in existence, in the case at bar, it is easy to see how
their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or
an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued
as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain
identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones,
affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if
different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the
whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

83 SCRA 453

Facts:

Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar

Anglo claim ownership over the same lots.
The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to
the Bureau of Education on September 21, 1926 by the late
Esteban Jalandoni through his will. Republic further alleged that
the said parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens
System "before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of
331

Meerkamp and Company"; that said company sold the lots to

Esteban Jalandoni; that TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of
Education when the subject property was bequeathed to it.
Respondent de Ocampo averred that the lots were unregistered
lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation
dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. Respondent
Anglo intervened having allegedly bought the same lots from
respondent de Ocampo.
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools initiated a
forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo. On appeal, the CFI of Negros
Occidental dismissed the complaint.
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the same
two parcels of land. On May 2, 1961, Republic, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint against de Ocampo with the CFI of Negros Occidental
for the recovery of possession of the subject lots.
After a joint trial of the cases, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint
and adjudged the registration of the subject two lots in the name of the then
applicant de Ocampo.
It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August 13,
1965 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However, Republic later filed with the
trial court, a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction
Pending Proceeding. The trial court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of
competent proof.
September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for
Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary
Injunction. Republic contended, inter alia, that actual fraud had
been perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo in securing the lower
court's decision ordering the registration of the lots in his name
and that the Court of First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in favor
of respondent de Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of the
same lands in favor of Meerkamp and Company.
The trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition against Republic.
From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. Hence, an appeal by certiorari was filed by
the petitioner.
332

Issue:
Whether the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for land
registration of Alfredo V. de Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509
were already registered under the Torrens System before 1919.
Ruling:

The trial court made an express finding that the alleged deed of
donation by Mosquera in favor of de Ocampo, acknowledged
before one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his
notarial book and the Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental
likewise issued a certification, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509
were never declared in the name of Mosquera. His later
certification states that the said lots were assessed in the name of
the Bureau of Education, and that the technical descriptions in the
Bureau of Lands records show that the same lots were in the
name of Meerkamp and Company.
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration
case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void.
If there is no valid and final judgment by the land registration court to speak of,
then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the decision denying the Amended
Petition would be immaterial and of no moment, in so far as these proceedings are
concerned in view of the congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main
decision decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos. 817
and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the
name of Meerkamp and Company.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the said Court to give due course to and consider on
its merits Republic's appeal.

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

333

G.R. No. 105027 April 22, 1994

Facts:
The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same parcels were
being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego, Incorporated.
All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over the subject
properties, three civil suits for quieting of title were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention that the OCT in B.E. San Diego's
name is null and void because Lorenzana Food Corporation's title emanated from
an OCT issued more than thirty-nine years prior to the issuance of B.E. San
Diego's original certificate of title.
In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in the open continuous and adverse possession in concept of owner of the
subject property for more than fifty years prior to Lorenzana Food Corporation's
purchase of the two parcels. It was further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation
was erroneously claiming the subject property because of Lorenzana's titled
property is described to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego's
property is situated in Barrio Niog.
Plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua claim ownership over the
parcels they respectively purchased from the heirs of Juan Cuenca.

The respondent court decided in favor of the private respondent,

B.E. San Diego, Inc. It rejected petitioners' titles because the
appellees (petitioners) titles state that the properties are located
in the barrio of Talaba when the properties described therein are
situated in the Barrio of Niog.
On the other hand, it found the titles of private respondent unblemished by any
defect. Petitioners assail the Decision in this petition for review on certiorari as
having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

334

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the decision of the lower court to uphold the validity of
the land titles of private respondent.
Ruling:

We find no compelling reason to reverse this ruling. The defects

appearing on the face of the titles of the petitioners are too
glaring to escape the naked eye.
The title of the appellant's predecessors-in-interest showed that
the land acquired by the appellant and for which title was issued
in the appellant's name was described in said title as being
located in Barrio Niog, while the appellees' title described the
property covered by their title as located in Barrio Talaba. But
appellees claim a parcel of land that is located in Barrio Niog.
These two barrios of the town of Bacoor, Cavite, are located poles
apart and were never one and the same town in the history of the
province. The appellees are claiming property not located in the
barrio as described in the technical description.
With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not deserve the
sanctity given to torrens title.
In pointing out the discrepancies in petitioners' titles, the respondent court was
simply stressing that these titles cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of
the private respondent.
The petition for review is DISMISSED there being no showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent court.
Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp vs. Eridanus Devt
Inc.
GR No. 152445 July 4, 2008
Facts:
335

Petitioner CAMBRIDGE is the registered owner of a 9,992-square

meter lot, covered by TCT. Respondent ERIDANUS is the registered
owner of a 2,794 square meter parcel of land covered by TCT. The
foregoing properties are adjoining lots located in Barangay
Valencia, Quezon City, and constitute the subject matter of the
present controversy.
On May 30, 1989, ERIDANUS filed Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 to
enjoin CAMBRIDGE from pursuing the planned subdivision and
development of its property, which ERIDANUS claims encroached
upon its own.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO PROVE
OVERLAP AND ENCROACHMENT OF PETITIONERS PROPERTY ON
RESPONDENTS PROPERTIES.
Ruling:
The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of
experts in the field of geodetic engineering. The very reason why
commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement
of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis
of the titles in conflict with each other. Given their background,
expertise and experience, these commissioners are in a better
position to determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial
court may rely on their findings and conclusions.
The appellate court, however, found that there is an
encroachment, and the cause thereof may be traced to a change
in the technical description of the petitioners title (which was
derived from TCT 578) when it was subdivided on November 10,
1920
Likewise, we cannot see how a change in the bearings of the
CAMBRIDGE property from S.21deg.5655E in TCT 578 to
N.25 deg. 07W in the CAMBRIDGE title can cause an overlap of
respondents properties. This has not been sufficiently shown by
respondents evidence to be the cause of the overlap.
336

Respondents key witness Nerit does not believe that the

CAMBRIDGE title was a derivative of TCT 578, because there is
nothing in the title thereof which indicates that it was derived
from the latter; he was ambivalent, if not ambiguous, and
definitely far from categorical, in this respect. State surveyor De
Laras testimony and Report inconclusive and incomplete as it is
does not help or indicate any. Likewise, a thorough examination
of TCT 578 shows that it has no similar boundary and bearings
with the CAMBRIDGE title. Finally, the CAMBRIDGE title explicitly
declares that it is derived from TCT No. 363717/T-1823, and not
TCT 578.
Thus, for failure of the respondents to prove that the CAMBRIDGE
title is a derivative of TCT 578, the conclusion that a change in the
technical description of the former as compared to that of the
latter is the reason for the overlap, simply does not follow. The
appellate court is in clear error.
Finally, we agree with the trial courts observation that the
continuous presence of the old adobe wall diminishes the case for
the respondents. It was only in 1989 that the wall became an
ungainly sight for respondents. Previous owners of what now
constitutes the respondents respective lots did not complain of
its presence. The wall appears to have been built in the 1960s,
and yet the Madrigals (SUSANA title owners) did not complain
about it; if they did, Nerit would have known and testified to the
same since he was responsible for the subdivision of the lot. Only
respondents complain about it now. In one overlapping of
boundaries case, the Court held that a land owner may not now
claim that his property has been encroached upon when his
predecessor did not register any objections at the time the
monuments were being placed on the claimed encroached area;
nor did the latter make any move to question the placement of
said monuments at the time. In every land dispute, the aim of the
courts is to protect the integrity of and maintain inviolate the
Torrens system of land registration, as well as to uphold the law; a
resolution of the parties dispute is merely a necessary
consequence.
Taking this to mind, we cannot grant the
respondents prayer without violating the very principles of the
Torrens system. They have failed to lay the proper foundation for
337

their claim of overlap. This is precisely the reason why the trial
court should have officially appointed a commissioner or panel of
commissioners and not leave the initiative to secure one to the
parties: so that a thorough investigation, study and analysis of the
parties titles could be made in order to provide, in a
comprehensive report, the necessary information that will guide it
in resolving the case completely, and not merely leave the
determination of the case to a consideration of the parties more
often than not self-serving evidence.

PAGADUAN v OCUMA
GR No. 176308 May 8, 2009
Facts:
The subject lot used to be part of a big parcel of land that
originally belonged to Nicolas Cleto as evidenced by Certificate of
Title (C.T.) No. 14. The big parcel of land was the subject of two
separate lines of dispositions. The first line of dispositions began
with the sale by Cleto to Antonio Cereso on May 11, 1925. Cereso
in turn sold the land to the siblings with the surname Antipolo on
September 23, 1943. The Antipolos sold the property to Agaton
Pagaduan, father of petitioners, on March 24, 1961. All the
dispositions in this line were not registered and did not result in
the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the
purchasers.
On November 26, 1961, Eugenia Reyes executed a unilateral
deed of sale where she sold the northern portion with an area of
32,325 square meters to respondents for P1,500.00 and the
southern portion consisting of 8,754 square meters to Agaton
Pagaduan for P500.00. Later, on June 5, 1962, Eugenia executed
another deed of sale, this time conveying the entire parcel of
land, including the southern portion, in respondents favor.

338

On July 26, 1989, petitioners instituted a complaint for

reconveyance of the southern portion with an area of 8,754
square meters, with damages, against respondents before the
RTC of Olongapo City.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the registration of the
southern portion in the name of respondents had created an
implied trust in favor of Agaton Pagaduan, petitioners, however,
failed to show that they had taken possession of the said portion.
Hence, the appellate court concluded that prescription had set in,
thereby precluding petitioners recovery of the disputed portion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual fraud is committed
RULING:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. The property in question did not come from the
petitioners. In fact that property came from Eugenia Reyes. The
title of the Ocumas can be traced back from Eugenia Reyes to
Ruperta Asuncion to the original owner Nicolas Cleto. Thus, if the
respondents are holding the property in trust for anyone, it would
be Eugenia Reyes and not the petitioners. In the instant case,
none of the elements of actual or constructive fraud exists. The
respondents did not deceive Agaton Pagaduan to induce the latter
to part with the ownership or deliver the possession of the
property to them. Moreover, no fiduciary relations existed
between the two parties.
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who
may have first possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.

339

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the

person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the
absence thereof; to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
In this case there was a first sale by Eugenia Reyes to Agaton
Pagaduan and a second sale by Eugenia Reyes to the
respondents. For a second buyer like the respondents to
successfully invoke the second paragraph, Article 1544 of the Civil
Code, it must possess good faith from the time of the sale in its
favor until the registration of the same. Respondents sorely failed
to meet this requirement of good faith since they had actual
knowledge of Eugenias prior sale of the southern portion property
to the petitioners, a fact antithetical to good faith. This cannot be
denied by respondents since in the same deed of sale that
Eugenia sold them the northern portion to the respondents for
P1,500.00, Eugenia also sold the southern portion of the land to
Agaton Pagaduan for P500.00.
b. Registration as an operative act bringing the land
ROXAS vs.DINGLASAN
G.R. No. L-27234
May 30, 1969
Facts:
Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated
at Lipa City. On June 11, 1959, she sold it to Francisca Mojica and
Victoria Dinglasan with different sizes in areas. Long before and at
the time of the sales, Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan
were in possession of the Lot. The vendor's Certificate of Title No.
9125 was not delivered to the vendees because it was in the
possession of another person to whom the lot had been
mortgaged by Felisa Kalaw.
Pedro Dinglasan, succeeded in having Certificate of Title No. 9125
in the name of Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-10392 issued in his name by falsifying a
public document of conveyance. He subsequently mortgaged the
lot to Leonora T. Roxas as security for a loan. Roxas, instituted the
instant foreclosure suit against him for his failure to pay his
obligation.
340

Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene since

they allege that they are the true owners.
The lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage
was validly constituted and its foreclosure was in order. The Court
of Appeals certified the appeal of this Court on the ground that it
involves only questions of law.
Issue:
Whether Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are the true
owners of the land
Ruling:
No, they are not the true owners.
The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of
the land, their action to vindicate ownership must fail because
such action can prosper only upon proof by plaintiff that he is the
owner. As pointed out, the intervenors did not acquire ownership
of the land because their deeds of sale were not registered.

Egao v CA
174 SCRA 484
Facts:
The respondents claim that they are the owners of the parcel of
land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto
Marfori. The respondents also introduced improvements; they as
well paid the taxes of the property. However, the petitioners
341

illegally occupied portions of the land. Petitioner answers that

they are the true owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate of
Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent.
The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. The CA reversed the
decision on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao
can validly sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred
the ownership to the respondents. The CA holds both Egao and
Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction
provided by Commonwealth 141 against encumbrance and
alienation of public lands acquired thrufree patent or homestead
patent.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to
resolve the rights of the respondents over the land in dispute
Ruling:
The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to Marfori
within the 5-year restriction period provided by law on Free Patent. When the land
was sold to the respondents, they know that the OCT is still registered under the
name of the petitioners. Thus, they are not considered to be innocent purchaser as
contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects to make the
necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title,
and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor,
purchases the property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim
that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.
PEOPLE vs. REYES
175 SCRA 597
Facts:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land, registered in
their names. Both are now deceased. They were survived by the following
children.
However, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register
of Deeds that the subject property had already been transferred in the name of
Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa,
Philippines". They further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected
342

through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed by their parents.The deed of
sale was registered with the Register of Deeds. Upon examination of the document,
they found that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that
accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was
married.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive period started when the deed of sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds.
Ruling:
The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the
whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains.
It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property of the
deceased was executed by some of his heirs, the registration of the instrument of
partition with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice that said heirs have
repudiated the fiduciary relationship between them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the
property in question. The heirs who were not included in the deed of partition are
deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the
Register of Deeds.
CHING vs. CA
181 SCRA 9
Facts:
A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of Title
correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal covering a parcel of land.
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng, TCT No. 91137 was issued.
Consequently, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching
filed a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching
Leng and was granted.
343

13 years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was filed by private
respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and cancellation of
T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession. Summons by publication to
Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court. The summons and the
complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general
circulation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new
TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is
in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his estates be bound by service of
summons and decision by publication.
Ruling:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an
action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration
proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in
rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a
person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An
action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for
it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing.
Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) requires "notice
to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng was already in the other world when the
summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.
HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998
344

Facts:
On November 20, 1986, an action for reconveyance with damages
was filed by petitioners against private respondents involving a
parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with a
total area of 3,277 square meters. Petitioners assert that the
subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the
private respondents, Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of
sale executed on May 18, 1959, and since then they have been in
actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the
property. However, on October 1986, private respondents
obtained a Torrens Title over the said land. The Madrids denied
having executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said
document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. During the
trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale
since. Instead, they presented a photo copy of the purported
original carbon copy of the deed of sale. The records show that
the disputed property has been in the possession of the
petitioners since 1959. They have since been introducing several
improvements on the land.
Issue:
Whether the Certificates of Title issued to private respondents
should be given more weight than the long possession of the
subject lands by the petitioners.
Ruling:
No. The Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can
operate against them because their title to the property is
registered
under
the
Torrens
system
and
therefore
imprescriptable. Such principles, while admittedly correct, are
subject to certain exceptions. The fact that the Madrids were able
to secure TCT No. 167250, and Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220 and
167256, did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the
property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It is
not a mode of acquiring ownership,especially considering the fact
345

that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective

TCTs only in October 1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after
petitioners first took possession of the land. If the Madrids and
Marquezes wished to assert their ownership, they should have
filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to
have the land registered under their respective names.
CABRERA v CA
267 SCRA 339
Facts:
In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in mutual
by Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited
the same from their late father, Domingo Teokemian, was sold to
Andres Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign in the Deed of
Sale.In 1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee issued Free
Patent and Original Certificate of Title over the said property.In
1972, the one-third share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession
was sold to spouses Elanoand Felicidad Cabrera who instantly
took possession of it. In 1988, Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for
quieting of title against Felicidad Teokemian and Felicidad
Cabrera. On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in
favor of defendants against the plaintiff, ruling that the latter can
no longer recover the portion of land occupied by the past due to
laches. The Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal
on the justification that the defendants action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust had already been barred by prescription
and that the action of the plaintiffs is not barred by laches
because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of
the community property.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of the plaintiffs is barred by laches.
Ruling:

346

Yes. The argument that laches does not apply because what was
sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community
property, and, therefore, void, is untenable.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion
of the subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed
Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to
her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the
transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a coowner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has
not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored, the
possessor is in a better condition or right.
AVILA vs. TAPUCAR
G.R. No. L-45947 August 27, 1991
Facts:
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a
1.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land which was inherited by
private respondents in 1965, as successors-in-interest. In 1960,
petitioner
Avila
bought
under
a
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land ,a 4,371 square meter parcel of land
which is part of the subject property inherited by the Bahans from
their predecessor. On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan
filed Free Patent Application for alot which has a total area of
6.9027 hectares in its entirety. Sometime later, private
respondent Julito Bahan and company gathered coconuts from
the land purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila. They filed an
action for quieting of title and damages against the Avilas. In their
answer, the petitioners Avilas raised the defense of having
purchased the land from a certain Luis Cabalan and from then on
has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of the same. The Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary
writ of injunction praying that the Bahans be enjoined and
ordered to refrain and desist from gathering or continue
harvesting the fruits on the land in controversy until the
termination
of the
case. In
the
meantime,
the Bahans'
application for free patent was approved and the free patent was
issued , and on the same date an Original certificate of title was

347

issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by

Julito Bahan.
Issue:
Whether the free patent and original certificate of title which
were erroneously issued and vested ownership of lands in favor of
the Bahans is proper.
Ruling:
No.The free patent issued to the Bahans is erroneous because it
embraced and comprised portions of lands belonging to
the Avilas. The subsequent registration of the portion of land
belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could not make the
latter owners thereof. A cadastral court has no authority to award
a property in favor of persons who have not put in any claims to it
and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the
certificate of title issued under thecircumstances to such persons
would be declared void subject to the right of innocent purchasers
for value. Land registration is a proceeding
in rem and binds the whole world. However, the simple
possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does
not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens
system,which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no
longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of
the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally
included. Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode
of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a
particular property. It does not give the holder any better right
than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done
in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made
at all.
TAN vs BANTEGUI
GR No. 154027 October 24, 2005

348

Facts:
Bantegui acquired the property sometime in 1954 and rented it to spouses Caedos
who resided therein until 1994. In 1970, she left for the United States of America.
She returned to the Philippines in January 1988 and executed her special power of
attorneymaking Guadalupe B. Bautista (Bautista for brevity) her representative,
after which, she went back to the United States. For failure of Bantegui to pay
taxes, said property was at public auction held on November 21, 1984, to the
spouses Capistranos. Since the property was not redeemed within the one (1) year
redemption period, title to said property was consolidated to the Capistranos. The
property was later sold on June 20, 1988 by the Capistranos to spouses Pereyra.
These transfers were unknown to Bantegui and the Caedos. Said property was
again sold by the Pereyras to the spouses Tan. Bantegui, thru her sister Guadalupe
Bautista, and joined by the spouses Caedo[,] filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale, Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. After the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of respondents,
petitioners appealed to the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the auction sale was valid.
Ruling:
The tax sale did not conform to the requirements prescribed under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 464, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. The
auction sale of real property for the collection of delinquent taxes is in personam,
not in rem. Although sufficient in proceedings in rem like land registration, mere
notice by publication will not satisfy the requirements of proceedings in personam.
[P]ublication of the notice of delinquency [will] not suffice, considering that the
procedure in tax sales is in personam. It is still incumbent upon the city treasurer
to send the notice directly to the taxpayer -- the registered owner of the property -in order to protect the latters interests. Although preceded by proper
advertisement and publication, an auction sale is void absent an actual notice to a
delinquent taxpayer. A certificate of title under the Torrens system serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears on it. While it is true that Transfer Certificates of Title have already been
issued in the names of the subsequent purchasers, they should nonetheless be
invalidated. Considering the failure to abide by the mandatory requirements of a
proceeding in personam, no better title than that of the original owner can be
349

assumed by the transferees.

Besides, the incontrovertible nature of a certificate of title applies only when
the issue involved is the validity of the original and not of the transfer. Subsequent
titles issued to the prejudice of the rightful owner will produce no legal effects
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. That which is a nullity
produces no effect.
DEMASIADO vs VELASCO
71 SCRA 105
Facts:
Plaintiff bought the land in question through pacto de retro sale from his uncle
Ambrosio Demasiado which vendor a retro could repurchase within ten years after
the first five years from the date of the document. That said vendor a retro
subsequently executed a deed of definite sale of same lot in favor of the plaintiff
Melquiades Demasiado and his wife Jovita Pareja It is admitted that both deeds of
sale though contained in a public document have not been registered in the office
of the Register of Deeds. From the evidence of the plaintiff, it has been established
that plaintiff's claim to the land in question is premised on two unregistered
documents. This shows that when said document was executed parties already
knew that lot 5169 has been titled and it would have been easy for parties to
inquire from the office of the Register of Deeds as to whether this land is titled or
not. Based on the evidence presented by plaintiff and defendants, the plaintiff has
not even proved his clear right over the whole lot. Deeds of Sale could not be
superior to the existing valid original certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff has clear right over the disputed lot.
Ruling:
Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, (Act No. 496) the certificate of title
covering registered land "shall be received as evidence in all courts of the
Philippines, and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein (principally,
the Identity of the owner of the land covered thereby) except so far as provided" in
the Act itself. And there is no pretense that appellant comes under any of the
exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of the Act. What appellant tries to point out,
350

however, is that the trial court admitted the certificate of title invoked by appellee
without the same being properly Identified. According to appellant, although the
trial court did rule that said certificate "should be admitted", it did not actually rule
that "they are hereby admitted." We believe such argument is unavailing,
considering that His Honor's ruling that said certificate, "the owner's copy of
Original certificate of Title No. 61801 is admissible", was precisely made after
originally sustaining appellant's counsel's objection to its admission, which must be
deemed to be clearly even if not categorically, a reconsideration and reversal of its
earlier ruling rejecting the same.
DAVID ODSIGUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
233 SCRA 626
Facts:
Armando Angeles, owner of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4050 and situated at Lagundi, Morong,
Rizal. Since 1972, David Odsigue has been in possession of the
land by the tolerance of the owner of the original owner Platon
Espiritu Santo. In 1989, Espiritu Santo died and was succeeded by
his heirs, among whom was Armando Angeles. On January 10,
1991, Angeles, as co-owner and assignee of the other heirs, sent
a letter of demand to David Odsigue to vacate the premises. The
letter was delivered to the Odsigue by the Barangay Captain of
Lagundi, Fernando Austria, who, in a sworn affidavit, stated that
he tried to deliver the letter to petitioner but petitioner had
refused to receive it.
On February 8, 1991, private respondent brought this suit for
unlawful detainer in the MTC. The MTC rendered a decision
ordering the petitioner to vacate the premises. On appeal the RTC
and, later, the CA, affirmed the decision of the MTC. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the
appellate court, which found no new matters which would warrant
a reversal of its decision. Hence this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:

351

Whether or not the property sought to be recovered has been

properly identified.
Ruling:
A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership
of the land referred but also its location. The subject of these
proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly,
petitioners will be required to demolish only whatever is
constructed within its boundaries. Private respondent's title (OCT
No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay
Lagundi. Likewise, the certification issued by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner
was occupying a landholding at Barangay Lagundi.
BUDLONG vs. PONDOC
79 SCRA 24
Facts:
On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and Crispina
Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a notarial instrument their
two-thirds share in the said lot in consideration of the donee's
personal services to the donors. Andrea accepted the donation in
the same instrument.
Two years after the execution of the donation, or on October 27,
1936, Original Certificate of Title No. 4718 was issued for the said
lot. The title shows that the lot is owned by the following coowners: Crispina Pondoc 113; Isabela Pondoc 1/3; Francisco
Garrote 1/6, and Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.the donee, Andrea
Budlong did not intervene in the cadastral proceeding. She was
not substituted for the donors in that proceeding.
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without any descendants
in 1935 and 1937. Francisco Garrote left Bohol thirty years before
1966 and had never returned to that province. Isabel GarrotePondoc died and was survived by her five children named Juan,
Fabio, Apolinaria Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed Pondoc y
Garrote

352

Andrea Budlong has been in possession of the lot. She declared it

for tax purposes in her name. She planted the lot to coconuts,
bamboos, bananas and a mango tree. Early in 1965 Andrea
wanted to register the deed of donation. The register of deeds in
a letter dated April 1, 1965 asked Juan Pondoc to surrender the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718.
Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of First instance of Bohol an
action for the partition of the said lot. She was allowed to sue as a
pauper. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches and that the registration
of the lot extinguished her rights under the deed of donation.
Issue:
Whether or not the done ceased to be a co-owner because her
name does not appear in the certificate of title
Ruling:
Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land, and ownership
therein, shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens and
incidents attached by law to unregistered land", and that nothing
in Act No. 496 "shall in any way be construed "to change the laws
of descent, or the rights of partition between coparceners joint
tenants and other cotenants " "or to change or affect in any other
way any other rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to
unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act or in the amendments hereof".
LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND
1 Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens and
incidents as unregistered land and, therefore, fake unregistered
land, it is subject to attachment and execution for the payment of
debts. The rights and liabilities which are created by law and are
made applicable to unregistered land, are applicable to registered
land, except as otherwise provided in Act No. 496.
2. The rights arising from the relation of husband and wife are
applicable to registered lands.
3. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien of any description
established by law on land and the b thereon, or the interest of
353

the owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the laws of descent,

and (c) to the rights of partition between coparceners joint
tenants, will other cotenants except as otherwise expressly
provoked in Act No. 496.
The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-owner of Lot No.
5447. She became the successor-in-interest of the donors, Isabela
Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc. The fact that in OCT No. 4718, which
was issued subsequent to the donation, the donors appear to be
the co-owners and not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all
the rights of Andrea as a co-owner.
Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It unmistakably provides
that the conversion of unregistered land into registered land does
not affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal rights and
liabilities applicable to unregistered land
G. ATTRIBUTES
i. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE
Section 47, PD 1529 Registered land not subject to prescription. No
title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
CANA VS. EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH
G.R. 157573
FACTS:
Petitioner Elinel Caa is a former pastor assigned in the respondents affiliate Malabon
Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC). The disputed property consists of a lot and a
church, covered by a transfer certificate in the name of the respondent Evangelical Free
Church of the Philippines.
Petitioner was permitted by the respondents to occupy the disputed property for the
worship services of MCEC. On Dec. 1997, the petitioners revoked the the petitioners
license and was verbally ordered to vacate the premises which the petitioner refused to
do, even after a demand letter later being served.
As a result, respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner, who in turn filed
an answer with counterclaim in the same MTC. The said court dismissed the parties suit
and counterclaim for some technicalities. An appeal to the RTC was also futile, as the
RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
354

A review was then filed by the respondents with the Court of Appeals, who also
dismissed the same for the case being insufficient in form and substance. Thereafter, the
respondents complied by attaching sufficient and relevant documents to its suit.
Then the CA reversed the RTCs ruling and ordered said petitioner to vacate said
property. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not said petitioner has lawful title to the disputed property.
RULING: The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the petitioners contention that in
all its pleadings, the respondents never disputed petitioners claim that MCEC was the
one who purchased the disputed property. Records show that the respondents have
consistently asserted their ownership over the said land, with the evidence of the Deed
of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title. The evidence presented by the
petitioner, which consisted mainly of affidavits of its members of the board, was found
to be self-serving and unsubstantiated.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent's title over the subject property is evidence
of its ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule
is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
In fine, petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove his right to remain in
possession of the disputed property. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that an
ejectment case against the petitioner was proper.
NATALIA REALTY CORP. VS. VALDEZ
173 SCRA 534
FACTS:
Petitioner-plaintiff Corporation filed a complaint against
respondents, alleging that defendants unlawfully occupied
portions of the parcels of land belonging to and registered in its
name. Petitioner prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the
same land belonging to the former and to pay the reasonable
compensation and financial reliefs.
355

Defendants sought the dismissal of all the aforesaid complaints

for ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Their motion
was denied on a holding that the grounds therefore are not
concrete.

On October 1983, plaintiff Corporation moved for a summary

judgment on the consolidated cases under Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court. Claiming that there is no genuine issue averred in the
defendants complaint, and are mere pretended denials and flimsy
defences.

On December 1983, the trial court rendered a summary judgment

upon finding that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only
"conclusions that because they have been in actual possession for
over 30 years of their respective farm lots they are entitled to be
respected of such occupancy and as such the complaints should
be dismissed.

A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA, the CA

affirmed the ruling of the trial court for absence of a valid issue
raised by defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a factual controversy in these

consolidated cases.

RULING:
356

None. The rendition of the questioned summary judgment by the

trial court is proper and valid. The very allegations of the
defendants prove that no valid issue has been tendered by them,
They relied mainly on two points, the alleged invalidity of the title
of the plaintiff and their supposed acquisition of the properties by
adverse possession. Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but
they are entitled to the benefit of clarification.

The certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in

accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) are
indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree of registration. A petition for review of the decree must be
presented within one year after its entry. After the lapse of one
year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons. The certificates
of title of Appellee Corporation were issued more than thirty years
ago

Also, there is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which

may be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted
the ownership of said lands to them and their successors by
title. Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe
that they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole
country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform
area.

Even assuming that said titles may still be challenged base on

their claim applying Presidential Deree no. 2 purportedly making
them and their successors owners of said land, the present case
does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial
action required is a direct, and not a collateral, attack. Petition
was granted.

357

LUCAS VS. GAMPONIA

100 PHIL 277
FACTS:
By the stipulation of the parties it appears that on March 13, 1916, free patent No.
3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in the name of Domingo Mejia.
This patent was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Vizcaya on July 26, 1916 and certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of
Domingo Mejia. On March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but before the
registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias
Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof and enjoyed its fruits. Upon his
death the property was included in the distribution of his estate and adjudicated to
Roque Sanchez. Roque Sanchez in turn sold the land on January 21, 1940 to
Andres Gamponia, Defendant herein. Sanchez was in possession and enjoyment of
the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from Ciscar up to the time he
sold it to Defendant Andres Gamponia, the latter has also possessed and enjoyed
the property from the time he bought it to date.
Upon the above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias
Ciscar is null and void, as the sale was made only 11 days after the issuance of a
patent in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court further
held that since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the
registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his
successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and Defendant Andres Gamponia.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff's right of action has already prescribed by virtue of the
possession of the land by the Defendant and his predecessors in interest for a
period of 37 years
RULING:
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to
find, however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in
favor of the Defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. No hold that the
defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the
registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of
358

laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that while Defendant may not be considered as
having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long continued
possession for 37 years, the original owners right to recover back the possession
of the property and the title thereto from the Defendant has, by the long period of
37 years and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.
In Go Chi Gun, et al., vs. Co Cho, et al., (96 Phil., 622) we held that the equitable
defense of laches requires four elements:(1) conduct on the part of the Defendant,
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
Defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit, (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the Defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; (4) injury or prejudice to the
Defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
to be barred.
All the four elements mentioned above are present in the case at bar. .
The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during
which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition
which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other
words, where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change
that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the
intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will
not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his
own neglect. (Penn Mutual Life Inc. Co., et al., vs. City of Austin et al., U. S.
962.)
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and one is hereby entered
absolving the Defendant from the action.
RIGHT TO RECOVER POSSESSION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE
JM TUASON VS CA
93 SCRA 146
FACTS:
It is not disputed that this case originated as an action for recovery of possession
(ejectment) instituted by the plaintiff (petitioner) corporation against the private
respondent Guillermo Renosa. Respondent's defense to the action for ejectment
was that he bought the disputed portion of land from a certain Capt. Faustino C.
Cruz, for the sum of P3,600.00; that said Faustino C. Cruz acquired the said
359

portion from 3,000 square meters of land acquired by virtue of a compromise

agreement in Civil Case Nos. Q-135, Q-139, Q-177 and Q-186 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch; and that all in all Faustino C. Cruz sold to
respondent 360 square meters of the 3,000 square meters allegedly allocated to the
former in the compromise agreement.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner in the ejectment case on the grounds
that petitioner is the registered owner of the questioned land; that as owner,
petitioner is entitled to possession as an attribute of ownership. Respondent Court
of Appeals in reversing the trial court's decision based its stand on its firm belief
that the compromise agreement between the petitioner and the "Deudors" created a
valid right in favor of Capt. Cruz to possess the property in question; that this valid
right of possession was transmitted to private respondent Reosa when Cruz sold a
portion of that land in 1956, to Reosa.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent Reosas predecessor-interest in the disputed
property namely, Capt. Cruz, acquired a valid right to own and possess said land a
right that he could have legally transferred to private respondent Reosa which was
also to entitle the latter to a better right to possession against the admitted
registered owner of the land.
RULING: Taking into consideration the fundamental principle in law applicable to
the circumstances of this case that mere possession of whatever length cannot
defeat the imprescriptible title to the holder of registered Torrens Title to real
property, and that registered real property under the Torrens system cannot be
acquired by acquisitive prescription. The petitioner who is the registered owner of
the disputed land has a right to possess and recover the same, as against private
respondent Reosa who merely claims a right to possess from his predecessor-ininterest Capt. Cruz who likewise never acquired any right to possess the disputed
property. Both Capt. Cruz and respondent Reosa cannot be considered exactly as
possessors in good faith because both of them knew at the time they entered into
possession that petitioner was the registered owner of the disputed land.
Capt. Cruz cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because as beneficiary
of the compromise agreement he should be in a position to know that there were
suspensive conditions attached to his possible acquisition of the disputed property
and that if the conditions were not fulfilled, his right as beneficiary would never
arise. Aside from the compromise agreement as the only basis of Capt. Cruz'
alleged right to the property in question, he and respondent Reosa were never able
to prove transfer to ownership of the same from petitioner to Capt. Cruz, thus
360

strengthening the obvious fact that the suspensive conditions imposed in the
compromise agreement were never fulfilled and hence petitioner never transferred
title to the reserved properties in favor of the beneficiaries therein. As registered
owner of the land and in the absence of any equal or better right on the part of
respondent Reosa to possess the disputed land, petitioner is entitled to possession
and initiated the correct action when it brought a case to recover possession of the
same.
DABLO VS CA
226 SCRA 618
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title with recovery of possession and
ownership. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Hilariona Fortaleza Dablo is
the surviving spouse of Mariano Dablo who died in 1936, while Maria and Juanito,
both surnamed Dablo are their legitimate children; that plaintiffs inherited from
Mariano Dablo a parcel of unirrigated riceland in Zambales. This parcel of land is
covered by Original Certificate of Title in the name of Hrs. of Mariano Dablo; it
was issued in the name of the heirs of Mariano Dablo on and was transcribed in the
Registry Book of the Resister of Deeds of Zambales. Mariano Dablo had been in
peaceful, continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the property as owner
thereof since 1911 until his death when the plaintiffs succeeded in the possession
of the property, until the defendants illegally entered and occupied it in 1946.
Regional trial court declared that the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in
question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in question.
RULING:
SC held that the private respondents are the true and rightful owners of the western
portion of the land in dispute.However, the remedy granted by respondent Court of
Appeals, that is, the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No P-3593, does
not appear to be proper and apt.
Neither would prescription aid the cause of private respondents, not only because
the acquisitive prescription of 10 years of possession provided under Article 1134
of the Civil Code of the Philippines has not yet transpired (private respondents
361

entered the eastern portion in 1969 while the complaint to quiet title was filed on
April 1, 1975), but also because ownership of registered land under the Torrens
System is imprescriptible (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Cleofas, 92 SCRA 389
[1979]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 146 [1979]).
Nor will laches bolster the claim of ownership of private respondents over this
eastern portion. An action by the registered owner to recover possession based on a
Torrens title is not barred by laches.
MELGAR VS PAGAYON
21 SCRA
FACTS:
A parcel of land was originally owned by Basilia Paccial, who sold it to one
Palomino subject to the right of repurchase within a period of three years. The
period expired without such a right being exercised. Petitioner acquired the rights
and interests. Earlier on January 30, 1925, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
rendered judgment decreeing the registration in the above lot in favor of vendor
Basilia Paccial noted that it was encumbered to the Palomillo "for the sum of TEN
PESOS (P10.00). The original certificate of title was issued in the name of Basilia
Paccial with the foregoing encumbrances and conditions annotated thereon.
Salvador Pagayon, the predecessor-in-interest of the other respondents in this
proceeding acquired the property for the sum of P2,000.00. The Deed of Sale was
registered, and the next day Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
Salvador Pagayon which cancelled the Original Certificate of Title in favor of
Paccial.
Issue:
Whether or not the vendee is the owner of the land.
Ruling:
The conclusiveness of a decree of registration has been stressed. As former Chief
Justice Arellano so emphatically stated: "[It] shall remain in full force and effect
forever. No other conclusion would do in the opinion of former Chief Justice
Araullo as "Section 38 of Act No. 498 . . . is very plain and conclusive..The
Torrens title then "issued after the necessary judicial proceedings [possesses] an
absolute and conclusive character. "The effects of the decree of registration cease
to exist when the title is transferred to a successor." The interests of the Philippines
will best be served by a strict adherence to the provision of the Land Registration
362

Law."
If it were otherwise, much of the stability that it is the purpose of the Torrens
system to maintain would be a thing of the past. The incontestable and absolute
character of the Torrens title.
At the risk of stating what is obvious, We say that land registration proceedings
under Act 496 are in rem and that such proceedings, as well as the title issued as a
result thereof, are binding and conclusive upon the whole world.
This has to be the rule, for if even after the ownership of a property has been
decreed by a land registration court in favor of a particular person and title issued
may still be annulled, alleged, changed, altered or modified after the lapse of the
one year period fixed by the legal provision mentioned above, the object of the
Torrens system, namely, to guarantee the indefeasibility of the title to the property,
would be defeated. In the instant case the above doctrine should apply with more
reason, considering the fact that the property has passed from the hands of the
original registered owner into those of clearly innocent third parties."
CANA VS. EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 157573
FACTS:
A dispute over the possession of a land claimed by a church against its former pastor
sparked the commencement of this case in the trial court. The disputed
property,consisting of a church lot and building, is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 96813, registered in the name of Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines
(respondent), a corporation existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. Elinel
Caa (petitioner) is its former pastor assigned to its affiliate, Malabon Evangelical Free
Church, which petitioner refers to as Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC).
Respondent permitted petitioner to occupy the disputed property wherein MCEC
maintained worship services. However, on December 1, 1997, respondent revoked
petitioner's license and verbally demanded that petitioner vacate the disputed property
but the latter refused to obey. Hence, respondent sought the services of a counsel who
wrote a formal demand letter dated December 17, 1997 requiring petitioner to vacate
the disputed premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to
respondent. Petitioner ignored the demand letter.
Issue: WoN mere possession of the said property defeats a Torrens Title
363

Ruing:
No, Respondent's title over the subject property is evidence of its
ownership thereof.
It is a fundamental principle in land
registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old
rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof.
Having failed to overcome herein respondents right of possession
over the disputed property, petitioner cannot insist that his
continued occupation thereof is lawful. One whose stay is merely
tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the property
the moment he is required to leave (Caiza vs. Court of Appeals,
268 SCRA 640). This is consistent with the principle that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. (Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525)
Instances when defense of indefeasibility is NOT available:
1 The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not apply where
fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not
furnish a shield for fraud. As such, a title issued based on void
documents does not run against the State and its subdivisions.
EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 151424
FACTS: Eagle Realty, a company engaged in the real estate
business, bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via
a Deed of Sale. This Reyes acquired the land from a certain
Medina who earlier acquired the said land via surreptitiously
entering a false record in the records of the Land Registration
Commission. Eventually, the true owners of the said land, the de
Leons, discovered that another title was fraudulently issued to
364

Medina over the same parcel of land. De Leon was able to have
the said title annulled as well as the TCT issued to Eagle Realty by
virtue of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the TCT was validly revoked

RULING: Yes, the principle of indefeasibilty of a Torrens Title does

not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null
and void. The Director of Lands had no authority to grant a free
patent over privately owned land.

DE GUZMAN VS AGBALA

G.R. No. 163566

FACTS:
The subject parcels of land were inherited by Carmen, who died
single, without any compulsory heir. Said land was the subject of
a deed of donation in favor of her niece Madelene Javier Cruz.
According to Madelene, she was present when all the signatories
thereon, including the notary public, signed the document. From
that time on, she received the rentals of the properties covered
by the donation.
Carmen even informed her tenants that
Madelene would inherit the properties upon her death. The
respondent then filed a civil case against Madelene praying that
the deed of donation be nullified, as well as the subsequent
transfers to other parties of the properties covered by the
spurious donation.
An amended complaint was filed on September 15, 1988 to
include the transferees of the properties including petitioner
365

spouses Raymundo and Perla de Guzman, who were the

transferees of the land.
Respondent claimed that the deed of donation was fake.
This was confirmed by the handwriting expert of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Rogelio Azores.
The RTC, in its decision, declared the deed of donation in
favor of Madelene null and void ab initio. Such decision was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OCT No. P-30187 was correctly nullified
RULING:
Yes. Although OCT No. P-30187 was merely collaterally attacked;
it was still correctly nullified because the free patent on which it
was based was null and void ab initio. The principle of
indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and the title based
thereon are null and void. An action to declare the nullity of a
void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as
to collateral, attack. OCT No. P-30187 was registered on the basis
of a free patent which the RTC ruled was issued by the Director of
Lands without authority. The petitioners falsely claimed that the
land was public land when in fact it was not as it was private
land previously owned by Carmen who inherited it from her
parents. This finding was affirmed by the CA.

BORNALES VS. IAC

166 SCRA 512

FACTS:

366

In 1927, Spouses Sixto and Isabel Dumolong were awarded a

parcel of land. Their marriage, however was not blessed by a
child. Sixto then had an extramarital affair and he cohabited with
Placida who even used Sixtos surname. Placida and Sixto begot
children.
The petitioner, on the other hand, is Sixtos tenant. In March
1978, Placida and her children executed a Deed of extrajudicial
Adjudication and Sale of Real Property. They were able to acquire
the supposed thumbmark of Isabel. But apparently, Isabel never
affixed her thumbmark and that the same was not within her
knowledge.
In November 1978, Placida registered the Deed and a Torrens title
was issued in their name. Three months thereafter, Placida and
her children sold the land to Bornales. Isabel assailed the sale.
Isabel argued that the acquisition of the Torrens title by Placida et
al was through fraud. Bornales countered he was not aware of the
fraudulent nature of the prior transactions, but since a Torrens
was issued he should be considered as a buyer in good faith,
hence entitled to some right.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bornales may invoke the indefeasibility of a
Torrens title
RULING:
No. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens
system from their vendors who procured title thereto by means of
fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate
of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest
therein. The Torrens system of land registration should not be
used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of
real property. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good
faith. Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of
a certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it
with notice of the flaws in his transferors title. If at all, the
petitioners only acquire the right which their vendors then had.

367

HEIRS OF TIRO VS PES

G.R. No. 170528

FACTS:
Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting
of Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the children
of the late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
disputed land since time immemorial until they were prevented
from entering the same by persons claiming to be the new
owners sometime in 1995. But they discovered that OCT No. RO1121 had already been cancelled as early as 1969 and was
presently registered in the name of respondent. The petitioners
prayed that all the transactions emanating from the "Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation of Sale," executed by
Maxima Ochea, be declared void, including the transfer made in
favor of the respondent; that the title which was issued in the
name of respondent be cancelled; and that the property be
restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific
Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses
Velayo, the registered owners of the property who were also in
possession of the same at the time of the sale. Respondent
argued that petitioners action for quieting of title was barred by
laches and prescription. The RTC issued a decision dismissing
petitioners complaint. The RTC ruled that respondent was an
innocent purchaser for value who relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title in the name of the vendor.The petitioners filed
with the CA an appeal and MR but were denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the
RD of registering a clearly void and unregistrable document
368

confers no valid title on the presentor and his successors-ininterest.

RULING: Petitioners arguments are unfounded.Certificates of

title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested.
The indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a
means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Good faith must concur with registration because,
otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value
when he buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays
a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before
he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the
property. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor,
and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate
to determine the condition of the property. The courts cannot
disregard the rights of innocent third persons, for that would
impair or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land
registration. Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation
can still be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the
same is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

181 SCRA 46

FACTS:
369

On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed a case in the

CFI of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the
registered owners under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan,
Pangasinan which is now in the possession of petitioners. But
petitioners alleged that they became the owners by accession or
accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed
bordering their properties. While the above-mentioned case was
still pending, petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents
Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the CFI of Pangasinan
for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear
title to a parcel of land. Petitioners alleged that the land in
question belongs to them and that it was only on April 13, 1971,
when respondent spouses filed a complaint against them, that
they found out that the said land was granted by the Government
to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to
which OCT. 2370 was issued in the latter's name. And the said
patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and
void since the said land, an abandoned river bed, is of private
ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land
grant. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the defendants
to surrender to the plaintiffs the physical possession of the land in
question.

On June 24, 1974, the aforesaid CFI of Pangasinan, acting on the

motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and
spouses Agpoon, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. U-2649
for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case
of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. that an action to annul a free
patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible
states no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing

370

the complaint although the facts and circumstances set forth in

the complaint show that the land in question was private land
under Article 370 of the old Civil Code.

RULING:
The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its
dismissal order is not controlling. It is true that by filing the
application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the
invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the
name of his predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither
the allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor
in interest was the absolute owner of the property covered by said
Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or
insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of the free patent and
original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was Barroga's
privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership
in favor of his predecessor in interest and of whatever the latter's
Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to
consider that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part
of the public domain. Acting accordingly he applied for a free
patent and was successful. It must be borne in mind that the
Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and that its holder still
had to prove that he had possessed the land covered by it without
interruption during a period of ten years by virtue of a good title
and in good faith (Royal Decree of June 25,1880). We may well
presume that Barroga felt that he had no sufficient evidence to
prove this, for which reason he decided to acquire the land as part
of the public domain.
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute a sufficient cause of
action against private respondents. Petitioners in their complaint
alleged that the disputed area was formerly an abandoned river
bed formed due to natural causes; that they are the real and
lawful owners of the said land as decreed by Article 370 of the old
Civil Code, the law then in force; that since the said area was a
private land, the same could not have been the subject matter of
an application for free patent; and that all these facts were known
371

to the private respondents and their predecessor in interest.The

indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued
pursuant to a patent may be invoked only when the land involved
originally formed part of the public domain. If it was a private
land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are
a nullity.

MARTINEZ VS CA

G.R. No. 170409

FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who
during his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa
Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them from her own
mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged
that sometime in 1992, petitioner, Gregoria Merquines,
represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the
descendants of Celedoniaand under that name applied for free
patents over the properties with the CENRO. Unbeknownst to
private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in
the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later
filed an application for land registration over the same properties,
petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents
372

to file the instant complaint.

The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and
land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation
in their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering
the cancellation of petitioners titles. Before the Court of Appeals,
She argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of
the lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.
Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is
untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and
incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their
issuance
RULING:
No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and
incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their
issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued
on the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in
the facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as
Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of
Celedonia.
Under the recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the
basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the
law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with
indefeasibility. Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing
where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.
The petition is denied.
CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
132 SCRA 718
373

FACTS:
Petitioner, Juliana Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano De Vera,
were first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one
roof in the care of a common aunt. In year 1951, Mariano De Vera
died. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966.
De Veras nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator
of De Veras estate. Prior to the widows death, she made an
inventory showing that De Veras property (located in Calasiao,
Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada
however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated
that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the
discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana. Estrada
sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the
concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been
paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947
but it only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches
has set in.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor

of De Veras estate

RULING:
374

No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was

erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered
woman, agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the
purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime;
that when de Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that
of Juliana, the latters land was erroneously included.

The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her

inventory before she died, attested that de Veras portion of land
is only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates
the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the
only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is
that which was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A
recalculation must however be made to specify the exact
measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained
by Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m.
should go to de Veras estate.

In the case at bar, the principle of indefeasibility applies only in

the claimed portion or property wherein it can be adjudged not on
the illegally included area.
IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE
208 PHIL 441
FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court in the case of
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, and the National Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondent court
upheld the primacy of the respondent banks title and ordered the cancellation of
the petitioners title. Petitioner raised the sole issue of: which of the two titles is
superior, an earlier title secured administratively or a latter title secured thru
judicial proceedings?.
375

The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the name of the
plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that
said property was acquired by the plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio
Libunao in whose name the same was previously registered by virtue of a
homestead patent; that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria
Maravilla who was the registered owner of a parcel of land including the land in
question under O.C.T. by virtue of a decree/decision, of the CFI of Nueva Ecija .
The lower court declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the respondent Court denied it. Failing to
obtain a reversal of the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired earlier by
homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent land registration proceedings.
Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the conflicting titles had
been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her predecessor Mariano Padilla even
several years before the Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as
private land and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration Case No.
3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the petitioner attacks the validity of
the homestead patent and title issued to the respondent banks predecessor, Emilio
Libunao.
In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public
patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue
thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor, is recorded and the certificate of title is issued to the
grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the expiration
of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding."
Applying the case of Pajomayo, Et. Al. v. Manipon, Et Al., (39 SCRA 676)
Supreme Court held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the
Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of
title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under
the Land Registration Act. Supreme Court should add that the Director of Patents,
being a public officer, has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing the
questioned homestead patent.
376

HEIRS OF SPS, LIM VS. RTC JUDGE

G.R. No. 173891
FACTS:
Amparo E. Caosa (respondent Caosa) filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City seeking the reconstitution of the original Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 169395 of the Register of Deeds of the same city.
The trial court had ex parte presentation of evidence before the branch clerk of
court. Convinced that the jurisdictional requirements were complied with and
finding merit in the petition, the trial court ordered the reconstitution of the original
and owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395.
Petitioners filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial courts decision.
According
to
petitioners,
their
parents, spouses Luciano P. Lim and Salud Nakpil Bautista, are the registered
owners of a parcel of land. They acquired it from Domingo L. Santos. The lot
contained an area of 795 square meters more or less and was covered by TCT No.
27997. Furthermore, they alleged that their parents had been in actual physical
possession of the property. A fired razed Quezon City Hall, the records destroyed
was the original copy of TCT No. 27997 and thus, one of the petitioners applied
for and was issued a reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-97223, in September
1994.
Petitioners
claimed
that
when
respondent Caosa filed
a
petition
for the reconstitution of TCT No. 169395. They insisted that the petition for
reconstitution did not comply with the requirements found in Sections 12 and 13
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as it failed to state specifically the boundaries of the
property subject of the petition as well as the names of the occupants or persons
in possession of the property. Petitioners considered these circumstances as
extrinsic fraud. Caosa alleged that there was no fraud and that the jurisdictional
requirements of notice and publication had been complied with.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners sought reconsideration of
the resolution, but their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have personality and right to be notified of
the reconstitution proceedings nor do they have any right to file the petition for
annulment of judgment.

377

Ruling:
Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the reconstitution of the original
and duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395 will have no effect on their property, the
latter being different from, and not even a part of the property covered by the
reconstituted title. One having no right or interest of his own to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action, thus petitioners
petition for annulment of judgment was rightfully dismissed.
Petitioners impute error to the Court of Appeals when it dismissed
their petition after it concluded, on the basis of its simple comparison
of petitioners and respondents TCTs, that the properties covered by the two titles
are entirely different. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should have
conducted a trial and received evidence; and having failed to do so, its conclusion
was allegedly not only flawed but was also arrived at with grave abuse of
discretion and without due process. Supreme Court does not agree.
The Court of Appeals did not dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment
outright. In fact, it required respondent Caosa to file her answer, and even
allowed the filing of an amended answerproof that it was predisposed to
consider the arguments of both parties before it even decided to finally
dismiss the petition. Mere filing of a petition for annulment of judgment does
not guarantee the holding of trial or reception of evidence. A petition
for annulment of judgment may in fact be dismissed outright if it has no
prima facie merit. With more reason that the Court of Appeals may dismiss a
petition even without a hearing if it finds that based on the averments in the
petition and the responsive pleading, the annulment of the assailed judgment
is not warranted.
TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANO
G.R. No. 152007
FACTS:
On September 19, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, the
complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the successors-ininterest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs of the
original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5,795 square meters situated in
Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol; that in 1992, when petitioners decided to partition the
subject property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the title
covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a
378

Deed of Sale executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest in

1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors
therein, did not sign the conveying deed; and that one of the alleged vendors,
Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, ong before the purported Deed of
Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Hence, Petitioners, pray for the
nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant
thereto and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus damages.
Respondents assert that they had been in open, continuous, and
peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said
sale, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due
thereon.
On June 7, 1999, the trial court finding that the evidence adduced
by the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim that the
questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. A motion for
reconsideration was filed with the CA, which affirmed the decision
of the trial court, ruling that petitioners are barred from filing their
petition due to laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse of the petitioners is valid.
RULING: No. The recourse must fail. As it is, the petitioners call for a review of
the facts of the case. Their action calls for the determination of the truth or
falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve.
It appears that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public
document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo
Yap. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public
document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution.
More so, as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere
allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies
on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge
their burden.
A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question
on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or
not, can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in
379

a collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of

deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of
Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to
attack a Torrens certificate of title. Petition was denied.
NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ
173 SCRA 534
FACTS: Petitioner, Natalia Realty, filed separate ejectment cases against
respondents with the RTC of Rizal for allegedly unlawfully occupying parcels of
lands which were covered by the petitioners transfer certificates. The respondents
file a consolidated answer moving to dismiss said case based on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
Then the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that there is no
valid issue raised by the respondents, but only conclusions that they have been in
actual possession of the subject lands for more than 30 years. They were then
ordered to vacate the lots and to pay monthly rents. So the respondents filed an
appeal with the Intermediate Appellate Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a valid claim over the disputed land?
RULING: The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the lower court that the
certificate of title issued to the petitioners in accordance with the Land Registration
Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of
registration. After the lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or
not they were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings. The said
titles were issued to the petitioners more than 30 years ago.
Furthermore, the SC averred that, under the law, Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be
subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article
1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the
Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No.
496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both
immaterial and inconsequential.
There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be
said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the
ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title.
380

Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that

they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole
country was declared by the previous regime as a land reform
area.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION VS CA
201 SCRA 165
FACTS:
On August 27, 1974, Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora) filed an
application for registration of title of a parcel of land. It alleged that the parcel of
land has an area of 156 hectares, more or less; and that the applicant acquired said
property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954.
Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to
14 hectares and praying for a decree of registration over said
portions of Lot 8. Same with Ortigas and Company Limited
Partnership (Ortigas) filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging,
among others, that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the
case, the land being applied for having been already registered
under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under TCT
77652 and TCT 77653.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas,
holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their
face show that they were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334,
pursuant to Decree 1425; Ortigas then filed a motion for
reconsideration praying the respondent court to reconsider its
order of March 30, 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
over the application for registration, the parcels of land subject
thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title.
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent court
praying for the annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19,
1989 orders of the trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be
ordered to dismiss the land registration case,the trial court then
rendered the decision in favor to Ortigas.
ISSUE: Do a Torrens Certificate of Title be subjected to a
collateral attack?
381

RULING:
Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied
for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that
Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila
while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by
the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an
area of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers
away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the
merits to ascertain the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the
decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission
which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of
title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to
and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240
[1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been
issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate
of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title
to nor bind the land and is null and void.
Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting
the alleged error in the questioned TCTs. A certificate of title
cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. Also, no correction of
certificate of title shall be made except by order of the court in a
petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in
which the decree of registration was entered. While the law fixes
no prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not
authorized to alter or correct the certificate of title if it would
mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the
period allowed by law.
While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a
land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land
already covered by a certificate of title, it is nevertheless true that
the aforesaid rule only applies where there exists no serious
controversy as to the certificate's authenticity visa vis the land
covered therein. In the case at bar, the claimed origin of the
questioned TCTs evidently appear to be different from what is
stated therein. It does not appear indubitable that the disputed
382

parcels of land are properly reflected in the TCTs relied upon by

private respondent. Off-hand, and as the parties admit, the TCTs
do not show that they are actually derivatives of OCT 351.
The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted
respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs
relied upon by the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed
origin. Thus, in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769
[1926]) this Court held that the "simple possession of a certificate
of title, under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor
the true owner of all the property described therein. If a person
obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the
Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included (citing Legarda
and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])." As it is in this case, a
certificate of title cannot be considered conclusive evidence of
ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported
origin.
ESLANISLAO VS. HONRADA
114 SCRA 748
FACTS;
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals granting ex-parte the
cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor
of Pedro Asedillo.
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo
Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No.
N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original
Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register
of Deeds covering a parcel of land with an area of 51,852 square
meters.
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44
383

Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137

was issued on September 18, 1961.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts,
United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch III, Pasay
City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching
Leng. Alfredo Ching was appointed then asthe administrator of
Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of
administration issued on January 3, 1966.
Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was
commenced on December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City
docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the
abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his
favor based on possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No.
44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T.
No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in
private respondent's complaint).
The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo, declaring him to be
the true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo
ching to surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its
cancellation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was
cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in
favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa
Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979. Upon
knowing, Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He
filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as
null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the
court on May 29, 1980.
ISSUE: Where to file an action for the cancellation of a title?
RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
384

property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole

world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will;
it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard
or given an opportunity to be heard. An action to recover a parcel
of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds
a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a
tangible thing.
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of
title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant
Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years
after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475) the decision of the
lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have
been validly served with summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of
legal relations, was lost through death.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must
be filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal,
sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112
of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI
Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case
No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in
interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when
the summons was published he could not have been notified at all
and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The
ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been
held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter one
year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree,
but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open
to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
385

justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value.
FERRER VS. BAUTISTA
231 SCRA 748
FACTS:
Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the
Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims its
ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980
covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north of the land
in question. On the other hand, private respondents equally
assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation
and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of
respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent No.
309504 issued on 24 January 1966 .

On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint

with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to
"Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano
Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated
Civil Case No. A-514.

Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the
Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965,
against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also
handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint,
without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority
to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director
of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.

Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was
386

denied.

Petitioner claimed that the respondent judge committed an error

in outright dismissing on the ground of collateral attack on Free
Patent Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion
and an excess of his jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not a void title can be subject to collateral

attack.

RULING: Yes. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a

free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and
which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued
or conveyed by him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not
from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority
being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that
are privately owned.

Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title

over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the
time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not
a part of the disposable land of the public domain.

Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year

after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not
apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare
the nullity of that void title does not prescribe; in fact, it is
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack.
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS IAC
387

157 SCRA 380

FACTS:
On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners
of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising
more or less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of
spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit ,herein
private respondents, as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This
sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was
made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents
for the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of
the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with
the P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the
balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is
issued. From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in
peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the
property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975,
said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez
authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains
Authority (NGA).
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed
by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property
involved in this case, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor
of the petitioner.
The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property
in question, scheduling the public auction sale. The petitioner was the highest and
successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same
date by the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, NGA in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold the
subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT
No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the
388

name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974.

A month after, the private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas
spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the same
property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena
Magcamit offered to pay the NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance
of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale
but the petitioner refused to accept the payment and claimed ownership of the
property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same. The private
respondents are in possession of subject property were asked by the NGA to vacate
it but the former refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private
respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the case was
dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against
the NGA and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be
declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in
possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said
property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such
terms and conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the
premises.
In its answer to the complaint, the National Grains Authority maintained that it is a
purchaser in good faith and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No.
1728; and that the title is now indefeasible, hence, cause of action of Nena
Magcamit has already prescribed.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of National Grains
Authority the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible
title to the same and ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to
defendant National Grains Authority.
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to
the Intermediate Appellate Court which rendered its decision reversing and setting
aside the decision of the trial court ordering the National Grains Authority to
execute a deed of reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and
cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same
389

was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Grains Authority is the rightful owner of the
disputed land.
RULING:
Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner
under the Torrens System and has obviously a better right than private respondents
and that the deed of absolute sale with the suspensive condition is not registered
and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private
respondents.
It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real purpose of the Torrens
System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality.
Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the
possibility of losing his land. An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is
not allowed.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a
land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner.
He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the
land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent
purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529
and later as innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
D, STATUTORY LIENS AFFECTING TITLE
Section 44, PD 1529- Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall
hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said
certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and
Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear of
390

record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent

purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years
immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an
innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the government
to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or
any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title
does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or
lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by
virtue of, pursuant to, Presidential No. 27 or any other law or regulations on
agrarian reform.
a Sec. 44, PD 1529 is an exclusive enumeration.
ROJAS ET AL VS TAGAYTAY CITY
60 OG 6
Petitioners Zosimo Rojas, et al., claiming to be the registered owners of Lot No. 1,
Psu-103916-Amd. originally decreed in their favor in Case No. 398, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 53546, have filed this original petition for certiorari seeking to nullify
the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dated December 2, 1957, denying
their petition to set aside the decision of June 30, 1957 rendered in another and
subsequent Land Registration Case No. 323, G.L.R.O. Record No. 12440
decreeing, for the second time, the registration of the same Lot No. 1, this time in
favor of the City of Tagaytay. At the instance of herein petitioners, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court on January 24, 1958, restraining
the respondent Judge from taking further cognizance of the aforementioned
registration case No. 323 until further orders from this Court.
The City of Tagaytay sought original registration of this parcel of land, allegedly
acquired by purchase from Zosimo Rojas, either under Act. No. 496 or pursuant to
Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act. No. 141, said applicant and its predecessorsin-interest having been in actual possession of the land since 1894. No copy of the
deed of sale was attached to the application, allegedly because it was either lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation.
391

As nobody appeared at the hearing to oppose the application, an order of general

default was entered by the court against the whole world, and the applicant was
allowed to adduce its evidence.
On June 30, 1957, the court decreed registration of said Lot No. 1 plan Psu103916-Amd. in the name of the City of Tagaytay, free from any liens and
encumbrances, and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title upon the
finality of said decision.
On July 15, 1957, Zosimo Rojas, supposed vendor of the lot in question, together
with his present co-petitioners, Manuel, Bernardo, Deomedes, Felisa and Soledad,
all surnamed Rojas, filed in the same proceeding a petition to set aside the decision
of the court in so far as said Lot No. 1, Psu-103916-Amd was concerned; to lift the
order of general default as far as it affected them because as adjoining owners cited
in the application, no actual notice was served them as requires in Section 32 of
Act 496, as amended; and praying that they be allowed to file their opposition to
the registration of the aforesaid lot for the reason, among others, that said Lot. No.
1 was part of a bigger parcel of land already decreed in a previous land registration
case (Case No. 398, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 53546) and covered by an original
certificate of title (O.C.T. No. 29) issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite in their
names since December 5, 1940.
The lower court denied this petition by order of December 2, 1957; hence, the
filing of the instant action by the Rojas brothers for the purpose already stated
above
Issue:
Is the granting of OCT includes Lot No. 1?
Ruling:
Applicant-respondent also alleges that even granting that Original Certificate of
Title No. 29 includes Lot No. 1, such registration did not confer ownership upon
the petitioners, at least insofar as that portion occupied by the City Hall of
Tagaytay is concerned, it being contended that such building and the land whereon
it was erected are properties for public use and, hence are outside the scope and
efficacy of the Torrens title acquired by petitioners, pursuant to Section 39 of Act
496.
392

The aforementioned Section 39 of the Land Registration Act reads:

SEC. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free
of all incumbrances except those noted on said certificate, and any of the
following incumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or
Constitution which the statutes of the Philippine Islands can not require to
appear of record in the registry.
Second. Taxes within two years after the same become due and payable.
Third.Any public highway, way, private way established by law.or any
Government, irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title
does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal
or lateral thereof, have been determined.
The aforequoted provision specifically enumerates the only cases that may limit
the registered owners absolute title over the property: (1) liens, claims or rights
existing or arising under the laws or the Constitution and which the statutes do not
require their annotation or appearance in the registry; (2) taxes within 2 years after
they become due and payable;(3) encumbrance or lien duly annotated in the
certificate of title; and (4)any public highway, way, private way established by law,
or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof existing on the property even
if not annotated in the certificate. It is clear therefrom that even if we concede, for
the sake of argument, that a municipal building or city hall and the land whereon it
is erected may be considered as properties for public use, under the well-accepted
principle of inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius, respondent cannot validly invoke the
provision of law quoted above.
This decision is limited only to the action of the trial court, sitting as land
registration court, decreeing for the second time, the registration of Lot No. 1 of
subdivision plan Psu-103916-Amd. infavor of respondent City of Tagaytay, a lot
already previously decreed by a competent court in favor of the petitioners, which
action, Supreme Court held, is null and void.
b Certificate of Title is subject to servitudes. Exception.
DIGRAN VS AUDITOR GENERAL
64 OG 19
FACTS:
393

On June 22, 1909, RupertaCabucos bought from, and fully paid to the
Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated in Cebu City
for which a formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor on November 27,
1915 by the Friar Lands Agency. On February 28, 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-3918 (T-320) was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate was among
the friar lands acquired by the Government for resale to actual tenants or occupants
pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine Commission.
Sometime in 1914 or 1915, without prior expropriation proceedings, the
government constructed Mango Avenue, a municipal road, passing through Lot No.
638. A claim for compensation was filed with the Municipality of Cebu but it was
still unpaid when World War II broke out.RupertaCabucos died in 1940. In 1951
her heirs subdivided Lot No. 638 into eight lots.
On February 16, 1963 Raymunda S. Digran, a daughter of Candida Samson,
became administratrix of the estate of RupertaCabucos. On February 18, 1963 the
Deputy Auditor General, as stated, denied the claim. This decision was the subject
of two motions for reconsideration, the later one having been denied on June 10,
1963. On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to this Court from
said decision altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an amended claim for compensation
with the Auditor General. On August 7, 1963 the Auditor General desisted from
rendering a decision on the amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that the
case was already sub judice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of RupertaCabucos are entitled to compensation
for Lot No. 638-B, the road lot.
RULING: The Government denies the obligation to give due compensation for
Lot No. 638-B mainly on the grounds that RupertaCabucos' title over Lot No. 638
was subject to the Government's reservations for public use, such as rights of way
and other public servitudes under Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 and Section
39 of Act 496; and, that the right to enforce the claim for compensation is barred
by prescription and laches.
The grounds relied upon by the Government, stated above, lack merit. Firstly,
Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no authority for the Government to
take private lands covered by said Act for public use without just compensation.
Sections 19, 20 and 21 state:
394

SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any exclusive
rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any water
supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent, but all of
such irrigation works and water supplies shall remain under the exclusive
control of the Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered
under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for the
common benefit of those interests dependent upon them. And the
Government reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the
right to levy an equitable contribution or tax for the maintenance of such
irrigation works, the assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of
benefits received, and each purchaser under this Act, by accepting the
certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be given, shall be held to assent
thereto. And it is further provided that all lands leased or conveyed under
this Act shall remain subject to the right of way of such irrigation canals,
ditches, and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter see
fit to construct.
SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of this Act
shall hold such lands subject to the same public servitudes as existed upon
lands owned by private persons under the sovereignty of Spain, including
those with reference to the littoral of the sea and the banks of navigable
rivers and rivers upon which rafting may be done.
SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of the
Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or tracts of said
lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same for public use, and thereafter
such tracts shall not be subject to sale, lease, or other disposition under this
Act.
Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive right to any canal,
ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any water supply upon which such
irrigation works are or may be dependent which were already existing at the time
of purchase. It also subjects the land so purchased to the right of way of such canal,
ditch, reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the friar lands subject to
public servitudes also imposed on other lands owned by private persons. Section
21 gives the Civil Governor, upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, the
authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as non-alienable and reserve
the same for public use. Needless to say, the road construction through Lot No.
638-B is not the servitude contemplated in Sections 19 and 20, above quoted.
395

Moreover, it has not been shown that Lot No. 638-B was declared nonalienable by
the Civil Governor prior to sale to, and purchase by, Ruperta Cabucos so as to
prevent her from acquiring ownership thereover.
ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. FREEDOM TO
BUILD, INC.

G.R. No. 134692

August 1, 2000

FACTS:

Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost

housing, sold to petitioners, a house and lot in Barangka,
Marikina, Manila. The Contract to Sell and the Transfer Certificate
of Title covering the lot issued in the name of petitioners
contained a Restrictive Covenant providing prohibitions such as
easement of two meters in front, second storey expansion to be
placed above the back of the house and should not extend
forward beyond the apex of the original building, and the 2nd
floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front property
line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house.
Petitioners, despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended
the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the
second floor of their house to a point directly above the original
front wall. Respondent filed an action to demolish the
unauthorized structures. The RTC ruled against Spouses Fajardo
and directed them to immediately demolish and remove the
extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the
limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The spouses filed
petition for review before the Supreme Court.

396

ISSUES:

Whether the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid.

Whether respondent has the personality to enforce the provisions
of the covenant.

HELD:

The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are
not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the
use of land or the location or character of buildings or other
structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or
rights but it can also be contended that such covenants, being
limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property,
do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes (burden),
sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal
negative easements, which is the most common easement
created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the
owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement
existed, he would be entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive
covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected are
crafted not solely for creating easements nor as a restriction as to
the type of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on the
subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the
developer originally might have intended the stipulations to be.
Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive
covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is
intended. It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has
neither right nor interest in the land for the benefit of which the
restriction has been imposed. Thus, a developer of a subdivision
can enforce restrictions, even as against remote grantees of lots,
only if he retains part of the land. There would have been merit in
397

the argument of petitioners - that respondent, having relinquished

ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners, is precluded
from claiming any right or interest on the same property - had not
the homeowners' association, confirmed by its board of directors,
allowed respondent to enforce the provisions of the restrictive
covenant.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
F. SPLITTING OR CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE
Section 49, PD 1529 Splitting or consolidation of titles. A registered owner of
several distinct parcels of land embraced in and covered by a certificate of
title desiring in lieu thereof separate certificates, each containing one or more
parcels, may file a written request for that purpose with the Register of Deeds
concerned, and the latter, upon the surrender of the owners duplicate, shall
cancel it together with its original and issue in lieu thereof separate certificates
as desired. A registered owner of several distinct parcels of land covered by
separate certificates of title desiring to have in lieu thereof a single certificate
for the whole land, or several certificates for the different parcels thereof, may
also file a written request with the Register of Deeds concerned, and the latter,
upon the surrender of the owners duplicates, shall cancel them together with
their originals and issue in lieu thereof one or separate certificates as desired.
G. SUBDIVISION AND CONSOLIDATION PLANS
Section 50, PD 1529 Subdivision and consolidation plans.Any owner
subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a
subdivision project as defined and provided for under PD No. 957, shall file
with the Commissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a
subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways
and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together with the
approved technical descriptions and the corresponding owners duplicate
certificate of title is presented for registration, the Register of Deeds shall,
without requiring further court approval of said plan, register the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended:
Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new
certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space, a
memorandum to the effect that except by way of donation in favor of the
national government, province, city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan shall be
398

enclosed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without the

approval of the Court of First Instance of the province or city in which the
land is situated,
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more,
requiring new technical descriptions, shall file with the Land Registration
Commission, a consolidation plan on which shall be shown the lots to be
affected, as they were before, and as they will appear after the consolidation.
Upon the surrender of the owners duplicate certificates and the receipt of
consolidation plan duty approved by the Commision, the Register of Deeds
concerned shall cancel the corresponding certificates of title and issue a new
one for the consolidated lots.
The Commission may not order or cause any change, modification, or
amendment in the contents of any certificate of title, or of any decree or plan,
including the technical descriptions therein, covering any real property
registered under the Torrens system, nor order the cancellation of the said
certificate of title and the issuance of a new one which would result in the
enlargement of the area covered by the certificate of title.
a Simple Subdivisions.
Section 50, PD 1529
b Complex Subdivisions
PD 957

REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION

A. APPEAL
a. Reglementary period: 15 days from receipt.
i. As against the government.
REPUBLIC VS SAYO
191 SCRA 71
FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela,
but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
399

Act No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato

Bayaua opposed such registration. An order of general default
was thereafter entered against the whole world except the
oppositors. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until
a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the
parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded
portions of land in favor of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development, Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao &
Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, 5,500
hectares was adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the
Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares
were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The parties also
mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over
Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981, the
respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have
that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void
and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy
in confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land?
HELD:
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development
to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. It
was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for
approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal
counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that
"Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of

400

the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding

until they are actually received by the Solicitor General."
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null
and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however
indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that
the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by
competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge
complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration
Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court
of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings
therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter
rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant.
REPUBLIC VS CA
135 SCRA 156
FACTS:
In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the registration of
885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the Maxinos. The decision became
final and executory so a decree of registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8)
years after the decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the
same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision, decree, and title on the
ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the
unclassified public forest. The Maxinos opposed the petition. The CFI judge
denied the petition and when appealed, the same was dismissed on the ground that
the order had allegedly long become final and unappealable so the Government
was estopped thru the registration made by its agents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the registration order?
RULING:
No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land involved in
the present case is a part of a forestland, thus non-registerable. As to the ruling of
CA that the government was estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously
registered by its own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in
Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, (50 Phil. 975, 980),
where it held that the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors
of its agents.
401

ii. Despite the pendency of the appeal, the court retains jurisdiction until
expiration of one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.
GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
168 SCRA 503
FACTS:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12
parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion
later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et
al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among
them. After notice and publication, and there being no opposition
to the application, the trial court issued an order of general
default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision
became final and executory hence the court directed the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels
of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already
granted by homestead patent in 1929.
Under the law, land
already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the
subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverios
recommendation. Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529
(Land Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of
the decree of registration and certificate of title. That once the
judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree
of registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on
approving the adjudication even after it had become final and
executory.
HELD:
402

Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a

cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final,
in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one
(1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The
Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not
been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA)
and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry
of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision
in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
HENCE, the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside when
granted.
Republic vs. Estenzo
158 SCRA 282
FACTS:
On 11 November 1961, the Land Tenure Administration,
representing the Republic, initiated and prosecuted expropriation
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the
acquisition of some 591.0654 hectares of private agricultural
lands situated in San Isidro, Leyte, and owned by respondents
Espeletas, Martinezes and Pachecos, for resale to tenants,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 1400.chanroblesv
On 14 June 1962, the lower court rendered a decision condemning
the said land for P411,995.78. 1 The Republic, having already
paid the partial sum of P206,850.00, was, accordingly, ordered to
pay the balance of P205,145.78, plus the further sum of
P20,000.00 for a farmhouse, copra drier and warehouses, or a
total of P225,145.78. This was supplemented by an amendatory
order providing for payment of 6% per annum interest starting 14
June 1962 on the unpaid balance. Implementing orders, the last of
which was dated 28 July 1962, were thereafter successively
issued.chanroblesi
Came 12 April 1963 and the balance of P143,150.00 still
remained unpaid despite an order directing payment thereof.
Respondents-landowners then filed a motion in the lower court
403

imploring the latter to (1) annul its amended decision of 24

August 1962 on the ground that its basis - the compromise
agreement - was secured through fraud; and (2) resuscitate its
original decision of 14 June 1962.chanroblesvanrob
The Republic went to the Supreme Court on a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction. Before the Supreme Court could rule on the petition,
however, the parties entered anew into another compromise
agreement. The Republic, now represented by the Land Authority,
covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of
P143,150.00 plus 6% per annum interest from 24 August 1962.
Respondents-landowners, for their part, agreed to renounce "any
and all further claims against the former
which had been
recognized and ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26
April 1963 "in the event (of) full payment of said compromise
price . . . on or before said date,"
The Republic failed again to pay its obligation in full, as per
agreement. Out of P143,150.00, it was able to pay, as of 31
August 1964, P85,260.65 on the principal and P17,010.98 on the
interest, or a total of P102,271.63 only. This precipitated the filing
of respondents-landowners' motion, dated 10 November 1964, in
the lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the
Sheriff of the City of Manila to enforce the writ of execution of 28
July 1962. nroblesvirtualaw
The Republic moved for reconsideration of the lower court's order
alleging, in addition to the two basic arguments previously raised
in its oposition to respondents-landowners' motion of 10
November 1964, that the garnishment of the funds of the Land
Authority violates Sections 14 and 21 10 of Republic Act No. 992,
otherwise known as the Revised Budget Act, because the money
garnished was appropriated by Congress "for the operation and
maintenance of the nineteen (19) Settlement Projects and twelve
(12) Agencies under the administration of . . . (the) Authority,
pursuant to the provision of R. A. 3844, (and) to cover salaries of
personnel, travelling, supplies and materials and other
administrative expenses," and are, therefore, not funds for the
payment of expropriated estates. This was opposed by
404

respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14 and 21 of

Republic Act No. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure and/or
payment by the government official charged with custody of such
funds but are not applicable to forcible seizure through
garnishment pursuant to a writ of execution," as in the case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibr
Hence, this present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.lnrob
HELD:
The first plea of herein petitioner, that the Court of First Instance
of Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section
154 (3) of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), enacted
on 8 August 1963, is plainly without merit. Said Section 154 (3)
provides that Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land Tenure
administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the time of
the effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and continued in
the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby the Republic
undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation price with
interest on or before 31 August 1964. Whatever writ of execution
could be issued by the respondent judge must necessarily be
predicated on the second compromise, and conform to the terms
thereof.chanroblesvir
and that it is undeniable that the petitioner Republic had not
made full payment of P143,150.00, plus legal interest from 24
August 1962, on or before 31 August 1964. Such default,
however, only entitled respondents to demand execution on the
basis
of
the
compromise
approved
by
this
Court.chanroblesblesvirtual
The lower court was, therefore, already divested of its control
over the cause when the motion of 12 April 1963 was filed; it was
already shorn of its jurisdiction when its controversial order of 26
405

April 1963 was issued pursuant thereto, ordering payment of the

original award made in 14 June 1962. All that the lower court
could do under the circumstances was to enforce the amended
decision of 24 August 1962. Instead of a motion for relief under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the proper move for respondentslandowners would have been to file a separate and independent
civil action to set aside, by annulment or rescission, both the first
compromise agreement and the amended decision embodying
the same.chanroblesvirtualawl libraryanroblesvirtualaw
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, and the
respondent Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further
proceeding in its Civil Case.The preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is made permanent. No costs. Let a copy of this opinion be
sent to the Honorable, the President of the Philippines, through
the Secretary of Justice.
HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS VS DE BANUVAR
25 SCRA 316
Facts:
Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lots
in questions with reservations, and ordered the registration of
these lots in favor of the Benuvar.
A petition for reconstitution was made. At the pendency of the
reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired
lot 1 from Santiago de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a
party for the latter. The petitioners opposed, on a claim that they
have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted possession
and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since
time immemorial, long before the second world war.
For "lack of proper notices," the respondent court denied the
petition. However, in its later order the court reconsidered and
granted the petition.
The petitioners interposed an appeal from this last order.
Respondent court dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the
required bond," but withheld action on the motion for immediate
execution as to lot 1 "until after this order dismissing the appeal
406

shall have become final." The herein petitioners then filed a

petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, to compel the
trial court to give due course to their appeal. This petition was
finally dismissed.
De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree over lot
1. The petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not
final and executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have
appealed from the said decision by virtue of a notation the
counsel received the same "Con mi excepcion making the
execution of the said decision impossible. De Banuvar asserted
that the issuance of the decree is but a ministerial duty of the
respondent court.
Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De
Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision
in the land registration case had already become final and
executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory
because the La Urbana, Inc. appealed therefrom, as may be seen
from the notation of the reconstituted decision stating, "Recibi
copia. Con mi excepcion.
Ruling:
This contention is without merit.
Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had long
become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate,
dated March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by
the Director of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision
rendered." The notation found at the foot of the last page of the
reconstituted decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc. excepted
from that decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an
appeal. An appeal was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con
mi exception." The judgment rendered in a land registration case
becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted
from the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the
decision.
407

The requirement contained in the decision of March 24, 1938

regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an
agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while
it does leave something yet to be done, does not detract from the
finality of the decision, because the segregation adverted to
refers to a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and
may be accomplished anytime after the decision became final
and executory.
NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the Bureau Of Lands
cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in the municipality of
Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome
Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys
were completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of
Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the assurances made
by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they would take care of his
homestead in the cadastral proceedings, Bartolome Quines did not file any answer
therein. However, one Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots
including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930,
rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by
her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently because neither the
Director of Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during the bearing to
inform the court that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930,
pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the original certificate
of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted
to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on
September 15, 1930 issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six
months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots
awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino sold the said
land to Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral proceedings,
408

prevails over the title of Quines, which is from homestead. What is the effect of
failure to appeal?
HELD:
The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a cadastral
proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered therein by the cadastral court is
binding against the whole world, including the Government. As a general rule,
registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable,
after the passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt
by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without
any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then
have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title
issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested
upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or
adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected.
The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting
registration of subsequent disposition the land where court proceedings would no
longer be necessary.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS REYES
68 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Alipio Alinsurin, later substituted by Paraaque Investment
and Development Corporation, sought to register under Act 496, a parcel of land
indisputably included within the area reserved for military purposes under
Presidential Proclamation No.237, dated December 19, 1955. Applicant claimed
that his predecessors acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title
issued during the Spanish Regime on March 5, 1895. The application was opposed
by the Government. The lower court adjudicated (a) 2/3 portion of the land in favor
of the corporation, subject to the rights of one Ariosto Santos per a manifestation
submitted in court, and (b) 1/3 portion to Roman Tamayo. Within the extended
period, the Government filed the corresponding record on appeal, copy of which
was duly served upon the corporation and Tamayo. Pending approval of the Record
on Appeal, and on motion of the corporation and of Tamayo, the lower court
directed the issuance of a registration decree of the entire parcel applied for, 1/3
pro-indiviso in favor of Tamayo, and 2/3 pro-indiviso in favour of the corporation,
and declared that as to Tamayo's share, the court's decision had become final, but
409

as to the share of the corporation, the registration shall be subject to the final
outcome of the appeal. Hence, the Government instituted this Special Civil Action
for certiorari and mandamus and the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the lower court from issuing a writ of possession,
the corporation and Tamayo from exercising acts of ownership over the property,
and the register of deeds from accepting for registration documents on the land
until the government shall have filed a notice of lis pendens. During the pendency
of the appeal in the registration case, a certain Honofre A.Andrada and others filed
with the Court of First Instance a complaint against the corporation and Tamayo
for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question. The trial court assumed
jurisdiction over, and decided, the case in favor of Andrada. Pursuant thereto, but
in violation of the Supreme Court's injunction (in L-27594), the corporation
executed a subdivision plan of the parcel subject of the land registration, and the
trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the original certificate of title
and to issue new titles to Andrada, et al., "free from all liens and encumbrances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution pending appeal is applicable?
HELD:
The court held that:
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL; FAILURE TO SERVE APPELLEE WITH NOTICE
OFAPPEAL CANNOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF APPEAL, IF APPELLEE WAS
SERVED WITH COPYOF RECORD ON APPEAL. The failure of appellants to
serve a copy of their notice of appeal to the counsel for one of the several appellees
is not fatal to the appeal,where admittedly, he was served with a copy of the
original, as well as the amended record on appeal in both of which the notice of
appeal is embodied. Such failure cannot impair the right of appeal, especially if the
substantial rights of the adverse party is not impaired and the appeal taken was
from the entire decision which is not severable.
2. LAND REGISTRATION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT
APPLICABLE INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. Execution
pending appeal is not applicable in land registration proceedings. It is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real
properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
3.LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE ISSUED BASED ON
JUDGMENT THAT ISNOT FINAL IS A NULLITY. A Torrens Title issued on
the basis of a judgment that is not final, the judgment being on appeal, is a nullity,
as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act, which
requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title
410

becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the register of
deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
4. ISSUANCE OF TITLE DESPITE TIMELY APPEAL IS ERRONEOUS. The
lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire
decision a quo.
TALAVERA VS MANGOBA
8 SCRA 837, 1963
FACTS:
On December 2, 1957, Talavera filed before the CFI of Nueva
Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba
and his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of
B-Meg Poultry Feeds, which latter received from former.
Defendants presented separate Answers, wherein they admitted
some and denied other allegations in the complaint. Both also
interposed separate counterclaims of P1,000.00 each. In the
hearing scheduled on March 10, 1958, neither Mangoba et,. al nor
their counsel appeared, so that the trial court received Talaveras
evidence in their absence. On March 18, 1958, a decision was
rendered in favour of Talavera.
Appellant claims that the above decision was received by
him on March 25, 1958 and the next day, wherein it was stated
that the failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or
excusable negligence, counsel having been ill of March influenza
which was evidenced by a medical certificate. Counsel for
appellant asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April
2, 1958, however, one day ahead of the date, the trial court
denied said motion. In the appeal brief, appellant contends that in
denying the motion for new trial, the court a quo deprive him of
his day in court.

RULING:
Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or not,
411

motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into the
reasons for the exercise of such discretion. In this particular case,
however, it was shown that the absence of counsel was explained
and immediately upon receipt of the decision, a motion for new
trial, accompanied by an affidavit of merit, and a medical
certificate, were presented. Said motion for new trial could well be
considered as motion to set aside judgment or one for relief, since
it contained allegations purporting to show the presence of good
defenses. The ends of justice could have been served more
appropriately had the lower court given appellant the chance to
present his evidence at least. Furthermore, it appears that
payments had been made by appellant to appellee, which were
duly received and receipt for. This particular circumstance merits
consideration. After all, court litigations are primarily for the
search of truth, and in this present case, to find out the correct
liability of defendant-appellant to appellee. A trial, by which both
parties are given the chance to adduce proofs, is the best way to
find out such truth. A denial of this chance, would be too
technical. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of
legitimate grievances, should not be barred by technicalities
(Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11621, May 21, 1962; Santiago, et al. v.
Joaquin, L-15237, May 31, 1963). Had not the trial court resolved
the motion for new trial, one day before the date set for its
hearing, the defendant-appellant could have presented the
documents (receipts of payments), itemized in his brief, to
counteract appellant's claim. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and another
entered, remanding the case to the court of origin, for the
reception of appellant's evidence and for the rendition of the
corresponding decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
ANTONIO VS RAMOS
2 SCRA 731, 1961
FACTS:
On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for recovery of a parcel
of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas Francisco. Only Francisco was able to
answer, thus, declaring Nicolas and Leonora in default. On the date of trial, neither
Francisco not his counsel appeared despite early notice. Hence, evidence was
412

presented by the plaintiffs. On August 23, 1956 a judgment has been redndered in
favour of the Antonios. Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on September of
1956, praying that the decision dated August 23 of 1956 be set aside, alleging that
their failure to appear during the hearing of the case was due to accident, mistake
and excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against(Counsel lost the envelope containing the notice to the trial before he has
the opportunity to open the same). This, however, was denied by the court.
Francisco appealed to the CA, denied. Appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an excusable mistake and
negligence, so as to entitle his client, the appellant herein, to be heard.
RULING:
The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the notice of hearing in his
calendar is flimsy. It does not constitute the accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, contemplated by the Rules of Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence
on his part could have guarded against or avoided such mistake or negligence.
Counsel did not exercise ordinary prudence because he did not perform his routine
job or duty of noting down the notice of hearing in his calendar. On this point, the
learned trial judge commented:
Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition thereto, the court
believes the negligence of the counsel is not excusable in view of his admission
that he received the registry notice from the court on May 24, 1956, and that it was
duly registered and that its envelope shows it came from the court which made the
envelope and its contents so important that he should have immediately opened the
same and not just put it aside, that he misplaced the same is also indicative of his
recklessness (See Gonzales vs. Amon, L-8963, Feb. 29, 1956). Furthermore
counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco had all the time from March 24, 1956,
until the date of the trial on Aug. 20, 1956 to inquire from the Court records or
Clerk of Court about the nature of the registered notice that was sent to him on
March 24, 1956, if he really misplaced the same. This is what a diligent counsel
should do as required by ordinary prudence. All he had to do was examine the
records of this case. This Court noted that since it reconvened June 18, 1956,
counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco has been appearing in Court almost
every week if not everyday. He had therefore, ample opportunity to verify the
nature of the said registered notice of hearing which he allegedly misplaced upon
his receipt thereof on March 24, 1956. Little need be added to these observations
of the trial court, except to state that lawyers should always be vigilant and alert, in
order to properly safeguard the rights and interests of their clients. Upon the
413

lawyers specially devolve the duty to evaluate the urgency and importance of
registered letters coming from the courts where they daily ply their trade.
PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ
207 SCRA 632 (1992)
FACTS:
In the early dawn of March 19, 1990, Cesar Soliven was standing at the
corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St. in Aguilar, Pangasinan waiting
for a ride back to his residence in Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night
around the poblacion during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. 3-4, tsn, May 9,
1991). While standing at the aforementioned place, a man smelling of liquor, who
was identified later on as Eduardo dela Cruz (appellant herein), stood beside him.
Subsequently, Merly Caburnay, a neighbor of Soliven, passed by, proceeding
towards the direction of Barangay Pogomboa. Appellant, who appeared drunk
followed the girl but Soliven did not mind. Instead, he went home.
Early the following morning, Soliven, while in his house, heard the cry of
Carmelita Caburnay, mother of his neighbor, Merly. When he went out of the
house, he learned that Merly was raped and her dead body was found in a nearby
ricefield (pp. 5-6, tsn, id.). Prior to Soliven's knowledge of the happening, Mayor
Domingo Madrid of Aguilar was already informed of the discovery of the dead
body of the victim and was able to proceed immediately to the crime site. There,
the Mayor was informed that a man walking suspiciously has [sic] just left the
place. So, Mayor Madrid lost no time, took a tricycle and overtook the man. The
man was identified as appellant and he was found with dirty clothes, his maong
pants torn and his T-shirt stained with blood. He also bore scratches on his neck
and arms. When asked to explain his dirty appearance and the presence of dried
straws of palay at the back of his pants, appellant only answered that on his was
home, he felt sleepy and lied down for a while on the field. Because of his
unsatisfactory explanation, the police arrested him on that same morning on
suspicion that he was the perpetrator of the crime. (pp. 4-8, tsn, March 14, 1991).
Four days later, Cesar Soliven was invited to the police headquarters for the
purpose of identifying the man he saw in the early dawn of March 19, 1990
following the victim Merly Caburnay. Standing in front of the prison cell, Soliven
pointed to appellant, who was among the four men inside the cell, as the person he
saw. The victim, Merly Caburnay, was at the time of the crime only ten years
old while the accused was forty-eight years old. In his defense, the accused
asserted that on 18 March 1990 he was invited by one Andoy Versoza, his landlord,
to cook and prepare food for the latter's visitors. At around 6:00 p.m. of the said
date, he, together with his two aunts, went around the plaza and watched some
414

shows until midnight. Thereafter, he drank a bottle of gin and another bottle of beer
until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. They then strolled about the plaza for two
hours. Afterwards, they rested for awhile near the highway beside the church and at
about 5:00 a.m., they attended mass. When he was advised by his aunts to go
home, he decided to walk because he had no more money. Along the way, he was
arrested by the police for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He vehemently
denied having committed the crime. He likewise claimed that there were no rice
stalks at the back of his pants when he was arrested.
Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness, the trial court
found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for conviction. Moreover, the
defense has not shown any improper or ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for
testifying against the accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and
nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his
testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit. Nor is the non-presentation of the
victim's companions of any help to the cause of the accused. In the first place, it
was never established that the two companions were with the victim when she was
on her way home or when she was raped and killed. It was duly established that,
after obtaining permission from her mother, she went "to the fiesta in Aguilar" with
her cousin and her mother's sister-in-law, and that immediately before the incident
the victim was walking alone but "was following persons." Accordingly, her two
companions, who were not eyewitnesses, could not have testified on the rape and
killing of the victim. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to determine
who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of its own assessment of their
necessity. Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the
time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection
shall become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered
waived. Moreover, the bloodstains on the pants of the accused were testified to by
Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta 28 and Mayor Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of
scratches on his neck and arms was not satisfactorily explained by the accused.
Taken together with the other circumstances present here, this fact serves to
buttress the prosecution's case.
ISSUES:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must
415

be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time the same was committed. 31 In this case, the place where the
accused claims to be 32 is more or less ten meters away from the scene of the
crime )a ricefield in Barangay Pogomboa). 33 Furthermore, the place where he was
questioned by Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police authorities
is twenty meters away from the place where the naked body of the victim was
found. 34 Hence, the physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime
scene, which is necessary is order that the defense of alibi may be considered, is
lacking.
The accused committed a heinous crime. He was not content with unleashing his
bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10-year-old; he also brutally
inflicted upon her severe injuries which caused her untimely demise. Another life
was lost because a beast in man's clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what
he did in prison, a place which, unfortunately, is definitely much better than what
he truly deserves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of
Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case
No. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the accused-appellant
Eduardo dela Cruz y Laoang.

GARCIA VS MENDOZA
203 SCRA 732 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her husband, Cirilo
Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on
April 24, 1938. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to copetitioners Sps. Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who
then took possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court issued a
decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza, their son.
Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely claimed that his
father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from Hermenegildo Mendoza; that
Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo
Mendoza, who had been in possession of the lot since October 15, 1987, and
subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza. The petitioners filed with the
court a petition for review of judgment but denied, so they appealed. Mendoza
416

countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496, does
not
apply
to
a
cadastral
proceeding.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is
warranted
by
Act
No.
2259
(Cadastral
Act).
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly
states that except as otherwise provided by the Cadastral Act, all the provision of
the Land Registration Act are applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the
decree and certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.
RUBLICO VS ORELLANO
30 SCRA 511 (1969)
FACTS:
Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. IL-N-2, L.R.C.
Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with the Court of First Instance of
Lanao, claiming ownership and praying that the said lots be adjudged and decreed
in his favor. On 20 November 1964, the court a quo approved the report and
recommendation of the clerk of court and rendered judgment adjudicating Lots
1664 and 1665 in favor of respondent-appellee Orellana. Petitioners-appellants
filed a petition to annul the judgment and/or review the decree of registration,
alleging ownership of the lots adjudicated to the respondent; that respondent, "by
means of fraud, made the court to believe that he is the owner" and that said
judgment "was secured by means of fraud". Orellana filed a motion to dismiss the
petition. The court, on 23 September 1965, sustained the motion, holding that
petitioners-appellants had no personality to file their petition because they did not
file an answer and were declared in default and that they should have first secured
the lifting of the order of general default, with respect to themselves, before they
filed their petition for review.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act 496 need not
be an original claimant in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting of
the order of general default with respect to himself
RULING:
417

The Supreme Court ruled that a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act
496, as amended, need not be an original claimant in a cadastral proceeding and
need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect to himself.
The aim of the law in giving aggrieved parties, victimized by registration
proceedings of their estate in land by means of fraud, the opportunity to review the
decree would be defeated if such parties would be limited to those who had filed
their opposition to the petition for registration or to first require them to procure
the lifting of the order of general default before they could file a petition for
review. The essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of a decree are: (a) that the petitioner has a real or dominical right; (b) that
he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within
one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet
been transferred to an innocent purchaser. The provision does not require that the
petitioner be an original claimant who had filed an answer and because fraud might
intervene precisely to prevent a person from filing an answer.
CRISOLO vs. CA
68 SCRA 435 (1975)
FACTS:
On August 20, 1965, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance,
Branch VII, of Pangasinan, ordering the registration of Lots 1 and 2, situated in the
Poblacion of Mabini, Pangasinan, and more particularly bounded and described in
the technical descriptions (Exhibits B and B-1) in the name of applicant spouses,
Pedro C. Crisolo and Soledad de G. Crisolo. On September 20, 1965, the court
ordered the issuance of the Decree, followed three months later by writ of
possession in favor of the spouses. Within a year from the issuance of this decree
of registration, respondent-ward, represented by his guardian, filed a petition for
review of the decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which
allegedly consisted in petitioners taking advantage of the insanity of respondentward to secure the execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and between
the petitioner and said respondent-ward, and in petitioners instituting the land
registration proceedings while said ward was confined at the National
Psychopathic Hospital. The trial court dismissed the petition and held that Section
38 of Act 496 was not applicable because respondent had opportunity to oppose the
registration
proceedings
but
abandoned
his
opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when petitioner moved to
have the appeal certified to the Supreme Court because it involved purely
questions of law, the Court of Appeals denied the motion and instead sustained the
allegation of fraud. It rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court and
418

remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the re-opening of the land
registration proceedings.

RULING:
NO. Respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496
because respondent-ward was given opportunity to oppose the registration but
abandoned his opposition. Under Section 38 of Act 496, the persons entitled to a
review of the decree of registration are those who were fraudulently deprived of
their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case and not those who
were not denied for their day in court by fraud, which the law provides as the sole
ground for reopening the decree of registration. Thus, where an oppositor, through
counsel, announced his opposition to the registration of the land involved but later
abandoned the same, he cannot claim that he was fraudulently deprived of his day
in court to entitle him of the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496; and a petition for
review of a decree of registration will be denied where the petitioner had notice of
the original proceeding but failed to substantiate his claim.
iv. A homestead applicant may avail of the remedy.
CRUZ vs. NAVARRO
54 SCRA 109 (1973)

FACTS:
Sometime in 1966 the respondent Alfonso Sandoval filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II, Pasig) an
application for registration (under Act 496) of five (5) parcels of
land with an aggregate area of four and one-half hectares, more
or less, situated in the municipality of Antipolo, province of Rizal.
Under date of August 1, 1966, the respondent Judge Pedro C.
Navarro issued a notice of initial hearing. On December 1, 1966,
419

no oppositor having appeared, the court a quo, after a hearing ex

parte, declared the respondent spouses the owners of the five
parcels of land. On January 3, 1967 the court ordered the issuance
of the corresponding decree of registration.
On March 20, 1967 the petitioners filed a "Petition for Review
of Decree of Registration" in the court below alleging, among
others, that actually, petitioners ROSA CRUZ, CELEDONIA
CABRERA, and LEONCIA CABRERA are the absolute owners and
possessors of, and/or the person having an irrevocable vested
interest in, aforementioned Lots 1, 2 and 3 for the reason that lots
form a part of respective petitioner's Lot, Plan Psu-136628, which
was originally a public land but to which said petitioners had
perfected a homestead right long before respondents secured
aforementioned decrees and certificates of title, their homestead
applications thereof having been duly approved by the Bureau of
lands and they having fully complied with all requirements for the
acquisition of a homestead and possessed and cultivated the
same as their respective private property. On April 24, 1967,
acting on the petition, but without receiving any evidence in the
premises, the respondent Judge issued an order stating that "the
Court ... finds the petition for review to be without sufficient merit
and therefore DENIES the same." The petitioners then filed a
"Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration" of the mentioned
order, but this was denied on May 25, 1967.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners has legal personality,
homestead applicants, to file this petition for review.

as

RULING:
YES. In Mesina vs. Pineda vda. de Sonza, the Supreme Court,
citing Susi vs. Razon, held that once a homestead applicant has
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant,
420

he acquires "not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the

Government.
In Nieto vs. Quines, the Court affirmed the doctrine in these
words:
Considering the requirement that the final proof must be
presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead
application (sec. 14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that
Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923
and that the Director of Lands approved the same not long
thereafter or before the land became the subject of cadastral
proceedings in 1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the
ministerial act of in suing the patent and the same was actually
issued only after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to
Maria Florentino. Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms
and conditions which would entitle him to a patent, Bartolome
Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has
unquestionably acquired a vested right in the land and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof.
It is the Courts view that the petitioners have amply alleged
below such real, legally protected interest over the parcels in
question sufficient to clothe them with the necessary personality
to question, independently of the Director of Lands, the validity of
the grant of title over the said properties to the private
respondents..

BONIEL VS REYES
35 SCRA 218 (1970)
FACTS:
Petitioners therein alleged to be the bona fide actual
occupants and cultivators of a 46.2877-hectare parcel of public
421

agricultural land designated as Lot No. SI-17618-D and located at

Bo. Langka, Lupon, Davao province, and that on October 12,
1965, one Ramon Ombay, late husband of co-petitioner Mauricia
Ombay had filed a free patent application for the land; that
sometime on September 11, 1964, one Rafael S. Yap had
clandestinely filed a sales application for the very same parcel of
land, which was favorably by the land inspector of the Bureau of
Lands who certified in the records the findings of his investigation
as to the absence of any claimants of the land; and that as a
result of such alleged fraud and collusion between Yap and the
bureau personnel, Yap was issued, the sales patent in December,
1965 and the corresponding original certificate of title No. P18131 on February 11, 1966. Petitioners prayed of respondent
court that it annul Yap's title and instead award the land to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court validly dismissed the
petition.
RULING:
A person claiming to have been deprived of the land or an
interest therein, in which case within one year from entry of the
decree he may in the same proceeding ask for review and the
issuance of the decree in his own name and implead the adverse
party. But here, the land is not claimed to be private property of
petitioner nor of his co-petitioners but was admittedly formerly a
part of the alienable and disposable public land awarded under
sales patent to Yap. Accordingly, since petitioner and his copetitioners make no claim of their application for a free patent to
the land having been approved nor a patent their favor having
been awarded, they had no valid cause of action to file an action
for annulment of Yap's patent and for cancellation of the title
issued to Yap by virtue thereof. Their claim based on alleged
fraudulent issuance of title to the public land in favor of Yap
should be addressed in proper administrative proceedings to the
Director of Lands, who if he finds the claim substantiated, may
then take the necessary steps towards the reversion of the land,
to the public domain, and petitioners may then press for favorable
action on their application and the award of the land to the
422

tenant. The mere reversion of the land to the State would not
entitle them of itself to an award of the land to them, which is
beyond respondent court's jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition
for certiorari is hereby denied.
b. Where to file.
BALDOZ VS PAPA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)
FACTS:
On January 7, 1957, the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina
Agaceta, parents of herein appellees, applied for the registration
under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area
of 37,671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Case No. 2215, L.R.C. Record No. 12389). After the requisite
publication of the application in the Official Gazette, the case was
called for hearing on May 16, 1957 in the course of which an
order of general default was entered. On the same date, however,
Baldomero Baldoz father of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift
the order of default as against him and praying that his opposition
to the application, thereto attached, be admitted. Prior to October
1, 1958. oppositor Baldoz died. On October 10, 1958, the latter's
counsel filed a motion to set aside the order of default alleging
that the reason for the nonappearance of oppositor Baldoz was
his death on July 28, 1957 and praying that his son, appellant
herein, be substituted as party-oppositor. Although this motion
was denied on October 31 of the following year, appellant
appears not to have appealed from the order of denial aforesaid.
On February 16, 1959, the court rendered judgment decreeing the
registration of the parcel of land described in Psu 59688 in favor
of appellees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court in said case committed a reversible
error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having
filed a written opposition which was duly admitted by it and that
its order denying appellant's motion for substitution as oppositor
therein has deprived him of his day in court.
423

RULING:
The court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
grounds (1) that the final judgment in Registration Case No. 2215
is res judicata in the present action and (2) that the instant action,
being in the nature of a petition for review of a decree, cannot
prosper because it was filed more than one year from the date of
the issuance of the decree and because it is not based on fraud as
provided for in Section 38 of Act 496. The present is an appeal
from said order.
WALSTROM V. MAPA JR.
181 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Cacao Dianson, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, filed for Free-patent
application for Lot 1 and Lot 2 of Psu-15365. Josefa Mapa, predecessor-in-interest
of respondent, filed for miscellaneous sales application. The lot was awarded to
Josefa in 1934. In 1956, Cacao filed a letter protesting the construction of Josefa of
a camarin in Portion A of Lot 1 of Psu-153657. Mapa countered claiming that
such area was awarded to her in public bidding. Bureau of Lands Investigator then
investigated and found that Cacao sold the land to a certain Agripino Farol.
Agripino Farol also transferred the rights and interests to herein petitioner
Walstrom. The regional land director rendered a decision in favor of Mapa,
excluding Portion A from Lot 1 of Psu-153657. The Director of Lands reversed the
decision. Mapa appealed with DANR but the appeal was dismissed. Upon
reconsideration, however, the DANR Secretary reinstated the order of the regional
land director. Wastrom filed for reconsideration but was denied for being filed out
of time. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were also denied and the writ of
execution in favor of Mapa was granted. Original Title issued in the name of Mapa
pursuant to miscellaneous sales patent was issued in 1971. In 1972, Wastrom filed
with CFI Baguio-Benguet for judicial relief as the prescriptive period is about to
lapse but such petition was denied on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the case may be reopened by the RTC?
RULING:
No. a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by the proper
424

Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five essential requisites, to wit:
(a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right;
(b) that he has been deprived thereof;
(c) through fraud;
(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and
(e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value
The first element is patently not present because the petitioner can not allege that
she has already a real and dominical right to the piece of property in controversy.
The second element is also absent since corollary to the aforecited ruling of the
DANR Secretary, the petitioner can not aver that she was deprived of property
because she did not have a real right over portion "A". The third element, the
records are bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the
certificates of title.
STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION V. RUIZ
30 SCRA 318 (1969)
FACTS:
Teodorico Cabascas, the late father of respondent Alejandro Cabasbas, owns
a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT no. 815. Petitioners allege that the
controversy arose from Civil Case No. 4870 filed by Alejandro to recover the lot of
his father against Jose A. de Kastro and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo
Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus. Pursuant to a compromise
agreement entered into by the parties, the spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A.
Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were declared to be the registered owners of the
western portion of the land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per
Original Certificate of Title No. 615, the land subject of the petition.
Subsequent transfers were then made until the petitioners acquired
ownership of the land subject of the petition. In 1968, Alejandro filed another
complaint praying for the nullification of the compromise agreement with the
allegation that it was obtained through fraud as it was made to appear before the
court of first instance that the conveyance of title was made on February, 1946
when in fact it took place on September 14, 1944, in violation of the Homestead
Law. Alleging res judicata, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the case.
However, Judge Ruiz refused to dismiss the case asserting that the sale of a parcel
of land was made on September 14, 1944 in violation of the five-year period within
which a transfer of a homestead patent is prohibited.
425

ISSUE:
Whether there was an actual or extrinsic fraud rendering the judgment null?
RULING:
No. Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the
litigation. Was this not the rule there would be no end to litigations, perjury being
of such common occurrence in trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing
party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to
his adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination however
erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in
another proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent's
perjured evidence. Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set
aside a judgment. Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud
is a ground for annulling a judgment.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a
litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party,
or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic
fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of
forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of
the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.
RAMIREZ VS CA
144 SCRA 292 (1986)
FACTS:
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses filed an
application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. An order
of general default was issued. Thereafter, the petitioners
presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question
by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the
American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost
and no copy or record of the same was available. On March 30,
1960, the private respondents filed a petition to review the decree
of registration on the ground of fraud. After trial, the court found
that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents
took possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita
Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to
426

secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00 by way of

antichresis. The trial court then ordered the reconveyance of the
property. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Was there an actual or extrinsic fraud?

RULING:
Yes. The averments in the petition for review of the decree of
registration constitute specific and not mere general allegations
of actual and extrinsic fraud. The petitioners in this case did not
merely omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the land.
They positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim
therein. This is clear misrepresentation. The omission and
concealment, knowingly and intentionally made, of an act or of a
fact which the law requires to be performed or recorded is fraud,
when such omission or concealment secures a benefit to the
prejudice of a third person.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON vs. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC.
G.R. No. 170750. April 7, 2009
FACTS:
In October 1997, filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of
Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary
Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against respondents. Petitioners
claimed in their Complaints that they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive
possession of the subject properties for more than 90 years until they were forcibly
ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991 and that the subject properties
from which they were forcibly evicted were not covered by respondents
certificates of title. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints
on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and
427

(4) res judicata.

The RTC dismissed the complaints of petitioners. The trial court determined
that the subject properties were already registered in the names of respondents, and
that petitioners were unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to
the said properties. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners appeal and affirmed
the RTC Resolutions. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the actions instituted by petitioners before the RTC were for the
reopening and review of the decree of registration and reconveyance of the subject
properties.
RULING:
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a decree of
registration may be reopened when a person is deprived of land or an interest
therein by such adjudication or confirmation obtained by actual fraud. On the other
hand, an action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as
incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in other persons names, to its rightful and legal owners, or
to those who claim to have a better right. In both instances, the land of which a
person was deprived should be the same land which was fraudulently or
erroneously registered in another persons name, which is not the case herein, if the
Court considers the allegations in petitioners Complaints.
While petitioners improperly prayed for the cancellation of respondents TCTs in
their Complaints, there is nothing else in the said Complaints that would support
the conclusion that they are either petitions for reopening and review of the decree
of registration under Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree or actions for
reconveyance based on implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code. Instead,
petitioners Complaints may be said to be in the nature of an accion reivindicatoria,
an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the subject properties, from
which they were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994 by respondents. IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

428

NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., vs. TANJUATCO

[G.R. No. 168800. April 16, 2009)
FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman
and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by
virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name
to the Bureau of Lands. While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands
is pending, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. Director of Lands released an
Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco on 1996,
wherefore TCTs were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco. Petitioner filed a
Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and
Damages. Tanjuatco argued that the complaint stated no cause of action against
him because it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the
agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for
reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioners complaint for reconveyance.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. In an action for reconveyance,
the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful and legal owner, or
to one with a better right. To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person
claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of
the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was
procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet
passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4) the action is filed after the
certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but within four
years from the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an
implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. CA
149 SCRA 32 (1987)
429

FACTS:
Private respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole of Lot No. 140
from her grandmother. In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha.,
to the municipality for the purpose of high school and had 4 ha. converted into a
subdivision. However, in 1963, she discovered that more or less 4 ha. of the parcel
of land, was used by petitioner, as a cemetery from 1934. On 1963, respondent
wrote the Mayor of the municipality regarding her discovery, demanding payment
of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by
petitioner. On 1964, respondent filed a complaint in the CFI for recovery of
possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipal cemetery. However, the
petitioner defended its alleged ownership of the subject lot, having bought it from
Simeona Ditching in 1934. The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are estopped from
questioning the possession and ownership of the petitioner which
dates back to more than 30 years.

RULING:
It is certain that petitioner failed to present before the Court
a Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which
is included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma
Leuenberger. Thus, it has been held that where the land is
decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such
person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the property
comes. The beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust,
notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title and the
trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to execute the
deed of reconveyance.

430

a. Purpose of an action for reconveyance.

RODRIGUEZ vs TORENA
79 SCRA 356 (1987)
FACTS:
Valentina
Quiones,the
predecessor-in-interest
of
respondents, owned a parcel of land in Davao City with an area of
39,043 square meters which is designated as Lot No. 2017. The
land was brought for registration before a cadastral court in 1922
and a certificate of title was issued on August 7, 1950. After its
issuance,the certificate of title was delivered to the petitioner by
Atty. Suazo, the respondents counsel in the cadastral case. On
July 9, 1958, the respondents filed with the Court of First Instance
of Davao, a complaint for ejectment and damages against the
petitioner, alleging that they are pro-indiviso registered owners of
the land and that the petitioner illegally, maliciously, and by
means of force and intimidation, entered the land in question and
occupied approximately 27,500 square meters thereof.The
petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentina Quiones had
already sold their rights over the land as early as 1941 and 1950
either through themselves or their successors in interest, thus
making him the rightful and legal owner of approximately 27,899
square meters thereof; that he had been in the peaceful,
continuous and public possession of the same; that there was no
lien, encumbrance or adverse claim annotated on the certificate
of title so that the series of sales made in his favor, although not
registered and annotated thereon, are valid and binding between
the parties, the said land not having passed to a third person.
ISSUE:
Whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to
an action filed after one year from the issuance of the decree to
compel
reconveyance
of
the
property
in
question.
HELD:
A landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens system is not barred from bringing
an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the
431

reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not

aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set
aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person
who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the
real owner thereof.
ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
FACTS:
Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a
parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and
now covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda,
Bulacan. Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of
Possession against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as
they have been occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March
of 1978 the opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge
Bautista. Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same
branch presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of
Possession against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a
motion to quash which was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which
was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground
that (1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the
complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for
reconveyance and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or
laches from filing the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder
to motion to dismiss and motion for leave of court. The sheriff
then, upon the courts order, delivered possession to Delfin
however he was barred in entering the premises. Delfin filed a
motion for an Alias writ of possession which was granted. The
sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin,
however, when the latter went to the premises he was again
barred by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and
he moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again,
granted. Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the
petitioner was dismissed. After which motions and motions have
432

been filed. The second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining

order directing the sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing
and/or carrying out the third alias writ of possession. Petitioner
then filed motion to amend the resolution and TRO, either
nullifying third alias writ of possession served orto issue a
mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court.

ISSUE: Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper remedy.

RULING:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the
rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the
land to him. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose
property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from
bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the
reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to
re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only
to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is
not the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek
to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer
open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to
the rightful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance
is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title,
nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed
intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which
intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the
Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner that:
"Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a
moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning
compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although
the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy." An action for
reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4)
years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken
place from the issuance of an original certificate of title.
DACLAG V MACAHILIG
433

G.R. NO. 159578 JULY 28, 2008

FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in
which she confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and
adjudication made therein. Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses
Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale, an OCT was issued in the name of Daclag by virtue of her
free patent application.Respondents filed with the RTC for
reconveyance. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.

ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the

respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
In an action for reconveyance, the issue involved is one of
ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title may be
introduced. Respondents had sufficiently established that Parcel
One, covered by OCT of which respondents' northern one half
portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima at the time she
sold the land to petitioners. An action for reconveyance prescribes
in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of
434

the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Records show that while the land was registered in the
name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for
reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus
still within the ten-year prescriptive period.
SANTOS VS HEIRS OF DOMINGALUSTRE, GR. NO. 151016, 6 AUGUST
2008,561 SCRA 120 (2008)
FACTS:
Dominga Lustre, who died on October 15, 1989, owned a residential lot.
On September 20, 1974, Dominga Lustre mortgaged the lot to spouses Santos and
later sold it to the latter. Subsequently, Santos executed a Deed of Sale transferring
the property to their son. In April 14, 1994, Cecilia Macaspac and Tarcisio
Maniquiz, both heirs of Dominga Lustre, filed with the RTC, Complaint for
Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages[6] against
the
son.
The
complaint
alleged
that
the
spouses Santos simulated the Deed of Sale dated May 16, 1976 by forging
Dominga Lustres signature.A lleging that the plaintiffs right of action for
annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCTs had long prescribed and was barred by
laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. The RTC denied it. They then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA declared that an
action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for reconveyance on the ground that the
certificate of title does not exist prescribes.
RULING:
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was
obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the
declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe. [37] Moreover, a person
acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case,
the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if
plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run
against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would
be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
435

CABRERA vs CA
163 SCRA 214 (1988)
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land with an
area of 4,080 square meters situated in Cainta, Rizal. It was
originally owned by the spouses Diego and Patricia Gonzaga, who
acquired it in 1921, presumably with conjugal funds. Both are now
dead, survived by the private respondents, their grandchildren by
their deceased children. The petitioners claim the property by
virtue of an alleged sale in their favor, the private respondents by
right of succession. The records show that the tax declaration on
the land had since 1921 been in the name of the spouses
Gonzaga until 1944, when it was made in the name of Eliseo
Gonzaga, one of their children. In 1953, the tax declaration was
again changed, this time in the name of Joaquin Cabrera. In 1970,
the private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the
property from the petitioners in the court of first instance of Rizal,
claiming that the latter had no right to the property. The
petitioners, in their answer, invoked a sale made to them by
Eliseo Gonzaga, who had previously purchased the land from his
parents, adding that they had been in possession of the property
since 1944. Both parties adverted in their respective pleadings to
the petitioners' application for registration of the land under the
Torrens system which was then pending in another court. The
petitioners claimed it was justified by their right of ownership
while the private respondents contended it was a fraudulent act
that did not bind them. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs,
herein respondents, after finding that their evidence remained
unrebutted, and declared them to be the owners of the disputed
property. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower
court.

ISSUE: Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely

filed?
436

RULING:
An action for reconveyance may be filed even before the
issuance of the decree of registration. There is no reason, indeed,
why one has to wait until the land is actually registered before he
can sue for reconveyance. The private respondents filed their
complaint because they were unwilling to recognize the
registration proceedings for lack of compliance with the
notification requirements. They did not have to await its
termination. As it happened, providentially, the registration was
granted during the trial of the plaintiffs' complaint for recovery of
the property. Hence, their pending action could conveniently and
properly be deemed an action for reconveyance, filed within the
one-year reglementary period prescribed by the Land Registration
Act. And there were valid grounds. The private respondents were
able to establish that the transfer of the land had been made
under fraudulent circumstances to their detriment as the
hereditary owners of the property. They also submitted that they
had not received notice of the registration proceedings and that
no notice thereof had been posted on the subject land as required
by law. These grounds were not controverted at the trial.

ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
FACTS:
A parcel of land with an area of 2,273 sq. m was registered
under the name of private respondent Ramon V. Delfin.On
February 13, 1978 private respondent filed his "Petition for Writ of
Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa
Esconde .On March 29, 1983, the Sheriff turned over possession
of the premises to the representative of the private respondent.
However, when private respondent went to the premises, he was
barred by the petitioner from entering the property. Consequently,
437

private respondent asked for a writ of demolition for the removal

of any construction of the Esconde family on the premises and to
cite petitioner Basilisa Esconde for contempt of court.On
November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias
writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to turn
over possession of the premises to private respondent. Petitioner
then filed at Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash
and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of
Possession on the ground that they have filed a civil action for
reconveyance. Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint for
reconveyance because plaintiff's cause of action is barred by res
judicata.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's cause of action is barred by
res judicata.
HELD:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another, for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. A
landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens System is not barred from bringing
an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the
reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not
aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set
aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person
who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the
real owner thereof.In the case at bar, it is apparent that
reconveyance is not the proper remedy because there was no
proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings
incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed
intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year
within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired.
Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property
procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between
the parties.

438

HUANG vs CA
G.R. No. 198525, 13 September 1994
FACTS:
In 1965 Dolores Sandoval purchased two adjacent lots in Makati, but being
advised by her sister-in-law Milagros that it is not possible to acquire two lots in
only one name, she registered the other lot in the name of her brother Ricardo.
Then Dolores constructed her house in the lot she bought, thereafter her brother
also asked permission if he could construct a house on the lot registered under his
name, to which Dolores agreed to. Ricardo was also given permission to mortgage
said lot in order to secure a loan from SSS, and to be used on his construction of
his house. In March 1968, Dolores was able to obtain a deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage over the property with the Huangs. In 1980, Dolores
sought the help of the barangay to compel the spouses Ricardo and Milagros to
execute the necessary request to the SSS for the approval of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage, as well as for the release in her favor of the owner's
duplicate certificate of title in its possession so that the deed could be duly
annotated on the title and/or a new certificate of title issued in her name. But no
amicable settlement was reached. But on that same year, spouses Ricardo and
Milagros also filed a complaint against spouses Dolores and Aniceto for the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale and quieting of title.
The trial court consolidating the cases, ruled in favor of the Sandovals. It was
shown that Dolores was the one who bought both the lots, and even paid for the
construction of a swimming pool and fencing of the subject lots. The petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals who also affirmed the lower courts
decision.Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient ground for reconveyance of ownership
to spouses Dolores and Aniceto?
RULING:
The Supreme Court noted that it was not possible for Ricardo to have
bought or constructed such improvements on the disputed lot on his earnings alone,
as it was shown to be substantially insufficient. The Court agreed with the lower
courts findings that it was Dolores who bought said lots and made improvements
on it. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was not impressed with the contention of
the petitioners that they were not aware that what they were signing was deed of
absolute sale, from the evidence it was shown that spouses voluntarily signed and
439

read the contents of said document. Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property which involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder
of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. Trust is either
express or implied. Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the
parties. Implied trust comes into being by operation of law. A constructive trust is
imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the property arises because it was
acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or through breach of a
fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of another's property. On the
other hand, a resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be made a
disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does
not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the beneficial
interest in the property.
In the present case, Dolores provided the money for the purchase of
Lot 20 but the corresponding deed of sale and transfer certificate of title were
placed in the name of Ricardo Huang because she was advised that the subdivision
owner prohibited the acquisition of two (2) lots by a single individual. Guided by
the foregoing definitions, we are in conformity with the common finding of the
trial court and respondent court that a resulting trust was created. Ricardo became
the trustee of Lot 20 and its improvements for the benefit of Dolores as owner. The
pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides that there is an
implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but
the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest for the
property. A resulting trust arises because of the presumption that he who pays for a
thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself.
Petitioners are of the mistaken notion that the 10-year prescriptive period is
counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title. This rule
applies only to the remedy of reconveyance which has its basis on Sec. 53, par. 3,
P.D. No. 1529. Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property
procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the parties, a
situation which does not obtain in this case. Therefore, the Court affirmed the
decision of the RTC, thereby dismissing the petition.

VILLAGONZALO VS IAC
167 SCRA 535 (1988)
440

FACTS:
In an action for reconveyance, RTC Leyte ordered the cancellation of
transfer certificate title in the name of private respondent Cecilia Villagonzalo.
Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals (formerly IAC), said decision of lower
court was reversed.
The appellate court found out that the private respondent was able to loan an
amount to her father in order that he can acquire said land. Furthermore, the CA
found the petitioners cause has already prescribed. The appellate court held that the
issuance of transfer certificate of title to the private respondent was already a
notice of ownership to the whole world, thereby repudiating any fiduciary or trust
relationship involved. It anchored its conclusion on doctrinal holdings that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years counted from the date when adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property. Due to the inaction of the petitioners, the private respondent was made
secure over her ownership on the subject land, and thereafter spent time and money
in introducing improvements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the land in the private respondents name
was not a repudiation of the implied trust created between her and their father.
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the appellate court. An action for
reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied trust shall prescribe after ten
years, since it is an action based upon an obligation created by law, and there can
be no doubt as to its prescriptibility. It is likewise established that said period of ten
years is counted from the date adverse title to the property is asserted by the
possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that assertion of adverse title, which
consequently was a repudiation of the implied trust for the purpose of the statute of
limitations, took place when trasfer certificate of title was issued in the name of
private respondent.
There is also evidence of record that as far back as 1961,
private respondent refused to give any share in the produce of
the land to petitioners; that in 1963 she mortgaged the property
in her own name; and that in 1969, she leased the same to one
Ramon Valera, without the petitioners taking preventive or
retaliatory legal action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that an
441

action to enforce an implied trust may be barred not only by

prescription but also by laches, in which case repudiation is not
even required. Whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its
enforcement may be barred by laches. Petitioners were, therefore,
correctly faulted for their unjustified inaction. WHEREFORE, the
judgment of the respondent Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

ALZONA vs CAPUNITAN
G.R. No. L-10228 (February 28, 1962)
FACTS:
The parcels of land in question were part of the friar lands in
the Spanish times and were then possessed by spouses Perfecto
Alomia and Cepriana Almendras, both deceased; they were
survived survived by three children, Arcadio Alomia, Eulogio
Alomia and Crispina Alomia. Arcadio Alomia married Ildefonsa
Almeda but they did not have any children. When both Arcadio
and his wife Ildefonsa died, they were survived only by the two
sisters of Ildefonsa namely Marciana and Narcisa and also by the
nephews and nieces of Arcadio. Narcisa is the mother of herein
defendant Gregoria Capunitan married to Manuel Reyes. Eulogio
Alomia, other hand, is the father of plaintiff Gregorio and Eleuteria
Alomia while Crispina Alomia is the mother of plaintiff Cornelio
Alzona. Of the three children of Sps. Perfecto and Cepriana
Alomia, it was Arcadio and wife Ildefonsa who purchased and
possessed the lands originally claimed by their parents and was
able to acquire title to two of the four lots in question. When
Arcadio died, his widow Ildefonsa, sold the lands in question to
her niece Gregoria Capunitan (defendant) daughter of Narcisa
Almeda and cousin of plaintiffs-appellants and in whose name
new certificate of title was issued in 1928.
After Ildefonsa's death, plaintiffs herein instituted an action
in the CFI of Laguna on October 11, 1929 for the recovery of the
lots; the case was set six times for hearing during 1930. The case
was dismissed because of the non-appearance of the parties and
their attorneys. On January 23, 1931, same plaintiffs, thru same
442

counsel filed another action for the recovery of lots Nos. 332, 210,
2968 and 2524. Again, due to numerous petitions for
postponement from 1931 to 1936,nothing was done hence on
August 31, 1936, the court dismissed the case. The lower court
found that the dismissal of these two cases was not due to an
amicable settlement because of defendant's recognition of
plaintiffs' rights or to a promise to reconvey one-half of the
property to them.
ISSUE/S: Whether the right of the appellees
to ask for
reconveyance of their share of the land is already barred by
prescription.
HELD:
The case at bar involves an implied or constructive trust
upon the defendants-appellees. The Court of Appeals declared
that Ildefonsa held in trust the 1/2 legally belonging to the
plaintiffs; on which condition, the defendants had full knowledge.
The sale made by Ildefonsa in favor of the defendants, was not
void or inexistent contract, action on which is imprescriptible (Art.
1450, N.C.C.). It is voidable, at most, and as such is valid until
revoked within the time prescribed by law for its revocation, and
that is undoubtedly the reason why the Court of Appeals
pronounced that "the appellees had the right to ask for a
reconveyance of their share, unless the action is barred by
prescription". The prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust, is now a settled question
in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten (10) years. The cause of
action of the plaintiffs against the defendants accrued in 1928
when the latter purchased and took possession of the two lots
from Ildefonsa Almeda. The action, being for recovery of title to
and possession of real property, the same should be brought
within ten (10) years from 1928, or up to 1938 (Sec. 40, Act 190).
But after the dismissal of the second case on August 31, 1936,
the plaintiffs-appellants went into a long swoon only to wake up
when they filed the present action on November 28, 1949
(according to the lower court) or January 28, 1950 (according to
appellants). In the first case, 13 years had elapsed and in the
second, 14 years. In either case, the action has long prescribed.
443

Furthermore, and by the same token, the defendantsappellees being third persons, and having repudiated the trust
and expressed claim of ownership over litigated properties, by
themselves and by their predecessors-in-interest, they have also
acquired the said properties by the law of prescription (Tolentino
vs. Vitug, 39 Phil. 126; Government of the Philippines vs. Abadilla,
46 Phil. 642).

ALMARZA vs. ARGUELLES

G.R. No. L-49250 December 21, 1987
FACTS:
Lot No. 5815 of the Cabatuan Cadastre, situated in
Cabatuan, Iloilo, originally belonged to respondents' predecessorin-interest, Romualdo Grana. In 1929, he sold a 7,300 square
meters portion thereof to petitioner and her husband, the late
Leon Almarza, who since then had been in continuous, peaceful,
open and adverse possession thereof. The document evidencing
the sale between the parties was lost during the war, but
sometime thereafter, the late Laura Pancrudo, mother of private
respondents Asuncion and Gilda Arguelles, executed an affidavit
acknowledging the sale of said portion to petitioner and her
husband. On the basis of said affidavit, the Provincial Assessor
issued a new tax declaration, beginning in the year 1945 to Leon
Almarza, annotating at the back thereof the aforementioned
affidavit of the late Laura Pancrudo. The tax declaration, covering
the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 sold to petitioner and her
husband was designated as Lot No. 5815-B. On the other hand, a
new tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 3909 was issued by the
Provincial Assessor in the name of Romualdo Grana for the
remaining portion of Lot No. 5815, described therein as Lot No.
5815-A.
Sometime prior to July, 1950, Josefa Malote, mother of
private respondents Gil and Balbina Pancrudo, filed for and in
behalf of her children and the late Laura Pancrudo an answer in
Cadastral Case No. 78, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1321. In support of her
claim over Lot No. 5815, she presented in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 3909 covering only a portion thereof designated
444

therein as Lot No. 5815-A and a land tax receipt dated March 30,
1950 showing payment of the real estate tax for a portion only of
Lot No. 5815 known and described in the Tax Declaration as Lot
No. 5815-A. On July 25, 1950, the cadastral court declared Gil and
Balbina Pancrudo owner of one-half undivided share of Lot No.
5815 and the late Laura Pancrudo as owner of the other undivided
half share. Pursuant to a decree of title, Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-134, covering the entire Lot 5815 was issued in the name of
said adjudicatees on May 29, 1951. On November 1, 1951, Laura
Pancrudo died, leaving private respondents Asuncion Arguelles
and Gilda Arguelles as her only children and legal successors-ininterest. On April 20, 1977, the said heirs instituted before the
then Court of First Instance of Iloilo a case against petitioner for
recovery of the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 in her
possession and for damages. Basis of the action was OCT No. 0134 issued on May 29, 1951. Petitioner, in turn, interposed a
counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed portion of Lot No.
5815 in her favor. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondents on the ground that petitioner's action for
reconveyance had prescribed more than ten years having elapsed
from the issuance of said certificate of title.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners action for reconveyance has
prescribed.
Whether or not laches have already set in against private
respondents
right to assert their ownership over the subject land.
HELD:
We held that prescription cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance, which is, in effect, an action to quiet title against
the plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land in question.
The reason, We explained, is "that as lawful possessor and owner
of the Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance
which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's
possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a
period of 48 years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a
445

Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a

third party and the effect on her title." Private respondents
obtained OCT No. 0-134 on May 29,1951. Their action was
instituted only on April 20, 1977, or after a lapse of twenty-six
[26] years. The neglect or failure of private respondents to assert
their alleged right under the certificate of title for such
unreasonable length of time makes them guilty of laches.' They
should now be held either to have abandoned or waived whatever
right they may have under said certificate of title.
Private respondents ordered to cause the segregation of the
disputed portion of 7,300 square meters from Lot No. 5815 of the
Cabatuan Cadastr and to reconvey the same to said petitioner.
After the segregation shall have been accomplished, the Register
of Deeds of Iloilo is hereby ordered to cancel OCT No. 0-134 in the
names of Balbina, Gil and Laura, all surnamed Pancrudo, and
thereafter to issue a new certificate of title covering said 7,300
square meter portion in favor of petitioner and another certificate
of title in favor of private respondents covering the remaining
portion of Lot No. 5815.

TAMAYO VS CALLEJO
G.R. NO. L-25563 JULY 28, 1972
FACTS:
This action, initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, was
brought by Aurelio Callejo, originally against Mariano Tamayo only, and, later,
against his brother Marcos Tamayo, also, for the reconveyance of the northern
portion of a parcel of land formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
2612, in the names of said brothers. In due course, said court dismissed the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The latter appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, in turn, rendered a decision the dispositive part. In 1940, Mariano
Tamayo sold the land to Estacio, whose surveyor went to the land in 1952 to
segregate it; that same year Callejo registered his adverse claim to the land.
Tamayo pleaded the statute of limitations as defense, but the court found that in
1918, when they had the land registered in their name, Mariano Tamayo, on his
behalf and that of his brother, executed a public document acknowledging that his
deceased parents had sold a parcel of the land to Domantay.
446

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the respondent
Aurelio Callejo's cause of action, if any, had already prescribed.
2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the decision
rendered by the trial court.
RULING:
Tamayo argues that if the erroneous inclusion in his certificate of title of the
parcel of land formerly sold by his parents to Fernando Domantay created, by
operation of law, an implied trust, the corresponding action for reconveyance of
said parcel prescribed ten (10) years from the accrual of the cause of action, on
November 15, 1915, when OCT No. 2612 was issued, or long before the institution
of this case on June 25, 1952. The express recognition by Mariano Tamayo on
his behalf and that of his brother Marcos Tamayo of the previous sale, made by
their parents, to Fernando Domantay had the effect of imparting to the
aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust it having been created by
the will of the parties, "no particular words" being "required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" which express
trust is a "continuing and subsisting" trust, not subject to the statute of limitations,
at least, until repudiated, in which event the period of prescription begins to run
only from the time of the repudiation.
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals did not err in overruling the plea
of prescription. Also, petitioner questions the right of Callejo to demand a
reconveyance, insofar as it may affect the portion of 70,000 square meters sold by
him to Proceso Estacio, upon the ground that the latter is a purchaser in good faith
for value. This is, however, a defense not available to petitioner herein, aside from
the fact that he has not even pleaded it in the trial court or otherwise raised it either
in that court or in the Court of Appeals. We note that the dispositive part of the
decision of the Court of Appeals declares that the land in question is "declared
reconveyed" to said respondent. Such reconveyance cannot, however, be deemed
made without a survey defining with precision the metes and bounds of the area to
be segregated for herein respondent, Aurelio Callejo. Accordingly, the case should
be remanded to the court of origin for the preparation of a subdivision plan of the
portion thus to be segregated and the judicial approval of such plan, and only after
such approval has become final and executory may the reconveyance be either
made or deemed effected. SO MODIFIED, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this instance
against petitioner Mariano Tamayo. It is so ordered.
447

CASTILLO VS HEIRS OF MADRIGAL

G.R.

NO.

62650.

JUNE

27

(1991)

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 66849-R entitled
"Spouses Mariano Castillo, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Heirs of Vicente
Madrigal, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. On December 17, 1979, petitioners
spouses Mariano Castillo and Pilar Castillo, in their own behalf and in
representation of the heirs of Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint before the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila for annulment of
contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with damages against
private respondents heirs of Vicente Madrigal and/or Susana Realty, Inc. and
public respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Manila. On February 4, 1980,
private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: (a) the complaint
states no cause of action; and (b) the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations. On March 25, 1980, the trial court dismissed the complaint (pp. 120126, Rollo). On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed in toto
on
August
5,
1982.
Hence.
the
present
petition.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not petitioners action for annulment of contract and transfer
certificate of title and or reconveyance with damages is subject to prescription
2.) Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action against private
respondents.
RULING:
Both courts ruled incorrectly. It is evident in paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 of the
complaint, supra, that petitioners sought the declaration of the inexistence of the
deed of sale because of the absence of their consent. Thus, following the provision
of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, this kind of action is imprescriptible. The action
for reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis is the alleged void
contract of sale. This pronouncement is certainly far from novel. We have
encountered similar situations in the past which We resolved in the same manner.
One of these is the case of Baranda, Et Al., v. Baranda, Et Al., G.R. No. 73275,
May
20,
1987,
150
SCRA
59,
73
However, there should be no debate that the action for damages against private
448

respondents has already prescribed. In accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil
Code, 4 it should have been brought within ten (10) years from the date of the sale
to Vicente Madrigal and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72066 in
his name on July 12, 1943, if against the heirs of Vicente Madrigal; or within ten
(10) years from the date of the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36280
in the name of Susana Realty, Inc. on May 12, 1954, if against the firm.
Notwithstanding the discussion on the imprescriptibility of petitioners
action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and/or
reconveyance, the dismissal of their complaint by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was correct. It was also
Our ruling in the Baranda case, supra, (and in other previous cases) that only as
long as the property is still in the name of the person who caused the wrongful
registration and has not passed to an innocent third person for value will an action
lie to compel that person to reconvey the property to the real owner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 5, 1982 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification
regarding the issue on prescription.SO ORDERED.

CHING VS CA
181 SCRA 9

FACTS:
A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and
Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate
of Title correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land. By virtue of a sale to
Ching Leng, TCT No. 91137 was issued. Consequently, Ching Leng
died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed a petition for
administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng and was
granted. 13 years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was
filed by private respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said
property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on
possession. Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his
449

estate was directed by the trial court. The summons and the
complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper
of general circulation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a
new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.
ISUUE:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of
title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his estates be bound by service
of summons and decision by publication.
RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is
not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration
proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in
rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a
person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An
action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for
it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing. Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) requires
"notice to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng was already in the other world
when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.

YUJUICO vs REPUBLIC
GR. NO. 168861, 26 OCTOBER 2007

FACTS:

450

In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the

registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land
located in Paraaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance
(CFI).The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and byMercedes
Dizon, a private party. Trial court ruled in favor of Castro. The
Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the
adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for the
issuance of a decree of registration became final, and a Decree
was issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). An
Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Fermina
Castro by the Register of Deeds. Land was then sold to Jesus
Yujuico. The OCT of Castro was cancelled and a TCT was issued in
Yujuicos name over Lot1 while another TCT was issued in favor of
herein co-petitioner Augusto Carpio. Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was
issued and asserts that Land reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay became the properties of the Public
Estates Authority (PEA), a government corporation that undertook
the reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed
lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in favor of PEA. The PEA also
acquired ownership of other parcels of land along the Manila
Bay coast which were subsequently sold to the Manila
Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) The PEA undertook the
construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being
planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey
they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped
their property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by
the PEA to the MBDC. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the
Paraaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the
Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages.
Respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was
still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina
Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision
adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was
void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived
from a void title, were likewise void. Trial Court ruled in favor of
the petitioner and states that after 28 years without being
contested, the case had already become final and executory. The
451

trial court also found that the OSG had participated in the LRC
case, and could have questioned the validity of the decision but
did not. On appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court
asserting that shores are properties of the public domain intended
for public use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in
a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of
private individuals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Government for reversion
is proper?
HELD:
No. We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that
the property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on
the two (2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by
Lands Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands
Geodetic Engr. Manuel Cervantes, finding the same no longer
forms part of Manila Bay but is definitely solid land which cannot
be reached by water even in the highest of tides. This BeraniaCervantes report based on ocular inspections literally overturned
the findings and recommendations of Land Director Narciso V.
Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto
C. Mendiola dated December 1, 1977, and the fact that the
Villapando-Mendiola reports were merely based on projections in
the cadastral map or table surveys.
The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is
further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal
acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter
where it stated that: Your ownership thereof was acknowledged
by PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA
Association, in which an owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA
automatically becomes a member thereof. Section 26, Rule 130
provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
The
admissions of PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case
on the nature of the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding
on respondent Republic. Respondents claim that the disputed
land is underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions of PEA
against its interests.
Hence, res judicata now effectively
452

precludes the relitigation of the issue of registrability of

petitioners lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Paraaque RTC.
Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal
of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already
barred by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is
already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining therein.

GALICIA VS MANLIQUEZ
GR. NO. 155785, 13 April 2007

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that their predecessor, Juan, was the true and lawful
owner of a parcel of land situated in Romblon. Such land is declared in the name of
Juan under various tax declarations. They alleged that after years of possession of
said land, Juan was driven away from the property through force by the heirs of
Inez Ramirez and one of whom is defendant. Petitioners alleged that because of
poverty and lack of knowledge, Juan was not able to assert his right over the
property but he informed his children that they owned the land and that the
continuous possession of the property by defendant has further deprived herein
petitioners of their right over the same.Defendants denied the allegations of
petitioners in their complaint asserting that Juan was not the owner and never took
possession of the disputed lot. They also contended that the subject property was
part of a larger parcel of land which was acquired by Ines, predecessor-in-interest
of defendant from a certain Juan Galicha who is a different person from Juan
Galicia.
During the scheduled pre-trial conference, none of the defendants
appeared. They filed a motion for postponement of the pre-trial conference but it
was belatedly received by the trial court. As a consequence, defendants were
declared in default. Herein petitioners, as plaintiffs, were then allowed to present
evidence ex parte. On December 2, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioners declaring the plaintiffs as the true and absolute owner of the
453

property, affirming and confirming the validity and legality of plaintiffs ownership
over the property and ordering defendants to vacate the land.
On December 1997, the RTC received a Motion for Leave of Court to
intervene with an attached Answer-in-Intervention filed by the compulsory heirs
of Ines, among whom are herein respondents. They contended that the subject
parcel of land forms part of the estate of Ines which is yet to be partitioned among
them; an intestate proceeding is presently pending in the RTC
of Odiongan, Romblon, the outcome of Civil Case, one way or the other, would
adversely affect their interest; their rights would be better protected in the said civil
case; and their intervention would not unduly delay, or in any way prejudice the
rights of the original parties. The RTC denied the said motion to intervene on the
ground that it has already rendered judgment and under Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, the motion to intervene should have been filed before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
Defendants filed an appeal with the CA but CA issued a Resolution
dismissing the appeal for failure of the defendants-appellants to file their brief
within the extended period granted by the appellate court. Subsequently, the trial
court issued a writ of execution dated March 3, 2000. On May 23, 2000, herein
respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA anchored on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over their persons and property and on extrinsic
fraud. On January 14, 2002, the CA granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have lost such ownership by extinctive
prescription because respondents and their predecessors had been in uninterrupted
adverse possession of the subject lot for more than 40 years?
HELD:
As to the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with the
CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for annulment
of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its
discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or
estoppel. The principle of laches or stale demands ordains that the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. There
is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case
is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable
454

doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used

to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts,
under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result.
In the present case, the CA found no evidence to show when respondents
acquired knowledge of the complaint that petitioners filed with the RTC.
Moreover, the Court finds that herein respondents' right to due process is the
overriding consideration in allowing them to intervene in Civil Case No. OD-306.
Petitioners also fault herein respondents for their failure to avail of other remedies
before filing a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Petitioners cited
the remedies enumerated by the RTC in its Order of December 23, 1997.
However, the Court notes that the remedies enumerated therein refer to those
available to a party who has been declared in default. In the present case, herein
respondents could not have been declared in default, and thus could not have
availed of these remedies, because they never became parties to Civil Case No.
OD-306.
REBECCA LEVIN VS. JOAQUIN V. BASS 91 PHIL 420 (1952)
FACTS:
Rebecca Levin, widow, 65 y/o, illiterate & knew only how to sign her name
owner of a lot with 2 houses (No. 326 & No. 328) located at San Rafael St.,
Manila.
At the end of Dec. 1943 respondent Bass called Levin at her house at No.
328representing himself to be a real estate broker & asked if Levin wanted to sell
her lot & house at No. 326 adjoining her residence w/c was at that time occupied
&rented by Japanese civilians, officers & employees of Pacific Mining & 2 rooms
privately rented by Angelita Martinez Levin refused several times to the offer until
she gave in as Bass told her that with the proceeds of the sale, Levin can purchase
another property at Antonio Rivera St. w/c she will be gaining a better profit for
renting it out & w/o the fear that the other house might just be appropriated by the
Japanese & shell be getting nothing in return Levin w/ her houseboy went twice to
Antonio Rivera St. to check the property that Bass told her she will be purchasing
from the proceeds of the sale on the house & lot on No. 326 but they were not able
to enter the second floor as Bass told them that the owner is gone to Pampanga.

455

Relying on the presentation of Bass, Levin accepted the offer. Levin, Dr.
Manlapaz & Angelita Martinez were conversing at her house when Bass came &
ask her to sign several documents which according to Bass were only Authority to
Sell the property (no copy was left to Levin).
Bass handed Levin Php 10K saying that it was the partial payment of the
property w/c was sold to a Japanese & asked her to give him the Torrens Title of
the House & Lot --- w/c title was in the possession of Agricultural &Industrial
Bank due to a mortgage in the amount of Php 2k --- 2k was deducted from 10K &
they went to the Bank to pay the debt & get the title --- remaining 8kwas also taken
by Bass as purported initial payment for the property at Antonio Rivera St. (w/
receipt but only 6k was in the receipt Levin did not realized the difference in the
amount). Bass gave Levin the rentals on the building at Antonio Rivera St. in order
for Levin to believe that she already owned that property.
Due to suspicions, Levin sought the help of Dr. Manlapaz regarding the
property until they found out that the documents Levin signed were
Deed of Absolute sale to one Estaquio Php 30K for No. 326 house & lot ---w/c
was later on sold to Bass for Php 65Kb.
Deed of Sale to Bass Php 65K for No. 3289.
The Title of Levin was then cancelled & issued a new one in the name of
Bass.
Bass mortgaged the property to Co Chin Leng to secure payment of PHP
70Kw/c was duly annotated in the title in consideration of PHP 200K, Bass sold
the No. 328 property to Mintu (PHP90K paid upon execution of the document &
PHP 10K will be paid upon the cancellation or removal of the notice of lis pendens
& the balance of PHP 100Kto be paid to his bank after securing the release of the
mortgage to Co ChinLeng.
Deed of Sale & owners duplicate COT were presented to
the RD for registration with full payment of the fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entry in the day book of a deed of sale w/c was presented
& filed at the RD &full payment of the registration fees constitute a complete act
of registration w/c operates to convey and affect the land.
456

HELD: Yes. Voluntary Registration

If the owners Duplicate Certificate be not surrendered & presented or if no
payment of registration fees be made w/in 15 days, entry in the book of the deed of
sale does not operate to convey & affect the land sold.
Innocent purchaser for value having done the required steps in the registration, the
sale in then presumed to be valid in both properties.
a. Effects of voluntary and involuntary registration
GARCIA VS CA, 95 SCRA 389 (1980)
FACTS:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer

certificates of title to different persons for the same lot, or
subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title
were issued to replace the original title.
A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and
covered by OCT No. 983 was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus, a
bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was presented for
registration and contained entries showing that it was annotated
on the back of the OCT. Contrary to SOP however, the deed of
sale was not annotated on the OCT and that consequently, that
title was apparently not cancelled.

As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No.

4910 (Lapus Title) was issued to Lapus. Upon his death, the two
lots were inherited by his daughter Carolina Lapuz-Gozon, who
had the land subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her now corespondents. Lapus and successors-in-interest have been in
possession of the lands even before 1910 of more than 70 years.
457

In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la

Concepcion Vidal filed a motion in land registration cases, alleging
that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda
Maysilo. Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the
court adjudicated the land in their favor. The OCT was then
cancelled and TCT No. 112235 (Rivera Title) was issued to the
Riveras. Lots 5 and 7 (E and G) were then assigned to Bartolome
Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs
were issued in their behalf. Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into
lots A and B, retained lot A and assigned B to Antonio Munoz.
Munoz mortgaged lot B to Associated Banking Corp.On the other
hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to
Philippine National Bank. Both Munoz and Go did not pay their
mortgage debts, hence the two banks foreclosed the properties.
PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at the auction, but notice of lis
pendens was already annotated on the title.
Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on
the disputed lots.
Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring
the land, had her adverse claims registered on the titles of lots 5
and 7 and filed an action to quiet title and damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided
the TCTs issued to the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision.
Garcia and PNB appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera
title and subsequent titles derived from it.
HELD: Yes. Lapus title prevails.

RULING:

458

Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly

transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or
ownership over the disputed lots. That title could not be nullified
or defeated by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of
another title over the same lots due to the failure of the register
of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus.
This must be so considering that Lapus and his successors-ininterest remained in possession of the disputed lots and the rival
claimants never possessed the same.

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates

of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the
maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is
first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land
resgistration matters.

The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has

no merit because the deed of sale in favor of Lapus and the titles
issued to him and his successors-in-interest are all a matter of
public record in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has
been properly recorded, such record is a constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence and good
faith otherwise the very purpose of the law requiring a record
would be destroyed. The bank should have made an on-the-spot
investigation of the lot mortgaged.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. BASA, Jr.
GR No. 149121. April 20, 2010

459

FACTS:
Spouses Basa loaned from NHA secured by a real estate mortgage over their
properties. Spouses Basa did not pay the loan despite repeated demands. To
collect its credit, the NHA filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage before the Sheriffs Office in Quezon City. After notice and publication,
the properties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest
bidder. On April 16, 1991, the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered and
annotated only on the owners duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of the
respondents, since the titles in the custody of the Register of Deeds were among
those burned down when a fire gutted the City Hall of Quezon City on June 11,
1988. On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired, without respondents
having redeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter, on April 24, 1992, NHA
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the foreclosed
properties, and the same was inscribed by the Register of Deeds on the certificates
of title in the hand of NHA. NHA moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession. Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of possession, respondents, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition
in Intervention.Respondents theorized that the instrument is deemed registered
only upon actual inscription on the certificate of title in the custody of the civil
registrar. Since the sheriffs certificate was only inscribed on the owners duplicate
certificate of title, and not on the certificate of title in the possession of the Register
of Deeds, then there was no effective registration and the one-year redemption
period had not even begun to run. Thus, respondents asked the RTC, among
others, to declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the respondents to
redeem the mortgaged properties. NHA maintained that respondents right of
redemption had long expired on April 15, 1992 since the certificate of sale was
inscribed on their TCT Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16,
1991. RTC issued an Order admitting the Petition in Intervention and treating the
same as the petition to set aside sale. NHA filed a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision in favor of the NHA. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, in its Amended Decision, reconsidered its
earlier stance. It declared that the period of redemption had not expired as the
certificate of sale had not been registered or annotated in the original copies of the
titles supposedly kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were earlier razed
by fire.

460

ISSUE:

Whether or not the annotation of the sheriffs certificate

of sale in the primary entry book of the register of deeds and
on the owners duplicate title is sufficient compliance with
the requirement of law on registration.

HELD:

The prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once

the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for
purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to be
accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds. NHA
followed the procedure in order to have its sheriffs
certificate of sale annotated in the transfer certificates of
title. It was not NHAs fault that the certificate of sale was
not annotated on the transfer certificates of title which were
supposed to be in the custody of the Registrar, since the
same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the
fact that there were no reconstituted titles available during
the time of inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in
having the same reconstituted as early as July 15,
1988. NHA did everything within its power to assert its right.
Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered,
the redemption period accruing to respondents commenced
therefrom, since the one-year period of redemption is
reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale.
REPUBLIC VS RAVELO
FACTS:
461

On February 16, 1989, the Director of Lands issued Sales Patent No. 12458
covering the subject lot to respondent Ravelo. She was subsequently issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4517 registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Olongapo City.
The petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of title against Ravelo
on November 6, 1992. The petitioner alleged that the issuance of the patent by the
Director of Lands violated DENR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 20. This A.O.
mandates that applications for sales patent should be filed with the DENR regional
office that has jurisdiction over the land applied for, not with the Director of Lands
in Manila.
On March 24, 1994, a notice of lis pendens (indicating the pendency of the
petitioners complaint) was inscribed as Entry No. 7219 on Ravelos OCT No. P4517.
In a separate development, one Antonio Chieng filed on December 13,
1989 a collection suit against Ravelo, which suit led to a judgment against Ravelo
and the issuance of a writ of execution.
The Notice of Levy was registered with the Register of Deeds on March 17,
1993.
In the auction sale that followed, Wilson Chieng, Antonio Chiengs son, won
as highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to Chieng and the sale was
registered with the Olongapo Registry of Deeds on May 25, 1993.
The respondent-spouses Redondos subsequently bought the subject lot from
Chieng. The parties first signed an agreement for the purchase of the subject lot
on May 11, 1993, and upon payment of the agreed purchase price, executed
on December 20, 1993 a deed of absolute sale.
On September 23, 1994, the final deed of sale covering the subject lot in
favor of Chieng was inscribed as Entry No. 2419 on OCT No. P-4517.
On the same date, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7209 covering
the subject lot was issued to Chieng. Entry No. 7219 (the petitioners complaint
for cancellation and reversion) was carried at the back of Chiengs TCT No. T7209.
Chieng and the Redondos entered into another deed of sale in the Redondos
favor on November 21, 1994. This deed was inscribed as Entry No. 7554 at the
back of TCT T-7209 on December 20, 1994. On the same day, TCT No. T-7261
covering the subject lot was issued to the Redondos.
462

RTC decided in the petitioners favor and cancelled Ravelos Sales Patent
No. 12458 and OCT No. P-4517, Chiengs TCT No. T-7209, and the Redondos
TCT No. T-7261.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling and
declared the Redondos as innocent purchasers in good faith. The appellate court
also declared the Redondos TCT No. T-7261 valid.
The appellate court ruled that the Redondos were buyers in good faith
because they and Chieng entered their agreement for the purchase of the subject lot
on May 11, 1993 and executed their Deed of Sale on December 20, 1993, prior to
the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on March 24, 1994, and prior as well to
any awareness by the Redondos of the existence of any flaw in the vendors title.
ISSUE:
Whether the Redondos are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value
HELD:
May 11, 1993 agreement was not registered nor annotated in OCT No. P-4517
because it was technically a side agreement relating to but not directly affecting the
registered property, and was thus enforceable only between the parties Chieng
and the Redondos. Thus, the government cannot be effectively put on notice of
the May 11, 1993 agreement when it registered its notice of lis pendens on March
24, 1994.
Thus, bereft of registration, any sale or transaction involving registered land
operates only as a contract between the parties and shall not affect or bind the
registered property.
AFP-MBA VS SANTIAGO
G.R. No, 147559, June 2008
FACTS:
A Notice of Levy on Attachment on Real Property was issued in Civil
Case No. Q-92-11198 entitled The Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc., Plaintiff, vs. Eurotrust Capital Corporation, Elsa
B. Reyes, Rene M. Reyes, Celedonio N. Reyes, Digna Blanca, Fernando C.
Francisco, Ma. Cristina C. Cornista, EBR Realty Corporation and B.E. Ritz
Mansion International Corporation, Defendants, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 216, Quezon City, levying all the rights, claims, shares, interests
and participation of EBR Realty Corporation in the real property covered by
463

Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-79252.

On September 14, 1994, the Notice of Levy was presented for
registration in the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. The Notice was entered
in the Primary Entry Book under Entry No. PT-1305. However, it was not
annotated on TCT No. PT-79252 because the original copy of said title on
file in the Registry of Deeds was not available at that
time. Aniana Estremadura, the employee who examined the notice of levy,
kept the said document in the meantime hoping some later days said title
may be found as at the time we were yet in turmoil or in disarray having
just transferred from our old office.
On September 20, 1994 or six days after the presentation of the Notice
of Levy, a Deed of Absolute Sale, executed by EBR Realty Corporation in
favor of Ines B. Santiago involving the same parcel of land covered by TCT
No. PT-97252 was presented for registration and entered under Entry No.
PT-1653.
The deed of sale was examined by the same employee who examined
the notice of levy, but she failed to notice that the title subject of the sale was
the same title which was the subject of the notice of levy earlier
presented. Unaware of the previous presentation of the notice of levy, the
Register of Deeds issued TCT No. PT-94912 in the name of vendee Ines B.
Santiago on the basis of the deed of sale. It was only after the Register of
Deeds had already acted on the said deed of sale that Aniana Estremadura
informed him of the presentation of the notice of levy.
Nevertheless, when the Register of Deeds discovered the error he
immediately sent a letter to Ms. Ines B. Santiago requesting her to surrender
the documents, particularly the deed of sale and owners duplicate of TCT
No. PT-94912 so that he can take appropriate rectification or correction. Ms.
Santiago refused to surrender the documents and owners duplicate of said
title.
The LRA is of the opinion that the subject Notice of Levy cannot be
annotated on TCT No. PT-94912, except by order of the court.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition. It declared that to allow the
inscription of the controversial levy on attachment upon the title of
respondent Santiago will be tantamount to prematurely declaring her as a buyer in
bad faith of the property.
ISSUE:
464

Whether the notice of levy on attachment may be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912.
HELD:
The notice of levy on attachment in favor of petitioner may be annotated on TCT
No. PT-94912.
The entry of the notice of levy on attachment in the primary entry book or
day book of the Registry of Deeds on September 14, 1994 is sufficient notice to all
persons, including the respondent, that the land is already subject to an attachment.
The earlier registration of the notice of levy on attachment already binds the land
insofar as third persons are concerned. The fact that the deed of absolute sale was
dated February 24, 1994 is of no moment with regard to third persons.
The act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned. Constructive notice is also created upon
registration of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land.
Superiority and preference in rights are given to the registration of the levy
on attachment; although the notice of attachment has not been noted on the
certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of the Register of Deeds
produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or inscription.
SOSTENES CAMPILLO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS 129 SCRA 513
FACTS:
Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo, Manila. In
1961, de Vera sold the lands to Simplicio Santos. Santos however did not register
the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which means that the land was still under de
Veras name.
On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Campillo. Campillo obtained a
judgment for sum of money. De Veras 3 parcels of land, including those sold to
Santos were levied in 1962 in favor of Campillo. Campillo acquired the land and
he was able to have the lands be registered under his name.
465

ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it w/o registering it
or Campillo who subsequently purchased it at a public auction and have it
registered under his name.
HELD: Campillo has the right over the said properties.
RULING:
It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a
result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally
effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Santos
purchase of the two parcels of land may be valid but it is not enforceable against
third persons for he failed to have it registered.
Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of any previous
sale for Santos never caused the annotation of the sale.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land lies.
The purchaser (Campillo) in the execution sale of the registered land in suit,
acquires such right and interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by
prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve
the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under
our Torrens system of land registration.
SOSTENES CAMPILLO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS 129 SCRA 513
FACTS:
Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo, Manila. In
1961, de Vera sold the lands to Simplicio Santos. Santos however did not register
the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which means that the land was still under de
Veras name.
466

On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Campillo. Campillo obtained a

judgment for sum of money. De Veras 3 parcels of land, including those sold to
Santos were levied in 1962 in favor of Campillo. Campillo acquired the land and
he was able to have the lands be registered under his name.
ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it w/o registering it
or Campillo who subsequently purchased it at a public auction and have it
registered under his name.
HELD: Campillo has the right over the said properties.
RULING:
It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a
result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally
effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Santos
purchase of the two parcels of land may be valid but it is not enforceable against
third persons for he failed to have it registered.
Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of any previous
sale for Santos never caused the annotation of the sale.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land lies.
The purchaser (Campillo) in the execution sale of the registered land in suit,
acquires such right and interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by
prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve
the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under
our Torrens system of land registration.
G.R. No. L-40105 November 11, 1985
NESTOR L. CENTENO, BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, ARTEMIO
GUTIERREZ, GREGORIO FERNANDEZ, ZENAIDA DE LA CRUZ,
FRANCISCO GOMEZ, RICARDO ADRAO, AMPARO RAYOS and
OFELIA SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA C.
VICTORIA and DANIEL O. VICTORIA, Respondents.
467

Facts:
In June 1969, the spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar offered to purchase
from the defendants- spouses and the latter agreed to sell to the former, a parcel of
unregistered land situated in Hagonoy, Taguig, Rizal, covered and evidenced by
Tax Declaration No. 5685. In making the offer to purchase, the spouses Pedro M.
Cruz and Rosanna Villar disclosed to the defendants their intention to subdivide the
said property into residential lots to be sold later on as much.
On July 10, 1969, defendants executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the spouses
Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar the above-described parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 5685. Xerox copy of said Contract to Sell is hereto attached as
ANNEX 'A'.
The spouses Pedro M, Cruz and Rosanna Villar in fact caused to be subdivided the
said property subject of the Contract to Sell into residential lots to be offered for
sale to individual purchasers.
On March 11, 1970, defendants executed 'Deed of Sale with First Mortgage' in
favor of the land subject matter of the Contract to Sell (ANNEX 'A') and
ownership of said property passed from defendants to the Cruz spouses, subject to
the said first mortgage, Xerox copy of said Deed of Sale with First Mortgage
hereto attached as ANNEX 'C'.
The spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar thereafter applied for the
registration of the subject land with the Court of First Instance of Rizal and after
due hearing on August 14, 1970, a Decision was rendered in Land Registration
Case No. N-129-M (N-66) L.R.C. Rec. No. N-38492, granting their application for
registration and once final, Original Certificate of Title No. 8626 was issued in the
name of the Cruz spouses, In said Original Certificate of Title No. 8626, it is
expressly stated that the parcel of land so registered is subject 'to a first mortgage
in favor of Rufina Cruz Victoria in the amount of P72,000.00 Philippine Currency,
payable in four (4) equal installments of P18,000.00 each on July 31, 1970,
December 31, 1970, May 31, 1971 and October 31, 1971, respectively'. Xerox
copy of the said Original Certificate of Title No. 8626 is hereto attached as Annex
'D'.
In view of the failure of Pedro M. Cruz and Rosanna Villar to comply with the
terms and conditions of the mortgage on the land covered in and evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. 8626, defendants caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage on January 9, 1971 the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal gave
written notice of the Sheriff's sale at public auction of said property set for
February 15, 1971. Xerox copy of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale hereto attached as
ANNEX 'E'.
On February 9, 1971 after the 'Notice of the Sheriff's Sale' (ANNEX 'E') was
published and before the sale at public auction, Pedro M. Cruz filed a petition with
468

the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the approval of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd132057 of the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8626 and for
the cancellation of said title for each of the resulting lots in the approved
subdivision plan.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in not holding that from the combination
of the undisputed circumstances in this case, the victorias knew of the sale by
pedro m. cruz of the subdivided lots to the petitioners.
Held:
We find no merit in the present appeal. The property in question was originally
owned by the Victories. On July 10,1969, they executed in favor of the spouses
Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar a contract to sell said property, which at that
time was still unregistered and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 5685, Under
said agreement, it was stipulated that while possession of the property shag be
considered delivered to the buyers Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar, the
ownership thereof shall remain with the Victorias until the downpayment of
P70,000.00 shag have been paid, in which event the necessary deed of transfer of
ownership of the property will be executed together with a first mortgage on the
property in favor of the Victorias to secure payment of the balance of the purchase
price. On March 11, 1970, said deed of transfer with first mortgage on the property
was executed between the Victorias and Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar.
Thereafter the Cruzes registered the property and were issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 8626 with the mortgage constituted on the property in favor of the
Victorias annotated thereon.
As the Victories were not parties to the contracts of sale in favor of petitioners, the
same having been executed by Pedro M. Cruz and petitioners and according to the
Stipulation of Facts Pedro M. Cruz had never been appointed attorney-in-fact of
the Victories, there is no privity of contract between petitioners and the Victorias.
Petitioners have no cause of action against the Victories since there is no evidence
whatsoever to show that petitioners by acts or omissions of the Victorias had been
induced to buy lots to which the property had been subdivided by the Cruzes.
Neither is there any evidence that the Victorias had received any of the money paid
by said petitioners to the Cruzes for the lots bought by them. Petitioners recourse
must be against the Cruzes.
ABELARDO IBARRA, CELESTE IBARRA VS. FAUSTINO
IBARRA, SR.
FACTS:
469

Spouses Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales bought on

installment basis two (2) parcels of land, designated as Lot No. 5
(the lot on which they later erected a house of strong materials)
and Lot No. 6. from the San Juan Subdivision. On 19 December
1951, Filomena Morales died, as a consequence, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 45070 and 46235, were issued by the
Register of Deeds of Manila solely in the name of Faustino Ibarra,
Sr. as widower.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 6 August 1971, Faustino
Ibarra, Sr. conveyed the two (2) lots, including the house on Lot
No. 5 which belonged to the dissolved but undistributed conjugal
partnership of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales, for the
price of P40,000.00 to spouses Alfredo de la Rosa and Concesa P.
de Regla. On 29 September 1971, petitioners herein, claiming to
be the legitimate children of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and the deceased
Filomena Morales, filed on action before the Court of First Instance
of Manila, praying, among others, for the nullification of the Deed
of Absolute Sale and the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 105276 and 105277. The lower courts upheld in toto the
sale executed by defendant Faustino Ibarra, Sr. in favor of spouses
de la Rosa and de Regla.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 105276 and
105277 be nullified.
HELD:
Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed
properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, was sold
by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the
certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow,
the Court held that the purchaser acquired a valid title to the land
even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale
for this rule is that a person dealing with registered land is not
required to go behind the register to determine the condition of
the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the
property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of
470

the primary objects of the Torrens system.

G.R. No. 92871 August 2, 1991 MARIA P. VDA. DE JOMOC, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, 10th Judicial Region, Br. 25, respondents.
G.R. No. 92860 August 2, 1991 SPOUSES LIM LEONG KANG & LIM
PUE KING, petitioners, vs. MAURA SO & HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(Eleventh Division), respondents.
Facts:
A parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro owned by late Pantaleon
Jomoc was fictitiously sold to third persons in which the last
transferee are the spouses Mariano and Maria So. Maria Vda de
Jomoc, as administrarix of Pantaleon Jomocs estate, filed suit to
recover the property.
The case was decided in favor of Jomoc and was accordingly
appealed by Mariano So and one Gaw Sur Cheng to the Court of
Appeals.
While pending appeal, Vda de Jomoc executed executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of Land with private respondent
for P300,000.00. The document was not yet signed by all the
parties nor notarized but in the meantime, Maura So had made
partial payments amounting to P49,000.00.
Mariano So, the appellant in the recovery proceeding, agreed to
settle the case by executing a Deed of Reconveyance of the land
in favor of the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc. The reconveyance was in
compliance with the decision in the recovery case and resulted in
the dismissal of his appeal. The heirs of Jomoc executed another
extra-judicial settlement with absolute sale in favor of intervenors
Lim Leong Kang and Lim Pue filing claiming that they believe that
So already backed-out from the agreement.. Later, Maura So
demanded from the Jomoc family the execution of a final deed of
conveyance. They ignored the demand.
Maura So sued petitioners-heirs for specific performance to
compel them to execute and deliver the proper registrable deed
471

of sale over the lot.

The lower court, finding that there was no sufficient evidence to
show complainant-respondents' withdrawal from the sale.
On appeal, the trial court decision was affirmed.
Issue/s: WON the sale is enforceable.
Held:
Since petitioners admit the existence of the extra-judicial
settlement, the court finds that there was meeting of the minds
between the parties and hence, there is a valid contract that has
been partly executed.
The contract of sale of real property even if not complete in form,
so long as the essential requisites of consent of the contracting
parties, object, and cause of the obligation concur and they were
clearly established to be present, is valid and effective as
between the parties. Public document is only needed to bind third
persons.
The payment made by So is a clear proof of her intention to
acquire the property and the petitioners cannot claim about the
respondent backing out. The sale to the intervenors Lim cannot
be recognized because when they bought the property, there was
already a notice of lis pendens and the sale cannot be said to be
in good faith. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 13, 1989 and its resolution dated April 2, 1990
are AFFIRMED.
DURAN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-64159 September 10, 1985
FACTS:
Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land in Caloocan City which she had
purchased form the Moja Estate. She left the Philippines in June 1854. A Deed of
472

Sale of the 2 lots was made in favor of Circes mother, Fe. In December 1965, Fe
mortgaged the same property to Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. When Circe came to
know about the mortgage, she wrote to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Caloocan
informing that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or mortgage any
of her properties. She failed to get an answer from the RD. So she returned to the
Philippines in May 1966.
Meanwhile, Fe failed to redeem the mortgaged properties and foreclosure
proceedings were initiated by Marcelo- Tiangco. Circe claims that the sale in favor
of her mother is a forgery saying that at the time of its execution in 1963, she was
in the US. Fe alleges that the signatures of Circe in the Deed are genuine and the
mortgage made by Fe is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good faith and for
value.
HELD:
Yes. Good faith, while it is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to
the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title was
received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it. The
mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title and, in the
absence of anything to excite suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond
the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of the
said certificate. The fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root
of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the
true owner to the name indicated by the forger.
G.R. No. L-48322 April 8, 1987
FELIPE DAVID and ANTONIA G. DAVID, petitioners,
vs.
EULOGIO BANDIN (substituted by his legal heirs, namely:
JUANA SILVERIO, JOSE, GABRIEL, ANICETA, VIRGINIA and
FELIX, all surnamed Bandin); GREGORIO BANDIN,
RAYMUNDA BANDIN, VALENTIN BRIONES, SOFIO BRIONES
and AGAPITA RAMOS. respondents.
FACTS:
473

During their lifetime, the spouses Juan Ramos and Fortunate

Calibo, were the owners of two parcels of land; the Talon Property
and Laong property. Both spouses died intestate, leaving as heirs
two legitimate children, Candida and Victoriana Ramos, and
grand-daughter, Agapita Ramos, daughter of their deceased Sora
Anastacio. Candida and Victoriana died intestate on February 16,
1955 and December 12,1931, respectively. Candida Ramos; her
niece, Agapita Ramos; and her nephew, Eulogio Bandin, sold a
portion of the Talon property to the spouses Rufino 0. Miranda and
Natividad Guinto. This portion was divided into three lots. Parcel 1
was subsequently sold to Narciso Velasquez and Albino Miranda.
Parcels 2 and 3 were subsequently sold to Jose Ramirez and
Sotero Ramirez, repectively, who registered these properties and
obtained OCT Nos. 2027 and 2029 in their respective names. The
remaining portion of the Talon property was extra judicially
partitioned on September17, 1955 among the heirs of Candida
Ramos and was subdivided in seven lots. Lot 5 was given to
Victoria Martin, who was able to register the land and was issued
OCT No. 3706. Lot 6 was given to Maximina Martin, who also was
able to register the land and was issued OCT No. 3707. A portion
of these lots were subsequently sold to Magno de la Cruz who was
able to obtain TCT. The Laong property was sold by Candida
Ramos and her children on December 19, 1943 to Hermogenes
Lucena, husband of Juanita Martin, one of the daughters of
Candida. On September 23, 1959, Juanita (then widowed) sold the
property to the spouses Gregorio and Mary Venturanza. On
January21, 1965, the Venturanzas, in a deed of sale also signed
by Juanita Martin, conveyed a portion of the property to the
spouses Felipe and Antonia David. Juanita Martin was able to
register the property in her name and was issued OCT No. 8916
on July 1, 1971.On June 14, 1963, respondents, who were the
heirs of Victoriana except for Agapita, filed a complaint for the
recovery and partition of property. A decision was rendered by the
trial court, in favor of the plaintiffs,declaring, however, that
certain properties could no longer be reconveyed to plaintiffs
since they had been transferred to purchasers who bought them
in good faith for value. Not satisfied with the decision, both
plaintiffs and defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which
nullified the transfers made to the defendants who were declared
474

by the trial court as purchasers in good faith.

ISSUES:
Whether or not private respondents' claim is barred by
prescription2. Whether or not petitioners were buyers in good
faith
HELD:

No. Respondents claim is not barred by laches and prescription

since it was not shown
that they were guilty of negligence or slept on their rights. They
sent a letter of demand to the heirs of Candida Ramos on April 23,
1963, and filed their complaint against them on June 14, 1963, or
within a period of approximately eight (8) years from Candida's
death. Petitioners Felipe David and Antonia G. David were buyers
in bad faith. They bought the property when it was still
unregistered land. The defense of having purchased the property
in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is
involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of
the registered owner. One who purchases an unregistered land
does so at his peril His claim of having bought the land in good
faith, i.e. without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, the property, would not protect him if it turns out that
the seller does not actually own the property.
SPS. JUANITO R. VILLAMIL and LYDIA M. VILLAMIL VS.
LAZARO CRUZ VILLAROSA
FACTS:
Spouses Juanito and Lydia Villamil (petitioners) represented
by their son and attorney-in-fact, Winfred Villamil, filed a
complaint for annulment of title, recovery of possession,
reconveyance, damages, and injunction against the Spouses
Mateo and Purificacion Tolentino (Spouses Tolentino), Lazaro
475

Villarosa (Villarosa) and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City

before the RTC of Quezon City.
The complaint alleged that petitioners were the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated at Siska Subdivision, Tandang
Sora, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 223611; that Juanito Villamil Jr. asked permission from his
parents, petitioners herein, to construct a residential house on the
subject lot in April 1986; that in the first week of May 1987,
petitioners visited the lot and found that a residential house was
being constructed by a certain Villarosa; that petitioners
proceeded to the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify their
title; that they discovered a Deed of Sale dated 16 July 1979
which they purportedly executed in favor of Cipriano Paterno
(Paterno) as the vendee; that they later found out that the TCT in
their names was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 351553, was
issued in the name of Paterno; that a Deed of Assignment was
likewise executed by Paterno in favor of the Spouses Tolentino,
and; that on the basis of said document, TCT No. 351553 was
cancelled and in its place TCT No. 351673 was issued in the name
of the Spouses Tolentino. Three months later, the Spouses
Tolentino executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Villarosa for
the sum of P276,000.00. TCT No. 354675 was issued in place of
TCT No. 351673.
Spouses Villamil asserted that the Deed of Sale in favor of
Paterno is a falsified document because they did not participate in
its execution and notarization. They also assailed the Deed of
Assignment in favor of the Spouses Tolentino as having been
falsified because the alleged assignor is a fictitious person.
Finally, they averred that the Deed of Sale between Spouses
Tolentino and Villarosa is void considering that the former did not
have any right to sell the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Tolentino are buyers in good
faith; and Villarosa, the present registered owner, is a buyer in
good faith.
HELD:
476

The court declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and
Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa.
In the instant case, there were no traces of bad faith on
Villarosas part in acquiring the subject property by purchase.
Villarosa merely responded to a newspaper advertisement for the
sale of a parcel of land with an unfinished structure located in
Tierra Pura, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. He contacted the number
specified in the advertisement and was able to talk to a certain
lady named Annabelle who introduced him to the owner, Mateo
Tolentino. When he visited the site, he inquired from Mateo
Tolentino about the unfinished structure and was informed that
the latter allegedly ran out of money and eventually lost interest
in pursuing the construction because of his old age. Villarosa was
then given a copy of the title. He went to the Register of Deeds
and was able to verify the authenticity of the title. He also found
out that the property was mortgaged under the name of Mario
Villamor, who turned out to be the employer of Tolentino. Upon
reaching an agreement on the price of P276,000.00, Villarosa
redeemed the title from Express Financing Company. Thereafter,
the property was released from mortgage and a deed of sale was
executed. Villarosa then secured the transfer of title in his name.
Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige
him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto.
A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid
title if the property has already been transferred from the name of
the owner to that of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize
that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will

477

acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a

Torrens title.
Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the
title to be authentic, Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate
of title. When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in
this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further
than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face. He
examined the transferors title, which was then under the name of
Spouses Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and every
title and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino.
EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 151424
FACTS: Eagle Realty, a company engaged in the real estate
business, bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via
a Deed of Sale. This Reyes acquired the land from a certain
Medina who earlier acquired the said land via surreptitiously
entering a false record in the records of the Land Registration
Commission. Eventually, the true owners of the said land, the de
Leons, discovered that another title was fraudulently issued to
Medina over the same parcel of land. De Leon was able to have
the said title annulled as well as the TCT issued to Eagle Realty by
virtue of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the TCT was validly revoked

RULING: Yes, the principle of indefeasibilty of a Torrens Title does

not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null
and void. The Director of Lands had no authority to grant a free
patent over privately owned land.

EGAO VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

478

G.R. No. L-79787 June 29, 1989

FACTS:
Private respondents Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao, who
claimed themselves as the legitimate owners and possessors of
two parcels of land situated in Bukidnon, filed a verified complaint
for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and Ownership
against petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao. Allegedly,
sometime in June 1983, herein petitioners occupied illegally
portions of the land, which they bought from Marfori. Petitioners,
however, asserted that Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of
the subject parcels of land and that he and his family have been
in actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous possession
thereof even before the issuance to him of the free patent; that
the land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against
alienation under CA No. 141; and that the instant case was the
fourth in a series filed against the Egaos and is part of
respondents' scheme to grab said parcel of land from the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deeds of Sale executed between the
purchasers and the petitioners is valid.
HELD:
No. Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the
prohibited five year period are null and void. No title passed from
the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to herein
respondents.
Moreover, respondents are not innocent purchasers for
value. Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary
inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property
without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he
is a purchaser in good faith for value. Accordingly, respondents
who are not innocent purchasers for value have no standing to

479

question petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for

quieting of title.
FRANCISCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-30162 August 31, 1987
FACTS:
Nicolasa Resurreccion, the owner in fee simple of a three
parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, sold Lots Numbered 3 and
9 to one Agustin Esguerra. On March 16, 1926, Esguerra sold the
same two parcels to the spouses, Pedro Francisco and Francisca
Tolentino. The spouses registered the sale under Act No. 3344,
and declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of
Pedro Francisco. Afterwards, the property was declared in the
name of their son, Candido Francisco, the petitioner, who
continued in possession of the property after his parents demise.
Three years later, Resurreccion executed another deed of sale
dated conveying all the three parcels of land covered by her title,
in favor of a certain Felisa Afable, who registered the sale under
the Torrens Act and obtained title in her own name. Thirty-one
years afterwards, Afable sold the property to the persons now
private respondents. Espiritus asked Francisco to vacate lots
Numbered 3 and 9, which the latter was occupying and on which
was in fact standing a house that he had constructed. As might be
expected, Candido refused. The Espiritus thereupon sued him for
recovery of title and possession in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal.
ISSUE:Whether or not under the admitted facts, the Espiritus are
buyers in good faith, and therefore entitled to the full protection
of the Torrens Act.

HELD:
No. There were sufficient strong indications to impel a closer
inquiry into the location, boundaries and condition of the two
smaller lots embraced in the purchase on the part of Casimiro
480

Espiritu and his co-vendees. That inquiry is in truth dictated by

common sense, expected of a man of ordinary prudence. Had that
inquiry been made, the adverse claim of Candido Francisco over
the two small lots would have immediately come to light, and the
controversy would have died a-borning.
The Espiritus failure to undertake such an inquiry precludes
their successful invocation of the character of purchasers in good
faith. The buyer, who could not have failed to know or discover
that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of
another, is a buyer in bad faith, such knowledge being equivalent
to registration.
QUIIANO vs CA 39 SCRA 221, May 31, 1971

FACTS:

The original owners of the disputed parcels located in

Pangasinan were the spouses Fabiano Sarmiento and Tomasa de
Guzman obtained a "titulo real de composicion gratuita". The
spouses had two children.

One of them was Joaquina, the mother of the principal

petitioner, Marta Quinano. In 1932, there was an extra-judicial
partition adjudicating such lots to Jose and Marta Quinano filed an
application for a free patent in 1941 in order to acquire the same
and she was successful. She was likewise able to take possession
during the early part of the Japanese Occupation.

It was not until a complaint for reconveyance with damages

was filed with private respondents as plaintiffs wherein they
alleged that the free patent was obtained by Quinano without
their knowledge and they learned that she had sold Lots 6 and 8
481

as well as three-fourths of Lot 5 to a certain Felix Capito; on

December 7, 1946, she sold the remaining one-fourth of Lot 5 to
Antero Sanchez, with the former in turn having transferred his
rights to now petitioner Celedonio Fermin without such vendees,
however, obtaining any certificate of title in their names. were
sustained in the lower court decision as to Lots 1, 3, 4, 7, 9 and
11.

Their action was dismissed as to Lots 2 and 10 as well as to

the present disputed Lots 5, 6 and 8. Their action was dismissed
as to Lots 2 and 10 as well as to the present disputed Lots 5, 6
and 8 and elevated the matter to the CA and it decreed a
reconveyance in their favor as well as ordering the receiver
appointed "to deliver these properties unto the plaintiffs as well
as the net harvest during his receivership. Hence this petition for
review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in its judgment
sustaining an action for reconveyance of three parcels of land in
favor of private respondents.

HELD:
The law was correctly applied. In a 1953 decision, Director of
Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: "The sole remedy of the
land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of
the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in the instant
case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer
open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages." In the
language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon,: "A
different view would encourage fraud and permit one person
unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another." It would
482

indeed be a signal failing of any legal system if under the

circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as
having lost his right to a property to which he is entitled. It is one
thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different
matter if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to
enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the
undeviating line of decisions from the SC, such an undesirable
eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against. So it has
been before and so it should continue to be. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.

PNB VS CA 98 SCRA 207 (1980)

FACTS:

At the cadastral proceedings during the adjudication of the

conjugal property of spouses Iigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver, the
Cadastral Court rendered a decision and a decree of registration
of the lot was issued. Thereafter, a corresponding title in the
name of the spouses Iigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver was likewise
issued and in the Registry Books of the RD of Ilocos Norte. Before
the issuance of the said original certificate however, Iigo Bitanga
died. On October 20, 1936, Rosa Ver mortgaged the entire
property in favor of the PNB. In the meantime, Rosa Ver had
defaulted in the fulfillment of her obligation with the Manila
Trading Company so the said company levied upon her share in
the lot in question and had the attachment annotated on the
title. Rosa Ver's interest in the lot afterwards sold at public
auction, at which the MTCom was the highest bidder and the
deed of sale in favor of the MTCom was annotated on the title.

Because Rosa Ver failed to settle her obligation with thePNB,

483

the latter sold at public auction the whole lot and PNB emerged as
the highest bidder. After the period of redemption had expired,
the PNB consolidated its title over it but it was not annotated
upon the owner's duplicate certificate of title. Later, the PNB
presented a petition before the trial court asking that the owner's
certificate of title No. 7683 be declared null and void, and a new
certificate of title be issued in its name. The trial court favored
them. Later, the PNB sold the property in question to Felizardo
Reyes. On November 16, 1960, the trial court rendered a decision
in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors finding and holding that:
(a) The lot in question is a conjugal partnership property, one-half
of which must go to the heirs of the late Iigo Bitanga; (b) The
other half goes to Rosa Ver as her share; (c) That Felizardo Reyes
is not a purchaser of a registered land for value and in good faith,
and (d) Since the issuance of TCT No. 3944 in favor of the PNB,
and Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title No. 3944, in favor of
Felizardo Reyes were without legal basis, they are declared nun
and void and cancelled. On appeal by PNB and Felizardo Reyes to
the CA, respondent Court affirmed the judgment appealed from
except letter (d) thereof and ordered the RD to issue another
certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs and intervenors.

ISSUE: Whether or not The CA erred in holding that the mortgage

deed is valid and existing only with respect to the one-half portion
of the lot in question allegedly belonging to the mortgagor Rosa
Ver as her share in the conjugal partnership with her husband
Iigo Bitanga.

HELD:
The SC fully agree with the trial court and the respondent
Court and affirm the holding that "what the Philippine National
Bank had acquired from Rosa Ver by virtue of the mortgage was
simply one-half () of the entire property, for this was all she had
in her power to convey the other half being, as it still is, the
lawful share of the plaintiffs-appellees as inheritance from their
484

father, Iigo Bitanga. Nemo date quod non habet One cannot
give what is not his. There is no dispute that the document of
mortgage executed by Rosa Ver was in accordance with the
formalities required by law and that was register in the day book
of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte within a month after its
execution. What is here contested is whether Rosa Ver could, as
she did in fact, m the entire Lot 9068 to petitioner PNB. In other
words, the issue refers to the intrinsic vanity of the mortgage, as
distinguished from its formal sufficiency.

Under Article 2085, New Civil Code (Art. 1857, Old Civil
Code), one of the essential requisites to the contract of pledge
and mortgage is that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. And under Article 493,
New Civil Code (Art. 399, Old Civil Code), each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. And also
applying the law in force at the time of Inigo Bitanga's death in
1935, Rosa Ver, as surviving spouse, cannot take part legally in
the sharing of the estate left by her deceased husband (one-half
() of Lot 9068) with respect to which she only had usufructuary
rights. "The usufructuary not being an owner, cannot alienate or
dispose of the objects included in the usufruct. Thus, he cannot ...
mortgage or pledge the thing.

Therefore this court reject PNB's contention that the

mortgage constituted by Rosa Ver in its favor on October 20, 1936
is valid and covers the entire property known as Lot 9068. And a
purchaser of a land whose title contains a notice of lispendens is a
purchaser in bad faith.
485

BERNALES vs IAC
FACTS:
The lot in question was a public land which was cadastrally
surveyed. Henry Siagan is the father of both Elpidio Siagan whose
mother is Cagaoay Camiling and Augusto Siagan whose mother is
Dagaoan Sawadan. Both sons of Henry Siagan and their
successors-in-interest are the contending parties in this case,
claiming ownership of the land in question.
Petitioners claim that Dagaoan Sawadan acquired ownership
over subject land by means of continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession since time immemorial. Augusto Siagan inherited Lot
1494 but his son Constante alleging in a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 16, 1967 that he inherited the same from his late
grandmother, sold the lot in question to the Pasimio spouses and
registered said instrument. The Pasimio spouses in turn sold the
same lot to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. who
bought the same for the sole purpose of disposing the same at
cost to the actual occupants-tenants. Said tenants are now the
petitioners herein. Elpidio Siagan applied in September, 1967 for
Free Patent over said lot on 1968. Subsequently, the original
certificate of title covering said lot, was issued in the name of
Elpidio Siagan.On May 5, 1973, or after the lapse of five (5) years,
Elpidio Siagan sold it to the spouses Cadiam, and the TCT was
issued in their names.
Following their purchase, said spouses took possession of the
land, fenced it and planted it with rice but herein petitioners on
1974, forcibly dispossessed them uprooting the plants of said
couple who then brought a criminal complaint for theft of rice
plants against the petitioners. This led to the referral of the
criminal charge to the Court of Agrarian Relations but because
petitioners claimed ownership in their answer before the CAR,
spouses Cadiam filed a civil action for recovery of ownership of
the same lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam have a better title
486

over the disputed land than Bernales and his co-plaintiffs

HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, the Cadiam spouses who were found
by the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with a
Transfer Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their
names, have evidently a better right than herein petitioners
As aforestated, the Cadiam spouses to whom a Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued after the purchase of the lot from
Elpidio Siagan for a valuable consideration as stated in the Deed
and who had no knowledge of any flaw or defect of the title at the
time of the purchase, are evidently as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, innocent purchasers for value and above all
considerations, are entitled to the protection of the law.
Petitioners admitted that the land in dispute was originally
public land. According to them it became private land because of
the long possession of Dagaoan Sawadan. They allege that she
had been in possession since 1908 and that she brought said lot
to the marriage which as will be noted was allegedly also in 1908
giving credence to the fact that said lot was formerly owned,
occupied and possessed by Henry Siagan since time immemorial,
as agreed and stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial
conference. Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals
correctly observed that whether Lot 1494 descended from Henry
Siagan as claimed by private respondents or from Dagaoan
Sawadan, the mother of Augusto Siagan as claimed by the
petitioners, it is undeniable that Augusto Siagan had already quitclaimed, ceded and conveyed whatever rights or interest he had
over said lot in favor of Elpidio Siagan. Petition for review on
certiorari is denied.
<CASES 334 AND 344 ARE SAME>
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LAZARO
MANGAWANG
G.R. No. L-18861 June 30, 1964

487

FACTS:
Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the
issuance of a homestead patent over a parcel of land situated at
Balanga, Bataan. Pending action on his application, cadastral
proceedings were instituted by the government in said
municipality wherein Amposta filed an answer praying for the
adjudication of the same land in his favor.
On March 8, 1920, the cadastral court rendered decision
awarding the land to Amposta. Since no advice on this matter was
given either to the Bureau of Lands or to the Governor General,
the latter, issued in favor of Amposta Homestead Patent covering
the same land, and Original Certificate of Title was issued to him
by the Governor-General.
On December 20, 1922, the cadastral court issued a decree
of registration of the land in favor of Amposta pursuant to the
decision rendered in the cadastral case.
On November 24, 1941, Amposta sold the land to Santos
Camacho surrendering to him Original Certificate of Title, thus a
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to Camacho.
On November 18, 1946, Santos-Camacho sold the land to
Bonifacio Camacho as a result of which another Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued to the latter. On April 28, 1948,
Bonifacio Camacho mortgaged the land to the Development Bank
of the Philippines and having failed to pay the loan as agreed
upon the land was sold at public auction to said bank as the
highest bidder.
Meanwhile, or on June 11, 1947, Gavino Amposta again sold
the same property to Lazaro and Arsenio Mangawang. In
connection with this transaction, Amposta surrendered to the
vendees the title that was issued to him in the cadastral case,
which was later substituted by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued
in the name of the vendees.
Upon learning of this transfer, the Development Bank of the
488

Philippines, commenced the present action against them to

recover its possession and damages.
Appellees contend that their right over the property in
litigation should be restored because the certificate of title they
are holding is derived from that issued pursuant to a decision
rendered by a cadastral court, while the title being held by
appellant was merely based on the title issued in an
administrative proceeding, upon the theory that a judicial title is
deemed preferred to one issued administratively.
ISSUES: Whether the petitioner bank or respondent Mangawang
is considered the rightful owner of the land herein in dispute.
HELD: DBP is the rightful owner of the land in dispute.
RULING:
Amposta first sold the land to Santos Camacho on November
24, 1941, who registered it in his name on the same date. Seven
years thereafter, Amposta again sold the land to the Mangawang
brother, who also registered it in their name on the same date.
Since both purchasers apparently have acted in good faith, as
there is nothing in the evidence to show that they did otherwise,
the sale made by Amposta to Santos Camacho is the valid one
considering that when Amposta sold the same land to the
Mangawang brothers he had nothing more to sell even if the title
he surrendered to them is one issued covering the same property.
In legal contemplation, therefore, Amposta sold a property he no
longer owned, and hence the transaction is legally ineffective.
On the other hand, the case under consideration can also be
viewed under a different angle. It can also be treated as one of
double sale, where a person sells the same land to two different
persons who are unaware of the flaw that lies in its title, and
where the law adjudicates the property to the purchaser who first
registers the transaction in his name in the registry of
property.And applying this principle, the title should likewise be
adjudicated to appellant whose predecessor-in-interest acquired
and registered the property much ahead in point of time than the
489

appellees. Verily, the title acquired by the latter is invalid and

ineffective.
Petition granted.
CASES 331 AND 346 ARE SAME
CASES 345 AND 347 ARE SAME
GATIOAN VS. GAFFUD ET AL 27 SCRA 706
FACTS:
The land in question was originally registered in the name of
Rufina Permison under Original Certificate of Title No. L-3432,
dated December 18, 1935 on the basis of a free patent. In the
year 1948, Permison sold it to Sibreno Novesteras, who in turn,
conveyed it to appellee Encarnacion Gatioan on April 1, 1949.
Through the initiative of appellee, the said Original Certificate of
Title No. L-3432 in the name of Rufina Permison was cancelled on
June 3, 1949 and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T1212 was issued in favor of Gatioan.
On June 12, 1950, Gatioan obtained a loan in the amount of
P900.00 from the Philippine National Bank, and as security
therefor, mortgaged the land described in TCT No. T-1212. After
payment, using the same land and title as collateral, he acquired
another loan in the sum of P1,100.00 from the same bank on May
3, 1954, and a third loan on July 18, 1957, P2,800,00.
In the meantime, on January 23, 1956, spouses Sixto
Gaffud and Villamora Logan procured a free patent covering the
identical parcel of land described in TCT No. T-1212 of Gatioan, on
the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-6038 was
issued in their favor. On May 15, 1956 and January 8, 1957, they
also obtained two loans from the Bank in the sum of P1,400.00
and P300.00, respectively, and as collateral for both, they
mortgaged the said land covered by OCT No. P-6038.
On May 16, 1962, because of the existence of OCT No. P6038 in the name of spouses Gaffud and Logan, containing an
annotation of the aforementioned consolidated mortgage in favor
490

of the Bank, and the annotation on TCT No. T-1212 of the

mortgage encumbrance covering the already paid loan of
P2,800.00 to the Gatioan, which appellant Bank refused to have
cancelled, Gatioan filed the complaint for quieting of title in this
case.
The lower court declared null and void ab initio the patent
and certificate of title No. P-6038 issued in the name of the
defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan and ordered
also its cancellation. Declaring the real estate mortgage executed
by the defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan in
favor of the Bank, recorded on OCT P-6038 null and void and
unenforceable as against the herein plaintiff, and ordering its
cancellation, without prejudice of the Bank's right to collect from
the said spouses;
The Bank appealed, insisting that the lower court should
have declared it an innocent mortgagee in good faith and for
value as regards the mortgages executed in its favor by said
spouses and duly annotated on their abovementioned OCT P-6038
and that consequently, the said mortgage annotations should be
carried over to and considered as encumbrances on the land
covered by TCT No. T-1212 of Gatioan which, as already stated, is
the identical land covered by OCT P-6038 of the Gaffuds.
ISSUE: Who has the better right of title in case of double sale
through a free patent application?
HELD:
We find no merit, whatsoever, in this contention, because
the point raised was already passed upon by this Court in no
uncertain terms in Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, way back on
October 2, 1915 and in subsequent cases of similar nature. We
unhesitatingly affirm the judgment of the lower court.
Moreover, it is a matter of judicial notice that before a bank
grants a loan on the security of land, it first undertakes a careful
examination of the title of the applicant as well as a physical and
on-the-spot investigation of the land itself offered as security.
491

Undoubtedly, had herein appellant Bank taken such a step which

is demanded by the most ordinary prudence, it would have easily
discovered the flaw in the title of the defendant spouses; and if it
did not conduct such examination and investigation, it must be
held to be guilty of gross negligence in granting them the loans in
question. In either case, appellant Bank cannot be considered as
a mortgagee in good faith within the contemplation of the law.
Under the circumstances, the bank had absolutely no excuse
for approving the application of the defendant spouses and giving
the loans in question. To appellant, therefore, fittingly applies the
following pronouncement of this Court:
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect
or lack of, title in his vendor cannot claim that he has
acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner
of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must
be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should
have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might
be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of
his vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe
that such defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to the
possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title
will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and
it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would
have led to its discovery had be acted with that measure of
precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent
man in a like situation..... (Dayao v. Diez, supra; citing the
case of Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery. Co., 37 Phil; 644.)
In any event, again, the following ruling of this Court in the
recent case of De Villa v. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20,
1968, applies to appellant:
We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title
around issued to different persons covering the same land in
492

whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between

original parties and in case of successive registrations where
more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person
holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the person who rely on the second certificate. The
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and his
successors, should resort to his vendor for redress, rather
than molest the holder of the first certificate and his
successors, who should be permitted to resort secure in
their title. (Citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590)
G.R. No. L-24918
FELIX DE VILLA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANACLETO TRINIDAD, ETC., ET AL., defendants,
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARIANO S.
TRINIDAD, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Cesario Fabricante owned 5,724,415 square meters of land designated as Lot No.
9, Plan PSU, located in Sitio Salog, Barrio San Agustin, Municipality of Iriga,
Camarines Sur, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50, decree No. 86989,
issued in his name.
To secure a loan of P150,000, Japanese currency, he mortgaged on April 18, 1944
this land, together with another lot, [[1]] in favor of Felix de Villa to whom he
surrendered his duplicate certificate, and with whom it remained until it was lost.
The mortgage was for a period of four years, redeemable within two years
thereafter.
On November 3, 1945, Cesario Fabricante petitioned[[2]] the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur for the issuance of a new duplicate of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50 upon the alleged ground that his duplicate was lost.
Felix de Villa, the mortgage creditor was not notified. The petition was granted on
November 10, 1945, and a new duplicate certificate of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 50, was issued to Fabricante.[[3]]
Several days after, on November 27, 1945, Fabricante sold the land for P10,000 to
Eustaquio Palma who, on the same day, secured in his name Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 12 covering said lot. [[4]]
493

In 1946, to secure two loans of P10,000 each, Palma mortgaged the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12 in favor of the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank, which later became the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and is
now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). When Palma failed to pay
the loan, DBP foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially pursuant to Act No. 3135
and, as highest bidder at the public auction held on April 17, 1951, bought the land
and possessed it by virtue of a writ of possession issued on September 26, 1951 in
its favor. Later, it obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1115 covering said
land.
On October 11, 1951, Palma assigned his right of redemption to Anacleto Trinidad
who, though he failed to pay, was allowed by the DBP later to buy the land in
consideration of P27,005.11 payable on installments.[[5]] Trinidad then took
possession of the land.
Meanwhile, Felix de Villa, having lost the duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 50 surrendered to him by Fabricante and learning that the original was lost in
the Register of Deeds, filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
[[6]] on June 12, 1948 a petition to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 26, in favor of Cesario Fabricante with the annotation
of the mortgage in his favor as was allegedly contained in the original lost. [[7]]
After hearing, notice of which was served on Fabricante, the Court of First
Instance ordered[[8]] the reconstitution, with the annotation of the mortgage in De
Villa's favor. Said reconstitution was based on the photostatic copy of the deed of
mortgage[[9]] in which the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50 appeared.
ISSUE: Who owns the land despite the presence of laches or estoppel and the
propriety of the award of damages by the lower court.
Held:
We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail
as between original parties and in case of successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate
is entitled to the land as against the person who rely on the second certificate. The
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and his successors, should resort
to his vendor for redress, rather than molest the holder of the first certificate and
his successors, who should be permitted to rest secure in their title. Consequently,
since Original Certificate of Title No. 183 was registered on January 30, 1920, De
Villa's claim which is based on said title should prevail, as against Trinidad's whose
original title was registered on November 25, 1920. And from the point of equity,
494

this is the proper solution, considering that unlike the titles of Palma and the DBP,
De Villa's title was never tainted with fraud.
With the modification that the damages recoverable by De Villa against Trinidad
should date from and after the filing of the complaint on January 26, 1962 until the
property is restored to the plaintiff, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed
in all other respects; and, accordingly, prior to the payment of the damages in De
Villa's favor, supplementary proceedings in aid of execution are hereby ordered to
be forthwith held by the court a quo, to appraise and determine the value of
improvements and expenses reimbursable to Trinidad, and thereafter to offset the
two amounts respectively due to the parties to the extent that one covers the other.

BERGADO VS. CA, 173 SCRA 497

FACTS:
The property subject of this case is claimed by both the
petitioners and the Republic of the Philippines under two separate
deeds of sale executed by the same vendor.
Disputed are some 5,900 square meters of land forming part
of a lot situated in Pangasinan and covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 16545 in the name of Alejandro Trinidad and Aniceta
Soriano. It was inherited by Marciana Trinidad, their sole heir. She
transferred it by virtue of an Escritura de Compraventa dated May
3, 1928, to Pedro Bergado and Justina Galinato, the petitioners'
parents. She then conveyed it again, this time through a Deed of
Sale dated February 19, 1947, to the Parent-Teacher Association
of the Urdaneta Community High. School.
The petitioners claim the property by right of inheritance
from their parents. The Republic says the land was donated to it
on July 26, 1977, by the said PTA.
The Republic was sustained by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals. Thus, the petitioners appealed.
495

In rejecting their appeal, the respondent court held that the

petitioners had slept on whatever right they might have had and
were now barred by prescription and laches from asserting it.
Moreover, their alleged right, such as it was, was inferior to the
title asserted by the Republic to the property in question.
The petitioners contend that the Republic was itself barred
from putting up the defenses of prescription and laches because
these had not been pleaded earlier and that the Regional Trial
Court and Court of Appeals have erred and so should be reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not good faith in
essential.

registration of land

HELD:
Yes. When real property is the subject matter of a double
sale, the purchaser who first registers it in the registry becomes
the owner thereof under the provision of Article 1473 of the Civil
Code, but this legal provision should not be understood in an
absolute sense, nor does it constitute a ground to sustain the
demurrer, because the rights conferred by said article upon one of
the two of purchasers of the same real property who has
registered his title in the registry of deeds, do not come into being
if the registration is not made in good faith.
The inscription of the Escritura de Compraventa in 1964 produced no legal effect
because it was made in bad faith. Ownership should therefore vest in the
respondent Republic of the Philippines because it was first in possession of the
property in good faith. If any recourse is still available to the petitioners, it
definitely is not against the Republic of the Philippines. Their claim for satisfaction
on which we do not rule at this time may be addressed only to Marciana Trinidad
who, for reasons still to be discovered, sold the same land once, and then once
again, to separate purchasers.
HEIRS OF TIRO VS. PES
GR. No. 170528, August 26, 2008.
496

FACTS:
Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Quieting of Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the
children of the late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
disputed land since time immemorial until they were prevented
from entering the same by persons claiming to be the new
owners sometime in 1995.
But they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been
cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently registered in the
name of respondent.

The petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating

from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation of
Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void, including the
transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title which was
issued in the name of respondent be cancelled; and that the
property be restored and registered in the name of the
petitioners.

Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific

Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses
Velayo, the registered owners of the property who were also in
possession of the same at the time of the sale. Respondent
argued that petitioners action for quieting of title was barred by
laches and prescription.

The RTC issued a decision dismissing petitioners complaint.

The RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for
value who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title in the
name of the vendor. The petitioners filed with the CA an appeal
497

and MR but were denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD of

registering a clearly void and unregistrable document confers no
valid title on the presentor and his successors-in-interest.

HELD:
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for
value when he buys the property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right or an interest in such property, and
pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person in the property.

A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the

correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. The courts cannot
disregard the rights of innocent third persons, for that would
impair or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land
registration.
Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still
be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

498

In the present case, the certificates of title of Pacific Rehouse Corporation

and the Spouses Velayo were clean and appeared valid on their face, and there was
nothing therein which should have put the respondent on its guard of some defect
in the previous registered owners title to the disputed property.
VICENTE RAESES VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-68747 July 13, 1990
FACTS:
The proceedings at bar originated from two actions instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte by the spouses
Vicente Raeses and Zenaida Buena against Antonino Lamadrid.
They were docketed as Civil Cases Numbered 2113 and 2313.
Involved in Civil Case No. 2113 is a parcel of land with an
area of about 11.7174 hectares, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-5616 in the name of Vicente Raeses The complaint
alleged that Antonino Lamadrid had intruded into a 6 hectare area
of this land, had occupied it for some years, and had refused to
vacate it despite repeated demands; it therefore prayed for
judgment ousting Lamadrid from the property and commanding
him to pay damages. In his answer, Lamadrid claimed that he had
been in continuous, open and public occupation in concept of
owner, of the area in question since 1942 (about 30 years prior to
the filing of the complaint); that the Raeses' title, acquired from
a free patentee, Eustaquio Asido, was null and void on account of
fraud on the part of the Raeses and Asido their "dummy," and
that he (Lamadrid) should therefore be declared the owner of the
land, entitled to a conveyance thereof from the Raeses and
recovery of damages from the latter.
Involved in Civil Case No. 2313 is another parcel of agricultural land
situated in Mahawanhawan, Pinagtambangan, Labo, Camarines Norte, known as
Lot 2000-B of the Labor Cadastre, measuring 8.7092 hectares, more or less, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6098 in the name of Zenaida Buena.
The complaint averred that Lamadrid and his wife also intruded into this property
without any right whatsoever, forcibly occupying about two and a half (2 1/2)
hectares thereof, and have since refused to leave the premises despite demands.
The complaint thus prayed for judgment directing the defendants' ouster and their
payment of damages by way of attorney's fees.
499

The cases were tried jointly

parties, after which judgment was
1979, disposing as follows:

by agreement of
rendered on May

the
22,

In Civil Case No. 2113.Declaring the plaintiff Vicente Raneses

the owner of the property in question; ordering the defendant
(Lamadrid) to vacate the same, and to pay the costs;
In Civil Case No. 2313.Declaring the sale in favor of Zenaida
Buena Raneses by Isabelo Cuevas, Exhibit E, genuine and valid;
declaring plaintiffs the owner of the portion in question consisting
of the two-fifths (2/5) of the land originally belonging to Isabelo
Cuevas; ordering the defendants to vacate the same and to pay
the costs. 7
The intermediate Appellate Court pronounced the Raeses to
be vendees in bad faith, and their deed of sale, Exhibit E, a
forgery.The Appellate Court moreover ruled that its "own close
examination, verification and analysis of the questioned and
standard signatures" impelled it to the same conclusion as that
presented by the NBI handwriting expert, Arcadio Ramos, i.e., that
the questioned signature were a forgery, a conclusion
strengthened by "suspicious circumstances" attendant on "the
preparation, execution and ratification of the questioned
document of sale.
ISSUE: whether or not a forged deed will affect the title.
HELD:
In any case, the principle that a forged deed is an absolute
nullity and conveys no title is firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence. Clearly militates against according any primacy to
the claim of the Raeses over that of respondent Lamadrid,
whose own instrument of acquisition has not been shown to be
affected by any such defect.
SPOUSES VALENTIN SOLIVEL
MARCELINO M. FRANCISCO

VS.

THE

HONORABLE

500

G.R. No. L-51450 February 10, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioners, the spouses Valentin Solivel and Petra Mente
(hereinafter called the Solivels), are an old couple residing in
Davao City. They are the registered owners, under Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-10985 and T-10986 of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao del Sur, of two parcels of land located in the
Municipality of Digos in said Province with a combined area of
twenty seven (27) hectares, more or less. The portion covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10985 is the subject of this case.
On or about May 25, 1972, following a number of previous
visits to said owners, Federico Tompong, a practicing lawyer, and
Isaias Ngoho obtained the former's agreement to sell their
property to a certain Espinosa of Masbate for P60,000.00. Giving
the Solivels a partial payment of P10,000.00 allegedly coming
from Espinosa,Tompong and Ngoho persuaded the Solivels to give
them the certificates of title to the property, for which they issued
a receipt, and promised that the sale would be consummated and
the balance of P50,000.00 paid within six (6) months, failing
which the partial payment would be forfeited in the Solivels' favor
and their certificates of title returned to them.
Tompong and Ngoho never returned to make good their
promise. They could not in fact be located until some months later
when they were arrested by Philippine Constabulary on complaint
of a certain Atty. Hilario Mapayo to whom, it appeared, they had
sold a portion of the Solivels' property.
Following their arrest, Tompong and Ngoho were confronted
by Valentin Solivel and his son, Rafael, at the PC Headquarters in
Davao City. That confrontation brought to light the existence of
the following documents purportedly executed by either or both
of the Solivels.
1) a deed of sale dated May 24, 1972 ratified by
Tompong as notary public selling a 40,000 squaremeter portion of the Solivels' property to Atty. Hilario
501

Mapayo for the price of P30,000.00 ;

2) a power of attorney dated May 24, 1972, ratified also
by Tompong as notary public, constituting Isaias Ngoho
the attorney-in-fact of Valentin Solivel to receive from
Atty. Hilario Mapayo partial payment of P15,000.00 in
two installments ;
3) a power of attorney dated September 7, 1972
ratified also by Tompong as notary public, authorizing
Isaias Ngoho to sell the Solivels' property in question as
said owners' attorney-in-fact ;
The Trial Court found that the power-of-attorney (Exhibit C)
ostensibly empowering Ngoho to sell the Solivels' property as said
owners' attorney-in-fact was a forgery and thus, albeit not
expressly but by necessary implication, that the deed of sale
executed by Ngoho in favor of Cagas on the strength of said
instrument was also falsified and that the Solivels' claims
against Tompong and Ngoho had been sufficiently established.
However, said Court also held that Cagas was an innocent
purchaser for value, decided that he had acquired valid title to the
property in question by virtue of the sale,and was entitled to its
possession and enjoyment, and gave the Solivels only the sop of
an award against the elusive defendants Tompong and Ngoho of
the price paid by Cagas for the property (P19,000.00) plus
interest, and of damages, including attorney's fees, in the amount
of P8,500.00
ISSUE: Whether or not a forged deed or document may be the root of a valid title
RULING:
Thus the rule is simple: the fraudulent and forged document
of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name indicated by the forger
If the certificate of title has already been transferred from
the mane of true owner to the name of the forger or the name
indictaed by the forger, and while it remained that way, the land
502

was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the forged deed

or document may be the root of a valid title.

TENIO-OBSEQUIO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107967 March 1, 1994
FACTS:
On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed a complaint in the court a
quo against herein petitioners Consorcia Tenio and her husband, Orlando
Obsequio, and the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for recovery of possession and
ownership, alleging that sometime in 1964, they mortgaged the land to Eduardo
Deguro for P10,000.00; that to guaranty the loan they delivered to the latter the
original certificate of title to the land; that in the meantime, they continued to
cultivate the same and, at the end of the harvest season, they gave two-thirds (2/3)
of the harvest to Eduardo Deguro; that on June 25, 1965, Eduardo Deguro and his
wife, without the knowledge and consent of herein private respondents, prepared a
document of sale and through misrepresentation and other manipulations made it
appear that private respondents sold the land to them.
This deed of sale was annotated at the back of the said certificate of title as
Entry No. 16007. By virtue thereof, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1181 in the
name of Eufronio Alimpoos was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T1360 was correspondingly issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the death of
Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio. On
September 22, 1970, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1421 was issued in her
name. It was allegedly only in 1982, when Eufronio Alimpoos received a
Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of his land from the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), that he learned that the land was already titled in the name of
another.
ISSUE: Whether or not a forged document of sale give rise to a valid title.
HELD:
Yes. The court has held that a fraudulent or forged document of sale may
give rise to a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from
503

the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger and while it
remained as such, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.
DURAN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-64159 September 10, 1985
FACTS:
Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land in Caloocan City which she had
purchased form the Moja Estate. She left the Philippines in June 1854. A Deed of
Sale of the 2 lots was made in favor of Circes mother, Fe. In December 1965, Fe
mortgaged the same property to Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. When Circe came to
know about the mortgage, she wrote to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Caloocan
informing that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or mortgage any
of her properties. She failed to get an answer from the RD. So she returned to the
Philippines in May 1966.
Meanwhile, Fe failed to redeem the mortgaged properties and foreclosure
proceedings were initiated by Marcelo- Tiangco. Circe claims that the sale in favor
of her mother is a forgery saying that at the time of its execution in 1963, she was
in the US. Fe alleges that the signatures of Circe in the Deed are genuine and the
mortgage made by Fe is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good faith and for
value.
HELD:
Yes. Good faith, while it is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to
the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title was
received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it. The
mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title and, in the
absence of anything to excite suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond
the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of the
said certificate. The fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root
of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the
true owner to the name indicated by the forger.

504

TORRES VS. CA
G.R. No. L-63046 June 21, 1990

FACTS:

The land erected with a building (TCT No. 53628 issued in his
name) is owned by Torres. He was and still in possession of the
realties, holding safely to his owner's duplicate certificate of title,
and paying the real estate taxes, and collecting rentals from
tenants occupying the building.

Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law, misrepresenting

to be the attorney-in-fact of Torres and falsely alleging that the
duplicate copy of TCT No. 53628 was lost, obtained another copy
of the certificate. He forged a simulated deed of sale of the
realties in his favor. He mortgaged the same to Rosario Mota, wife
of Ernesto Cue, and also to Angela Fermin, who later assigned her
credit to the spouses Cue.

Torres filed civil case against Fernandez to annul TCT No.

86018 as well as the proceedings in LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133.

Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which prompted the

Cues to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Fernandez filed Civil Case No. 75643 against the spouses Cue for
the annulment of the mortgage with preliminary injunction.

The trial court ruled that Torres is the true and legal evidence
505

of ownership of the subject immovable which was affirmed by the

CA.

Prior to the CAs decision, Fernandez failed to comply with

his obligation under the amicable settlement and the Cues were
granted a writ of execution. The subject realties were then levied
upon and sold at public auction where Rosario Mota was the
highest bidder.

The redemption period for the property having lapsed

without Fernandez nor Torres redeeming the properties, Mota was
issued the title.

Torres filed a complaint to restrain Mota from collecting

rentals and for the declaration as void TCT No. 105953.

The trial court declared that Motas title is void but CA

reversed it.

ISSUE: Whether a forged sale may be the root of a valid title.

HELD:
Yes, except if the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title
covering the same property.
The claim of indefeasibility under the Torrens land title
system would be correct if previous valid title to the same parcel
of land did not exist. The petitioner had a valid title. It never
506

parted with it; it never handed or delivered to anyone its owner's

duplicate of the transfer certificate of title, it could not be charged
with negligence in the keeping of its duplicate certificate of title or
with any act which could have brought about the issuance of
another certificate upon which a purchaser in good faith and for
value could rely. If the respondent's contention as to
indefeasibility of his title should be upheld, then registered
owners without the least fault on their part could be divested of
their title and deprived of their property. Such disastrous results
which would shake and destroy the stability of land titles had not
been foreseen by those who had endowed with indefeasibility
land titles issued under the Torrens system. Fernandez
perpetrated the fraud by making false representations in his
petition and the title issued to him being the product of fraud
could not vest him valid and legal title to the parcel of land in
litigation. As he had no title to the parcel of land, in the same way
that a thief does not own or have title to the stolen goods, he
could not transmit title which he did not have nor possess.

To hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota

was an innocent mortgagee would be futile because no certificate
of title covering the realties in derogation of Torres' certificate of
title may validly be issued.

PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

THE

HONORABLE

G.R. No. 66715 September 18, 1990

FACTS:

Leticia de la Vina-Sepe executed a real estate mortgage in

favor of PNB, San Carlos Branch, over a lot registered in her name
507

under TCT No. T-31913 to secure the payment of a sugar crop

loan of P3,400. Leticia, acting as attorney-in-fact for her brotherin-law, private respondent, executed an amended real estate
mortgage to include his (Alcedo's) Lot No. 1626 as additional
collateral for Sepe's increased loan of P16,500. Sepe and Alcedo
verbally agreed to split 50-50 the proceeds of the loan but failing
to receive his one-half share from her, Alcedo wrote a letter to the
PNB, revoking the SPA he had given to Leticia Sepe to mortgage
his lot.

The PNB Branch Manager assured Alcedo that the bank

would exclude his lot as collateral for Sepe's forthcoming sugar
crop loan.
On the same day, PNB advised Sepe in writing to replace Lot
No. 1402 with collateral of equal or higher value. Despite such
advice, Sepe still obtained an additional loan on the security of
Alcedo's property as collateral. Alcedo requested Sepe to pay her
accounts to forestall foreclosure proceedings against his property,
but to no avail.

Alcedo sued Sepe and PNB for collection and injunction with
damages. While pending, Alcedo's land was sold to PNB as the
highest bidder in the sale to which he filed an annulment of it and
reconveyance of the land to him free from liens and
encumbrances, with damages.

Alcedo withdrew his action to collect his one-half from the

proceeds of the sugar crop loans obtained by Sepe. PNB alleged
that it had no knowledge of the agreement between Mrs. Sepe
and Alcedo to split the crop loan proceeds between them.
The trial court favored Alcedo, declaring the public auction
sale and the certificate of sale as null and void, which decision
508

was affirmed by IAC.

ISSUE: Whether PNB validly foreclosed the real estate

mortgage despite notice of the revocation of the Special Power of
Attorney.

HELD:

PNB committed error in foreclosing the property of Alcedo

despite the revocation of the Special Power of Attorney.

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public

policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against its own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and
who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs
from equitable principles and the equities in the case. It is
designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where
without its aid injustice might result. It has been applied by this
Court wherever and whenever the special circumstances of a case
so demands.

In the case at bar, since PNB had promised to exclude

Alcedo's property as collateral for Sepe's 1971-72 sugar crop loan,
it should have released the property to Alcedo. The mortgage
which Sepe gave to the bank on Alcedo's lot as collateral for her
1971-72 sugar crop loan was null and void for having been
already disauthorized by Alcedo. Since Alcedo's property secured
only P13,100.00 of Sepe's 1970-71 sugar crop loan of P16,500.00
509

(because P3,400 was secured by Sepe's own property), Alcedo's

property may be held to answer for only the unpaid balance, if
any, of Sepe's 1970-71 loan, but not the 1971-72 crop loan.

While Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the
revocation of Alcedo's Special Power of Attorney to mortgage his
property should appear in a public instrument. Nevertheless, a
revocation embodied in a private writing is valid and binding
between the parties.

The PNB acted with bad faith in proceeding against Alcedo's

property to satisfy Sepe's unpaid 1971-72 sugar crop loan. The
extrajudicial foreclosure being null and void ab initio, the
certificate of sale which the Sheriff delivered to PNB as the
highest bidder at the sale is also null and void.

The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

G.R. No. L-53620 January 31, 1985

PEDRO LONZAME, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXIV, MELANIO FLORES and
SEGUNDA MANUEL, respondents.
Facts:
Eufemia Corporal Blones was the registered owner of a parcel of
land, denominated as Lot No. 19, containing an area of 276.80
square meters more or less, situated at Tondo, Manila and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 98530 of the Registry
of Deeds for Manila.
510

On February 16, 1969, Blones and the spouses Segunda Manuel

and Melanio Flores entered into a "Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan"
whereby Blones sold and spouses Flores bought a portion of Lot
No. 19, denominated under the subdivision plan, as Lot No. 19-A
and containing an area of 131.76 square meters, in consideration
of the price of P200.00 per square meter, payable as follows:
P10,000.00 upon signing of the contract, P5,000.00 on February
6, 1970, and the balance on February 6, 1975. Said contract also
contained stipulations which provided that upon full payment of
the purchase price, the vendor would segregate the area sold to
the vendees and cause to be issued another title thereon in the
name of said vendees. The contract further stipulated that
possession of Lot No. 19-A passes to the vendees upon the
signing of the agreement. However, the "Kasunduan ng
Pagbibilihan" was not registered with the Registry of Deeds for the
City of Manila.
The stipulated payments were duly complied with by the Floreses.
In the meantime, on August 12, 1970, for value received, Blones
executed and delivered to Conchita Trinidad and Patrocinio
Trinidad, a promissory note in the sum of P24,000.00, payable
twelve months after date, with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum. Under the terms of the promissory note, if any
interest is not paid when due, then the principal, together with all
unpaid interests, shall at once become due and demandable. As
security for the payment of the promissory note, Blones likewise
executed a real estate mortgage on August 12, 1970, over Lot No.
19. The real estate mortgage was duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds for Manila.
Before the first week of February, 1974, the Floreses offered to
pay the sum of P12,000.00 to cover the unpaid balance on the
purchase price but Blones and her son refused to accept the
same. Instead, the two proposed to return the spouses' but the
latter rejected the proposal. At this point in time, the Flores
spouses discovered that Lot No. 19 had been mortgaged to
Conchita and Patrocinio, both surnamed Trinidad and married to
511

Tito Tatoy and Fernando M. Marquez respectively. As a

consequence, the spouses executed an affidavit of adverse claim
and registered the same in the Register of Deeds for Manila.
Thereafter, they filed an action against Blones and the
mortgagees to declare null and void the mortgage executed by
Blones in favor of her co-defendants-mortgagees and to compel
Blones to accept P12,000.00 as purchase price for Lot No. 19-A.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is required accept the tender of
payment made by the private respondents for the lot known as
Lot No. 19-A, after herein petitioner had already acquired the
same through a sale by public auction.

Held:
In the case of Villar v. Javier de Paderanga (97 Phil. 604, 608), we
held that in foreclosure of mortgages under Rule 70 (now Rule 68
of the Rules of Court), there is no right of redemption after the
judicial sale is confirmed; and when the foreclosure sale is validly
confirmed by the court, title vests upon the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale and the confirmation retroacts to the date of the
sale. Thus, the rights of the mortgagee and persons holding under
him are cut off by the sale upon confirmation, and with them the
equity of redemption.
The "Option to Buy" executed by herein petitioner in favor of the
private respondents has no merit. The rights of the parties under
the option to buy cannot be litigated and passed upon by the
court a quo in a decision already long final. If the private
respondents intended to enforce the "Option to Buy" against the
petitioner, they should have filed a separate action for that
purpose.
GONZALES V IAC
157 SCRA 587
Facts:
512

Asuncion and Dioscoro Buensuceco were the original owners of a lot but due to
tax delinquency, the lot was sold at public auction in favor of the province of Iloilo. The daughter of the spouses, Hortencia, discovered that the title of the land is
still in the name of her parents. She paid the taxes and was issued a deed of
repurchase. The title was reconstituted and issued in the name of Asuncion. It was
then sold to spouses Panzo. The spouses Panzo mortgaged the property with Rural
Bank of Pavia. Due to failure to pay, the property was foreclosed and a deed was
executed in favor of Rural Bank.
Petitioner, as judicial co-administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Matias
Yusay, thereafter filed for the cancellation of the title and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of Yusay. She alleges that the property was originally
mortgaged to Yusay by spouses Buensuceco and was later sold orally to the same.
It is also alleged that the property is in possession of Yusay as evidenced by the
presence of tenant Daguino. Defendant bank alleges good faith.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent nullification of the mortgagors certificate of title nullifies
the mortgage?
Ruling:
No.
Where the Torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later
given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said title as null
and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage right of the bank, which had
acted in good faith. Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien
upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagors
obtained their title thereto thru fraud.

PRUDENTIAL
BANK
vs.HON.
DOMINGO
D.
PANIS,
FERNANDO MAGCALE & TEODULA BALUYUT-MAGCALE
G.R. No. L-50008 August 31, 1987

FACTS:
Plaintiffs-spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential
513

Bank. To secure payment, Plaintiffs-spouses executed in favor of

defendant a deed of Real Estate Mortgage on the 2-storey semiconcrete residential building with warehouse and on the right of
occupancy on the lot where the building was erected. The Real
Estate Mortgagewas registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Zambales on November 23, 1971.
On May 2, 1973, plaintiffs secured an additional loan from
Prudential Bank. To secure payment, plaintiffs executed in favor of
Prudential Bank another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
same properties previously mortgaged. The second deed of Real
Estate Mortgage was likewise registered.
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4776 on the land was issued
on April 24, 1972, on the basis of which OCT No. 2554 was issued
in the name of private respondent Fernando Magcale on May 15,
1972.
For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant
Bank after it became due, and upon application of said defendant,
the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed.
Consequent to the foreclosure was the sale of the properties
mortgaged to defendant as the highest bidder in a public auction
sale conducted. The auction sale was held despite written request
from plaintiffs to desist from going with the scheduled public
auction sale.
Respondent Court declared the deeds of Real Estate
Mortgage as null and void. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be
constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to
another.

RULING:
514

Yes. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,

this Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building"
separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can
only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property."
Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily
includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements
thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged
apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage
would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be
considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and
apart from the land.

It is without question that the original mortgage was

executed before the issuance of the final patent and before the
government was divested of its title to the land, an event which
takes effect only on the issuance of the sales patent and its
subsequent registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Under the foregoing considerations, it is evident that the
mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building
which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to
all intents and purposes a valid mortgage.

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales &

Olongapo City is hereby MODIFIED.

CENTRAL
APPEALS

BANK

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

vs.

COURT

OF

G.R. No. L-45710 October 3, 1985

FACTS:
515

On April 28, 1965, Island Savings Bank, upon favorable

recommendation of its legal department, approved the loan
application for P80,000.00 of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, who, as a
security for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate
mortgage over his 100-hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves,
Agusan, and covered by TCT No. T-305, and which mortgage was
annotated on the said title the next day. The approved loan
application called for a lump sum P80,000.00 loan, repayable in
semi-annual installments for a period of 3 years, with 12% annual
interest. It was required that Sulpicio M. Tolentino shall use the
loan proceeds solely as an additional capital to develop his other
property into a subdivision.
On May 22, 1965, a mere P17,000.00 partial release of the
P80,000.00 loan was made by the Bank; and Sulpicio M. Tolentino
and his wife Edita Tolentino signed a promissory note for
P17,000.00 at 12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from
the date of execution of the contract at semi-annual installments
of P3,459.00 (p. 64, rec.). An advance interest for the P80,000.00
loan covering a 6-month period amounting to P4,800.00 was
deducted from the partial release of P17,000.00. But this prededucted interest was refunded to Sulpicio M. Tolentino on July 23,
1965, after being informed by the Bank that there was no fund
yet available for the release of the P63,000.00 balance (p. 47,
rec.). The Bank, thru its vice-president and treasurer, promised
repeatedly the release of the P63,000.00 balance (p. 113, rec.).
On June 14, 1968, the Monetary Board, after finding thatIsland
Savings Bank failed to put up the required capital to restore its
solvency, issued Resolution No. 967 which prohibited Island
Savings Bank from doing business in the Philippines and
instructed the Acting Superintendent of Banks to take charge of
the assets of Island Savings Bank (pp. 48-49, rec).

ISSUE:
516

Whether or not
Sulpicio M. Tolentino's liability to pay the
P17,000.00 subsists, can his real estate mortgage be foreclosed
to satisfy said amount?

RULING:
Article 2089 provides:
A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the
debt may be divided among the successors in interest
of the debtor or creditor.
Therefore, the debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the
debt can not ask for the proportionate extinguishment
of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not
completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditor's heir who have received his
share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the
mortgage, to the prejudice of other heirs who have not
been paid.
The rule of indivisibility of the mortgage as outlined by
Article 2089 above-quoted presupposes several heirs of the
debtor or creditor which does not obtain in this case. Hence, the
rule of indivisibility of a mortgage cannot apply
The fact that when Sulpicio M. 'Tolentino executed his real estate
mortgage, no consideration was then in existence, as there was
no debt yet because Island Savings Bank had not made any
release on the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage void
for lack of consideration. It is not necessary that any
consideration should pass at the time of the execution of the
contract of real mortgage (Bonnevie vs. C.A., 125 SCRA 122
[1983]).
The decision is therefore modified:
IN CASE SULPICIO M. TOLENTINO FAILS TO PAY, HIS REAL ESTATE
517

MORTGAGE COVERING 21.25 HECTARES SHALL BE FORECLOSED

TO SATISFY HIS TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS

RURAL BANK OF SARIAYA, INC. vs YACON

175 SCRA 62 1989
FACTS:
In October 1976, plaintiffs entrusted their owner's copy of their
TCT No. T-38632 covering the land in question to their nephew,
defendant Florentino Alcantara, whom they approached for the
purpose of obtaining a bigger loan from a bank in Manila with the
land as collateral. After a few days, Alcantara returned to
plaintiffs' house and he brought with him plaintiffs to the house of
one Gregorio Cordero, wherein Alcantara introduced to plaintiffs
Aniano Tantuco, Efren Rocha and Cordero who told plaintiffs that
they have prepared the latter's application for a real estate
mortgage. These people convinced plaintiffs to papers as a
requirement for securing a loan from the Bank in said Manila.
Without understanding the contents thereof as plaintiffs do not
understand English, the language in which the documents were
written and having trust and confidence in their nephew,
Alcantara, plaintiffs signed the prepared documents in their belief
that they were indeed applications for a loan. The defendants
assured plaintiffs that they would be notified as soon as the loan
would be ready for release.
In April 1977, plaintiffs discovered that their Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T- 38632 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-142490 had been issued in favor of
defendant Luis Parco Plaintiffs also found that the papers they
were made to sign in Cordero's house included a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Alcantara with authority to negotiate, to
mortgage and to sell' the property.
Defendant Parco was able to transfer the title covering the land in
his name and he was able to mortgage the land in favor of the
defendant Rural Bank of Sariaya, Inc., for a loan of P 24,500.00.
518

The RTC rendered judgment nullifying the special power of

attorney and deed of real estate mortgage hereinbefore
mentioned, and cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No. T142490 and restoring the validity and legal effect of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 38632. Petitioner bank and its codefendant Luis Parco seasonably appealed to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, but said appeal resulted in the
affirmance of the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the certificate of title is in the name of the mortgagor
when the land is mortgaged, the innocent mortgagee for value
has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title.
RULING:
No, the innocent mortgagee has to investigate with full diligence
on the validity of the certificate of title.
There is no ground to reject or deviate from the findings of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In cases heretofore
decided by this Court, We took judicial notice of the common
practice of banks, before approving a loan, to send a
representative to the premises of the land offered as collateral
and duly investigate who are the true owners thereof. Failure to
do so was considered as constitutive of negligence on the part of
the banks. This is in keeping with the bank's responsibility to
exercise care and prudence in dealing even with registered land,
more than in the case of private individuals. The finding that the
petitioner bank failed to make adequate inquiries with the person
in possession of the land had adequate evidentiary support. The
testimony of the bank inspector, Ricardo Aro, Jr., that he went to
the land together with an assistant inspector does not bespeak
the diligent verification required in the circumstances. As earlier
stated, the prudent practice is to investigate who are the true
owners of the properties sought to be mortgaged. What appears
to have been done in the present case is that petitioner merely
went through the motions of sending a representative to the
premises. When the inspector found nobody on the land on the
date of inspection, he only counted the coconut trees, without
bothering to look for the person in possession of the same. He
519

further testified that he did not bother to find out who was in
actual possession of the property when he went to the premises,
relying on the fact that the vice-president of the bank had already
talked to Luis Parco. Petitioner is, therefore, not in a position to
assail the finding that Luis Parco never took possession of the
land in question and that the respondents continuously and
openly possessed the land without any disturbance.
UNCHUAN vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 78775 May 31, 1988
FACTS:
On November 3, 1976, Flora Jaldon, represented by her attorneyin-fact, Manuel Jaldon, Jr., mortgaged a parcel of land located in
Cagayan De Oro City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T7564, to the Philippine Banking Corp. On December 10, 1976,
petitioner Unchuan, claiming to be the owner of one-half of the
mortgaged property, caused to be annotated on the title an
adverse claim.
On March 18, 1985, Faustino Neri, Jr. caused to be annotated on
the title a Notice of Lis Pendens, which, however, was
subsequently cancelled after he executed a release of claim on
January 30, 1986.
On May 14, 1986, the bank filed a petition for the cancellation of
the annotations on its title and for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Named respondents were Unchuan and Faustino Neri,
Jr. Unchuan filed an opposition to the petition. In his affirmative
and special defenses, Unchuan again raised his claim of
ownership to the 1/2 portion of the lot in question.
Hearing was set several times. On July 16, 1986, notice was sent
setting the hearing for August 19, 1986, but due to the failure of
Unchuan's counsel to appear, said hearing had to be reset for
September 2, 1986. The hearing set for September 2, 1986 had to
be reset again for September 23,1986 upon motion of counsel for
Unchuan. Finally, on September 23, 1986, hearing proceeded as
scheduled and the case was submitted for resolution upon
agreement of the parties. However, on September 25, 1986,
520

Unchuan
filed
a
manifestation
praying
for
the
dismissal/suspension of the petition for writ of possession on the
ground that he had filed an action for quieting of title on the
property, Attached to the manifestation was a copy of Unchuan's
complaint in Civil Case No. 10770 for "Quieting of Title,
Ownership, Annulment of Deed of Mortgage, Foreclosure
Proceedings and TCT No. 43346."
On October 3, 1986 the trial court issued an order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the bank. Unchuan
brought a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether a decision should be in favor of Unchuan
RULING:
No, the case is not in favor of Unchuan.
Once the estate mortgaged is extrajudicially sold, and it is not
redeemed within the reglementary period, no separate and
independent action is necessary to obtain possession of the
property.
It is too late in the day for Unchuan to question the summary
nature of the proceedings in the lower court. In the hearing of
September 23, 1986, his counsel agreed to submit the case for
resolution, even as on said date, all that he had submitted for
consideration of the court was his Opposition to the Petition of
Philippine Banking Corporation. He is now estopped from
questioning the procedure adopted by the trial collaborated.
Moreover, there is nothing objectionable in the summary
disposition of third-party claims. On several occasions, the Court
had sanctioned summary proceedings to determine the nature of
the possession of third-party claimants.
On the basis of the record of the case, the trial judge ruled in
favor of Philippine Banking Corporation. This Tribunal has carefully

521

gone over the record, and is convinced that there is sufficient

basis warranting the issuance of a writ of possession.
The land involved is a Torrens-title property. It is basic that a
person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but
only has to rely on, the title. He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims which annotated on the title, for
registration is the operative act that binds the property.
Unchuan claims that he purchased one-half (1/2) of the property
"long before November 3, 1976." However, other than his bare
allegation, the only proof he presented in court is a handwritten
receipt for the payment of his contribution to realty taxes
allegedly signed by Flora Jaldon. He has not bothered to prove the
authenticity of the private writing, though. The alleged receipt
does not even sufficiently identify the land subject of the sale to
Unchuan to be the same land mortgaged and then sold to
Philippine Banking Corporation. Also, for a transaction as
important as the sale of a registered parcel of land; Unchuan has
not even kept a record of precisely when he bought the property,
except that it was "long before November 3, 1976," which
incidentally is the day when Flora Jaldon mortgaged the property
to Philippine Banking Corporation. Moreover, the sale was merely
a verbal agreement; hence, it could not be registered. All that
Unchuan did was to file a belated adverse claim on December 10,
1976, after the property had been mortgaged to Philippine
Banking Corporation. Note however, that since the filing of the
adverse claim, Unchuan has done nothing to prosecute his claim
of ownership over onehalf of the property. He has not, for
instance, compelled Jaldon to execute the property instrument so
that the sale could be registered (Assuming that the land was
indeed sold to him) and the proper title issued in his name. In
fact, the mortgage to the bank had been foreclosed, and a new
title had been issued in the name of Philippine Banking
Corporation, but all the Unchuan did was file an adverse claim.
B & I REALTY CO., INC., vs. CASPE
G.R. No. 146972. January 29, 2008 / 543 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Venegas, the owner of a parcel of land delivered the title and executed a
522

simulated deed of sale in favor of Datuin for purposes of the latter to obtain a loan
with the RCBC. However, Venegas learned of Datuin's fraudulent scheme when
she sold the lot to the respondents in a deed of conditional sale. Venegas instituted
a complaint against Datuin for recovery of property and nullification with
damages.
Thereafter, spouses Venegas, respondents and Datuin entered
into a compromise agreement whereby the Venegases agreed to
sell and transfer the property to respondents with the condition
that the respondents would assume and settle Datuin's mortgage
debt to petitioner.
As provided for in the agreement, Datuin executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property covered in favor of respondents.
On February 12, 1976, the respondents started paying their
assumed mortgage obligation to petitioner.
However, on August 27, 1980, Venegas brought a new action
before the for annulment of the transfer of the property to Datuin
and the declaration of nullity of all transactions including the
mortgage executed in favor of petitioner, as well as the
cancellation of the conditional deed of sale to respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents waive the defense of
prescription.

RULING:
Although the deed of real estate mortgage and the
promissory note executed by Datuin expressly declared that the
date of maturity of the loan was May 14, 1974 or one year after
the real estate mortgage was entered into between Datuin and
petitioner, the same could not be the reckoning point for purposes
of counting the prescriptive period of the mortgage. This is
because Datuin and respondents executed a deed of absolute
523

sale on October 30, 1975 whereby the latter acknowledged and

assumed the mortgage obligation of the former in favor of
petitioner. Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, the written
acknowledgment and assumption of the mortgage obligation by
respondents had the effect of interrupting the prescriptive period
of the mortgage action.
We have held in a number of cases that the computation of
the prescriptive period of any cause of action (the same as
prescription of actions) starts from the date when the cause of
action accrues.20 Here, petitioner's cause of action accrued from
the time respondents stopped paying the mortgage debt they
assumed from Datuin, in accordance with Article 1151 of the Civil
Code
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which
have for their object the enforcement of obligations to pay
principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment
of the annuity or of the interest.

RURAL BANK vs. CA, SERRANO and CUEME

101 SCRA 5 (1980)
FACTS:
The trial court rendered a decision, ordering the defendants to
pay plaintiff bank within a period of "not less than 90 days nor
more than 100 days from" the receipt of the decision with twelve
percent interest per.

In case of nonpayment within that period, the trial court, in order

to satisfy that obligation, ordered the sheriff to sell at public
auction the mortgaged lot. Consequently, the Serrano spouses did
not pay their mortgage debt. A writ of execution was issued. The
mortgaged lot was sold to the bank as the only bidder. There
524

being no redemption within the one-year period.

But it was allegedly revealed that the land had already been sold
to Mejos and, therefore, its acceptance of the redemption price
amounting to would not produce any legal effect.

The bank further disclosed that there is pending in the trial court
a case for the annulment of the foreclosure sale of the said lot
and the release of the mortgage which was instituted by the
Serrano spouses, as mortgagors, against the bank and the Mejos
spouses.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court and the CA erred in not giving due course
to the bank's appeal.

RULING:
The SC ruled that the trial court and the CA acted correctly in
refusing to give due course to the bank's appeal not only because
the order sought to be appealed is in interlocutory but also
because in the present posture of the case it is imperative that
the trial court should consolidate the foreclosure case with the
other case filed by the Serrano spouses. Note that the latter case
is also pending in the sala of respondent Judge.

Under section 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, it is the

confirmation by the court of the auction sale that would divest the
Serrano spouses of their rights to the mortgaged lot and that
525

would vest such rights in the bank as purchaser at the auction

sale.

In the instant case, where the foreclosure sale has not yet been
confirmed but the statutory one-year period for redemption
expired and the mortgaged lot was sold by the mortgagee (as the
only bidder at the auction sale) to a third person, the trial court
should give the purchaser a chance to be heard before requiring
the mortgagee-bank to accept the redemption price tendered by
the mortgagors.
G.R. No. L-53620 January 31, 1985
PEDRO LONZAME, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXIV, MELANIO FLORES and
SEGUNDA MANUEL, respondents.
GONZALES V IAC
157 SCRA 587
Facts:
Asuncion and Dioscoro Buensuceco were the original owners of a lot but due to
tax delinquency, the lot was sold at public auction in favor of the province of Iloilo. The daughter of the spouses, Hortencia, discovered that the title of the land is
still in the name of her parents. She paid the taxes and was issued a deed of
repurchase. The title was reconstituted and issued in the name of Asuncion. It was
then sold to spouses Panzo. The spouses Panzo mortgaged the property with Rural
Bank of Pavia. Due to failure to pay, the property was foreclosed and a deed was
executed in favor of Rural Bank.
Petitioner, as judicial co-administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Matias
Yusay, thereafter filed for the cancellation of the title and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of Yusay. She alleges that the property was originally
mortgaged to Yusay by spouses Buensuceco and was later sold orally to the same.
It is also alleged that the property is in possession of Yusay as evidenced by the
presence of tenant Daguino. Defendant bank alleges good faith.

526

Issue:
Whether the subsequent nullification of the mortgagors certificate of title nullifies
the mortgage?
Ruling:
No.
Where the Torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later
given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said title as null
and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage right of the bank, which had
acted in good faith. Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien
upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagors
obtained their title thereto thru fraud.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS JESUS
and ANACORITA DOYON
G.R. No. 167238. March 25, 2009

FACTS:
Jesus and Anacorita Doyon obtained several loans amounting
to P10 million from petitioner Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). As security for the loans, respondents
mortgaged their real estate properties as well as the motor
vehicles of JD Bus Lines. Due to their inability to fully pay their
obligations upon maturity, respondents requested petitioner to
restructure their past due loans. Petitioner agreed. Hence,
respondents signed three promissory notes on June 29,
1994.Respondents still failed to pay the quarterly installments on
the promissory notes. Thus, petitioner demanded the payment of
the total value of their loans from respondents. Respondents,
however, ignored petitioner and adamantly refused to pay their
loans.

Petitioner filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real

estate mortgages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City
527

in 1995. To forestall the foreclosure proceedings, respondents

immediately filed an action for their nullification in the RTC of
Ormoc City, Branch 35 claiming that they had already paid the
principal amount of their loans (or P10 million) to petitioner.
Petitioner withdrew the application for extrajudicial foreclosure and thereafter
moved for the dismissal of Civil Case. The RTC granted the motion and the case is
considered dismissed with prejudice.

Weeks later, petitioner demanded from respondents the payment

of their outstanding obligations which had by then ballooned to
more than P20 million. Again, respondents ignored petitioner.

Petitioner filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of

respondents real and chattel mortgages with the DBP special
sheriff in Makati10 and subsequently took constructive possession
of the foreclosed properties.
Respondents Doyon filed a complaint for damages against petitioner and the DBP
special sheriff in the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch 35. According to respondents, by
withdrawing the application for extrajudicial foreclosure and moving for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3314-O, petitioner led them to believe that it would no
longer seek the satisfaction of its claims. Petitioner therefore acted contrary to
Article 19 of the Civil Code when it foreclosed on the real and chattel mortgages
anew.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DBP has the legal right to foreclose on the real property and the
chattel mortgage?
RULING:
Since respondents neither assailed the due execution of the June
29, 1994 promissory notes nor presented proof of payment
528

thereof, their obligation remained outstanding. Upon default, by

prior mutual agreement, petitioner had the right to foreclose on
the real and chattel mortgages securing their loans.

The promissory notes uniformly stated that failure to pay an

installment (or interest) on the due date was an event of
default. Respondents were therefore in default when they failed to
pay the quarterly amortizations on the designated due dates.

When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to
perform his obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the
mortgage for the purpose of alienating the (mortgaged) property
to satisfy his credit.
GOROSPE vs. UCPB
193 SCRA 546

MATILDA GOROSPE and MARIANO GOROSPE vs. DOLORES

M. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-30079 January 30, 1976
FACTS:
In 1958, Caridad J. Torento executed a deed of First Mortgage over a parcel of
duly registered land in favor of defendant-appellant Dolores M. Santos. This was
done in order to secure her indebtedness to Santos in the amount of 7000 Php. Said
deed was validly registered and a subsequent certificate of title in favor of Santos
was issued.
But in 1959, Torento again executed a second mortgage, with the consent of
Santos, over the same property in favor of plaintiffs to secure a debt in the amount
of 6000 Php. Said deed was not registered.
In 1960, the first mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and was put in auction,
529

where Santos was the highest bidder in the amount 3500 Php. Said sale was then
annotated at the TCT of the subject lot. Afterwhich, Santos filed for the recovery of
the deficiency resulting from the price paid for the property and its value at the
public auction. The court then issued a writ of attachment over the properties of
Torento, who assigned to Matilda Gorospe all her rights on the subject property
particularly her statutory right of redemption.
On March 1961, the Sheriff, who conducted the sale of the foreclosed property,
issued a Certificate of Redemption in favor of plaintiffs-appellees as successors in
interest of Torrento over the foreclosed property. The Certificate of Redemption
was registered a on March 13, 1961 with Register of deeds, and the corresponding
entry and annotation made on the original of said certificate of title.
Defendant-appellant, in her answer, denied that Matilda J. Gorospe had validly
redeemed the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of redemption may be transferred or assigned by the
owner?
RULING:
As held by the Supreme Court in Magno v. Viola, the term "successor-in-interest'
includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of redemption;
or one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose
of redemption; or one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of
law; or one or more joint debtors who were not owners of the property sold;. or the
wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of
her husband's title passes to her. There is no question, therefore, that plaintiffappellee Matilda J. Gorospe is a "successor-in-interest" of the debtor Caridad J.
Torrento and as such could exercise the right to redeem the property at any time
within the period provided by law.
In the case at bar, registration of the certificate of sale in favor of the purchaser at
public auction was e only on October 20, 1960. Appellee Matilda J. Gorospe had,
therefore, a period of one year from that date within which to exercise the right of
redemption assigned to her by Caridad J. Torrento. The redemption having been
made on March 10, 1961, it is evident that the same had been timely made.
The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the CA and ordered Santos to
deliver the owners certificate of TCT to the Gorospes.
530

Gorospe vs. UCPB, 193 SCRA 546 (1991

GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, and ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO PONCE
G.R. No. 70987 September 29, 1988

vs.

FACTS:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo
Ponce and his wife Adela (since deceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00.
The mortgages were registered. Two of the lot were afterwards sold by the Aquinos
to the Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be
annotated
on
the
certificates
of
title.
Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay Wood
Export Corporation in Court of First Instance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment,
the lots were levied upon on and sold at public auction to Limpin as the highest
bidder
for
the
sum
of
P517,485.41.
On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and issued to Limpin.
Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs
Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled on November 4, 1983, and TCTS were
replaced
in
Sarmiento's
name.
Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage
over the Aquinos' four lots. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the
judgment became final, the Trial Court, directed the sale at public auction of the 4
mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners exercised their equity of redemption on time?
RULING:
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of redemption
exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an
order of the court, ... shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action
and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as
531

may be allowed by law. Such rights exceptionally "allowed by law" (i.e., even after
confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the
Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act
(R.A. 337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any
judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on
foreclosure-after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale-which right may
be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration
of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
It is Sarmiento's position, that the "17 June 1987 confirmation of the sale of the
two lots could not have cut off ... (his) equity of redemption;" in fact, "Ponce
himself, in his 'Urgent Motion' dated 1 June 1987, precisely prayed for the issuance
of a writ of possession 'subject to the equity of redemption of Rogelio M.
Sarmiento' thereby recognizing Sarmiento's equity of redemption beyond
confirmation date," He also argues that he had not been informed of the time when
his right of redemption would be cut-off, because he "never received a copy of any
Motion for Confirmation, much less notice of hearing thereon in violation of his
right to due process;" that to hold otherwise would "render nugatory the decision of
the Court of Appeals and this ... Court on the issue;" and that he is entitled to a
reasonable time, e.g., a year, for the exercise of his equity of redemption.
The Supreme Court held that the equity of redemption claimed and invoked by
Sarmiento over the subject properties, lapsed and ceased to exist without having
been properly exercised from the date of issuance by the Trial Court of the Order
confirming the sheriffs sale of said properties in favor of the private respondent.
TOLENTINO vs. CA
106 SCRA 513, 1981
FACTS:
Ceferino de la Cruz, the owner of a homestead land, died in 1960; his heirs
sold the land to the Tolentino spouses in 1962. In 1967, the de la Cruzes filed an
action with the Court of First Instance in Davao to repurchase the land, since the
law allows a five year period for repurchase of homestead lots. They said they had
tried to repurchase the land several times extrajudicially, but the Tolentinos
refused.
By that time, however, the Tolentinos had taken two mortgages on the
land. When the first mortgage with BPI fell due, the land was auctioned, with BPI
as the highest bidder. In 1969, it was registered to BPI. Vicenta Tolentino went to
BPI with a check for P16,000, trying to redeem the land. She was told that it was
532

sold a year ago, when the court decision became final in favor of Dela Cruzes.
However, the Tolentinos were told they could still redeem two other lots they had
mortgaged with BPI after paying P75,995.07, the balance of the loan after the de la
Cruzes had paid P16,000 for the homestead lot.
Instead of redeeming the two other lots, Vicenta consigned payment to the
court, giving a crossed PNB check for P91,995.07, for the redemption of the three
lots, including the homestead lot. However, she ordered payment stopped on the
check the following day, upon advice of counsel and to protect her rights, she said.
She said this was to prevent BPI from encashing the check without returning all the
foreclosed properties. Then she filed a redemption case against BPI, imputing bad
faith for failing to return all the foreclosed properties.
The complaint was dismissed
Issue:
In the case of a mortgage, is consignation necessary or is tender of payment
enough? May a check be used for tender of payment and if so, when is the
obligation extinguished? When the check is filled out or when it is encashed?
Ratio:
The court ruled that Art. 1249 does not apply in this case because the
Tolentinos debt was extinguished when the property was foreclosed and sold to
satisfy the debt. What remained was their right to redeem said properties, which is
not an obligation but a privilege. Once they exercise the right to redeem, they
would then have an obligation to pay, but that obligation would be extinguished
only when the check is encashed.
Since the formal offer to redeem was made during the period of redemption
prescribed by law, the Tolentinos may redeem the two other properties mortgaged
to BPI within 30 days from entry of judgment, plus 1% per month interest up to the
time of redemption, together with taxes or assessments BPI may have paid after
purchase.
They were not allowed to redeem the homestead lot because the decision of
the lower court was already final and there was no finding of grave abuse of
jurisdiction that would justify a reversal of the decision.
A mortgagee is deemed to have waived the statutory period of redemption
when he accepts redemption price after one year from date of expiration of
redemption period
RAMIREZ vs CA
219 SCRA 598
FACTS
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina
533

Bonifaciofiled an application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. In

their application for registration, they alleged that to the best of their knowledge
and belief, there is nomortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting
said land and that they hadacquired it by purchase from certain Gregoria Pascual
during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale
was lot and no copy or recordof the same was available.The Court found, however,
that the applicants are not the owners of the land sought tobe registered. They were
ANTICHRETIC CREDITORS- mere holders placed inpossession of the land by its
owners as security for loan. The applicants were foundguilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation and concealment when they declared that noother person had
any claim or interest in the said land.
ISSUE
Can an antichretic creditor acquire land of debtor by prescription?
HELD
No. The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owners, but mere
HOLDERS placed in possession of land by its owners. Thus, their possession
cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion. The court, from other cases like
Trillana v. Manansala, Valencia v. Acala and Barretto v. Barretto, held that the
antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered
to him by the debtor.
Mortgagor may still execute another mortgage contract during the
redemption period; reasons.
MANUEL D. MEDIDA and TEOTIMO ABELLANA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPS. ANDRES DOLINO and PASCUALA DOLINO
G.R. No. 98334 May 8, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of
redemption over thesubject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho, purchaser of the
aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of the previous mortgage in favor of Cebu City
Development Bank, went to Teotimo Abellana,President of the City Savings Bank
(formerly known as Cebu City Savings and LoanAssociation, Inc.), to obtain a loan
of P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan application and
the subject lot was offered as security. Subsequently they executed a promissory
note in favor of CSB.The loan became due and demandable without the spouses
Dolino paying the same, petitioner association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage. The land was sold at a publicauction to CSB being the highest
bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which wasalso registered. No
redemption was being effected by Sps. Dolino, their title to the property
534

wascancelled and a new title was issued in favor of CSB.Sps. Dolino then filed a
case to annul the sale at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate of sale
issued pursuant thereto, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
inviolation of Act 3135, as amended. The trial court sustained the validity of the
loan and the realestate mortgage, but annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure on the
ground that it failed to complywith the notice requirement of Act 3135. Not
satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to
the CA,assailing the validity of the mortgage executed between them and City
Savings Bank, amongothers. The CA ruled in favor of private respondents
declaring the said mortgage as void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extrajudicially foreclosed and
sold ata corresponding foreclosure sale, may validly execute a mortgage contract
over the same property in favor of a third party during the period of redemption.
RULING:
It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner bank was
executed by respondent spouses during the period of redemption. During the said
period it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed
property since the rule up to now is the right of a purchaser of a foreclosure sale is
merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right
being exercised. The title to the land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in
the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and the
conveyance of the master deed. The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of
the property during the redemption period and has the free disposal of his property,
there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the Civil Code for the constitution
of another mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise would create an inequitable
situation wherein the mortgagor would be deprived of the opportunity, which may
be his last recourse, to raise funds to timely redeem his property through another
mortgage.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
BANK and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86679 July 23, 1991
FACTS:
As found by respondent court and sustained by the record, on May 7, 1985,
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan and
docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N-33399, a petition for the
535

cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16)

transfer certificates of title. As a backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses
Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real
estate mortgages. For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation
with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended,
the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the real estate mortgages executed by
the said spouses in favor of petitioner. The sheriff s certificate of sale was
registered on April 3, 1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a memorandum
thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the
foreclosed properties.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent International Corporate Bank, as
successor in interest of the defunct Continental Bank, filed an opposition to the
petition contending that, since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued
in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.
On August 28, 1986, the lower court rendered a decision, denying the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the annotations of levy
over to the new title certificates issued in purchaser's favor is vid and illegal.
b.) Whether Section 108 of "Property Registration Decree" expresly allows the
summary amendment of certificates of title whenever interest annotated has
"terminated and ceased".
RULING:
We find the foregoing contentions meritorious.
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens
subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the purchaser at public
auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens.
Ordinarily, thereafter the Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles
without carrying over the annotation of subordinate liens. 15 In a case with similar
features, we had earlier held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to
redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136, the land which was sold
extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to
secure the cancellation of the annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the
certificates of title of said land.
It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands, etc., et al. vs.
Noblejas, etc., et al., 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at
536

the back of the certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice the mortgage
previously registered, and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the
public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of the
mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for
no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. . . .
This alone is sufficient justification for the dropping of the adverse claim from the
new certificates of title to be issued to her, as directed by respondent
Commissioner in his opinion subject of this appeal."
Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest
arising from the judgment in Civil Case No. 69035 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, appearing at the back of petitioner's certificates of titles, is already without
force and effect consider that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title
for more than ten (10) years without being duly implemented. Properties levied
upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of ten (10)
years during which the judgment can be enforced by action.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. LOZADA
GR No. 164919, July 4, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI the Unit No. 402
of Cluster 1 of the Project. Six months later, PPGI executed two Deeds of Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to
PPGI in the combined maximum amount of P37,000,000.00. The real estate
mortgages covered 51 units of the Project, including Unit No. 402. When PPGI
failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated demands, CBC filed with the Clerk
of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the Makati City RTC a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of the real estate mortgages.
A year following the public auction sale of the foreclosed properties held on
11 September 1998, spouses Lozada executed a Notice of Adverse Claim dated 13
September 1999 as regards Unit No. 402, which she registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City. Said Notice of Adverse Claim was subsequently annotated
on CCT No. 69096 when it was issued in the name of CBC.
On 27 July 2001, CBC filed an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession in favor of petitioner [CBC] and against Erlinda [sic] Lozada.
On 31 August 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the Ex Parte Petition
of CBC, and decreeing that a writ of possession issue in favor of the China
Banking Corporation.
29 October 2001, the spouses Lozada filed with the Court of Appeals their
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order against the Makati City RTC, Sheriff,
537

CBC, and PPGI.

The CA ruled in favor of the spouses Lozada.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of possession may be granted and issued by the RTC ex parte or
without notice to other parties.
HELD:
The purchaser at the public auction sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real
property may seek possession thereof in accordance with Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended.
The Court expounded on the application of the foregoing provision in De
Gracia v. San Jose, thus:
The law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ of
possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath
for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the
case of property with Torrens title; and upon the filing of such motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court
to issue the order for a writ of possession.
Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein
the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month
period for redemption.
In the case of Nera, the procedure under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, may be availed of by a purchaser seeking possession of the foreclosed
property he bought at the public auction sale after the redemption period has
expired without redemption having been made.
Rights acquired by the purchaser of the foreclosed property at the public
auction sale upon the consolidation of his title when no timely redemption of the
property was made, to wit:
1.
the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration
of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can
demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and
the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact
demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he
has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No
such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
2.
The purchaser in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to
a writ of possession; and upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial
upon the RTC to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However,
538

while this is the general rule, the exception and its basis were summarized by the
Court in Roxas v. Buan, thus:
In the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, possession of the
property may be awarded to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale during the
pendency of the period of redemption or after the lapse of the redemption period,
without need of a separate and independent action
Under Section 33 of Rule 39, which reads:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by
whom executed or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the
date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a
conveyance and possession of the property;
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and
claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The
possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by
the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to
the judgment obligor.
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed property
is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting
debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be
done ex parte.
While CBC invokes the general rule in the Petition at bar, the spouses Lozada
assert the exception.
The spouses Lozada aver that they are holding Unit No. 402 adversely to the
debtor/mortgagor PPGI, and that their possession is sufficient obstacle to the ex
parte issuance of a writ of possession in favor of CBC.
They cannot assert that said right of possession is adverse or contrary to that of
PPGI when they have no independent right of possession other than what they
acquired from PPGI.
The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title
or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The spouses Lozada
cannot claim that their right of possession over Unit No. 402 is analogous to any of
these.
It must be emphasized that what PPGI executed in favor of the spouses Lozada
was a Contract to Sell, a mere promise to sell, which, at the moment of its
execution, did not yet transfer possession, much less, title to Unit No. 402 from
PPGI to the spouses Lozada. When PPGI constituted the real estate mortgage on
539

Unit No. 402 in favor of CBC six months later, possession of and title to the
property still resided in PPGI.
a.)
mandatory and ministerial duty of the Makati City RTC to grant the ex parte
petition of CBC and order the issuance of a writ of possession in the latters favor
over Unit No. 402.
b.) mandatory and ministerial for the Clerk of Court to comply with the Makati
City RTC order by issuing the writ of possession,
c.)
mandatory and ministerial for the Sheriff to implement the writ by first
issuing a notice to vacate to the occupants of Unit No. 402.
He is entitled to the possession following the consolidation of ownership in his
name.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
BANK
G.R. No. 86679 July 23, 1991
FACTS:
As found by respondent court and sustained by the record, on May 7, 1985,
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan and
docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N-33399, a petition for the
cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16)
transfer certificates of title. As a backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses
Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real
estate mortgages. For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation
with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended,
the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the real estate mortgages executed by
the said spouses in favor of petitioner. The sheriff s certificate of sale was
registered on April 3, 1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a memorandum
thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the
foreclosed properties.
Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption period, petitioner
consolidated in its name the ownership of all the foregoing mortgaged properties
for which new transfer certificates of title were issued in its name. However, the
annotation of the notice of levy in favor of private respondent was carried over to
and now appears as the sole annotated encumbrance in the new titles of petitioner,
that is, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1236,
1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1216, 1217 and 1218.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent International Corporate Bank, as
successor in interest of the defunct Continental Bank, filed an opposition to the
petition contending that, since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure
540

proceedings, the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued
in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.
On August 28, 1986, the lower court rendered a decision, denying the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the purchaser of real property at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
acquires such property free from all liens and encumbrances.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the right of petitioner to the relief prayed for is clear. The
facto before us sufficiently show that the cancellation of the disputed annotation
from the certificates of title of petitioner is justified in law.
It is undisputed that private respondent is a subsequent lien holder whose
rights over the mortgaged property are inferior to that of petitioner as a mortgagee.
Being a subsequent lien holder, private respondent acquires only the right of
redemption vested in the mortgagor, and his rights are strictly subordinate to the
superior lien of the anterior mortgagee. After the foreclosure sale, the remedy of
the second mortgagee is limited to the right to redeem by paying off the debt
secured by the first mortgage.
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens
subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the purchaser at public
auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens.
Ordinarily, thereafter the Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles
without carrying over the annotation of subordinate liens. In a case with similar
features, we had earlier held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to
redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136, the land which was sold
extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to
secure the cancellation of the annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on the
certificates of title of said land.
BPI vs. TARAMPI
GR No. 174988, December 10, 2008
FACTS:
In 1995, spouses Homobono and Luzdeldia Tarampi (respondents) obtained
loans from Bank of Philippine Islands (petitioner) in the total amount of
P19,000,000, which were secured by four sets of real estate mortgage over a parcel
of land located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City, with an area of 796 square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 122627 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
541

Respondents defaulted on their obligation, prompting petitioner to institute

extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. At the auction sale on February 8, 1999, the
mortgaged property was sold to petitioner as the highest bidder. A Certificate of
Sale was thereupon issued to petitioner which was registered and annotated on the
TCT.As the redemption period expired without respondents redeeming the
mortgages, petitioner, through its Vice-President Jocelyn C. Sta. Ana, executed an
Affidavit of Consolidation. TCT No. 122627 was thus cancelled and TCT No. N216396 was in its stead issued in the name of petitioner on July 27, 2000.
Petitioner thereafter filed for Writ of Possession over the property including all the
improvements thereon, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-13412(00), which was raffled
to Branch 105 of the RTC of Quezon City. Where it was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of possession should be implemented during the pendency of the
case for annulment of mortgages.
HELD:
No, It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute
owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the
property and can demand it any time following the consolidation of ownership in
his name and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the
bond required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of
the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon
proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
A mortgagee is entitled to a writ of possession after extrajudicial foreclosure
even before the expiration of the period of redemption

VELOSO vs. IAC

205 SCRA 227
FACTS:
The property involved was a house and lot belonging to the petitioner
spouses, Romeo F. Veloso and Delia M. Veloso. Their ownership was evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 136559 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
By deeds executed on October 3, and 16, 1978, they constituted a mortgage over
the property as security for a loan in the sum of P200,000.00 given by State
542

Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) to Globe Engineering Corporation, a firm of which

Romeo F. Veloso was the President and General Manager. About four months later,
Globe Engineering Corporation asked SIHI for an additional loan. The request was
turned down. Instead SIHI demanded that the former pay its original loan in
accordance with the terms of the contract and its current statement of accounts. No
payment having been made, SIHI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage by the Sheriff of Quezon City pursuant to the mortgage deeds. The
public auction sale was held on December 4, 1980, after due publication and
notice. The highest bid for the property, P303,069.79, was submitted by SIHI.
Consequently, the Sheriff executed a certificate of sale in SIHI's favor, conveying
the property to it. After the expiry of the redemption period, ownership over the
property was consolidated in SIHI and a new title, No. 285806, was issued to it.
The one-year period for redemption of the foreclosed property lapsed, as
aforestated, with neither the Velosos nor Globe Engineering Corporation making
any attempt to redeem the property. All that was done, as the record shows, was the
transmission by Globe Engineering Corporation, prior to foreclosure, of a request
for review and correction of SIHI's statement of account, and when the request was
rejected and it became evident that foreclosure was forthcoming, the institution by
the Velosos on December 2, 1980, 1 of an action in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 136559, 2 praying for the nullification or
reformation of the mortgage contracts. The complaint was amended within a month
to implead Globe Engineering Corporation as additional co-plaintiff and to include
a prayer for the annulment of the sheriff's extra-judical foreclosure sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of that action bar the issuance of a writ of possession
to mortgagee who has acquired it as highest bidder in the subsequent public
auction sale
HELD:
NO, The pendency of that action does not and cannot bar the issuance of a
writ of possession to the mortgagee who has, in the meantime, extrajudically
foreclosed the mortgaged property and acquired it as highest bidder in the
subsequent public auction sale. The law is quite explicit on this point, and the right
of the mortgagee thereunder unquestionable. And decisions abound applying the
law and declaring it to be the court's ministerial duty to uphold the mortgagee's
right to possession even during the redemption period. 4 The petitioners have
simply failed to demonstrate with any degree of persuasiveness why the clear
provisions of law and the jurisprudence in application thereof should not be
equally controlling in the case at bar.
543

LAM VS. METROPOLITAN BANK

G.R.No.178881, February 18, 2008
FACTS:
Alexander and Julie Lam, petitioners, obtained a loan of P2M from
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, respondent. To secure its payment,
petitioners executed a deed of REM over their property in Davao City, covered by
TCT No. T-115893. After that, they were also granted additional loans and signed
several amendments to the REM.
However, petitioners failed to pay the loans and so respondent instituted an
extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding with the Office of the Clerk of Court and the
Ex-Officio Sheriff of Davao, which was granted by the latter. A Sheriff's sale was
held and as the sole bidder, the property was awarded to the respondent. A
Provisional Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of respondent and it was
registered with the RD.
Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the 1-yr redemption period.
Accordingly, a Final Certificate of Sale in favor of the respondent was
executed by the Sheriff. Respondent consolidated its title to the subject property,
thus, TCT No. T-115893 was cancelled and TCT No. T-327605in the name of the
respondent was issued.
Respondent demanded that petitioners turn over the possession of the
property but the latter refused to do so. Due to that, respondent filed a complaint
for the issuance of Writ of Possession with the RTC of Davao City. Petitioners in
their answer, denied the material allegation in the complaint, that respondent's
complaint did not allege its capacity to sue and be sued, that there was no showing
that the officer who signed the verification and certification was duly authorized to
represent the respondent and that they deny obtaining a loan of P3.9M. During the
pre-trial conference, the RTC directed the parties to proceed to mediation but the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement and so the case was referred back
to the RTC for the continuation of the pre-trial conference. At the pre-trial
conference, respondent manifested and moved that the complaint for writ of
possession should be heard ex parte.
RTC rendered a decision that the case will be heard ex parte and that the
defendant (petitioners) should not be allowed to participate in the case as an
adverse party as if the same is an ordinary civil action. On January 23, 2004,
petitioners filed a complaint for the specific performance and annulment of the
foreclosure of mortgage with the RTC. Subsequently, February 11, 2004,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order regarding the hearing of
the issuance of Writ of Possession in ex parte.
RTC granted petitioners' motion for reconsideration, reversing its decision
and allowing petitioners to participate in the proceedings, RTC declared that
544

respondent was estopped from demanding a resolution ex parte, after allowing

petitioners to participate in the proceedings. RTC added that under equitable
circumstances, the duty of the court to issue a writ of possession ceased to be
ministerial and that the existence of these equitable circumstances can only be
determined in the adversarial proceedings. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.
Respondent then went to the CA , CA reversed the RTC decision. It rendered
a decision that petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex parte and that
RTC mistakenly opined that it was prudent to consolidate the hearing of the
issuance of writ of possession with that of the civil case for annulment of the
foreclosure sale. As to CA, the rule on the consolidation of actions in a civil
procedure covers only civil actions, thus, it cannot be consolidated with an ex parte
petition. It further held that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or
its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration, but CA denied it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of a writ of possession should be heard ex parte?
RULING:
Yes. The court quote with approval the following disquisition of the CA: The
respondent judges line of reasoning in declaring ex parte petition as an adversarial
proceeding is simply puerile. The fact that the Spouses Lam were allowed to
actively participate in the proceedings for the said case, by filing an Answer and
going through pre-trial and mediation, was a glaring procedural anomaly that the
court a quo had inexcusably abetted. The court cannot allow the erring court a quo
to use that same aberration as an excuse for a continuing defiance of the law and
jurisprudence that defines a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession as a
non-litigious ex parte proceeding that does not require the participation of the
mortgagor.
F. DAVID ENTERPRISES v. INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA
(IBAA)
G.R. No. 78714.
FACTS:
For alleged non-payment of obligations secured by a real estate mortgage
executed by Francisco and Norma David in its favor, IBAA instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings. An auction sale was held and the mortgaged property was
sold to IBAA as the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was registered. No
redemption was not having been effected by the mortgagors, ownership of the land
was consolidated in IBAA and a new certificate of title was issued in its name.
IBAA filed a petition for a writ of possession over the said lot was filed by IBAA
545

and such was subsequently granted. David spouses filed a petition to prohibit the
foreclosure sale on the ground that the real transaction between the parties was not
a real estate mortgage but a trust receipt agreement. The second is where the
mortgagors were seeking the cancellation of IBAAs transfer certificate of title on
the ground of the nullity of the foreclosure sale. In this latter case, a preliminary
injunction order against IBAA dealing with or entering into the possession of the
subject lot although the writ itself had not yet been granted because the petitioners
bond was still awaiting approval.
Judge Felipe Kalalo recalled the writ of possession and dismissed the LRC.
This prompted IBAA to file a motion for reconsideration where it argued that
since the petitioners bond had not yet been approved in the Case the injunction
order issued therein should be regarded only as a temporary restraining order
which should be deemed to have expired after twenty days from issuance under BP
No. 224 but the motion was denied on the ground that the movant had earlier
recognized the validity of the injunction order.
Judge Pedro Laggui issued an indemnity bond in the writ of preliminary
injunction and the complaint itself was dismissed on the ground that the
foreclosure sale had been validly held because the order issued in the case to
restrain the said sale had been served tardily on the provincial sheriff.
IBAA filed a second motion for reconsideration in the LRC arguing that in
view of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6565 and the consequent lifting of the writ
of preliminary injunction, there was no more reason for not issuing the writ of
possession. This motion was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration of period of
redemption without mortgagor exercising right to redeem?
HELD:
Yes, A mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration of period of
redemption without mortgagor exercising right to redeem; possesion may be
demanded after consolidation of ownership; writ of possession. There is no longer
any legal bar for the issuance of a subsequent writ of possession which petitioner is
rightfully entitled to. Legal technicalities should be brushed aside to pave the way
for the dispensation of substantial justice.
Accordingly, we agree that the second motion for reconsideration filed by
IBAA should have been considered a new application for a writ of possession
although it was not correctly captioned as such. It is the text and purpose and not
the designation of a pleading that should control 6 lest a mere technicality deprive
a party of a substantial right because of a fastidious obsession with formality. A
546

contrary rule would forever deprive IBAA of the means to possess and enjoy the
property it had acquired in the foreclosure sale.
The new application for a writ of possession should have been granted,
especially since the reason for the withdrawal of the earlier writ had already
disappeared with the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No.
6565.
The right of the petitioner to the possession of the property is clearly
unassailable. It is founded on its right of ownership. As the purchaser of the
properties in the foreclosure sale, and to which the respective titles thereto have
already been issued, petitioners right over the property has become absolute,
vesting upon him the right of possession over an enjoyment of the property which
the Court must aid in effecting its delivery. After such delivery, the purchaser
becomes the absolute owner of the property. As we said in Tan Soo Huat v.
Ongwico, the deed of conveyance entitled the purchaser to have and to hold the
purchased property. This means, that the purchaser is entitled to go immediately
upon the real property, and this it is the Sheriffs inescapable duty to place him in
such possession.
SUENO VS. LBP
GR No. 174711, September 17, 2008
FACTS:
Sueno obtained loans from LBP. The loans were secured by Real Estate
Mortgages over two parcels of land. However, Sueno failed to pay her debt so the
LBP filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of said
properties at a public auction. LBP was the highest bidder in the auction sale.
Before the expiration of the one-year period for the redemption of the
subject properties, Sueno wrote LBP a letter requesting a six-month extension of
her period to redeem. LBP denied and informed her that she needed to post an
initial amount so that LBP would not consolidate the titles to the subject properties
in its name. Partial payment was made by the petitioner, but filed to pay the
balance despite warnings from the respondent. Thereafter, writ of possession of the
subject properties was issued in favor of LBP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession
RULING:
Under the provision of Sec. 33, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court and
Sec. 7 of Act 3135, as amended, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a
writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under
oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in
547

the case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and
the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the
court to issue the order for a writ of possession.
A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of ownership of
the property in the name of the purchaser. It is settled that the buyer in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new transfer
certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is
no longer necessary. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the
purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

JOVEN VS. CA
212 SCRA 700
FACTS:
Joven, the petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land which
she mortgaged in favor of the DBP. Upon the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage due to her failure to pay her loan, the properties were sold at public
auction to DBP as the biggest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and annotated
on the certificate of title on November 17, 1982.
After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having been
made by the petitioner, DBP sold the subject properties to Roberto Paguia, one of
the herein private respondents, through a deed of sale executed on December 17,
1985. On January 30, 1986, Paguia took possession of the properties through his
representative, Fernando Lasala, the other private respondent.
Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City for the annulment of the mortgage and its
foreclosure. Named as defendants were DBP and the private respondents. Later,
when her application for preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied,
she lodged with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court a complaint against the private
respondents for forcible entry with a prayer for writ of mandatory injunction. The
case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was granted. This resolution was reversed on appeal by the
Regional Trial Court. The petitioner elevated the case to the respondent Court of
548

Appeals, which sustained the assailed decision.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case and that the
private respondents were guilty of forcible entry on the subject premises for
occupying the same without judicial authorization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition has merit
HELD:
The petition has merit:
The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on the principal ground that a
question of ownership was involved therein.
It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible entry in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the case for annulment of the mortgage and
foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves recovery of ownership, was already
being litigated in the Regional Trial Court. Even so, the municipal court could,
pending final adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the
right of possession over the subject properties in the ejectment case.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
except where the question of ownership is involved or where the damages or
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed P20,000.00 at the
time of the filing of the complaint. The respondent court erred when it affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring that the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner.
SPS. VACA VS. CA
GR No. 109672, July 14, 1994
Facts:
Private respondent Associated Bank filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of property covered by TCT No.
254504. The property, consisting of a 953-square meter lot and a residential house
erected on it, situated at Quezon City. Private respondent alleged that for failure of
petitioners Eduardo Vaca and Ma. Luisita Pilar to pay their mortgage obligation to
private respondent, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the mortgaged
property was sold on October 30, 1990 to private respondent as the highest bidder;
that the one-year period to redeem having expired, TCT No. 254504 was cancelled
and TCT No. 52593 in private respondent's name was issued in lieu thereof; and
that despite demands, petitioners refused to turn over possession of the property to
549

private respondent
Petitioner spouses filed an opposition alleging that there was a pending
action in another court which the petitioners had filed for the annulment of the
mortgage and its foreclosure.
The RTC denied private respondent's petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession, and denied private respondent's motion for reconsideration
On
certiorari the Court of Appeals annulled the orders and ordered the RTC to issue
the writ of possession. Hence this petition.
Issue:
-whether or not the action for annulment of the mortgage constitutes a prejudicial
question in LRC for issuance of a writ of possession and that it was error for the
Court of Appeals to order the RTC to issue the writ of possession in favor of the
mortgagee.
-whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession
after the one-year period to redeem has expired is subject to certain exceptions.
Held:
Petitioners' contention has no merit. The question raised in this case has
already been settled in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, in which it was held that
the pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage
cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession, because the same is a ministerial
act of the trial court after title on the property has been consolidated in the
mortgagee.
Petitioners cited the cases of Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and
Barican v.Intermediate Appellate Court, where deferment was ordered of the
issuance of the writ of possession notwithstanding the lapse of the one-year period
of redemption. The deferment, however, was due to the circumstances of the
property which had been sold to third parties who assumed the indebtedness of the
mortgagor and took possession of the property earlier so that at the time of the
hearing on the petition for a writ of possession, the original debtor was no longer in
possession. Under these circumstances, it was held that the obligation of the court
to issue the writ of possession had ceased to be ministerial.
None of these equitable circumstances is present herein to justify making an
exception to the rule that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure, after the period of redemption, is a ministerial function of
the court. In this case, there is no dispute that the property was not redeemed
within one year from registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Private
respondent thus acquired the absolute right, as purchaser, to the issuance of a writ
of possession pursuant to Act No. 3135, sec. 7.
VICTOR CLAPANO vs. HON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS
550

G.R. Nos. L-51574-77 September 30, 1984

FACTS:
The spouses Conrado Crisostomo and Thelma Gallaza mortgaged three (3)
parcels of land, one a coconut plantation located at Maasim, and the other two
parcels situated at General Santos City, with respondent Philippine National Bank,
General Santos City Branch (PNB for brevity), as security for a loan. The
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the properties were sold at public
auction to the PNB as the highest bidder. After the expiration of the one-year
redemption period, PNB took possession of the same. On October 8, 1974, the
PNB appointed Matilde Abejeron as caretaker.
On October 21, 1975, the PNB executed a Deed of Promise to Sell said land
in favor of respondent Princessita Jabido-Maulit. When the vendee, Princessita,
tried to take physical possession of the land, petitioners Fernando Abellon and his
wife Conchita Abellon (the Abellons, for short) claiming to be the tenants of the
former owner, Conrado Crisostomo, and to have planted most of the coconuts in
said land, refused to give up possession.
On September 17, 1976, respondents PNB and Princessita filed with the
Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, an "Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
Writ of Possession. As the Writ was not fully satisfied because of the refusal of the
Abellons and their workers to leave the subject property, private respondents
moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere refusal of the defeated party to surrender the property to
the winning party upon the order of the sheriff does constitute contempt.
RULING:
Petitioners were successful in obtaining an Order upholding their tenancy
status and enjoining the defendants therein from depriving them of their possession
and cultivation of the subject property. Even under Section 35, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, made applicable in extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages by Section 6 of Act No. 3135, the possession of property is given to a
purchaser in extrajudicial foreclosures unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor." In this case, the subject land was being
possessed and cultivated by the Abellons as third parties, whose status as tenants
was recognized in CAR Case No. 44. Petitioners-spouses are protected by
Presidential Decree No. 1038, which provides that no tenant tiller of private
agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn, including but not
limited to abaca, banana, coconut, coffee, mongo durian and other permanent crops
shall be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from his farm holding unless for
551

causes provided by law and directed by a final decision or order of the court. Sale
of the land is not included as one of the just causes for removal of tenants.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION(CBC) vs. SPOUSES TOBIAS L.
LOZADA and ERLINA P. LOZADA
G.R. No. 164919
FACTS:
On 25 June 1995, the spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with
PPGI a two-bedroom residential unit with an area of 42.90 square meters, covered
by CCT No. 34898, for the total price of P1,444,014.04. About six months later,
PPGI executed two Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to secure the
credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI in the combined maximum amount
ofP37,000,000.00. The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the Project.
When PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated demands, CBC filed
with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the Makati City RTC a Petition
for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real estate. The public auction sale took place
at which CBC was the highest bidder, offering the amount of P30,000,000.00 for
the foreclosed properties.
On 15 May 2001 to Erlina, CBC notified her that it had already consolidated
its title and ownership over the unit which she presently occupied, and requested
her to vacate and surrender the said property, including the appurtenant keys, to its
duly authorized representative within 15 days from receipt of the letter. The Court
of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on 25 March 2004 ruling in favor of the
spouses Lozada. According to the appellate court, the issuance of the Writ of
Possession was not mandatory and ministerial on the part of the Makati City RTC,
and the court a quo should have afforded the spouses Lozada a hearing,
considering that (1) the Unit was no longer in the possession of the original
debtor/mortgagor PPGI, but was already being enjoyed by the spouses Lozada; (2)
the Makati City RTC was aware that the Unit was already in the possession of the
spouses Lozada because it was so stated in the ex parte petition of CBC, as well as
the Notice of Adverse Claim presented by CBC as evidence before the trial court;
(3) the spouses Lozada , under Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 957, had the
right to continue paying for the Unit to CBC, the purchaser thereof at the
foreclosure sale, still in accordance with the tenor of the Contract to Sell; and (4)
the spouses Lozada had a perfect cause of action for the annulment of the mortgage
constituted by PPGI in favor of CBC since PPGI failed to comply with the
requirement in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, to notify the installment buyer of the condominium unit of the mortgage
constituted thereon.
552

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in ruling that the respondents were
holding the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor thus the issuance of
the writ of possession was improper and unwarranted.
RULING:
The purchaser in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled
to a writ of possession; and upon an exparte petition of the purchaser, it is
ministerial upon the RTC to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.
However, while this is the general rule, as in all general rules, there is an exception.
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a
judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the
nature of said adverse possession. Similarly, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding
the same adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of
a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be
ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. For the exception to apply,
however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by
the third party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor. The exception provided under
Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in
which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a coowner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary
possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the
property. The spouses Lozada cannot claim that their right of possession over the
Unit is analogous to any of these.
It is true that in the case presently before this Court, PPGI executed in favor of the
spouses Lozada the Contract to Sell covering the Unit before it constituted in favor
of CBC the real estate mortgages on 51 Project units including spoueses Lozadas
unit. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that what PPGI executed in favor of the
spouses Lozada was a Contract to Sell, a mere promise to sell, which, at the
moment of its execution, did not yet transfer possession, much less, title to the
from PPGI to the spouses Lozada. When PPGI constituted the real estate mortgage
on the Unit in favor of CBC six months later, possession of and title to the property
still resided in PPGI. And when PPGI subsequently ceded possession of the Unit,
upon its completion, to the spouses Lozada, such right was already burdened by the
terms and conditions of the mortgage constituted thereon. By merely stepping into
the shoes of PPGI, the spouses Lozadas right of possession to the Unit cannot be
553

less or more than PPGIs.

The Court already made a determination that the spouses Lozada possessed the
Unit as the successors or transferees of PPGI. Still, the spouses Lozada only
acquired the right of possession of PPGI; hence, their possession can never be
adverse or contrary to that of PPGI. The spouses Lozada, having succeeded PPGI
in the possession of the Unit, cannot be considered a third party holding the said
property adversely to PPGI, the defaulting debtor/mortgagor.
CESAR SULIT vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ILUMINADA CAYCO
G.R. No. 119247. February 17, 1997
FACTS:
On 9 June 1992 Iluminada Cayco executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM)
over Lot 2630 which is located in Caloocan City and covered by TCT No. (23211)
11591 in favor of Cesar Sulit to secure a loan of P4 Million. Upon Caycos failure
to pay said loan within the stipulated period, Sulit resorted to extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage as authorized in the contract. Hence, in a public
auction the lot was sold to the mortgagee, who submitted a winning bid of P7
Million. On 13 December 1993 Sulit petitioned the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City for the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. On 17 January
1994 the RTC Judge issued a decision in favor of Cesar Sulit, upon his posting of
an indemnity bond in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand (P120,000.00)
Pesos.
The governing law thus explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure
sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex
parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or
cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of
such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express
terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.
The rule is, however, not without exception. Under Section 35, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act 3135, the possession of the mortgaged
property may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a
third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgagee or purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is
entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession over the mortgaged property despite
554

his failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor or the person
entitled thereto. Secondarily, it calls for a resolution of the further consequences of
such non-payment of the full amount for which the property was sold to him
pursuant to his bid.
RULING:
Now, in forced sales, low prices are generally offered and the mere
inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriffs sale, unless shocking to the
conscience, has been held insufficient to set aside a sale. This is because no
disadvantage is caused to the mortgagor. On the contrary, a mortgagor stands to
gain with a reduced price because he possesses the right of redemption. When
there is the right to redeem, inadequacy of price becomes immaterial since the
judgment debtor may reacquire the property or sell his right to redeem, and thus
recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the
auction sale.
The case at bar, in the sense that instead of an inadequacy in price, there is
due in favor of private respondent, as mortgagor, a surplus from the proceeds of the
sale equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt, which excess is
indisputably a substantial amount. Nevertheless, it is our considered opinion, and
we so hold, that equitable considerations demand that a writ of possession should
also not issue in this case.
The application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to
the mortgagors obligation is an act of payment, not payment by dation; hence, it is
the mortgagees duty to return any surplus in the selling price to the mortgagor.
Perforce, a mortgagee who exercises the power of sale contained in a mortgage is
considered a custodian of the fund, and, being bound to apply it properly, is liable
to the persons entitled thereto if he fails to do so. And even though the mortgagee
is not strictly considered a trustee in a purely equitable sense, but as far as concerns
the unconsumed balance, the mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the mortgagor or
owner of the equity of redemption.
The general rule that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a
foreclosure sale is based on the theory that the lesser the price the easier it will be
for the owner to effect the redemption. The same thing cannot be said where the
amount of the bid is in excess of the total mortgage debt. The reason is that in case
the mortgagor decides to exercise his right of redemption, Section 30 of Rule 39
provides that the redemption price should be equivalent to the amount of the
purchase price, plus one per cent monthly interest up to the time of the redemption,
555

together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may
have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the
same rate.
We cannot simply ignore the importance of surplus proceeds because by
their very nature, surplus money arising from a sale of land under a decree of
foreclosure stands in the place of the land itself with respect to liens thereon or
vested rights therein. They are constructively, at least, real property and belong to
the mortgagor or his assigns. Inevitably, the right of a mortgagor to the surplus
proceeds is a substantial right which must prevail over rules of technicality.
LEONG vs. TANGUANGCO
G.R. No. 154632, March 14, 2008
FACTS:
On February 5, 1999, respondent Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
(Hermosa Bank) filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. The
petition alleged that on November 28, 1997 Hermosa Bank purchased at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale three parcels of land together with improvements therein;
that the Certificate of Sale of Realty issued to it was duly registered and annotated
with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on December 17, 1997; that twelve (12)
months from the date of registration of the sale had already elapsed and neither
petitioners nor any person entitled thereto had exercised their right of redemption;
that upon the expiration of the period, Hermosa Bank caused the consolidation of
ownership over said parcels and secured under its name; and that having
consolidated its ownership thereon, it is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
possession.
Petitioners filed an Opposition with Urgent Motion to Dismiss/Suspend
Proceedings and Motion for Consolidation. Petitioners claimed that Alfonso only
agreed to sign the documents upon the insistent prodding of the banks president,
Benjamin J. Cruz, that they were needed for purposes only of the Bangko Sentrals
audit of Hermosa Bank; in truth, the documents were required to cover up the loan
of spouses Rene and Remedios Dado and Sierra Madre Development Corporation,
who are the real debtors of the bank.
Petitioners moved to reconsider the Order but reconsideration was denied;
hence, on August 12, 1999, they filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
556

Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The
following day, however, the Cavite RTC issued the writ of possession in favor of
Hermosa Bank.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the petition under Rule 65 by the CA based on
it being moot and academic is patently erroneous;
2.
Whether or not the issues as to the validity of the real estate mortgage
contracts, loan agreements, promissory notes, extrajudicial foreclosure and auction
sale of petitioners properties must first be resolved in the civil case pending in the
Las Pias RTC since the question of whether respondent Hermosa Bank is entitled
to a writ of possession in the LRC case is dependent thereon.
RULING:
As the CA correctly found, the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite had already granted the writ
of possession sought by Hermosa. Hence, the petition to consolidate the case
before the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite with the case pending before the RTC of Las
Pias, had become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

E RAMOS vs. CA
213 SCRA 207
FACTS:
Private respondents mortgaged their 230 square meter residential lot located
in Modern Village, Paciano Rizal, Calamba, Laguna and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-35475 in the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Laguna, to the Luzon Development Bank (hereinafter, the Bank) as security for a
loan of P10,000.00 which is evidenced by a promissory note. There being default
in the payment of the installments on due dates despite several written demands,
the Bank applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. In a public
auction on 30 July 1981, the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna sold the mortgaged
property to the Bank, the lone bidder therein, for P23,808.29.
On 26 July 1983, the Bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna which was
docketed as SLRC Case No. III-83-C. In its Order dated 24 June 1985, the trial
557

court granted the petition, ordered the issuance of a writ of possession and directed
the Provincial Sheriff or any of his deputies to place the Bank in possession of the
property, the writ of possession was issued on 1 July 1985. During the pendency of
the petition for a writ of possession, or specifically on 3 September 1983, the Bank
sold to the herein petitioners the property in question under a Deed of Conditional
Sale for P35,000.00 payable in installments. After the said balance having been
paid, the Bank executed in the petitioners favor a Deed of Absolute Sale on
November 1983 which was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on 13
November 1983.
The Demamays neither moved for a reconsideration of nor appealed from
the aforesaid 24 June 1985 Order. Instead, on 5 July 1985, Estelita Demamay filed
a complaint "To Set Aside the Sale of Mortgaged Property and Subsequent
Transactions Pertinent Thereto and Cancel Writ of Possession Issued Thereon"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 894-85-C.
Then, seven (7) months later, or more specifically, on 8 August 1986, Estelita
Demamay, now joined by her husband Flavio, filed a complaint for Annulment of
Sales and Reconveyance of Real Property with Damages against the bank and
herein petitioners with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna; the complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 1031-86-C 11 and was raffled off to Branch 34 of the said court.
In its Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction, the Bank interposed Special and Affirmative Defenses, among which
are (a) res judicata, the issues involved having already been raised and resolved by
Branches 37 and 36 of the court, and (b) Branch 34 of the RTC has no jurisdiction
to annul the final orders of the two (2) aforementioned branches of the court in
SLRC No. 111-83-C and Civil Case No. 849-85-C, respectively. The trial court
dismissed Civil Case No. 1031-86-C on the ground that it is barred by res judicata
because of the final orders dated 24 June 1985 in SLRC No. 111-133-C, and 3
January 1986 in Civil Case No. 894-85-C.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Orders are adjudications on the merits of the causes of
action and the issues involved.
RULING:
The principle of res judicata applies in this case. There being clearly
identical parties and identity of rights asserted in all three (3) cases the focal
issue in this case having been fully adjudicated in the aforecited cases this case
must be dismissed."
The essential requisites of res judicata are (1) there must be a final judgment
558

or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of action.
The parties do not dispute the fact that Branches 37 and 36 of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna had jurisdiction over SLRC No. 111-83-C and
Civil Case No. 894-85-C, respectively, that their Orders which were pleaded as a
bar to Civil Case No. 1031-86-C are firm and final; and that the principal parties,
causes of action and issues involved in the latter are identical to those in the first
two (2) cases.
After having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in SLRC No. 111-83C, testifying therein and offering documentary evidence to resist the petition for a
writ of possession and to obtain affirmative relief such as the nullification of the
foreclosure proceedings and all incidents thereto including, necessarily, the sale at
the public auction, Demamay cannot now be heard to challenge the jurisdiction of
the said court and to suggest, in order to escape from the effects of the finality of
the Order, that all that had transpired in the said case was an exercise in futility. A
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. Put differently, it is not proper for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. That
order was, undoubtedly, an adjudication on the merits of Demamays claim and
cause of action. If the court in Civil Case No. 894-85-C finally decreed the
dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, it was because the Order of 24 June
1985 in SLRC No. 111-83-C was already final; the court could not, therefore,
annul it. the authority to annul the same is vested in the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) pursuant to Section 9(2) of B.P. No. 129.
The message the court wanted to convey was that the Order of 24 June 1985
constituted a prior final judgment which barred Civil Case No. 894-85-C.
The 3 January 1986 Order in Civil Case No. 894-85-C was, by itself, an
adjudication on the merits of the Demamay spouses claim because it declared
them no longer entitled to the right upon which their claims are based. A judgment
is deemed to be rendered upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the
law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate
fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the
right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives or
contentions.
SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK, INC. Vs. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and DOMINIC G. AQUINO
559

G.R. No. 168088. April 3, 2007

FACTS:
Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (respondent PODC) was the
registered owner of a parcel of land in San Fernando, Pampanga (now San
Fernando City). Respondent PODC secured two loans from petitioner and
Masantol Rural Bank, Inc. (MRBI). The loans were evidenced by separate
promissory notes executed by Federico R. Mendoza and Anastacio E. de Vera. To
secure payment of the loans, respondent PODC executed a real estate mortgage
over the subject lot in favor of the creditor banks. The contract provided that in
case of failure or refusal of the mortgagor to pay the obligation secured thereby, the
real estate mortgage may be extrajudicially foreclosed in accordance with Act No.
3135, as amended.
Eliza M. Garbes (PODC President and daughter of Federico Mendoza),
together with her husband Aristedes Garbes, secured aP950,000.00 loan from
petitioner on March 27, 1992. The loan was to mature after 180 days or on
September 23, 1992. Mendoza signed as co-borrower in the promissory note
executed by the spouses. The spouses also executed a chattel mortgage over their
personal property as security for the payment of their loan account. Upon
respondent PODCs failure to pay its loan to petitioner, the latter filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Petitioner did not file a petition
for a writ of possession during the redemption period.
On May 11, 2002, petitioner, through Eliza Garbes (with the authority of
petitioners board of directors), executed a notarized deed of assignment in favor of
respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its right to redeem the property. On May 30,
2002, respondent Aquino remitted Cashiers Check No. to the Ex-OfficioSheriff as
redemption money for the property for which he was issued Receipt dated May 31,
2002. On October 15, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Possession in
the RTC of Pampanga. On December 20, 2002, the court in LRC No. 890 issued
an Order granting the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession, on
a bond equivalent to the market value of the property. It ruled that petitioner, as
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, was entitled to a writ of possession.
The appellate court ruled that the December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC
granting the petition for a writ of possession was interlocutory and not final; hence,
it may be questioned only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, not by appeal. The CA cited the ruling of this Court in City of Manila v.
Serrano. The CA further held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it granted the application of
petitioner for a writ of possession.
560

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it sanctioned the
Respondents resort to Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
questioning a final order and not an interlocutory order of the RTC.
RULING:
The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the petition for a
writ of possession was merely interlocutory. Interlocutory orders are those that
determine incidental matters and which do not touch on the merits of the case or
put an end to the proceedings. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the proper remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order. On
the other hand, a final order is one that disposes of the whole matter or terminates
the particular proceedings or action leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined. It is one that finally disposes of the pending
action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower court. The remedy to
question a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The remedy of respondents was to appeal to the CA by filing their notice of
appeal within the period therefor. Even if the trial court erred in granting a petition
for a writ of possession, such an error is merely an error of judgment correctible by
ordinary appeal and not by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Such writ cannot be
legally used for any other purpose.
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a
general utility tool in the legal workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal.
DIONISIA DORADO VDA. DE DELFIN vs. SALVADOR D. DELLOTA and
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GUMERSINDO DELEA,
G.R. No. 143697
January 28, 2008
FACTS:
The late Dionisia Dorado Delfin, herein petitioner, represented by her heirs,
was the registered owner of Lot No. 1213 situated in Panitan, Capiz with an area of
143,935 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RP-1124
(14972). On June 16, 1929, Dionisia executed an "Escritura De Venta Con Pacto de
Retro" over a 50,000-square meter portion of Lot No. 1213 in favor of spouses
Ildefonso Dellota and Patricia Delfin. However, Dionisia failed to exercise her
right of redemption. On June 9, 1949, Dionisia sold another portion of Lot No.
1213 consisting of 50,000 square meters to Gumersindo Delea (respondent herein
represented by his estate), as evidenced by a notarized "Deed of Sale with Right of
Redemption," thus, leaving an unsold area of more than 43,000 square meters.
561

Dionisia never redeemed this 50,000-square meter portion from Gumersindo.

Records show that Salvador Dellota (also a respondent represented by his heirs)
leased this area from Gumersindo. On October 12, 1956, Dionisia executed a
"Deed of and Promise To Sell" in favor of Salvador over a 90,000-square meter
portion of Lot No. 1213, without specifying whether it included the 50,000-square
portion sold (with right of redemption) to Gumersindo.
On June 8, 1964, Dionisia filed with the then Court of First Instance, Branch
2, Roxas City, a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. V-2760. Impleaded as defendant was respondent Salvador D. Dellota,
represented by his wife Genoveva D. Dellota and their children.
The trial court ruled Dionisia to redeem the 40,000 meter portion of Lot
2123 and declared the ownership 50,000 portion also of the same lot in the name of
Gumersindo Delena. On appeal by Dionisia, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption entered into by
Dionisia and Gumersindo is an equitable mortgage.
RULING:
An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or
form, or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the
intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains
nothing impossible or contrary to law. The essential requisites of an equitable
mortgage are: (1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of sale, (2) but
their intention is to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
G.R. No. 97822 May 7, 1992
MAURICIO N. CACHOLA, SR., represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, NILO
C. CACHOLA vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPS. FEDERICO BRIONES and
TRINIDAD ENCINAS
FACTS:
On July 30, 1973, the respondent spouses Federico Briones and Trinidad
Encinas, as the registered owners of the above-named property under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 72398 mortgaged the same to Benjamin Ocampo as
a security for a loan of P15,000.00. For failure of the spouses to pay the loan,
562

Ocampo caused the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the subsequent sale
of the property at public auction. Ocampo being the highest bidder, purchased the
property at the auction. A certificate of sale was executed in his favor.
The respondents were able to exercise their right of redemption within the
one-year period from the auction sale by paying P19,876.80 plus accrued interests
and taxes. This was made possible through a loan of P40,000.00 obtained from
petitioner, the late Mauricio Cachola and his co-defendant in Civil Case No. Q45163 for annulment of deed of sale, Angelina Alfaras. This second loan was
evidenced by a promissory note executed by the spouses Briones duly signed by
them dated March 11, 1975, but subscribed before a notary public on March 13,
1975. The loan was also evidenced by a "Kasunduan" (Records, pp. 244-245)
between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the respondent spouses, on the other
signed on March 13, 1975 containing the same stipulation for payment. The
Kasunduan recognized the full ownership by the respondents. There was also a
stipulation that after the properties shall have been redeemed from Ocampo, the
title should be placed in the hands of Cachola for the purpose of securing the loan.
Hence, another real estate mortgage was entered into by virtue of the Kasunduan
over the same house and lot in favor of petitioner Cachola. TCT No. 72398 was
placed under the custody of Angelina Alfaras on behalf of the petitioner.
The respondent spouses failed to pay any amount within the stipulated six month
period and even afterwards. On January 30, 1976, petitioner executed a Release of
Mortgage.
On November 9, 1981, the subject property was conveyed by Cachola to his
son Ebenezer Cachola by way of donation inter vivos. The transfer by donation
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City so that TCT No. 216104
of Mauricio Cachola was canceled and a new one, TCT No. 339434 in the name of
Ebenezer Cachola was issued.
On June 10, 1985, the respondents filed the instant case, Civil Case No. Q-45163
against the petitioner and Angelina Alfaras before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 76 again for: annulment of the deed of absolute sale,
cancellation of TCT No. 216104 of the petitioner and annulment of the unlawful
detainer judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract involving the real property in this case is one of sale or
an equitable mortgage.
HELD:
563

The Court holds that even assuming that the consideration was below
standard, it was not unusually inadequate during that time. Besides, inadequacy of
the price does not by itself support the conclusion that the property was not at all
sold to the petitioner or that the contract was a loan. Inadequacy is not sufficient to
set aside a sale unless it is purely shocking to the conscience (Vda. de Cruzo v.
Carriaga, 174 SCRA 330 [1989]; and Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612
[1990]).
An equitable mortgage is "one which although it lacks some formality, form
of words or other requisites prescribed by a statute, show(s) the intention of the
parties to charge a real property as security for a debt and contains nothing
impossible or contrary to law." (Vda. de Zulueta v. Octaviano, 121 SCRA 314
[1983], quoting Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes. and R.C. Puno)
The plain terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale of January 30, 1976 (Exhibit
"E" for the plaintiffs-petitioners) and the circumstances of the case do not suggest
an unequivocal intention to make the property answerable for the P40,000.00 debt
after the lapse of the six-month period from March 13, 1975 to September 13, 1975
within which the respondent spouses were expected to pay their obligation. There
was nothing to show an agreement that the parties recognized the continued
ownership of the spouses Briones.
The words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the desire of the
spouses to transfer the property by way of sale to the petitioner. No other meaning
could be given to the terms and stipulations of the contract but their literal
meaning. (Article 1370, New Civil Code). The contract was proper in form. It was
properly executed and signed by each of the spouses and by Cachola on its second
page as well as on the left hand margin of every page. It was acknowledged by a
notary public.
MINDANAO DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CA
133 SCRA 429, 1982
FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Ang Bansing was the owner of a big tract of land
situated in Barrio Panacan Davao City. Ang Bansing sold a portion thereof, with an
area of about 5 hectares to Juan Cruz Yap Chuy. A cadastral survey was made and
Lot 664-B-3 was designated as Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Juan Cruz sold
Lot 1846-C to the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the amount of P6,347.50.
On February 25, 1965, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No.
459, transferring ownership of certain parcels of land situated in Sasa Davao City,
564

to the Mindanao Development Authority, now the Southern Philippines

Development Administration, subject to private rights, if any. Lot 1846-C, the
disputed parcel of land, was among the parcels of land transferred to the Mindanao
Development Authority in said proclamation. He, in selling his property to another,
made a written promise to work for the titling of the land, but it was not done. The
court ruled that there was no express trust, because the written promise did not
categorically create an obligation on the part of the landowner to hold the property
in trust for the other. Neither was the subject matter of the supposed trust clearly
described.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an express trust between Ang Bansing and Juan Cruz
over Lot 1846-C of Davao Cadastre
HELD:
No express trust had been created between Ang Bansing and Juan Cruz over
Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Herein petitioner relies mainly upon the
following stipulation in the deed of sale executed by Ang Bansing in favor of Juan
Cruz to prove that an express trust had been established with Ang Bansing as the
settlor and trustee and Juan Cruz as the cestui que trust or beneficiary. The
stipulation, however, is nothing but a condition that Ang Bansing shall pay the
expenses for the registration of his land and for Juan Cruz to shoulder the expenses
for the registration of the land sold to him. The stipulation does not categorically
create an obligation on the part of Ang Bansing to hold the property in trust for
Juan Cruz. Hence, there is no express trust. Thus, the petition is denied.
In a separate opinion of Justice Aquino, however, it is said that the disputed
land should be adjudicated to the government agency known as the Southern
Philippines Development Administration, the successor of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. It is argued that Ang Bansing did not touch at all Lot No. 1846-C
because he knew that it was not his property and that it belonged to the State. It is
claimed that Ang Bansing was the true owner of Lot No. 1846-C, there being an
express trust in this case. In any event, the real plaintiff in this case is the Republic
of the Philippines and prescription does not run against the State. The maxim is
nullum tempus occurrit regi or nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of time
does not bar the right of the crown or lapse of time does not bar the
commonwealth). The best reason for its existence is the great public policy of
preserving public rights and property from damage and loss through the negligence
of public officers. The government officials concerned were negligent in not
intervening in the land registration proceeding or in not promptly asking Ang
Bansing to reconvey the disputed lot to the Commonwealth or to the Republic of
565

the Philippines. Such negligence does not prejudice the State. The negligence or
omissions of public officers as to their public duties will not work an estoppel
against the State.

SANTOS VS AQUINO
(205 SCRA 127)
FACTS:
Santos and Camus filed a case against the FINASIA and its officers who are
responsible in luring them to make the money placement in that company and upon
the application and strength of the attachment bonds, the court issued an
attachment to the property owned by the company in its officer. The proceedings
against FINASIA were suspended because it was placed under receivership by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for operating without prior SEC
registration and for failure to pay maturing money market placements. FINASIA
file a motion to lift the attachment by offering counter bonds but opposed by the
Santos. Then later they filed again a motion to substitute the attached properties
and were set on September 22, 1988. But a day before the hearing, the counsel of
Santos informed him that the hearing was cancelled because the judge is attending
a seminar but the truth is he was there so he decided the case without the petitioner.
An order was issued to the counsel of the petitioner but for some unexplained
reason he failed to inform his client. Santos discharged his lawyer and he himself
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. So he filed a petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge exercises grave abuse of discretion in ordering the substitution
of the attached properties?
HELD:
Yes, Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the
substitution of the attached properties over the vigorous opposition of the
petitioners and without hearing them. His orders dated October 10, 1988 and
December 10, 1988 are hereby annulled and set aside. The original writ of
attachment should be deemed to have subsisted on the attached properties from the
date of the original levy. The writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution
except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination, of a suit. It
places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until
the judgment of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff's claim is established, when the
lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy.
There is no rule allowing substitution of attached property although an
566

attachment may be discharged wholly or in part upon the security of a counterbond

offered by the defendant upon application to the court, with notice to, and after
hearing, the attaching creditor, or upon application of the defendant, with notice to
the applicant and after hearing, if it appears that the attachment was improperly or
irregularly issued.
If an attachment is excessive, the remedy of the defendant is to apply to the
court for a reduction or partial discharge of the attachment, not the total discharge
and substitution of the attached properties. The reason for this is that the lien
acquired by the plaintiff-creditor as of the date of the original levy would be lost. It
would in effect constitute a deprivation without due process of law of the attaching
creditors' interest in the attached property as security for the satisfaction of the
judgment which he may obtain in the action.
The notice of levy in Civil Cases 365-MN and 374-MN was annotated on
FINASIA's TCTs Nos. 120450 on November 22 and 23, 1983 and on Villarosa's
TCTs Nos. 13350-A and 13351-A on November 7 and 30, 1983. By ordering the
substitution on October 11, 1988, the Court obliterated the petitioners' earlier lien
under the original attachment and in effect deprived the petitioners of their interest
in the attached properties without due process of law.
ARRAZOLA VS. BERNAS
86 SCRA 279 (1978)
FACTS:
On May 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas executed in Iloilo City a notarized will
wherein he disinherited Teresita, her allegedly adopted daughter, and instituted
respondents (his siblings) as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and
373 which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita. On June 5,
1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the CFI of
Capiz a petition for the probate of the formers will. On December 12, 1967, Pedro
filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim. He
alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were conveyed by his
brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas "involuntarily, fictitiously and without
consideration" and that in Elviro's will the two lots were devised to him and his
sister Soledad. After the ROD annotated the adverse claim on TCT Nos. T-6881
and T-6882, Teresita filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a motion for the
cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim. She contended that she was not
served with prior notice of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for
approval or justification" thereof filed with the court. Pedro and Soledad opposed
the motion. The lower court granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel
the annotation.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in granting the cancellation of the annotation on the
567

titles?
HELD:
YES. Under section 110 Act 496, the adverse claimant must be one who
claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the original araregistration. That interest is registerable as an
adverse claim if no other provision is made in Act No. 496 for its registration.
Applying section 110, it was held that a claim based on occurrences prior to the
original registration is not registerable as an adverse claim. In the instant case, the
lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim because the will of Elviro
Bernas had not yet been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate
respondents are merely presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and
inchoate" interest in the two lots. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet
been probated, but there is still a pending proceeding for its probate. In that will,
the testator transmitted to his surviving siblings the right to secure a declaration as
to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to petitioner. Teresita's
title to the two lots have become controversial because of that will. To alert third
persons, or for that matter the whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and
Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act
No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim on
the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then the registered
owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the
unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or frustrated. The purpose of
annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third
persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve
and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the
disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute. Appellants' adverse claim,
which was made in good faith, has some basis and semblance of plausibility and is
not palpably frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation
of the annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that the titles
of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible and that appellants'
claim is devoid of merit. It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim
should not be confused with its validity which should be litigated in a proper
proceeding and that the registration of an invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as
the non-registration of a valid one.
ARRAZOLA VS. BERNAS
(175 Phil. 452)
FACTS:
568

Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5,

1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he
disinherited Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister
Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and
373 which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.
A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His
brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a petition dated
September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special Proceeding No. V-2965).
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of
Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse
claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It reasoned out
that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely
presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two
lots.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in cancelling the adverse claim?
HELD:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the adverse
claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated but the fact
is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the testator
transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or
adverse claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole world, to the fact
that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two
lots, section 110 of Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated
their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them,
then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value
and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or frustrated.
(See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952 as to the right of an heir to sue for
the annulment of a conveyance made in fraud of the deceased.)
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land
is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land
and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency
of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the
disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis
569

and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it

is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally
determined by the courts that the titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed
lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.
LUCIO C. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
RURAL BANK OF ORMOC CITY, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. L-40177 February 12, 1976]
FACTS:
Respondent Rural Bank of Ormoc City, Inc. had executed certain affidavits
of adverse claim to certain registered sugar lands in Tacloban and Ormoc Cities
alleged by petitioner to belong to him either as co-owner and/or as redemptioner.
The said lands were the subject of mortgage loans obtained from respondent bank
which had been fully paid and discharged either by payment or redemption after
extra-judicial foreclosure. Upon the refusal of the Tacloban Register of Deeds to
register the bank's adverse claim, respondent bank filed with the court of first
instance of Leyte as a land registration court three petitions 3 for an order to direct
the Tacloban and Ormoc Registers of Deeds to annotate its adverse claim on the
titles, while petitioner in turn opposed the petitions and filed his counter-petition
for an order directing respondent bank to return the said titles without such
annotations.
The court of first instance oredered the Registers of Deeds to annotate
respondent' bank's adverse claims and thereafter release the aforesaid titles to the
corresponding registered owners. The Order was immediately implemented even
before it became final and executory and the bank's affidavits of adverse claim
were annotated by the Registers of Deeds on the back of the certificates of title.
Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court of Appeals
for the setting aside of the Order and the cancellation of the annotations of adverse
claims, pleading the inadequacy of resorting to an ordinary appeal with its
concomitant delay.
ISSUE(s):
Whether or not a mere money claim may be properly registered as an
adverse claim on a Torrens Certificate of Title within the purview of the Land
Registration Act.
HELD:
A mere money claim may not be registered as an adverse claim on a torrens
certificate of title and a judge who orders the annotation on the certificate of title of
such money claim as an adverse claim acts without any authority in law and
570

commits a grave discretion amounting in law and commits a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction that calls for the issuance of the
corrective writ of certiorari. Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496)
manifestly provides that a person or entity who wishes to register an adverse claim
in registered land must-claim a "part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner. Thus, purely money claims such as those of respondent bank by
virtue of unsecured personal loans granted by it on promissory notes executed in its
favor signed by the borrowers and co-signed by petitioner as co-maker are not
registrable as adverse claims against the petitioner's registered lands. The claim
asserted must affect the title or be adverse to the title of the registered owner in
order to be duly annotated as an adverse claim to the land against the registered
owner. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the
interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such
interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and
serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered
owner thereof. If respondent bank wanted the additional security of petitioner's real
properties besides his personal signature assuming liability for the payment of the
personal loans, then it should not have extended the loans without requiring
furthermore the execution of a covering real 'estate mortgage. If the loans were due
and it feared that there would be a fraudulent removal-or disposition of the debtors'
properties, then its proper course was to file the proper collection suit and seek a
court order for attachment under bond but certainly not to execute and submit
for registration a mere baseless adverse claim, simply because it happened to be in
possession of petitioner's certificates of title as a mortgagee whose mortgage lien
had been fully discharged.
DARIO N. LOZANO, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the
deceased AGUSTO N. LOZANO, PATROCINIO DEL PRADO and
ANTONIO LOZANO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. IGNACIO BALLESTEROS,
defendant-appellee.
[G.R. No. 49470 April 8, 1991]
FACTS:
Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the
original registered exclusive owner of the land in question. On March 6, 1958, by
virtue of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the land in question to Marciana de
Dios. Augusto, Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano,
together with Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidation-subdivision plan
571

and for the annotation of several documents at the back of the Original Certificate
of Title No. 46076. The court approved the consolidation-subdivision plan and
directed the inscription of said deed of sale at the back of the title. On January 22,
1963, plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the title
of the said lot. On August 25, 1966, De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio
Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63171 was later transferred in his
name. Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios alleging that the
estate of Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B. The court
rendered a default decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Having failed to effect the
recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed several complaints for
reconveyance and recovery of possession. The appellants insist that "the said
adverse claim has been carried along in the subsequent titles of the defendants."
Appellee however, stresses that a cursory examination of the adverse claim filed by
the plaintiffs-appellants readily reveals that the same has failed to comply with the
formal requirements of Section 110 of Act 496 with respect to adverse claims. And
for which, and for all legal purposes, the adverse claim under comment is not valid
and effective.
ISSUE(s):
Whether or not the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title
of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the defendant meets the requirements
provided for in Section 110 of Act 496.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court that whoever
claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a
reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner,
and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement
shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and
designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall
be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any
party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of
such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may
require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If
in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered
was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in
its discretion. Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the above
quoted provision are the formal requisites of an adverse claim. However, as the
572

lower court noted "the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title of
Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did not meet the
requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is setting forth fully how
or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the property. Thus, the effect of such
non-compliance renders the adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective.
CHING vs. ENRILE
GR No. 156076, 17 September 2008
FACTS:
On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La
Fuente a 370-square meter lot located at Barrio Tungtong, Las Pias and covered
by TCT No. 83618. The conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds.
Instead, on November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim.
In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously possessed the
subject property.
Three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners received a
Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of respondents.
On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet
Title to Real Property asserting ownership of the disputed property.
On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
upholding the latters superior right over the disputed property in view of the
registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of Sale
annotated in favor of respondents.
In time, respondents appealed to the CA, theorizing that the prior
conveyance of the disputed property made by La Fuente to petitioners being a
voluntary dealing with a registered land, mere registration of their adverse claim
was insufficient.
On August 29, 2002, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision
reversing that of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents were purchasers in good faith when they
acquired the disputed lot despite the annotated adverse claim on their title.
HELD:
No. The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a vendee
and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who registers the order of
attachment and the sale of the property to him as the highest bidder acquires a valid
title to the property as against a vendee who had previously bought the same
573

property from the same owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This is
because registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as
third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there is notice to the whole
world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest, as here, which
is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of
that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge
of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. Respondents were not
purchasers in good faith and, as such, could not acquire good title to the property
as against the former transferee.
G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978
TERESITA ROSAL ARRAZOLA
vs.
PEDRO A. BERNAS and SOLEDAD VERNAS ALIVIO
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was annotated
on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T-6882 in the name of Teresita
Rosal Bernas (Arrazola).
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5,
1967 executed a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his
brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his
properties, including the lots in question which he had allegedly "involuntarily
transferred" to Teresita.
A month later, Elviro Bernas died, and his brother Pedro filed with the Court
of First Instance of Capiz a petition for the probate of his will.
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of
Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were conveyed
by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas "involuntarily, fictitiously and
without consideration" and that in Elviro's will the two lots were devised to him
(Pedro) and his sister Soledad.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim, Teresita R.
Bernas Arrazola filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a motion for the
cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim, which was predicated on the
grounds that she was not served with prior notice" of the adverse claim and that
there was "no petition for approval or justification" thereof filed with the court.
Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim annotated in the name of the petitioner should be
cancelled.
574

HELD:
No. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated but the
fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the
testator transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositorsappellants or adverse claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity
of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole world, to the fact
that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two
lots, section 110 of Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated
their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them,
then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value
and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or frustrated.

G.R. No. L-28529 April 30, 1979

L. P. LEVISTE & COMPANY, INC., and NITA U. BERTHELSEN
vs.
HON. ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS in his capacity as Land Registration
Commissioner, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, and MARIA
VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
The property involved is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 108425
of the Province of Rizal in the name of Z. Garcia Realty, Inc. On a date that does
not appear of record, the property was converted into a subdivision called the
Garville Subdivision. This subdivision has blocks and certain lots and the
controversy in this case centers on Lot 6, Block 4.
On September 7, 1964, a Notice of lis pendes was presented by Melecio B.
Emata, noting the pendency of Civil Case No. 2489-P referring specifically to Lot
3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the new subdivision plan. It is to be noted that the lis
pendens does not refer to Lot 6, Block 4. On April 28, 1966, an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim covering Lot 1, Block 5 was presented by J. Antonio Leviste,
Executive Vice President of petitioner company, based on an assignment in his
favor by one Leticia P. Ramos, buyer of said lot from Garcia Realty. Also to be
noted is that this has no reference to Lot 6, Block 4. On May 6, 1966 an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim covering Lot 6, Block 4 was presented by respondent Maria
575

Villanueva based on an agreement to sell in her favor executed by Garcia Realty.

This is the Disputed Lot.
Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title issued in
her favor, free of any encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste and Berthelsen objected
alleging that they had registered adverse claims and attachments. The Register of
Deeds refused to issue a new title to Villanueva without carrying over the two
annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim.
Petitioners take the position that the agreement to sell in favor of Maria
Villanueva was not registered. Hence, the rights of a lienholder established by law
cannot be invoked in favor of petitioner (herein respondent).
ISSUE:
Whether or not a claim not validly registered is effective for the purpose of
protecting claimant's right or interest on the disputed land.
HELD:
No. In Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro, it was held that for
the special remedy of adverse claim to be availed of, it must be shown that there is
no other provision in the law for registration of the claimant's alleged right or
interest in the property. In said case, the basis of the adverse claim was a perfected
contract of sale. As the Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the procedure
for registration of the vendee's right on a registered property (Section 57), the filing
of an adverse claim was held ineffective for the purpose of protecting the vendee's
right.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that Villanueva attempted to register the
agreement to sell under Section 52 of Act No. 496 and that the registered owner,
Garcia Realty, refused to surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation of
said instrument. Instead, Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said
agreement to sell Considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act
prescribes the procedure for the registration of Villanueva's interest less than an
estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and there being no showing of her inability
to produce the owner's duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of
Act 496, which was resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the
purpose of protecting her right or interest on the disputed lot.
Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the same
did not have the effect of a conveyance of her right or interest on the disputed lot
and could not prejudice any right that may have arisen thereafter in favor of third
parties.
ARRAZOLA VS. BERNAS (175 Phil. 452)
FACTS:
576

Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5,

1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he
disinherited Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister
Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and
373 which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.
A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His
brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a petition dated
September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special Proceeding No. V-2965).
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of
Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse
claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It reasoned out
that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely
presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two
lots.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in cancelling the adverse claim?
HELD:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the adverse
claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated but the fact
is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the testator
transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or
adverse claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole world, to the fact
that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two
lots, section 110 of Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated
their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them,
then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value
and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or frustrated.
(See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952 as to the right of an heir to sue for
the annulment of a conveyance made in fraud of the deceased.)
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed
land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership
of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant
577

during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any
transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the
dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis
and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it
is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally
determined by the courts that the titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed
lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.
a. A mere money claim cannot be registered as an adverse claim.
L. P. LEVISTE & COMPANY, INC., and NITA U. BERTHELSEN
vs.
HON. ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS in his capacity as Land
Registration Commissioner, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL, and MARIA VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
The property involved is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 108425 of the Province of Rizal in the name of Z. Garcia
Realty, Inc. On a date that does not appear of record, the property
was converted into a subdivision called the Garville Subdivision.
This subdivision has blocks and certain lots and the controversy in
this case centers on Lot 6, Block 4.
On September 7, 1964, a Notice of lis pendes was presented by
Melecio B. Emata, noting the pendency of Civil Case No. 2489-P
referring specifically to Lot 3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the new
subdivision plan. It is to be noted that the lis pendens does not
refer to Lot 6, Block 4. On April 28, 1966, an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim covering Lot 1, Block 5 was presented by J. Antonio Leviste,
Executive Vice President of petitioner company, based on an
assignment in his favor by one Leticia P. Ramos, buyer of said lot
from Garcia Realty. Also to be noted is that this has no reference
to Lot 6, Block 4. On May 6, 1966 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
covering Lot 6, Block 4 was presented by respondent Maria
Villanueva based on an agreement to sell in her favor executed by
Garcia Realty. This is the Disputed Lot.
Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and
title issued in her favor, free of any encumbrance, but petitioners
Leviste and Berthelsen objected alleging that they had registered
578

adverse claims and attachments. The Register of Deeds refused

to issue a new title to Villanueva without carrying over the two
annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim.
Petitioners take the position that the agreement to sell in favor of
Maria Villanueva was not registered. Hence, the rights of a
lienholder established by law cannot be invoked in favor of
petitioner (herein respondent).
ISSUE:
Whether or not a claim not validly registered is effective for the
purpose of protecting claimant's right or interest on the disputed
land.
HELD:
No.
In Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro, it was held that
for the special remedy of adverse claim to be availed of, it must
be shown that there is no other provision in the law for
registration of the claimant's alleged right or interest in the
property. In said case, the basis of the adverse claim was a
perfected contract of sale. As the Land Registration Act
specifically prescribes the procedure for registration of the
vendee's right on a registered property (Section 57), the filing of
an adverse claim was held ineffective for the purpose of
protecting the vendee's right.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that Villanueva attempted to
register the agreement to sell under Section 52 of Act No. 496
and that the registered owner, Garcia Realty, refused to surrender
the duplicate certificate for the annotation of said instrument.
Instead, Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said
agreement to sell Considering that Section 62 of the Land
Registration Act prescribes the procedure for the registration of
Villanueva's interest less than an estate in fee simple on the
disputed lot and there being no showing of her inability to
produce the owner's duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in
Section 110 of Act 496, which was resorted to by Villanueva, is,
579

therefore, ineffective for the purpose of protecting her right or

interest on the disputed lot.
Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid,
the same did not have the effect of a conveyance of her right or
interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that
may have arisen thereafter in favor of third parties.
ARRAZOLA vs BERNAS (86 SCRA 279)
FACTS:
Elviro Bernas disinherited his adopted daughter Teresita and
when he was 79 years old , he executed a notarized will
instituting his brother and sister as heirs to all his properties
including the lots which he had involuntary transferred to Teresita.
In 1967, Elviro died. On December, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed
with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse
claim. A copy of the will was attached to the adverse claim.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim
on the transfer certificates of title, Teresita filed in the cadastral
and probate proceedings a motion for the cancellation of the
annotation of adverse claim. The motion was predicated on the
grounds that she was not served with prior notice" of the adverse
claim and that there was "no petition for approval or justification"
filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
opposed the motion. The lower court in its order of August 20,
1968 granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the
annotation. The oppositors appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not expected hereditary rights do not constitute
adverse claim.
RULING:
Yes, the contingent, expectant and inchoate hereditary rights
of the children of a living parent do not constitute an adverse
580

claim during his lifetime which could be annotated on the titles

covering the parent's land. That is an illustration of a frivolous or
vexatious adverse claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation
of the adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet
been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A.
Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs
with a "contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two
lots.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of
the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and
protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction
regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the
dispute.
It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim
should not be confused with its validity which should be litigated
in a proper proceeding and that the registration of an invalid
adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-registration of a valid
one
TAEDO VS. COURT APPEALS (322 Phil 84)
FACTS:
Lazaro Taedo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ricardo Taedo and
Teresita Barrera in which he conveyed a parcel of land which he will inherit. Upon
the death of his father he executed an affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said
sale. He also executed another deed of sale in favor of the spouses covering the
parcel of land he already inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed of sale in the
registry of deeds in their favor.
Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children through a
deed of sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Taedo spouses have a better right over the property against the
581

children of Lazaro Taedo

RULING:
Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a subject of a contract, the deed of
sale and the affidavit of conformity made by Lazaro has no effect. The subject of
dispute therefore is the deed of sale made by him in favor of spouses Taedo and
another to his children after he already legally acquired the property.
Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the
one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the
undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered
the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one
who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
property.
ATTY. FERRER VS SPS. DIAZ
GR No. 165300
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint that on May 7, 1999, the
Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA), obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of
Title and a Promissory Note pimary payable within six months or up to November 7,
1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to secure payment of said
loan. Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of
hereditary interest executed by Comandante.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said
respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on
September 29, 1999 a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real
Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante .
582

Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative

relief the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and, second, by impleading as
additional defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by Transfer
of Certificate of Title was already transferred under their names in Transfer of
Certificates of title. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all the
respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum of P1,118,228.00,
exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial foreclosure of the property pursuant to
the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights valid. Whether not the
petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid and effective.
RULING:
Yes. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet been opened since
both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise
present considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly
forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death
and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary
in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a
contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioners favor.
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim should have
been determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioners adverse
claim filed by Comandante It has been held that the validity or efficaciousness of an
adverse claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party,
in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only when such claim is found
unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled.
.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for
being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which
583

was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right
or interest over the property. Petition is denied.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ABABA
88 SCRA 513 (1979)
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the petition for the
cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the adverse
claimant on the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners.
The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was
retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in Civil Case
No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled
"Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a
contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of
the land which was the subject matter thereof. The Court of First
Instance of Cebu rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to
the petitioner and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the
services of his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, liable to
compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal
executed a document on June 10, 1961 whereby he obliged
himself to give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might
recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper.
The real property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No.
R6573 was actually the share of the petitioner in Lots 5600 and
5602, which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and
which were partitioned the heirs which included petitioner
Maximo Abarquez and his elder sister Agripina Abarquez, the
defendant in said civil case.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was
issued on May 19,1965 in the name of Maximo Abarquez, married
to Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600
and 5602 containing an area of 4,085 square meters. These
parcels of land later by the subject matter of the adverse claim
584

filed by the claimant.

The case having been resolved and title having been issued
to petitioner, adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply
with ha obligation under the document executed by him on June
10, 1961 by delivering the one-half () portion of the said parcels
of land. Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and
instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land covered by TCT
No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de
Larrazabal. Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner,
adverse claimant immediately took stops to protect his interest by
filing an affidavit of adverse claim on July 19, 1965 with the
Register of Deeds of Cebu. By virtue of the affidavit, the adverse
claim for one-half () of the lots covered by the June 10, 1961
document was annotated on TCT No. 31841.
Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim,
petitioner-spouse Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia Cabigas
conveyed by deed of absolute sale on July 29, 1965 two-thirds
(2/3) of the lands covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses
Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.
When the new transfer certificate of title No. 32996 was
issued, the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841
necessarily had to appear on the new transfer certificate of title.
This adverse claim on TCT No. 32996 became the subject of
cancellation proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses on
March 7, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, filed his opposition
to the petition for cancellation on March 18, 1966 .The trial court
resolved the issue on March 19, 1966, denying the petition to
cancel adverse claim.
Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal.
Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates
Article 1491 because it involves an assignment of a property
subject of litigation.
ISSUE:
585

Whether or not the registration of the adverse claim of Atty.

Fernandez is valid.
RULING:
Yes. In resolving the issue of the validity or nullity for the
registration of the adverse claim, Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496) should be considered. The contract for
a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty. Fernandez an interest
or right over the lots in question to the extent of one-half thereof.
Said interest became vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was
won on appeal because only then did the assignment of the onehalf () portion of the lots in question became effective and
binding. So that when he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his
interest was already an existing one. There was therefore a valid
interest in the lots to be registered in favor of Atty. Fernandez
adverse to Maximo Abarquez.
Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots
in question arose long after the original petition which took place
many years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land
Registration Act under which the interest or claim may be
registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 thereof.
Consequently, there being a substantial compliance with
Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is
held to be valid.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice
and warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right
than the registered owner thereof.
ARRAZOLA VS BERNAS
86 SCRA 279
FACTS:
586

This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which

was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering
Lots Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total
area of 12,830 square meters.
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas
who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in Iloilo
City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and
instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad
Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371
and 373 which he had allegedly involuntarily transferred to
Teresita.
A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in
Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance
of Capiz a petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his
will.
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the
register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim which
was recorded as a notice of adverse claim in favor of Pedro and
Soledad, all surnamed Bernas. Claiming ownership in the parcels
of land described in T-6881 and T-6882 by virtue of the Last Will.
He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were
conveyed by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas
involuntarily, fictitiously and without consideration and that in
Elviro's will the two lots were devised to him (Pedro) and his sister
Soledad.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim
on TCT Nos. T-6881 and T-6882, Teresita R. Bernas Arrazola filed in
the cadastral and probate proceedings a motion dated August 13,
1968 for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim. The
motion was predicated on the grounds that she was not served
with prior notice of the adverse claim and that there was no
petition for approval or justification thereof filed with the court.
Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion.
The lower court in its order of August 20, 1968 granted it and
587

ordered the register of deeds to cancel the annotation. The

oppositors appealed.
The appellate court decided that the correctness of the lower
court's order is to be passed upon in the light of section 110 of
Act No. 496. Applying section 110, it was held in De los Reyes vs.
De los Reyes, 91 Phil. 528 that a claim based on occurrences prior
to the original registration is not registerable as an adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the adverse claim by the
lower court is correct.
RULING:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the
cancellation of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro
Bernas has not yet been probated but the fact is that there is a
pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the testator
transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the herein
oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the right to secure a
declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371
and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have
become controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the
whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas
Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act
No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their
adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not
given to them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to
an innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the
unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or frustrated.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of
the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and
protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction
regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the
588

dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith,
has some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably
frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the
cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally
determined by the courts that the titles of Teresita Arrazola to the
disputed lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid
of merit.
It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim
should not be confused with its validity which should be litigated
in a proper proceeding and that the registration of an invalid
adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-registration of a valid
one.

ESTELLA VS RD
106 PHIL 911
FACTS:
These are appeals from two decisions of the Land
Registration Commission dated 7 February and 30 April 1957,
upholding the refusal of the Register of Deeds in and for the
province of Rizal to record the claimant's adverse claims under
the provisions of section 110, Act No. 496 .
On 24 December 1956 Pedro Moraga filed in the Office of the Registar of
Deeds in and for the province of Rizal and affidavit of adverse claim subscribed
and sworn to by him, No. 14, Block No. 51-C of the subdivision plan Psd-15136,
situate in barrio Calaan, Municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, containing
an area of 682.5 sq. m. more or less, described in transfer certificate of title No.
47961 issued in the name of John O. Yu, married to Anicate T. Yu, registered on the
registration book in the registry of deeds of Rizal, on the ground that in or about
the year 1945 the Philippine Realty Corporation sold that said parcel of land to a
Chinese citizen disqualified to acquire public agricultural lands or to holds lands of
the public domain in the Philippines; that the contract of sale of the parcel of land
in question to the disqualified alien is null and void and neither the vendor nor the
589

vendee retained or acquired ownership thereof.

He further claimed that he and predecessor-in-interest have been in actual
continuous, public, exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the parcel of land in
question for more than ten years and built two houses thereon; that no one has
claimed from then ownership or possession of the parcel of land in question or
demanded from them payment of rentals for its use and occupation had prescribed;
and that the vendee had in it already has prescribed; and that the registered owner
was aware that the appellant had been in possession of the parcel of land in
question when he brought it from the Philippine Realty Corporation and that the
transaction between the Philippine Realty Corporation and the disqualified alien
was illegal. The appellant requested the Registrar of Deeds to record his adverse
claim pursuant to section 110, Act No. 496.
On 29 December 1956 the Registrar of Deeds refused the request and
submitted the following questions to the Land Registration Commission for
resolution pursuant to section 4, Republic Act No. 1151 on the issue that is the
adverse claim of Pedro Moraga, a mere squatter on the registered private land,
registerable.
On 7 February 1957 the Land Registration Commission rendered a decision
answering in the question in the negative because the parcel of land in question
being registered under Act No. 496, the appellant's claim of prescription and/or
adverse possession is untenable of "No title registered in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."
On 26 February 1957 the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. On 12
March 1957 John O. Yu, the registered owner who had intervened, filed an
opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
On 28 February 1957 Juan Estella, Felicisimo Vargas, Maximo de Lara,
Domingo Samson and Florentina Tabocboc by counsel filed in the Land
Registration Commission a written consulta based upon an affidavit of adverse
claim subscribed and sworn to by them, the first two claiming ownership to onethird; the rest, to one-third; and Pedro Moraga to one-third of the parcel of land in
question, on the same grounds invoked by the latter in his affidavit of adverse
claim filed in the first case. They prayed that the Registrar of Deeds be ordered to
register their respective adverse claims under the provisions of section 110, Act
No. 496.
On 30 April 2957 the Land Registration Commission denied the motion for
590

reconsideration of Pedro Moraga and the petition of the other appellants,

reiterating its decision dated 7 February 1957 in the first case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim of the appellants registerable?
RULING:
Here the appellant's adverse claim of ownership is based upon prescription
and adverse possession, would serve no useful purpose and could not validly and
legally after the parcel of land.
The appellant's claim that as neither the vendor nor the vendee could claim
ownership of it, it reversed to the State as patrimonial property, which they may
acquire by prescription or under the free patent law. Even if their opposition of
reversion to the State be sustained, still their respective adverse claims cannot be
registered. Prescription does not run against the State. 2 Besides, the reversion to
the State of the parcel of land in question did not withdraw it from the operation of
the provisions of Act No. 496. Neither could the fact that their adverse possession
which might entitle them to fact that their under the free patent law constitute a
registerable adverse claim.
MARGARITA F. CASTRO
G.R. No. 183719

VS NAPOLEON A. MONSOD,

FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located
on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Pias City, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36071, with an
area of one hundred thirty (130) square meters (sq.m.).
Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property
adjoining
the
lot
of
petitioner,
located
on Lyra
Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, Las Pias City. There is a
concrete fence, more or less two (2) meters high,
dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.
On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation of
an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of
petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The adverse claim was
filed without any claim of ownership over the property.
591

Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal easement of

lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to
prevent the property from collapsing, since his property is located
at an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the
level of petitioners property. Respondent also filed a complaint
for malicious mischief and malicious destruction before the office
of the barangay chairman.
In defiance, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. Petitioner also
prayed that the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City be ordered to
cancel the annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. T-36071.
Petitioner averred that when she bought the property
from Manuela Homes in 1994, there was no annotation or
existence of any easement over the property. Respondent neither
asked permission nor talked to her with regard to the use of 65
sq.m. of her property as easement. Upon learning of the adverse
claim, she felt disturbed and experienced sleepless nights for fear
that she would not be able to sell her property. Petitioner
admitted that TCT No. 36071 does not cover the open space at
the dead-end portion of Garnet Street.
Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the
annotation of the lateral and subjacent easement of his property over the property
of petitioner, in view of the latters manifest determination to remove the
embankment left by the developer of Manuela Homes.
The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of
respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of his
claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the
registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of petitioner.
Furthermore, the adverse claim of respondent failed to comply
with the requisites provided under Section 70 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.The CA ruled that
while respondents adverse claim could not be sanctioned because it did not fall
under the requisites for registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly
annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal easement of
592

subjacent and lateral support. The purpose of the annotation was to prevent
petitioner from making injurious excavations on the subject embankment as to
deprive the residential house and lot of respondent of its natural support and cause
it to collapse. Respondent only asked that petitioner respect the legal easement
already existing thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support
exists on the subject adjacent properties and, if it does, whether
the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient
estate.
RULING:
Respondents assertion that he has an adverse claim over
the 65 sq.m. property of petitioner is misplaced since he does not
have a claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of an
adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the
disputed land. Annotation is done to apprise third persons that
there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to
preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the
pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that
any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the
outcome of the dispute.
In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial
recognition of the existence of the easement of subjacent and
lateral support over the 65 sq. m. portion of petitioners property
covering the land support/embankment area. His reason for the
annotation is only to prevent petitioner from removing the
embankment or from digging on the property for fear of soil
erosion that might weaken the foundation of the rear portion of
his property which is adjacent to the property of petitioner that
the annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T36071, recognizing the existence of the legal easement of
subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or
horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square
meters, more or less, of the property of petitioner Margarita F.
Castro, is hereby ordered removed.
SPS. JESUS CHING AND LEE POE TIN
593

Versus
SPS. ADOLFO & ARSENIA ENRILE,
G.R. No. 156076
FACTS:
Petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a 370-square
meter lot located at Barrio Tungtong, Las Pias and covered by TCT No.
83618. La Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
with the Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners took
physical possession of the subject property.
For reasons known only to petitioners, the conveyance was not registered in
the Register of Deeds as prescribed by Section 51 of PD 1529.Instead,
on November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which
was recorded and annotated at the back of TCT No. 83618 reflected in the
Memorandum of Encumbrances under Entry No. 86-62262.
In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously possessed the
subject property.
On August 19, 1988 three years after they purchased the disputed
property, petitioners received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of
Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of
respondents, in Civil Case No. 54617 entitled Sps. Adolfo Enrile and Arsenia
Enrile v. Raymunda La Fuente.The Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at
the dorsal portion of TCT No. 83618 under Entry No. 3433-2 while the Writ of
Execution was inscribed under Entry No. 3434-2. Also inscribed in the TCT is the
Certificate of Sale dated January 26, 1989 covering the disputed property in favor
of respondents.
On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet
Title to Real Property asserting ownership of the disputed property.
On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
upholding the latters superior right over the disputed property in view of the
registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of Sale
annotated in favor of respondents
CA rendered the herein challenged decision reversing that of the RTC. Even
as the CA viewed the prior sale of the disputed lot in favor of petitioners as
perfected and consummated, it nonetheless upheld respondents preferential right
over the disputed property.The CA declared that respondents, as attaching creditors
who registered the order of attachment and the sale of the property to them as the
highest bidders, acquired a valid title to the disputed property as against petitioners
who had previously bought the same property from the registered owner but failed
to register their deed of sale.The CA further declared respondents as purchasers in
good faith.
594

ISSUE:
Whether the levy on attachment later annotated shall prevail over the
Adverse Claim earlier annotated at the back of the title by the mere lapse of 30
days and even without any petition in court for its cancellation
RULING:
Court finds that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the
annotated adverse claim had already prescribed by the mere lapse of 30 days from
its registration. The issue is no longer of first impression. In the 1996 case
of Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, we explained that a notice of adverse claim remains
valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided by Section 70 of PD 1529.
We held that for as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the
notice of adverse claim remains subsisting
The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a vendee and
an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who registers the order of attachment
and the sale of the property to him as the highest bidder acquires a valid title to the
property as against a vendee who had previously bought the same property from
the same owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This is because
registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third
persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there is notice to the whole
world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest, as here, which
is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of
that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge
of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration
It is beyond dispute that the property in question had already been sold by
La Fuente to petitioners on September 5, 1985. Petitioners immediately took
possession thereof. When the Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the
dorsal portion of TCT No. 83618 and when the Writ of Execution and Certificate
of Sale were inscribed under Entry No. 3434-2 in favor of respondents, on January
26, 1989, petitioners have been, since September 5, 1985, in actual, physical,
continuous and uninterrupted possession.
Here, petitioners adverse claim is annotated at the back of the title coupled
with the fact that they are in possession of the disputed property. To us, these
circumstances should have put respondents on guard and required them to ascertain
the property being offered to them has already been sold to another to prevent
injury to prior innocent buyers. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact
which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent
purchaser for value.
SAJONAS V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102377 July 5, 1996
595

FACTS:
The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on
Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The
inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate
of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of
the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the
spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are
now
the
petitioners
in
this
case.
The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and
caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of Sale
was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was
registered only on August 1985.
Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise
agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment
creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On
February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same
was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered
only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six
(6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.
ISSUE:
Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the
deed of absolute sale?
RULING:
The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the
interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse claim
is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is
otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the
596

original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for

registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest
is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him.
This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate
of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the
date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim
may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation
of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question
of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof
shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall
find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in
an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his
adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency
between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse
claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity
period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse
claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse
claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its
cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a
useless
ceremony.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without
qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute
597

provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an

adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece
of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than
the registered owner thereof.
Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT
No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.
ARRAZOLA V. BERNAS
G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was annotated
on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T-6882 in the name of Teresita
Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz
cadastre with a total area of 12,830 square meters.
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5,
1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he
disinherited Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister
Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and
373 which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.
A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His
brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a petition dated
September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special Proceeding No. V-2965).
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of
Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse
claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It reasoned out
that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely
presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two
lots.
598

ISSUE:
Is the lower court correct in ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim?
RULING:
No. The lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim.
It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated but the fact is that
there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the testator
transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or
adverse claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole world, to the fact
that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two
lots, section 110 of Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated
their adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them,
then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser for value
and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or frustrated.
(See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952 as to the right of an heir to sue for
the annulment of a conveyance made in fraud of the deceased.)
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land
is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land
and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency
of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the
disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis
and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it
is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it is finally
determined by the courts that the titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed
lots are indefeasible and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.

TY SIN TEI V. DY PIAO

G.R. No. L-11271 May 28, 1958
599

FACTS:
Dy Lac, the testator, purchased houses and a lot located at Zurbaran Street,
Manila, and placed the title thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 58652, in the
name of his maidservant and concubine named Paz Ty Sin Tei in 1940. After the
testator's death in 1948, Paz filed a petition for the probate of his will. Lee Dy Piao
and Uy Cho, the respective legitimate son and widow of Dy Lac acting pursuant to
section 110 of Act No. 496, caused their claim, as heirs of Dy Lac, to be annotated
on the back of TCT No. 58652 pending the determination of their hereditary rights
in the testamentary proceeding.
On March 23, 1955, Paz Ty Sin Tei filed a petition in the land registration
record of TCT No. 58652 for the cancellation of the adverse claim. The Court of
First Instance of Manila cancelled it over Lee Dy Piao's opposition. On appeal, this
Court set aside the order of cancellation and further held that the adverse claim
could subsist concurrently with a subsequent annotation of a notice of lis pendens
which referred to a case filed by Lee Dy Piao, involving the same right or interest
covered by the adverse claim.
In further support of our holding that the lower court erred in ordering the
cancellation of the annotation of the adverse claim, it is also relevant to cite the
holding that where a guardianship proceeding was instituted for an octogenarian
woman, it was proper to annotate on the title of her land the pendency of such a
proceeding by means of a notice of lis pendens for the purpose of alerting anyone
who might wish to buy the land that his purchase might be questioned later on. An
adverse claim and a notice of lis pendens have the same purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a notice of lis pendens would be, unecessary and superflous
where an adverse claim has previously been annotated.
RULING:
There no dispute as to the fact that appellant caused the annotation of an
adverse claim on said property on August 22, 1951, and that without said notation
having been cancelled a notice of lis pendens was also inscribed on the same title
on March 21, 1955, upon the institution by said claimant of a civil action based on
the same ground as his adverse claim. Hence, appelle protested against the
600

existence of 2 notices in her title and sought the cancellation of the adverse claim
on the allegation that one invalidates the other. We find this contention to be
untenable. The registration of an adverse claim is allowed by Section 110 of Act
496, which reads as follows:
SEC.110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to
the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or
interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume
and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description
of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant's residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the
court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as
justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration shall be cancelled. If any case the court after notice and hearing shall
find that a claim thus registered was frivoluos or vexatious, it may tax the adverse
claimant double or treble costs in its discretion.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the
interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such
interest or right is not otherwise provided, for by the Land Registration Act, and
serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered
owner thereof. The aforequoted Section 110 lays down the procedure for the
registration of such notice-by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds
of the province where the property is located, setting for the basis of the claimed
right together with other data pertinent thereto. The validity or efficaciousness of
the claim, however, may only determine by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing
thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it
is ONLY when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration thereof may
be cancelled. In the case at bar, no such petition was filed by appelle who should
be the party interested in having the notation cancelled. Instead, We find that from
August 22, 1951, when the adverse claim was registered, to March 21, 1955, when
601

the notice of lis pendens was annotated, petitioner-appellee took no step in having
the claim inquired into or investigated in order that the question of the validity of
such claim may be resolved.
G.R. No. 35205 April 17, 1990
FACTS:
The appellant registered his affidavit of adverse claim, which
conformed to the requirements of Section 110, Act 496, in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1217 under primary entry No.
26083 of the Register of Deeds.

The appellant filed Civil Case 3496 seeking from the

defendant the surrender of owner's duplicate of TCT T-1217 for
the deed of sale in favor of the appellant be registered or
annotated in the certificate of title. In this case, the defendant's
answer raised the issue of validity of the deed of sale in favor of
the appellant.

More than four years after the appellant's adverse claim was
annotated and while case No. 3496 is (sic) pending, the appellee
presented for registration two deeds of sale affecting the land
subject of the action, the first conveyed 8.6186 hectares and the
second conveyed the remaining 3.0219 hectares and that TCT T1217 was cancelled and TCT T-7601 was issued to the appellee
wherein the adverse claim annotated was carried on.

It is this adverse claim which the appellee seeks to be

cancelled. The lower court first ordered its cancellation, then in an
order the court reconsidered and finally returned to its original
stand. Hence, this appeal.

602

Petitioner-appellee filed a motion to dismiss appeal in the

Court of Appeals on the ground that the issue involved has
become moot and academic, because oppositor-appellant Jose
Juezan filed a notice of lis pendens on the property covered by
T.C.T. No. T-7601 and in connection with Civil Case No. 3496.
ISSUE:
Whether an adverse claim annotated in a transfer certificate
of title may be cancelled when the validity or invalidity of the
claim is still subject of inquiry in a civil case pending resolution by
the trial court.
HELD:
The basis of Civil Case No. 3496 is a deed of absolute sale,
allegedly executed by Simon Maghanay in favor of appellant Jose
Juezan. This document is also the basis of the Affidavit of Adverse
Claim ordered cancelled by the trial court. The purpose of said
adverse claim is to protect the interest of the appellant pending
this litigation.

Thus, considering that a notice of lis pendens had been

annotated on T.C.T. No. T-7601 of petitioner-appellee, the Court
finds no basis for maintaining the adverse claim.

This Court sees no reason for disturbing the questioned

order of the trial court directing the cancellation of the oppositorappellant's adverse claim at the back of TCT No. T-7601. The
notice of lis pendens filed by the oppositor-appellant affecting the
same property in connection with Civil Case No. 3496 is sufficient.

The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit and for being moot
and academic.
603

ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL, INC. and MARCIAL P.

SORIANO v. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF
MAKATI CITY and HILARIO P. SORIANO

G.R. No. 174290

January 20, 2009

FACTS:

Two special civil actions for Certiorari and Prohibition were

consolidated per Resolution. SMWSI is an educational institution
incorporated and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines,
Marcial Soriano being the President.

Hilario Soriano is one of the siblings of petitioner Marcial

Soriano. The cases originated from the Complaint filed by H.
Soriano for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Assignment, Deed of
Sale and Cancellation of 3 TCTs registered in the name of Oro
Development Corporation; and another TCT registered in the
name of SMWSI. Hilario Soriano alleged that during the marriage
of his parents, the couple acquired both real and personal
properties, including the subject properties. Soriano couple
allegedly executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC
involving the subject properties to pay for Tomas Q. Sorianos
subscription of stocks in the said corporation. Tomas Q. Soriano
died intestate.
604

Thereafter, ODC sold the property to SMWSI. Private

respondent discovered that his fathers signature in the Deed of
Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery. A Notice of Lis Pendens
was annotated on the 3 TCTs in the name of ODC which notice
was carried over to the new certificate of title. The RTC dismissed
the private respondents Complaint.

Hilario Soriano moved for reconsideration but RTC denied the

same. The RTC granted the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens. CA granted private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Reannotate Notice of Lis Pendens on the TCTs of the subject
properties.

ISSUE:

Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting

private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis
Pendens

HELD:

No.

605

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the

jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property
involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment.

Lis pendens is intended (1) to keep the properties in

litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree
by subsequent alienation; and (2) to announce to the whole world
that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning
that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at
his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over
said property.

A trial court has the inherent power to cancel a notice of lis

pendens on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose
of molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the
annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.

Considering that the dismissal of the Complaint bearing the

annotations of lis pendens on the 3 properties by the RTC was
appealed to the CA, CA rightly saw the need to give notice to the
public of such fact. The necessity becomes more compelling
considering that SMWSI already entered into transactions with
third parties involving the subject properties.

The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of

public policy and convenience, under the view that once a court
has taken cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to
interfere with the consummation of the judgment by any ad
interim transfer, encumbrance, or change of possession.
606

Now that the case is pending before us on appeal, there is no

certainty as to the outcome of the case. There is a need to warn
the whole world that a particular property is in litigation, serving
as a warning that the one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result
of the litigation over said property.

These consolidated Petitions for

DISMISSED.

Certiorari are

hereby

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MABELLE RAVELO and

SPOUSES EMMANUEL and PERLITA REDONDO

G.R. No. 165114

August 6, 2008

FACTS:

Jose Fernando filed miscellaneous sales application over a lot

and relinquished his right over it to Victoriano Mortera, Jr. Then,
one Severino Muyco also filed a miscellaneous sales application
for the same property.

After investigation, DENR ordered in favor of Fernando and

Mortera.

607

Before the DENR's action, the Director of Lands issued Sales

Patent and Original Certificate of Title covering the same lot to
Mabelle Ravelo. Thus, the DENRs Order was not enforced, to
which Fernando protested.

Petitioner filed complaint for cancellation of title alleging that

sales patent should be filed with the DENR regional office that has
jurisdiction over the land applied for, not with the Director of
Lands in Manila. The government also accused Ravelo of fraud for
asserting in her application that the land was not occupied and
was a part of the public domain.

A notice of lis pendens was inscribed on Ravelo's OCT.

In a separate development, Antonio Chieng obtained a
judgment against Ravelo in a collection suit, which led to the
issuance of a writ of execution. The Notice of Levy was registered
with the Register of Deeds. In the auction sale that followed,
Wilson Chieng, Antonio Chieng's son, won as highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued to Chieng and the sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds.

The respondent-spouses bought the lot from Chieng. The

parties first signed an agreement for the purchase of the subject
lot and upon payment of the agreed purchase price, executed a
deed of absolute sale.

The final deed of sale covering the subject lot in favor of

Chieng was inscribed. On the same date, TCT covering the subject
lot was issued to Chieng. The petitioner's complaint for
cancellation and reversion was carried at the back of Chieng's
TCT.
608

Chieng and Redondos entered into another deed of sale in

the Redondos' favor inscribed at the back of TCT and issued to
Redondos.

The RTC cancelled Ravelo's Sales Patent and OCT, Chieng's

TCT, and the Redondos' TCT and ordered the reversion of the land
to the mass of the public domain.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
ruling and declared the Redondos as innocent purchasers in good
faith.

ISSUE:

Whether the Redondos are innocent purchasers in good faith

and for value, whose title over the subject lot that could defeat
the petitioner's cause of action for cancellation of title and
reversion.

HELD:

No. The CA erred in concluding that the Redondos were

buyers in good faith. They purchased the subject lot from Chieng
subject to the government's notice of lis pendens; hence, their
purchase was at the risk of the outcome of the State's complaint
for cancellation and reversion which we find to be meritorious.
The subject lot must therefore revert back to the public domain.

609

Lis pendens literally means "a pending suit," while a notice

of lis pendens, inscribed in the certificate of title, is an
announcement to the whole world that the covered property is in
litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires interest in
the property does so at his own risk and subject to the results of
the litigation. The notice that this provision speaks of - the notice
of lis pendens - is not a lien or encumbrance on the property, but
simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those dealing with the
property that it is under litigation.

The government's notice of lis pendens came after the

execution sale and thus cannot affect Chieng and the conveyance
to him of the subject lot. However, the sale by Chieng to the
Redondos of the subject lot was subject to the notice of lis
pendens duly annotated on Chieng's title.

iii. A notice of lispendens is ordinarily recorded

without the intervention of the court; may be ordered
cancelled any time.
HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN VS IAC
152 SCRA 253
FACTS:
In 1975, Marron filed a case against the spouses Bazaar,
praying for the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a lot in his
favor. Notably, while the case is still pending in 1976, Marron
caused the annotation of notice of lis pendens at the back of the
TCT. Judgement was thereafter rendered in favor of Marron,
ordering spouses Bazaar to execute Deed of Absolute Sale.

610

Notwithstanding the writ of execution, the spouses Bazar

refused to execute the Deed. The clerk of court was then ordered
to execute the deed in behalf of the spouses.
When the said deed was presented to the Register of Deeds
for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a
court order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein
petitioner Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.
It appears that in 1974, a Deed of Absolute Sale involving
the subject property was executed by spouses Bazaar in favor of
Marasigan. It was, however, only in 1977 that such Deed was
registered with the Registry of Deeds. When the new title was
issued in the name of Marasigan, the notice of lis pendens
effected by Marron was carried over.
In 1979, Marasigan filed a case for the registration of the
Deed of Absolute Sale issued by the Clerk of Court in his favor
with the Registry of Deeds. He also prayed for the cancellation of
the Deed issued in favor of Marasigan.
The trial court dismissed the complaint but the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Marron. Aggrieved, Marasigan filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in ruling that herein respondent
has a better right?
RULING:
Yes.
There is a clear showing that although the late Marasigan
acquired the property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a
deed of absolute sale on 1974, the transaction became effective
as against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of
registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world.
611

The filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with

a notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and,
therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is
subject to the eventuality of the suit.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public
policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the
judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by
successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or
decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution.

MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. CA

184 SCRA 325 (1990)
FACTS:
Magdalena Estate Inc. owns a subdivision known as
Magdalena Rolling Hills. The disputed property in the case at bar
is a lot within the subdivision initially set as an open space and
therefore could not be sold, disposed or encumbered.
Thereafter, the subdivision plan was amended with the
approval of the City Council and the Court of First Instance. The
open space was made open for public disposition and was
surveyed into several lots. A part of the lot was then donated to
the city government and part was conveyed to the Developmental
Bank of the Philippines by way of dacion en pago.
Herein petitioners then filed an action against Magdalena
Estate Inc. for the recovery of the open space for their use as
residents of the subdivision. At the instance of the petitioners, a

612

notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title of the lot

conveyed to DBP.
The trial court rendered judgment not favorable to the
petitioners. Hence, an appeal with the CA was perfected. Pending
judgment, DBP and MEI filed motions for the cancellation of notice
of lis pendens. The motions were subsequently granted.
Contending that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion
in granting the motions filed by DBP and MEI, the petitioners
brought herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA has power to remove the notice of lis
pendens?
RULING:
Yes.
The notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice
is but an incident in an action, an extra judicial one, to be sure. It
does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the
property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever
rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well
be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally
determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it
at any given time. And its continuance or removal like the
continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction
is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the
action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

613

BIGLANGAWA V. CONSTANTINO
109 Phil 168
FACTS:
Biglangawa and Espiritu were co-owners of a parcel of land.
Constantino was appointed as their agent who is to develop the
area and sell them to prospective homeowners. In 1951,
Constantino was able to dispose off more than half of the lots.
However, Biglangawa and Espiritu failed to give him sufficient
compensation as agreed upon.
Later, Biglangawa and Espiritu terminated the agency
contract with Constantino. They, however, acknowledged their
liability to Constantino and promised him that they will pay the
unpaid commissions. Payments were made but the entire amount
was not given. A case for the collection of the unpaid sum was
then filed by Constantino.
Pending the resolution of the case, Constantino filed for the
annotation of notice of lis pendens with the Registry of Deeds.
Biglangawa and Espiritu refused, however, to surrender the
owners copy of transfer certificate. Upon sale of the lot to Santos,
the notice of lis pendens was annotated in the TCT. Hence,
Biglangawa and Espiritu filed for the cancellation of the annotated
notice of lis pendens.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of
Biglangawa and Espiritu. Constantino then filed with this court.
ISSUE:
Whether the annotation was proper.
RULING:
No.

614

Appellant's amended complaint, not being "an action

affecting the title or the right of possession of real property", nor
one "to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto,
or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other
proceeding of any kind in court affecting the title to real estate or
the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon . . .", the
same cannot be the basis for annotating a notice of lis pendens
on the title of the petitioners-appellees.
ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL, INC. and MARCIAL P. SORIANO
vs. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY and
HILARIO P. SORIANO
G.R. No. 174290
FACTS:
Private respondent claimed that several years after his father Tomas Q.
Sorianos death, he discovered that the latters signature in the Deed of Assignment
of 10 May 1988 in favor of ODC was a forgery. Being very familiar with his
fathers signature, private respondent compared Tomas Q. Sorianos purported
signature in the Deed of Assignment of 10 May 1988 with Tomas Q. Sorianos
genuine signature in another document captioned Second Amendment of Credit
Agreement. RTC dismissed the complaint files by the private respondent.
On 16 May 2005, petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion to Cancel
Notice of Lis Pendens[31] annotated on the titles covering the subject properties,
which Motion was opposed by the private respondent.
As mentioned in the case, the notice of lis pendens can be cancelled if it is
not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Private respondent Hilario P. Soriano has no interest to be protected insofar as the
subject properties are concerned because of his acknowledgment that he already
received his share in the estate of Tomas Soriano.
On 14 March 2006, private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a
Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis Pendens on the TCTs of the subject
properties given that there was yet no final judgment of dismissal of his Complaint,
as its dismissal had been duly appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not lispendens be cancelled
HELD:
The inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, under the express
provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2)
615

when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it
to be recorded.
The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of public policy and
convenience, under the view that once a court has taken cognizance of a
controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with the consummation of the
judgment by any ad interim transfer, encumbrance, or change of possession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, these consolidated Petitions for
Certiorari are hereby DISMISSED.
NORMA S. TIRADO vs.
LILIA SEVILLA, THOMAS S. ONG, CELSO UY and COURTS OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma S. Tirado (hereafter Mrs. Tirado) acquired ownership of a
parcel of land under a Deed of Assignment executed by her father Jose Dimzon on
October 12, 1967. The deed assigned 73,000 sq. m. of Dimzon's land consisting of
361,558 sq. m.Tirado subsequently sought the assistance of respondent Lilia
Sevilla to have her land titled, including that of her father.
Keenly interested in having her land titled, Mrs. Tirado agreed to execute
another deed of sale whereby she would sell 15,000 sq. m. (or 1.5 has.) to Mrs.
Sevilla who, in turn, would deliver three (3) fishing boats worth P150,000.00 and
advance initial expenses for the titling of the land. The first deed of sale would be
deemed cancelled. The second document of sale was finalized on December 23,
1975.
Despite the lapse of several months, and repeated demands, Mrs. Sevilla
failed to institute any proceedings nor to advance any money for the titling of Mrs.
Tirado's land. Instead, without Mrs. Tirado's consent and knowledge, she filed a
petition in her name (Civil Case 1755, CFI, Br. XXXII Kalookan City) for the
issuance of title over the entire area of Lot B-2, Psd-4350 (Dimzon's land) which
includes Mrs. Tirado's 73,000 sq. m.
On November 8, 1977, Mrs. Sevilla sold 4/5 portion of TCT No. C-10299 to
Thomas Ong and, on November 15, 1977, 1/5 portion thereof to Celso Uy (p. 77,
Rollo). On February 14, 1978, TCT No. C-12456 was issued to Ong and Uy.
RTCs judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent
Lilia Sevilla, ordering the questioned decision partly nullified and transfer
certificate of title No. 4128 issued therefrom is hereby amended to exclude the
616

claim of herein petitioner to the extent of 73,000 square meters.

On appeal by Mrs. Sevilla, Ong and Uy, the Court of Appeals modified the
decision by declaring Ong and Uy purchasers in good faith and for value, in effect
depriving Mrs. Tirado of that portion of land to the extent covered by TCT No.
12456.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong and Uy were notified of filing notice of lis pendens.
RULING:
The purpose of filing notice of lis pendens is to charge strangers with notice
of the particular litigation referred to in the notice; and if the notice is effective, a
third person who acquires the property affected by the lis pendens takes same
subject to the eventuality of the litigation. But when the adverse right fails in such
litigation, the lis pendens loses its efficacy.
At the time appellants Ong and Uy purchased the realty in question (TCT
No. C-10299), they were well aware that it was involved in a litigation because of
a notice of lis pendens filed by the counsel of Roqueta Rodriguez on July 28, 1977.
However, they (Ong and Uy) took a calculated risk and brought (sic) it just the
same from Lilia Sevilla, hoping all the while mayhap, that a decision would be
rendered favorable to their predecessor-in-interest, Lilia Sevilla in Civil Case No.
C-1836.

DORONILA vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. L-42956-57 January 12, 1988
FACTS:
Blue Chips Projects, Inc. a Corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, is the registered owner
of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Paths, Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal and covered by TCT Certificate of Title
No. 344936 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. Blue Chips Projects,
Inc. purchased said property from Purita Landicho the lawful
registered owner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167681.
On December 11, 1972, petitioner-appellant A. Doronila Resources
Development Inc. availed of the remedy of lis pendens in Civil
Case No. 12044 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the same
617

having been annotated on Transfer Certificate Title No. 344936 in

the name of Blue Chips Projects, Inc. On August 8, 1973,
petitioner thru its President Alfonso Doronila, filed an affidavit of
adverse claim for registration on Transfer Certificate of title No.
344936 with the Register of deeds of Rizal on the ground that the
property covered by the aforesaid title registered in the name of
Blue Chips Projects Inc. is a portion of a big parcel of land which
was purchased by petitioner corporation from Alfonso Doronila.
Respondent-appellee, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied the
registration of the affidavit of the aforementioned adverse claim
on the ground that a notice of lis pendens remain registered on
the certificate of title involved should be a bar to the registration
of an affidavit of adverse claim. Considering that the rights and
interests of the petitioner are already amply protected thereby
without imposing a further burden on the registered owner by the
registration of an affidavit of adverse claim which would be
serving the same purpose. After all an affidavit of adverse claim
does not add anything to the validity of one's claim nor does it
create a non-existent right. Petitioner elevated the matter en
consulta to the Land Registration Commission. On November 6,
1973, the Land Registration Commission issued its Resolution
holding that the affidavit of adverse claim be denied registration.
On November 5,1973,Transfer Certificate of Title No.344936
registered in the name of Blue Chips Projects, Inc. was cancelled
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 425582 was issued in favor of
the purchaser Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. with an annotation at
the back thereof that the property therein described is subject to
the Resolution of LRC Consult No. 887. Petitioner A. Doronila
Resources Dev. Inc. again sought the registration of an affidavit of
adverse claim Identical to that which was the subject of LRC
Consult No. 887 on TCT No. 425582 registered in the name of
Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. Respondent-appellee Register of Deed
elevated the records to the Land Registration Commission for
resolution under Sec. 4 of RA No. 115. The Land Registration
Commission rendered on January 8, 1974, a resolution in L.R.C.
Consult No. 894 main its oponion L.R.C. Consult No. 887 and
ruling against registrability of the affidavit of adverse claim.

618

Not satisfied with the above resolution, petitioner-appealed

to this Honorable Court.
On March 12, 1974, appellant filed before this Honorable
Court a petition for Consolidated of Case SP-02569 and Case SP02711which was granted by this Honorable Court on March 19,
1974.
On 26 November 1975, the respondent Court of Appeals, as
earlier stated, rendered a decision, affirming the resolutions of the
Land Registration Commission in LRC Consults Nos. 887 and 894.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at
the back of a certificate of title precludes the subsequent
registration on the same or successor certificate of title of an
adverse claim.
RULING:
The Land Registration Commission, in its resolutions in
the Consultas, abovementioned, declared, and the respondent
appellate court affirmed, that since the petitioner had already
availed of the remedy of lis pendens, and that the rights and
interests of adverse claimant are already amply protected by the
registration of such notice of lis pendens, "it does not seem fair to
have a title saddled by two encumbrances arising from one and
the same source, and serving one and the same purpose."
This Court, however, has ruled differently, i.e., that the two
remedies, notice of lis pendens and adverse claim, are not
contradictory or repugnant to one another; nor does the existence
of one automatically nullify the other, and if any of the
registrations should be considered unnecessary or superfluous, it
would be the notice of lis pendens, and not the annotation of an
adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled
without adequate hearing and proper disposition of the claim
involved. The Court said:
But We have to give certain consideration to the implication
created by the lower court's ruling that the institution of a court
619

action for the purpose of securing or preserving the light which is

also the object of an adverse claim invalidates the latter,
irrespective of whether a notice of lis pendens has been
annotated or not, for such a doctrine gives the impression that
the 2 remedies are contradictory or repugnant to one another, the
existence of one automatically nullifying the other. We are
inclined to believe otherwise, for while both registrations have
their own characteristics and requisites, it cannot be denied that
they are both intended to protect the interest of a claimant by
posing as notices and caution to those said with the property that
same is subject to a claim. But while a notice of lis
pendens remains during the pendency of the action, although
same may be cancelled under certain circumstances all where the
case is prolonged unecessarily or for failure of the plaintiff to
introduce evidence bearing out the allegations of the complaint ;
and it has even been held that a court, in the of absence in the
absence statute,has the inherent power to cancel a lis
pendens notice in a proper case, the same is not true in a
registered adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only in one
instance, i.e., after the claim is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious
by the Court, acting either as a land registration court or one of
general jurisdiction while passing upon a case before it where the
subject of the litigation is the same interest or right which is being
secured by the adverse claim. The possibility therefore, that
parties claiming an interest in a registered property desire, for
any other purpose, to have their cause ventilated in a court of
general jurisdiction may result in giving them two ways of making
the registration of their claimed rights. In such instances, it would
not only be unreasonable but also oppressive to hold that the
subsequent institution of an ordinary civil action would work to
divest the adverse claim of its validity, for as we have pointed
out, a notice of lis pendens maybe cancelled even before the
action is finally terminated for causes which may not be
attributable to the claimant. And it would similarly be beyond
reason to confine a claimant to the remedy afforded by Section
110 of Act 496 if there are other recourses in law which such
claimant may avail of. But, if any of the registrations should be
considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the notice
of lis pendens and not the annotation of the adverse claim which
620

is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate

hearing and proper disposition of the claim.
Besides, it cannot really be said that the rights and interests of the petitioner over
the land in question are amply protected by the annotation at the back of TCT
425582 issued in the name of Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc., that "the property
therein described is subject to the resolution of LRC Consults No. 887." The
statement that the property described is subject to the resolution of a consulta,
unlike a statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as a notice and warning to third
persons dealing with the property that someone is claiming an interest in the same
or a better title than that of the registered owner thereof. A consulta, as is generally
understood, is but the reference of a question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration by a Register of Deeds when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be
taken when a deed or instrument is presented to him for registration
LOPEZ/ NORDEC v Esquivel
GR No. 170621 April 24, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioners in G.R. No. 168734, namely, Marcelino, Felisa,
Leonardo and Zoilo, all surnamed Lopez (Lopez siblings), seek to
reverse and set aside the assailed Decision of the appellate court
affirming in toto the Decision RTC, which (1) ordered the Lopez
siblings to vacate and to convey to Jose Esquivel, Jr. (Esquivel)
and Carlito Talens (Talens) a parcel of land, measuring 2.6950
hectares, situated in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal (subject
property); and (2) directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
Metropolitan Manila, to divest the Lopez siblings of their title over
the subject property and to issue title over the same property in
the names of Esquivel and Talens. In its assailed Resolution, the
appellate court denied for lack of merit the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Lopez siblings.
On the other hand, Noel Rubber and Development Corporation
(Nordec Phil.) and Dr. Potenciano Malvar (Dr. Malvar), the
petitioners in G.R. No. 170621, pray for the setting aside of the
Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November 2005of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428 where it dismissed for
621

prematurity the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by

Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar under Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the RTC Decision dated 11
January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, as they were not
impleaded in said case, neither as indispensable nor necessary
parties. The appellate court, in its other questioned Resolution
dated16 November 2005, denied the Motion for Amendment
and/or Reconsideration of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.
G.R. No. 168734
FACTS:
Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez
siblings. During Hermogenes lifetime, he applied with the Bureau
of Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land. The Bureau
of Lands approved Hermogenes application. The patent was
subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for
transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of
titlein Hermogenes name. Unaware that he had already been
awarded a homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land,
Hermogenes sold the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property,
with an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in
survey plan H-138612 of Hermogenes property. The subject
property supposedly formed part of the land owned by Lauro
Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of Hermogenes. Resultantly,
on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim over
his rights and interests to the subject property in Hizons
favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and
Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land. Hermogenes died. The Lopez siblings, as Hermogenes
heirs, filed an action with the RTC for the cancellation of the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959, executed between
Hermogenes and Aguilar, and which involved the entire 19.4888hectare land.
ISSUE:
622

Whether the petition is meritorious

RULING:
The instant Petition is meritorious.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land
Act, as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen
of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family,
and who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the
country. To be qualified, the applicant must show that he has
resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality
where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least onefifth of the land applied for.
In this case, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes
application for homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land
after finding him qualified for the same. In contrast, the only
evidence supporting Hizons claim to the subject property was the
Quitclaim. There is no other proof that Hizon possessed,
cultivated, and introduced improvements on the subject
property. Neither is there any showing that after the execution of
the Quitclaim, Hizon himself applied for a homestead patent over
the subject property. In fact, it is undisputed that the subject
property has always been in the possession of Hermogenes, then
the Lopez Siblings. Hizon and Esquivel and Talens never came
into the possession of the subject property even after the
execution of the supposed deeds of conveyances in their favor.
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been
held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is
the rule that a homestead applicant must personally comply with
the legal requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead
applicant himself must possess the necessary qualifications,
cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It would be a
circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply

623

in behalf of another, as the latter may be disqualified or might

not comply with the residency and cultivation requirements.
In the end, the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965 could not have
validly conveyed or transferred ownership of the subject property
from Hermogenes to Hizon. It is null and void for being contrary
to the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. As a result,
Hizon acquired no right over the subject property which he could
have sold to Esquivel and Talens; and the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in
favor of Esquivel and Talens, is similarly void for lack of an object.
Even granting arguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and
transferred ownership of the subject property from Hermogenes
to Hizon, the latter and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and
Talens, are now barred by the statute of limitations and laches
from asserting their rights to the subject property, after failing to
exercise the same for an unreasonable length of time.
In the instant case, when Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC
their application for registration of the subject property on 5
March 1993, 28 years had passed since the execution by
Hermogenes of the Quitclaim covering the subject property in
favor of Hizon on 29 November 1965; and 25 years elapsed from
the execution by Hizon of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject
property in favor of Esquivel and Talens on 26 August
1968. During these periods, without providing any reasons
therefor, neither Hizon nor Esquivel and Talens took possession of
the subject property or exercised in any other way their rights
over the same.
Finally, concerning this Petition, is the issue of whether the Lopez
siblings are estopped from questioning the validity of the
Quitclaim, as ruled by the Court of Appeals? It bears to point out
that the question of estoppel is relevant only if the Lopez siblings
are challenging the validity of the Quitclaim on the ground that
when Hermogenes executed the same, he had already previously
sold his 19.4888-hectare land, which included the subject
property, to Aguilar. In recollection, the Lopez siblings
624

successfully had the said sale of the land by Hermogenes to

Aguilar nullified. Since the Court herein refuses to give effect to
the Quitclaim in question on other grounds already discussed
above, the issue of estoppel actually loses relevance and need
not be resolved anymore.
Considering the pronouncements of this Court that the Quitclaim
covering the subject property executed by Hermogenes in favor of
Hizon is null and void for being contrary to the provisions of the
Public Land Act, as amended, on homestead grants; and that the
Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property executed by Hizon
in favor of Esquivel and Talens is null and void for lack of a proper
object, then Esquivel and Talens have no basis to ask for the
reconveyance of the subject property. Hizon never owned the
subject property and could never have sold the same to Esquivel
and Talens.
G.R. No. 170621
FACTS:
In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193,
the RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject
property to Esquivel and Talens. The subject property, however,
was already supposedly sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and
Dr. Malvar. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for
Annulment of Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-ininterest of Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels
of land situated at Overlooking, Sumulong Highway, Barangay
Sta. Cruz. Among these parcels of land were Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and
8, covered by TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997 of the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina City, with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares,
and which constituted the subject property. Beginning 20 April
1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased the aforementioned lots from the Lopez siblings and their assigns, namely,
Atty. Angeles and Rogelio Amurao (Amurao), as evidenced by
several Deeds of Absolute Sale and Deeds of Conditional
Sale. Immediately after making such purchases, Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar introduced large scale improvements on the
625

subject property, among which were several

establishments with a cost of no less than P50,000,000.

business

In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No.
96-4130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74,
entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was
Atty. Angeles who represented and protected the interest of
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in said case by filing a Motion to
Dismiss. In Cabuay, Jr., wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings
were named the respondents in the Petition Seeking for
Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of the Two (2)
Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of this Court
involving the subject property, it was also Atty. Angeles who
appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar.
Sometime after 2 August 2004, Atty. Angeles again informed
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was another case filed
against the Lopez siblings involving the subject property. Atty.
Angeles, however, belittled this most recent case involving the
subject property, and even showed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
the Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August 2004, which he filed
in CA-G.R. CV No. 70200, together with the Brief for the Lopez
siblings. Yet, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar conducted their own
inquiry, and were surprised to discover that the Decision rendered
by the RTC on 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was
actually adverse to their rights and interest; and despite this, they
were neither impleaded nor represented therein. Even Atty.
Angeles, the supposed counsel for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar,
did not lift a finger to protect their rights in said case.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for
Annulment of Judgment for being premature since the judgment
sought to be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet
final and executory.
RULING:
626

The Court answers in the negative.

The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available
only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is
rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a
party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot
make use of a petition for relief from judgment. Indubitably,
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot avail themselves of the
aforesaid ordinary remedies of motion for new trial, petition for
relief from judgment, or appeal, because they were not parties to
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which the RTC
Decision dated 11 January 2001 sought to be annulled was
rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar also cannot seek the
annulment of the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 96-4193.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the
final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a
renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic
fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it
is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he
would be adversely affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies
only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial
or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration
when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of
627

the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in

court.
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so
that there will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought
to be annulled, like in this case, is still on appeal or under review
by a higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be
no renewal of litigation because the litigation is actually still open
and on-going. In this light, the arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be final and
executory for it to be annulled must fail.
This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court
of Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given
that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 964193 was still pending appeal before this Court, the Court of
Appeals could not take cognizance of the Petition for annulment
of the same judgment, for if it had done so, then it would risk
promulgating a ruling which could be contrary to and inconsistent
with the ruling of this Court on the appeal of the judgment.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. VIRAY
G.R. No. 162218. February 25, 2010
FACTS:
Rico Shipping, Inc., together with respondent Viray, obtained 3 separate loans from
petitioner MBTC. The three loans were obtained on July 1979, June 1981 and
September 1981, or several years before the free patents were issued to the
respondent on December 1982.
However, on the due date, the debtors failed to pay the loan despite demands to pay
by MBTC. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against the debtors. On
April 1983, the RTC rendered a judgment in favor of MBTC.
Meanwhile, on December 1982, the government issued Free Patents in favor of
Viray over three parcels of land.
On March 1984, the RTC issued a writ of execution over the lots owned by Viray,
628

whereby, the lots sold at public auction in favor of MBTC as the winning
bidder. Thus, the Certificate of Sale issued to MBTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the auction sale falls within the 5-year prohibition period laid down in
Section 118 of CA 141.
RULING:
The law clearly provides that lands which have been acquired under free patent or
homestead shall not be encumbered or alienated within 5 years from the date of
issuance of the patent or be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior
to the expiration of the period.
For a period of five years or from 29 December 1982 up to 28 December 1987,
Section 118 of CA 141 provides that the lots comprising the free patents shall not
be made liable for the payment of any debt until the period of five years
expires. In this case, the execution sale of the lots occurred less than two years
after the date of the issuance of the patents. This clearly falls within the five-year
prohibition period provided in the law, regardless of the dates when the loans were
incurred.
It must be emphasized that the main purpose in the grant of a free patent or
homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of
public land which the State has given to him so he may have a place to live with
his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of the society.

c. Filing, processing & issuance of free patent constitutes the administrative

mode of confirming an imperfect title; judicial mode is under Sec. 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act
KAYABAN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-33307 August 30, 1973
FACTS:
The lands covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente
629

Kayaban and his co-heirs from their father and common

predecessor-in-interest, Gabriel Kayaban, whose last will was
admitted to probate. After the properties were partitioned,
Vicente Kayaban acquired the shares of his co-heirs by purchase
and afterwards he and his wife applied for and obtained the two
free patent titles in question.
The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to
be the rightful and exclusive owners of the properties covered by
the said titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they
be reverted to the State, but nevertheless declared the titles null
and void on the ground that since the owners had acquired the
properties partly by inheritance from their father and the rest by
purchase from their co-heirs, and their father had been in
possession thereof for many years before them, the lands were no
longer public and hence not subject to disposition by the
government under the Public Land Act. The procedure that should
have been followed, said the court, was judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title and not administrative legalization thereof through
patent application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedure that must be followed judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title.

RULING:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved
the applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance
of the corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the
action for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at
least with his prior authority and consent.
Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through
630

judicial or administrative legalization of imperfect or incomplete

title is of no practical importance. The certificates of title in either
case is the same, namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act
No. 496, which, except for some restrictions as to alienability
within entitled to all the protection afforded by the Torrens System
of registration.
MARTINEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 170409 January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner, whose real name as appearing in her birth certificate is
Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and
as thus one of the descendants of Celedonia, and under that
name applied for free patents over the properties. Unknown to
private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in
the name of Gregoria Martinez.
The evidence shows that the appellant committed fraud and
misrepresentation in her application for free patent which later
became the basis for the issuance of the certificates of title in her
name. More than the issue of the use of the surname Martinez,
her fraudulent act consists essentially in misrepresenting before
the CENRO that she is the heir of Celedonia Martinez whom she
admitted in her Answer as the original absolute owner of the
subject parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due
to fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement.
RULING:
A cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title
would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to
the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendants
fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of
title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises
strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the
631

jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of

title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is
not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the
parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.
A certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent procured thru fraud or in
violation of the law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with
indefeasibility.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS. EDGARDO VIRAY
G.R. No. 162218
FACTS:
On 7 July 1979, Rico Shipping, Inc., represented by its President,
Erlinda Viray-Jarque, together with respondent Edgardo D. Viray
(Viray), in their own personal capacity and as solidary obligors,
obtained two separate loans from petitioner Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company (MBTC). The debtors failed and refused to pay
on due date. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against
the debtors with the RTC of Manila, Branch 4. On 28 April 1983,
the RTC of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of
MBTC. Meanwhile, on 29 December 1982, the government issued
Free Patents in favor of Viray over three parcels of land, all
situated in Barangay Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis
Oriental. On 6 March 1984, the RTC of Manila issued a writ of
execution over the lots owned by Viray. On 12 October 1984,
pursuant to the writ of execution, the City Sheriff of Cagayan de
Oro sold the lots at public auction in favor of MBTC as the winning
bidder. On 30 July 1991, Viray filed an action for annulment of
sale against the sheriff and MBTC with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro
City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 23. Viray sought the declaration of
nullity of the execution sale, the sheriffs certificate of sale, the
sheriffs deed of final conveyance and the TCT's issued by the
Register of Deeds. The RTC of Cagayan de Oro City rendered its
decision in favor of MBTC. Viray filed an appeal with the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the auction sale falls within the five-year prohibition period laid down in
Section 118 of CA 141.
HELD:

632

The petition lacks merit. Petitioner MBTC insists that the fiveyear prohibition period against the alienation or sale of the
property provided in Section 118 of CA 141 does not apply to an
obligation contracted before the grant or issuance of the free
patent or homestead. The alienation or sale stated in the law
pertains to voluntary sales and not to forced or execution
sale.Respondent Viray, on the other hand, maintains that the
express prohibition in Section 118 of CA 141 does not qualify or
distinguish whether the debt was contracted prior to the date of
the issuance of the free patent or within five years following the
date of such issuance. Further, respondent asserts that Section
118 of CA 141 absolutely prohibits any and all sales, whether
voluntary or not, of lands acquired under free patent or
homestead, made within the five-year prohibition period. The law
clearly provides that lands which have been acquired under free
patent or homestead shall not be encumbered or alienated within
five years from the date of issuance of the patent or be liable for
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
the period.
In the present case, the three loans were obtained on separate
dates 7 July 1979, 5 June 1981 and 3 September 1981, or
several years before the free patents on the lots were issued by
the government to respondent on 29 December 1982. For a
period of five years or from 29 December 1982 up to 28
December 1987, Section 118 of CA 141 provides that the lots
comprising the free patents shall not be made liable for the
payment of any debt until the period of five years expires. In this
case, the execution sale of the lots occurred less than two years
after the date of the issuance of the patents. This clearly falls
within the five-year prohibition period provided in the law,
regardless of the dates when the loans were incurred.
It must be emphasized that the main purpose in the grant of a free patent or
homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of
public land which the State has given to him so he may have a place to live with
his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of the society.

633

ROBERTO AGURA, et al. vs. FEDERICO SERFINO, SR.,

FEDERICO SERFINO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. L-50685 December 4, 1991
FACTS:
On 10 December 1965, private respondent Federico Serfino, Sr.,
filed with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous Sales Application
(MSA) No. (V-3)2 over a 4,172 square meter parcel of land located
at San Patricia Bacolod City. On 18 February 1966, his son,
respondent Serfino, Jr., filed MSA No. (V-3)1 over an adjoining lot
with an area of 1,358 square meters.
On 11 March 1968, District Land Officer Pedro C. Reyes ordered
an investigation of an alleged conflict between Serfino, Sr.'s MSA
No. (V3)2 and that of an unnumbered Revocable Permit
Application (VRAP) of a certain Primitive Donozo. On 2 April 1968,
another investigation of an alleged conflict between Serfino, Jr.'s
MSA No. (V-3)1 and the RPAs of petitioners Agura, Alib, and Sta.
Rita and a certain Domingo Natividad was ordered.
Meanwhile, petitioners Agura, Alib, Sta. Rita and 106 others sent
to the President of the Philippines a petition dated 22 August
1969 requesting that the small parcels of land located in the
areas covered by private respondents' MSAs which they have
been occupying for thirty (30) years be awarded to them.
On 7 January 1970, the City Court of Bacolod rendered decision in
Civil Case No. 6533 ordering the ejectment of the defendants
therein from the lots in question for "failure to pay rentals." On 22
August 1970, Civil Cases Nos. 6534 and 6674 were dismissed on
the ground that "the question of who has a better right to the
areas claimed by the parties will be determined by the Bureau of
Lands who has charge of the disposal of public lands."
On 10 February 1971, Land Investigator Villamarzo submitted a
report recommending that the petitioners herein be given
"preferential right" over the portions occupied by them.
On 7 August 1971, private respondents moved for a
reconsideration alleging that they were not given the opportunity
634

to introduce evidence in their behalf.

On appeal by herein private respondents, the Secretary of Natural
Resources held that the Order of the Director of Lands dated July
6, 1971be SET ASIDE, and the appellees are hereby ordered to
vacate the two lots in question within thirty (30) days from receipt
of their copies of the decision hereof and leave the appellants in
peaceful possession of the same.
On appeal by herein petitioners, the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs on 20 September 1977 affirmed in toto the decision
of Secretary of Natural Resources.
In affirming the Secretary's decision, the Office of the President
held as without merit the contentions of petitioners that the land
in question is foreshore and cannot therefore be disposed of by
sale but only by lease pursuant to Section 61, in relation to
Section 59 of the Public Land Act, and that if at all it could be
disposed of by sale, purchasers are limited to 1,000 square
meters pursuant to R.A. No. 730. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the above decision having been denied, they
filed with the respondent trial court a special civil action for
certiorari and asked for the nullification of the decisions of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs and the Secretary of
Natural Resources. On 30 April 1979, the trial court affirmed the
questioned decisions and dismissed the petition. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale to the respondents Serfinos at public auction of
more than 1,000 square meters of residential public land violated
the provisions of R.A. No. 730 and is therefore void.
HELD:
Petition is devoid of merit. We agree with the ruling of the
respondent court that R.A. No. 730 does not repeal or amend
Sections 61 and 67 of C.A. No. 141; it merely establishes an
exception to said sections.
635

R.A. No. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to

the general rule that it should be by bidding, if the area applied
for does not exceed 1,000 square meters, and that the applicant
has in his favor the conditions specified for in Section 1 thereof.
Hence, if the area applied for is in excess of 1,000 square meters,
as in the instant case, the sale must be done only through
bidding.
HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCO vs. HEIRS OF JOSE and
VICTORIA ALIWALAS and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77541 November 29, 1988
FACTS:
Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was originally a part of the
public domain and it was so declared on October 12, 1933.
Thereafter, Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for
the issuance of a homestead patent covering this lot. On
December 12, 1936, the Director of Lands granted this application
and issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588.
OCT No. 159 was issued in the name of Jose Aliwalas. As owner of
this property, Jose Aliwalas, thru his overseer Espiridion Manaul,
had this parcel fenced and vegetables were planted in some
portions thereof and cattles were raised on other portions. When
the properties left by Dr. Jose Aliwalas were petitioned among his
surviving heirs, the lot in question was alloted in favor of the
plaintiff Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas as indicated in the amended
project of partition executed by her mind her nine children, one of
whom is Jose Aliwalas, Jr. After this amended project of partition
was approved and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga, OCT No. 52526-R was issued in the name of the
plaintiff on November 14, 1966.
On the other hand, on October 31, 1973, the defendant Ponciano
Tengco in representation of the defendants Heirs of Gregorio
Tengco filed an application with the Bureau of Lands, thru its
District Land Office here in San Fernando, Pampanga. Among
other things, he alleged in his application that this parcel of land
had been occupied and cultivated originally and continuously
thereafter by Gregorio Tengco. After being given due course, this
application was approved by the Director of Lands who issued
636

Free Patent No. 557692. This free patent issued in favor of the
Heirs of Gregorio Tengco was predicated on the assumption that
the lot still formed part of the public domain and on the findings
of the Public Land Inspector Romeo Buenaventura who conducted
an investigation thereon and who also reported that the land in
question was possessed and occupied by the applicant. On
rebuttal, the plaintiff adduced evidence showing that the prewar
records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land
applications were burned during the war as indicated in the
certification issued by the Chief of the Records Management
Division of the Bureau of Lands. This is to explain why the Bureau
has no more record pertaining to the Homestead Patent issued in
favor of Jose Aliwalas in i936 which gave rise to the issuance of
OCT No. 159 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8,
1937. The certification also attests that what is now found in the
files of the Bureau of Lands is Free Patent V-557692 issued on
February 5, 1974 in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco
pertaining to Lot No. 3563. Private respondents argue that since a
homestead patent and an original certificate of title had already
been issued to their predecessor-in-interest, the land had ceased
to be part of the public domain and, hence, the Bureau of Lands
had no jurisdiction over the controversy. Private respondents add
that since an original certificate of title had been issued pursuant
to the homestead patent, their title to the property had become
conclusive, absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs of Victoria,granting that they have proprietary
rights on and to the land in question, have not long lost such
rights by laches and/or prescription.
HELD:
An original certificate of title issued on the strength of a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title
issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is
really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of
one year from the date of the promulgation of the order of the
637

Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent.

b. Lands covered by such titles can no longer be subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding

GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M.
Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang,
Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father
of Consolacion).
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in petitioners' favor.
On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly
stating that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and
directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots
adjudicated in the decision of August 5, 1981.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the
Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
submitted a report to the court a quo stating that portions of the
land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents
issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land
Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of August 5,
1981 and the order of October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners
opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by
638

the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that

the decision of August 5, 1981 should be implemented because it
had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting
aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated
October 6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this
recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the homestead patents are still be subject matter
of a cadastral proceeding.
HELD:
It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under
the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the
subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in
cadastral proceeding.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. BANATAO
FACTS:
On November 16, 1962, Banatao, et al. (plaintiffs-respondents)
initiated an action for recovery of real property against Marciano
Carag (one of the defendants-respondents) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The disputed property was a new land formation
on the banks of the Cagayan River an accretion to Lot 3192 of
the Iguig Cadastre that the plaintiffs-respondents claimed as
the owners of the adjoining Lot 3192. The defendantsrespondents, on the other hand, were the occupants of the
disputed property. While the case was pending, the defendantsrespondents were able to secure homestead patents evidenced
by Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) issued in their names.
The OCTs were issued in 1965 and 1966, and all bear the proviso that, in
accordance with the Public Land Act, the patented homestead shall neither be
639

alienated nor encumbered for five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the
patent. The defendants-respondents separately applied for loans with the Philippine
NationalBank (PNB or the bank) secured by real estate mortgages on their
respective titled portions of the disputed property.
The PNB mortgages were annotated on the defendants-respondents' respective
OCTs also in the years 1965 and 1966.
The trial court decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and ordered
the return of the disputed property to the plaintiffs-respondents. Carag appealed the
trial court decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs-respondents also added two (2) additional
causes of action, or a total of three (3) causes of action, namely: (1) recovery of
real property; (2) cancellation of the OCTs; and (3) annulment of real estate
mortgage. The bank was made a party to the case in view of the suit for annulment
of mortgage.
The records disclose that on March 29, 1973, while the case was pending before
the trial court, the bank extra judicially foreclosed the property. The bank was
declared the highest bidder in the ensuing public auction, resulting in the
consolidation of title in the banks name; hence, the issuance on October 3, 1985 of
TCT No. T-65664 in the name of the bank.
On February 28, 1991, the plaintiffs-respondents and the defendants-respondents
entered into a compromise agreement whereby ownership of virtually the northern
half of the disputed property was ceded to the plaintiffs-respondents, while the
remaining southern half was given to the defendants-respondents. In the same
compromise agreement, the defendants-respondents acknowledged their
indebtedness to petitioner PNB and bound themselves to pay their respective
obligations to the bank, including the interests accruing thereon. Petitioner PNB,
however, was not a party to the compromise agreement.
The trial court rendered its decision, approving and adopting in toto the
compromise agreement, and ordering the participating parties to strictly comply
with its terms. The appellate court dismissed the appeal in its decision of March 30,
2001.
PNB submits that its consent to the compromise agreement is necessary to secure a
final and complete determination of the claims and defenses of all the parties to the
case. The PNB further argues that when the appellate court approved in toto the
trial court's judgment on the compromise agreement, it failed to consider that the
bank was a mortgagee in good faith. The bank claims good faith on the position
that the OCTs presented to it were all clean on their faces at the time the mortgages
were applied for; that there were no notices of lis pendens or any annotation of
liens or encumbrances on all of them; and that it had no knowledge, actual or
constructive, of facts or circumstances to warrant further inquiry into the titles of
640

the defendants-respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the mortgage constituted on the disputed land covered by a
homestead patent is valid.
HELD:
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, which contains a proscription
against the alienation or encumbrance of homestead patents within five years from
issue. The rationale for the prohibition, reiterated in a line of cases, first laid down
in Pascua v. Talens states that x x x homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and
cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116, now Section 118) within five years
after the grant of the patent. x x x. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to
him.
GONZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On October 13, 1958, Juan Evangelista died intestate leaving among others, a
parcel of land situated in Barrio Darangan, [Municipality] of Binangonan, Province
of Rizal covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 183 of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal and Tax Declaration No. 12131 of the Provincial Assessor of Rizal, which
parcel is now the subject of this litigation; That said Juan Evangelista was survived
by the defendant, Ana Gonzaga and plaintiffs, the latter being the sons and
daughters of the brothers and sisters of the deceased;
That during the lifetime of Juan Evangelista, he and said Ana Gonzaga on April 21,
1956 sold for valuable consideration several parcels of land to the spouses,
Anastacia San Juan and Servillano Ignacio (defendants herein) including that
parcel of land describe in the foregoing paragraph and as a consequence which
sale, the corresponding tax declaration was transferred to said vendees; that at the
time of said sale, there was a pending application of Juan Evangelista an Ana
Gonzaga over the land in question with the Bureau Lands, but the title thereto was
not issued until November 28, 1958, i.e., after the death of Juan Evangelista; That
on April 21, 1962, defendant Ana Gonzaga alleging to be the surviving spouse of
the deceased Juan Evangelista, executed an Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of the
sum parcel of land in question in favor of the same vendees, herein defendants,
Servillano Ignacio and Anastasia San Juan;
That in a series of subsequent transfers and conveyances, the same parcel of land
was sold on March 6, 1963 by the spouses Servillano Ignacio and Anastacia San
Juan to the defendant R & R Realty Co., Inc. and the latter, together with other
properties owned by it, mortgaged the same to the Continental Bank; that it was by
641

reason of these subsequent conveyances that defendants Filipinas Agricultural &

Realty Co., Inc. and the Continental Bank were impleaded as party defendants."
On the above facts, the lower court relying on the aforesaid Section 20, declared he
1956 sale void and consequently ruled in favor of the successional rights of private
respondents as heirs of the deceased, Juan Evangelista. Respondent Court of
Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the land between Juan Evangelista and Sps. Servillano
Ignacio is valid?
HELD:
Section 118 of the Public Land Act 9 reads: "Except in favor of the Government or
any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall
not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops of
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations." Is it not a clear expression then of the state policy to assure that the
original grantee, even if he were minded otherwise, is deprived for a period of five
years of his freedom of disposition? Thus is he protected from his own weaknesses
or temptation to sell, or lack of business acumen, the purpose being to keep and
preserve for him "or his family the land given to him gratuitously by the State, so
that being a property owner, he may become and remain a contented and useful
member of our society." Considering that such is policy, does it not logically
follow that he is precluded disposing of his rights prior even to his obtaining the
patent? Both policy and reason, therefore, unite in conclusion that no such
distinction should be made. Then, it is not to be forgotten that the state is possessed
of plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership?
FACTS:
Gregorio Cuenca was an applicant for a homestead patent for a certain parcel of
land in Negros Occidental. On Oct. 1951, an order for issuance for the patent was
given, but it was only after 20 years on Oct. 1971 that the patent was issued by the
president. Unfortunately, Gregorio and his wife already died before said issuance
and herein petitioner Andrea Decolongon stated that she is the only child and legal
heir of the late Gregorio. In view of that, the title was cancelled and placed in her
642

name on May 1972.

The brothers and sisters of Gregorio, herein private respondents, claimed that on
May 1966 Gregorio has relinquished and transferred all his rights to the said patent
to Felicidad Cuenca. Therefore, an action was filed by the private respondents for
the reconveyance of the subject land.
The CFI ruled in favor of Andrea Decolongon, which the private respondents
appealed with the Court of Appeals, who later reversed said judgment. Hence, this
petition filed by Andrea Decolongon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of relinquishment which conveyed the land to the private
respondents was within the prohibited five-year period.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that, from a long line of decisions they have made with
similar issues, they have time and again reiterated and emphasized that the patent
is deemed issued upon promulgation of the order for issuance thereof by the
Director of Lands.
In the case at bar, the issuance of patent was made on Oct. 1951, but it was only 20
years later that the patent itself was issued. The Deed of Relinquishment executed
on May 1966 in favor of the private respondents was valid since it has been 14
years after the order that said parcel of land was relinquished in favor of the private
respondents.
The Supreme Court then denied the petition for review and affirmed the CA
decision.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS
REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES
G.R. Nos. L-46898-99 November 28, 1989
FACTS:
On Aug. 1966, private respondent spouses Amando and Julia Arana, mortgaged 6
parcels of land to herein petitioner PNB. Two of the parcel of lands were acquired
thru a homestead patent, while the remaining four were only under tax
declarations.
On July 1969, upon the failure of the private respondent spouses to pay their loan
upon maturity, PNB foreclosed said properties and were publicly auctioned
whereby PNB was the highest bidder. Without any action of redemption from the
spouses, the said bank consolidated their ownership over the 6 parcels of land.
A civil suit was instituted by the respondent spouses for the redemption of the said
parcels of land, furthermore, they refused to vacate the 2 lots which the bank has
sold to a private person. The bank agreed for the redemption of the parcels of land
643

covered by patent, but not the remaining four under tax decalaration.
A case was filed in the RTC by herein respondents agains the petitioner bank, and
the court rendered a decision in favor of the former. The bank Is ordered to release
the mortgage upon full payment of the spouses of their balance and further
contended that the sale executed in favor of the third person be cancelled by the
bank.
The bank then filed a direct appeal thru certiorati to the Supreme Court, as the
dispute raises questions of law and not of facts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent spouses are entitled to redeem all the lots covered by
the mortgage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the indivisibility of mortgage does not apply to the
instant case because the aggregate number of the lots which comprise the
collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
There is neither partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to
speak of. Note, however, that applications for free patent covering the four (4)
unregistered parcels of land had been filed by respondent spouses, and were then
still pending action, which thus gives rise to the admission that said properties
involved in the aforestated cases were public lands and which the petitioners never
rebutted.
It is an essential requisite to the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the property, mortgaged. 21 Consequently, private respondents,
not being owners as yet of the subject lots when the same were supposedly
mortgaged, they could not have validly made any disposition of or created an
encumbrance on said four (4) lots to which they had neither title nor any vested
right. At most, what they had was a mere right of expectancy dependent on the
continuance of the circumstances then existing or a contingent right dependent on
the performance of some conditions, 22 but which could not be the proper object of
a valid mortgage contract.
Consequently, there was no need for private respondents to
repurchase the four (4) parcels from petitioner. That aspect of the
case actually calls for mutual restitution as an equitable remedy.
Therefore, incident to the nullity ab initio of the mortgage, mutual
restitution by the parties of what they had respectively received
from each other under the contract in connection with the four (4)
lots must be made and is hereby ordered to be effected by them.
While the law bars recovery in a case where the object of the
644

contract is contrary to law and one or both parties acted in bad

faith, we cannot here apply the doctrine of in pari delicto which
admits of an exception, namely, that when the contract is merely
prohibited by law, not illegal per se, and the prohibition is
designed for the protection of the party seeking to recover, he is
entitled to the relief prayed for whenever public policy is
enhanced thereby. The Supreme Court then affirmed the appeal of
the petitioners.
HOMENA vs. CASA and REGISTER OF DEEDS
G.R. No. L-32749 January 22, 1988
FACTS:
The complaint, filed by plaintiffs-appellants against the spouses
Dimas Casa and Maria Castor, was for alleged unlawful acts of
dispossession disturbing plaintiffs peaceful, continuous, open,
uninterrupted adverse and public possession of the property in
question. In their complaint, plaintiffs also sought to annul the
original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds for the
province of Cotabato in favor of defendant spouses pursuant to a
Homestead Patent on the ground that said patent was obtained
by defendant spouses through fraud and misrepresentation by
stating, among others, in their application, that the lot was not
claimed and occupied by another person.
Plaintiffs alleged that on June 15, 1952, they purchased from the
defendants two (2) hectares of the aforementioned parcel of land,
on the condition that the said portion would be reconveyed to
plaintiffs after the five-year prohibitory period, as provided for in
the Homestead Patent Law, shall have elapsed, and that
defendants failed to abide by said agreement. Plaintiffs averred
that they were not assailing the validity of the patent as a whole,
but only with respect to that portion of two (2) hectares owned by
them which defendants, through fraud, were able to register in
their name. RTC dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:

645

Whether or not the agreement entered into between the herein

parties that the land as purchased be reconveyed after the fiveyear prohibitory period under the Homestead Patent Law, shall
have elapsed is valid?
HELD:
The agreement is clearly illegal and void ab initio; it is intended to
circumvent and violate the law. As parties to a void contract, the
plaintiffs have no rights which they can enforce and the court can
not lend itself to its enforcement. Plaintiffs can neither invoke the
doctrine of implied trust based on an illegal contract. The issue of
prescription or laches becomes irrelevant in a case such as this,
where plaintiffs clearly have no cause of action.
SANTANAS v MARINAS
94 SCRA 853
FACTS:
Respondent Marinas alleged that he acquired, on May 22, 1929, under free patent
and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 217, a parcel of land
containing an area of four hectares, twelve ares and eighty-six centares (41,286 sq.
m.); that on January 16, 1956, he sold the above parcel of land to petitioner
Francisco Santana for a sum of P4,128.60; that the other petitioner Jose H.
Panganiban was included in the complaint because he is a subsequent lienholder
and/or encumbrancer, the property having been sold to him by Santana on March
25, 1956 for the same amount of P4,128.60.
On April 21, 1960, Sotero Marias as plaintiff filed in CFI of Rizal a
complaint to recover the above real property praying among others, that he be
allowed to repurchase the property.
The petitioners interposed the following affirmative defenses: (1) that at the time
the absolute sales were entered into, they were totally ignorant of and had no
knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance or right to repurchase by private
respondent, who assured petitioner Francisco Santana that he (Santana) could sell
the land in question absolutely and free from any encumbrance and is not subject
to any right of repurchase; (2) that they (petitioners) are purchasers in good faith;
(3) that being innocent purchasers for value, they acquired absolute ownership over
the property and private respondent cannot enforce against them any right of
repurchase of whatever nature (4) that the property in question now a residential
646

area with real estate subdivisions and roads in front and at the back thereof.
The trial court ruled out respondent Marinas right to repurchase the property and
dismissed the complaint but that on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision of dismissal and ordered petitioners to reconvey the land to private
respondent upon payment to the former of "the repurchase price thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether under all the circumstances, the repurchase of the land in question by
Marinas is in consonance with the reason and purpose of the law
HELD:
SC upheld petitioners proposition that to allow the repurchase of the subject land,
under the peculiar circumstances obtaining herein, would be repugnant to the
philosophy behind Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 and the jurisprudence laid down on
the matter.
The findings of fact of the trial court are clear and duly supported by the evidence.
The property of Sotero Marinas has ceased to be in the nature of a homestead, and
that instead it has been transformed into growing commercial and residential area.
The vicinity of the property is now a vast expanding business empire, the lands
having (been) converted into subdivisions. which are sold to the public at fantastic
prices. Close to this particular property of Sotero Marias the subdivision being
developed by a son of the plaintiff who has extensive business interests centered on
construction of buildings. By plaintiffs own admission, he is 78 years old and sick
with a lung ailment; while from the testimony of his son, Antonio Marias, it is
shown that the sons of plaintiff are all financially independent from the latter and
have their respective properties and means of livelihood. Under these
circumstances it is evident that to grant plaintiff the right to repurchase the
property at this time would be not for the purpose of giving him back the land for
his house and cultivation but for him to exploit it for business purposes at the
expense of the defendants who are innocent purchaser(s) in good faith and for
value."
In Simeon v. Pea We arrived at the conclusion that the plain intent, the raison d
tre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141." . .is to give the homesteader or patentee every
chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating
it."The basic objective is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and
decent living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small
landholders
which
is
the
bulwark
of
peace
and
order."
As it was in Simeon v. Pea, respondent Marias intention in exercising the right
of repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving the same within the family
fold", but "to dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the laws policy
647

and spirit."
It could be true that the land in question is the only land owned by respondentappellee. But this is not the determinant factor in allowing the repurchase of land
acquired through homestead or free patent. We can, therefore, properly inquire into
the motives behind the repurchase and convinced as We are in the instant case, that
the intention is not so, but to exploit it for business purposes or greater profit, We
can deny the repurchase. To sustain respondent-appellees claim under the
circumstances would put a premium on speculation contrary to the philosophy
behind Sec. 119 of Com. Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Law.
VALLANGCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 55336 May 4, 1989
FACTS:
Involved in this case is the more than eleven (11) hectares of
agricultural land located in Buguey, Cagayan covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1648 in the name of Heirs of Esteban
Billena which was later on transferred in 1940 to Maximiana
Crisostomo and Ana Billena, wife and daughter, respectively of
the deceased Esteban Billena under Transfer of Certificate of Title
No. 1005. When Mariana Crisostomo died, the land was left to Ana
Billena then married to Fortunate Vallangca with whom she had
three (3) children namely Benjamin, Rodolfo and Alfredo who are
the petitioners herein.
Upon Fortunate Vallangca's death in 1944, his widow Ana Billena,
together with her eldest son Benjamin, mortgaged the land in
dispute to her cousin Nazario Rabanes for Eight Hundred Pesos
(P800.00) in Japanese war notes, to cover the burial expenses of
her deceased husband. There being no notary public in the place
at the time, the agreement was not reduced to writing.
After the Pacific war, Rabanes went to the residence of Ana Billena
on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document which
Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a mortgage contract
written in the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and
trusting in her cousin Rabanes signed the document. In the same
648

year Billena was informed that the document she signed was
actually a Deed of Absolute Sale and not a Mortgage Contract.
This prompted Ana Billena and her son Benjamin to Rabanes'
place for the purpose of redeeming the land and actually
tendered to him the loan amount of P800.00, this time, in genuine
and legal Philippine currency. However, Rabanes told them that
the land could no longer be redeemed.
Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons were in possession and
actual cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against
them on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit before the CFI of Cagayan
and Recovery of Possession in 1972. A decision by RTC and CA
was rendered upholding the ownership of Rabanes over the
subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ana Billena and her heirs have the right to
repurchase the land notwithstanding the absence of any
stipulation in the deed of sale of the vendor's right to repurchase
the land.
HELD:
Under the law, restrictions are imposed on the conveyance of
patented lands within five (5) years from the date of the issuance
of the free patent; the owner of the land is precluded from
subjecting the same to any encumbrance or alienation. After the
lapse of five (5) years, such prohibition is lifted, but the ownervendor is entitled to repurchase the property from the vendee
within five (5) years from the date of the execution of the deed of
sale or conveyance.
The document signed by Ana Billena in 1946, whether be it an
Absolute Deed of Sale or a Mortgage Contract was to become
absolute and irrevocable only upon the failure of Billena or her
heirs to repurchase the same within five (5) years from February
2, 1946. In the case at bar, it is not refuted that Billena, together
with her son Benjamin, went to Rabanes' residence in 1946 to
649

redeem the property and tendered to him the amount of P800.00

in Philippine currency, but the latter told them that the land could
no longer be redeemed. By Ana Billena's act of tendering to
Rabanes the P800.00, she had in effect exercised her right to
repurchase.
For, notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of
sale of the vendor's right to repurchase the land, Billena or her
heirs are granted such right by operation of law. Petitioners may
redeem the property covered by TCT No. 1005 upon the return of
the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) to private
respondents, with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from 1 January 1962 until fully paid.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. HON. COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE
FACTS:
On August 20, 1976, Decree No. N-161749 was issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration. And on September 26, 1976,
the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 0662 in favor of the applicants.
In a Motion dated October 16, 1976, the registered owners
(Graciano B. Neri, Jr., et al.) alleged that squatters who had built
shacks before the issuance of the decree refused to vacate the
land for which reason they prayed for the issuance of a writ of
possession and a writ of demolition. The court granted the motion
in an Order dated October 22, 1976. After several motions for
reconsideration, the court issued an Order dated August 8, 1980,
as stated by the applicants, there is no more legal obstacle for the
issuance of the writ of possession and demolition. On August 18,
1980, the writ of possession and demolition was actually issued.
However, on October 22, 1980, Petronilo R. Bullecer as President
650

of the Taguanao Settlers Association asked for a 90-day stay in

the enforcement of the writ. The Director of Lands, thru the
Solicitor General also asked that the execution of the writ "be
stayed or held in abeyance pending the result of the Annulment
proceedings which this Office is filing with the proper court.
ISSUE:
WON the remedy sought to annul the illegal patent was correct.
HELD:
Yes, The Court ordered the reversion of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 to the State and declaring the
same as owned and belonging to the latter. The issue in respect of
the validity of OCT No. 0662 has been previously and directly
raised in Civil Case No. 7514 which is the proper action.
Resolution of the same issue in this Court will displace a tribunal
which can best ascertain the veracity of the factual allegations
and which first acquired jurisdiction over an action which
exclusively pertains to it. There should be no multiplicity of suits.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AUGUSTO MINA

G.R. No. L-60685 June 29, 1982
FACTS:
On July 7, 1967, defendant August Mina filed with the Bureau of
Lands Free Patent Application for tract of land in Meycauayan,
Bulacan, with an area of 2 hectares, 69 ares and 47 centares. the
Director of Lands on August 14,1969 issued an order approving
said free patent application and also directing the issuance of
patent to defendant Mina and, pursuant thereto, Free Patent was
correspondingly issued to said defendant on February 6, 1970. on
651

December 16, 1972, Montano F. Esguerra Jr. filed with the Bureau
of Lands a petition assailing the validity of the patient issued to
defendant Augusto Mina claiming that the latter obtained the
same by means of fraud and misrepresentation. Acting on the
aforementioned petition by Montano F. Esguerra, Jr, an
investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands which
revealed that neither defendant Augusto Mina's free patient
application aforesaid had been fraudulently obtained hereby
prompting the Director of Land to issue an order on April 2, 1973,
the proper court action be initialized for the cancellation of the
patent and the corresponding certificate title issued, ands for the
reversion of the covered thereby to the state.
ISSUE:
WON the application is void
HELD:
Yes, A certificate of title that is void may be ordered canceled.
And, a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud,
as when a person applies for registration of the land on the claim
that he has been occupying and cultivating it. In the case of
disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to
comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding
such title void.). The lapse of the one (1) year period within which
a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the
cancellation thereof for the hold that a little may become in
defeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured
through fraud or in violation of the law would be the height of
absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing
title A title founded on fraud may be canceled, notwithstanding
the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a
petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, The complaint in
the present case was brought by the Republic of the Philippines
not as a nominal party but in the exercise of its sovereign
functions, to protect the interests of the State over a public
property. This Court has held that the statutes of limitations does
not run against the right of action of the Government of the
Philippines.Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not
652

run against the state. It has been held that the statute of
limitations does not run against the right of action of the
Government of the Philippines
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA
ABRILLE
G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976
FACTS:
Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the
owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area
of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY
TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in her name. The deceased Luisa Villa
Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the aforesaid
parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1
and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which
was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March
17, 1967. Under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, the sum of all
the lands (composed of 4 lots) contains an area of 577,679
Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is
82,127 Square Meters more than the original area covered in
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of said defendant Luisa
Villa Abrille.
Ten days after the approval by the Land Registration
Commissioner, Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from
the Court of First Instance of Davao directing the Register of
Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the
area of Certificate of Title and thereafter to cancel the same and
issue new TCTs. On March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds
concerned registered the lot and issued a new TCT in the name of
Luisa Villa Abrille.
However, it appears that the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2,
which includes the aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square
Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the required
653

notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Law, and that the
excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of
the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was
formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of
the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land
belonging to the public domain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Certificate of Titles was validly cancelled?
HELD:
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in
controversy, we are of the opinion and so hold that the lower
court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690
which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square
meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly
under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the
court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322
and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased area of
82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and
irregular. This is so, for the increased area in question, which is
not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give
allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of
the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging
to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa
Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the
parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao
River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration
Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should
have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision
plan.

654

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act

496, which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the
herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers
previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts
of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet
been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse
still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more
particularly the Director of Lands.
KAYABAN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-33307 August 30, 1973
FACTS:
The present case started with an action for illegal detainer filed in
the municipal court of Alcala Pangasinan. The plaintiff was Vicente
Kayaban, one of the petitioners herein, the other petitioner being
his wife Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban; and the defendants were
the spouses Benjamin Orpindo and Leonila Aguilar-Orpindo.
The lands covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente
Kayaban and his co-heirs from their father and common
predecessor-in-interest, Gabriel Kayaban, whose last will was
admitted to probate in 1923. After the properties were
partitioned, Vicente Kayaban acquired the shares of his co-heirs
by purchase and afterwards he and his wife applied for and
obtained the two free patent titles in question.
The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to
be the rightful and exclusive owners of the properties covered by
the said titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they
be reverted to the State, but nevertheless declared the titles null
and void on the ground that since the owners had acquired the
properties partly by inheritance from their father and the rest by
purchase from their co-heirs, and their father had been in
possession thereof for many years before them, the lands were no
longer public and hence not subject to disposition by the
government under the Public Land Act. The procedure that should
655

have been followed, said the court, was judicial confirmation of an

imperfect title and not administrative legalization thereof through
patent application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Original Certificates of Title are null and void?
HELD:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved
the applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance
of the corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the
action for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at
least with his prior authority and consent.
In the second place, the dictum of the lower court that the
appellants chose the wrong remedy in applying for free patents
instead of obtaining a judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
involves a technicality that is of no material consequence now in
view of the declaration by the same court that the appellants are
the rightful and exclusive owners of the lands covered by said
titles. Indeed, insofar as the kind of land that may be the subject
of one or the other remedy is concerned, there is no difference
between them. Both refer to public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes; both require continuous occupation and cultivation
either by the applicant himself or through his predecessors-ininterest for a certain length of time; and both are modes of
confirming an imperfect or incomplete title one judicially and
the other administratively.
Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through
judicial or administrative legalization of imperfect or incomplete
title is of no practical importance. The certificates of title in either
case is the same, namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act
No. 496, which, except for some restrictions as to alienability
within entitled to all the protection afforded by the Torrens System
of registration.
656

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed is reversed insofar as it

declares null and void Original Certificates of Title in the names of
Vicente Kayaban and Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban, respectively.

Consultants
TEODORO ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN
G.R. No. L-22486

March 20, 1968

FACTS:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by
original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to
Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the
Register of Deeds upon the following grounds: 1.) That Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M.
Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property; 2.) That in the
sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is
necessary that both spouses sign the document; but 3.) Since, as in this case, the
wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot
dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law. In view of such
refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition
for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to
issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of
October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . .
because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151",
dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the
transaction appealed to by the petitioner.
657

HELD:
No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on
his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over
real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the
deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. A
register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem
of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For
under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he
is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of
Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Orilla , GR. No. 170422

FACTS:
Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the owners of situated in
Bohol, containing an area of 23.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title .The Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(DAR-PARO) of Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land Valuation and
Acquisition dated November 15, 1996 informing them of the compulsory
acquisition of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657) for P371,154.99
as compensation based on the valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines
(petitioner)
658

Respondents rejected the said valuation.

Consequently, the Provincial

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Provincial DARAB)

conducted a summary hearing on the amount of just compensation. Thereafter, the
Provincial DARAB affirmed the valuation made by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the payment of just compensation
RULING:
The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind
of expropriation, being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the
farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an
exercise of police power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation
where the odds are practically against him.

He cannot resist it.

His only

consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for
the property taken by the government. As expected, the landowner will exercise
this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to just
compensation. Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the
DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.
Constitutionally, just compensation is the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair
value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to
sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
true measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used
to modify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the
659

equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full,
and ample.
LBP vs. Heirs of Domingo, GR No. 168533
FACTS
The late Angel T. Domingo (Domingo) is the registered owner
of a 70.3420-hectare rice land situated at Macapabellag, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title

On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 was issued,

pursuant to which actual tenant farmers of private agricultural
lands devoted to rice and corn were deemed as full owners of the
land they till.

Consequently, out of the 70.3420 hectares of the said rice

land, 34.9128 hectares (subject land) were taken by the
government under its land transfer program and awarded the
same to tenant farmers.
On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija a complaint for determination
and payment of just compensation against the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) and DAR.

660

Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the

just compensation for the subject land should be computed using
the parameters set forth under Republic Act No. 6657.
ISSUE: Whether or not

Heirs of Domingo shall be paid just

compensation from the parameters setforth under R.A 6657.

RULING
In sum, in determining just compensation, the cost of the
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes
or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.Petition is denied.

Lee vs. LBP, GR No. 170422, March 7,2008

FACTS:
On 7 August 2001, petitioners received a notice of coverage informing them
that their landholding is covered by the governments compulsory acquisition
scheme pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657).

661

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an original petition for the determination of just

compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan.
LBP filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals and argued that
the SAC erred in giving considerable weight on the appraisal report of the private
appraisal firm thereby disregarding the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 and its
implementing regulations.
It found that the SAC made a wholesale adoption of the valuation of the
appraisal company and did not consider the other factors set forth in R.A. No. 6657
even though the appraisal company admitted that it did not consider as applicable
the CARP valuation of the property.
Finally, relying on the presumption of regularity, petitioners claim that the
SAC had considered the criteria set forth in the law for the determination of just
compensation in computing the value of the subject landholding. In any case,
according to them, R.A. No. 6657 does not at all require the SAC to consider all
the seven factors enumerated therein in its determination of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A 6657 shall be considered in determining of just
compensation.
RULING:
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the factors to be considered
in determining just compensation reads.
SECTION 17.
Determination of Just Compensation.In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and the assessment
662

made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and

economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes
or loans secured from any government financing institutions on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
These factors have already been incorporated in a basic formula by the DAR
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. AO No. 5
precisely filled in the details of Section 17, R. A. No. 6657 by providing a basic
formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account.This
formula has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors referred to
in Section 17 of the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
LBP vs. Heirs of Cruz, GR No. 175175 September 29, 2008
FACTS:
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government banking institution
designated under Section 64 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6654 as the financial
intermediary of the agrarian reform program of the government.
Eleuterio Cruz is the registered owner of an unirrigated riceland situated in
Lakambini, Tuao, Cagayan per Transfer Certificate of Title of the total 13.7320
hectares of respondents landholding, an area of 13.5550 hectares was placed by
the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer program under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27
Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76
based on the guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No.
663

228. Respondents rejected petitioners valuation and instituted an action for a

summary proceeding for the preliminary determination of just compensation before
the PARAD.
The SAC held that the value of P80,000.00 per hectare fixed by the PARAD
should be accorded weight and probative value and that the SAC is guided by the
various factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 in determining just
compensation. It disregarded respondents claim that the valuation should be based
on the current market value of the landholding since no evidence was adduced in
support of the claim. The SAC also did not accept petitioners valuation as it was
based on P.D. No. 27, in which just compensation was determined at the time of
the taking of the property.
Petitioner insists that the values in E.O. No. 228 are applicable to lands
acquired under P.D. No. 27 in cognizance of the well-settled rule that just
compensation is the value of the property at the time of the taking on 21 October
1972, when the ownership of the subject property was transferred from the
landowner to the farmers-beneficiaries and when the former was effectively
deprived of dominion and possession over said land.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD. 27 and EO 228 are still applicable in determining
payment for just compensation

RULING:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, the Court explained why the
guidelines under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 are no longer applicable to the
delayed payment of lands acquired under P.D. No. 27, to wit:
664

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just

compensation based on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO
228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation
for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
LBP vs. Natividad, GR No. 127198(2005)
FACTS
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before
the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their
agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were
acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and
Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to
implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.
The judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and
against
respondents,
ordering
respondents,
particularly,
respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of
the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and
which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land
reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square
meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands
of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat,
Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered
to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring
that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere
guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in
relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the
properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land
Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition
in 1972.
665

Land Bank avers that private respondents should have

sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing
a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 27 and EO 228 are applicable for the
determination of payment of just compensation
RULING:
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be
paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the
passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)before the completion
of this process, the just compensation should be determined and
the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the
applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory
effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO
228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA
6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation
due private respondents for their property, taking into account its
nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market
value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce.
This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined
the amount of just compensation due private respondents in
accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing
jurisprudence.
The petition is DENIED.

666

EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
NEPOMUCENO vs. City of Surigao, GR No. 146091
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 4570 was a complaint for Recovery of Real Property and/or
its Market Value filed by petitioner Maria Paz Nepomuceno to recover a 652 sq.
m. portionof her 50,000 sq. m. lot which was occupied, developed and used as a
city road by the city government of Surigao. Maria Paz alleged that the city
government neither asked her permission to use the land nor instituted
expropriation proceedings for its acquisition. On October 4, 1994, she and her
husband, co-petitioner, Fermin A. Nepomuceno, wrote respondent (then Surigao
City Mayor) Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable settlement for the
payment of the portion taken over by the city. They subsequently met with Mayor
Sering to discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and refused
to pay them anything.RTC rendered its judgment in favor to the petitioner.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other respects.
Petitioners claim that, in fixing the value of their property, justice and equity
demand that the value at the time of actual payment should be the basis, not the
value at the time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. They demand P200/sq. m.
or a total sum of P130, 400 plus legal interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the value at the time of actual taking should be the basis of
the property
RULING
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that where actual taking is
made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and the owner seeks
recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling
for purposes of compensation. As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for
this rule is:
The owner of private property should be compensated only for what
he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend
beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of
his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the
compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the
individual whose property is taken, but to the public, which is to pay
for it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
667

NPC vs. Suarez. GR No. 17525 October 8,2008

FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, a complaint on August 23, 1996 for expropriation of a parcel of land
(the property) in Brgy. Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon registered in the names of
Angel Suarez, Carlos Suarez, Ma. Teresa Suarez and Rosario Suarez (respondents).
In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 42, petitioner
deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Legazpi City Branch the amount of
P7,465.71 representing the provisional value of the property, alleged to cover an
area of 24,350 square meters.
By Decision of April 15, 1999, the trial court adopted as basis for
determining just compensation the recommendation of the Commissioners. Thus it
disposed:
Petitioner contends that since it merely seeks an aerial easement over the
property, the decision of the appellate court affirming the trial courts order for the
payment of just compensation in the amount of P783, 860.46 representing the total
value of the property and excluding the application of Section 3A (b) of RA 6395 is
erroneous.
ISSUE: whether petitioner in its acquisition of an easement of right of way (aerial)
over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value of the land, must be paid.
RULING:
An easement of right of way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property.
The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As
correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of
the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use of the land
for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the
property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary
equivalent of the land
The nature, as well as the character of the land at the time of taking is thus
the principal criterion in determining just compensation. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and
capabilities, must thus be considered.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
NPC vs. Purefoods, GR No. 160725 September 12,2008
668

FACTS
On 5 November 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for eminent
domain before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan .
The complaint alleged that the defendants were either the registered owners
or the claimants of the affected pieces of property.
The complaint also alleged the public purpose of the Northwestern Luzon
Project, as well as the urgency and necessity of acquiring easements of right-ofway over the said parcels of land consisting of 62,426.50 square meters. It also
averred that the affected properties had not been expropriated for public use and
were selected by NAPOCOR in a manner compatible with the greatest public good
and the least private injury and that the negotiations between NAPOCOR and the
defendants had failed. The complaint prayed, among others, that the RTC issue a
writ of possession in favor of NAPOCOR in the event that it would be refused
entry to the affected properties.
Respondent Pure foods counters that determination of just compensation is a
factual finding, which may be reviewed by this Court only when the case falls
within the recognized exceptions to the prohibition against factual review. Since
the instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions, it argues that the issue of
just compensation may not be reviewed in the instant proceeding.
On the other hand, there is a question of law when the issue does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of
law and jurisprudence on the matter. In the instant case, NAPOCOR is raising a
question of law, that is, whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market
value of the expropriated properties should be paid to the affected owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation shall be based on the market value of
the affected properties
RULING
The question of just compensation for an easement of right-of-way over a
parcel of land that will be traversed by NAPOCORs transmission lines has already
been answered in National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation. In that case, the Court held that because of the nature of
the easement, which will deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite
period, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected
properties. The Court explained therein that expropriation is not limited to the
acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The
right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights
over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls
within the ambit of the term expropriation. In eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of
669

the condemned property is entitled is the market value.

Based on the foregoing elucidation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs
finding of the value of just compensation based on the majority reports valuation
of P400.00 per square meter for the properties belonging to respondents with the
exception of respondent Moldex. Both the Court of Appeals and the RTC were
convinced that the commissioners recommendation was arrived at after a judicious
consideration of all factors. Absent any showing that said valuation is exorbitant
and unjustified, the same is binding on this Court.
Denied
FORFOM Dev. Corp vs. PNR GR No. 124795
FACTS:
Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San
Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) and all of the Registry of
Deeds of Laguna. On 24 August 1990, Forfom filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Binan, Laguna a complaint for Recovery of Posssession of Real
Property and/or Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of military men, and
without its consent and against its will, occupied 100,128 square meters of its
property located in San Pedro, Laguna and installed thereon railroad and railway
facilities and appurtenances. It further alleged that PNR rented out portions of the
property to squatters along the railroad tracks. Despite repeated verbal and written
demands for the return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed
to comply.
PNR alleged that, per authority granted by law (Presidential Decree No.
741), it acquired parcels of land used in the construction of the railway track to
Carmona, Cavite. It, however, denied that the property acquired from Forfom was
leased to tenants. It stressed that the acquisition of the properties used in the
project was done through negotiations with the respective owners. It claimed that it
670

negotiated with the respective owners of the affected properties and that they were
paid just compensation. Dr. Felix Limcaoco, it said, was not paid because he failed
to present the corresponding titles to his properties. It claimed that the right to and
just compensation for the subject property was the declared fair market value at the
time of the taking which was P0.60 per square meter. Defendant explained that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos authorized the PNR to acquire said right of way in
a Cabinet Meeting on 1 November 1972 as evidenced by an excerpt of the minutes
of the meeting of the PNR Board of Directors on Resolution No. 751.
Judgment rendered in favor to the plaintiff. The trial court found that the
properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without due process of law and without
just compensation.
Not contented with the decision, both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals by filing their respective Notices of Appeal. PNR questioned the trial
courts ruling fixing the just compensation at P10.00 per square meter and not the
declared value of P0.60 per square meter or the fair market value of P1.25 paid to
an adjacent owner. CA affirmed the decision with modification as to damages.
Plaintiff filed for a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner FORFOM can recover the property because
respondent failed to file aby expropriation and to pay just compensation.
RULING:
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for
purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2)
the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3)
671

the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4)
the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally,
appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property of Forfom, a
private land.

The entrance into Forfoms property was permanent, not for a

fleeting or brief period.It is clear that recovery of possession of the property by the
landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more
importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation
to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation
will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left
to the landowner is the right of compensation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY DENIED insofar as it
denies Forfom Development Corporations prayer for recovery of possession (in
whole or in part) of the subject land, unearned income, and rentals.
FLORENTINA ALEMAN,
CATERA, ET AL
G.R. No. L-13693

ET

AL

vs.

PRESENTACION

DE

Facts:
De Catera is and was the owner and operator of several
passenger trucks. One of her trucks was the "Catera No. 5." One
morning, said passenger truck fell into the ditch because it was
over speeding the driver was trying to overtake another truck.
Aleman and her son who at that time were on the lawn in front of
their house were hit by the said truck thereby causing the
instantaneous death of the son and the injury of Florentina
Aleman. Civil case No. 2969 is for the recovery of damages
672

instituted by Florentina Aleman and her husband Federico Real for

the death of their son and for the injury of Florentina Aleman.Two
of the passengers of the aforesaid truck were killed as a result of
the mishap.
The Southern Motors, Inc. filed with the provincial sheriff a thirdparty claim to the bus, On 16 May in both cases the plaintiffs filed
with the Court a motion to strike out the third-party claim filed by
the motor company. The intervenor motor company filed an
answer in intervention setting up a counter claim and praying that
it be declared the owner of the bus attached by the sheriff to
answer for the damages awarded to the plaintiffs. The counterclaim of Southern Motors, Inc. is dismissed. The filed a notice of
appeal. Hence, the appeal before the Court is that taken by the
intervenor Southern Motors, Inc. in both cases from that part of
the judgment dismissing its counterclaim
Issue
Which has a preferred right to the bus under attachment the
Southern Motors, Inc. in whose favor, as seller of the bus, a
chattel mortgage thereon had been executed and recorded in the
corresponding registry of deeds, or the families of the vehicular
accident victims who, having been awarded damages for death
and injuries, had caused an attachment on the said bus owned by
the operator whose purchase and ownership thereof had been
recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office.
Ruling
A Mortgage in order to affect persons should not only be
registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should
also be recorded in the Motor Vehicle Office as required by section
5(e) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law." Here, the Southern Motor,
Inc. did not record in the Motor Vehicle Office the mortgage
executed in it's favor. Such being the case the mortgage is
ineffective as far as the appellees are concerned. Its right or
interest, therefore, in the truck, because of the mortgage
constituted in its favor, cannot prevail over of that appellees who
thought mere judgement creditors may be deemed innocent
purchase of the bus owner-operator Precentacion de Catera, who
had her purchase of the bus from Wenceslao Defensor recorded in
673

the Motor Vehicles Office,

DELFIN MONTANO vs. JOSE LIM ANG, ET AL

G.R. No. L-13057
Facts
Montano brought to the Philippines from the United States a Cadillac car which he
registered in his name in the Motor Vehicles Office and for which he obtained a
certificate of registration. He sold the car to Jose Lim Ang and his wife Teodora A.
for which the latter executed a promissory note. Having paid part of the price, said
spouses executed on the same date a chattel mortgage on the car in favor of
Montano to guarantee the payment of the balance. Because Montano did not want
to transfer the registration certificate to Jose Lim Ang before the registration of the
mortgage, the latter was registered in the office of the register of deeds, but
Montano failed to notify the Motor Vehicles Office of the execution of the
mortgage.
Jose Lim Ang transferred the registration certificate to
Villanueva. Villanueva sold the car to Santos for Santos sold the
car to the Manila Trading & Supply Company and this company
sold the car to Tinio . . He also executed a chattel mortgage on
the same car to secure the payment of the promissory note. This
mortgage was registered both in the office of the register of
deeds as well as in the Motor Vehicles Office
Jose Lim Ang failed to pay the balance of the purchase price to
Montano in spite of the latter's demand. Montano requested the
sheriff of Manila to sell the car in accordance with the conditions
agreed upon in the chattel mortgage. Having found, however,
that the car was no longer in the possession of Lim Ang but in
that of Angel M. Tinio, Montano commenced the present action of
replevin before the Court of First Instance of Manila against
spouses Lim.
Issue
Whether or not the chattel mortgage executed by Jose Lim Ang
674

and Teodora A. Gonzales in favor of Delfin Montano is binding

against third persons even if they failed to give notice thereof to
the Motor Vehicles Office as required by Section 5(e) of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law;
Ruling
"A mortgage in order to affect third persons should not only be
registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should
also be recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office as required by
section 5(e) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. And the failure of
the respondent mortgagee to report the mortgage executed in its
favor had the effect of making said mortgage ineffective against
Borlough, who had his purchase registered in the said Motor
Vehicles Office."' Adopting this view in our case the inevitable
conclusion is that as between Montano whose mortgage over the
car was not recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office and Angel M.
Tinio who notified said office of his purchase and registered the
car in his name, the latter is entitled to preference considering
that the mere registration of the chattel mortgage in the office of
the register of deeds is in itself not sufficient to hold it binding
against third persons.
FELIX CAMITAN vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128099

Facts
The spouses Camitan sold to Fidelity Investment Corporation
(respondent) a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title. After the death of the spouses Camitan, without the
knowledge of respondent, the heirs of the spouses-petitioners
herein - filed a petition for the issuance of a new Owners
Copy,2 However, it appears that respondent was not given notice
of such proceedings. The trial court issued an order of general
default. When respondent learned of the petition and order for the
first time, it caused the annotation of a notice of sale on the title
of the property. In a Petition6 for annulment of judgment and
675

cancellation of title before the Court of Appeals, respondent

argued that the order is null and void, having been issued by the
trial court without jurisdiction since the Owners Copy of TCT
exists and has been in its possession, and not lost as petitioners
alleged. Moreover, it claimed that petitioners have no standing to
file the petition, not being the registered owners of the property,
nor persons in interest, since all the rights and interest of the
spouses Camitan had already been transferred to respondent
upon the sale of the property. Respondent further accused
petitioners of perjury; intentionally suppressing from the trial
court the fact that they were not in possession of the property;
and not serving notice on respondent despite knowledge that it
was in actual possession of the property. 7
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered the
annulment of the impugned Order. 8 It found that the Owners
Copy is in the possession of respondent since 1967. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals found that petitioners committed perjury in
executing their Joint Affidavit of Loss in support of their petition
before the trial court as they made it appear that the Owners
Copy was still in the possession of the spouses Camitan, when in
fact, as early as 1967, the same had already been given to
respondent.

Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered the
annulment of the Order of the trial court which directed the
Register of Deeds to issue a second Owners Copy of the title.

Ruling
The petition for issuance of the new Owners Copy before the trial
court was filed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," Section
No. 109 of which provides:
676

SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate

certificate.In case of loss or theft of an owners duplicate
certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the
owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds
of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss
or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for
the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of
any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or
destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other
person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in
interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct
the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place
of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and
shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this
decree.
Thus, before a duplicate certificate of title can be replaced, the
petitioner under the foregoing provision must establish that the
duplicate certificate was lost or destroyed. This Court has
consistently held that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction
over a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
certificate of title, if the original is in fact not lost but is in the
possession of an alleged buyer. In other words, the fact of loss of
the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.
REPUBLIC v SANTUA
G.R. No. 155703 September 8, 2008
Facts:
On February, 16, 1999, respondent Dominador Santua filed with
the RTC a petition for judicial reconstitution of a TCT. He alleged
that the original copy was among those destroyed by the fire that
completely razed the Capitol Building then housing the Office of
677

the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on August 12, 1977.

The documents he presented were tax declarations, survey plan
and technical description. On February 25, 1999, the RTC issued
an Order setting the initial hearing of the case and it also directed
the publication of the order. On December 15, 2000, the RTC
granted the petition. On January 16, 2001, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due
course by the RTC. On September 23, 2002, the CA affirmed the
RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the documents presented by Santua are sufficient bases
for the
Ruling:
No, they are not sufficient.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in
the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. It partakes of a
land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted only upon
clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued
to the petitioner. In this regard, Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No.
26 enumerates the documents regarded as valid and sufficient
bases for reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. The Court
has already settled in a number of cases that, following the
principle of ejusdem generis in statutory construction, any
document mentioned in Section 3 should be interpreted to refer
to documents similar to those previously enumerated therein. As
aptly observed by the petitioner, the documents enumerated in
Section 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are documents that had been
issued or are on file with the Register of Deeds, thus, highly
credible.
Once again, we caution the courts against the hasty and reckless
grant of petitions for reconstitution. Strict observance of the rules
is vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution
678

proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificate

of titles over parcels of land which turn out to be already covered
by existing titles. Courts should bear in mind that should the
petition for reconstitution be denied for lack of sufficient basis,
the petitioner is not left without a remedy. He may still file an
application for confirmation of his title under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, if he is in fact the lawful owner
Basis for Reconstitution of Title
PASCUA v REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162097 February 13, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner claimed that she is the owner in fee simple of Lot No.
3209, Pagsanjan, Laguna Cadastre, having inherited it from her
parents, Guillermo Abinsay and Leoncia Rivera. On December 4,
1930, the cadastral court awarded the lot to Limuaco, who sold
the lot to petitioners parents on December 24, 1956, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
On December 8, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for judicial
reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 3209 with the RTC of
Laguna. The RTC denied the petition for reconstitution for
insufficiency of evidence because Tax Declaration No. 5471 in the
name of spouses Abinsay did not indicate any certificate of title
number, cadastral lot number or even an assessors lot number
while Tax Declaration No. 1376 only indicated Assessors Lot No.
19-pt.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner argued that Assessors Lot No. 19pt and Lot No. 3209 are the same. For respondent Republic of the
Philippines, the Solicitor General contended that what petitioners
predecessors-in-interest bought from Limuaco was Assesors Lot
No. 19-pt, which was neither designated nor mentioned as Lot No.
3209. Also, the Solicitor General said the property described in
the documents presented is still unregistered land of the public

679

domain and there is no evidence that an OCT was actually issued

to Lot No. 3209.
The CA affirmed the trial courts order.
The CA held that
petitioner failed to present the documents enumerated in Section
2, RA 26.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner should be allowed to reconstitute her
alleged title
Ruling:
No, the petitioner
reconstitution.

is

not

qualified

to

file

an

action

for

We are not convinced. RA 26 presupposes that the property

whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought
under the provisions of the Torrens System, Act No. 496.
Petitioners evidence itself, the Deed of Sale between Limuaco
and her parents, stated that the lot was not registered under Act
No. 496 and that the parties agreed to register it under Act No.
3344. Even the Deed of Co-owners Partition stated that the
subject lot, Lot No. 19-pt, is not registered. The other piece of
evidence, the certifications from the LRA, merely stated that
Decree No. 412846 covering Lot No. 3209 was issued
on December 4, 1930, but the copy of said decree is not among
the salvaged decrees on file with said office. The said copy is
presumed lost or destroyed during World War II. The LRA neither
stated that a certificate of title was actually issued nor mentioned
the number of the OCT. It cannot be determined from any of the
evidence submitted by petitioner that the adjudicatee of the
purported decree was Limuaco.
The Court is not persuadsed that petitioners pieces of evidence
warrant the reconstitution of title since she failed to prove the
existence of the title in the first place. The purpose of
reconstitution of title is to have the original title reproduced in the

680

same form it was when it was lost or destroyed. In this case, there
is no title to be re-issued.
Villanueva vs Viloria,
GR No. 155804, Mar. 14 2008, 548 SCRA 401

Facts:
Victorino Viloria claimed that he is the owner of a parcel of land in
Iba, Zambales covered by TCT 16156; that he and his wife went to
and settled in Ilocos Sur until her wifes death in 1995. In the
same year, he discovered that the duplicate copy of the TCT was
eaten by termites. He executed an Affidavit of Loss and he
applied for reconstitution which the lower court granted.
Viloria then sold the land in 2002 and a new TCT was issued to the
buyer (Ruben Marty).
On the other hand, the spouses Villanueva were the actual
occupants of the said land. They came to know of the foregoing
only in 2002. They petitioned for the annulment of the
reconstitution. They claimed that they are in possession of
the duplicate copy of TCT 16156 as well as a Deed of Sale
executed in their favor by the late wife of Viloria in 1986.

ISSUE:
Whether or not to annul the reconstitution of the title.

HELD:
Yes. If an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not
been lost but is in fact in possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has
681

not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be

attacked any time.
As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said
owners duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in
replacement thereof are void.

Layos vsFil-Estate Golf and Devt. Corp.,

GR No. 150470 Aug. 6 2008
FACTS:
In a previous case, Fil-Estate Golf (FEGDI) was the developer of a golf course in
Laguna along with La Paz who provided the properties registered in its name.
Thereafter, Layos filed for injunction against FEGDI and alleged that he is the
legal owner of the lands in question, and further alleged an intrusion on the part of
FEGDI and La Paz. Layos filed two different cases in two separate courts, praying
for the same thing. Complaint was dismissed for forum-shopping.
Only months after instituting the injunction cases, Layos filed a complaint
for quieting of title against La Paz. Layos alleges that La Paz grabbed his land
and entered it without his consent. His main proof was the Original Certificate
Title No. 239, issued in his name. La Paz argues that Layos never owned or
possessed the land in question an in fact, it got the lands from the government and
it was issued the assailed Transfer Certificate of Titles. The court ruled in favor of
La Paz and declared their titles to be indefeasible and found the OCT of Layos to
be spurious.
Layos filed an action to reconstitute his title and many others opposed. The
court again denied this, reiterating that OCT 239 of Layos is forged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Layos is entitled to reconstitution.
HELD:
No.Layos did not have a valid title to the said property because the RTC ruled that
it was forged.
Reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the
meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is
682

supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. For an
order of reconstitution to issue, the following elements must be present:
1) the certificate of title has been lost or destroyed;
2) the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest therein; and
3) the certificate of title is in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.
Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost
or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting
titles in the name of their duly registered owners.
When the court relied on the previous judgment in the injunction cases that
the OCT of Layos was forged, it did NOT entertain a collateral attack when it
dismissed the reconstitution case.
Republic vs Taustumban
GR no. 173210 April 24, 2009
FACTS:
Tuastumban filed a petition for reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 7129,
Flr-133, Talisay-Minglanilla Estate under Patent No. 43619 in the name of the
Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo, with area of approximately 3,633 square meters. The
OCT which was in the possession of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu
was allegedly either lost or destroyed during World War II. Respondent anchored
her petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 26 which provides
that an original certificate of title may be reconstituted from an authenticated copy
of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued.
According to the Certification by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Cebu City, Lot No. 7129 was granted to the heirs of Sofia
Lazo via Patent No. 43619 issued on 21 July 1938. Respondent claims she bought
the property from the said owners who are also her relatives, as evidenced by an
Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Inheritance Rights and Deed of
Absolute Sale. She claims that since the time of purchase, she has been occupying
and possessing the land and paying the realty taxes thereon. Respondent prayed
for reconstitution of the title covering the property since the title, supposedly on
file and under the custody of the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province, had either
been lost or destroyed during World War II as certified by said office. Cebu City
Prosecutor, representing the Office of the Solicitor General, did not present any
evidence against respondent. On 11 December 2000, the RTC ordered to
reconstitute the lost Original Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 7129, Flr-133,
Talisay-Minglanilla Estate, in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo based on
683

Patent No. 43619 issued on 21 July 1938.

Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed the
RTC judgment. The appellate court held that no proper reconstitution can be done
since respondent did not utilize the sources of reconstitution provided under Sec.
2of R.A. No. 26 in the order therein stated, merely presenting as it did a
Certification from the CENRO that a patent had been issued over Lot No. 7129 in
the name of the heirs of Sofia Lazo.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the Court of
Appeals in its Amended Decision of 23 June 2006 reversed itself and held that
respondent has substantially complied with the requirements for reconstitution
under RA 26.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents presented by respondent constitute sufficient basis for the
reconstitution of title to Lot No. 7129.
HELD:
No. Respondents evidence is inadequate.
The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has
been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property
whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the
provisions of the Torrens System.
Respondent anchored her petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of RA 26.
Respondent however failed to present an authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued.
She relied on the CENRO certification which is however not the authenticated
copy of the decree of registration or patent required by law. The certification
plainly states only that Lot No. 7129 is patented in the name of the Legal Heirs of
Sofia Lazo. It is not even a copy of the decree of registration or patent itself but a
mere certification of the issuance of such patent.
Republic vs. Santua
GR No. 155703 sep. 8 2008
FACTS:
Dominador Santua was claiming that he is the owner of a parcel of land in
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. He could not produce the original copy of the
certificate as it was lost during an earthquake in 1994. The records of the Registry
of Deeds were destroyed due to a fire in 1977. There are no encumbrances on the
684

land.
Santua then filed for reconstitution. He presented a tax declaration, a survey
plan and technical description of the land as evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not tax declarations, technical description and lot plans are sufficient
bases for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles.
HELD:
No. Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:
SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or
destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the
description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original
had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Santua anchored his argument on Section 3 (f) of RA 26. However, applying the
principle of ejusdem generis, Section 3 (f) of RA 26 should be pertinent to the
items preceding it. Meaning, these should be documents issued by or are on file
with the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, they are documents from which the particulars of the certificate of title
or the circumstances which brought about its issuance could readily be ascertained.
At most, the tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of possession or a
claim of ownership.
As for the survey plan and technical descriptions, these are not the documents
referred to in Section 3(f) but merely additional documents that should accompany
the petition for reconstitution. Moreover, a survey plan or technical description
prepared at the instance of a party cannot be considered in his favor, the same
685

being self-serving.
Republic vs. Lagramada
GR. No. 150741 june 12, 2008
FACTS:
The land in this case was allegedly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
118717 in the name of Reynaldo Pangilinan. The original copy of TCT No.
118717 was allegedly destroyed when a fire razed the office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City on 11 June 1988.
On 25 June 1996, Pangilinan sold Lot 8 to the spouses Vicente and
BonifaciaLagramada. Respondents paid all the taxes on the land from 1976 to
1997 under Tax Declaration No. C-122-01735. On 16 April 1997, respondents
filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 118717 and for
the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of the title. Pangilinan allegedly
misplaced the owners duplicate copy and it could no longer be found despite
diligent efforts to find it.
After complying with the required publication and notice to all parties, the
trial court heard the petition on 7 January 1998. No oppositors appeared.
However, the trial court did not issue any default order. BonifaciaLagramada
appeared as the lone witness.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal on the
ground that respondents pieces of evidence are not sufficient to warrant
reconstitution of TCT No. 118717.
The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents sought the reconstitution of
TCT No. 118717 not in their capacity as owners but as persons who have an
interest in the property. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were asking
for reconstitution not in their names but in the name of Pangilinan.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents presented by respondents are sufficient bases for the
reconstitution of TCT No. 118717.
HELD:
686

No. The documents submitted by respondents are not sufficient bases for
reconstitution. A tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership.
In this case, two certificates of title were allegedly lost the original copy of
the transfer certificate of title in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City which was
destroyed in a fire, and the owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title which
Pangilinan misplaced. Hence, respondents were asking for the reconstitution of the
original copy of the transfer certificate of title and the issuance of a second owners
duplicate copy of the certificate of title.
The requirements of Sections 2 and 3 are almost identical. We agree with
petitioner that the enumerated requirements are documents from official sources
which recognize the ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest. We
likewise agree that any other document in paragraph (f) of Sections 2 and 3
refers to documents similar to those enumerated.
Republic vs .Royales
GR no. 168742 sep. 3 2008
FACTS:
On July 7, 1970, the Director of Lands filed a cadastral case
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur for several
parcels of land to be declared as public land. Norma Royales was
a claimant of the said lots. Subsequently, a notice was published
in the Official Gazette.
On September 17, 1975, the CFI ruled in favour of Royales
and ordered the registration of the lots in her name. However,
before the certificate of the finality of the decision and the order
of the issuance of the decree of registration could be issued by
the court, the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur was razed by
fire, burning all the titles and documents therein.
After about 27 years, herein respondent filed a petition for
the reconstitution of the CFI decision in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Camarines Sur. The RTC then set a date for the hearing
without directing the respondent to cause the publication of the
said order in the Official Gazette. Subsequently, the RTC granted
the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the 1975 decision.

687

The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the CA, which

upheld the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was
also denied, ruling that held that publication was no longer
required because the CFI, through the Land Registration
Commission (predecessor of the LRA), had already caused the
publication of the order in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication was necessary for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a final and
executory decision in a cadastral case.
HELD:
Yes, publication is an indispensible requirement in order for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The action is one of a cadastral proceeding as it was initiated
by the Republic of the Philippines and this remains to be the case
despite the earlier ruling of the CFI in favor of respondent since
the decree of registration has not yet been issued. This means the
case remains to be a pending cadastral case. The pertinent
provision, therefore, is Section 10 of Act 3110 which applies to
the reconstitution of a pending cadastral action, a distinct kind of
land registration process. It provides:
SEC. 10. Pending cadastral case shall be reconstituted as
follows:
The Court shall issue an order directing the person interested to
file anew their replies, for which purpose reasonable time may be
allowed. The order shall be published in the Official Gazette and by
local notices during a period fixed in said order.
Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents
petition for reconstitution for failing to comply with the publication requirement.

688

However, this does not mean that the cadastral case should be filed anew.
What the respondent has to do is to file the petition for reconstitution anew and
observe the requirements under Section 10 of Act 3110. Considering that there is
already a final decision in her favor, the case can continue and the court, if proper,
may order the issuance of a decree of registration.
The petition here is granted, reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Manotok vs. Barque

GR No. 162335, dec. 18 2008
FACTS:
Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate
Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. The subject
parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.On 23
December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government
pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of the
government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration of
the Director of Lands. Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823
began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which
destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945
square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in
1991. In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque
also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of
the alleged owners duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations
and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.MANOTOKs opposed alleging that
TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land
belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an
aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302)
pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
689

LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent.
Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1 st be
sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT. The LRA
denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the
dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the subject property. 2002 and
2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the
Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and
existing TCT No. 210177.
Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were
ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004. December 12, 2005, SC First Division
affirmed both decisions of the CA. Manotoks filed MR Denied in April
2006 Resolution.
Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with
their MR attached. Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of
judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the
meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution
of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for
Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments).
Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a
motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. They
alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale
Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that
the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be.
Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the
Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the
state.
CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation
of Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120
otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. Notably lacking in the deed of
conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the
690

factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase

of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of
fraud and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919.
They have since occupied the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The
subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta
who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently
bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by
armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their
rights.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right over Lot No. 823?

Held:
From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the
DENR-LMB indicate the original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain
Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records Management
Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of original documents
entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920 and 1923.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale
contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly
secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No.
29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of
Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved
by the Secretary of the Interior.
691

It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale
of friar lands shall be validonly if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).
In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the
original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives,
shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and
above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the
Secretarys approval.
The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance
of the RDs task in issuing the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend
that we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by
the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in
the name of the buyer Severino Manotok. FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that
even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the performance of official
duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by
then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over
friar lands.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the
Manahans, states that some Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of
the LMB do not bear the Secretarys signature despite full payment for the Friar
Land. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that
the applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all the requirements
under the Friar Lands Act.
The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department
issuance because it makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with
the records of the DENR field offices. The Manotoks copy of the alleged Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from the National
Archives. Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the
Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price.
(They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2] of the
Friar Lands Act.
Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention
however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias, the conveyance executed in favor of a
buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
692

ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale
may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full.
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the
certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such
certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd paragraph of
Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.
Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had
no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government because their
Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural ResourcesThe decades-long occupation by the Manotoks
of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings, are
of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the
existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the
latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any
explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no
record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds.
As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply
described the copy presented as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original
copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on
the year of issuance and name of registered owner.
Hulst vs PR Builders, GR No. 156364, Sep. 25, 2008, 566 SCRA 333
FACTS:
The Petitioner and his spouse, both Dutch Nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell
with PR Builders, Inc. to purchase a 210-sq m residential unit in the respondent's
townhouse project in Batanagas. When PR Builder's failed to comply with their
verbal promise to complete the project, the spouses Hulst filed a complaint for
recession of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees before the Housing
and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB), which then was granted. A Writ of
Execution was then addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan,
Batangas, but upon the complaint of the respondent, the levy was set aside, leaving
only the respondent's personal properties to be levied first. The Sheriff set a public
auction of the said levied properties, however, the respondent filed a motion to
quash Writ of levy on the ground that the sheriff made an over levy since the
aggregate appraised value of the properties at P6,500 per sq m is P83,616,000.
Instead of resolving the objection of the respondent's regarding the auction, the
Sheriff proceeded with the auction since there was no restraining order from the
HLURB. The 15 parcels of land was then awarded to Holly Properties Realty at a
693

bid of P5,450,653. On the same day, the Sheriff remitted the legal fees and
submitted to contracts of sale to HLURB, however, he then received orders to
suspend proceedings on the auction for the reason that the market value of the
properties was not fair. There was disparity between the appraised value and the
value made by the petitioner and the Sheriff, which should've been looked into by
the Sheriff before making the sale. While an inadequacy in price is not a ground to
annul such sale, the court is justified to such intervention where the price shocks
the conscience.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Sheriff erred in the value that was attached to the properties
during the auction and as well as disregarding the objection made by the
respondent's?
2. Whether or not the market value of the said property was inadequate?
2. Whether or not the spouses Hulst's request for damages is actionable?
HELD:
1. No. According to the Rules of Court, the value of the property levied is not
required to be exactly the same as the judgment debt. In the levy of property, the
Sheriff does not determine the exact valuation of the levied property. The Sheriff is
left to his own judgment. He should be allowed a reasonable margin between the
value of the property levied upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the
Sheriff levies upon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the execution does not
render his actions improper.
In the absence of a restraining order, no error can be imputed to the Sheriff in
proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash the levy filed
by the respondents with the HLURB. Sheriffs, as officers charged with the task of
the enforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must act with considerable
dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice. It is not within the
jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider and resolve respondent's objection to the
continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his
own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to
postpone the conduct of the auction sale.
2. No. The HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to
determine the value of the levied property. The Appraisal report, that was
submitted, was based on the projected value of the townhouse project after it shall
have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential units
appraised had already been built. Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project
694

did not push through, the projected value did not become a reality. Thus, the
appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value.
3. No. Under Article 12, Sec.7 of the 1987 Constitution, foreign nationals, the
spouses Hulst, are disqualified form owning real property. However, under article
1414 of the Civil Code, one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money
before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore
entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission,
which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to
acquire private land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to
the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price
paid to respondent. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract;
being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties
involved. Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Valiao vs Republic
GR 170757
FACTS:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for registration
of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality
of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the application
on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable
and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and
(3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial
thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they
acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio who
purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale
695

dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed
the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in
1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious,
uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants
as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and
violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application
for registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through
Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed
the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence,
the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the piece of land in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
HELD:
Petition denied.
Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts
and that only questions of law may be raised. This rule, however, is subject to
certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court. Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA
and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before
the lower courts.
Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question
has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the
696

absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already

classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain.
Republic vs Estenzo
158 SCRA 282
Facts:
On August 20, 1972, private respondent Jaime D. Omega filed
with the Court of First Instance of Leyte a petition to reopen the
cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 5463-B, Ormoc Cadastre, alleging
that he is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a portion of
said Lot No. 5463, denominated as Lot No. 5463-B and containing
as area of 15.868 square meters; that he acquired the same by
purchase from one Alejandro Padayao; that he and his
predecessors in interest have been in continuous possession and
occupation of said lot since time immemorial and have been
paying the taxes thereon. Respondent Omega sought the setting
aside of the decision of the cadastral court, dated October 31,
1940, and prayed that he be allowed to file his cadastral answer.
On September 26, 1972, respondent Judge rendered a decision
setting aside the decision of the cadastral court, dated October
31, 1940, declaring Lot No. 5463 as public land, and adjudicating
Lot No. 5463-B in favor of respondent Jaime D. Omega and
Asuncion Con-Ui.

Issue:
697

Whether the judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
cadastral proceedings.

Held:
Clearly, respondent Judge is without jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the cadastral proceedings. The land subject matter of
the case had been declared pubic land in a decision, dated
October 31, 1940 of the cadastral court. Under the provisions of
Republic Act 931, which took effect on June 20, 1953, the period
for reopening of cadastral proceedings expired on June 20, 1958.
The pertinent provision of said Act is as follows:
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have
been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the
survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some
justifiable reason had been unable to file their claims in the
proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such
parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right
within five years after the date on which this Act shall take effect,
to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the
provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as
amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and
the component Court of First Instance, upon receiving such
petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor
General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find that
all conditions herein established have been complied with, and
that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from
the time when land tax should have been collected until the day
when the motion is presented, it shall order said judical
proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such
parcels. (Emphasis supplied)
698

This period has been extended by Republic Act 2061 up to

December 31, 1968, after which there had been no further
extension.
Thus, respondent Judge was without jurisdiction to set aside the
cadastral decision, dated October 31, 1940, declaring lot No. 5463
as public land. The aforesaid decision is res judicata.

Director of Lands vs Rivas

141 SCRA 329
Facts:
On March 14, 1873 Domingo Bunaganwas purportedly granted a possessory
information title for a tract of land, called Nottab, and on November 3, 1885
obtained a "composiciongratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile, Cagayan or a
gratuitous adjustment title as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title, which
the Solicitor General found as not authentic.
In the present case, the parties involved assert their own claims over the disputed
parcel of land. The evidence presented by the parties was conflicting. According
to Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to Luis Guzman Rivas and later to
Cavaco, whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion was sold to Luis
and the remainder was sold to Lope Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to
Vijandre and Fernando A. Pascua.
The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its area, is
forestal and grazing land, and consequently, was inalienable land and, therefore, all
supposed sales regarding that land were void.
On the other hand, according to Vijandre's evidence in this case, on July 26, 1915,
Manuela Bunagan, the sole heir of Domingo, sold to Pablo Guzman for Pl,000 the
remainder of the land in Nottab, Enrile, Cagayan.Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre
filed in May, 1968 an application for the registration of two parcels of land located
at SitioNottab, the same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco.
The learned trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed the
applications of Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua and
Cavaco.
699

The Appellate Court reversed said decision and granted the application of Lope
and Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13. The Directors of Lands and Forest
Development appealed to this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in not declaring that the disputed land is
part of a forest reservation
Held:
The appellate court was wrong. The Supreme Court held that the disputed land is
inalienable public grazing land, being a part of the forest reserve. It is part of
Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile, Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of
Forestry Map L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan Land
Classification, containing an area of 8,249 hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and
Amulong, Cagayan. It is non-registerable. It cannot be appropriated by private
persons. It is not disposable public agricultural land.
Said land is a part of the forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation No. 159
dated February 13, 1967. It is intended for "wood production watershed soil
protection and other forest uses". The reservation was made prior to the instant
1968 application for registration.
We have stated that the supposed possessory information title issued in 1873 to the
original claimant, Domingo Bunagan, describes the land as a grazing land
Manuela Bunagan, the supposed heir to Domingo Bunagan, sold in 1915 the 2,000
hectares in question to Pablo Guzman at fifty centavos a hectare. Similarly, Ignacio
A. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a parcel
of pasture land".
Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from
grazing lands (inalienable).
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of private
ownership
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The
700

application for registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V. Vijandre and the
counter-application of lawyer Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed.
Homena vs Casa
157 SCRA 232
Facts:
The complaint, filed by plaintiffs-appellants against the spouses Dimas Casa and
Maria Castor, the defendants-appellees herein, was for alleged unlawful acts of
dispossession disturbing plaintiffs peaceful, continuous, open, uninterrupted
adverse and public possession of the property in question. In their complaint,
plaintiffs also sought to annull the original certificate of title issued by the Register
of Deeds for the province of Cotabato in favor of defendant spouses pursuant to a
Homestead Patent on the ground that said patent was obtained by defendant
spouses through fraud and misrepresentation by stating, among others, in their
application, that the lot was not claimed and occupied by another person. Plaintiffs
alleged that on June 15, 1967, they purchased from the defendants two (2) hectares
of the aforementioned parcel of land, it being agreed in the deed of sale that the
said portion would be reconveyed to plaintiffs after the five-year prohibitory
period, as provided for in the Homestead Patent Law, shall have elapsed, and that
defendants failed to abide by said agreement.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, based on the
following grounds: (1) the complaint is barred by prescription,
since thirteen years had elapsed from the issuance of the
homestead patent before the action was filed; (2) plaintiff has no
cause of action, since the deed of sale executed on June 15, 1952
or prior to the approval of the application and issuance of the
homestead patent was null and void and inoperative to convey
the land in question, which was at that time still public land; and
(3) plaintiff is not the proper party to institute the action to annul
the homestead patent.
In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs averred that
they were not assailing the validity of the patent as a whole, but
only with respect to that portion of two (2) hectares owned by
them which defendants, through fraud, were able to register in
their name. Because of such fraud, the action of the plaintiffs
cannot be deemed to have prescribed, since such action can be
brought within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud.
Moreover, the defense of prescription can not be set up in an
701

action to recover property held in trust by a person for another.

On January 4, 1968, the court a quo issued the questioned order
dismissing the complaint.

Issue:
1.The lower court erred in holding that the allegations in the
complaint do not conform with the terms and conditions of the
contract as to amount to a justifiable cause of action.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the plaintiffs-appellants
have no personality to bring the present action as they do not
seek the land for themselves but for the government.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the present action based
on fraud is barred by the statute of limitations.
4. The lower court erred in holding that the deed of sale is not
lawful as the same was made to circumvent the provisions of the
Public Land Act.
Held:
No, the court committed no reversible error in dismissing the complaint.
The plaintiffs' supposed cause of action rests upon the deed of sale executed by
defendants in their favor on June 15, 1962 wherein the latter sold a two-hectare
portion of the homestead which they were applying for to the plaintiffs on the
understanding that the actual conveyance of the said portion to plaintiffs would be
made only after the lapse of the five-year period during which, under the Public
Land Act, the homestead owner was prohibited from transferring his rights. The
agreement is clearly illegal and void ab initio; it is intended to circumvent and
violate the law. As parties to a void contract, the plaintiffs have no rights which
they can enforce and the court can not lend itself to its enforcement. Plaintiffs can
neither invoke the doctrine of implied trust based on an illegal contract. The issue
of prescription or laches becomes irrelevant in a case such as this, where plaintiffs
clearly have no cause of action.
Tan vs. Director of Forestry
702

FACTS:
The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a certain
tract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land consists of 6,240
hectares and located within the former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,252
hectares of timberland. Petitioner submitted his application in due form along with
nine other applicants. Thereafter, President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to
the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation establishing the said
area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids received for the
issuance of timber license be rejected. The Secretary of Agriculture and National
Resources sustained the recommendations of the Director of Forestry who
concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made
available for exploitation under certain conditions. Finally, the area was awarded to
petitioner. Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for
reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry. Ravago appealed to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which later on, declared the
license issued to petitioner by Director of Forestry as null and void. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies

HELD:
YES. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders
or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner to take that appeal
is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. From the decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioner had a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing to the Chief Executive. Certiorari
is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again, it being a time honored and
well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must exhaust the
administrative remedies available.
Republic vs Imperial Credit Corp.
GR 173088
703

Facts:
Respondent Imperial Credit Corporation purchased from Jose Tajon a parcel
of land situated in Barrio
Colaique (now Barangay San Roque), Antipolo City, Rizal for the sum
of P17,986.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Upon full payment
of the balance of P1,909.00 through judicial consignation, ownership of the
property was consolidated in the name of respondent and the mortgage constituted
thereon released in December 1997. The property was thereafter privately surveyed
under PSU-178075 and approved on 25 January 2000.
The respondent thereafter filed before the RTC of Antipolo City an
application for registration of a parcel of land, as shown on Plan PSU-178075
containing an area of 8,993 square meters. The application alleged, among others,
that respondent subrogated former owner Jose Tajon, who has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the parcel of
land, being a part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, by virtue of Deed of Sale with
Mortgage executed on 07 March 1966. There were no oppositors.
At the hearing, Ricardo Santos, respondents legal researcher and duly
authorized attorney-in-fact, testified on the fact of respondents actual possession
through its caretaker, Teodisia Palapus, who had been overseeing said property
since its acquisition from Jose Tajon. Palapus also corroborated Santos testimony
and added that except for some trespassers, no one else had laid possessory claim
on the property. Aside from the transfer documents, the other documentary
evidence submitted consisted of a 1993 tax declaration, the tracing cloth plan,
survey description, a certification from the Land Management Sector in lieu of the
geodetic engineers certificate and the report by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office that the property falls within the alienable and disposable
zone.
RTC rendered judgement in favor of the respondents. The Republic appealed
the decision contending that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence
that respondent and its predecessor-in-interest have been in open continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. Hence this petition.
704

Issue:
Whether the lower courts erred in granting the respondents application for
origingal registration of title, holding as basis thereof par 2 and 4 of Sec 14 of PD
1529?
Held:
Yes. Petitioner argues that contrary to the Court of Appeals ruling that respondent
was able to prove its claim under paragraphs (2) and (4) of Section 14, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, respondents application for registration was actually
based on paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, the conditions under which
were not sufficiently established by respondents evidence. Although petitioner
concedes that respondent was able to show that the land applied for has been
declassified from the forest or timber zone and is an alienable public agricultural
land, respondents evidence failed to satisfy the requirement under paragraph (1) of
Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, that is, respondents possession and occupation of the
property for the length of time and in the manner required by law.
The reckoning date under the Public Land Act for the acquisition of ownership of
public lands is June 12, 1945 or earlier, and that evidence of possession from that
date or earlier is essential for a grant of an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve
as sufficient basis for inferring possession. However, (Case ended abruptly as per
the copy provided by sc.judiciary.gov. I shall check from the library the additional
ratio provided by the Court. But for our purposes now, and from the facts, we can
attribute the reversion of judgement to the respondents inability to present proof
that they, and their predecessors-in-interest, satisfied the requirement laid by law
of the manner and length of possession and occupation over the property in
question. The deficiency being that they have proven possession only from 1993, as
evidenced by the tax declaration).
DENR et al VS. YAP et al

705

FACTS:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc.
No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to
secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
706

ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had
the right to have the lots registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the
mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised
Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that
respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry
Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the
appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG
sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial
court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
707

1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land

(protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since
time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of
the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right
to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD:
petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD
708

No. 705 defines apublic forest as a mass of lands of the public

domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects
titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the
1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or
709

claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of
land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064.
This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is
misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when
the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act
710

No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of

Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then,
courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to
determine the classification of lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future
value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the
land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of
proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitutionclassifying lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks,
do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
of Forestryis particularly instructive:
711

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does

not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a
dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of lands
of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is
tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not
look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may
not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
712

under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not

denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural.
Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily
mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith
as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or
protect their possession. For another, they may look into other
modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by
law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them
from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.

Cayanan v. delos Santos

21 scra 1348
Facts:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac
Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16, 1958, a petition for review was filed
in the same proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of
appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was
rendered and a decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was
713

stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the
other respondent, appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the
said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration, the
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate
of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant
Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on appeal. It
was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case, as admitted by the
petitioners, even [if] the petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of
final decree, the same cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the
questioned lot has already been transferred to Felix L. [Camaya] in accordance
with section 38 of the Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states
that such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L.
[Camaya] is not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly threshed out
in an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition, like the one at bar."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court acting as such could likewise inquire into an
allegation that the lot subject of the decree was transferred in a simulated sale
intended to avoid such a review.
HELD:
It can and accordingly reverse the appealed order.
The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496 may
be sought in 'the competent Court of First Instance' is no sufficient indication that
the petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general
jurisdiction, considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts
on land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and
that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another."
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of one year fixed for
the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
714

decision therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it.
In Capio v. Capio, the ruling being to the effect "that the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
after the entry of the final decree; that as long as the final decree
is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another party."
The order was SET ASIDE and the case remanded to the Court of First Instance for
a hearing on the merits of the petition of appellants for the reopening of the decree
of registration in favor of appellee Leon de los Santos.
Talusan vs Tayag
GR 133698
Facts:
On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein
they alleged, inter alia, that:
They bought the subject property covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial,
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
On October 15, 1985, [herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x
x x sued x x x in his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City,
wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him
that the above described property would be sold at public auction
on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate
taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the
sum of P4,039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties
thereon;Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to
Australia in 1974. Elias Imperial never authorized a certain
Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for and on
his behalf.
[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to
715

[Respondent] Tayag for P4,400.00 without any notice to the

former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and without
compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by
the Certificate of Sale.
A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the [Respondent]
Hermenegildo Tayag. The assessed value alone of the said
property is P37,310.00 and the fair market value of the same is
more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these. The
bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the
conscience, thus, the sale for the alleged unpaid taxes in the
sum of P4,039.79, including penalties is null and void ab initio.
[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in
question, since they bought the same from its former owners, and
their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse and in the
concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has
never been in possession of the said property.
[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the
[respondents] the sum of P4,400 plus all interests and expenses
which [they] might have incurred x x x but said offer was rejected
without any just [or] lawful cause.
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
preserve the status quo.
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00;
exemplary damages of not less than P20,000.00; attorneys fee of
P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 for every
appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00 to
prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his
[A]nswer with [C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record),
wherein he substantially denied the allegations in the complaint
and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative defenses,
among others: (T)he ownership of the Condominium unit
registered under Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio
City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16,
716

1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and executory

as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8,
1987
[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a
buyer in good faith in a regular and lawful public bidding in which
any person is qualified to participate.
The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim
because the [petitioners] pray for the annulment of the
Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was
affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision
has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate
of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
The public auction sale complied with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 464 hence, the same is lawful and
valid:
[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale
in favor of the [petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not
registered and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of:
moral damages of at least P50,000.00; exemplary damages;
attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and, expenses of
litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18.
1988, wherein he denied the material averments in the complaint
and stated that no irregularity or illegality was committed in the
conduct of the proceedings with respect to the delinquent real
property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant
herein were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance
with the provisions of the law pertaining to delinquent real
property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real
Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed
against him. He also claimed, by way of affirmative defenses,
that:
717

The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent]

herein:
[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No.
464 x x x thus, the case cannot prosper;
Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the
plaintiffs [because of] the fact that it is unregistered, the same
does not bind third persons including defendant herein.
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7,
1981, they had acquired the condominium from Elias Imperial, the
original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was purportedly
evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not and
thenceforth never been registered with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioners also averred that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City
Treasurer Juan Hernandez sold the property at a public auction
due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate taxes thereon. The
property was sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400
which represented the unpaid taxes.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of
the auction sale. They cited irregularities in the proceedings and
noncompliance with statutory requirements.
Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City
cited the December 16, 1987 judgment of Branch 6 of the same
court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier Branch 6 Decision
had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of
Respondent Tayag. The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31,
1988 Order of Branch 5 of the same court which had granted a
Petition for the Cancellation of Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 651 in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the Register of
Deeds to issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of
Respondent Tayag. According to the trial court, the Decision in
LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already upheld the legality of the
questioned auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same issue
would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal
court, contrary to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
718

Rejecting petitioners contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the
CA ruled that such inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale. It likewise held
that petitioners had not established bad faith on the part of respondents in
conducting the auction sale. Finally, it agreed with the latters contention that the
former were remiss in causing the registration of the sale in their favor of the
subject property and they likewise did not fulfill their obligation to pay taxes. It
[is] thus clear x x x they should only have themselves to blame. Laws exist to be
followed, failing in which the price must be paid.
Issue:
Whether the auction sale is valid.
Held:
The auction sale is valid. Petitioners contend that the auction sale
was invalid, because several requisites regarding notice and
publication were not satisfied. We are not convinced.
It has been held that matters of notice and publication in tax
sales are factual questions that cannot be determined by this
Court. Moreover, a recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
as in this case, generally precludes the determination of factual
issues. This Court will not, as a rule, inquire into the evidence
relied upon by the lower courts to support their findings. In this
case, the CA had already ruled on the question of compliance with
the requirements of notice and publication in this wise:
In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements
of notice, publication and posting have been complied with by the
public defendant prior to the auction sale wherein the subject
condominium unit was sold. x x x Ergo, there was nothing
irregular in the questioned public auction -- thus, the validity of
the same must be upheld in accordance with the aforementioned
cases.
The CA ruling notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss
these factual issues in order to assure petitioners of a complete
adjudication of their case, and not a mere disposition of
procedural technicalities.
719

Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because

of noncompliance with the requirement of publication prescribed
in Section 65 of PD 464.
In this regard, we note that unlike land registration
proceedings which are in rem, cases involving an auction sale of
land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam. Thus,
notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in
rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in
personam. As such, mere publication of the notice of delinquency
would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in
personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city
treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the
taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by
registered mail to the permanent address of the registered owner
in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City directed
him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest
in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice
sent by registered mail adequately protected the rights of the
taxpayer, who was the registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of
the property is deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered
owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other
proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners
of the property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of
such notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it.
Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not
given personal notice of the public auction. They cite Section 73
of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced
hereunder:
x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by
registered mail or by messenger, or through messenger, or
through the barrio captain, to the delinquent taxpayer, at the
address shown in the tax rolls or property tax records of the
municipality or city where the property is located, or at his
720

residence, if known to said treasurer or barrio captain. x x x.

(Underscoring supplied by petitioners in their Memorandum)
According to petitioners, the notice of public auction should
have been sent to the address appearing in the tax roll or
property records of the City of Baguio. That address is Unit No. 5,
Baden #4105, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the
known address or residence of the registered owner at 145 Ermin
Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City. They contend that notice may
be sent to the residence of the taxpayer, only when the tax roll
does not show any address of the property.
The above-cited provision, however, shows that the
determination of the taxpayers address to which the notice may
be sent is the treasurers discretionary prerogative. In this case,
the city treasurer deemed it best to send the notice of public
auction to the residence of the taxpayer. The former validly
exercised this option, inasmuch as the address of the latter was
known to him. Moreover, it was more practical and favorable to
the registered owner that the notice of delinquency be sent to his
permanent residence in Manila, because he was using the subject
condominium unit merely as a vacation house and not as a
residence.
This Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals made a clear and
categorical ruling on the matter, when it declared as follows:
Under the said provisions of law, notices of the sale of the public
auction may be sent to the delinquent taxpayer, either (I) at the
address as shown in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of
the municipality or city where the property is located or (ii) at his
residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio captain.
(emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, for purposes of the collection of real property
taxes, the registered owner of the property is considered the
taxpayer. Although petitioners have been in possession of the
subject premises by virtue of an unregistered deed of sale, such
transaction has no binding effect with respect to third persons
who have no knowledge of it.
721

The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated

in Section 51 of the Property Registration Decree or PD 1529,
which reads:
Sec. 51.
Conveyance and other dealings by registered
owner. - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage,
lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with
existing laws. He may use such forms, deeds, mortgages, leases
or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no
deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will
purporting to convey or effect registered land, shall take effect as
a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
Registry of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where
the land lies.
Thus, insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the
registration of the deed of sale that can validly transfer or convey
a persons interest in a property. In the absence of registration,
the registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of
title is deemed the taxpayer to whom the notice of auction sale
should be sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be
taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of the auction sale
may not be invoked successfully.
As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable
considerations will not find application, if the statutes or rules of
procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and standards by
which the matters at bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent
Tayag are innocent purchasers of the subject property, it is a
well-settled principle that between two purchasers, the one who
has registered the sale in ones favor has a preferred right over
the other whose title has not been registered, even if the latter is
722

in actual possession of the subject property.

Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners
brought this misfortune upon themselves. They neither
registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the
consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their
name. Worse, they failed to pay the real property taxes
due. Although they had been in possession of the property since
1981, they did not take the necessary steps to protect and
legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners suit is now barred by laches. The law helps
the vigilant, but not those who sleep on their rights, for time is a
means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against the
slothful and the contemners of their own rights.

723