1

US

Policy

towards

Iran:

roots

of

failures

and

corrective

perspective
By Hooshang Amirahmadi and Shahir ShahidSaless
Abstract
The objectives of this essay are threefold. First, to seek an answer to the
question of why Iran and the US do not or cannot engage in a process of
sustained dialogue aimed at dtente and minimal cooperation; second, to
demonstrate that the current US policies towards Irans nuclear program will
likely fail, leading to either nuclear weaponization of Iran or war; and third, to
offer corrective policy adjustments aimed at dtente and ending the standoff
over Irans nuclear program. There are several points of friction between the
US and Iran. However, what is highly noteworthy is that the two countries are
locked in a rare relationship: Their governments cannot talk in a meaningful
and consistent way to each other. This pattern was not seen even during the
Cold-War era between the US and its communist adverseries. If the factors
contributing to the perpetuation of this state of non-communication (or
failing engagement) continue to be ignored, it would be unreasonable to
expect a negotiated solution.
The perilous state of US-Iran relations
The spiral conflict between the US and Iran is multifaceted. From the US
perspective, major dimensions of the conflict include Irans nuclear program,
threat to the security of Israel, sponsorship of terrorism, abuses of human
rights, and inspiring anti-Americanism in the region. Currently, the US is
focused on uranium enrichment and is determined to to prevent Iran from
having nuclear weapons capability.
The Iranian governments perspective is given in its policy paper prepared in
2007:

2
America and the Westfrom the inception of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, have assailed the existence, independence and sovereignty of
our country by raising issues such as human rights, export of
revolution, womens rights, minorities rights, sponsoring terrorism,
opposition to the so-called Middle East peace process, efforts to
destabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, and finally our peaceful nuclear
technology as pretextAmerica, under the slogan of sponsoring
democracy, explicitly talks about regime change in one of the most
democratic countries in the region and the world[Therefore, at this
point] Iran would adopt a new strategy[based on] confrontation
with Americas unilateralism in all global stages. 1

Particular to the nuclear issue, Irans position is that it is simply doing what it
is allowed to do under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the
NPT, a signatory state has the right to enrich uranium to be used as fuel for
civil nuclear power. Iran claims that the UN resolutions are politically
motivated and as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said: The Iranian
nation will not succumb to bullying, invasion and the violation of its rights.
As admitted by the US officials, Iran is not yet building a bomb but the US
remains concern that Iran is aiming at developing a military capability. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in its February 2012 report, also
expressed concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear
program. Unable to resolve their disputes through diplomacy, the two sides
have increasingly resorted to confrontational policies.
To stop Iran from advancing in the military direction, the US has applied a
policy of pressure and insists that Iran abide by the UN resolutions
demanding a halt to uranium enrichment until all concerns about the nature
of its nuclear program are addressed. The US has led international efforts in
crafting and imposing sanctions (through the UN and the EU) and has
unilaterally ratcheted crippling economic and financial sanctions against Iran.
It has also sought to isolate Tehran, and it supports the Iranian political
opposition and disgruntled ethnic groups.2 These pressures and several UN

3
resolutions notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic has refused to suspend its
uranium enrichment program.
Aside from resisting pressures, Iran has also responded by punishing acts
of its own. It has gradually increased the number of centrifuges spinning in
the nations uranium enrichment plants from the initial 164 centrifuges in
2006 to around 8,000, and it is enriching uranium to 20 percent. As claimed
by the Pentagon3, the Islamic Republic has used its Quds Force to make the
US bleed in Iraq, and according to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme
Leader, Tehran has provided logistical supports to anti-Israeli forces in the
region4. Moreover, Khamanei has issued a new policy of threat against
threat5. This threat policy has been a major reason for the rise in oil prices
in 2012.
The US dual-track policy towards Iran
The US policy towards Irans nuclear program is aimed at making that
country suspend uranium enrichment activities until all questions with regard
to its nuclear project are addressed. To fulfill this objective, according to the
State Department, the US is committed to a dual-track policy of applying
pressure in pursuit of constructive engagement, and a negotiated solution.
The policy, originally dubbed as carrot and stick, has overtime become a
stick only dogma. Sanctions are central to this coercive diplomacy, which
also includes the threat of military action under the mantra of all options are
on the table.
Many Iran experts including Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh support the
dual-track policy. In a fall 2011 paper6 they write, the two of us were among
the very first to propose this policy. They assert that the Obama
administration started out with a passionate determination to emphasize
carrots, and claim that the United States and the international community
have offered Iran a path toward a responsible civilian nuclear program ...
should it conform to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.

4
They then admit that the current version of the two-track policy has failed
and propose more biting measures directed at regimes security.
Contrary to assertions by Pollack and Takeyh, among others, the problem
with the dual-track policy is not that it was not biting enough but that it is
based on wrong arguments and understandings. For example, the rationale
behind the US view that Iran may develop nuclear weapons is weak. First, no
country has developed nuclear weapons while remaining a signatory to the
NPT. If Irans plan were to build nuclear weapons, it could withdraw from the
NPT by giving the IAEA a three-month advanced notice, as required, and then
reconfigure its facilities for weapon production. Democratic Peoples Republic
of Korea (DPRK) in 2003 withdrew from the NPT and in 2006 tested its first
nuclear weapon underground.
Second, if Iran intends to acquire atomic weapons covertly, why then would
it invite draconian sanctions and threat of war by stubbornly insisting on the
continuation of its overt nuclear activities? Third, if we were to accept the
view of many high-ranking Americans that the leaders in Iran are rational
actors,7 then Tehrans insistence on pursuing its nuclear program under the
IAEA watch does not pass a rational cost-benefit test. If Iran intends to
acquire nuclear weapons, it cannot do so overtly because its recognized
facilities are monitored by the IAEA and the country is under international
radar.
Finally, the assumption that pressure works with Iran is also a misplaced
understanding of the dual-track policy. The policy measures, including tough
sanctions, can and have crippled Iranian economy and harmed the
population, particularly those in the lower income brackets. A tightening and
toughening of the sanction and other isolating measures can further worsen
the life situation in the country. However, their impact on the regime will not
be so devastating as to make it bent under the pressure and give up its
rights to uranium enrichment. The following pages will explain why.

5
Why dual-track policy has failed in its core objective?
In their paper Pollack and Takeyh write:
Since taking office in 2009, the administration has patiently pursued a
two-track policy which seeks to persuade the Iranian leadership to give
up its nuclear weapons ambitions by creating a series of reinforcing
positive and negative incentives. The administration started out,
properly, by offering to repair relations through a process of
engagement. When Tehran rebuffed these overtures, Washington
switched over to the path of pressure

The authors justify Washingtons shift to an all-coercive policy by Obamas

failed overture to Iran in March 2009. What they fail to offer is an in-depth
explanation as to why Tehran turned down Obamas reconciliatory move.
Logic dictates that in order to adjust a failed policy the cause(s) for the
failure be carefully identified and explained.

Pollack and Takeyhs passing

reference to the rule of mistrust and ideology in the failure of Obamas

overture could have provided an excellent analytical clue and formed logical
basis for a more effective policy. However, they neglect to give any credence
to their own correct diagnosis in recommending the next US policy direction.
Specifically,

Pollack

and

Takeyh

acknowledge

that

the

strategy

of

engagement that we proposed and the Bush and Obama administrations

implemented was bedeviled by its core intellectual misjudgment discounting
ideology and mistrust of the United States as critical ingredients of Irans
international relations. However, their analysis stops here and gives no
explanation as to why mistrust and ideology are key problems in US-Iran
relations. Neither is there any recommendation or indication in their new
proposed policy to address these factors in bringing the Iranians to the
negotiation table.

6
Contrary to the logic of their analytical contention, Pollack and Takeyh move
in the direction of recommending a new tougher policy by suggesting more
coercive measures and doubling down on Iran in order to directly harm the
regime. If mistrust and ideology have been major factors in the failure of the
previous

policies,

then obviously,

intensifying

pressures

and directly

targeting the survival of the ideological regime will elevate the level of
mistrust and ideological conflict even higher, thus minimizing the likelihood
of a cogent negotiation process.
It is our contention that a broader and deeper explanation of the causes of
the conflict between Iran and the US and the prevailing state of noncommunication between the two governments would logically lead to a new
policy paradigm. The new perspective must at the least account for the
important role that mistrust, perceptions, and misanalysis play in US-Iran
relations. We further believe that unless US policy towards Iran takes the
challenge and considers these factors in due manners, it will have no chance
of changing Irans behavior.
Worst yet, with existing policies in place, despite their biting intensity, Iran
will be moved toward nuclear weaponization, thus making a war with it
inevitable. Only regime change or recognition of Irans right to uranium
enrichment can prevent these eventualities. Given the state of the Iranian
opposition, regime change is a remote possibility, leaving the right issue as a
panacea. On the basis of this understanding, and in the interest of regional
stability and world peace, in the pages that follow we are humbly calling for
a paradigm change and have offered corrections to the dual-track policy.
The role of mistrust
Mistrust plays a key role in US-Iran spiral conflict. The admitted role of the US
in the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mossadegh, Irans popular Prime

7
Minister, is central to the debate on mistrust between Iran and the US.
Following the coup, the Shahs repressive regime emerged as a major ColdWar ally of the US in its competition with the USSR. The Shahs
modernization program, promoted by the US, would try to westernize Iran,
and thus marginalize the traditional and Islamic cultures. In resistance to the
Shahs policies, an Islamic movement under the leadership of Ayatollah
Khomeini emerged.
In a 1964 fiery speech directed at the Shah, Khomeini had said, if [our]
country is under American occupation then tell us.8 Shortly after the speech,
he was expelled from Iran and sent to exile. Subsequently, the modernization
program accelerated and attacks on the conservative political Islam
represented by the Ayatollah increased. To downgrade Khomeini and his
followers, the Shahs regime would call them with the derogatory term of
erteja-e siah (black reactionaries). Thus, when the Islamic Republic of Iran
came to exist, seeds of hostility between the two states had already been
planted.
Just months after the victory of the Iranian revolution, the American Embassy
in Tehran was seized by a group of radical Muslim students, intensifying
already tense relations between the two countries. In an in-depth study of
the

hostage

crisis,

David

Houghton

examines

several

competing

explanations of why Iranian students seized the US embassy in Tehran. The

hostage crisis developed into a much larger episode than the students had
envisioned: the religious ruling elite used it to consolidate power and
eliminate political rivals. However, according to Houghton, the initial
motivation for hostage-taking came from a feeling of deep insecurity for the
revolution originating from a strong sense of mistrust of the US.9
Around the date that the Shah entered the US, Ayatollah Khomeini, in an
interview with a Western journalist, said, When we have been bitten by a
snake, we are even afraid of a piece of rope which from afar looks like a

8
snakeWe fear you socially and politically. 10 As one of the hostage-takers
years later explained, with the admission of the Shah to the United States,
we thought the countdown for another coup dtat had begun. 11 Backed by
an array of evidence, Houghton concludes that the best explanation for
hostage taking is that the radical Muslim students had reached the
conclusion that the revolution was threatened and wanted to prevent a
repeat of the 1953 coup.
Nikki Keddie, a scholar of Iranian studies, maintains that for every strangeseeming character trait [of the Iranians], as with mistrust or paranoia,
one can nearly always find partially explanatory causes in Iranian history. 12
According to Houghton, the students misperception of the admission of the
Shah to the United States, coupled with the meeting between the liberal
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Zbigniew Brzezinski, were the immediate
causes of the seizure of the embassy. The Shah was admitted to the US
because he was extremely ill, but students and the leaders supporting them
thought the US was plotting another coup.
The hostage crisis was also caused by misreading of the Iranian reality.
Specifically, President Jimmy Carter failed to detect the deep antiAmericanism of the revolution and that the 1953 coup was not an ancient
history in Iran. It was on the basis of this understanding that he allowed the
Shahs admission to the US for cancer treatment, triggering the hostage
crisis. As a former American hostage correctly put it, Americas role in the
collapse of the Mossadegh government in 1953 was as immediate and alive
to the people as if it had occurred yesterday. 13 Iranians have a long
historical memory.
The 444-day long hostage crisis has created a lasting mistrust of the Iranian
regime in the American political realm. In the words of Gary Sick, the
underlying belief [was] that we were dealing not only with a government that
had flouted the laws of nations ... but with a regime that was historically
illegitimate, unfit, despicable.14 The American view of Iran became even

9
more negative as a result of events like bombing of American embassies in
Beirut and Africa, the Khobar terrorist attack against the Americans in the
Saudi Arabia, and attacks against the American troops in Iraq. The revelation
of years of clandestine nuclear activities in 2003 took the Americans
mistrust of Iran to new heights.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies asserts that mistrust now
affects every aspect of US-Iranian competition over energy, economics,
trade, sanctions and the nuclear issue.15 Under the situation, it seems odd
that policy-makers and analysts have remained silent about the fact that no
measure has been taken to address this state of extreme mistrust. On the
contrary, the adopted policies to date have largely contributed to the
intensification of mistrust between the US and Iran. It could be argued, as
Pollack and Takeyh do, that President Obama tried to address the issue but
was rebuffed by the Supreme Leader of Iran. As we shall argue below, this
assertion is deeply flawed.
Fear of regime change
Fear of regime change is another important factor in US-Iran spiral conflict.
High level of mistrust reveals itself mainly as fear of regime change by the
Islamic regime. Since the time of the Shahs admission into the US, Tehran
has perceived regime change as the real aim of US policies.

This

perception has overtime become solidified in the mind of the Iranian Islamic
leaders because of President Bushs axis of evil characterization, the
articulation of the preventive war doctrine, the US support for the opposition
to destabilize the regime, and the imposition of sanctions. Reporting by the
international media on alleged US covert operations to sow chaos in Iran
have further fueled the Iranians suspicions.16
Since Khamenei's perception is that the US strategy is regime change, he
strongly holds that under bullying and intimidation, the way to success is to
not retreat from the enemy, not even one step. 17 He has been quoted as

10
saying: If the officials of a country get daunted by the bullying of the
arrogant powers and, as a result, begin to retreat from their own principles
and make concessions to those powers, these concessions will never come to
an end! Indeed, the end to US pressure and intimidation will only come
when Iranian officials announce they are ready to compromise Islam and
their popular Islamic Republic and the United States may bring to power in
this country whoever it wants!18
Resisting pressure is a broadly shared view among the ruling hardliners in
Iran, layman and clergy alike. They believe that the suspension of the
nuclear program under coercion would open the door to more coercion and
demands of concessions by the US. Grand Ayatollah Makarem once remarked
that even If the nuclear issue is resolved they (foreign powers) will start
making claims about human rights, freedom of the press . . . We have to be
careful and never accede to their demands. 19 The fear of regime change,
next to the mutual mistrust, is a key obstacle to a solution to the nuclear
dispute.
The pride and right factors
The carrot-and-stick policy was not a solution and the current stick-only
approach is even less promising. Tehran perceives the policy as extremely
disrespectful. A joint report on Irans nuclear issue, prepared by the US
Institute of Peace and United Nations Association in 2009, noted that in the
Iranian cultural context, terms such as carrots and sticks are understood to
apply to donkeys rather than countries or leaders. The report recommended
that the US leaders should cease threats and intimidation and replace it
with a respectful discourse.20 Mohamed ElBaradei, when heading the IAEA,
had also repeatedly reminded the American leaders that carrot and stickis
a policy suitable for a donkey but not for a proud nation.21
Pride has a significant place in the construction of Irans national identity.
Iranians have been characterized as proud or very proud people by

11
numerous scholars of Iranian studies. This sentiment is rooted in their long
civilization and cultural heritage. Iran experts such as George Perkovich and
Shahram Chubin22 have posited that national pride drives Irans nuclear
program. Kamal Kharrazi, Irans former Foreign Minister, was once quoted as
saying no government can relinquish a program that has gained it national
pride.23 In Iran national pride is more important than national interest
because pride directly connects to the right factor, that is, national
right and national pride is often used interchangeably.
An opinion poll conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2011 showed that 87
percent of Iranians strongly favor Iranian development of nuclear energy for
civilian use, while 98 percent believed that the possession of nuclear energy
is a national right.24 When Iranians say that nuclear energy is their national
right, they are not making a legal statement only but a pride sentiment as
well. Yet, [T]he so-called carrot and stick policy ignores the immense value
that Iranians have always placed on their pride and prestige.25 Given that
pride and right are driving forces of Irans nuclear program, it is only logical
that they receive due consideration in formulating solutions to the deadlock.
This powerful sentiment concerning pride and its pervasive role in Irans
nuclear program is incomprehensible to the Western analysts and policymakers alike. It is no surprise that the US policies toward Iran almost
unreservedly discount the influence of national pride. ElBaradei had
reportedly reminded the Obama administration that in seeking a solution to
Irans nuclear impasse, it is necessary to design an approach that is
sensitive to Irans pride.26 Indeed, the Iranian political leaders, the Supreme
Leader in particular, would incur a high cost if they were to back down from
the nuclear issue, given that they have constantly linked it to national pride
and right, often comparing the program to the oil nationalization in 1950s.
The official US explanation as to why Iran refuses to suspend uranium
enrichments is that it is seeking to develop a nuclear weapon capability.
Should not they also consider the national pride issue as an alternative

12
explanation? A perception adjustment of that nature has the consequence of
accepting that the Iranian leadership cannot agree to conduct negotiations
which have no regards for Iranians pride and right. This then can logically
make the US officials consider changing their tones and approach. The
adjustment can certainly help given that the Iranian political leaders often
accuse the US officials of speaking in tones that are disrespectful and
derogatory. True, the Iranians also often speak in undiplomatic language but
reciprocating such behavior has only worsened the problem.
Given the role of pride in the Iranian culture, Tehrans rejection of President
Barak Obamas 2009 televised message for a new beginning was
predictable. Yet, the American officials and most Iran experts saw the
reaction as a vicious rebuff of Obamas conciliatory move. It is true that the
message included an unprecedented overture, but it is also true that it
implicitly accused the Iranian regime of supporting terror and building
nuclear arms. In Khameneis view once again the carrot and stick policy
was in display. He immediately criticized Obama saying they congratulate
the Iranian New Year, but, at the same time, accuse Iran of supporting
terrorism and efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons. Our nationhates
[the policy of] threat and enticement.27
Islamic culture of resistance
In the Muslim Middle East, particularly in Shiite Iran, resistance is a key
characteristic of the traditional culture. The Shiite culture urges Muslims to
resist when they are put under pressure. Drawing on Islamic teachings,
Khamanei has constantly preached about the superiority of believers
(momenin) over worldly people (aafiat-talaban) in defending their values
(arzeshha), honor (sharaf) and dignity (ezzat). Besides, Khamanei himself
has become a symbol of resistance to the US and Israel, a position that
provides him with authority (eghtedar) and stature (jaaygah) as the Guardian
Jurist (vali-e faqih). There is a serious concern that his position will be ruined

13
if he were to surrender Irans inalienable rights, as he has often put it, to
nuclear energy under humiliating conditions.
It is no wonder that the coercive policy, which ignores the Iranian traditional
resistance culture, has been a powerful source of blockage to negotiations
between the two states. Under coercion and humiliation, we believe, the
Iranian Supreme Leader could act suicidal. First, because he believes in
martyrdom and, if need be, in becoming a martyr for Islam, his beloved
religion; and second, he and the power elite tend to believe that Iran is
powerful enough to defeat the US by harming its interests in the region in an
irregular warfare. General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force,
repeatedly cites Hezbollahs 33-day war and Hamass 22-day war with Israel
as examples of how the spirit of martyrdom (roohe shahid talabi) can
defeat powerful armies.
The Role of Misanalysis
Another factor that has negatively impacted US policy towards Iran is the
misanalysis of domestic political struggle. Irans 2009 contested presidential
elections is a case in point. The dispute over who won the race prompted
street protests and violent oppression by the government. In the West, the
US in particular, the Green Movement became a new source of hope for
regime change and halting Irans nuclear program. For example, Ray Takeyh
would argue that the only thing standing between the mullahs and the
bomb is the Green Movement;28 Richard Haas would posit that control
[over Irans nuclear program] wont be won at the negotiating table, but on
the streets. The West must make clear its support for the protesters; 29 and
Pollack and Takeyh in their 2011 article, argued that making connections with
the Green Movement would be a critical component of any strategy.
These arguments are based on a serious misanalysis and have already
complicated the relations, making constructive communication between the

14
two states even more unlikely. In sharp contrast to the widespread view
among Western political pundits and policy-makers, the Green Movement is
not a struggle of the people against the regime. Rather, it is mainly a
struggle between two factions: the religious conservatives (traditionalists)
who support the regime and the principle of absolute guardianship of the
jurist (velayat-e motlaghe faqih), and their opponents consisting of Islamic
and secular liberals. Former President Mohammad Khatami, Mahdi Karubi
and Mir Hossein Mousavi are notable representatives of the liberal Islam.
They still support the Islamic system but demand the full execution of the
constitution (ejraye bedoone tanazol ghanoone asasi). The secular liberals,
who wish to overthrow the system, have no comparably popular leaders.
Both groups lack credible organizations.
Among supporters of the Green Movement, many intellectuals, writers,
artists, and academics (secular and religious) are found, but the young
middle and upper-middle class form its backbone. This particular class
composition of the movement explains the fact that no economic demand
was raised during and after the protests; instead it suggests that the uprising
was an essentially civil rights movement. In other words, the Green
Movement reflects the will and demands of the liberal middle and upperclass faction of the society (about 30 percent of the population30) rather than
the will of the whole population (75 million). It is no wonder that the
Washington Posts should report from Tehran reads31the following:
Two years ago, Iranian activists used social media sites as engines to
organize massive anti-government demonstrations. But nowinstead of
marching in the streets, the same doctors, artists and students who led the
demonstrations in 2009 are playing internet gamesconfining their political
debates to social media sites such as Facebook, where dissent has proved
less risky.

According to a report on the website of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the real number
of votes was 21.3 million for Mousavi and 10.5 million for Ahmadinejad 32.

15
Taking these figures at face value, the conservative power elite that rule Iran
has at least 10 million supporters. In addition, given that Mousavi was also
approved by the ultraconservative Guardians Council, a portion of the
conservatives must have voted for him. Therefore, while the street
demonstrators were representing a good portion of the population, the
regime also enjoyed considerable support. Besides, in contrast to the
supporters of the Green Movement, followers of the conservatives are
organized, in power, ready to use brute force, and are prepared to make
sacrifices for the Islamic system. Thus, in our humble opinion, the 2009
protests did not reflect a struggle between the people and the regime but
the revival of a fight between the forces of tradition and modernity, 33 a battle
that dates back to the end of the 19th century.
The discussion of who won the election is beyond the scope of this article. 34
The election was rigged; there is no doubt about it. However, before drawing
any conclusion, considering the expert opinion of Walter Mebane, who
performed a mathematical analysis of the 2009 election, can be critically
helpful. He writes:
It is important to be clear that none of the estimates or test results in
this report is proof that substantial fraud affected the 2009 Iranian
election. The results suggest very strongly that there was widespread
fraud in which the vote counts for Ahmadinejad were substantially
augmented by artificial means. But it is possible that Ahmadinejad
actually won, supported by many who might have voted for [the other
two candidates] Karubi or Rezaei instead voting for Ahmadinejad.

35

Our assertions by no means suggest that the U.S. government should be

indifferent to human rights violations in Iran. It should speak out against such
abuses loud and clear. However, supporting the human rights of the Iranian
people is one thing and relying on the Green Movement to change the
behavior of the regime or overthrow it is another thing.

Ignoring the

theocratic and revolutionary nature of the Iranian government and belittling

16
its staying power have been most counterproductive for both US-Iran
relations and the reform movement in Iran. Specifically, the consequences of
those

ignorance

and

policies

have

been

twofold:

first,

contrary

to

expectations, it has justified more repression and tougher restrictions on

socio-political liberties in Iran since 2009; and second, it has solidified and
heightened mistrust in a relationship already dominated by suspicion.
It may be argued, as some do, that even if the Green Movement cannot
change the regime or its behavior, supporting it can still be justified for it can
weaken the regime by delegitimizing it. But this argument is problematic
for at least three reasons: first, internationally, the more the regime is
discredited the more difficult it will be for the U.S. to pursue engagement
with it; second, to enter into dialogue with a repressive and illegitimate
regime would also be a hard sell domestically for any US administration
whether Democrat or Republican as it has indeed become; and third, using
the movement as an instrument of US policy will indeed strengthen the
regime in its fight against the reformist groups including those inside the
Green Movement.
Will dual-track policy ultimately work?
Proponents of the dual-track policy might argue that, regardless, under
tightening sanctions, once the Iranian regimes survival is threatened, the
leadership would have no choice but to surrender. The validity of this
argument can be challenged on a number of grounds. First, an endangered
Islamic Republic will be ready to take retaliatory actions. The radicalized
regime has already adopted a policy of threat for threat and may adopt
other measures such as destabilizing Iraq and the Persian Gulf (Strait of
Hormuz).

Iran could particularly create troubles in Iraq through its Quds

Force now that the US is leaving the country and Iraq is becoming a rival oil
producer. The Quds Force is well entrenched in Iraq and works closely with its
anti-American allies there. Against Iranian retaliatory measures, the US may

17
be forced to exercise its last resort option of war as Secretary Panetta put
it.
Second, it could be argued that sanctions would work in the long run when
crippling hardship would move moderate conservatives away from the
regime towards the Green Movement, making it easier for the opposition to
overthrow the ruling elite. This is a possibility but experts are warning that
the US government has a limited timeframe to disrupt Irans nuclear
program with sanctions before it must consider military options. 36 Indeed,
prolonged sanctions with no concrete outcome may provide the Iranian
regime with enough time to develop nuclear arms if in fact it intends to do
so.
Third, protracted crippling sanctions can also create a moral dilemma:
while the US says it supports the human rights of the Iranian people, it
cannot justify prolonged sanctions that would harm the ordinary Iranians,
particularly its jobless youth. Finally, it is a mistake to assume, as Americans
do, that economic and financial pressures would make the development of
nuclear weapons difficult for Iran. The lesson to be learned from the cases of
Pakistan and North Korea is that even a poor country can produce an atomic
bomb.
To conclude, the dual-track policy will not work as sanctions and isolation
would fail to change Irans behavior or its regime. Under life-threatening
pressure,

the

Islamic

Republic

could

be

pushed

toward

nuclear

weaponization and retaliatory actions against the US, especially in Iraq and
the Persian Gulf.

As Vali Nasr has aptly put it at some point sanctions

become an act of war. The regime could also use the enemy factor to
uproot liberal forces and the opposition in the nation. As sanctions fail and
Iran becomes more belligerent, patience in Israel and the US for diplomacy
will wane, making the US exercise its last resort- war option.
What is to be done?

18

At the heart of the problem with the US policies towards Iran is the
assumption that the Islamic regime will respond favorably to coercion. The
lack of an in-depth knowledge about Iranian society, culture, and politics is
significantly responsible for this wrong assumption and policy.

Former US

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once remarked that Iran is a very

opaque place and its a political system I dont understand very well. Pollack
and Takeyh also admit that Iran is a land that revels in ambiguity, opacity,
and complexityit [is] exceptionally difficult for outsiders to perceive Iranian
motives and intentions...the best that outside observers can do is guess at
Tehrans motives, and they should be duly humble given our incomplete
understanding of Irans politics or the policies which emerge from them.
These assertions are true.
This lack of a better understanding has its roots in many factors, notably in
the fact that only a few American analysts and policy-makers know Farsi, and
not many Iranian-American analysts visit Iran. Worst yet, of those who travel
to that country only a handful ever come in contact with the ordinary
Iranians from different walks of life, and even less have ever interacted with
the ruling elite, influential clergy, and high ranking officials to acquire firsthand knowledge of their views and motivations. Reliance on Irans internet
users and social networks has been particularly problematic since they do
not represent the whole society. According to reports, internet users [in Iran]
are predominantly urban middle and upper class 37 groups who form the
backbone of the opposition and are often, as expected, unreliable and
biased.
While understanding an historical and cultural country like Iran is a difficult
task, it does not need to become daunting to policy makers and analysts who
are often narrowly focused on US-Iran relations or on a particular aspect of
that relationship such as the nuclear dispute. This essay has argued that by

19
enriching their understanding of a few troubling factors and accounting for
them in their pronouncements and policies, Americans can make a huge
difference in their entanglements with Iran. These factors are mistrust of the
US, fear of regime change, the place of pride and right in Irans identity
formation, the Islamic resistance culture, and the misanalysis of Irans
domestic politics.

While many other factors are at work in US-Iran spiral

conflict, the ones that we have identified are the most critical.
Beginning from this basis of understanding, moving forward with Iran should
not be difficult. The good news for the troubled relations is that both sides
are rational actors. While no one has questioned American rationality, few
until recently believed that the leaders in Tehran are rational players. This
misunderstanding is gradually but surely changing among officials in the US,
Israel and Europe. Indeed, Iranian leaders in many crisis occasions have
shown that they understand and apply the so-called cost-benefit principle.
For instance, despite intense animosity between Iran and the US, Ayatollah
Khamanei, the founding father of the Islamic Republic, and his successor
Ayatollah Khamanei has both allowed relations with the US when they
become beneficial.
In the nuclear enrichment dispute, too, Iran has shown that it is a rational
player as well by staying with the NPT even if the IAEA sent its dossier to the
UN Security Council. North Korea left the Treaty when it came under
pressure. Let us not forget that Iran once suspended uranium enrichment
under President Mohammad Khatami. Then, just as now, the same Supreme
Leader was in charge of the decision. Unfortunately, Europeans missed that
opportunity by offering Iran an incentive package that the reformist
Khatami characterized as an insult to the Iranian nation. Thereafter, Iran
renewed enrichment at an expanded scale, demonstrating that the Iranian
pragmatism and cost-benefit analysis fades away under humiliation.

20
Despite increasing coercion in the form of sanctions and other crippling and
destabilizing measures, Iran has continued to keep its doors open for a
possible respectful settlement of its problems with the US. For example, in
November 2011, in an unprecedented manner, an article by an Iranian
conservative analyst, Amir Mohebbian, was posted on Khamaneis website.
The article stated that the Supreme Leader will consider a rational change in
American behavior toward Iran. This last March, Ayatollah Khamenei
welcomed comments by US President Obama damping down talk of war
against Tehran, saying This talk is good talk and shows an exit from
illusion". Iran now seems to be looking for any opportunity to reduce
tension.
One place the tension has been very high is over Irans nuclear program.
Here, too Iran has been looking for ways to reduce tension. The successful
talks in Istanbul this last April is an example of a new confidence-building
environment that Iran is trying to promote. Even before this meeting, Iran
had allowed the IAEA visit Irans most sensitive nuclear sites including R&D
sites for centrifuges and heavy water (these visits fall outside the NPT). An
Iranian official told one of the authors of this paper that last summer Iran
also accepted the Russian plan for incremental resolution of the nuclear
dispute and within that framework accepted to implement the Additional
Protocol of the Safeguard Agreement and the code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements to the Safeguard Agreement.
The will for better relations and a solution to the nuclear impasse has always
existed38. However, the two sides have not been able to communicate and
compromise. As the US former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates has aptly
put it, the history of outreach [to Iran] that was very real, under successive
presidentsdid not yield any results. It is true that resolving the US-Iran
spiral conflict is not going to be easy given the extent of issues involve, but it
is also true that neither side can afford to shy away from a resolution to the

21
conflict given that the no-war no-peace status quo is shaky. To improve
relations, the current level of political will in that direction on both sides must
be enhanced.

What is also needed is a concrete road map similar to the

Whitepaper that the American Iranian Council produced a few years ago. 39
As Charles Kupchan, in How enemies become friends has correctly argued,
in order to turn former enemies in international politics into friends, the first
step is the most crucial one and that step should be a unilateral act taken by
the stronger power. He contends that this is essential to build the trust of the
weaker competitor to engage in dialogue and cooperate toward reaching a
compromise. Kupchan posits that diplomatic engagement with rivals, far
from being appeasement, is critical to conflict resolution. Mediation is
another

helpful

idea

in

the

context

of

US-Iran

conflict

where

misunderstanding plays a major role. The potential mediator must be familiar

with both the Iranian and Western cultures and must have friendly relations
with both countries. According to Jacob Bercovitch, a highly regarded expert
on international conflict resolution, mediation may well be the closest thing
we have to an effective technique for dealing with conflicts in the twenty-first
century40.
The role of a mediator is to educate the parties about the nuances of each
others actions and perceptions, and correct chronic misunderstandings. It is
a fact that leaders in Iran and in the US are unfamiliar with the other sides
political culture and its nuances. Let us illustrate with an example. In
February 2012, ahead of Chinese Vice Presidents visit to the US, Vice
President Joe Biden met with several Chinese human rights activists. In that
meeting Biden called on China to address the deterioration of its human
rights situation. A few days later the Chinese Vice President, Xi Jinping, who
is expected to take power in China this year, met with Biden and Obama,
shook hands, talked about human rights issues in China, and left the US

22
without promising anything about human rights - live went on, presumably,
unchanged.
To

the

Iranian

leaders,

this

sort

of

relationship

is

absolutely

incomprehensible. They do not understand that the US president or its Vice

President is constrained by the US Congress, interest groups, and public
opinion. It is then no wonder that when Obamas message for a new
beginning contains implicit condemnations about terrorism and nuclear
weaponization, Khamenei perceives it as deceitfully offering an "iron hand
inside a velvet glove." American leaders, too, are very unfamiliar with Iranian
domestic political games and are often confused as to why so many voices
speak in so many seemingly contradictory directions. They have a hard time
to penetrate into the Iranian soul and its decision-making dynamics. Both
sides require education and one way to address the problem immediately is
through the use of educated and reliable mediators.
Nuclear dispute has become the focal point of US-Iran conflict and it is one
dispute that is most influenced by mistrust. Indeed, a mutually acceptable
peaceful resolution to Irans nuclear issue has the potential to create a
strong starting point for a comprehensive settlement between the two
states. By the same token, any settlement on the nuclear issue would be
unstable unless the two countries reach a comprehensive settlement that
would include issues ranging from terrorism, Middle East peace and human
rights. A settlement of the nuclear dispute to follow with a global settlement
is the key to not only better US-Iran relations but also for regional stability
and peace. The stronger-power first step and mediation approaches are
particularly useful in the conflict over Irans nuclear program.
However, to resolve the nuclear dispute, the parties must also be prepared
to make compromises. First, the US should abandon the language of threat
and intimidation. This unrelenting attitude provokes sharp reactions from

23
Tehran, escalates the conflict, and blocks the formation of negotiations. The
issue of pride and its role in Irans politics cannot be ignored. Iran, through
numerous direct and indirect channels, has repeatedly demanded that the
US change its tone. Hooshang Amirahmadi, who has acquired a wealth of
knowledge about the views, motivations and sensitivities of the Iranian
leaders through years of track-two diplomacy between the two countries, has
said that there is only one way to encourage Iran to cooperate with the US
and that is for the US to assume a new attitude towards Iran.
Second, for the reasons discussed in this paper, Iran will not concede to a
complete halt in its enrichment program. The US can agree to let Iran
continue enriching uranium up to 5% purity, in exchange for strict monitoring
and the implementation of Additional Protocol including unannounced
inspections. Mohammad Javad Larijani, key foreign policy advisor to Ayatollah
Khamenei, has announced that Iran is prepared to accept even permanent
human monitoring in exchange for Western cooperation 41. If this plan is
complemented by a proposal to sell Iran the necessary amount of 20 percent
uranium rods for its medical purposes, then Iran can be persuaded to
transfer to a third country any uranium enriched beyond 5 %. Iran may also
be persuaded to deactivate its Fordow underground plant as a step in the
direction of building trust with the US.
Third, were Iran to make such concessions, the US should reciprocate by
easing the sanctions and abandoning the mantra of all options are on the
table. A reversal of the sanctions trend could be a major step towards trust
building. Such a move can help advance the principle of a step-by-step
approach and reciprocity" that was discussed and implicitly agreed upon
during the Istanbul II meetings. The all options on the table mantra has
done nothing positive to a resolution of the conflict. In fact, in the eyes of the
Iranian leaders it is a clear manifestation of bullying by the arrogant
powers. The mantra and the fact that the US has consistently refused to

24
offer Iran any security assurances,42solidifies Irans fear of regime change
and leads to its non-compromising and hostile posture.
Fourth, the US must seriously consider stopping its clandestine operations
inside Iran as they are a major source of Irans hostility towards the US. The
New York Times has reported43 the existence of a Joint Unconventional
Warfare Task Force Execute Order that was signed in September 2009 by
General David Petraeus then CENTCOM commander and now head of the CIA.
The Executive Order authorizes the sending of U.S. Special Operations
personnel to Iran to gather intelligence about the countrys nuclear
program and identify dissident groups that might be useful for a future
military offensive. Also, some news reports have revealed that dangerous
false flag operations have been conducted by the Israeli Mossad inside
Iran.44 Iranians would not believe that these operations have been conducted
without Washingtons approval.
Finally, the US government must not take a neutral stance toward human
rights violations in Iran, but it must not also use it as a policy instrument
towards regime change.

Contrary to expectations, the US human rights

policy towards Iran has justified more repression and tougher restrictions on
social and political liberties in Iran. This has been particularly the case since
2009 elections when the US has more explicitly called for regime change.
Secretary Clinton, referring to the post-elections protests, boasted that
behind the scenes, we were doing a lot". The US human rights policy toward
Iran is also counterproductive for the double standard that Washington
applies in this respect to various repressive states in the region. For example,
right after the Saudi crackdown on pro-democracy protestors in Bahrain, Ms.
Clinton announced new sanctions on Iran to hold accountable those
governments and officials that violate human rights.
To conclude, the current no war, no peace status-quo is unstable and
cannot be sustained for any length of time. The US and Iran have arrived at a

25
crossroad of peace and war. They must now choose between the two roads in
front of them. War is a costly option for both sides (and indeed all sides) and
is hardly advisable in the current political-economy environment in the two
countries, in the region, and globally. The peace option, while tougher as it
require courageous compromises, is surely a less costly option. The
imperative for peace are obvious: mounting frustration from the absence of
any tangible progress in resolving the nuclear issue may eventually lead to
military action; and the current open-ended process may grant Iran the time
it needs, should it seek to develop nuclear weapons. In order to break
through this impasse, it is necessary for the two states to engage in
sustained dialogue.

Hooshang Amirahmadi is a professor at Rutgers University and President of

the American Iranian Council. Shahir ShahidSaless is a political analyst and
free-lance journalist.

1 Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hosseini, The Study of Successful Aspects of the Ninth-administrations
Foreign Policy (Farsi), Presidential Center for Research and Documents, 2007,
http://www.presidency.ir/Portal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=1cc470a7-74ac-41ed-ab55-1bbae424d3a8
(accessed viewed 10 May 2011).

2 William Lowther, US funds terror groups to sow chaos in Iran, The Telegraph, 25
February 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1543798/US-fundsterror-groups-to-sow-chaos-in-Iran.html (accessed 20 June 2011).
3 William Branigin, Irans Quds Force was blamed for attacks on US troops in Iraq
The Washington Post, 11 October 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/irans-quds-force-wasblamed-for-attacks-on-us-troops-in-iraq/2011/10/11/gIQAPqv0dL_story.html
(accessed 2 March 2012).
4 Thomas Erdbrink, Khamenei: Iran will back any nations, any groups fighting
Israel, The Washington Post, 2 February 2012,
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5 Amir Mohebbian, Possible scenarios of threat against Iran (Farsi) 2011,
http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-note?id=17882 (accessed 15 December 2011).
6 Kenneth Pollack & Ray Takeyh, Doubling Down on Iran, Washington Quarterly,
2011, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 7-21.
7 Ben Armbruster, Obama Backs Dempsey, Thinkprogress, 2 Mar 2012,
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/03/02/436357/obama-dempsey-iran/?
mobile=nc (accessed 10 March 2012).
8 Imam Khomeini's Objection to Capitulation Bill and his disclosuring the regime's plans, 26
October 1964,

http://www.tebyan.net/islam_features/islamic_world/muslim_scientists_and_thinkers/2005/10/29/27
390.html(accessed 10 January 2012).

9 David Houghton, US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
10 Donette Murray, US foreign policy and Iran: American-Iranian relations since the Islamic
revolution, (Routledge, New York, 2010), pp. 28-29.

11 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shahs men: an American coup and the roots of Middle
East terror, 2nd edn., (Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), p203.
12 Nikkie Keddie & Yann Richard, Roots of revolution: an interpretive history of
modern Iran, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 275.
13 Murray, US foreign policy and Iran (note 16), p. 30.
14 Gary Sick, All fall down: Americas faithful encounter with Iran, (London: I. B.
Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1985), p.168.
15 Anthony H. Cordesman, Bradley Bosserman, Jordan D'Amato, and Andrew C.
Gagel, US and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Sanctions game: Energy, Arms
Control, and Regime Change , Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6
October 2011, http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competitionsanctions-game-energy-arms-control-and-regime-chang (accessed 11 January
2012).
16 Lowther, US funds terror.
17 Khamenei: The way to success is to not retreat from the enemy, not even one
step, 14 February 2012, http://www.irandailybrief.com/?m=20111018&paged=2,
(accessed 15 February 2012).

18 Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Irans Most Powerful
Leader, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf (accessed 20
December 2011).
19 Ayatollah Makarem meeting with the board of directors of The Followers of
Imam and the Leader, The G. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi Official Website, 12
November 2009, http://www.makaremshirazi.org/persian/news/?nid=635&sw=
( accessed 24 March 2012).
20 Daniel Brumberg & Erkis Berzins 2009, US-Iranian Engagement: Toward A Grand Agenda?, A
joint report by: US Institute of Peace and United Nations Association of the USA, 2009,
http://www.unausa.org/Document.Doc?id=438 (accessed 17 January 2012).

21 'You Cannot Treat Iran Like a Donkey', Newsweek Magazine, 30 January 2009,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/30/you-cannot-treat-iran-like-a-donkey.html
(accessed 20 January 2012).

22 George Perkovich & Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 18 September 2006,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/09/18/iran-s-nuclear-ambitions/906 (accessed
1 March 2012).
23 Glenn Segell, Axis of evil and rouge states: the Bush administration, 2000-2004, (London, Glen
Segell, 2005), p.189.

24 Sara Beth Elson & Alireza Nader 2011, What do Iranians think? A survey of attitudes on the
United States, the nuclear program, and the economy, The RAND Corporation, 2011,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/ RAND_TR910.pdf (accessed
27 January 2012)

25 Hooshang Amirahmadi 2009, Toward an Obama policy for better US-Iran relations, The
American Iranian Council (AIC), 2009,
http://www.americaniranian.org/sites/default/files/pdf/AmericanIranianCouncil_WhitePaper.pdf
(accessed 12 July 2011).

26 David Sanger, US may drop key condition for talks with Iran, The New York
Times, 13 April 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world /
middleeast/14diplo.html (accessed 16 January 2012).
27 Speech for the pilgrims to Imam Rezas shrine (Iranian New Year) 2009, The
Center for preserving and publishing the works of Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei
(Farsi), 21 March 2009, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=6082
(accessed 10 July 2011).
28 Ray Takeyh, The US must empower the Green Movement, Council on Foreign
Relations, 17 February 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/us-must-empower-greenmovement/p24155 (accessed 4 August 2011).
29 Richard Haas, Enough is enough, News Week Magazine, 21 January 2010,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/21/enough-is-enough.html (accessed viewed 3
August 2011).

30 Federal Research Division, Iran: a country study, Glenn E. Curtis & Eric
Hooglund, 5th ed., 2008, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Iran.pdf (accessed 1
March 2012).
31 Thomas Erdbrink, In Iran, couch rebels prefer Facebook The Washington
Post, 14 June 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/in-irancouch-rebels-prefer-facebook/2011/06/10/AGB9FpTH_story.html (accessed 27 June
2011).

32 Real June 12 election results leaked, Mowge Sevvom (Farsi), 14 June 2009,
http://www.mowj.ir/ShowNews.php?7229 (accessed 20 June 2011).

33 Ramin Jahanbegloo, Iran: between tradition and modernity, (Lanham:

Lexington Books 2004).
34 We found three more extensive statistical analyses on the 2009 election.
Ansari points to widespread fraud and casts doubt on the results (Ansari et al.
2009). Ansaris report is refuted by Bozogmehr and Esfandiari (2010). In their
analysis they conclude that the outcome of the election is a genuine reflection of
the will of the Iranian people. In another statistical analysis, Brill concludes that
Ahmadinejad has been the actual winner of the election (Brill 2010).
35 Walter Mebane JR., Note on the presidential election in Iran, June 2009, http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~wmebane/note29jun2009.pdf (accessed 10 July 2011).

36 Ariel Cohen, James Phillips & Owen Graham, Irans energy sector: a target
vulnerable to sanctions, The Heritage Foundation, 14 Feb 2011,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/irans-energy-sector-a-targetvulnerable-to-sanctions (accessed 7 May 2011)
37 Freedom House, Report on internet freedom in Iran 2011, United States
Institute of Peace, 3 May 2011,
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/may/03/report-internet-freedom-iran-2011
(accessed 15 August 2011).
38 1986 McFarlane, key advisor to President Reagan, goes to Tehran carrying a cake with a key on
top to represent the opening of a new era and a Bible inscribed by President Reagan (Coughlin
2009, p. 230).1989 George H.W. Bush inaugural address referring to Iran: Good will begets good
will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly move on.
1990 Iranian Ambassador to the UN repeated his governments interest in improving relations
with the US.

1990 Scowcroft sends a message informing Tehran that the US would accept talks in any setting .
1991 Baker informs the UN Secretary General, de Cuellar, that the US is prepared to restore
relations and requests to meet secretly with the Iranian Foreign Minister.
1993 Rafsanjani, the Iranian President, calls for the unfreezing of assets and the resumption of
relations.
1998 Khatami, the Iranian President, proposes dialogue of civilizations to break the bulky wall of
mistrust.
1998 Albright proposes a road map for normalization of relations.
2003 Iran offers a grand bargain backed by the Iranian Leader.
2004 George W. Bush offers to talk personally with an authorized person from Iran to prevent
the problems remain unresolved. The message was being passed to Iran through El Baradei
according to Hassan Rowhanis new book titled "National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy [Farsi].
Rowhani is the former Irans chief negotiator on its nuclear issue.
2009 Obamas call for a new beginning.

39 Amirahmadi 2009, Toward an Obama policy for better US-Iran relations.

40 Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in international conflict: theory, practice, and
developments, in IW Zartman (ed), Peacemaking in international conflict:
methods and techniques (revised edition), (Washington DC.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
41 Christiane Amanpour, Iran Official Offers 'Permanent Human Monitoring' of
Nuclear Sites, ABC News, 15 March 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/iranofficial-offers-human-monitoring-nuclear-sites/story?id=15930677#.T6gpdOuXRid
(accessed 16 March 2012).
42 Douglas K. Daniel, No security guarantee for Iran, Rice Says, Washington Post, 21 May 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100369_pf.html
(accessed 10 March 2012).

43 Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast, The New York
Times, 24 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/25military.html

(accessed 10 April 2012).

44 Mark Perry, False flag,Foreign Policy, 13 january 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=full (accessed 10 March 2012).